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
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June 3, 1996

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503-0001

LRM NO: 5004

FILE NO: 1267

7/12/96

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

Total Page(s): 5

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(for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

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jones_re@a1.eop.gov

SUBJECT: TREASURY (Customs) Proposed Testimony on Interdiction of Rohypnol.

DEADLINE: 11:00 AM Monday, July 15, 1996

In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

COMMENTS: If we do not hear from you by the stated deadline, we will assume you have no objection to the proposed testimony.

objection
DEA Testimony will be sent separately.

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**Statement of Maria Herrera
U.S. Customs Service**

**Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs**

July 16, 1996

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.

It is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the current situation regarding the interdiction of the drug commonly called Rohypnol. This drug is a relative newcomer on the drug usage scene. The threat it poses for our nation's young people cannot be underestimated. That threat led Treasury Secretary Rubin and Customs Commissioner Welsch to declare on March 5, 1996, an absolute halt to the importation of Rohypnol. Since March 5, Customs inspectors at our borders have been vigorously enforcing the ban on Rohypnol. We are excited to tell you about our efforts to keep this drug out of our country.

The U.S. Customs Service is many things to many people because of its diverse responsibilities. The Custom's mission is to ensure that all goods and persons entering and exiting the over three hundred United States ports of entry, do so in accordance with all United States laws and regulations. The U.S. Customs Service serves as the nation's "border guard" for approximately 40 other Federal agencies against the importation of articles which are prohibited. Importation of some of these articles -- Rohypnol being a prime example -- poses a threat to public health and safety.

The Customs Service is the nation's primary vehicle for keeping illegal drugs from entering our country. We enforce Federal laws and regulations, including those of the DEA and FDA, at ports of entry of the United States. For DEA, the Customs Service enforces the regulations governing the importation and exportation of controlled substances into and out of the United States. For FDA, the Customs Service prevents mislabeled, adulterated and prohibited drugs, which do not meet FDA approval, from being imported into the United States.

The efforts and capabilities of the Customs Service can also be seen in the numerous seizures of various types of non-narcotic pharmaceuticals governed by FDA and DEA laws and regulations. Reasons for these seizures range from lack of FDA approval of a drug, to misbranding or labeling a product, to false or unsubstantiated medical claims. These discoveries and seizures encompass various types of medications, from exotic remedies to Rohypnol.

The philosophy underlying all U.S. Customs operations is that good law enforcement is based on intelligence, not luck; it should use all of its resources in combination, not individually; and should recognize problem areas and move quickly to correct these

problems. One example of this was reflected in our approach to dealing with the drug Rohypnol.

Rohypnol, the brand name for the generic chemical name flunitrazepam, is also known as "roofies", the "forget pill", and, more ominously, the "Date-Rape Drug." It usually comes in white, 2-milligram tablets in packaging similar to that of cold medicine (Bubble packs). It is a sedative that is approximately 10 times more potent than Valium. Used legally in as many as 60 countries to battle insomnia, Rohypnol is marketed and manufactured in Mexico, South America, Europe and Asia by the Swiss-based company Hoffman-LaRoche.

Rohypnol is commonly used as a secondary drug to alcohol and marijuana. Cocaine addicts use Rohypnol to ease the descent from a cocaine high and by heroin users to relieve withdrawal and enhance the depressant effects of heroin. Rohypnol creates a drunk, sleepy feeling that peaks after two hours and lasts about eight. It is odorless and tasteless. Many state agencies have reported cases in which women had been given the pill, some unknowingly, and then had been raped. Because of its potency, Rohypnol can cause lethal overdoses, especially if mixed with alcohol and/or other drugs.

Currently, Rohypnol is a Schedule IV Controlled Substance neither manufactured nor approved for use in the United States. The Food and Drug Administration believes that Rohypnol meets no legitimate therapeutic need in the U.S. not already met by legal and approved drugs.

Rohypnol tends to be found on individuals or in their personal possessions in quantities of 20 to 200 tablets. These are called "personal use" amounts. National seizure statistics indicated that the drug abuse involving Rohypnol appeared to be greatest in Florida and Texas. Large numbers of tablets were discovered and seized at the Miami Airport and mail branch coming from Columbia. Due to its extremely low cost and ease of availability in Mexico, Rohypnol almost overtook marijuana as the leading substance of abuse in many high schools along the Southwest Border. The use of the drug was shown to be also spreading into other states.

Customs recognized this as a problem for FDA, DEA and the Customs Service. We established a working group which included participants from all three agencies and took steps to initiate action to stop the importation of the drug into the United States.

On March 5, 1996, on behalf of the FDA, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and U.S. Customs Service Commissioner George Weise announced that importation of Rohypnol into the United States will be halted.

Under DEA regulations, 21 CFR 1311.27, any individual who is in possession of a controlled substance listed in Schedules II through V which has been lawfully obtained in a foreign country for personal medical use may bring the drug into the United States, provided that the importation is not otherwise prohibited under other Federal laws. The March 5 action, in effect, made Rohypnol "otherwise prohibited."

Since that prohibition we have increased the number of seizures. We began receiving cooperation from Mexican doctors and pharmacies when they were made aware of the prohibition on Rohypnol. Most have been advising U.S. residents who come into Mexico to purchase Rohypnol, that it is a prohibited entry item. We have been advised that many Mexican pharmacies will not sell Rohypnol to U.S. residents.

FY 1995 seizures of Rohypnol occurred only when the drug was undeclared and then discovered during a secondary examination or concealed in mail shipments. In FY 1995, 22,779 undeclared tablets were seized at 10 separate Southwest Border ports of entry. Also in FY 1995, 99,890 undeclared or mail shipment tablets were seized in Miami.

The total seizure of Rohypnol during FY 1995 was 122,669 tablets at 11 principle locations. Of significant note, Laredo alone had 18,652 of the 22,779 tablets on the Southwest Border.

Although we were still operating without the prohibition on Rohypnol in January and February of this calendar year, seizures of Rohypnol through June 5, 1996 are already at 103,672 tablets. The 11 principal ports reporting activity continue to lead in seizures. However, personal use quantities of 90 tablets or less have been seized in Blaine, Washington; Cincinnati, Ohio; Dulles International Airport and other locations around the country.

In June of this year, the FDA and Customs Service identified the threat of several other "Rohypnol type" prescription drugs of abuse and moved ahead to place the same prohibition on those substances. We are working with FDA and DEA on this issue.

At Customs, there is no higher priority than drug interdiction. I would like to express my thanks to this committee for the opportunity to explain U.S. Customs policy regarding the interdiction of Rohypnol. We are all familiar with the tragedies and costs of drug usage in our country. Drug interdiction is a critical component in our efforts to address this very serious, very complicated problem.

Wherever the threat arises, whenever the need is seen, the U.S. Customs Service will continue to work hand-in-hand with any Federal agency to ensure that all goods and persons entering and exiting the United States do so in compliance with all United States laws and regulations.

This concludes my statement and I will be glad to take any questions you have at this time.

How Bill Bratton made a difference

LAST WEEK, CRAIN'S NEW YORK BUSINESS WROTE about William Bratton's plans to sell his expertise to police forces around the world. They would be getting a bargain. Earlier this month, the Police Foundation of New York City invited a group of civic leaders, including a *Crain's* editor, to spend a day in a precinct. It is in the field, in this case the 47th Precinct in the north Bronx, that Bill Bratton's contribution becomes so obvious.

The numbers are becoming well known. If the city can reduce the crime rate by a targeted 10% this year, 50% fewer crimes will be committed in New York City this year than five years ago. The decline is virtually the same for burglaries against business as it is for murders, and is distributed almost equally across the city.

The debate over the causes goes over equally well-trodden ground. Some like to wish away the city's accomplishment by claiming that the drop results from demographic shifts and an easing of drug use that mirrors changes across the country. Others say that the sharp increase in the police force is the key ingredient, a way of sharing the credit with former Mayor David Dinkins. Rudy Giuliani's partisans want to make sure he gets the recognition for making public safety the overriding objective.

All of those factors play a role. But what Mr. Bratton did was give his expanded department a single-minded focus that business people can understand. On the wall behind the commander of the 47th Precinct are three maps, which track robberies, burglaries and grand auto theft in the current month and the previous month. Every day, the precinct commander checks the crime reports. Are they up or down? And if they're up, what is he going to do about it? Few companies are so dedicated in their focus on the bottom line.

Once a month, each precinct commander is summoned to One Police Plaza for a grilling on the numbers. If they are up, commanders had better have a plan to bring them down. Burglaries are up in the 47th, for example, so the precinct commander has started vertical patrols.

Many business people can empathize with this precinct commander. He took over in January after an excellent year with a sharp drop in crime. His bosses want another 10% reduction, and so far, he's brought crime down only 5%. To make matters worse, civilian complaints filed against his officers are up. It will be tough to meet his goal, and it's pretty clear his fast-rising career depends on it.

His men understand the changes, too. "There's a lot more work since Bratton came on board," a veteran patrolman says.

It's possible, of course, that this system could become an end in itself. Commanders may become too wrapped up in simply having a good story for the bosses downtown, especially as it gets harder and harder to push crime rates down further. New priorities and ideas will inevitably emerge, diffusing the focus.


In the end, it's clear that Rudy Giuliani gave New York a commitment to tough law enforcement. But it was Bill Bratton who figured out how to make the New York City police the most effective around.

Crain's e-mail addresses

Crain's New York Business editorial staffers can now be contacted by direct Internet electronic mail.

To determine any Crain's e-mail address, take the initial of the person's first name and add the first seven letters of the last name, followed by @Crain.com.

The names of Crain's New York Business staff members are in the box on this page.



LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Jersey jobs cause cable overload

News overkill may make networks pull back

In regard to the May 13 story in *Crain's New York Business* called "New Jersey grabs 1,000 new cable jobs from ABC, NBC," the last laugh may be on Gov. Christine Todd Whitman after all. If viewer interest in news continues to drop, as a recent poll reported, the ABC and NBC all-news channels will fold up their cameras and retreat back to New York.

So you flip your remote to Channels 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11 and CNN Headline News and add on all-news programs from ABC, CBS, Fox and NBC, and you see the same lawyer talking about the same murder on at least 10 channels.

No wonder viewers opt for any thing but news.

WILLIAM T. HENDRICKSON
Chairman
Hendrickson & Co.
Manhattan

Stadium plan must allot plenty of parking

Mayor Rudy Giuliani's proposal to relocate Yankee Stadium on the West Side of Manhattan has not addressed the need to provide a large parking facility as part of the plan ("Business lays off the pitch: balks at stadium's political, financial cost," April 15).

The proposed site, the West Side Rail Terminal, is of sufficient lot coverage that three levels of park-

ing—forming a base upon which the new stadium could rest—could provide parking for more than 20,000 cars.

Direct access to this parking facility from the West Side Highway and the Lincoln Tunnel would be offered by a series of dedicated vehicular ramps. These would mitigate the impact on local streets of the traffic generated by such a singularly large garage.

The revenues produced by this facility—one that would provide commuter and Javits Convention Center parking when no games are scheduled—will make the numbers work.

FREDERICK A. LEE
Architect
Manhattan

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Audit Bureau
of Circulations



Lauren in the b

JAMES BRADY



Kennedy, Ralph Lauren: They have all been hounded by Brandeis University with doctorates in humane let Mr. Lauren got his de creative work in fashion l his campaigns against A l pecially against breast cation designers are forev their names to this goo that. In some cases it's j polishing the old image, take much time. But in R in the breast cancer bati much more to it than name.

It all goes back to a w dead, named Nina Hyde the fashion editor of *The ton Post*, and one of t under Ben Bradlee and S fey, who made the *Post's* tion perhaps the best in ti.

Nina Hyde was tall a and intense and took fa seriously. Maybe too seri

Bored b It matte

ALAIR TOWNSEND



455-3770; Senate Major: Joe Bruno at (518) 455- Gov. George Pataki at 7669.

Two months after the fiscal year began on April no budget and no appare urgency. There's plenty of and wonderful opportun seized enthusiastically— campaign funds from the worried about the outco

State legislators don't of a fixed agenda. The hearings, point with p with alarm and make n— all pretty much of choosing and timing.

One of the few thing on them to do each year

Dennis,

Some material on

- ① Quality of Life
- ② Bratton for Mayor ^{ha}
^{ha}
^{ha}
- ③ Misc. International
publications and
other publicity

FYI

- Joan

my new card! ☺



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A sigh of relief

NEW YORK WILL BE sleeping a lot easier tonight, knowing there's one less predator on the streets. With the confession yesterday of John Royster, the town's latest terror spree appears to be over. For his victims and their families, the anguish continues — but there must be some consolation even to them that a suspect is in custody.

The ferocious brutalization of the Central Park victim last week — in daylight in a busy area of the park — shook New York to its nervous core. Then came the assault Friday on a Yonkers woman on a pedestrian bridge over the Thruway; she had been beaten so savagely that the teenagers who found her at first didn't recognize her inert form as that of a human being. Tuesday's dawn brought the horrific bludgeoning death of gentle Evalin Alvarez in the doorway of her Park Ave. dry cleaners. And it brought the question, "What the hell is happening here?"

Three random acts of violence, seemingly unconnected, had stunned the city. Imagine if people had known there was a fourth? But police said John Royster knew. And that's one of the reasons they're confident they've got their man.

Apparently, it was good, old-fashioned, laborious detective work that led them to Royster. The guy had no rap sheet to speak of — which must make him unique among N.Y.C. thugs. But he had one arrest, for fare-beating. He was fingerprinted then. Cops found a print at the Park Ave. murder scene. They hunted through their records for a match — and guess what?

Somebody please call former Police Commissioner William Bratton and thank him.

This case is a textbook example of why his quality-of-life-crimes crackdown was vital. In the not-so-distant past, fare-beaters were just been given desk appearance tickets and sent blithely on their way — until their next crime.

Bratton changed all that. If he had not ordered the new procedure, there would have been no Royster prints to check. And chances are there would have been other victims.

We may never know what demons inhabit the psyche of a person like this. A lot of us don't care. Leave that to the shrinks. Leave New York to recover from his demonic handiwork.

Now the criminal justice system must move forward — quickly and thoroughly. And if the charges stick, the punishment must be as final as Evalin Alvarez' last breath.

Quack attack

Question: What do you think happens to medical hucksters who have neither a license nor a degree? Answer: Not a damn thing. Which is why so many fake doctors prey on the helpless.

But thanks to the Daily News' series on quacks in Chinatown, outrage finally has reached Albany. Fines are being levied. And the Legislature is considering a bill that will criminalize blatant quackery. It shouldn't delay.

Unlicensed physicians have offered surgery, dispensed drugs, ordered X-rays and peddled outlawed potions with impunity. Until last week. Seventeen "doctors" were slapped with heavy fines by the city's Consumer Affairs Department for committing a "deceptive trade practice."

That's putting it mildly. Patients went to these "doctors" for relief and came away maimed. Or worse yet, butchered. Six of the 17 cases were uncovered by The News' Molly Gordy. Like Ping Lu, an abortion "doctor" who worked with the Butcher of Canal St., Dr. Eugene Schwalben. She boasted to a News researcher posing as a patient, "I do these operations all the time." It was in those offices that a desperate patient was left in a pool of her own blood after a botched abortion.

Aiwah Qi, the "Liver Lady," is not a doctor, but she plays one in her TV infomercial. Her mug adorned every \$160 bottle of the junk she hawked as a cure for hepatitis and liver cancer. It was actually aspirin.

Legislation introduced by State Sen. Roy Goodman (R-Manhattan) would help put other charlatans out of business — and behind bars. For the first time, practicing medicine without a license would be a criminal offense earning the guilty a minimum of a year in jail and stiff fines.

Passing the bill is a no-brainer. It could mean the difference between life and death.


Toil & trouble

From Paris comes word that John Travolta stormed off the set of his new movie, "The Double," after a dispute. A studio source was puzzled. "We're all flummoxed . . . He'd started rehearsing. One of the doubles he has to play speaks perfect French, so he had dialogue coaching. And he also has to blow bubbles, so he had a bubble coach. It was all going ahead."

Wait a minute. A bubble coach?

Please, John, reconsider. This film must be finished. If only for the sake of the credits.

NEW N.Y.C. SCHOOL UNIFORMS



VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

Making Hitler's day

Bronx: While reading the June 6 edition of the Daily News, I noticed that the only place the D-Day invasion was mentioned was in the "Peanuts" comic. However, on page 4 there was a story about the actress Pamela Anderson Lee having a baby. All those lost brave men were relegated to the funnies. At least Snoopy remembered their sacrifice.

Anthony Johns

War isn't funny

Brooklyn: It's a sad commentary when the only mention of D-Day appears in "Peanuts."

R. Kennelly

For valor and victory

Brooklyn: "V" to Schulz and Snoopy. At least someone remembered.

Marvin Korot

Grand Old Flag

Brooklyn: Today, June 14, we observe Flag Day, which commemorates the adoption of the U.S. flag in 1777. Flying the flag is a patriotic way to thank all those American veterans who fought to defend it.

Neal Losinno

Cold copy

Waretown, N.J.: To Hot Copy columnist A.J. Benza: Listen up! Women weren't put here to be your personal "playmate of the month." We're as good as you are; in some cases, much better. How dare you be offended because a model gets pregnant without your permission. Get a grip, boy!

J. Stella Bock

Blasting haters

Brooklyn: Voicer Maj. Joseph G. Stano (USAF, ret.) doesn't like Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League censoring Louis Farrakhan and Marge Schott. That's Stano's right. However, to think that the First Amendment is there to protect racists from condemnation is just as idiotic as the garbage these morons spew.

Richard Sandler

Going your way?

Long Beach, L.I.: While riding the subway, I have been reading those annoying, stupid advertisements the Transit Authority has been wasting our money on. There is one in particular I find to be hypocritical. It says, "Taking the subway during business hours saves your company time

and money. It's also handy for getting to interviews." TA management is the last place I would go for advice on managing a company's money. Its idea of budget balancing is to ask for government aid and then raise the fare. Furthermore, the top transit managers take limos to work. They should practice what they preach.

Mark Newman

Storm over port

Manhattan: I want to commend The News for its timely editorial on the Port Authority (May 26). For many years I felt that N.Y.C. was being cheated by the ineptitude and mismanagement of the idiots running the PA. We should demand the disposal of the unproductive assets by dividing the proceeds between the two states and reducing the function of the PA to managing just the connecting bridges and tunnels and the PATH trains.

C. Edwards

Abortion, yes; sex, no?

Brooklyn: Your "16 will get you 20" editorial is flawed because it sidesteps one very important issue: parental consent laws for abortions. In New York, teenage girls can get an abortion without parental permission. It would stand to reason, therefore, that if

you are legally old enough to make adult decisions regarding abortions, you are legally old enough to make adult decisions regarding sex. Will such disturbing details make The News support parental consent for abortions for teenagers? Probably not, which is why your editorial is nothing more than an exercise in hypocrisy. Bonnie Chernin Rogoff

Hat trickster

Rego Park: Mayor Giuliani is never satisfied. He wears the police hat, the prosecutor's hat and now the judge's hat. And Gov. Parrot is not much better. I hope the next hat they both wear has an "ex" in front.

C. Monte

Scholarship material?

Manhattan: Richie Parker can sexually abuse a woman and still get offered a scholarship to LIU. Meanwhile, those of us who have harmed no one still struggle to pay for school just because we are not basketball players. One coach said people should let Richie get on with his life. Fine, and let him pay for LIU himself.

Chel Houser & Joy Novick

Some new leaves

Brooklyn: Richie Parker, Darryl Strawberry, Dwight Gooden: Three young men with great athletic potential, who have made criminal errors in their lives, seek redemption and a second chance. Yet the public-at-large wants them to pay penance for an eternity. Whatever happened to allowing a person to make up for transgressions? We all make mistakes, and we all have the capacity to change. I say give these three men a chance.

Rozanne Blanford

Hear this

Astoria: In May, the nation observed National Hearing Awareness Week. In response to this, my hearing friends and I went to South Street Seaport, where the deaf congregate annually. Eager to use our freshly learned American Sign Language, we attempted conversations. And what did we get for our efforts? The first thing they asked was, "Are you deaf?" If you signed back negative, they were out of there as if we had the Ebola virus.

Reports about the deaf often mention how marginalized and isolated they feel. If this is true, it's not because the hearing community didn't try. Just look at the packed classrooms where hearing people are struggling to learn sign language.

To the deaf and hearing impaired, I say it's time to quit turning a deaf ear to those who go out of their way to help and befriend you.

Deody Lantoria

...had played on the...
...the state of...
...Hollywood-to-Wood...
...Hills subway line off a list of...
...titles for funding (B1).
TONIGHT: Bel Air Brass jazz at...
...30 at 7ax, 339 N. Brand Blvd.,...
...Glendale. Info: (818) 500-1604.

WEATHER: Chance of rain.
High near 58, low near 45. B10

—By Nancy Hill-Holtzman
and Jon D. Markman

■ The Top of Today's News is on A2

...stake...
...President Clinton entered the...
...first stretch...
...it unpaid was that Gingrich...
...had only himself to blame. For...
...nearly everyone close to him this...
...year has urged Gingrich to resist...
...the impulse to sound off—advice...
...that went unheeded day after day...
...Indeed, as Gingrich completes...
...his first year as one of the most...
...powerful speakers in history, the...
...promise and the peril facing him in...
...1996 rank among Capitol Hill's...
...most intriguing topics as a frazzled...
...Please see GINGRICH, A23

...cloudy, wintry weather...
...already pulled in the only...
...in Lincoln Park is the snow-mul...
...filled mound of Miller Creek, clim...
...bling beneath a crust of ice toward...
...Lake Superior...
...The creek begins in the wetlands...
...behind the ridge that overlooks...
...this old port city, where corporate...
...steel and paper once spewed their...
...debris into the largest of the...
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Please see ENVIRON

COLUMN ONE

NYPD: Bigger, Bolder—Better?

■ New York police claim
their new militarism has
led to the city's startling
drop in crime. The
hard-line strategy has
raised cheers—and fears.

By JIM NEWTON
TIMES STAFF WRITER

NEW YORK—Jack Maple, the roly-poly intellectual buzz saw behind the New York Police Department's new war on crime, slugged back another espresso and trumpeted the philosophy that has revolutionized policing in America's largest city.

"He who tries to defend

everything," said Maple, "defends nothing."

In a business where commanders generally cite management manuals, think tank studies and Justice Department reports, Maple drew his quote from a 4th century work by Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu. Called "The Art of War," the book has helped guide centuries of generals but not too many police chiefs.

But under the leadership of a new mayor and police command, the NYPD has spent the past two years shedding its historical reluctance to confront criminals in favor of a new militarism, one reflected in everything from the ideas of its command staff to the uniforms worn by street cops.

In precinct after precinct,

those cops today are taking on crime with new numbers and intensity. Backed by a department that has hardened its rhetoric, hired 8,000 new officers and revolutionized the use of crime statistics, they are producing results that have startled criminologists and forced a reexamination of long-held national assumptions about what causes crime.

The questions being asked in New York have deep implications for Los Angeles, where the Police Department has attempted to chart a near-opposite course. Unlike the NYPD, the LAPD's paramilitarism is being softened in an effort to regain the community support undermined by beatings, riots and racism.

To the cheers of many New

Please see NYPD, A18

A Science

■ Education: N
Harvard-Westl

By BETH SHUSTER
TIMES STAFF WRITER

STUDIO CITY—ER
ley-Gray's classic
than her house.
The 1,700-square-
lab at the private H
lake School is the sci
dream—from its ex
extraordinary amni
saltwater aquariums
filled with perch,
shrimp, a baby to
halibut. All were
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Elsewhere, the
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"I can't believe I r

LAT 12/24

NYPD: Department's New Militarism

Continued from A1
Yorkers, the NYPD's approach seems to be working. Since early 1994, when newly installed Police Commissioner William J. Bratton borrowed from the wartime words of Winston Churchill and vowed to "take the city back, block by block and neighborhood by neighborhood," crime in New York has plummeted to the lowest levels in 25 years. Once-empty streets now bustle with officers, their presence welcomed by business leaders, though a rise in citizen complaints of police brutality and racism have triggered alarm in some quarters.

But battling crime is Bratton's central mission, and over the past 24 months reports of:

- Murders are down 39.7%.
- Robberies are down 30.7%.
- Burglaries are down 24%.
- Aggravated assaults are down 12.9%.
- Shootings are down 39.6%.

Overall, New York crime dropped 11% in Bratton's first year and is on track to fall another 16% this year. Even at a time when crime has dropped nationally, those statistics are far ahead of the national average and of every other major city in the United States. In fact, they are nothing less than staggering.

"Something is happening in New York," says Bratton, 47, a former Boston police chief and onetime candidate to head the LAPD, whose best is part Boston but whose stiff bearing and lean, sharp-eyed looks are all cop. "It's the direct result of what we're doing."

Not everyone, however, is a convert.

Academics vs. NYPD

Academic crime experts—and many police chiefs—for decades have argued that police have little to do with crime trends. Instead, they attribute swings in illegal activity to social forces: age shifts in the population, fluctuating economic fortunes, migrations in and out of cities and changing drug habits.

"Increases usually are not the policeman's fault," said Marcus Melan, a distinguished crime expert who has worked at USC and Rutgers University. "And decreases are not his credit."

Writing on the subject in 1994, David H. Bayley, arguably the foremost scholar in the field, stated: "The police do not prevent crime."

Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are society's best defense against crime and continually argue that if they are given more resources, especially personnel, they will be able to protect communities against crime. That's a myth.

Just try telling that to Maple, the NYPD's deputy commissioner for operations. With the fervor of the convert, Maple dismisses each counterargument offered by Bayley and his colleagues.

Age? There has been no noticeable change in New York's young adult population, which commits most crimes, since 1983. Drugs? Suspects still overwhelmingly test positive for cocaine, the drug most associated with criminal activity. The economy? There do not appear to have been any dramatic shifts that would account for the vast drop in reported criminal activity. Deep public cynicism that discourages victims from reporting crimes? Undoubtedly that exists, but to evidence suggests that the public is significantly more cynical than it was in 1993, when a gentle decline turned into a precipitous one. New jails? New York, like California, has waged a jail and prison construction boom in recent years, but the number of new cells lags far behind the rate of New York City's drop in crime.

And Maple's response to the



Crime in America's Largest Cities

New York


Over the past two years, crime has been on the run in New York City. Led by a 40% drop in the number of murders, crime in America's largest city has fallen to the lowest levels in 25 years. Academics offer a host of possible explanations, but the New York Police Department says the reason is simple: assertive work by an emboldened police force.

Background:

- Officers: 38,000, who also cover housing projects and transit system
- Area: 322 square miles
- Population: 7.3 million

N.Y.C. MURDER


In thousands



■ N.Y.C.: Down 39.7% over past two years

N.Y.C. ROBBERY


In thousands



■ N.Y.C.: Down 30.7% over past two years

N.Y.C. BURGLARY


In thousands



■ N.Y.C.: Down 24.4% over past two years

N.Y.C. RAPE

In thousands



■ N.Y.C.: Down 7.7% over past two years

Through Nov. 12

"These criminologists," he scoffed, "their ancestors are the same people that said the world was flat."

The reason crime is down, according to Maple and others in and around the NYPD, is simple: The department is getting bigger, tougher and smarter.

Today, officers make arrests not only for felonies but for lower-level offenses that degrade a city and make it less hospitable.

Thousands of new officers whose hiring was initiated under former Mayor David Dinkins—who paid for the expansion out of the city's massive budget—have helped. But just as important, according to Bratton, are the strategies under which the officers work. Spotting crimes quickly, responding assertively and snuffing out trends—those are Bratton's missions, and he says the statistics back up his belief that the NYPD is onto something revolutionary.

"We haven't found the magic bullet," said the commissioner. "But what we have found is a way of getting American police forces back into the game where we can effectively reduce crime independent of all those historical pressures."

Trading Places

In ways large and small, America's highest-profile police departments are heading in opposite directions, each emulating

the other's recent past while rejecting its own.

These days, the NYPD, long famous for the size of its force—and, some would say, the size of its cops' midsections—wants to project a tougher image, starting with its uniforms. Out are the light-blue shirts that for decades made officers look like friendly security guards; in are dark blue duds that look more authoritative—and that consciously emulate the LAPD.

In Los Angeles, officers are trying to shed the very image that the NYPD covets. Cops are getting out of cars, walking beats, putting on shorts and riding bicycles, all to be closer to the public. Far from wanting to look more intimidating, they are trying to appear more approachable—something like the officer-friendlies that the NYPD once symbolized.

Los Angeles police are being encouraged to spend more time talking to residents and merchants about what troubles their lives, to emphasize community contacts over arrests, to consider the underlying community pressures that give rise to crime rather than focusing exclusively on criminal behavior itself.

But while LAPD learns to counsel and console, NYPD is recalling how to confront and arrest.

Unchained by Bratton, New York cops are hauling in more and more suspects, often for low-level "quality-of-life crimes" such as

aggressive panhandling. Suspects are arrested for petty offenses and checked for warrants, searched for guns and grilled about criminal working their areas. Those are rough tactics. In fact, they remind some observers of the sweeps that then-LAPD Chief Daryl F. Gates began during the late 1980s.

Today, the LAPD bristles every time someone raises the specter of its image as an "occupying army." Bratton, meanwhile, says he is now trying to get away from his military rhetoric, but it's not easy. He and his top aides routinely refer to their campaign against crime in military terms.

A department leader, said Maple, must be "part CEO, part field general." And victory, Maple added after another gulp of high-octane coffee, goes only to those who "act swiftly and audaciously."

In short, community policing is today's watchword in Los Angeles; in New York, it is yesterday's, preserved in the department's official rhetoric but, as a practical matter, abandoned in favor of a more militaristic approach to suppressing urban blight and crime.

Computers and Crooks

The NYPD's "mantra," as Bratton calls it, echoes through almost every interview with every department commander. It has four parts, and officials utter them with rever-

Helps Cut Crime

- Accurate and timely intelligence.
- Rapid deployment.
- Effective tactics.
- Relentless follow-up and assessment.

None of those ideas originated with the NYPD, of course. In various forms, they exist in all departments. But the NYPD has honed their application as few others have, particularly in the quick collection and turnaround of "intelligence," the crime statistics that increasingly drive New York's policing strategies.

The New York idea is simple: Gather crime statistics, day in, day out. Then overlay them on maps and produce visual representations of the patterns of violence and illegal activity across the city. The patterns, they say, suggest solutions.

Using a recent batch of data from the 73rd Precinct, Maple showed off the department's new approach. With a reporter at his elbow, he projected the precinct map on a wall and barked cheerful orders to a computer operator:

"Get me shootings," he said. A string of blue crosses appeared across the map.

"Let's see housing projects," Green blocks flashed up, overlapping many of the shootings.

"Homicides," said Maple. More marks.

"Now let's see warrants," he barked. This time, a blizzard of black slashes covered the map, with obvious pockets of concentration.

Through the overlapping crosses, dots and colors, patterns began to emerge. The areas with large numbers of robberies also were home to clusters of shootings and homicides. Many of those crimes were concentrated in and around a couple of housing projects, where a bevy of suspects were wanted on outstanding warrants.

Armed with that intelligence, Maple proposed a tactical strategy: Start serving the warrants in those areas. Bring the suspects in, question them about the local drug trade and its attendant violence. Find out who's doing the dealing, who's doing the shooting, then go out and get them.

Twice a week, that technique is applied by the department's top brass at the NYPD's command center, a high-ceilinged, smartly computerized post at 1 Police Plaza, headquarters of the nation's largest police department.

The meetings are known as "Compstat," short for computerized statistics, and they start at 7 a.m. so that precinct commanders cannot claim conflicts. The brass sit at one end of a rectangular configuration of tables. Precinct commanders and others are arrayed throughout the room. On a big day, the audience can number 200.

There, in front of peers and bosses, precinct commanders are tested over and over again. What are the problems in your area, and what do you plan to do about them?

Their answers start with the crime maps. They end either with proposed solutions or with drubbings.

Bratton attends the grillings, peppering his subordinates with questions, prodding them for results. Like others in the room, the commissioner is armed with detailed printouts on each precinct. The sheets even feature color pictures of the commanding officers, a reminder of the personal accountability that Bratton demands of his subordinates.

Tales of success abound. Inspector Richard Seta and his then-colleagues in the 9th Precinct identified a rash of quality-of-life crime along St. Marks Place in southeast Manhattan.

As is typical of the NYPD's new approach to crime-fighting, Seta

and his officers started small. They cracked down on illegal vendors, arresting a few and chasing the others off. That removed the cover for the drug dealers, which made it easier for police to infiltrate and break up that trade. Next was an aggressive move against store owners who were selling illegal weapons and drug paraphernalia.

Backed by civil confiscation laws, officers carted off 751,994 items—from switchblades and brass knuckles to marijuana and crack pipes. Residents stood near the police tape and cheered.

"People don't call me up and say 'I'm tired of these murders and robberies,'" said Seta, who now commands Midtown South, the city's largest precinct. "They say 'I'm tired of this guy urinating in my doorway. I'm tired of this guy drinking beer outside my building.'"

"What we've learned," Seta added, "is that by going after that guy who's drinking or urinating, we aggressively panhandling, we can have an effect on other crimes too."

Like many department leaders, Seta has flourished under Bratton's system. But officials acknowledge that not all commanders have fared as well.

During one recent Compstat meeting, a precinct commander acknowledged what the statistics made clear. A housing project in his area was home to a rash of drug crimes and citizen complaints. But the commander did the one thing that Bratton and Maple most abhor: He pleaded helplessness, saying it was difficult to penetrate the project with undercover officers.

"It's tough to buy [drugs] in there," he lamented.

"How hard do you think it is to live there?" one of his bosses shot back.

Maple, for one, is not losing any sleep over hurt feelings.

"These are police commanders we are talking to here, senior people," he said. "And this is a very serious business we're doing. We're trying to save lives."

In the process, the new leadership is willing to punish its own. Since the commissioner took office two years ago, more than 80% of the city's precinct commanders have changed jobs. Some have been promoted, some transferred, others ousted. In the old days, no more than five or six would have changed jobs in a comparable period, officials say.

"Some people rise to the challenge and it's very noticeable," said Chief of the Department Louis Bratton, who oversees the NYPD's day-to-day operations. "Some of them see it as a big pain in the ass."

Complaints Rise

Fighting crime is the issue that put New York Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, a former U.S. attorney, in office. He brought along Bratton to wage his battle, and the two have never looked back.

But their war has triggered a share of alarm as well. Critics warn of a new aggressiveness within the NYPD, of a distillation of public anger toward the poor and of an unleashing of Police Department frustration bottled up for years.

The NYPD's embrace of militarism, its self-consciously hardened approach to crime fighting, contains the seeds of police violence, said Paul Chevigny, a nationally renowned expert on that subject and the author of "Edge of the Knife: Police Violence in the Americas."

"The military analogy leads to brutality," said Chevigny, a professor at New York University School of Law. "The military is brutal."

Some observers say they are already seeing those fears realized. "The homeless know their enemies,"

Please see NYPD, A19.


That's not exactly "The Art of War," as today's NYPD defines it. But LAPD leaders and some government officials say community-based programs are more appropriate, given the size of the

"I honestly believe that [New York's strategy] can work anywhere in the world," said NY Deputy Commissioner for Operations Jack Maple.

Continued from A18

A Simple Message

Bratton's approach may trouble some observers outside the department, but it has struck a resonant chord with the NYPD's rank and




NYPD officers search a suspected crack dealer in Manhattan.

"I think Giuliani goes to sleep at night believing that the reductions in crime are the result of his hard work, not the police commissioners," said former Mayor Ed

Take Bernie Wittie, who runs S. Greenspan Hardware, a few blocks from the Midtown South precinct building. "It's a little better," Wittie said of the neighborhood since Giuliani and Bratton took over. But crime remains an abiding concern, especially since a high school for troubled kids moved in down the block, "Hoodlum High," Wittie calls it.

'It's Not Bad'

"I know they're saying it's a lot safer, but I don't see it," Varga said. "As far as crime around here, as far as I can see, it's not bad. But you gotta be smart. You leave at 5. You don't stay at night. You can't be stupid."



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From a speech

Bretton gave at
Fordham Law School
earlier this year

New Strategies for Combating Crime in New York City

William J. Bratton*

Good evening, Thank You. It is a real pleasure to be here with you this evening to talk about something that I spend a lot of time thinking about, how to make the City of New York a safer place. This evening's presentation, I hope, will be informative.

Before talking about why crime is down in New York City, and the national debate that is currently underway as to why it is down in New York and many other areas around the country, I think it is important to take a walk back through time to understand how we got to this point in time. A city that was once frequently cited as being the crime capital of the world¹ now has a singular honor and status as the nation's leading entity in the decline of crime.² This is a very significant turn-around in a two to three year period of time.

I have been in policing now for about twenty-five years.

*INSERT BIOGRAPHICAL DATA.

¹ Howard Kurtz, Scribe Bids New York Trash Farewell, Wash. Post, at W12 ("Washington may have higher per-capita murder rate, but New York is, hands-down, the weird-crime capital of the world."); Robert Friedman, Living in Fear: 1 of 2 is a Victim of Crime; City Losing the War on all Fronts, Newsday, Aug. 13, 1989, at 5 ("The perception of New York as the crime capital of the world is hardly new."); Ellis Henican, City Takes Beating over Attack, Newsday, Apr. 26, 1989, at 25 ("For as long as anyone can remember, New York City has been known as a crime capital").

² Eric Pooley, One Good Apple, Time, Jan. 15, 1996, at 54; Take Regional Approach to Solve City's Problems, Times-Picayune, Jan. 17, 1996, at B6 ("New York City, leading the nation in reducing crime, added 5,000 community police to its 32,000-person police force.").

Born and raised in Boston, I joined the Boston Police Department in 1970. During that twenty-five year period of time, there has been several very significant change in American policing. I entered policing during the beginning of one phase and now, after twenty-five years, I find myself in a leadership position as another phase is taking hold. Of the two phases, I think the current phase is going to be the more productive and the more successful.

1970. America. The Vietnam War was still raging. Huge demonstrations. We had just come through the race riots of the sixties, the Civil Rights Movement, and we were at the beginning of a more permissive society.³ American policing was moving into a new era--the professional policing era. We were going to take advantage of emerging technology, for example, the 911 system, computer-aided dispatch, and the increasing use of motorized patrol. The era was, I think, best emphasized by the old Jack Webb Dragnet Badge 714 series. The professional police officer--just the facts; no personality; no personal touch, if you will. Just the facts, man, just the facts. The era is best characterized by the three Rs and three P's. I will be talking about three Rs and three P's during the presentation. With my Boston accent the "R" may sound a little funny to you, so I apologize for that.

³See generally William J. Bennett, What's Wrong with America: Spiritual Decline Harms Nation, Greensboro News & Record, May 8, 1994, at F1.

(laughter)

The three Rs. What were they? What was the policing style of the 1970s that was going to be the end-all of policing, the professional era that was going to control crime and keep it reduced after the turbulent sixties and early seventies? One was the concept of rapid response. Those 911 calls, that allowed us to take police off walking posts and into cars so they could rapidly respond to the growing number of calls that 911 was creating. The second concept was the idea of random patrol. When not on calls these cars would be preventing and deterring crime. Because of the random nature of the patrol, the police-driven cars could cover large areas. The third element was the Jack Webb type of reactive investigation after the crime occurred. The theme of that type of policing was largely reactive. Think of it, reacting to 911 calls, random patrol, riding around waiting for something to happen--hoping that you are preventing things from happening--and the reactive investigation.

What happened, however, was that type of policing was ill-prepared for the large volume of calls that was generated by 911. Most major American cities were overwhelmed as other city services were declining and police became the catch-all. Dial 911 and, like the fire department, we were the two that would always come. We were overwhelmed by it. So there was less and

less time for man to patrol, more and more time chasing all those incidents, less and less time to solve the problems that were causing all those incidents. With more and more calls and more and more crime being generated during the Seventies and Eighties, there was less time to investigate, less clearance, and less solving of crime. So, when we entered the turbulent 1980s, American police forces were very ill-prepared to deal with what began to occur. There were drugs, particularly cocaine, and then the emergence of crack-cocaine around 1984-85.⁴ And with crack-cocaine came guns, increasingly more powerful weapons, the nine millimeter semi-automatic, with fifteen, seventeen rounds instead of the old zip gun or the old thirty-eight with five or six.⁵ Then there was the new element that scared the hell out of everybody. That is the increasing involvement of youth in that drug-related, gun-involved violence and the element of random violence.⁶ In what we once thought were safe areas of our cities arose the random nature of crime. When New York experienced this

⁴See, e.g., Philip Hagar, Drug Cases Now Dominate Caseloads of Urbanite Courts, L.A. Times, May 23, 1990, at 1 ("[In the five years after 1983, adult felony arrests for non-marijuana drug offenses rose . . . [to] a startling increase that closely parallels the emergence of crack-cocaine . . ."). See also Eric Lichtblau & Gaylord Shaw, Problem in 46 States: It's Not Just a 'City Drug', Apr. 5, 1988, at 1 ("[In] late 1985, crack became a big problem in New York City.").

⁵See id. ([L]aw enforcement officers across the country have detected a quantum leap in the arsenals of drug dealers. . . .Israeli-made machine guns, known as Uzis, American-made machine guns, known as Mac-10's, a variety of sawed-off shot guns, . . . 'every kind of hand gun you can imagine.'" (quotation omitted)).

⁶See id. (describing incidents of violence in the nation's cities involving youngsters and drug-related activities).

particularly in the late Eighties and early Nineties, it began to scare everybody. American police forces really were not prepared for it. We were not prepared for it. We are an incident-oriented, reactive type of profession.

Fortunately, in the late 1970s, early 1980s, a number of police leaders, academics, criminologists, and political types began to think about what we could do differently. Clearly, what we were doing was not working. From that evolved the concept of community policing. It began all over the country in little bits and pieces here and there, culminating in a process at Harvard University where, with a federal grant over a several-year period of time, police leaders, academics and political types came together to talk about the issues.⁷ Ultimately from that came the concept of community policing.

Community Policing. You hear a lot about it. We now have an office in Washington that is there to dispense millions of dollars to support the concept.⁸ But what is it? Well, the definition of it is still very much in debate. I am going to

⁷See generally Brian McGrory, Community Policing as Bold Plan, The Boston Globe, Jan. 16, 1992, at 1.

⁸Marjorie Lambert, State Getting Big Share of Crime Bill Aid, Sun-Sentinel Ft. Lauderdale, Oct. 31, 1994, at 1B ("Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 provides for a federal grant system to hire, train and equip new officers for community policing programs. States and local police agencies are eligible.")

give you my definition of it. Joe Brown⁹ and I, on our way up in the car were talking about it. We have different definitions of it and that is symptomatic of people trying to come to grips with what is community policing?

Why is community policing so good? And what is it going to do? Quite simply, it is the three P's. Remember the three Rs? Well community policing, in its simplest form is three P's. It is the concept of partnership. In the 1970s and 1980s, police said, "Give us money, give us equipment, give us cops, we will take care of your problems." And it just did not happen. The problems overwhelmed even those police departments that were adequately staffed, and many of them were not during the 1970's and 1980's. So we were not prepared to do it alone.

But community policing says let us work together; You; the community; the other institutions of government; and the other entities in the criminal justice system. Let us work in partnership and with our united numbers, maybe, we can have impact. What are we going to work on? We have finally come to recognize, after chasing all those hundreds of thousands of 911 calls in the 1970s and 1980s, that those calls were only symptoms of problems. After going back time and again to kick the kids off the corner or going back time and again for that husband and wife fighting with each other, and each time seeing the problem escalate we realized that we were not taking effective action to

⁹Joseph Brown, Director of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).

solve the problem that was generating all those calls. Community policing said let us look at the issue differently. What can we do to deal with that husband and wife whose constant fighting eventually escalates into assaults and the kids on the corner whose drinking eventually escalates into the equivalents of guns and knives, assaults, random shootings and more violence.

In addition to working in partnership to deal with problems, the other focus, of community policing was something the American police forces and the criminal justice system lost sight of in the 1970s and 1980s: the basic reason for our being. The reason that police were created was to prevent crime. We are here to prevent crime, to reduce it where we can, but more importantly, to prevent it. What is effectively going on in the 1990s in many American cities, and I will speak very specifically now about New York, is not doing away with the three Rs. We can not get rid of 911. Yesterday we just unveiled a \$150 million enhanced 911 system that allows us to see the address and phone number the calls are coming from.¹⁰ So, 911 is here to stay. We can not do away with random patrol of cops and cars. We need them to respond to those 911 calls. And we definitely can not do away with reactive investigation. There is always going to be crime, and there will always be a need to investigate it as part of the way we would attempt to investigate it in the future. Rather, we are attempting to blend those three with the new concept of

¹⁰For a description of the "new" 911 system, see Vivian S. Toy, Enhanced 911 System is Online Citywide, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1996, at B3.

partnership, problem-solving and prevention.

What are we doing in New York to implement community policing? My predecessors Lee Brown and Ray Kelly are New Yorkers. They are very familiar with the safe streets initiative. They are very familiar with the 1990 the headlines in New York Post, "Do Something Dave"¹¹ and the front cover of Time Magazine, "The Rotten Apple"¹² pointing out all the things wrong with New York City at that time. The negative image of a city seemingly out of control, or going out of control. If you think back over the previous twenty years, as a result of the corruption scandals in the 1970s, the city consciously opted to remove its police from dealing with anything with potential for corruption. Police were precluded from entering licensed premises and from acting on many street conditions, for fear of corruption. The result of these restrictions were that the New York Police withdrew from the streets of New York, went into their cars, and were satisfied with chasing 911 calls. Street conditions worsened resulting from a combination of police inaction and governmental indifference. The first time graffiti was put up on a wall in New York some place back in the 1960s, this very liberal city immediately described it as some form of

¹¹See Alan Friedman, New York's Decay Out paces 'Do Nothing' Dinkins, The Financial Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at 6 ("Do Something Dave' screamed a recent headline in the New York Post . . .").

¹²See id. ("[a]nd last month a cover story in Time Magazine ('The Rotten Big Apple') . . .").

Quality of Life



1

art--graffiti art.¹³ It was celebrated and encouraged to the extent that, by 1970, there was no subway car in the city that was not a roving art form. Then other things began to happen. There was progressive panhandling as the homeless types of situations became more prevalent and joblessness increased. There existed a sense of a permissive society allowing certain things that would not have been tolerated many years ago.

Quality of Life
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I can recall my first visit to New York in 1990 when I was being recruited to come down as Chief of the Transit Police from Boston. Many of you have visited Boston. Most New Yorkers think of it as "that great place up north." It is a beautiful city. It does not seem to have a lot of the problems of many major cities, definitely not on the scale of what New York is experiencing. But in 1990 I can recall coming in from the airport, flying into LaGuardia, and coming down that highway. It looked like something out of a futuristic movie in terms of graffiti on every highway wall, dirt on rubber tires that look like they have not been cleaned in years, burned-out cars, litter everywhere. "Welcome to New York!" Then when you reach the first stoplight in New York City, you see the official greeter for the City of New York. You know the guy out there in baggy dirty clothes with a rag. Or the more sophisticated would actually have a squeegee. Sometimes even with the squeegee they manage to scratch up your window. But that was a sense of how

¹³See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1972, at 25 ("M.F. Donaldson . . . contends [that] graffiti is the primitive pop art of inarticulate people looking for recognition.")

art--graffiti art.¹³ It was celebrated and encouraged to the extent that, by 1970, there was no subway car in the city that was not a roving art form. Then other things began to happen. There was progressive panhandling as the homeless types of situations became more prevalent and joblessness increased. There existed a sense of a permissive society allowing certain things that would not have been tolerated many years ago.

I can recall my first visit to New York in 1990 when I was being recruited to come down as Chief of the Transit Police from Boston. Many of you have visited Boston. Most New Yorkers think of it as "that great place up north." It is a beautiful city. It does not seem to have a lot of the problems of many major cities, definitely not on the scale of what New York is experiencing. But in 1990 I can recall coming in from the airport, flying into LaGuardia, and coming down that highway. It looked like something out of a futuristic movie in terms of graffiti on every highway wall, dirt on rubber tires that look like they have not been cleaned in years, burned-out cars, litter everywhere. "Welcome to New York!" Then when you reach the first stoplight in New York City, you see the official greeter for the City of New York. You know the guy out there in baggy dirty clothes with a rag. Or the more sophisticated would actually have a squeegee. Sometimes even with the squeegee they manage to scratch up your window. But that was a sense of how

¹³See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1972, at 25 ("M.F. Donaldson . . . contends [that] graffiti is the primitive pop art of inarticulate people looking for recognition.")

the city had stopped caring about itself. Then we came down Fifth Avenue, the very famous mile, if you will. There were unlicensed peddlers everywhere, and also dirt and filth everywhere. Then there were the subways. Upstairs was heaven, then you get to those subways. Incredible. I can remember going through the first turnstile array and watching people leap over turnstiles, crawl under them, anything but pay the fare. Every platform seemed to have a cardboard city on either end of it where the homeless had taken up residence. This was a city that had really lost control of its city and its subways. The turnaround in the last five or six years has been phenomenal considering what it looked like then, how it looks now and how it might look in the future.

In any event, into the 1990s Mayor Dinkins and the City Council, with the active support of the public, put through a process which allowed the hiring of 7,000 additional police in the three police departments along with an array of social agency enhancements and improvements.¹⁴ This was all designed to support Lee Brown's vision of a community policing initiative in the City of New York.¹⁵ The focus would be on the three Ps, but its emphasis would be on 1500 beats throughout the city staffed

¹⁴See generally, Todd S. Purdum, Dinkins in Accord on Financial Plan for Hiring Police, N.Y. Times, at A1 ("Mayor David N. Dinkins and the New York City Council reached an agreement yesterday on a compromise anti-crime plan for hiring thousands of new police officers.").

¹⁵For a discussion of Brown's "vision," see Crime and Management: An Interview with New York City Police Commissioner Lee D. Brown, Harv. Bus. Rev., May/June 1991, at 339.

by about 7,000 new young police officers who were going to go forth into the streets of New York to solve the problems of New York City. But when I came down in 1994, aware of the complexities of this great city, conscious of some of its limitations, and having watched the department for two years while the Chief of Transit, I changed very much the direction of the community policing initiative. I refocused the effort from concentrating on those 7,000 young men and women to the 76 precinct commanders.

Why the change in focus? Think about it. The average kid coming onto the New York City Police Department at that time was 22 years old.¹⁶ So of the 16,000 cops that you see in the streets of New York, the average age is 22. You only had to be twenty to join the NYPD, have a high school education on average or a G.E.D. Many never held a job until they became New York City Police Officers. Many had never driven a car until they became New York City Police Officers. Many, from Long Island, never had any interaction with a minority person until they found themselves assigned in Harlem, driving a car for the first time in their life, some not old enough to buy a drink legally in the City of New York. This was the individual we were going to count on to solve all those problems. That person was lucky enough that they could follow the six months of instructions we gave them in the academy and report to their first assignment.

¹⁶1994 Personnel Statistics provided by the New York Police Department, Bureau of Personnel.

Recognizing that this is an incredibly politically connected and involved city with its political power and strong community involvement, we were setting these young men and women up for failure. They could not compete with all the people who wanted to get into the game to deal with the problems. We also have a phenomenally large bureaucracy. In a department of 38,000 cops and 6,000 civilians,¹⁷ the beat police were very little fish in a very big sea who were not going to be heard. So, recognizing that, one of the fundamental changes was to immediately change the focus of the problem-solving from that young officer to a more mature, fifteen years on average, college educated, veteran police commander who knew how to police the city.

Now, what else did we change in the New York City Police Department to arrive at the point in time we are now in 1996? Overall crime in the city is down by 27% in the last two years,¹⁸ over 40% in the last five years,¹⁹ with single digit declines in 1991, 1992, 1993, and accelerating in 1994 and 1995. More importantly, there are even more significant declines in the homicide and robbery rates; 39% in homicide, about 30% in

¹⁷See Pooley, supra note 2, at 54.

¹⁸Id.

¹⁹New York City Police Statistics (Years-end 1990 and 1995)[hereinafter Police Statistics]. These statistics are collected and maintained under standards set by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Law enforcement agencies across the country collect and maintain crime statistics uniformly in accordance with these standards for national comparison studies.

robbery.²⁰ These have been the largest declines in 25 years to the extent that in robbery, we have fewer robberies now than we had in 1972.²¹ Homicides, in New York, have decreased from 2143 in 1990 to slightly under 1200 last year.²² A phenomenal decline in those categories. There are about 150 of you in this room. Last year we had 750 fewer homicides than the previous year.²³ Multiply you by five and that is the number of people who are alive today that might not have been. On top of that, there were several thousand fewer shooting victims in the city.²⁴ So we have had a very significant plus. There were 115,000 fewer victims of crime in 1995;²⁵ murders, rapes, robberies, car thefts, larcenies reported, arguably. Not all crime gets reported, it is significantly under reported. But over time, the amount of reported crime has remained fairly constant to the point that we can accurately reflect whether it is up or down. 115,000 fewer victims, 115,000 fewer of you were the victims of violent crime. But all of you during that time were the victims of another type of crime. The key to what we are doing in New York City at this particular juncture, apart from changing the focus of where community policing is controlled and embracing

²⁰Pooley, supra, note 2, at 54.

²¹See id.

²²Police Statistics (Years-end 1990 and 1995).

²³Police Statistics (Year-end 1995).

²⁴Id.

²⁵Id.

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community policing, is the way in which we are managing the department and responding to the Mayor's goal of a safer city. The key is to place dual emphasis on serious crime, as well as quality of life or signs of crime. The squeegee pest--the symbolism of doing something about the squeegee pest. There were only 75 of them, yet the image they were creating, the fear they were generating as people tried to travel into the city was great. 75 people, 38,000, cops and the squeeches were winning. Incredible. One of the first things the Mayor demanded upon election was, "Get rid of them." In as much as the acts they were committing were illegal, it required a few summonses, a few arrests, and pretty soon they were gone. Once in a while, you might see one that still pops up from time to time, but the department understands more clearly now that not only do we need to be more focused on reducing real crime, but we need to be focused, all 38,000 of us, on doing something about those quality of life signs of crime: the squeegee pests; people urinating in public; people drinking in public; illegal peddling.

All those things make this most complex of American cities, and indeed rural cities, such a tough place to live--tough in the sense that there are so many opportunities here and so many pluses in the city that were being overwhelmed for twenty years by the negatives. What we have now done as a police department is to embrace community policing to work with the other institutions of government, to be dual focused, and to have goals which are quite clear: to reduce crime, improve quality of life,

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community policing, is the way in which we are managing the department and responding to the Mayor's goal of a safer city. The key is to place dual emphasis on serious crime, as well as quality of life or signs of crime. The squeegee pest--the symbolism of doing something about the squeegee pest. There were only 75 of them, yet the image they were creating, the fear they were generating as people tried to travel into the city was great. 75 people, 38,000, cops and the squeeches were winning. Incredible. One of the first things the Mayor demanded upon election was, "Get rid of them." In as much as the acts they were committing were illegal, it required a few summonses, a few arrests, and pretty soon they were gone. Once in a while, you might see one that still pops up from time to time, but the department understands more clearly now that not only do we need to be more focused on reducing real crime, but we need to be focused, all 38,000 of us, on doing something about those quality of life signs of crime: the squeegee pests; people urinating in public; people drinking in public; illegal peddling.

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and enforce quality of life offenses for the first time in twenty years.

We have begun to see the difference and we are not doing it alone. All of the city agencies are involved in cleaning up the graffiti and cleaning up the highways. Next time you are on one of the highways in the city take a look. There is not too much graffiti anymore and when it pops up, within a couple days it is painted over. In most of the city's parks, graffiti is removed within several days. Many areas of the city are a lot cleaner because of the business improvement districts. There, the private sector is working with the city for enhanced security, improved lighting and improved cleanliness, particularly here in Manhattan, and certain areas in Brooklyn and Queens. Think of the area down around Bryant Park and the area right here on Columbus Circle. In 1990, in Columbus Circle, on any given day there would be 50 or 60 drug dealers working in and around that area, right adjacent to your campus. You do not see that anymore. Bryant Park, one of the drug capitals of the world in the back of the library, is now the site of a major fight between a restaurant and the fashion industry over who gets to occupy that site.²⁶ It has become a very valuable piece of real estate again. The city has undergone some very significant changes. And this police department has undergone some very significant

²⁶See Constance, C.R. White, Patterns, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1995, at B8 ("Micael Einstein, the president of Ark Restaurants has proposed that Seventh on Sixth be held responsible for any shortfalls of revenue to the Bryant Park Grill that might occur due to the presence of tents in the park during fall runway shows.")

changes. These changes have resulted in the desired impact that the Mayor wanted: reduced crime; improved quality of life.

We have done it by re-engineering the organization. This is a term that you hear a lot about, reinventing or re-engineering government. What we have effectively done in the New York City Police Department is taken this very large bureaucracy, this very large wedding cake, if you will, with all of its levels. Think of it. Let us go up that little wedding cake from the police officer in a precinct to me just to give you a sense of how big that bureaucracy is. The police officer reports to his sergeant, who reports to his lieutenant, who reports to his captain, who then used to report to his division commander, who then reported to the borough commander, who then reported to control commander, who then reported to the chief of the department, who then reported to the deputy commissioner. Then you finally got to me. You can imagine how long, in that bureaucracy, a request going up or down would take. We were a very centralized, hierarchical organization in which the Police Commissioner had absolute control. Precinct commanders had very little authority to do anything unless headquarters demanded it. They were required to have only so many officers in plain clothes. They were required to have absolutely only so many officers in cars. They were required to have only so many officers in different functions. They had no discretion or authority by and large to respond to the changing issues in those 76 very diverse precincts.

Most of you who live in the city recognize that there are no

two precincts in the city which are alike and no two neighborhoods which are totally alike. The NYPD, for most of its history, attempted to police the city as if it were one entity, police it with very tight control from headquarters. One of the things that we did, in re-engineering the department, was decentralize. We pushed the power down in the organization, not to the beat cop, as Lee Brown and Ray Kelly attempted to do with community policing, a system set up for a failure, but rather to that precinct commander level.

To the extent I now have 76 miniature police departments, I expect them to focus on the dual goals to reduce crime and improve quality of life. And with the exception, by and large, to respond to 911 calls. Because we have a pretty good idea of how many we need on each shift, they are given now a lot more discretion as to how many people in plain clothes, how many in uniform, how many on beats, so that they are able to respond to your needs--your concerns--in true partnership. What do you want addressed? In this precinct here, they want a lot of emphasis on quality of life because there is not a lot of serious violent crime in this precinct compared to East New York. There, they want a lot of emphasis on serious violent crime and shots being fired because that is the reality, unfortunately, in several of those precincts in East New York. Precinct commanders now have that discretion. And I firmly believe that the reason we are seeing such dramatic declines in crime, is not the weather, is not a lot of the socio-demographic issues that are being

advanced, is not economic issues. These declines may have been impacted somewhat by the higher incarceration rates. But the drop in crime in the city has been so precipitous over two years. All those factors are longer term, in terms of their causal relationship. On January 1, 1994, all the young kids in the City did not suddenly become old, all the criminals did not suddenly march into jail. The weather? Arguably, the blizzard this year did kind of slow crime down a little bit. Although during the blizzard, we saw theft in autos go up. The weather did not stop them from stealing the air bags and computer chips out of cars. It just stopped them from stealing the cars because they did not want to shovel them out. But as soon as the snow melted, car thefts went back up. 1994, if you recall, was the worst winter in many years. Crime went down. Everybody said it was the weather. The next year we had the mildest winter in many years, crime went down even more. Well, maybe it was not the weather. In any event, we really believe that what has happened in New York City and what has attracted such national and international attention is that we have found a better way of policing. We are results-focused, we are decentralized, we are coordinated, and we have enough cops--38,000 police officers in the City of New York.²⁷ The luxury, the inheritance, if you will, from the David Dinkins era is that we are benefitting now from that seed that was planted a while back. This is one of the causal factors that I think is making a difference. But more importantly, it is how

²⁷Pooley, supra note 2, at 54.

they are being used.

Prior to 1994, 1995, and now in 1996, uniformed police were not allowed to make drug arrests for fear of corruption.²⁸ They were not allowed to deal with a lot of the license premises violations for fear of corruption. They were not encouraged, for a variety of reasons, to deal with many of the issues which have taken such a hold on the streets of this city. Now it is expected of them to be out on those streets, be active, and allow the public to see them taking charge. It is important that the public should see them dealing with all of the those issues that infuriated them, causing them to ask, "why doesn't somebody do something about this?" That has been controversial and much debated. Many criticize it and are concerned that citizens are being abused in great numbers, or that it would lead to a change in the flavor of the city. I, for one, have not seen that yet. I speak out quite frequently in the debate about, "We have a brutal department, we have a corrupt department, we have a department that is too assertive." I am comfortable speaking on behalf of the department. I am very comfortable speaking in support of it. I am also very comfortable speaking about the 115,000 fewer victims of crime that department has been able to help generate.

²⁸See generally Joseph McNamara, Devastating Cost of Drug War, The Des Moines Register, Feb. 11, 1996, at 1 ("Police scandals are an untallied cost of the drug war . . . The gravity of the police crimes as disturbing as to their volume." The article goes on to describe various drug-related corruption arrests of police officers in New Orleans, Washington D.C., Atlanta and New York.).

So, that is where we are. That is really a walk through time. There were very significant changes in policing from the reactive to a much more proactive community policing model in this city. The formula of a political will to take the streets back, enough police resources used very appropriately, focused on real crime and quality of life. We think we have, in some respects, found the right mix that will do two things: continue to reduce crime and, as importantly, keep it down. Crime now in the city is down about 40% from what it was in 1990.²⁹ Some categories higher, some lower, but on the average about 40%. The goal for 1996 is another 10% so that we will have had a 50% reduction. Consider the psychological impact of that and the image it projects of this city. Two years ago, this city on a per capita basis, per 100,000 population was rated, among the 180 largest cities, 116th in terms of overall crime.³⁰ This means even two years ago, there were 115 American cities that had more crime per capita than New York. Now, we are down to 136 over the last two years and I anticipate at the end of 1996, we will be beyond 150. This might seem strange when you pick up the papers everyday and you see these horrific actions. But keep in mind how many of us there are. There are 7.5 million who live in the city,³¹ 3 million more who come in to work here everyday, and 26

²⁹Police Statistics (Years-end 1990 and 1995).

³⁰CANNOT FIND AN EXACT SOURCE FOR THIS, IS THERE ANYTHING AT NYPD WHICH CAN BE CITED?

³¹Information provided by the New York City Police Department, Bureau of Public Relations.

million tourists.³² There is always going to be, unfortunately, the crime of the day, the crime that is going to make the front page. But the reality is there are many more of you who are not the victims of crime, serious crime, than there were several years ago and the good news is we think we can continue to keep getting it down to at least that 50% reduction level.

Additionally, this year, as you may have heard, the Mayor has committed to even more aggressively attacking the drug problem in the City. We have been mandated by the Mayor to put together probably one of the most comprehensive assaults on the drug problem ever waged by any American Police Department. We benefit in New York from a very large police department, so I can throw a lot of resources at it. We will be identifying a major area of the city to go in, with about 1400 additional officers, and take that area back. Drug-related crime in the city is still what is generating the random violence, the fear, and a lot of the death toll. Many people live in this city in relative safety, but too many live in abject fear because their neighborhoods are still not safe and are still victimized by too much crime. We are going to commit ourselves this year, as a Department, to see if we can do even more. We will not sit back and rest on our laurels, but see if we can do even more. We are not talking about doing it here in Manhattan, we are talking about doing it in some of the toughest neighborhoods in the city. We will go where the problems are. We will not do it as an

³²Id.

occupying army, but in partnership, to work with those communities, to understand that to rid those neighborhoods, we must be there in very large numbers, and we must be there assertively. But we need to do it with their support and their cooperation and their understanding. So we will be spending a lot of time working with those designated neighborhoods to work with us and not feel that we are working against them.

So it has been a good-news couple of years. It has not been without problems, though. The issue of corruption was, unfortunately, in this department, a major problem as evidenced by the Mollen Commission Report.³³ I spent a great deal of my first year on that issue, as did my predecessors. The good news is that what was not known when the Mollin Commission was first put together--the extent of corruption--is known now. The Mollin Commission's principal service was that it identified the extent of corruption in the Department and caused significant changes in the way we police ourselves. As Police Commissioner, now, I feel I have a very good idea of the extent of it, but more importantly, the ability to control it. Like crime, police crime is never going to go away totally. I have 38,000 cops. They are risk-takers by nature. Some of them are not good people. They are in a profession where there are phenomenal temptations, and many of them go over the line. Yet, now I can comfortably say to

³³For excerpts from the report, see Corruption in Uniform: Excerpts of What the Commission Found: Loyalty Over Integrity, N. Y. Times, July 7, 1994, at B2.

you that we do not have rogue precincts like the 30th and the 48th. I do have rogue officers, but increasingly their numbers are being minimized and increasingly we are getting more efficient at finding them out ourselves, arresting them, and putting them in jail. But the reality is, you are still going to hear from time to time of those types of corruption arrests. In the same way, no matter how good we are, you will still hear about horrendous crimes, whether it is the massacre up in Harlem³⁴ or the shooting massacre up in the Bronx.³⁵ That is part of the American scene, unfortunately. The best we can do is try to prevent as much of that as possible. I think that, fortunately, in this City, we have been able to prevent an awful lot of it working together with you.

So with that, I would like to bring my comments to a close and open the discussion up for whatever questions, comments or critiques you might have. I believe we have brought some materials that reinforce some of my comments. Materials such as Managing for Results³⁶ which explains more in detail the intimacies of what we have done over the last couple of years. I have really only given you an overview. It is a very large topic area to cover in a 20-30 minute time frame. But certainly one

³⁴See John Kifner, Death on 125th Street; The Overview: Gunman and 7 Others Die in Blaze at Harlem Store, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1995, at 1.

³⁵See Wendall Jamieson et. al, Shoe Store Slaughter Shooter Kills 5, Wounds 3, Daily News, Dec. 20, 1995, at 3.

³⁶**PLEASE GIVE THE NAME OF THE COMPANY OR ORGANIZATION THAT HAS THE COPYRIGHT FOR THIS PROGRAM AND THE COPYRIGHT DATE.**

that is of critical importance to each and every one of you in this room. It is my pleasure to have had the opportunity to come in and talk about something that I thoroughly enjoy working on--improving our safety.

Larry King Live, March 27, 1996

LARRY KING: Two years ago, he left Boston to take the job of 38th police commissioner in the history of the City of New York, one of the finest and toughest jobs in the world. In the past two years, as commissioner New York City has experienced the steepest crime drop in its history and yesterday, William Bratton says he's leaving.

Why?

WILLIAM BRATTON, former Police Commissioner, New York City: Well, Larry, several reasons - one personal, that after 26 years of the business that I am going to start taking a look at my financial situation and my family situation and after 26 years and six departments that I'm still floating around without a pension - so there is a personal issue. From the professional side, unfortunately, for almost a year here in New York City, the media has constantly attempted to show that the Mayor and I have been at odds with each other, despite both of our denials at every turn, it's a story that would not go away, and increasingly in recent months has become very debilitating - and was beginning, I think, to have the potential to impact negatively on our ability to work together to keep the crime going down. So-

LARRY KING: So, did you call him and say 'I'm going to leave,' or did he ask you or what? How did it happen?

WILLIAM BRATTON: There's different versions of what happened. Whether I was pushed -

LARRY KING: What's the correct one?

WILLIAM BRATTON: -or whether I left - I think it was a convergence of both. I think that-

LARRY KING: You were pushed a little?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Both of us were very frustrated at our inability to push the-media reports aside, and coincidentally, over the last week or so, I got an offer that really I could not turn down. It met all of my needs, allowed me to stay here in New York, to get into a new venture that has potential growth. I will be working for a very large security firm that's going to seek to expand significantly in the years ahead. I'd like the excitement of those new challenges and being quite frank with you that after two years in this job, we've had great success, I've been able to tell the story of 38,000 great cops. I get a lot of credit for it, but it's the cops who are doing the job out there.

LARRY KING: All right. Why- why let the media - well, first of all, what began the stories? Was there a certain break? Was there a little- what- where did it begin?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Oh, it began about a year or so ago, that my deputy commissioner of public information, was forced out, he was - resigned. And it was widely felt that the Mayor had pushed him out the door. And-

LARRY KING: And you were angry over that?

WILLIAM BRATTON: And- I- I was disappointed. I had a great deputy commissioner,

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he's a personal friend, he remains a very close personal friend.

LARRY KING: So there was a rift then?

WILLIAM BRATTON: I think there was a difference of opinion about that particular individual, but both the Mayor and I are professionals and life went on and the second year crime went down 17 percent versus 12 percent in the first year.

LARRY KING: So, are you saying that the media - while there was some cleavage over this incident - the media overplayed it and made it bigger than it was?

WILLIAM BRATTON: I think they made it bigger than it is, bigger than it was. And that's unfortunate because the job was getting done. Crime is down another 9 percent so far this year, we have a goal of 10 percent. And the crime drops, you have to look beyond the percentages, that reality is that in New York there were 1,000 fewer people murdered last year in New York versus 1990, 70,000 some odd fewer cars stolen versus 1990 - and the good news is, in the City of New

York, we have found a way to not only reduce crime but to keep it down. I'm an optimist when it comes to crime in the United States. I think that American policing has finally woken up to the reality that we can make a difference and criminologists be damned, there is something that the police can do. And one of the things we can do is we can focus on results, and the results we can focus on is controlling crime and in New York one of the city's in this country that had the toughest reputation for crime, it is now clearly one of the safest city's in America if not the world.

LARRY KING: And you are very pro-handgun control and you're against what the Congress did the other day, right?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Oh, rabidly against what they did. They are talking out of both sides of their mouths - they want to say they want to support American police and on the other hand they are arming the people that are killing us left and right. We lost two police officers in New York state with two others shot, in just the last week. A New York City police officer, killed by some character on parole armed with two .9 millimeters, with multiple round clips, supposedly banned by the recent legislation. For Congress to even contemplate, let alone act on the idea of once again legalizing these weapons - we believe are about 1 percent of what's in the possession of American citizens, constitute 13 percent of the weapons used to kill American police officers. Congress wake up! American police forces are out there to protect you as well as the rest of the citizens, and this baloney that you keep coming up with, when are you going to wake up? You say you are so close to the American citizenry. Get out and listen to what the 80 percent of them want. And they want gun control and they want it now.

LARRY KING: Since you've done such a good job, and the Mayor has been done in that time, couldn't this have been done - couldn't it have been said, 'Look fellas, we had a disagreement over something, but I'm doing a good job as Mayor, he's doing a great job as police commissioner, let's keep it going.' I mean, couldn't that have been a better way to resolve this? Granted you need more money and granted there is a nice, private security job, couldn't that- for the benefit of the city couldn't this have been handled better?

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WILLIAM BRATTON: Maybe it could have been. But I am also an optimist about the changes that have been made in this organization. We have found a new way to police and it's not just Bill Bratton. It's the New York City police department. It's the organization it's become. When I left the Transit Police in 1992, crime was down 22 percent in that system, now in 1996, and I was gone for three of the last five years, crime is now down 63 percent in that subway system, robberies are down 75 percent, so the systems we put in place in '92 kept the momentum going. I'm comfortable with the systems we developed over the last two years, long after Bill Bratton is gone, crime is going to continue to go down in this city, because the cops know how to police this city. And the good news is, you can transfer what we're doing in New York to any city in America.

LARRY KING: The New York papers said today that the Mayor - you can have an opinion on this - was jealous of all of the good publicity you were getting. Do you buy that?

WILLIAM BRATTON: There is no denying that the New York City police department and myself included, get very publicity, as they should - it's a success story here - but it's a success story that-

LARRY KING: Well, why wouldn't the Mayor be happy over that? He's the Mayor-

WILLIAM BRATTON: He-

LARRY KING: -he gets the eventual credit.

WILLIAM BRATTON: -he personally has not expressed any dissatisfaction with that. He appointed me. It's the political changes here that have also helped to make this a safer city. The idea that - the appreciation that the police can now go out and enforce things that for 25 years they could not enforce: that we can go out and arrest drug dealers on the street - that we can aggressively attack quality of life crimes, and most importantly, that the police can change behavior. And that's what it's all about, changing behavior. That you don't tolerate graffiti, you don't tolerate squeegee persons, you don't tolerate drinking on the corner. And the good news is, if you change the behaviors of the adults, all those kids watching to see what the adults are doing, that big surge at the end of the decade - change the behavior now of the adults and you will be able to change the behavior of those kids that basically emulate the behavior of the adults that they associate with.

LARRY KING: Bill, did the Mayor ask you to reconsider?

WILLIAM BRATTON: No, he did not.

LARRY KING: Had he asked you to reconsider, would you have reconsidered?

WILLIAM BRATTON: At this time, I don't think I could have. Again, the offer was made that came at the right time for me. It's- it's time to move on. I'm going to stay very active in American law enforcement-

LARRY KING: Meaning?

WILLIAM BRATTON: -the president of the United States has appointed me as one of

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his representatives to the Crime Commission that is now being formed. The environment I am moving into, the private security field, part of the success of the future of America is going to be improvement in the quality of the security forces in America. And I intend to be a leader in the new company that I am going to, in developing private security to be regarded as highly as their counterparts in the public sector are now regarded. And I think that is doable.

LARRY KING: Do you expect to have any input into the selection of your replacement?

WILLIAM BRATTON: The Mayor and I met yesterday for about an hour and a half, I expressed to him my- my comments if you will, on the various candidates that he was looking at as of that time. I appreciated that opportunity and my understanding is that he is rapidly moving toward a selection or replacement. And I hope so - the sooner the better. These organizations, you don't want them to leave - to be left out there too long.

LARRY KING: Well, you leave - you leave April 15th. Shouldn't that selection be made before you leave?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Oh, I think every indication is that it will be made long before that.

LARRY KING: Is it going to come from the department?

WILLIAM BRATTON: The selection - we have- we are in great shape in New York. We have tremendous candidates inside the organization. There are candidates outside the organization that have also - one of them is the fire commissioner who is well known to the Mayor, well known in this city and he's had successes of his own. I- I trust that whoever the Mayor will put in will be able to keep the momentum going forward.

LARRY KING: And, as in your case, it might be someone from the outside, right?

WILLIAM BRATTON: There's the potential. One of the candidates that is talked about is the fire commissioner here in New York City.

LARRY KING: No, I mean, a police chief somewhere else.

WILLIAM BRATTON: No, I believe that the selection is going to be restricted to three or four candidates from within the police department, people who have been part of my team-

LARRY KING: Mm-hm.

WILLIAM BRATTON: -and two candidates have been named from outside the organization.

LARRY KING: So that's- that's a definite. You are not going to get the police chief of Indianapolis?

WILLIAM BRATTON: I don't think that is in the archives. I think the Mayor has confidence in the people that are already here.

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LARRY KING: We will be right back with your phone calls for William Bratton, New York City police commissioner since January of 1993. Before that he was in Boston, before that he was in the Traffic Division in New York. He's had an amazing success ratio and now goes into private industry with First Securities.

We will be right back, after these words.

[Commercial break]

LARRY KING: Let's take some calls for one of the best policemen in America, William Bratton of New York. Columbus, Ohio. Hello?

5th CALLER, [Columbus, Ohio]: Hello. Hi, Larry, how are you doing?

LARRY KING: Hi, go ahead.

5th CALLER: Yes, I'd like to know what he thinks of the concealed carry law that's going around the United States, and its positive impact on the country.

WILLIAM BRATTON: Well, first off, I disagree strongly that it's having a positive impact. I am strongly opposed to those concealed gun actions that have occurred in a number of states and am very fearful that, over time, they are going to result in a significance increase in gun violence in this country. Like most American police chiefs, we are opposed to that concept, unfortunately it seems to be a growing one.

LARRY KING: Indianapolis, Indiana. Hello? Hello, Indianapolis, are you there? Do you hear me? Indianapolis, one more chance. Okay, we lost Indianapolis. Are you going to support Mayor Giuliani?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Oh, sure. In terms of the changes that have occurred in the-

LARRY KING: No, I mean, when he runs for reelection.

WILLIAM BRATTON: When I go to the ballot box, I usually keep my opinions to myself-

LARRY KING: Aw, Bill-

WILLIAM BRATTON: -but we'll see.

LARRY KING: -you're not going to endorse him?

WILLIAM BRATTON: We'll- we shall see.

LARRY KING: Is he a good mayor?

WILLIAM BRATTON: He's an excellent mayor. He's an excellent mayor. The changes that have occurred in this city that- a lot of focus on the crime control, but there are a lot of other good things happening here. A lot of people being returned to work from the welfare rolls. The cleaning up of the city, the sense that there is somebody who is in control. This city has a very different feel than it did several years ago. A very different feel.

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LARRY KING: What's - what's the toughest job about running that police force. The single toughest thing about it.

WILLIAM BRATTON: The single toughest thing is dealing with the officers that are shot and injured in the line of duty. Every other aspect of this job I love immensely. It is the greatest job any person could ever hope to have and I've been blessed to, for the last 27 months have it, and it will remain with me for the rest of my life. But the negative is two police funerals in the past week, going to hospitals in the middle of the night too frequently for officers injured all too frequently by the .9 millimeter handgun, by the assault weapon that Congress seems to intent on putting out into the streets in even greater numbers.

LARRY KING: Do we know why, Bill, police officers want to be police officers?

WILLIAM BRATTON: I would think that many of them, like myself, that they come into the business, I came in at age 23, all my life wanting to be one - we came in wanting to do good. We come in wanting to make a difference and that's the beauty of the public sector, that where else can the actions of one individual, or a police department affect, in this case, 8 million people; or, in the case of the United States, that the Time cover story a few months back, 'Finally, We're Winning the War Against Crime.' Americans need to be more optimistic about our ability to deal with crime. We can in fact reduce it, we can control it, we can do a better job than we've done, we've shown it in New York. And I- I intend to speak loud and clear that there needs to be more optimism on this issue. The crime bill that President Clinton was able to get through after so many years of being stalled in Congress, it has made phenomenal changes in this country. We're benefited in New York, by almost \$50 million from that bill. And the good things that emanate from that type of positive action, it resonates throughout the land. These are good times for American law enforcement, we are beginning to make a difference.

LARRY KING: We will be back with our remaining moments with William Bratton who will be missed, the outgoing police commissioner of the City of New York.

Don't go away.

[Commercial break]

LARRY KING: We're back with police commissioner of New York William Bratton, he's given a lot of his life to service like this in other divisions of police work and in Boston. Going to miss it, aren't you?

WILLIAM BRATTON: I'm going to miss it terribly, but with the appointment to the crime commission, the close cooperation between the public and private sector, while I will be out of the public sector, [unintelligible] I will be heard from, I am not going away.

LARRY KING: Not quietly into the good night.

WILLIAM BRATTON: No, not at all. Not at all.

LARRY KING: What's - what's First Security Services?

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WILLIAM BRATTON: It's a Boston based firm. It's about the 10th, 11th largest in the country, largest in the northeast region. It's a multi-faceted security firm - investigative services, guard services. It's an entity that's rated among the best in its field and is offering me an opportunity to get into that field, be part of an expansion that's contemplated and to be part of a- I think, a very significant change that's going to occur in that industry over the next 10 years. Americans are going to spill- spend billions of dollars in the private sector and the image of the private security sector needs to be enhanced, and as we have been able to enhance it in the public sector, I think the same thing can happen in the private sector.

LARRY KING: You've got to get away from the private eye image, right?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Exactly, that it's- it's much more than that. It's much more sophisticated in today's day and age, and I think you are going to see a lot more reliance on the private security sector.

LARRY KING: Yeah. Did they come to you?

WILLIAM BRATTON: The gentleman that owns the company has been a friend for many, many years, and for a number of years has been attempting to recruit me and finally, the time was right and I am pleased to have been able to accept the offer.

LARRY KING: One other thing, Bill, can we say that on the list that you saw that you discussed with the mayor yesterday, any one of them would be satisfactory with you?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Actually, that is the case. Some more satisfactory than others?

LARRY KING: Is there one standout - you don't have to tell us who - but is there one in your mind that, if they said yes, you would say 'Yes, now.'

WILLIAM BRATTON: There's several in that group.

LARRY KING: There are several?

WILLIAM BRATTON: And that's the good news for the city.

LARRY KING: Several meaning more than two?

WILLIAM BRATTON: Several meaning two or three.

LARRY KING: Thanks very much, Bill, best of luck.

We will be seeing lots of you.

WILLIAM BRATTON: Okay, I hope so.

LARRY KING: William Bratton, the outgoing police commissioner of New York, resigned yesterday, he will leave April 15th.

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Tomorrow night we are up in New York City. Sotheby's is going to be auctioning off a whole bunch of items from the collection of the late Jacqueline Onassis. We're going to see a lot of them. Pierre Salinger is going to be one of our guides. This is tomorrow night in New York.

Friday night, Newt Gingrich will host this program. His guests will be Jack Hannah and a whole bunch of animals from the Columbus Zoo.

Next week, among our guests will be Richard Gere, Robert Shapiro and Hillary Rodham Clinton.

From Washington, this is Larry King. Good night.

The preceding text has been professionally transcribed. However, although the text has been checked against an audio track, in order to meet rigid distribution and transmission deadlines, it has not yet been proofread against videotape.

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Crime Busters for New Orleans

Pair of Ex-Aides to Bratton Try to Turn Around Another Force

By ADAM NOSSITER

NEW ORLEANS, Dec. 4 — For the last two years, New York City officials from the Mayor on down have proclaimed that their crime-fighting strategy is the solution to runaway big-city homicide rates.

Now New Orleans, afflicted with the highest murder rate among the nation's major cities, has imported two leading architects of New York's strategy, in a test of their methods that is being closely watched by police officials and criminologists around the country.

The imposing task faced by the two recruits — Jack Maple, who was the chief anti-crime strategist for the New York Police Department during the tenure of Commissioner William J. Bratton, and John Linder, who was Commissioner Bratton's private consultant — is to help overhaul a police force that is among the nation's most corrupt and inefficient.

The two men, now partners in a New York consulting firm, the Linder Maple Group, have come up with a plan that has shifted dozens of previously headquarters-bound detectives here to local districts and, in addition, subjects district commanders to intensive, New York-style grilling by their bosses once a week.

To be sure, Mr. Maple and Mr. Linder have already had to make some adjustments to suit this particularly tolerant subtropical city. Whereas a hallmark of the New York strategy was an all-out assault on quality-of-life offenses, the police in New Orleans cannot make arrests for drinking on the street, for instance, because doing so is perfectly legal as long as the alcohol is consumed from a covered container like the "go cups" available at virtually every bar in the French Quarter.

Further, not all experts agree that New York's anti-crime strategy is entirely responsible for the precipitous fall in its own murder rate. While many credit the program, others note that homicide rates have fallen in many other major cities (even in New Orleans from 1994 to 1995), though not so steeply as in New York.

In any event, and whatever the challenges, people in New Orleans are desperate for solutions.

Just this past Sunday, robbers herded three workers at a popular French Quarter restaurant into a freezer and shot them to death, capping an especially bloody week in which 13 people were murdered. The French Quarter slayings have provoked an outcry in this usually jaded city. Residents have met to demand stepped-up police protection, and a march on City Hall is scheduled for Thursday. At the same time, Mayor Marc Morial has appealed to Gov. Mike Foster, so far unsuccessfully, to send in state troopers to patrol the French Quarter.

As for the longer term, one hope is that Mr. Maple and Mr. Linder can make a difference.

Mr. Maple, a fireplug of a man whose flashy dressing has caused almost as much comment here as his shake-up of the police force, once filled a top spot at One Police Plaza in Manhattan. He was Mr. Bratton's deputy commissioner for operations, and his regular grillings on the latest crime statistics made precinct commanders nervous.

Here he has an office on the fifth floor of the dingy Police Headquarters building, and the ear of the Superintendent of Police, Richard Pennington, who hired him and Mr. Linder as consultants this summer.

The consultants' mandate is to bring down crime in a city where

gunfire is heard nightly in all neighborhoods, and to do so with what may be the most scandal-ridden instrument in law enforcement: the 1,285-member New Orleans Police Department.


The magnitude of the challenge is suggested by statistics. In the last three years, more than 50 police officers here have been arrested on felony charges, including rape and murder. And the consultants have calculated that the murder rate in the city's public housing developments is about twice the rate for the city as a whole, which was 76 per 100,000 people last year. That makes the public-housing murder rate roughly 18 times the nation's.

Only six weeks have passed since the Maple-Linder plan was introduced here, and so the final verdict is a long way off. But already police

STATUS REPORT

Two Cities, Two Trends

Murder rates per 100,000 people.



Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation

The New York Times

commanders in the city's eight districts say that at least one central element — detectives' redeployment from headquarters to the districts — has brought results.

"I'm really ecstatic about how the redeployment has worked so far," said one commander, Capt. Mike Ellington. "We've seen leaps and bounds in cases' being closed."

Academics are watching closely to see how the program works out.

"It will be an intriguing test of the transferability of the Bratton strategy to another place," said Alfred Blumstein, a criminologist at Carnegie-Mellon University.

Actually there is no academic consensus yet on how much credit is due Mr. Bratton and Mr. Maple for the 24 percent decline in New York's murder rate from 1994 to 1995, a drop that was three times the national average. But Mr. Blumstein and another well-known criminologist,

Cont'd

Fleming's sentiments are echoed by Bonnie Cain, who added that the new plan sounds like community empowerment policing, a current program that encourages community-police participation.

"I can't see any difference," said Cain, who until recently edited a Mount Pleasant neighborhood news-

paper. She is a newly elected ANC commissioner.

In the Shaw neighborhood of Northwest, Anne Hill is not quite sure what to think of the plan. She has lived on the west end of the 1st Police District for nearly 15 years, and has seen a lot change. As an Orange Hat anti-crime patrol leader and a single parent, she has seen the violence in her neighborhood at Fifth and O streets NW ebb and flow. Fatal shootings have occurred at the intersection over the years, and drug dealers remain a constant, she said.

Some aspects of the police plan are appealing, but she, too, has questions, she said. "It's a good idea for a loitering law, drinking in public. It's an excellent idea, but I wonder how much will it be enforced and how much will it be allowed to be enforced," Hill said.

One thing she is sure about, though, she said.

"Police can only do so much," she said. "If they don't have people who are willing to stand up, then their hands are tied."

Residents of Ward 3 in the 2nd Police District want another chance to hear the plan. A combination of holiday timing, short notice and conflicting meetings caused the low turnout last week, said Kurt Vorn-dran, president of the Ward 3 Democrats. They are requesting a second meeting, he said.

"I think what people are critical of [in Ward 3] is a lack of leadership" from city leaders, Vorn-dran said.

Across the Anacostia River in Ward 8 and the 7th Police District, some residents and community activists are among the most skeptical when it comes to the new police plan.

To James Foreman, founder of the Orange Hat patrols who lives in Ward 8, an area plagued by homicides and other violent crimes, the new plans sound like old ones. "Big meetings are about looking good and letting people vent their frustrations," he said.

Barry and Soulsby should have included residents in developing the plan, he said.

"You can't just put something together for us and then say you expect us to be a part of it," Foreman said.

The meeting in the 6th District will be 7:30 p.m. Monday at the Police Boys & Girls Club, 4103 Benning Rd. NE. The 5th District meeting will be 7 p.m. Dec. 16 at Bethesda Baptist Church, 1808 Capital Ave. NE.

Franklin Zimring of the University of California, are ready to give the New York strategy at least some of that credit.

"You really have to be in an advanced state of denial to talk of the New York drop as if it had nothing to do with policing," Mr. Zimring said. "Bratton himself has an enormous amount of credibility in policing circles."

It was this credibility, officials here say, that caused Superintendent Pennington to seek out the services of Mr. Maple and Mr. Linder.

Mr. Pennington, who was hired two years ago and told to reform the force, acknowledged in an interview the vastly different social and cultural climate that could make applying New York methods here difficult. Drinking in public, for instance, is not only legal in New Orleans but also "the accepted norm," he noted.

And a "zero tolerance" crackdown even on those minor acts that are actually outlawed here — an effort that was a crucial part of the strategy in New York — is not a part of the New Orleans plan, at least not yet. "I don't have at this time enough resources to do zero tolerance," Mr. Pennington said.

But other New York elements are in the plan, including the weekly meetings where district commanders are questioned closely about crime patterns in their jurisdictions, and compelled to come up with ways to combat them. This sort of strategic crime analysis, and the intensifying of the commanders' accountability, might seem like nothing more than common-sense steps that could have been taken long ago by a

troubled department. But they were foreign to the New Orleans force.

While Mr. Linder has returned to New York, Mr. Maple has taken up residence at a hotel here until February, to see through the implementing of the plan. He takes a low profile at the weekly meetings, officials say, not sitting at the table, not speaking out loud, limiting himself to whispers with ranking officers.

Mr. Maple declined to be interviewed about his role here. He and Mr. Linder are being paid by the private New Orleans Police Foundation, created by businessmen to help in the fight against crime.

Some rank-and-file officers are both skeptical and puzzled. Given its history of poor performance, the New Orleans force has been among the most thoroughly studied anywhere. And so when a patrolman in the French Quarter, who refused to give his name, was asked about Mr. Maple the other day, he replied: "He's come down here doing that survey. They come down here about every 10 years to do that survey."

But among the district commanders, there has been praise, if qualified, even for the weekly grilling sessions.

"It was easy for some captains to just sit back and let the district run itself," said one commander, who demanded anonymity. "For 25 years captains would just sit back in their offices, and nobody would know anything."

AP Associated Press

^AM-Death Penalty, HFR,560<

^Executions Reached 38-Year High in 1995<

^Eds: For Release 4:30 p.m. EST<

^By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN=

^Associated Press Writer=

WASHINGTON (AP) — Fifty-six men were executed last year, the largest number in 38 years, and an additional 3,054 inmates waited on death row at year's end, the Justice Department reported Wednesday.

The executions occurred in 16 states and was the most since 1957 when 65 were executed, the department's Bureau of Justice Statistics reported. All the 1995 inmates had been convicted of murder.

By comparison, during the 1930s annual execution totals always exceeded 120 and sometimes approached 200. Since the Supreme Court upheld revised death penalty laws in 1976, a total of 313 people have been executed. Previous capital punishment laws were ruled unconstitutional in 1972.

The prisoners executed last year had been on death row for an average of 11 years and two months — about a year longer than the 31 inmates executed in 1994.

By comparison, the 16 inmates executed in 1985 had been on death row an average of five years and 11 months. The time between conviction and execution has increased since capital punishment was restored. The average wait during 1977-83 was four years and three months.

The growing length of time condemned inmates postpone execution by appealing convictions was cited by Congress and President Clinton when they enacted legislation earlier this year imposing unprecedented limits on the appeals prisoners can take to federal courts.

As of Dec. 31, 1995, there were 2,998 men and 48 women on state death rows and eight men under federal death sentence. All had committed murder.

The youngest, 18, was in Nevada and the oldest, 80, was in Arizona. During 1995, eight states had no minimum age for the death penalty: Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah.

The federal system and the 30 other states with capital punishment set the minimum age for execution between 14 and 19. Twelve states and the District of Columbia have no death penalty.

More than a third of the death row inmates were in three states: California, 420; Texas, 404; and Florida, 362. Texas executed the largest number of prisoners, 19, followed by Missouri, 6, and Illinois and Virginia, 5 apiece.

Thirty-three of those executed were white, including two of Hispanic origin; 22 were black and 1 was Asian.

The death row inmates included 1,513 whites, 1,262 blacks, 22 native Americans, 19 Asians and two listed as other race. There were 236 Hispanics, of various races.

Among death row inmates whose criminal histories were available, two-thirds had a prior felony conviction and 8 percent had a prior homicide conviction. Half had never been married; a quarter were married when sentenced and another quarter were divorced, separated or had a deceased spouse.

Forty-nine of the executions were by lethal injection, seven by electrocution.

At year end, 32 states authorized lethal injection; 11, electrocution, seven, lethal gas; four, hanging; and three, firing squad. Thirty-seven states require an appellate review of death sentences regardless of the defendant's wishes; Arkansas and the federal system do not.

The states without a death penalty are: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.

12-4-96

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How to Run a Police Department

Get cops
to care
about what
they're doing,
and they'll
do it right.

George L. Kelling

From Plato in Athens to Police Commissioner William Bratton in New York, experts on public order have ceaselessly worried over one key problem: how to control the police who maintain that order.

Truly, it's a conundrum. The police, unlike almost everyone else in American society, are commissioned to use force, even deadly force. But unlike other groups licensed to use force—prison guards, say, or soldiers—they are not sequestered in prisons or on bases. They don't operate in groups under close command. They are dispersed throughout society. And as they patrol the streets unsupervised, singly or in pairs, their power exposes them to mighty temptations.

Citizens and politicians constantly urge them to "do something, *now*," about drugs, crime, and violence. Hampered by constricting criminal procedures, and at times by the lack of authority or resources, officers feel pressure (even from the administrators of their own departments) to do "what has to be done"—that is, to abuse their authority by settling matters with their own version of street justice. In addition, police become enmeshed with society's most troubled and most needy, as



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well as with its most vicious and most depraved. Their immersion in the world of vice and misery can breed cynicism and contempt for those around them and can tempt them to commit crimes like accepting payoffs not to enforce the law or even shaking down drug dealers.

Recently, Commissioner Bratton has had more reason than ever to ponder this problem: even as his aggressive anti-crime push has dramatically cut the city's crime rate—with murder down an astonishing 32 percent and robbery down 22 percent—the NYPD's well-publicized instances of lawlessness and corruption in the 30th Precinct, along with officers' unwillingness to finger their colleagues who made a drunken shambles out of a Washington police convention, have dramatized just how hard it is even for a successful top cop to keep his troops in line. The solution Bratton brings to that problem is as innovative and promising as his crime-busting strategies.

In fact it is, at bottom, the same strategy. If you can devise ways of reducing crime that work dramatically, most police officers will find success so gratifying that their own self-image, their pride in being part of a winning organization, will serve as an internal bar to misbehavior. If you set up a managerial structure that keeps everyone focused on the department's core crime-reducing mission, that in itself will go far to controlling officers. And if you make sure officers have the legal tools to do the job properly, they won't feel pressure to exceed their authority, and they won't develop the cynicism that comes from trying to do a job whose requirements are in irreconcilable conflict.

But here's the rub: this winning strategy is so far in advance of the conventional wisdom that New York State's legislators and judges don't begin to understand it. In June the State Legislature, pushed by the state's judiciary, blunderingly passed a little-noticed amendment to the budget that inadvertently stripped New York cops of the legal authority they need to police in Bratton's twenty-first-century style. New York City officials are scrambling to undo the Legislature's blunder, which threatens to subvert the city government's biggest success in years. As Bratton

told me, "If this is not corrected, it has the potential to undermine the whole effort."

Bratton's solution to the problem of control flies in the face of an orthodoxy that goes at least as far back as the early twentieth century. Since then, the effort to prevent corruption and control officers has shaped virtually every aspect of police organization, administration, and tactics. By mid-century, police and political leaders throughout the United States had established a rigidly hierarchical command structure designed for this purpose, a structure that remains in place today.

Rules and regulations cover every conceivable aspect of organizational life. Extensive training socializes not just recruits but also seasoned personnel. Until recently, departments kept officers in cars to prevent "contamination" by citizen contact, and regulations prohibited cops from making drug arrests, so as to forestall seduction by the mountains of money involved in drug dealing. A central 911 emergency call system screens requests for police service to ensure that individual officers aren't asked to do improper things. A powerful, secretive internal affairs bureau penetrates every nook and cranny to guard against corruption. And police administrators have tried to restrict cops to dealing with only the most serious crimes, since enforcement of laws against minor crimes like panhandling and disorderly conduct plunges patrol officers into ambiguity and requires them to exercise considerable discretionary judgment.

Given all these tools of control and socialization, managers should be able to shape a powerful, unified culture that would dominate their departments and prevent corruption. But no. Instead, police departments—the NYPD included—have two separate cultures: the cop culture and the management culture. The cop culture's most visible manifestation is the blue curtain—the protective allegiance of cops to one another, their in-the-trenches loyalty that places a higher value on solidarity and protecting comrades than on professional standards of conduct. But the cop culture, as researcher Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni has shown, is more than that. Penetrating

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lawed many traditional and appropriate techniques of maintaining order.

More than anything else, the disparities between "official" police work and actual police work are what breed frustration, cynicism, stress, and a wary, isolated culture among officers. When officers say that "citizens don't understand" or "you had to be there to understand," when they view citizens as actual or potential enemies, they are expressing their deep frustration at a system in which success or humiliation can so often be based on random luck, departmental politics, or wildly unpredictable encounters with citizens.

A recent example from New York City illustrates the kind of administrative action that breeds rank-and-file cynicism. In 1989, Robert Kiley, then chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, asked transit police management to develop plans to deal with the "homeless" problem in the subways. (This was a misnomer: the problem was the illegal disorderly behavior of individuals who mostly were not homeless.) After fussing about what they couldn't do, police managers proposed that maintenance crews should go into subways with high-power hoses to "clean" the areas in which the "homeless" congregated. Police, in support of "cleaning" operations, would eject the "homeless." This, of course, was a transparent ruse designed to evade serious constitutional, moral, and practical concerns. Officers were keenly aware of the duplicity and the risk for them. When things went wrong, the "white shirts," as officers called managers, would either be closeted in their offices or nicely home in bed, while line officers would face the glare of cameras and the wrath of advocates. Officers could hardly look to management for support and protection. Instead, they would do what they had to and pull the blue curtain around their activities. Happily, Kiley rejected the idea.

Police pundits have argued that the self-protective culture of line officers persists because police managers don't carry out their control strategy very well. Managers, for their part, blame police unions—though the blue curtain long predated unionization. But in fact the cop

culture is an understandable though troubling response to the simple reality that the management practices that have dominated policing for most of the twentieth century don't work.

As Bratton understands, the control strategy is fundamentally flawed. And for a simple reason: most police activities are not under the control of central administrators at all. To be sure, the command-and-control paradigm of management has an impeccable pedigree. From Adam Smith through Frederick Taylor to General Motors, the principles of task routinization and simplification, the assembly line, and bureaucratic notions such as layers of control, span of control, and extensive rules and regulations were at the forefront of organizational thinking. Yet however well this model once worked in factories, it has never worked well in police departments.

After all, police work cannot be broken into simple tasks. Police deal with extraordinarily complex human interactions. Furthermore, police work cannot be scrutinized by overseers. Most police work is performed either by an officer alone or with a partner. The nature of their work requires officers to make fine judgments, often in dangerous and confusing circumstances, usually by relying on their internalized values, knowledge, and skills rather than on direct oversight.

In ignoring these factors, police leaders have constructed control systems that leave the vast majority of police work uncontrolled. Departmental regulations are the most obvious example. Up to 80 percent of rules cover the internal manners and mores of the organization: issues like wearing uniforms, filling out forms, saluting, and handling property. The rest deal with very important but rare events: use of force, hot pursuit, and processing arrests. When sociologist Egon Bittner asks indignantly, "What has all of this to do with *policing*?" he is only slightly exaggerating, since actual police work consists primarily of helping people manage crises and conflicts. Most police officers, for their part, would give a cynical answer to Bittner's question: "What all these rules and regulations have to do with police work is that they can be used to 'get'

How to Run a Police Department

don't work. Somehow, line police must be controlled. Although the forces that corrupt police may change over time—machine politics yesterday, drug money today—they are always powerful. But paradoxically, the only way to control police effectively is not to focus primarily on controlling them. Instead, police departments must concentrate with utter dedication on their principal mission: preventing crime and keeping order. If managers win officers' commitment to that primary goal, cops' own internal values will make them resist corruption as inconsistent with the kind of officer they are dedicated to being.

Evidence is accumulating that Commissioner Bratton's new solutions to the problem, based on this principle, are beginning to work. As Harvard criminologist Mark H. Moore describes it, the trick for any leader trying to change an organization radically—to transform its culture so completely that employees feel a profoundly changed relation to the whole enterprise—is to find methods of change that will shake the organization to its core. Bratton has done this in two ways: by sending a powerful message to his officers about their work, and by devolving authority down so as to encourage creativity, while establishing a process to hold key staff accountable. In important instances, he uses the same technique to achieve both goals.

First, the message. Bratton has made sure that everyone understands the business of the NYPD: to reduce crime—not just a little, a lot. ("Think bold," he said shortly after taking office. "I don't want a 2 to 3 percent reduction in crime this year—I want 15 to 25 percent." And he got it.) Police can reduce crime now, within constraints—they needn't wait for new cars or computers, more cops, bigger budgets, or more overtime. But meanwhile, of course cops should have semiautomatic weapons, because they deserve the best equipment and, with training, they can be trusted to use it properly. Cops deserve smart-looking uniforms—and should wear them smartly—because they represent both the city and the profession. When cops come under criticism for doing their job properly, as they do on occasion, they deserve wholehearted support.

Bratton also sends strong messages about his disgust with corrupt police. When cops are corrupt, the commissioner goes out to arrest and publicly shame them—taking their shields, symbolic of their oaths, from them personally. Reinforcing the message, Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple reminds police over and over: "Do not lie to get an arrest." If an officer inadvertently conducts an illegal search, he should admit it. "Don't start making things worse by inventing stories like: 'The bag of white powder was sitting on the front seat alongside the driver when I made the traffic stop.' Don't ruin your career by escalating a simple mistake into perjury."

Bratton's most powerful message is about the seamless web that connects disorder, fear, serious crime, and urban decay. He makes the Broken Windows argument that James Q. Wilson and I developed: disorder and petty crimes, left untended, signal that no one cares, and lead to fear, serious crime, and urban decay.

Broken Windows flies in the face of the assumption that serious crime is the only proper business of the police, an assumption that unites two utterly opposite ideologies: the traditional law-enforcement view of the police as crime solvers and felon catchers, and the radical individualism of the sixties that tolerated all forms of non-violent deviance, lawful or not. The Broken Windows theory emphasizes instead that the best way to prevent major crimes and urban decay is to target minor crimes—panhandling, youths taking over parks, prostitution, public drinking, and public urination. Bratton's message goes something like this: People should not urinate publicly (or drink in public, or engage in prostitution, and so on). If they do, cite them. If they do it again, arrest them. If they appear to be carrying a weapon, search them; and, in any case, question them about other neighborhood problems. (Police ask suspects questions like: Do you know where to get a gun? Do you know where to buy drugs?) If information about other problems surfaces, relentlessly pursue it.

For many officers, steeped in the traditional police culture, this is a hard sell. In their minds,

by moving such offenses to administrative rather than criminal jurisdiction. The more likely reason is that judges feel as reluctant to deal with such seemingly trivial dirty work as cops were before Bratton won them over. In any event, legislators bought the argument and made the change, which took effect October 1.

The result: New York's cops have lost their principal tool for order keeping. Until October 1, officers could control public drunkenness or public urination or squeegeeing because they could arrest people who failed to answer summonses for such offenses. They could require people they stopped for such offenses to identify themselves and could then check if they had any warrants outstanding. But with these offenses moved to administrative jurisdiction, cops have lost the authority to make arrests. They can hand out tickets, but if offenders don't answer them, as most don't, police can do . . . nothing. Nor can officers compel offenders to identify themselves. As a practical matter, the Legislature has made the laws against such offenses unenforceable.

New York City officials are desperately trying to repair this incalculable damage. The NYPD's legal staff is scrambling to identify other sources of authority to arrest people for some of these offenses: public urination, for instance, may qualify as a misdemeanor violation of the health code. Officials persuaded the City Council to restore some offenses to criminal jurisdiction by elevating them from administrative offenses to misdemeanors. But the Council refused to recriminalize the most important offenses to the Bratton strategy—such as public urination, drunkenness, and squeegeeing. Officials have asked the Legislature to reconsider the change, and meanwhile they have asked the courts to stay the new arrangement. If nothing is done, the Legislature will have committed its biggest offense against the public interest in many years. "It's obvious," Bratton says, "that judges and legislators haven't gotten the message from citizens that police departments have."

Drawing upon the re-engineering experience of private industry, Bratton has made changes in



CULVER PICTURES

A former commander of the 29th Precinct.

the department's management structure that aim to do much more than merely cure bureaucratic paralysis and organizational bloat. The crucial goal is to create a unified police culture that both empowers officers to do police work and ensures that they will do it properly—reflexively, out of habit. Bratton's most important move has been to push decision making downward, under the assumption that the closer to the ground the decision makers are, the more likely that they will be focused on and responsive to neighborhood needs. The most natural level of decision making seems to be the precincts, geographical entities with histories and traditions. With 200 to 400 employees, they are small enough that commanders can wrap their minds around them.

Consequently, Bratton has moved aggressively to devolve authority to precincts. Early in his tenure he sent the message that the NYPD's most capable mid-managers would head precincts. The transfer of power from the department's 55 chiefs to these new precinct commanders has been real. Frank Hartmann, director of Harvard's Criminal Justice Program, has conducted focus groups with precinct commanders to help Bratton understand their problems. Hartmann has described to me the heady, almost giddy experience that

detail. He tries to get back to the formal presentation, but Maple continues to scrutinize the data. "What about household burglaries? They're down." The commander shoots back: "Yeah, we got wind of about four really active burglars, so we targeted on them." He provides details about how the police recognized the pattern, gathered information, devised a plan, and made arrests. The commander's peers break into applause.

Another commander steps up to the podium. "You had eight rapes this month, four above last year," Maple says. "What's going on?" The commander begins disaggregating: "Four rapes involved friends and family, one was a date rape, and three were stranger rapes. Two of those appear to be the work of one person." Maple turns

The NYPD's culture is different already. Anyone familiar with policing can feel the re-invigoration of officers.


to the detective lieutenant assigned to the precinct and standing beside the commander. "Tell me about the investigation." The lieutenant moves to the podium and describes the investigation. Maple interrupts and addresses another precinct commander seated at the table: "You had a similar problem a couple of months ago, didn't you? How did you handle it?" Later in the presentation, while discussing auto theft, the commander asks if it's legal to stop tow trucks towing cars (a common method of theft). Several people call out a jumble of opinions. Maple cuts them off. Nodding to the head of the legal department, he guarantees the captain a quick response: "We're not sure. Legal will get back to you with an answer by the end of the day." Finally, after half an hour or so, Maple allows the commander to wrap up his presentation.

Before he steps down, though, the commander recognizes two patrol officers: "I would like to introduce officers Jacques Guillois and John Bakke. Recently we were having particularly

Crime analysis identified that robbery pattern 27 in Queens and 40 in Brooklyn were virtually identical. [The NYPD assigns a number to every robbery pattern—mode of operation, number of offenders, descriptions, and so on.] There were also similar robberies in Nassau County. The violence was worsening with each robbery: it was only a matter of time until someone was killed. We convened a special crime control strategy meeting [of super-chiefs, borough chiefs, precinct commanders, heads of special units, and Nassau police]. We shared information and developed a coordinated response. We alerted units in Brooklyn, Queens, and Nassau County. Officers Guillois and Bakke, while patrolling in an unmarked car, recognized the license number [which had been identified in the robbery patterns], stopped the car, and arrested two persons—the driver for being unlicensed and the passenger for having three bags of marijuana. Guillois and Bakke arranged for a lineup so that a victim could make a positive identification. The pair was identified as the robbers we were looking for by a Burger King employee. Officers Guillois and Bakke, please stand up."

Along with the rest of the participants and the audience, chiefs, *super-chiefs*, rise and applaud—applaud patrol officers. The officers have been assigned to a month of special duty in the detective unit, a career-enhancing honor.

In another case, participants in a meeting were perplexed by a burglary pattern in Washington Heights: burglars were concentrating on cable TV boxes. Maple and Anemone pushed the issue, instructing the commander of the 34th Precinct to find out where the boxes were going and report back at the next meeting. Back in the precinct, the commander assembled a team of officers who put together a plan: youthful officers posing as burglars worked the street trying to sell "hot" cable boxes actually supplied by the cable company. Finally they found someone willing to buy them. They obtained a warrant and searched the buyer's residence, where they found a cache of stolen boxes that he planned to resell. At the next meet-




INSIDE THE
BUDGET TALKS

**FINALLY, WE'RE
WINNING
THE WAR AGAINST
CRIME.
HERE'S WHY.**

New York
Commissioner
William Bratton,
a leading
advocate of
community
policing

C R I M E

AND



Crime rates are down across the U.S.—some dramatically. Is this a blip or a trend? With so many factors in play, it may be a bit of both

By RICHARD LACAYO

WANT TO SEE A CIVIC MONUMENT THAT NO CITY would ever want? Go to New Orleans and proceed to the intersection of Congress and Law streets, just a few blocks from the tourists' Latin Quarter. Walk anywhere in that neighborhood of trashed storefronts and blunt-shouldered housing projects. It won't take long to find walls that are spattered with grimy little craters. Those are bullet holes. Every one of them is an unofficial memorial to the mayhem that was daily life around there until not so long ago.

Starting in the late 1980s, drug dealers had claimed the place as their own, part sales ground, part killing ground, where they seized market share the hard way, with drive-by shootings and turf wars. At the nearby St. Philip Social Service Center, preschoolers learned to dive for the floor in "shooting drills," then stay there until their teachers sounded the all clear. By 1994 there were three or more killings each month on the streets outside. Standing now where the unthinkable used to be the unremarkable, police lieutenant Edwin Compass III looks around with a shudder. "I'd bet it was the most dangerous block in the U.S."

The good thing about monuments is they commemorate the past. Last year the city inaugurated a Community Oriented Policing Squad (cops), now headed by Compass, a name so foursquare no novelist would dare invent it. With secondhand furniture and federal money, police set up round-the-clock substations in vacant

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COMMUNITY POLICING

Daylight basketball is just one aspect of the cops' increased presence in the Deane project in New Orleans. With a new police substation, gang bangers have fled

CRIME

apartments at three of the city's most deadly projects. The 45 cops assigned to them work foot patrol, get to know the law-abiding residents and sweep out the street dealers. They also help pick up trash, combat graffiti and round up kids who play hooky.

That mix of shoe leather and social work has made a difference. By the end of last year killings around the three projects had dropped 74%. A dozen dead bodies per annum is still no small problem. But if you don't happen to be one of them, it is cause enough for celebration. Lately, the neighborhood even sees its share of those spontaneous street parades that are defining outbreaks of civic life in New Orleans. What are people celebrating? Maybe just the return of their freedom to move around.

New Orleans is not alone. After years of depressing and implacable upswing, serious crime is retreating all around the U.S. In the nine cities with a population of more than 1 million, the decrease in violent crimes was 8% in 1994. Nationally, murders fell 12% in the first six months of 1995, and serious crimes of all kinds dropped 1% to 2%. The suburbs, long a growth area for felonies, posted declines between 4% and 5% last year in violent crime.

What makes these numbers important, not just encouraging, is that they extend what is plainly a sustained retreat from the crack-fueled crime wave of the late 1980s. According to the FBI, violent crimes started to decline in 1993. As always with crime, an area of famously wiggly trend lines, the downward curve is not to be found everywhere. Minneapolis, Minnesota, for instance, is still puzzling over why in 1995 homicides climbed more than 56% over the preceding year. Even with the downward trend, crime rates remain bloodcurdlingly high, especially when compared to the relatively peaceable kingdom of, say, 1985. (Murder victims per 100,000 then: 5.1. In 1994: 9.) And there are widespread predictions that another tidal wave will break as soon as the milk-toothed children of the '90s crowd into their saw-toothed teens. Whoever called economics the dismal science must not have heard about criminology.

For all that, even the experts in bad behavior are intrigued. Something is happening here. The question is, Why? The lineup of contributing factors includes most of the usual suspects: a decline in the proportion of young males in the general population, the leveling off of crack cocaine use, a moderate unemployment rate and tougher sentencing that gets more felons off the street and keeps them off longer.

Certainly demographics is part of it. Very simply, there are fewer people in the



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STRICTER SENTENCING

The U.S. prison population has more than doubled over the past 15 years, which means that many repeat offenders have been taken off the streets. But finding a place to put them all is getting harder. At the California Institution for Men, in Chino, prison officials have had to turn the sports facility into a bunk room.

Number of
prisoners in state
and federal
institutions
in millions

668

At year end 1980, 1 in every 440 U.S. residents were incarcerated. By year end 1994 that figure grew to 1 in every 175.

most crime-prone category, which is males from the ages of 15 to 29. The crime spree that began in the 1980s was largely the work of baby boomers as they moved into those years. The same boomers are tipping into their 50s, an age when you're just right for fly fishing but not much good with a semiautomatic. The bad news, however, is that today's smaller cohort of teenagers is more prone to crime than its elders were at the same age. Among 14- to 17-year-olds, for instance, murder rates skyrocketed over the past decade.

The trade in crack cocaine also appears to have changed. Perhaps it has lost its cachet. "As with any drug epidemic, the attractiveness of the drug begins to wear off, partly because users see so many of their friends dead," says James Q. Wilson, the UCLA professor who is one of the nation's most prominent thinkers on crime. That's important, because crack was the great im-

petus to crime in the late 1980s as by new dealers muscled in. Another theory is that the trade has simply stabilized in "mature market," as they say in the business schools, with surviving distributors less likely to clash over territory.

As for prison populations, those 1 more than doubled in the past 15 years. Most criminologists believe that a relatively small population of repeat felons is responsible for a disproportionate share of crime. Look away the most energetic thieves and killers, and you make a serious dent in their business. "Most prisoners are violent or repeat offenders," says Wil Bennett, the former Secretary of Education and drug czar. "Prisons do cut crime." Last week Bennett's Council on Crime in America, a commission he co-heads with Griffin Bell, who was Attorney General under Jimmy Carter, issued a report that violent crime is still higher than p



Incarceration rate per 100,000


lowest	668	highest	185
Illinois	573	West Virginia	234
Oklahoma	536	Maine	112
South Carolina	510	Minnesota	103
Arizona	472	North Dakota	90

records indicate because so much of it goes unreported. They urged even more aggressive jailings.


But time and again, the experts are also returning to an explanation they would have played down in the past: more effective policing strategies. It is respectable once again to believe that cops can have a real impact on crime rates, an opinion that has been seriously out of fashion among professional students of crime. For decades they held that crime was too deeply connected to underlying social causes, meaning everything from the state of the economy to the breakdown of the family. Such things are still assumed to play their part in producing crime. What changed is the view that police are useful only to chase down bad guys after they strike.

All over the U.S., the decade of the '90s seen a rapid reinvention of how the po-

Crimes per 1,000



Murders per 100,000



ECONOMY

Though crime and unemployment don't rise and fall perfectly in tandem, policymakers recognize that people without jobs are a crime wave waiting to happen. Parbe Meyer, 20, works at the NightRider Overnight Copy Service in Chicago. He got there through Jobs for Youth, a largely privately funded program that guides young people from impoverished neighborhoods to their first job in the workplace.

lice do their jobs, especially in major cities. A change from "squad cars to foot patrolling, a shift to "proactive" policing that seeks to dissolve problems such as open-air drug marts rather than just rack up arrests, the more frequent establishment of cross-agency task forces to target specific problems such as car theft or drug crime—all are now commonplace. "This decline in crime rates is more than a demographic phenomenon," says Jeremy Travis, director of the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the Justice Department. "Public policy can make a difference. Police can make a difference."

Exhibit A for supporters of the new policing is New York City where major crimes—murder, rape, robbery, auto theft, grand larceny, assault and burglary—is in something like statistical free fall, dropping 17.5% last year. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his police commissioner, William Bratton, both insist that the reason is their devotion to new ways of doing police business. John DiIulio Jr., a professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University, says that since the mid-'80s top brass who embrace a similar shift in philosophy have risen to key positions in cities all around the country. "So now you're seeing better policing. Not miracles or panaceas, but better policing."

To the extent that is true, police have had to pull themselves in two disparate directions—tougher and softer, as the cops

program in New Orleans illustrates. Tougher means more aggressive intervention. "If we see somebody we don't know, we ask them what they're doing there," says Compass. "If the story doesn't check out, we arrest them for trespassing. Now we don't see as many drug dealers around here." But at the same time, it has meant more neighborhood-friendly tactics, the foot patrolling and problem solving that form the loosely defined strategy called community policing. "We do neighborhood cleanups, counseling on child abuse, you name it," says Officer Djuana Adams. "We help the children with their homework, and they show up for treats when they get good grades."

New Orleans is also learning what other cities have discovered when they moved more officers away from the patrol-car policing that limited them to 911 emergency-response calls. The lesson: face-to-face contact between cops and the people they work among, with no windshield in between, helps to restore trust. For a city like New Orleans, which has recently seen some spectacular instances of police corruption, that is an invaluable side benefit. "I felt better almost as soon as the police moved in," says Brenda Holmes, who lives at Desire, the New Orleans housing project with the most poignant name. "They've given us our lives back."

The potential synergy between cops and residents works not only in big cities:

TIME, JANUARY 15, 1996

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CRIME

Taylor, Texas, about 28 miles northeast of Austin, has just 13,300 people. But no place is too small for the drug trade. Five years ago, crack moved in among the cotton gins and railroad tracks, bringing with it assault, rape, car theft and murder. Crime got so bad that Mae Willie Turner, 79, and her sister, Gladys Hubbard, 73, could no longer sit at night on their front porch. "The place was infested," says Turner.

So they got off the porch and joined Turn Around Taylor, a community-action group designed to help locals take back their town. It was conceived by Herman Wrice, a Philadelphia management consultant who organizes citizen-led anti-crime groups as part of a federal program. And the man who brought in Wrice and his ideas was Fred Stansbury, the police chief who arrived in Taylor in 1993, on an April day when a local teenager was killed in a gang fight. "We wanted a program where the community felt it had a proprietary interest," he says.

That's what they got. Most weeks Turner and Hubbard put on jackets with slogans such as UP WITH HOPE, DOWN WITH DOPE and joined other demonstrators on streets where the heaviest dealing happened. Stansbury got the town council to designate "downtown" Taylor as a historic district, which meant a ban on the public consumption of alcohol. The group even persuaded the Texas National Guard to bulldoze 48 worn-out buildings near the railroad tracks that had become weekend squats for drug dealers and their cus-

Number of murder offenders in each age group, 1994



Population age 15 to 29 in millions



DEMOGRAPHICS

Teenagers are the most crime-prone group. At the Mount View Youth Service Center in Denver, juveniles in custody for various offenses line up for lunch.

tomers, who used to come in by car and train. Taylor these days is more like it used to be. "I can sit on my porch anytime now," says Mae Willie Turner.

The single greatest imponderable in the crime debate is the role of gun control. Or decontrol: last week Texas became the

28th state to allow people to carry concealed weapons. The rationale is to discourage crime—supporters say felons will think twice about assaulting people who may be armed. Florida became the first state to pass such a law in 1987. Since then, more than 150,000 people there have ap-

Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time Bomb


THEY ARE JUST FOUR, FIVE AND SIX YEARS OLD RIGHT NOW, BUT already they are making criminologists nervous. They are growing up, too frequently, in abusive or broken homes, with little adult supervision and few positive role models. Left to themselves, they spend much of their time hanging out on the streets or soaking up violent TV shows. By the year 2005 they will be teenagers—a group that tends to be, in the view of Northeastern University criminologist James Alan Fox, "temporary sociopaths—impulsive and immature." If they also have easy access to guns and drugs, they can be extremely dangerous.

For all the heartening news offered by recent crime statistics, there is an ominous flip side. While the crime rate is dropping for adults, it is soaring for teens. Between 1990 and 1994, the rate at which adults age 25 and older committed homicides declined 22%; yet the rate jumped 18% for youths between 14 and 17, the age group that in the early '90s supplanted 18- to 24-year-olds as the most crime-prone. And that is precisely the age

group that will be booming in the next decade. There are currently 39 million children under 10 in the U.S., more than at any time since the 1950s. "This is the calm before the crime storm," says Fox. "So long as we fool ourselves in thinking that we're winning the war against crime, we may be blindsided by this bloodbath of teenage violence that is lurking in the future."

Demographics don't have to be destiny, but other social trends do little to contradict the dire predictions. Nearly all the factors that contribute to youth crime—single-parent households, child abuse, deteriorating inner-city schools—are getting worse. At the same time, government is becoming less, not more, interested in spending money to help break the cycle of poverty and crime. All of which has led John J. DiIulio Jr., a professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton, to warn about a new generation of "superpredators," youngsters who are coming of age in actual and "moral poverty," without "the benefit of parents, teachers, coaches and clergy to teach them right or wrong and show them unconditional love."

Predicting a generation's future crime patterns is, of course, risky, especially when outside factors (Will crack use be up or down? Will gun laws be tightened?) remain unpredictable. Michael Tonry, a professor of law and public policy at the University of Minnesota, argues that the demographic doomsayers



plied for permits to pack a gun. But two recent studies suggest loopholes in the law have also allowed felons, ordinarily forbidden to carry a gun, to do so legally. On the other hand, gun homicides in Florida have declined 89% since the law was introduced. Michael McHargue of the Florida

department of law enforcement shrugs, saying, "If you look at the overall statistical picture, we don't believe the law made any impression."

The effectiveness of gun laws that are stricter is no easier to compute. In the three cities with the most dramatic recent

declines in homicide—New York, Kansas City and Houston—police have very aggressive strategies for separating felons from their firearms and stemming the flow of cheap, illegal handguns. Chicago is currently celebrating a decline in homicides from 830 in 1994 to 823 last year. Police think part of the reason might be that Illinois' new, stricter penalties for felonies involving a firearm have persuaded many gang members and drug dealers to leave the guns at home. "We'll arrest a whole crew and still find no guns," says Paul Jenkins, the Chicago police department's director of news affairs. But while the anecdotal evidence is suggestive, it is nothing like firm. "If we knew the reason for success, we'd do a lot more of it," says Jenkins. "We'd bottle it."

For now, keep the bottles uncorked. Talk to most experts in law enforcement, and they soon complain about the paucity of solid research to identify what works against crime. Norval Morris, a professor of law and criminology at the University of Chicago, compares the state of knowledge in his field to that in medicine earlier in the century, when doctors were commonly in the dark as to whether their treatments worked, or why. "Testing the consequences [for crime] of different drug policies, different housing practices, different police practices—it's very, very rarely done," he says.

In the 1988 presidential election, when rising crime was an issue, Willie Horton became the wanted-poster child who

are unduly alarmist. "There will be a slightly larger number of people relative to the overall population who are at high risk for doing bad things, so that's going to have some effect," he concedes. "But it's not going to be an apocalyptic effect." Norval Morris, professor of law and criminology at the University of Chicago, finds DiIulio's notion of superpredators too simplistic. "The human animal in young males is quite a violent animal all over the world. The people who put forth the theory of moral poverty lack a sense of history and comparative criminology."

Yet other students of the inner city are more pessimistic. "All the basic elements that spawn teenage crime are still in place, and in many cases the indicators are worse," says Jonathan Kozol, author of *Amazing Grace*, an examination of poverty in the South Bronx. "There's a dramatic increase of children in foster care, and that's a very high-risk group of

kids. We're not creating new jobs, and we're not improving education to suit poor people for the jobs that exist."

Can anything defuse the demographic time bomb? Fox urges "reinvesting in children": improving schools, creating after-school programs and providing other alternatives to gangs and drugs.

DiIulio, a law-and-order conservative, advocates tougher prosecution and wants to strengthen religious institutions to instill better values. Yet he opposes the Gingrich-led effort to make deep cuts in social programs. "A failure to maintain existing welfare and health commitment for kids," he says, "is to guarantee that the next wave of juvenile predators will be even worse than we're dealing with today." DiIulio urges fellow conservatives to think of Medicaid not as a health-care program but as "an anti-crime policy."

—By Richard Zoglin.
Reported by Sam Alts/Boston and Ruth Kaminski/New York



Princeton's John DiIulio warns of "superpredators"

24K

helped elect George Bush. In 1993 Bill Clinton neutralized the Republican advantage by positioning himself as a tough-on-crime Democrat who favored the death penalty and would put 100,000 new police officers on the streets. In an interview with *TIME*, Clinton said last week that the country has embarked on a historic change: "What's happening now across America essentially closes the door on an era that began with the murder of Kitty Genovese 30 years ago." In that milestone episode of public indifference, Genovese, a young New Yorker, was murdered while dozens of people ignored her screams for help. "I think now we have ended both the isolation of the police from the community and the idea that the community doesn't have a responsibility to work with the police or with its neighbors."

Clinton's tough talk on crime helped him win back some of the Reagan Democrats who had fled the party. But with crime rates falling, the issue may lose some of the importance it had for voters two years ago. Though Americans still tell pollsters that crime is at the top of their concerns, that may change as lagging perceptions catch up to new realities. Meanwhile, the President sees the political advantage as his. Though crime has hardly been mentioned in the Republican primaries, the Clinton-Gore Re-Election Committee spent a surprising \$2.4 million last summer on TV spots that ran in 24 states, touting the President's record on crime.

As the year goes on, expect Clinton to attack congressional Republicans for their attempt to rescind the 100,000-new-cops provision in his 1994 crime bill. In the White House version, municipalities get the money only if they use it to hire new officers and use them in community-policing programs. Republicans want to send that money instead in bloc grants to states to use as they see fit. Last month the President vetoed the appropriations bill that would have distributed his police money that way. "I don't tell all these folks how to deploy the police," said Clinton, "or what they should do all day. All I say is there has to be a community-policing strategy because that's by definition grass-roots reform, and we know that it works."

Or at least that it is part of what works. There may be a conjunction of half a dozen lucky developments that are holding crime in check right now. The trick will be to find the way to keep it all working. But for once, it is possible to suppose the trick is one we can manage.

—Reported by *Art Benson*/New Orleans, *James Carney* and *Shane Shannon*/Washington, *Hilary Hyton/Taylor* and *Robt Kaminski/New York*, with other bureaus

Police Commissioner William Bratton
set out to prove that cops really can cut crime. The experts scoffed—but felony rates have dropped so far, so fast, that no other explanation makes sense

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By ERIC POOLEY

CRIME IS FALLING FROM THE NEW YORK sky, but New York City police captain Thomas Lawrence looks as if he's been out in the sun too long. It's just past 7 on the third morning of the new year, and Lawrence, who runs the 10th Precinct in midtown Manhattan, is standing on a podium in the command control center at police headquarters—the "war room." His face is bright red and a little clammy. His body is wired up tight. He is surrounded by shelves of statistics, screens filled with computerized maps and charts and N.Y.P.D. bosses, who, amazingly, seem to know as much about crime in his precinct as he does. "It's been 30 days since we've seen you, Tom," says Chief of Department Louis Anemone, a dark tone creeping into his voice. "And we're seeing an increase in robberies."

"What's the pattern here, Cap?" asks Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple, the department's thickest, dandyish crime guru. Using a laser pen, Maple scrawls on an overhead map, tracing robbery patterns the way John Madden diagrams football plays. Maple circles an archipelago of red dots: muggings along Ninth Avenue. "What are you doing to take these guys out?"

Lawrence launches into a first-rate description of his anticrime efforts, but the CEO of this organization—a slim, well-tended man who wears his reading glasses slung low on an impressive nose—barely looks up from his papers. Police Commissioner William Bratton designed these Comstat (short for computer statistics) meetings as a way to make his 76 far-flung precinct commanders—and 38,000 cops—accountable for the crime rate. Nobody had ever done it before, and it's working: total felonies in New York City are down 27% in just two years, to levels not seen since the early 1970s.

Crime had been falling gently since 1989, thanks to community policing strategies, a thinning in the ranks of the crack-head army and thousands of new prison beds and new cops. But as Comstat took hold in May 1994, the drop became a giddy double-digit affair, plunging farther and faster than it has done anywhere else in the country, faster than any cultural or demographic trend could explain. For two years, crime has declined in all 76 precincts. Murder is down 39%, auto theft 35%. Robberies are off by a third, burglaries by a quarter. No wonder Comstat has become the Lourdes of policing, drawing pilgrim cops from around the world—Baltimore,

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NEW YEAR'S RESOLUTION:

The commissioner, visiting
Manhattan station house,
wants an additional 10%
drop in crime.

London, Frankfurt, Zimbabwe, Taiwan—
a taste of New York's magic.

If those waters seem bitter to some-
cops who can't take Comstat's pressure,
and Latino leaders who say some of
Bratton's cops carry his aggressive style too
—"that's too damn bad," says Bratton.
Success isn't pretty, even for his troops. Ef-
fective precinct commanders such as
Lawrence (crime was down 15% in his
precinct in 1995) merely get grilled to a
medium rare at Comstat. Those who show

when victims suffered broken bones, not fat
lips or black eyes. Crimes in the category
plummeted in his precinct.


"You have delivered big time," says
Bratton, standing to address his Comstat
managers. He reminds them that when he
was hired away from the Boston Police De-
partment in January 1994 by Mayor-elect
Rudolph Giuliani, who had made crime
and quality of life his major campaign
themes, Bratton had asked for an immedi-
ate 10% decrease in crime (the request was

met with derision and
disbelief). "In the end,
we got 12%," he notes.
"In 1995 I raised the bar
to a 15% reduction, and
you gave me 17." Last
year you accounted for
60% of the national
crime decline—all from
one city. You proved
that police can change
public behavior. For
that you should be
proud," Bratton pauses,
then snaps, "Now get
your feet off the desk.
It's 1996." In the new
year, he says, he wants
an additional 10% re-

duction—more than even Giuliani expects.
If he gets it, New York's crime rate will be
half what it was five years ago. That, he says
later, "should show the criminologists who
refuse to give police credit."

Some experts doubt that Bratton is re-
sponsible for any of New York's crime
drop. "It's like trying to take credit for an
eclipse," says former New York City Police
Commissioner Raymond Kelly. Others are
watching Bratton with mouths agape. "I've
never seen anything like it," says Universi-
ty of Maryland criminologist Lawrence
Sherman, who has studied 30 police de-
partments in the past 25 years. "Police
chiefs routinely say, 'Don't expect us to
bring down crime, because we don't con-
trol its causes. But Bratton says just the op-
posite. It's the most focused crime-reduc-
tion effort I've seen. It will take time before
we can say how much effect it has had, but
this clearly is new. When I sat in at Com-
stat, I thought, 'Bratton is using crime data
for management by objective—a basic idea
that's never been tried before.'"

There's more to the Giuliani-Bratton
strategy, of course, than terrorizing cap-
tains at early-morning meetings. Though
their predecessors, Mayor David Dinkins
and Kelly, deserve real credit for putting
more cops on the beat, Giuliani instructed



12/29/90 dip in crime
in NYC 2.4%



Bratton to do something Dinkins would never have allowed: use those cops to crack down on minor offenders, public drunks, potheads, those who urinate on the street, aggressive panhandlers, graffiti scribblers and "squeegee pests," who converged on cars at stoplights to clean windshields for spare change.

This quality of life campaign tested a principle that Giuliani and Bratton had believed for years: the "Broken Windows" theory, first put forth in 1982 by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. Wilson and Kelling argued that minor violations create a disorderly environment that encourages more serious crime. "I chose Bill Bratton," says Giuliani, "because he agreed with the Broken Windows theory." Sure enough, as arrests for small offenses rocketed, New York's streets became notably more civil. Then Maple, who has been Bratton's aide-de-camp and crime strategist since Bratton was slashing subway crime as New York's Transit Police chief in the early 1990s, proposed an intriguing corollary to the theory.

He wanted to go after shootings, and he knew that gun possession and drug dealing were intertwined. "It's relatively hard for a uniformed patrolman to catch someone carrying drugs," Maple says. "But as we'd seen, it's easy to catch someone for an open can of beer on the street." Thus what the cops call "beer and piss patrol" became a tactic for apprehending more serious criminals. "Your open beer lets me

check your ID," says Maple. "Now I can radio the precinct for outstanding warrants or parole violations. Maybe I bump against that bulge in your belt; with probable cause, I can frisk you." Civil libertarians have been screaming, but shootings, gun murders and other signs of firearms use are down—proof, Bratton says, that thugs are leaving the guns at home.

This is a significant departure from the

Murders	1995	change
#666	48	+32%
San Antonio	194	+140 +28%
New York City	1,571	1,182 +25%
San Diego	119	+94 +21%
Houston	379	+304 +20%
St. Louis	248	+203 +18%
Miami	129	+111 +14%
New Orleans	421	+364 +14%
Chicago	930	+823 +12%
Washington	399	+360 +10%
Atlanta	153	+145 +5%
Dallas	291	+276 +5%
Debut	525	+514 +2%
Los Angeles	836	+828 +1%
Phoenix	244	+244 +0%
Baltimore	321	+325 +1%
Denver	85	+90 +6%
Boston	85	+98 +15%
Minneapolis	62	+97 +56%

service-oriented "community policing" introduced during the Dinkins administration, when beat cops were encouraged to be problem solvers for a neighborhood. (Now the patrolmen funnel these issues to their precinct commanders.) The Bratton version of community policing is to devise strategies that target specific criminal behavior. Special squads are dispatched to hit high-crime hot spots, while others track down illegal guns. Precinct detectives now interrogate suspects not just about the crimes they may have committed but also about other gun and drug dealers they know. Eventually, Bratton believes, all the policies begin to dovetail, and crime drops through the floor. "Most criminals commit multiple crimes," he says. "We're processing crime data faster than ever before, so we can identify patterns early and stop them after three crimes instead of 30. If you do that city-wide, you'll knock the crime rate down."

But what some rank-and-file cops refer to as "Bratton taking the cuffs off us" has increased force, abuse and discourtesy complaints to the Civilian Complaint Review Board 30%. Many of the complaints have never been investigated by the OCA's and are impossible to evaluate. Still, some New Yorkers fear the N.Y.P.D.'s new swagger. "A lot of people aren't comfortable with this style," says Kelly. "It goes to the question of what kind of policing we want in America. You can probably shut down just about all crime, if you're willing to burn down the village to save it. Eventually, I think, there will be a backlash, and crime will go back up. But Bill will be gone by then."

Bratton, who has been dismissed about persistent rumors that he'll soon jump ship, Bratton says even if he stays only another year, "that's enough time to consolidate our gains, so that long after I'm gone, my successors won't retreat." As for Kelly's burning-village imagery, Giuliani and Bratton dismiss such talk as sour grapes, pointing to the benefits of reduced crime being enjoyed by those hardest hit by it: Latinos and African Americans in the poorest parts of New York City. "The crime reduction has been across the board, in every neighborhood," says Bratton. That means four fewer people killed on the wealthy Upper East Side, but 51 fewer killed in war-torn East New York. The people who live there have noticed the change. "It used to be that I was throwing myself on the floor with my son all the time," says Elisandra Beltran, 27, "because of the bullets flying through my window. But now I haven't seen a bullet hole in a year." She doesn't much care who gets the credit, just as long as the bullets don't fly anymore.

—With reporting by Elaine Rivers/New York

**Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments
Can Lead to a *Decrease in Crime***

**William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner
City of New York**

**Part 1
Police Management**

I have been asked to write on the question: "Should we expect police activities to impact on measures of crime, disorder and fear and how will we know?" I'd like to begin by turning the question around: If we *don't* expect police activities and police departments to have an impact on crime, disorder, and fear, they almost certainly *won't*. By accepting the prevailing image of police departments as slow moving and relatively ineffectual bureaucracies and by assuming that nothing can be done to change them, we are, in effect, making a self-fulfilling prophecy. No organization, whether it's a police department or private business, is going to achieve high performance results in atmosphere of such low expectations.

I am police manager not a criminologist. I tend to think about crime not as a sociological problem but as a management problem. The scholarship about the underlying causes of crime is very interesting, but it is of limited utility to someone charged, as I am, with public safety in a large city. The fact that many criminologists have argued that police don't have much impact on crime just adds to my management problem. My job is to direct police resources and to motivate 38,000 police personnel. I literally cannot afford

to subscribe to a system of belief that tells me that the police can't accomplish our primary mission of controlling and preventing crime.

Instead, like many other police managers, I've turned to modern business theory and the study of how to make large organizations work more effectively toward their goals.

Goals, it turns out, are an extremely important part of lifting a low performing organization to higher levels of accomplishment and to revitalizing an organizational culture. Goals become a means not only of measuring success but of replacing unproductive or counter-productive behaviors with effective, goal-oriented activity. Goals can be used to inspire an organization that has long been dominated by negativism and fault-finding toward positive cooperative efforts and, therefore, toward success. As a police manager, I've learned how to set ambitious goals for police departments as the first step toward achieving ambitious results.

In this paper, I will describe two police management stories: the New York City Transit Police since the early 1990s and the NYPD in the past two years. I think I can make a strong case that management changes and goal-setting in both organizations were the primary catalysts for the steep decline in subway crime, beginning in 1991, and the steep decline in citywide crime, beginning in 1994. I use the word catalyst intentionally. In organizations as large and complex as the Transit Police and the NYPD, no management team can claim sole or even primary credit for success. The role of top management is to motivate and support the organization as a whole, driving it to work up to its full potential, but the credit for ultimate success belongs to the cops, detectives, supervisors,

and precinct commanders who take our plans out into the real world and make them work.

Following the general police management discussion, the second part of this paper discusses what we are doing in New York in terms of the relevant criminological theory about police departments and crime. It also considers some of the other possible factors that might be causing the decline in New York City crime besides the NYPD. In certain quarters, there seems to be a near absolute certainty that police *did* not and *could* not have caused the steep drops we have seen. Scholars are ready to attribute these declines to demographics, social causes, to supposed changes in the drug market, and to unsubstantiated speculations about drug gangs making peace -- in short, to any possible cause *except* to police work. I think most of these alternative explanations can be rather easily discounted. They are simply not supported by the facts in New York City, where youths between the ages of 15 and 19 have increased slightly rather than decreased, where the economy is relatively stable, where drug use patterns are relatively unchanged, and where small drug gangs continue to fight over turf in a number of locations throughout the city.

I am hopeful that this symposium will begin to change some of the preconceived notions about policing and crime. Better management, better strategies, higher expectations, and more effort on the part of police departments can do far more than just affect crime rates at the margins. We have in the nation's police departments an enormous untapped potential. If we can bring just a portion of that potential into play, we can have a swift

and decisive impact on crime. If we start to use police resources strategically and efficiently, we can cut crime by 20, 30 or even 50 percent in the space of several years.

Consider the following story. A series of robberies is taking place in a neighborhood and giving the local area a steeply rising crime rate. It just so happens that this neighborhood has enough political clout to have an elite police unit, expert at apprehending robbers, assigned to the problem. With all its special skill, the unit identifies the robbery patterns, deploys its resources, and systematically apprehends the members of two loosely knit robbery gangs. The robbery rate and the crime rate in the neighborhood plummet. Did the police cause the drop in the local neighborhood crime rate? Of course they did.

But I can hear the arguments now. A police department could never apply that level of skill and that level of resources to an entire city. Neighborhoods without clout -- poor and minority neighborhoods especially -- would be slighted. Crime would be displaced from the places where elite units were active to the neighborhoods where they were not. And so on.

If I were to assert that lowering the crime rate in an entire city -- even in New York City -- is simply the process of repeating the success of the elite unit over and over and over again, many criminologists would be skeptical. They would be even more skeptical if I were to say that an entire police department -- even the NYPD -- could be geared up to function like an elite unit, bringing to bear the same kind of timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up that make elite units so effective.

But that is exactly what I *am* going to argue because that is what the New York experience, at both the Transit Police and the NYPD, demonstrates.

The Transit Police

When I became Transit Police Chief in 1990, subway robbery rates were rising steeply, disorder was rife in the system, and fare evasion was skyrocketing out of control. Robberies rose 21 percent in 1988, 26 percent in 1989, and about 25 percent in the first two months of 1990. Many of these robberies were what we called "multiple perpetrator" cases, involving five or more youths who would often attack and beat subway riders in order to rob them.

A lot of the robberies seemed to be crimes of opportunity. The groups doing the robberies weren't real gangs but loosely organized associations of youths who knew that the subway was a good place to steal. They'd meet after school or encounter each other in the system, look for a likely target, and strike. As more and more kids picked up the tricks of this nefarious trade, the subway robbery rate was headed off the chart.

The farebeating problem was just as severe. Here is a petty crime that can collectively amount to a colossal theft. In 1990, at the peak of the problem, some 57 million fare evaders a year were costing the public about \$65 million. The turnstile areas were overrun not only with farebeaters but with token thieves who sometimes seized control of subway entrances and brazenly collected tokens from commuters as they shooed them through

illegally opened exit gates. The public was appalled and frightened by the spectacle. The criminals were emboldened by it.

Lastly, we faced a huge disorder problem beyond the turnstiles. Some 5,000 homeless people -- most of them drug abusers -- were trying to live on trains, platforms and in restricted track areas. In fact, more than 80 homeless people died in the subway in 1989. In addition, aggressive panhandlers and illicit hawkers were everywhere, disrupting transit operations and lending an air of chaos and disorder to the entire subway environment.

I drew on the collective wisdom of dozens of Transit cops -- many of whom were frustrated because they had never been given a chance to try out their ideas -- to develop a Transit Police patrol strategy concentrating on robbery, fare evasion, and disorder. We all agreed that there was a clear connection between the felonious crimes of opportunity, i.e. the robberies, and the petty crimes and violations. Seeing an environment of apparent disorder, the young multiple perpetrators reasonably concluded that they could get away with anything in the subway, including beatings and robbery. We had to change their perceptions in a hurry.

We coupled a program of full enforcement of all subway rules and regulations with a very targeted attack on repeat subway felons, especially youth gangs. Instead of closing multiple-perpetrators cases after one or two arrests -- as we had been doing -- detectives were instructed to pursue all of the participants in a robbery. Even if we failed to find them all, we reasoned, the effort of searching, the bringing of witnesses into schools, and

the general ubiquity of Transit Police detectives in pursuit of subway robbers would start to alter the criminals' perceptions of the chances of success in a subway robbery.

We also greatly intensified the pursuit of people wanted on subway warrants. Using computers and faxes, we cut the time it takes for the police to act on a bench warrant from 30 days to 24 hours. Our warrant unit started work at 2 a.m. when the fugitives were still at home, and our apprehension rate rose sharply, eventually rising to more than 60 percent. We turned out to these locations in force, once again sending a message that subway criminals were being relentlessly pursued.

In the fare evasion sweep, we developed a near-perfect tactic for the subway. Previous programs to attack farebeating had usually focused on deterrence by stationing uniformed officers in front of turnstiles. The cops hated this work, and the uniformed presence wasn't having any impact on the overall farebeating problem. We began intensive plainclothes fare evasion sweeps throughout the system. The sweeps not only caught farebeaters in the act, they also gave us an opportunity to intervene with robbers because every arrested farebeater could be searched for weapons and checked for warrants. Not surprisingly, most subway robbers weren't paying the fare, and a good number of them were caught up in our sweeps. During the first six months of this operation, about one in seven people arrested for fare evasion was wanted on a warrant.

The last piece of the puzzle was our attack on disorder. We mounted a huge outreach effort to the homeless, cutting the resident homeless population in the subway by about 80

percent over a couple of years by steadily enforcing the rules and offering 'round-the-clock transportation to shelters. We quelled disorder among school-age riders with a safe passage program on 80 key trains and with intensive truancy sweeps. We began enforcing the rules and regulations of the subway system against panhandling, illicit merchants, smoking, drinking, laying down in the system, and many other anti-social acts. The message was sent by both our uniformed patrol force and our anti-crime plainclothes units: The subway system is under alert police control.

It took about six months to put everything in place, but then subway crime began dropping and it kept right on dropping for the next five years. With the exception of March 1993, when there was a slight increase in both categories, total subway felonies and robberies declined every month from October 1990 through October 1995. If anything, the trend accelerated under my successor, Michael O'Connor, and has continued to accelerate since the merger of the Transit Police with the NYPD in April 1995.

The bottom line? Subway felonies in the first 10 months of 1995 have fallen nearly 64 percent compared with the first 10 months of 1990. Subway robberies have fallen 74 percent. There are fewer than 20 felonies a day on system that carries more riders daily than the population of most American cities.

Even more surprising, given the proportions of the problem, was the Transit Police's success against fare evasion.. By the end of 1994 it was cut more than in half. By the end of 1995 it will have dropped by two thirds for a total savings of about \$40 million.

It would be difficult to identify a demographic or social cause for the decline in subway crime. The subway ridership is poorer, younger, and more minority than the city as a whole. Yet in the early 1990s, subway crime dropped far more steeply than New York City crime, of which it is a subset. Between 1990 and 1993, the drop in subway robberies was three times greater than the drop in citywide robberies. In 1991, subway robberies accounted for nearly two thirds of the drop in the citywide robbery rate, even though subway robberies never represented more than ten percent of the citywide robbery total. What, besides the work of the Transit Police, could possibly explain that?

Yet, as a closed and contained system, the subway does present a special case. By intensifying police efforts in the subway, the Transit Police may have been driving crime to street level. It is possible to argue that subway crime was merely displaced to rest of the city. The Transit Police experience in the early 1990s showed how a police department can swiftly and very effectively redirect its efforts toward solving key problems and achieving key goals. It also showed that a redirected police department can prevent crime by changing criminals' perceptions of their chances of success. But it doesn't prove with any certainty that such a redirection can reduce an entire city's crime rate. For that kind of evidence we will have to turn to the NYPD in the past two years.

The NYPD

When Mayor Rudolph Giuliani appointed me New York City Police Commissioner in 1990, we both believed that the NYPD had vast untapped potential. But like the Transit Police, the New York City Police Department needed sharply focused strategies and a stronger direction to achieve its potential. With its wide array of skilled and experienced personnel, the department was like a race car that had never been driven more than 40 miles-an-hour. The mayor and I decided to experiment with putting the pedal to the floor.

We challenged the NYPD to focus its full talents and resources on its core missions of driving down crime and controlling disorder. We set a public goal for the department of a 10 percent decrease in felony crime in 1994. While many within and outside the department were skeptical that we could come anywhere near to achieving this goal, we ultimately exceeded it with a 12 percent decline in 1994 and are exceeding it again with an expected 16 to 17 percent decline 1995.

It took some doing to propel the organization forward. Although the public believes that police departments spend all their time thinking about and combating crime, the truth is that these large organizations are rather easily distracted from their core mission by the political or social issue of the moment. In addition, the burden of emergency response leaves police leaders with the sense that there is always something very urgent to do, and this day-to-day emergency footing cuts into the time spent on strategic planning. The

work that is done on crime is usually done on a case-by-case basis without any real strategic oversight. As a result, police organizations can be particularly subject to drift.

As you travel further down the ranks, you find many of the problems that plague any large bureaucracy. For years, the NYPD had been organized around avoiding risk and failure. Although the department is decentralized into 76 precincts, precinct commanders had been constrained on every side by regulations and procedures issued from headquarters. Many police operations, such as prostitution sweeps and executing search warrants, could only be conducted by centralized units, reflecting an abiding distrust of precinct personnel and resources. Yet despite all the micro-management, the department was providing very little in the way of genuine strategic direction. It was clear what precinct commanders and personnel weren't allowed to do, but much less clear what they *ought* to be doing to combat crime, disorder, and fear.

Beginning in 1994, there were major changes in the management philosophy of the NYPD. We established seven crime control strategies, dealing with guns, drugs, youth violence, domestic violence, reclaiming public spaces, auto-related theft, and police corruption. In all these areas, we got the entire organization thinking about how to attack the crime and disorder problems, how to best deploy police resources, how to disrupt criminal enterprises, and how to use each arrest to develop information that would lead to other criminals and other arrests.

Precinct commanders were granted far more latitude in initiating their own operations and running their own shops. Uniformed patrol cops were encouraged to make drug arrests and to assertively enforce quality-of-life laws. At the same time, the central strategic direction of the department became far stronger and the lines of accountability far clearer. Today, avoiding failure is no longer a formula for success. Instead, the positive efforts of commanders and cops at reducing crime, disorder, and fear are being recognized and encouraged.

For the first time in its history, the NYPD is using current crime statistics and regular meetings of key enforcement personnel to direct its enforcement efforts. In the past, crime statistics often lagged events by months and so did the sense of whether crime control initiatives had succeeded or failed. Now, there is a daily turn-around in the "Compstat" numbers, as the crime statistics are called, and NYPD commanders watch weekly crime trends with the same hawk-like attention private corporations pay to profit and loss. Crime statistics have become the department's bottom line, the best indicator of how the police are doing, precinct-by-precinct and citywide.

At semi-weekly "Compstat" meetings, the department's top executives meet in rotation with precinct and detective squad commanders from different areas of the city. These tough, probing sessions review current crime trends, plan tactics, and allocate resources. Commanders are called back to present their results at the "Compstat" meetings at least once every six weeks, creating a sense of immediate accountability that has energized the NYPD's widely scattered local commands. [For a good account of the Compstat

Meetings see "How to Run a Police Department," by George Kelling, *City Journal*, Autumn 1995]

Four steps or principles now guide the department's patrol and investigative work: timely, accurate intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment. Debriefing of people taken into custody, even for minor crimes, is now standard practice, greatly increasing the department's store of timely, on-the-ground intelligence. Computer pin mapping and other contemporary crime analysis techniques are functioning as the NYPD's radar system, achieving the early identification of crime patterns. The barriers that long separated the department's Patrol Bureau, Detective Bureau and Organized Crime Control Bureau have been broken down, and a new spirit of cooperation is resulting in the rapid deployment of appropriate resources. Although overall strategic guidance flows *down* to the precincts, many of the tactics that are accomplishing the strategies flow *up* from precinct commanders, squad commanders, and rank-and-file police officers and detectives.

In the six-week "Compstat" cycle, the effectiveness of every new tactic or program is rapidly assessed. Failed tactics don't last long, and successful tactics are quickly replicated in other precincts. The gathering of field intelligence, the adapting of tactics to changing field conditions, and the close review of field results is now a continual, daily process rather than an annual or biennial event. The NYPD can make fundamental changes in its tactical approach in a few weeks rather than a few years.

The new flexibility allows much quicker response to shooting and robbery patterns. Identified by computer pin mapping, shooting "hotspots" can be blanketed with uniformed and plainclothes quality-of-life enforcement. People carrying illegal guns begin to realize that they risk facing gun charges after being arrested for a minor offense. The result is fewer guns carried, fewer guns drawn, and fewer guns used. We have seen a 40 percent drop in handgun homicides in New York City since 1993.

The new strategic approach to crime problems has sharpened the focus on the criminal support system: on the burglary fences, the auto chop shops and stolen car exporters, and the gun dealers who supply both drug dealers and armed robbers. In many instances, we have been able to dismantle key pieces of the criminal enterprise. Shutting down the local fences, for instance, can have a dramatic effect on neighborhood burglary rates. It may take burglars some time to find another outlet for their stolen goods. The same is doubly true of auto thieves, who need an immediate outlet, in the form of a chop shop or a stolen auto exporter, because stolen cars are difficult to hide and easy to identify. We are also focusing on people wanted on warrants who we believe are likely to be committing additional crimes. Like the Transit Warrant Unit before it, the NYPD Warrant Unit has been revitalized. It has rearrested 10,103 wanted felons in the first 10 months of 1995 compared with 6,113 in all of 1993.

Intensive quality-of-life enforcement has become the order of the day in the NYPD.

Throughout the city, we are responding to problems like public drinking, boom-box cars,

street prostitution, and street-level drug dealing. Neighborhoods feel safer, and people see the police taking action against these highly visible problems. The NYPD's success against the "squeegee pests," who had begged for money by washing car windows at most of the highway entrances in Manhattan, is a prime example of what steady quality-of-life enforcement can accomplish. Continuing police pressure, backed up by arrests when necessary, have all but eliminated what was once a constant urban annoyance.

The NYPD Civil Enforcement Initiative has given us a powerful tool to combat petty crime and disorder. First developed by my predecessor, Commissioner Ray Kelly and by Jeremy Travis, who was the NYPD's deputy commissioner for Legal Matters and is now the executive director of the National Institute for Justice, Civil Enforcement sends NYPD attorneys into the field to assist precinct commanders in devising their enforcement strategies. Together, they use the civil law -- especially nuisance abatement law, police padlock law, and various forfeiture proceedings -- to augment the traditional police sanctions of summons and arrest. They close brothels, drug locations, and gambling locations, and confiscate the cars and cash of drug dealers. We have been able to have a significant impact on street prostitution by arresting johns and confiscating their cars, which we are authorized to do because the car would have been used in the intended crime. We have also had a powerful impact on boom-box cars -- using the threat of a temporary confiscation of the auto to be used as evidence. We have achieved a high level of compliance in neighborhoods that were once continuously assaulted by these drive-by noise polluters.

All this focused, strategic police activity has translated into steep declines in crime. The seven major felonies were down 12 percent in 1994 and are down 17 percent in 1995 according to preliminary data through November 12. The preliminary numbers through November 12 show a two-year decline of 27.4 percent. Crime is down in every felony category, including two-year drops of 39.7 percent in murder, 30.7 percent in robbery, 36.1 percent in auto theft, 24.4 percent in burglary, and 23.8 percent in grand larceny. Only the declines in felonious assault (12.9 percent) and rape (7.7 percent) have failed reach 20 percent for the two-year period. These relatively lower numbers probably reflect the department's domestic violence strategy which is actively eliciting complaints of assault and sexual violence from battered spouses.

In terms of human impact, the real numbers are even more impressive. After steep declines in 1994, there have been 51,728 fewer felonies in 1995 through November 12, including 373 fewer homicides, 47 fewer rapes, 11,949 fewer robberies, 3,103 fewer assaults, 12,520 fewer burglaries, 7,788 fewer grand larcenies, and 19,988 fewer auto thefts.

There have been declines in every borough and precinct in the city. All five of the city's boroughs have registered two-year declines of 23 percent or more. Keep in mind that Brooklyn and Queens would be the fourth and fifth largest cities in the country if they were independent municipalities. In effect, we have achieved crime declines of 23 percent declines or more in three of the five largest cities in the country.

One clear benefit of the strategic policing approach has been the allocation of police resources where they are most needed and the consequent declines in crime in some of the most crime-prone neighborhoods in the city. As of November 12, for instance, the 75th and 77th precincts in Brooklyn, which are among the toughest in the city, were the leaders for real-number declines in homicides, shooting victims, and shooting incidents. The 75th Precinct covering East New York and Brownsville has seen 45 fewer killings this year. The 67th Precinct, another tough neighborhood in Brooklyn, leads the city in the real-number decline in robberies with 544 fewer. The 107th and 109th precincts in Queens, which had been the car theft capitals of the world, saw real number declines of 1,186 and 1,063 auto thefts respectively through November 12.

If the current trend continues through the end of this year, total UCR Index crimes in New York city will have fallen 26 percent between 1993 and 1995 and 38 percent since 1989. These decreases are even more impressive when compared to the percentage change in total UCR Index crimes in other venues: While crime fell 3.0% in the nation as a whole and 9.0% in New York State during calendar year 1994, New York City's total UCR Index crime fell 11.7% in 1994 -- our largest percentage decrease since 1972. New York City's ranking for total index crimes among the nation's twenty-five largest cities moved down from eighteenth in 1993 to twenty-first in 1994.

The reduction in New York City crime has effectively pulled the nation's aggregate crime level down and pulled it down quite significantly. Based on the FBI's preliminary 1994

UCR figures, crime reductions in New York City accounted for approximately one-third of the national homicide and robbery reductions and for 70 percent of the national decrease in motor vehicle thefts. Although preliminary 1995 FBI UCR data are not yet available, we fully expect that New York City's decreases in crime will again contribute significantly to the nation's overall reduction in crime.

Why are the steep declines in crime happening at this time? I believe it is because of fundamental changes in the NYPD's management philosophy and operating principles. We have gone from a micro-managed organization with very little strategic direction to a decentralized management style with strong strategic guidance at the top. Our four operating principles -- timely accurate intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow up and assessment have made the NYPD a much more responsive, flexible, and effective force in the field.

In the broadest sense, an effective police department can't keep people from becoming criminals or control the social and demographic forces that, according to many criminologists, engender criminal activity. But we can keep people from becoming successful criminals. We can turn tables on the criminal element. Instead of reacting to them, we can create a sense of police presence and police effectiveness that makes them react to us. And then, in a narrower sense, we do keep people from becoming criminals or at least from committing criminal acts as they realize that their chances of success are so much smaller. This is certainly what the New York City Transit Police achieved in the subway to drive robbery rates down 74 percent. The young felons who committed most

of the subway robberies quickly learned that their chances of success had been greatly reduced. Now the NYPD is sending the same message in New York City as whole, and we are seeing comparable results.

Criminology tends to view criminals as a kind of irresistible social force. Its prognosis for the future amounts to the cry of "Look out! Here comes a demographic bulge in the crime-prone age cohort of 15 to 19 year olds, and we are all going to be swamped by it." I don't think so. The criminals are no irresistible force. In fact, the criminal element responsible for most street crime is nothing but a bunch of disorganized individuals many of whom aren't very good at what they do. The police have all the advantages -- in training, equipment, organization, and strategy. We can get the criminals on the run and we can keep them on the run. It's possible. We're doing it in New York.

**Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments
Can Lead to a *Decrease in Crime***

**Part Two
Theory and Practice**

One of the prevailing views in contemporary criminology, as I understand it, is the position that police have very little impact upon crime -- that variations in the rate and prevalence of crime within a community are primarily or entirely attributable to variations in population demographics, the impact of social trends, and a raft of economic factors. Criminologists, some of whom are quite fixed in their opinions, cite innumerable studies employing a variety of methodologies to show the relationships between these variables and the rate of reported crime or crime victimization. Specifically, they point to the relative size of a community's cohort of young males between 15 and 19 years of age as a primary determinant of crime rates, along with the availability of guns, the supply-and-demand economics of the illicit drug market, drug abuse patterns in the community, and a host of other broad social and economic variables. These views are supported by empirical research showing statistically significant and highly positive correlations between the rate of crime and the various demographic, social and economic variables over time, as well as by intuitive arguments and anecdotal evidence.

As a basic tenet of epistemology, however, we cannot conclude that a causal relationship exists between two variables unless the intuitive explanation for the relationship has face

validity -- it must make sense and conform to our objective observations of the world around us -- and unless three necessary conditions occur: one variable must precede the other in time, we must demonstrate an empirically measured relationship between the variables, and the relationship must not be better explained by any third intervening variable. Although contemporary criminology's explanations for the crime decline in New York City meet the criteria of the first two conditions, they don't explain it better than a third intervening variable. That variable is assertive, strategic enforcement by police officers in a well-managed and highly directed police agency. When it comes into play, the causal equation is radically altered.

As a corollary to the assertion that crime is primarily pulled by the engine of social and demographic trends, contemporary criminology maintains a long-standing belief that police activities have little or no appreciable effect upon crime, despite the public ideology and political rhetoric periodically mustered to justify larger police budgets and staffing increases. In support of this belief, academicians proffer a number of empirical studies showing that the addition of police resources, including personnel, has rarely if ever had a sustained impact on crime rates. If increasing the number of police within a given jurisdiction has no discernible impact on crime, the reasoning goes, the institution of policing is powerless to influence crime. This logic incorrectly assumes that all police patrol activity is undertaken with the same intensity and that police officers in disparate agencies will be deployed, managed and directed in the same or similar fashion.

I do not take issue with the empirical validity of any of these studies or with the observation that police activity has historically had little impact on crime. I do question the basic premise that because no credible causal relationship has ever been shown to exist between police activity and reductions in crime, no causal relationship *can* exist.

One of the earliest studies of this issue was conducted in the NYPD's 25th Precinct in 1954, where the operational strength of the precinct was more than doubled for a four-month period. At the project's conclusion, reported street robberies declined by an astounding 90 percent, and burglary and auto theft reports -- crimes that are typically visible to patrolling police officers -- declined as well. Increased manpower had no impact on homicides and minimal impact on felony assaults, however, since many or most of these crimes take place indoors or in locations that patrolling police could not easily scrutinize. Despite the project's brevity and several flaws -- it did not control for or measure the displacement of crime and it did not account for reductions that might be attributable to factors other than manpower deployment -- it was used to justify demands for an increase in police personnel and resources (Wilson, 1985, pp. 62-63).

Consistent results were obtained when this study was replicated through saturation patrol in the 20th Precinct in 1966. Street crimes visible to patrol again declined in the target precinct, but no appreciable declines were noted in crimes occurring indoors or in other private places. As James Q. Wilson (1985) points out, the results of these two projects "were sufficiently striking and consistent to warrant entertaining the belief that very large

increases in police patrols may reduce "outside" or "street" crime significantly, at least for a short period of time (p. 64)." Neither study, though, utilized sufficient controls or measures to adequately determine how much of the crime reduction effect was due to deterrence and how much was due to displacement.

The main conclusion derived from these studies -- that any impact the police may have on crime is due to a deterrent effect and is limited to the type of street crimes easily visible to patrolling officers -- prevailed in criminology and in police management circles for several decades. The accuracy of this conclusion is called into question by our contemporary experience in New York City, where we have achieved steep reductions in all categories of crime, irrespective of their visibility to patrolling officers. We have not found any significant variance in the relative proportion of reported "indoor" versus "outdoor" crimes in any offense category.

Samuel Walker (1985) has argued that the addition of more police to an agency has historically had no demonstrable effect upon crime. Although Walker acknowledges police do deter crime to some unspecified and limited extent and that arrests serve a specific deterrence purpose by incarcerating criminals, he says that the impact of mere police presence as a crime deterrent can scarcely be measured in precise terms. He asserts that while police patrol since the time of Robert Peel has been designed to prevent crime, the "police are at best a last-resort, reactive mechanism" of social control, and he concludes quite validly that "even the most superficial evidence suggests no relationship between the number of cops and the crime rate (p. 104)."

Walker's characterization of police patrol as a "last-resort, reactive mechanism" describes activities of agencies and officers cast in the traditional mold. Walker has argued elsewhere (1984) that this reactive model of police organization was in large part forged as the legacy of O.W. Wilson, whose classic *Police Administration* text became the 'bible' of an entire generation of police executives. These executives embraced Wilson's gospel of efficiency and were profoundly influenced by his ideology of crime suppression, which emphasized the deployment of resources to control "serious" crimes -- the seven felonies comprising the UCR Crime Index (p. 409-10). Indeed, for decades police executives were locked into a narrow mindset in which the UCR Index was practically the sole benchmark for police performance. When index crimes declined, they took credit; when index crimes increased they blamed either improved reporting rates or broad social factors lying beyond their control. The narrow mindset had its advantages.

I can hardly dispute the empirical evidence cited by Walker (1985) or the overall validity of his argument, but I would emphasize that the state of contemporary policing in New York City differs enormously from the traditional reactive model upon which criminologists have based their conclusions. What we have done in New York City is to radically alter the face of policing by empowering the agency and its officers with policies and tactics that "capitalize on community crime fighting initiatives *and* take the bad guys off the streets," a strategic approach that John DiIulio has so graciously dubbed "Bratton's Law" (DiIulio, 1995, p. A19).

Perhaps the best-known and most frequently-referenced study of the effect of police patrol on crime is the Kansas City Experiment in 1974. This year-long study determined that changing the level of preventive patrol within demographically matched neighborhoods had virtually no impact upon the number of reported crimes or the level of fear experienced by residents of the various neighborhoods. However, as James Q. Wilson (1985) observes, the experiment “did *not* show that police make no difference and it did *not* show that adding more police is useless in controlling crime. All it showed was that changes in the amount of random preventive patrol in marked cars did not, by itself, seem to affect... how much crime occurred or how safe citizens felt (p. 67, emphasis in original).” He points out that the experiment might have yielded very different results if important changes were made in the way police were used, including assignment to plainclothes patrol, sustained attention to places identified as having been the frequent site of crimes, or more extensive follow-up investigations of past crimes (p. 67-68).

After examining the body of research into the impact of police on crime, Wilson (1985) concludes that “*what* the police do may be more important than how many there are, that patrol focused on particular persons or locations may be better than random patrol, and that speed may be less important than information (p. 71, emphasis in original).”

There is much wisdom in Wilson’s conclusions, and they certainly jibe with our experience in New York City. What we have done in New York is, in effect, to focus and coordinate police officers’ activities, to free them from random patrol duties by providing coherent

tactical directions and enforcement strategies to occupy their undevoted time, and to provide them and their commanders with the accurate and timely crime intelligence necessary to make a difference. They relentlessly follow up on their enforcement activities and on identified crime problems, and we provide them with the discretion and authority to practice their considerable crime-fighting skills and to experiment with new methods and tactics in fighting crime. These policing skills were always present but usually underutilized. Street cops have always said that they had the ability to reduce crime if only the agency's executives would relieve them of the constraints imposed by an unimaginative and timid management cadre. At the NYPD, we did remove many of these constraints without sacrificing discipline or our command and authority over police officers' behavior. In New York, random preventive patrol is a thing of the past because we've given our officers better and more productive things to do with their time. The time they once spent aimlessly driving or walking the streets is now devoted to tactical strategic enforcement activities.

I would be remiss to leave you with the impression that the absolute number of officers deployed in the field is of little consequence. In fact, the number of officers deployed is an essential ingredient in this formula, but it is probably less important in terms of reducing crime than the *manner* in which the officers are deployed. Certainly, we require a sufficient number or "critical mass" of officers to make our crime strategies effective and workable, but we could probably do with fewer officers if we could significantly reduce the amount of time they devote to purely reactive policing and increase the amount of time they spend in a proactive enforcement mode. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact

that visible police patrol leads to a heightened public sense of safety and security. Making people feel safer is an important police function, and a certain amount of police time and personnel will always be devoted to that purpose.

In the traditionally-managed, reactive agencies, police work was often following a set of contradictory, or at least conflicting, operating principles. Officers were deployed in reaction to crime trends and patterns which might, at best, be several weeks or months old. And yet, as part of O.W. Wilson's legacy, many police executives displayed a near obsession with shaving seconds off the response time to 911 calls about crimes that had already occurred. Although they were given a long list of rules intended to govern their behavior, police officers in reactive agencies operated virtually unsupervised, with little meaningful management oversight of their specific activities. These officers were, in effect, set loose on the streets without the benefit of coordinated and integrated tactical strategies. Police officers and executives, alike, shared a rhetoric and a sensibility that "real police work" involved fighting the "serious" crimes of robbery, burglary, larceny, assault, rape and murder, to the exclusion of less important quality-of-life offenses. Yet, few agencies developed strategies to deal with these crimes in their totality as opposed to dealing with them on a crime-by-crime and case-by-case basis. And few recognized that the failure to enforce quality-of-life laws was sending a message of lax police enforcement and encouraging the commission of more serious crimes.

As described earlier, the NYPD now has the technological capacity to identify crime patterns almost immediately, and our response can be virtually contemporaneous with

evolving patterns. We also have significantly tightened our management controls over police activities, empowering officers and commanders at the local level while holding them highly accountable for their crime-fighting results. Officers and commanders are now guided by comprehensive and coordinated strategies and tactical plans which provide enough flexibility to permit the crafting of appropriate site-specific responses. We relentlessly follow-up on their activities to ensure that problems are solved rather than displaced. We have also recognized and embraced the wisdom of Wilson and Kelling's (1982) "broken windows" theory and its emphasis on the criminogenic nature of quality-of-life offenses. We have convinced officers and commanders that serious crime as well as public fear of crime can be reduced by tending to these 'minor' offenses and annoyances of urban life.

The NYPD circa 1995 is a very different agency than the reactive organizations which previously characterized American policing and it is achieving very different results. The assumption that all police department can provide only "a last-resort, reactive mechanism" is in need of very thorough study and evaluation. A new kind of police department is emerging -- a flexible, responsive, focused organization that can swiftly identify new crime patterns and just as swiftly counter them. It's time for the discipline of criminology to recognize the change. To compare the old reactive agencies to the NYPD circa 1995 is to compare apples and oranges.

I turn now to the main hypotheses, inferences and research data comprising the view that crime is primarily pulled by social and demographic engines. Let's look at how these theories are challenged by empirical facts in New York City's contemporary crime picture.

Age, demographics, and crime:

The relative size of the cohort between 15 and 21 years of age historically has been shown to have enormous influence upon the rate of reported crimes. Criminologists have clearly demonstrated that adolescents commit a disproportionate number and percentage of the total crimes, that criminality peaks between the ages of 16 and 20 for the majority of specific offenses, and that the rate of offenses attributable to a particular age cohort declines as the cohort ages (Travis and Hirschi, 1983; Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin, 1972; Tracy, Wolfgang and Figlio, 1990). These conclusions are supported over time by the UCR data as well as by victimization studies.

It should also be noted that individual criminologists define such important variables as 'youth' and 'youth crime' differently, which complicates the comparability of their research. By slightly altering the operational definitions used to collect data sets or by altering the upper and lower limits used to categorize an age group, for example, substantially different results might obtain.

Despite these caveats, official data and criminological research do reveal that the rate at which adolescents and young adults commit crimes is three to five times higher than their proportional representation in the general population. They account for a

disproportionate number of arrests as well. In particular, the highly credible cohort research conducted by Marvin Wolfgang and his colleagues (Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin, 1972; Tracy, Wolfgang and Figlio, 1990) found that about one-third of both Philadelphia birth cohorts they studied had been arrested by age 18 and that one-half had been arrested by age 30. These results support the general observation that the number of male adolescents in a population will have considerable impact upon levels of crime. Between 40 and 50 percent of the increase in crime index offenses during the 1960s, for example, is attributed to the "baby boom" generation.

Arrest data from New York City also shows the heightened criminality of adolescents aged 15 to 19. Between 1980 and 1994, for example, the average annual robbery arrest rate for young people aged between 15 and 19 (17.38 per 100,000) was more than five times higher than for the population as a whole (3.29 per 100,000) and nearly double that of the next closest age group (aged 20 to 24, 9.20 per 100,000). In 1994, this cohort accounted for more than 37 percent of all robbery arrests in New York City, almost four times the percentage for the population as a whole (9.47) and almost two and one-half times the percentage for the cohort aged 20 to 24 (15.7). The 15-to-19 age category clearly accounts for a disproportionate number and percentage of robberies, and generally similar relationships can be discerned by examining complaint and arrest data for other specific offenses.

When robbery arrest trend data from 1980 through 1994 is examined, however, a somewhat different picture emerges. Although the age 15-to-19 category has consistently

accounted for the greatest proportion of robbery arrests, that proportion in New York City has declined over time -- from 47 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1994. This cohort's share of the total robbery arrests declined steadily between 1980 (47.0 percent) and 1987 (30.8 percent), when it began to climb upward by one or two percentage increments per year.

Criminology's conclusions about the influence of the age 15-to-19 cohort upon overall crime may have been historically accurate, but they no longer seem to apply in New York City. The city's youthful population declined during the two decades from 1970 to 1990, when crime rates soared in New York and across the nation. The group aged between 15 and 19 declined by almost 22 percent in New York City during this period, but the proportion of the cohort involved in crimes increased enormously. Per capita arrests for youths aged between 15 and 19 increased almost 60 percent between 1970 and the early 1990s. During this period of significant decline in the City's high-risk youth population (between 1970 and 1990), total index crimes *increased* by 22.8 percent -- from 578,149 index crimes in 1970 to 710,221 in 1990. Both homicide and motor vehicle theft hit 20-year peaks in 1990.

But as New York City crime started to decline in the 1990s, the decline in youth population reversed itself. Based on its analysis of the 1990 US Census, the Department of City Planning estimates that the city's population of youths between 15 and 19 years of age has increased slightly between 1990 and 1995. Most significant, especially for

criminologists who consider race as a variable, the number of male Blacks between 15 and 19 is estimated to have increased nearly by 2 percent and the number of male Hispanic youths by 5.7 percent. Asian and Pacific Islander males aged between 15 and 19 also increased an estimated 2.36 percent. Pulling the average for the entire cohort down, were the male whites, who decreased 8.4 percent. These data are confirmed by New York State Department of Education school enrollment figures for the City of New York, which show that total public school enrollment increased 4.4 percent between the 1989/90 and 1994/95 school years. The number of public school students in grades 9 through 12, comprising a significant portion of the high-risk group aged from 15 to 19, increased by 12 percent.

The demographic rationales for crime and their emphasis on criminality among the cohort of males between the ages of 15 and 19 cannot explain the significant crime reductions in New York City over the past several years. These rationales would, in fact, predict the opposite effect. The demographic data provided here point to the indisputable, if theoretically inconvenient, reality that the number of individuals who have historically been shown to account for a disproportionate amount of crime relative to their percentage representation in the overall population was relatively low during the period (the late 1980s) when New York experienced a rise in crime, and that that number has actually increased between 1990 and 1995, when New York City began to realize a notable decrease in crime.

Drugs and Crime:

A great deal of the recent discourse and research in contemporary criminology has focused on the nexus between drug abuse and crime, particularly violent crime. Hypotheses typically establish a causal link between drugs and crime in two ways: 1) the physiological effects of a particular drug are said to induce violent crime through the removal of inhibitions or some other pharmacological effect and 2) the prohibitive cost of some drugs is said cause users to commit crimes (particularly property crimes) to generate sufficient income to satisfy their addiction. Of central concern to the “drugs cause crime” hypothesis is the question of which variable came first -- do individuals become addicted and then commit crimes, or do criminals begin to use drugs after the criminal career has begun? It is my understanding that this empirical question remains unresolved despite a quantity of research. Nevertheless, positive correlations between drug use and criminality have been demonstrated, despite the fact that many of the studies are based on convenient samples of prison and jail inmates and therefore present the problem of sample bias (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1988, 1991). Another empirical issue is the difficulty in determining what portion of overall crime is committed by drug abusers. As Wilson and Herrnstein (1985, p. 366) pointed out, it is virtually impossible to calculate how much crime heroin addicts commit even if we had accurate data about the number of addicts and the monetary cost of their addiction.

Criminologists seek to explain fluctuations in crime rates by pointing out how variations in drug markets and drug abuse patterns have historically correlated with crime trends. Specifically, some have argued that the precipitous increases in robbery complaints

experienced nationwide during the late 1980s were attributable to the emergence of crack cocaine, a drug which has been intuitively and anecdotally linked to higher rates of crime. Crack cocaine exploded onto the drug scene in New York City in 1985 and 1986, a period in which robbery complaints did in fact increase dramatically. Based on the concurrence of these historic trends and a general tendency to infer causation from mere correlation, many criminologists would conclude that New York City's increase in robberies during the late 1980s was driven by the advent of crack. Conversely, those criminologists would tend to conclude that New York City's recent decline in robberies signals a dramatic reduction in crack addiction and use. Some would argue, in a similar vein, that the supposed reemergence of heroin as the drug of choice among street criminals might translate into an increase in burglary complaints, since burglaries rates have long been associated with or attributed to the extent of heroin addiction. Unfortunately for these criminologists, however, neither of the hypotheses are supported by the current empirical evidence in New York City.

In 1984, just prior to the crack explosion, the first NIJ-sponsored Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) urinalysis study at the NYPD Manhattan Central Booking facility revealed a 42 percent positive rate for cocaine among all arrestees sampled, irrespective of the charge. By 1988 — perhaps the height of the crack epidemic — the prevalence of cocaine use among all arrestees had nearly doubled to 83 percent, lending credibility to the hypothesized relationship between crack cocaine and crime.

Although a decline has recently been noted in cocaine use among all arrestees, the decline has been fairly modest. In February 1995, 78 percent of arrestees tested positive for cocaine, and in May 1995 (the most recent quarterly data available) 68 percent tested positive for cocaine. These quarterly data fall within the typical range of variance for positive cocaine tests. Since 1988 the proportion of arrestees testing positive for cocaine in each quarterly sample varied from 59 percent to 83 percent, and since 1993 the proportion of positive cocaine tests varied from 63 percent to 78 percent. Cocaine use among those arrested in New York City has not declined substantially, and certainly not to the extent that declining cocaine use could account for the enormous decline in the crime and violent crime that cocaine supposedly engenders.

The hypothesized increase in heroin abuse has not been evident in the quarterly Drug Use Forecasting data either. In 1984, 21 percent of arrestees tested positive for opiates, and positive tests peaked at 27 percent in June 1988 and 25 percent in October 1988. In the most recent DUF testing quarters, February and May 1995, respectively 22 percent and 20 percent of arrestees tested positive for opiates.

Narcotics enforcement activity data also provides indirect evidence that drug abuse has not diminished significantly. Total arrests for narcotics offenses in New York City reached their highest point since 1989 when they increased 28.9 percent in 1994. Felony drug arrests rose 11.4 percent in 1994, and misdemeanor drug arrests rose 54.2 percent. Through November 12, 1995, total NYPD narcotics arrests increased 10.14 percent over the comparable 1994 period and 39.06 percent over the comparable 1993 period.

Although this increase is clearly due to our heightened enforcement and to the strategic approach we are taking to address the city's narcotics problem and although arrest data cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of the prevalence of drug abuse, these numbers provide a rough indicator that drug abuse remains pervasive.

Firearms Use:

Without engaging in the contentious and on-going debate about gun control and the right of citizens to possess firearms, one can intuitively grasp a connection between the availability of guns, particularly handguns, and violent crime. Guns are certainly more lethal than other weapons used in the commission of crimes, and it is a reasonable assumption that gun availability facilitates the commission of many crimes. Roughly half of the nation's homicides are committed with guns, and guns are used in about one-third of all robberies and one-third of all rapes. I won't address the question here of whether guns cause crime, in the sense of serving as a catalyst for the escalation of violence, or deter crime when they are in the hands of law-abiding citizens. It is scarcely debatable, however, that a large number of criminals have carried and used guns in the commission of their crimes or that, in the case of New York City at least, the vast majority of these guns are illegally possessed.

The number of firearms (especially handguns) used in criminal activity has declined substantially in New York City during the past two years. The data supporting this conclusion are derived from several sources, each of which confirms the observation that fewer criminals are carrying and using guns. The percentage of robberies in which

firearms were used, for example, fell from 36.3 percent in 1993 to 33.05 percent in 1994 to 28.7 percent for the first six months of 1995. The total citywide number of shooting incidents between January 1 and November 12 fell 39.67 percent between 1993 and 1995, and the number of shooting victims injured in these incidents fell 37.62 percent. The decline in firearms use can also be inferred from the declining number of calls reporting "shots fired" to our 911 system. The department received 23 percent fewer "shots fired" calls from citizens and dispatched 12,353 fewer radio cars for these calls in the first nine months of 1995 than it did for the comparable 1994 period.

The declining number of shooting incidents and shooting victims reflects a general decline in the number of firearms being carried and used by criminals, which we attribute to the effectiveness of our strategic gun enforcement efforts. We are hard pressed to conceive of any demographic or social variable which might induce street criminals to refrain from carrying or using their guns. Although the total number of gun arrests for the year-to-date period through November 12 declined 34.8 percent from comparable 1993 levels, we do not claim to have taken all of these guns off the streets or away from criminals. We merely assert that criminals have considered the wisdom of leaving their guns at home. Indeed, our gun arrests increased fairly rapidly subsequent to the introduction of our gun strategy, and then began to decline as a function of the aggressive enforcement. It should also be noted that the implementation of our strategies seem to have had the unanticipated consequence of promoting the use of other, but fortunately less lethal weapons. The number of arrests for non-firearm dangerous weapons *increased* more than 6 percent during the 1993 to 1995 year-to-date period.

The following example illustrates one creative way of approaching the problem of illegal guns. Our research and investigations showed that unscrupulous private gun dealers holding federal firearms licenses (FFLs) were a major source of illicit guns on New York City's streets. We began to jointly review FFL applications from New York City residents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in March 1993. Of the 238 new applications received through December 1994, 97.4 percent were disapproved. In addition, 71 percent of the renewal applications between August 1993 and December 1994 were abandoned, surrendered or disapproved in the face of the increased scrutiny from police. Although we cannot quantify the extent to which this policy actually reduced the availability of illegal firearms and handguns, we believe that it is certainly a contributing factor.

Social and Economic factors:

The question of whether poverty causes crime has been one of the most controversial and enduring issues in criminology as well as in the political arena. Academic research efforts have failed to provide conclusive data to support or reject any of the common economic theories of crime causation. Arguments over the role of poverty and other economic factors tend to follow the lines of political ideology, and are largely based on rhetoric and intuitive reasoning. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) have pointed out that the presumed connection between unemployment and crime is rather tenuous. They say that the empirical research in this area is inconclusive and note several logical faults within the competing theoretical models which seek to link unemployment and crime.

In any case, none of the common social or economic factors that criminologists typically cite to explain fluctuations in crime have registered changes of sufficient magnitude in New York City to suggest that they are responsible for any appreciable decline in crime. New York City's economic picture has improved slightly over the past several years, but those years cannot be accurately characterized as a boom period or even a period of significant growth. Monthly data from the US Department of Labor show New York City's unemployment rate at 10.8 percent in January 1995, 7.2 percent in September 1994, at 9 percent in February 1995 and at 8 percent in September 1995. Throughout the two year period, the city had a higher unemployment rate than the nation. A comparison of the New York City Human Resources Administration's July 1994 and July 1995 public assistance rolls in reveals that the number of city residents receiving public assistance benefits declined by 45,354, or fully 4 percent. A comparison of the number of city residents receiving food stamps in August 1994 and August 1995 reveals a very modest decrease of 0.4 percent.

Certain other indicators, however would seem to indicate a return of confidence in the safety of the city. In time, we might see an improvement in the city's economy following a decline in crime rather than the other way around. The New York City Convention and Visitors Bureau estimates that the city will welcome more than 25 million visitors in 1996, a 14 percent increase over 1995 levels. This translates into 3,500,000 more visitors who contribute to the local economy. New York City's hotel occupancy rate rose from 71.7 percent during the first six months of 1994 to 74.2 percent during the comparable 1995

period. Overall airport arrivals rose 2 percent, and international arrivals rose 7.4 percent. Attendance at Broadway shows rose 14.1 percent, and the number of visitors serviced at the Convention and Visitors Bureau increased by 5.1 percent.

Similarly, subway ridership has mirrored the decline in subway crime. Daily subway ridership fell 3.5 percent between 1990 and 1991, but increased 0.2 percent between 1991 and 1992, when subway crime fell 15 percent. In 1992 and 1993, when subway crime fell an additional 24.3 percent, daily ridership rose 5.1 percent. In 1994, with subway crime falling another 21.7 percent, ridership increased an additional 5.2 percent. From these data, we infer that public fears associated with riding the city's rapid transit system have declined, and that residents and commuters are increasingly willing to travel freely throughout the city using public transportation.

Prison and Jail Populations, Arrests and Incapacitation:

Even the best-managed, most effective and most highly directed police agency cannot reduce crime solely through arrest and enforcement. Other spheres of the criminal justice system -- the courts and the corrections, probation and parole functions -- take responsibility for an offender once he or she is in custody, and each plays a salient role in reducing crime and enhancing public safety. Corrections agencies in particular are instrumental in reducing crime through incapacitation and perhaps to some extent through deterrence, although the importance of the correctional role rarely receives much attention in the public discourse on crime.

Like each of the other spheres of the criminal justice system, the view of correctional agencies is subject to prevailing political and organizational ideologies. During the 1960s, when national crime rates tripled, correctional policies and practices were to large extent driven by the rehabilitative ideal. We did not conclude until the 1970s that in terms of rehabilitation, "nothing works" (Lipton, Martinson and Wilks, 1974; Martinson, 1974). In the 1980s and 1990s, the ideology of incapacitation has come to the fore.

Although it may be difficult to accurately estimate the relative effectiveness of incapacitation strategies, the rationale for incapacitation is fairly simple. We know that some criminals, particularly "career criminals," commit a highly disproportionate number of criminal offenses. Blumstein and his colleagues have noted that the most active 10 percent of offenders commit in excess of 100 crimes per year (Blumstein et al, 1986, p. 94). The clear implication is that drastic reductions can be made in the overall crime rate if this group of high-rate chronic offenders is incapacitated.

As discussed above, cohort research (Wolfgang *et. al.*, 1972; Tracy *et. al.*, 1990) on youth crime also reveals that a relatively small percentage of young people are responsible for a vastly disproportionate share of offenses. Statute law and the ideology of the juvenile justice system preclude sentencing youthful offenders with the same severity we direct toward adult criminals. But it also stands to reason that significant inroads can be made in the overall crime picture if we implement some sort of realistic intervention to discourage criminals at the early stages of an evolving criminal career. Too often in the past, police

and juvenile courts have not treated youth crime seriously enough . Both police and courts have operated on the assumption that it is not in children's best interest to burden them with criminal records. Many police officers have failed to take appropriate discretionary action in cases involving young people, possibly in the cynical belief that juvenile court authorities would, at best, merely give the juvenile offender a 'slap on the wrist.' It should be no surprise, then, that many young people who have had contact with the juvenile justice system learn that their offenses will not be taken seriously. For the small percentage of feral youth whose contacts with police and courts are frequent, this perception is repeatedly reinforced. Some are genuinely surprised when the criminal court system finally imposes a real sentence.

Recently an article in *The Detroit News* described New York City's tremendous drop in crime and speculated whether the strategies and tactics the New York City Police Department pursued would have a beneficial effect in Detroit. The article also noted that criminologists were skeptical about the role of the NYPD's strategic approach in achieving these reductions as well as the credit police deserve for them. One criminologist was quoted as saying that police do not control any of the things that generate crimes -- "Cops don't control the demand for drugs. They don't control who's on welfare and who's not. They don't control who has a job and who doesn't. They don't control what Republicans like to call 'family values'" (Tobin, 1995, p. A3). This is a fair and accurate assessment. The police do *not* control these broad social and economic factors. But the same criminologist went on to explain why, in his opinion, crime had declined so precipitously in New York City: "The bad guys are in jail," he said, "Even a small

number of crooks taken off the street can make a big difference in crime statistics.”

Who, if not the police, put them there?

For the year-to-date period ending November 12, the total number of arrests for *all criminal offenses* in New York City — felonies and misdemeanors — increased 26.73 percent over 1993 levels for the comparable period. Arrests for the combined index crimes — all felonies — increased 4.27 percent. The disparity in these data demonstrate the department’s shift away from a limiting emphasis on the traditionally “serious” index offenses committed by adults and toward the strategic enforcement of appropriate and applicable laws, and they provide evidence of the efficacy of the “broken windows” theory. By increasing enforcement (as measured through arrests) for misdemeanor quality-of-life offenses among adults and young people, we were able to achieve enormous reductions in felonies, particularly index crimes.

Not all of these arrestees were incapacitated through incarceration. Although a large percentage of the 3.4 percent increase in the New York State’s prison population between 1993 and 1994 is attributable to arrests from New York City, it must also be noted that both admissions and releases to state prisons declined in 1994. Admissions fell by 3.4 percent and releases by 1.8 percent. Fewer criminals are being incarcerated, but they are being incapacitated for longer periods.

The increase in arrests (especially misdemeanor and juvenile arrests) did not impose an untenable burden on our jail system. In fact, the city’s average daily jail population

actually fell 1.2 percent between 1993 and 1994, after falling in both 1992 and 1993. For the first nine months of 1995 versus the comparable 1994 period, the average daily jail population fell from 19,558 inmates to 18,397 inmates, or by 5.9 percent.


The inference to be drawn from these data is that dramatic crime reductions can be achieved through the sustained and tactical enforcement of quality-of-life misdemeanor offenses, coupled with vigorous enforcement of "serious" felony crimes and the concomitant incapacitation of "career criminals."

Summary

The magnitude and direction of change among the various socioeconomic and demographic variables reviewed here lends little credibility to traditional criminological conceptions about the causes of crime and crime reduction. Indeed, given the direction and magnitude of change evident in many of these variables, traditional criminological thought might have predicted increases in crime in New York City rather than the significant declines we have actually experienced. A third intervening variable -- a well managed and highly directed police agency -- provides a better explanation for the decline in New York City crime than any of the traditional explanations cited by criminologists.

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The enforcers: Rudy Giuliani, New York mayor, and William Bratton, the police commissioner, have turned the tide on their city's crime wave

Cops & Co clean up mean streets

The room was filled with 100 Brooklyn cops. There were precinct commanders, Snag (special narcotics and gun squad) officers and every kind of captain, sergeant and patrolman engaged in the thankless task of curbing crime in New York.

There was also a foreign visitor that Friday morning in July. Jack Straw, the shadow home secretary, sat attentively in the front row. What he learned during a previously unpublicised fact-finding visit to a routine Brooklyn police meeting was, a few weeks later, to send shock waves through British politics.

When Straw stood up at Lewisham town hall last week and delivered an aggressive speech urging a crackdown on street crime, he was doing more than merely transforming Labour party rhetoric on law and order policy. He was paying tribute to the achievements of an unusual American policeman.

William Bratton, the 47-year-old commissioner of police for New York, has pulled off a feat so improbable that men such as Straw with an interest in law enforcement are flocking to Manhattan to see how he has managed it.

In a city famous for its murders, muggings, ghetto gunfights, subway anarchy, drug gangs, junkies, rapists, winos, pickpockets and every other form of seething urban desperado, Bratton is turning the tide. Crime is in decline. Not a modest statistical blip, but a great, sweeping slump across the board of modern mayhem.

Backed by Rudolph Giuliani, the get-tough mayor, Bratton has achieved a 37.3% drop in the murder rate in the 20 months since he took over. Serious crime is down 27% over the same period. "American policing has been swatting at mosquitoes for 20 years. In New York we've learned how to drain the swamp," boasts Bratton.

Straw was last week the first to

New York's police chief is running his force like a business. **Tony Allen-Mills** investigates an experiment that is paying dividends for a crime-weary city and has won over the shadow home secretary

admit that London is not New York, and the Metropolitan police is not, by a very large margin, the bloated, corruption-stained behemoth that until recently was the New York police department (NYPD).

Yet, even after the fuss aroused by his call to "reclaim the streets", Straw was making no apology for his enthusiasm for Bratton's achievements. "Some of Bratton's approaches are rather too rough and ready for Britain," he said. "But the fact that he managed to tackle crime very significantly by tackling disorder first has great significance." By "disorder", Straw means the petty pavement mischief that Bratton has targeted as the root of more serious crime. Ridding the city of squeegee merchants may not seem the most logical approach to bringing down the murder rate, but Bratton and Giuliani are convinced that small crime begets large crime, and that if you arrest the man who jumps a subway turnstile, there may well be one mugging fewer that day.

Bratton is also convinced of a very different crime-fighting principle. He regards policework as a business, in need of modern corporate practice and principles.


If mobsters can run enterprises like Murder Incorporated, Bratton believes, the NYPD should turn itself into Cops & Co, with a balance sheet measured in crime. An avid consumer of Wall Street management theories, he talks of his work at the NYPD as "re-engineering an underperforming organisation". He refers to New York residents as his "customers" and speaks of reduced crime statistics as his "profit".

The man who has delivered a

thunderbolt to the New York underworld started his career in the traditional manner — as a cop on the beat in Boston. Unlike his squad car colleagues, however, he devoted his spare time to attending conferences at Harvard.

Bratton sped through police ranks to become commissioner of the Boston force in July 1993. But only six months later, he quit the job to join Giuliani in New York. He had already served a successful stint as head of New York's subway police, and Giuliani wanted him back to clean up the streets above.

NYPD: CRIMEBUSTERS



He hit town like a tornado, his determination to shake up the force matched only by his taste for Manhattan high life. It soon became known that he didn't like wearing a gun because it snagged on the silk lining of his impeccable double-breasted suits. He was frequently spotted in Elaine's, the late-night celebrity restaurant, with a coterie of colourful advisers, including Jack Maple, deputy commissioner for crime-control strategies.

He immediately beefed up the 30,000-strong NYPD with 7,000

new officers. In Bratton's view, police in New York had reduced themselves to containing crime, and were making no serious effort to reduce it. When precinct commanders shied from his demand for swinging cuts in the crime rate, they were swiftly fired or moved. The average age of senior staff tumbled.

With teams of high-powered management analysts fuelling him with restructuring proposals, Bratton harnessed the disparate squads responsible for speciality crimework and devolved authority back to local precinct level. Crime statistics became the NYPD's yardstick: "Can you imagine running a bank if you couldn't look at your bottom line every day?" says Bratton. They are scrutinised for clues to shifting crime patterns, and if hotspots are detected, such as a rise in robberies in one area, resources are moved. The strategy has quickly yielded results.

Maple, Bratton's key strategist, instituted regular discussion meetings such as the one attended by Straw. "What's going on?" he prodded the Brooklyn cops as Straw watched. "Why are these shootings happening? Is it a turf war? I want you back here next week with a plan."

As the precinct captains prepared to depart, Maple rammed home the strategy: "Remember — we need accurate, timely information; rapid, focused deployment; effective tactics; and relentless follow-up and assessment." It was the kind of language used to teach salesmen how to market washing machines.

Not everyone in New York has been awed by Bratton's achieve-

ments. For a generation of liberal criminologists, the notion that the level of crime is in any way related to police activity is as plausible as a cockroach dancing the cancan.

Crime has for years been blamed on unemployment, poor housing, ethnic division, drug culture and any number of sociological blights. Some of New York's most respected academics have persuasively argued that the level of crime is beyond the control of any police force. There has been no shortage of warnings this year that Bratton's success is a mirage, and that the numbers will soon rise again. One report last week predicted that violent juvenile crime would double by 2010.

Bratton, Giuliani and Maple, on the other hand, argue that the cause of crime is criminals. "The only thing you can link to the change in the crime rate in the last 18 months is the way the NYPD is run," says Bratton.

As Straw recognised last week, not all of Bratton's initiatives are directly applicable in Britain. British police forces are already highly accountable and better co-ordinated than their American cousins. But whatever the sniping from Labour's horrified left wing, Straw is convinced the NYPD experiment is applicable in Britain.

"Jack Maple said to me it wasn't organised crime which worried him, but disorganised crime," said Straw. "It is local crime, opportunist crime which arises when people sense the streets are out of control. That is true in Britain as well."

Additional reporting: Tony Travers and Jessica Stanford



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FILE

NYPD New

Commissioner William Bratton and his executive staff could take satisfaction in the progress made by the New York Police Department (NYPD) toward goals they had set at the outset of 1994 to reduce major crimes in the City. Their efforts had produced better results than even some of them had expected, better even than portrayed in the popular television drama carrying the Department's name. So much better, in fact, that the Commissioner recently had trumpeted the City's rapidly improving crime record to a bond rating agency responsible for rating New York City's debt, pointing out that improvements in quality of life would have an eventual favorable impact on the City's desirability as a place to do business, further strengthening its credit-worthiness.

Although the Department was in the process of delivering results desired by the City's residents, many questioned whether and how the highly-publicized, results-oriented emphasis of Bratton's first twenty-four months as Commissioner could be sustained. (Exhibit 1 contains a report of New York's crime statistics compared with other major U.S. cities.)

As Bratton's team of deputy commissioners (civilians) and chiefs (uniformed personnel) gathered in his office on a morning in late January, 1996, he pondered the appropriate strategy that would enable his organization to continue to produce results with the budget shortfalls that the City was experiencing. The Thursday, January 25 copy of *The New York Times* on his desk, the very same desk used by Teddy Roosevelt when he was Police Commissioner 100 years earlier, carried a front page article headlined, "Giuliani (Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York) Weighing Cuts to Police to Help Decrease Budget Deficit." It was no surprise, in that it reflected his recent discussions with Mayor Giuliani, whose administration faced a \$2 billion (6%) deficit in fiscal 1995 in spite of significant efforts to reduce the budget.

Bratton opened his weekly Executive Staff meeting by pointing out that achieving a further 10% reduction in major crimes during 1996 was beginning to pale in difficulty and complexity to several other challenges facing the Department. These included reduction in funding from the City, restrictions on ways the Department could deploy its resources and reward performance, and the difficulty of sustaining the momentum that had produced greatly improved results in the past two years. After pointing out that the department was "going into a very stressful year," Bratton challenged his deputies to be as creative in responding to these new challenges as they had in reducing crime.

Professor James L. Heskett prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

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History

Founded in 1845, the New York Police Department was the largest municipal police organization in the U.S. At various times in its history, it had been a model for big city policing. However, like other large municipal police organizations, its work was measured in terms of effort, such as the speed with which 911 (emergency) calls were answered and the number of patrols dispatched. From time to time, it had experienced periodic claims of corruption and police brutality.

As Bratton described it

We, as an organization, like many police departments in America during the 1970s and 1980s, became very reactive in our approach to crime. . . . the traditional or professional policing model that was made up of rapid response: Dial 911 and we'll come very quickly. . . . We focused on random patrol as the chief preventive measure—the idea that all these cars riding around would scare the criminals into submission. (Additionally), there was reactive investigation, something we always had done after-the-fact investigation. And it was often controlled by a strong, centralized organization; in the case of the NYPD, you had to go up to the top of the organization to make even the most basic decisions.¹

The concept of community policing began to sweep police departments in the U.S. in the late 1980s. Under this concept, individual officers, often the youngest members of the force, were encouraged to spend more time in the neighborhoods, maintain more visibility, gain the confidence of the citizens of a neighborhood, and collect information that would lead to efforts to deter crime. Nevertheless, specialized units trained to handle particular types of crimes, especially those that were drug-related, continued to exist. This reflected a fear that some patrol officers might be tempted to become involved in corrupt activities, such as drug dealing, themselves. In general, community policing initiatives had created a tension between personnel deployment strategies designed to provide maximum visibility of officers and those designed to deal with high-crime areas.

Safe Streets, Safe City Program

In response to increases in crime of near-epidemic proportions, Mayor David Dinkins and the New York City Council had won approval from the State Legislature in 1991 to hire 6,000 officers and pay for them through increased property taxes and a 12.5% surcharge to the City's income tax. The bill specified the total head count of all police in the city to be achieved on August 1 of each year (38,310 for August 1, 1995).

The program, called Safe Streets, Safe City, was due to expire on June 20, 1996. It had been initiated under extensive potential pressures to take a tougher stance on crime. A proposal had been put forth by the Speaker of the City Council to maintain the surcharge, but to use it in the future to finance the repair of increasingly dilapidated schools.

¹ Marie Simonetti Rosen, "Moving the Biggest Mountain," *Law Enforcement News*, June 30, 1995, pp. 8-10. The word in parenthesis is the author's.

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Giuliani Assumes Office

The election of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in November, 1993 opened a new era for the Department. Giuliani, a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York who had built his reputation as a tough fighter against corruption and organized crime, campaigned and won largely on a campaign that emphasized reductions in New York City's budget deficits and improved crime control. These were to be achieved largely by exempting the Police Department from cuts in budgets for uniformed personnel, cuts that were implemented for nearly every other function of the City's government. However, Giuliani inherited a Police Department that was badly in need of new technology and methods. Work was done by hand that could otherwise be computerized. Communication systems were badly outdated. Often police officers were more poorly armed than the criminals they confronted.

There was a very low level of trust among senior officers as well as between the leadership and the rank-and-file in the Department. One graphic example of this was the denial of access codes to automated criminal history files. Because of this policy, designed to limit misuse of information, officers in one precinct could not gain access to information about crimes committed outside the precinct. As a result, it was nearly impossible for an arresting officer to check a suspect's criminal record. Focus group meetings with frontline patrol people yielded responses such as "this place is not on the level" and "our bosses don't want to fight crime." John Linder, a communications consultant who, as part of an ongoing organization change effort, conducted a survey of what patrol officers believed the Department wanted from them, cited as most important write summonses, hold down overtime, stay out of trouble, and clear the 911 backlog, in that order. Fighting crime was seventh on the list.

One of Giuliani's first actions was to appoint William Bratton, Police Commissioner of Boston, to a similar post in New York. He was sworn in on January 10, 1994.

Giuliani's New Police Commissioner

A product of a working class family in Dorchester, Massachusetts whose father held full-time jobs in a metal-plating shop by day and the post office at night, William Bratton credited his first police job as a patrolman in Mattapan, a tough neighborhood of Boston, with giving him the self-assurance that some of his detractors tended to regard as bravado. The experience led him, according to one account, to develop:

... a particularly powerful distaste for precinct bosses who stayed away from volatile situations and weighed in afterward with criticism of their subordinates. "When I was working District Fourteen, in Boston, we had a major broo-ha in one of the public parks, and every cop in the district was there ... There were two sergeants, old-school guys, back in the station, and we were calling for P.S.—patrol supervisors—and neither one of those bastards would come out. They were two cowards hiding in the station house. We had a lot of them like that in Boston. They didn't want to see anything."²

Bratton came to the job of Commissioner with a clear understanding of the problems of police administration in New York City. Before assuming the job that quickly led to his being named Commissioner of Boston's Police Department, he had served as the chief of the New York City Transit Police Department between 1990 and 1992. During that time, he had helped transform

² James Lardner, "The C.E.O. Cop," *The New Yorker*, February 6, 1995, pp. 45-57, at p. 53.

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a somewhat demoralized force policing a transit system confronting increased robbery, fare beating, and a homeless population of about 5,000 living in transit facilities into an effective deterrent to these problems.

Bratton was an avid reader of management literature and fan of war movies. He occasionally referred to citizens as "customers," criminals as "competition," police officers as "sales representatives," and reduced crime as "profit." He and his wife, Cheryl Fiandaca, a former criminal-defense lawyer who was teaching at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, lived with five cats and a dog in a two-bedroom apartment on Central Park South and were frequently seen at cultural events as well as some of the City's better restaurants.

At about the time Bratton was appointed to head up the transit police, Jack Maple, a lieutenant in the transit police, came to the attention of the Commissioner through a plan for reducing crime that he had drafted. Maple, given to drinking espresso and wearing bow ties, blazers, and two-tone wing-tip spectator shoes (with a homburg hat in winter), was a sartorial opposite of Bratton (who tended toward Hermes animal ties) and a somewhat distinctive sight even on the streets of New York. (According to Maple, he adopted the dress because, as a short, stocky person, he attracted no attention in his youth as a conventional dresser.) The two hit it off immediately, with Maple, labeled by one journalist as "the Police Department's secret crime-fighting weapon," becoming a co-architect of a plan to turn the Transit Police Department around. As Bratton said more than once to those curious about his attraction to Maple, "Jack grows on you."

The program to transform the transit police was focused on two main thrusts. The first involved an effort to deter petty as well as major crimes committed on the system by attacking "quality of life" misdemeanors. For example, "sweeps" by officers in plain clothes were organized to arrest those avoiding fares ("fare beaters"). The search that was done routinely after arrest often yielded weapons which served to deter more serious crime. In Bratton's words, "A search or the threat of one is, in itself, a deterrent to crime because it encourages people to stop carrying guns." In fact, searches of fare beaters alone had turned up more than 400 concealed weapons in the first year.

The second thrust involved equipping the police with 9 mm. weapons with larger magazines, new autos, and new uniforms to improve their image in their own eyes as well as the public's.

Challenges and Responses: First Steps

Challenges facing the Department in early 1994 included a restive public that had swept Giuliani into office in part for his promises of safer streets; a somewhat demoralized police force whose "business was to stay out of trouble, not to police the city," according to John Linder; and a prior administrative focus on effort (number of patrols dispatched) vs. results (crime reduction).

According to one member of Bratton's executive staff, "there was widespread backbiting, fear of failure, and low performance. The structure of the organization was completely top-down. The Department lacked focus, and without focus a police department can end up being a municipal yo-yo." A former Precinct Commander said that the attitude of the senior staff had been, "You people in the precincts just make work for us."

Upon assuming office, Bratton quickly replaced a number of senior staff members, the largest organization shake-up in some time. Having decided that primary responsibility for day-

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to-day operations would reside with the 76 precinct commanders, a systematic effort was instituted to determine which of them could adapt to a strategy focused on results. Eventually, three-fourths of all precinct commanders Bratton inherited were moved out of their jobs. In his first 24 months on the job, the average age of the Commissioner's senior staff had fallen from the low 1960s to the mid 1940s. Bratton took great satisfaction in the result, saying "I would pit my command staff against any Fortune 500 company."

Bratton's reputation among police officers as a "cop's commissioner" was reinforced during his first week on the job as he began pushing for larger 15-shot ammunition clips that he had secured for his transit police several years earlier. These had become the envy of, and a source of resentment among, members of the main force required to use non-automatic weapons. Improved bullet-proof vests were ordered along with darker uniforms that conveyed a more authoritative image.

Word got around rapidly among police that this was a commissioner who "backed you up" but who would not hesitate to take disciplinary action if necessary. He was quick to obtain reliable information and, where appropriate, defend officers accused of excessive force. But in the situation involving the disclosure of widespread police corruption in the 30th Precinct just three months into his administration, Bratton accompanied the arresting force, personally removing the badges of offending officers. Later, he called all precinct commanders to headquarters, threw the badges on the table, and announced to the assembled group that he was retiring the badges so that no other police officer would ever have to wear them. A short time later, however, he emphasized to a reporter that he had "no intention of becoming an anticorruption zealot."

The public saw in Bratton an articulate spokesman capable of relating to their concerns. Shortly after taking office, he began making frequent references, both inside and outside the Department, to "taking the City back from criminals one block, one street, and one neighborhood at a time." In contrast to Bratton's popularity with the public, reporters used adjectives like "mouthy" and "cocksure" to describe him. One commented that he had a "consuming interest in media relations." Bratton was so effective in these encounters that some reporters sensed a growing rivalry between him and the Mayor, something that both denied.

"Quality-of-Life" Legislation

Mayor Giuliani, prompted by polls showing that New Yorkers were concerned about a declining "quality of life," characterized by more graffiti and vagrancy, promised to enforce existing laws against those committing what were termed "quality of life" misdemeanors, including urinating in public, spraying graffiti, and disorderly conduct. Much as had been done at the Transit Police Department, police were marshaled to reduce "quality of life" misdemeanors thought to be most important by the citizenry. In the first quarter of 1994, for example, arrests of peddlers, public drinkers, and squeegee cleaners increased 38%, summonses increased 40%, and sales tax violation citations increased 49% over the previous year. The effort achieved its greatest notoriety when it was used to go after what came to be known as "squeegee pests," people who approached stopped autos, cleaned their windshields, and demanded money from their occupants. Squeegee pests were warned then arrested. By increasing efforts begun in mid-1993, squeegee pests practically vanished from the streets by spring of 1994.

In addition, existing laws were used, for example, to arrest graffiti "artists" who spray-painted municipal and other property as well as slum landlords who had allowed their properties to fall into a state of disarray. The theory behind these efforts had two different rationales. The

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first was the "broken windows" theory that if a broken window is not fixed in a building, soon all windows will be broken. It held that people engaging in one kind of misdemeanor might be inclined to commit others as well, especially that of carrying a concealed or unlicensed gun. Heightened enforcement of these laws resulted in an increased number of searches and increased questioning in a process that turned up several hundred weapons in the first six months of the initiative. Commissioner Bratton referred to these practices as the "linchpin" in his crime-fighting strategies. The idea was not new; when it had been proposed by a consultant to Bratton's predecessor, he had responded, "Give me 50 guys, suspend the Constitution, and we can do that."

Development of the Strategies

One of the first actions of the new administration was to draft the first of what were to become seven Police Strategies. They were titled: (1) Getting Guns off the Streets of New York, (2) Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the Streets, (3) Driving Drug Dealers out of New York, (4) Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence, (5) Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York, and (6) Reducing Auto-Related Crime in New York. In response to continuing concerns about police corruption, a seventh strategy was added in mid-1995 titled, "Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department."

Each strategy statement contained a statement of the problem, current practice, specific conditions warranting the strategy, the strategy itself, and changes in laws as well as departmental policies and procedures that would be necessary to facilitate the strategy.

Excerpts from Strategy No. 5 are shown in Exhibit 2. When first developed, the strategies were labeled "bullshit" by many frontline police officers. Attitudes had begun to change with their implementation.

Organization

Police work in New York City traditionally had been carried out in three separate organizations. One force was entrusted with general public safety. Another dealt with police work associated with housing issues. The third concerned itself with crime on the city's transit system. One of the new Commissioner's first objectives was to implement the merger of these three departments, a high priority of the new mayor. The three forces were consolidated in April 1995. The job structure and headcounts for the consolidated department are described in Exhibit 3. Exhibit 4 contains an organization chart for the Department.

Management by the Numbers

Among the more important initiatives of the new administration were a new emphasis on results vs. effort, reinforced by efforts to computerize statistics and graphics formerly organized by hand, as well as the institution of twice-weekly "CompStat" (computerized crime comparison statistics) crime-strategy meetings based on the more-current information. In addition to introducing new performance measures based on this information, other initiatives involved giving more authority to the 76 precinct commanders, redefining the role of the officers policing neighborhoods, reengineering processes, and introducing new technology. All of this effort, and the

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results it would produce, was a topic of some debate among those knowledgeable about police work and crime control.

New Performance Measures

New performance measures were instituted for precinct commanders. Instead of being measured on the amount of effort put forth by their units, they would now be held accountable for the quality of their plans for dealing with crime problems. Increased emphasis was placed on efforts thought to lead to crime reduction. These included the proportion of people arrested and searched in connection with misdemeanors and the frequency with which those arrested had their past police records checked at the time they were identified and searched. According to Deputy Commissioner Maple: "You don't get into trouble for increased crime, but for not having a strategy to deal with it."

Performance was monitored daily by the NYPD's leadership. As Bratton put it, "Can you imagine running a bank if you couldn't look at your bottom line every day?"

Results vs. Effort: Reducing Crime

Whether or not crime could be reduced was a matter of some debate among criminologists and sociologists. Since a study commissioned by the Johnson Administration, "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society," was published in 1967, it had become conventional wisdom to assume that most inner-city crime was the inevitable product of poverty and racism. Among the theories used to explain a widespread decline in major crime in large cities between 1991 and 1995 were an improved economy, a smaller number of young males (representing an especially high crime risk in the population), increased numbers of drug dealers either dead or in jail, a switch from crack cocaine (a violence-inducing drug) to heroin (a depressant) as the drug of choice in cities, the settlement of many gang "turf wars," and reduced racism.³ Rarely was credit given to police ability to control the rate of crime. All of this was perceived by members of the Department as devaluing its recent achievements. One newspaper columnist suggested that the reason for the striking results achieved by the Department was that New Yorkers were not reporting crime as frequently as in the past. One of Bratton's predecessors even suggested that the trends were the result of a conscious decision on the part of drug dealers that crime (other than drug dealing) was bad for business.

In response, Bratton pointed to the dramatic results achieved in New York in contrast to other major cities. He argued that most of the theories that discounted the NYPD's recent accomplishments essentially assumed that all police departments were equally effective, a thesis that would be hard to defend. Instead of measuring and rewarding effort, their approach involved identifying the causes of major crime and deploying resources to reduce the likelihood that crime would occur, effectively utilizing information and technology.

For example, statistics suggested that there were three major circumstances associated with many murders: drugs, guns, and people with police records. Locations where drugs were dealt were well-known. People carrying licensed guns were known to the police; unlicensed guns were often found during police searches. With improved technology, such as cellular phones, quick checks could be run on the police records of individuals stopped for various offenses. By reallocating resources to places where drugs, guns, and people with prior records were found, dramatic reductions

³ Most of these trends were not true for New York City.

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in murder could be achieved, according to this philosophy. This was accomplished by giving more authority to precinct commanders and holding them accountable for their performance numbers.

Precinct-Level Authority and Accountability

Prior to Bratton's administration, an emphasis on neighborhood policing had resulted in more police being placed "on the beat" in neighborhoods and more authority being given to them to deal with anti-crime initiatives at the grass-roots level, calling in specialized experts from headquarters when necessary. Problems associated with this approach were that some neighborhoods were so crime-ridden that the young officers placed in them couldn't cope with the challenge. Novice police (most likely to be assigned foot patrol in the neighborhood police initiative) were less likely to use good judgment in threatening situations and often were lacking the human relations skills needed by neighborhood police. Precinct commanders had too little real control over the neighborhood police working for them, and resources were more difficult to allocate intelligently than under a plan that would place authority and accountability at a higher level. To correct the situation, Bratton's team decided to focus authority and accountability at the level of the precinct commanders.

The rationale for this action was that individuals at this level could bring sufficient deterrents to bear on difficult crime areas, resources could be reallocated from one "hot spot" to another within the precinct, results could be measured with greater consistency and reliability, and the precinct was a large enough unit to support its own specialized forces. Precinct commanders had been denied greater authority and accountability because it was feared that there was a risk of corruption if headquarters oversight could no longer be achieved through specialized services provided to the precincts.

As a result of this action, officers on neighborhood patrols were freed to concentrate their efforts on relating to neighborhood needs while obtaining leads on possible criminal activity.

The CompStat Meetings

If the precinct commander became the focal point for carrying out crime-reduction strategies, the CompStat meetings and associated activities became the engine for the effort. They were a product of Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple's favorite four-step philosophy for action, a philosophy that had become a mantra in the Department: (1) accurate, timely information, (2) rapid, focused deployment, (3) effective tactics, and (4) relentless follow-up and assessment. Prior to the initiation of the meetings, according to one senior staff member, "crime statistics" were a way of keeping score at the end of the year, not a means for managing for results."

What became known as the "Louie and Jack Show," twice-weekly CompStat (computerized statistics) meetings, required precinct commanders to be ready to review their up-to-date computer-generated crime statistics and relate what they were going to be doing to achieve crime reduction. They were led by Chief of Department Louis Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple and were held in the Department's "War Room," containing a number of large computer-fed screens and other devices for displaying statistics, at Headquarters in Lower Manhattan. A reporter sitting in on one meeting described it as follows:

Maple called the precinct commanders to the front of the room in turn, questioning, prodding, cajoling, and occasionally teasing information out of them. They discussed ongoing investigations, special operations, and any unusual criminal

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activity. When the men and women from the 81st Precinct got their call, they were asked to explain a recent spate of shootings.

"What's going on?" Maple wanted to know. "Why are these shootings happening? Is it a turf war? No? Well, somebody's not happy. Maybe they're cranky 'cause it's hot, but something's happening." When the shooting locations were put up on the huge map projected on the wall, along with those of drug complaints in the precinct, there was a clear overlap. Maple asked what was being done about the drug spots, and one of the narcotics officers said it was a tough area because the business was done inside and there were lots of lookouts. "That's fine," Maple said. "That's why we're detectives. Tell me what tactics we can employ to penetrate these locations." The detective said they would try some buy-and-bust operations and maybe get a couple of the guys behind the Plexiglas to rat when an arrest was hanging over their heads. Maple wasn't satisfied.

"I want you back here next week with a plan," he said to the precinct captain (normally each precinct comes in once every five weeks).⁴

In order to respond to the kinds of questions posed at CompStat meetings, precinct commanders began bringing with them to the meetings representatives from other bureaus (such as detectives) who were assigned to their precincts. The meetings thus encouraged inter-bureau coordination.

CompStat meetings had become well-known throughout the police world. Given the growing success of the Department, they were visited by police administrators and journalists from other parts of the U.S. and other countries. According to one precinct commander, "If your numbers don't look good, these meetings are not fun." Data displayed at a typical CompStat meeting is presented in Exhibit 5.

In addition to organizing CompStat meetings, Chief Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Maple toured the precinct commands, covering as many as 15 in a weekend. During these visits they checked to see, among other things, whether crime strategy maps were up-to-date, proper instructions were being given to patrol officers at roll-call, and communications from headquarters were displayed prominently.

Process and Organization Reengineering

Commissioner Bratton often referred to the work of his team as "reengineering an underperforming organization." He had put 300 members of the Department to work on the specific task of reviewing procedures and practices with representatives from the business world and academia. Twelve teams were organized around the themes of building community partnerships, geographical vs. functional organizational structure, precinct organization, supervisory training, in-service training, productivity, paperwork, integrity, rewards and career paths, discipline, equipment and uniforms, and technology. Management thought leaders such as Jack Welch and Michael Hammer were brought in to address the teams. The process produced more than 600 recommendations, 80% of which were implemented.

Resulting changes ranged from the obvious to the complex. For example, one early finding from the paperwork team was that there were at least 4,000 forms in active use within the

⁴ Craig Horowitz, "The Suddenly Safer City," *New York*, August 14, 1995, pp. 21-25 ff., at p. 25.

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Department. John Linder, a consultant to the culture and organization change process commented that the forms played a very distinctive role in the personnel strategies of previous administrations:

These forms were used to hang people down the food chain. As an officer, you had two choices. Either you filled out the form wrong and got flogged for it. Or you filled it out properly and accurately and were asked, "Why didn't you do something about this?" Either way, you couldn't win.

Bratton himself cited several obvious problems with what he termed "bankers' hours":

The auto-theft squad was working nine to five, and the drug units were mostly working ten to six, with a few going two to ten . . . The warrant unit was getting started at 7:30 a.m., and by the time they read the papers and had their coffee, it was ten before they'd start knocking on doors. The department was not really minding the store.⁵

Another study found that the average amount of police officer overtime associated with an arrest was 12 hours. It resulted from the fact that much of an officer's involvement in the preparation and presentation of a complaint by a district attorney had to be done in person, although it was solely within the discretion of a D.A. to alter the process. Because overtime was an important source of income for many officers, they did not complain about the waste of their time in the arrest and complaint process.

In the process of reengineering the organization, a reporting level was eliminated. This meant that precinct commanders, who formally reported to one of 17 division commanders, now reported directly to eight bureau commanders.

Because the incidence of drugs and guns often occurred in overlapping geographic patterns, specialized drug units were replaced with Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams who investigated situations involving both. In addition, new crime control strategies purposely required the formation of teams designed to break down the barriers that had separated the Patrol, Detective, and Organized Crime Control Bureaus.

Introduction of New Technology

Efforts to collect, organize, and display crime information by computer, part of a larger effort to modernize the Department's information systems, had required an investment of \$500,000. They had become a cornerstone of the Department's strategy, and were thought to have a high return.

New uses of video conferencing technology allowed officers to interact with district attorneys in precincts in order to reduce the average time, much of it overtime, associated with the arrest-to-arraignment process from 14 to a goal of 2 hours. This was critically important in a police force with wages averaging \$24 per hour. (At least one district attorney, when advised of the costs incurred by current procedures, had even approved the use of the telephone for an officer's involvement in the arrest process).

⁵ Craig Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

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Other technology-based initiatives, supported by a newly-passed Federal Crime Bill and private sector donations, included the purchase of precinct-based computers and mapping software to develop crime analysis capabilities at the precinct level. Over \$14 million of Federal Crime Bill funding also enabled the department to fully implement a larger decentralized arrest processing system project which would be critical to cutting arrest-to-arraignment time through the implementation of videoconferencing, Livescan computerized fingerprinting, photo imaging and enhancing the LAN network.

Continuing Challenges

New York City, according to FBI statistics, accounted for 61% of the total reduction in serious crimes for the entire U.S. during the first six months of 1995. Although Commissioner Bratton and his team could take satisfaction from this, it was clear that the job ahead would be made even more challenging by budgetary limitations, possible changes in the process for arbitrating labor wage disputes, restrictions on the deployment of resources, and the inability to reward good performance, all combined with the need to achieve higher productivity. Corruption within the Department was an issue that had to be given continuing attention. There was a persistent belief by some that the price of crime reduction, in terms of reduced civil rights, was high. And finally, it had become apparent that it would take much longer than two years to effect the attitude changes in the police force that were sought. As consultant Linder commented, "It's clear that the message hasn't filtered down into the ranks." But it would be difficult to sustain the high-intensity effort that had characterized Bratton's first two years in office.

All of this had to be achieved in an organization that had to be operated within constraints imposed by its public-sector nature. Exhibit 6 represents one view of basic differences between management in the NYPD and private-sector organizations.

Budgetary Limitations

Non-discretionary accounts dominated the Department's annual budget of about \$2.3 billion, as shown in Exhibit 7. They covered salaries, overtime, shift differentials, uniform allowances, annuity payments and holiday pay for employees, and resulted largely from head counts that were mandated by Safe Streets, Safe City and other legislation as well as wage policies that were determined in large part by linkages between 81 labor contracts that the City had with various labor unions, including the police officers' union.

In discussions with the Mayor, it was clear that City Hall expected savings from payroll and other sources of at least \$20 to \$30 million in 1996. This was on top of budgetary constraints that had been placed on the Department's OTPS (other than personal services) accounts in 1994 and 1995. In an effort to maintain the size of the police force in service, as promised by the Mayor in his election campaign, the OTPS budget had been cut by 30% (down to \$95 million) for fiscal 1996. This had to cover expenditures for such items as supplies, equipment, telephones, fuel, and rent. Some of the results were almost laughable. Jack Maple, for example, pointed out that his unit couldn't afford the supplies needed to display crime information in his office.

Perhaps the most significant cuts in discretionary budgets had come from overtime reduction. This account had been reduced from \$113 million in 1993 to \$79 million in 1995. While this had helped the Department meet its budget goals, it had hurt morale among frontline officers in the Department who could no longer count on overtime income to help with such things as mortgage payments.

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It was quite possible that the Mayor was ready to consider reductions in the size of the police force, although it would be politically difficult for him to allow any of those reductions in the number of police on patrol. His attitude toward head count had begun to change with the possible expiration of the Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, and a significant change in the arbitration process for the City's negotiations with its police and firefighters unions which could increase pay levels significantly. When queried about whether he was ready to abandon the staffing level of 38,310 mandated by legislation, the Mayor had pointed out that, because of attrition, the Department typically operated for most of the year at levels up to 1,800 persons fewer than those mandated.

Labor Contract Dispute Arbitration

Led by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of New York City, the State Legislature had passed and sent to the Governor for signature legislation shifting responsibility for contract dispute arbitration from the City's Office of Collective Bargaining to the State Public Employment Relations Board. It was thought that this action would result in larger salary increases from future arbitration. In its deliberations, the City's agency was required to consider such things as the City's ability to pay awards. In contrast, the State agency was required to take into consideration pay levels of communities surrounding New York City, which were as much as 35% higher than those in the City.

The bill, although vetoed previously by the Governor, had passed with only 8 legislators out of 200 opposing it. Previously, union officials had said they would make passage of the bill a litmus test for lawmakers when they allocated their much-coveted political campaign contributions.

The Mayor publicly had expressed his opposition to the bill and had asked the Governor not to sign it, weathering the criticism of the unions that had supported his political campaign. Privately, he had discussed with Commissioner Bratton whether or not deeper budget cuts would be required if the legislation were to be enacted. On January 25, alongside the report of the progress of the legislation, *The New York Times* reported that:

Preliminarily, the Mayor has ordered each of his agencies to cut their budgets for the next fiscal year by 7.5 percent, although he has not said that each would have to cut that much. For the Police Department, a cut that size would total \$170 million, from a \$2.3 billion budget. It remained unclear yesterday what other cuts, if any, (other than 1,000 personnel from the Department yielding estimated savings of \$20 to \$30 million) would be considered for the Police Department.⁶

Possible Sources of Staffing Reductions

If staffing reductions were required, the Commissioner could achieve them through attrition, which occurred at the rate of about 1,600 police officers and 500 civilians annually, and a postponement of the starting date for the Police Academy class that graduated about 1,800 new recruits each year. The latter would, however, slow down Bratton's efforts to improve the overall

⁶ Steven Lee Meyers, "Giuliani Weighing Cuts to Police To Help Decrease Budget Deficit," *The New York Times*, January 25, 1996, pp. A1 and B3.

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quality of Department personnel by imposing tougher entry standards and an improved training program.

This might also require combining positions and moving more officers from "desk jobs" to patrols. In 1995 alone, 500 officers were freed for patrol work who had previously staffed public affairs, personnel, and payroll units prior to the merger of New York City's three police forces.

Restrictions on Resource Deployment

The Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, which established staffing targets for each precinct of the City, was a reflection of a general feeling on the part of residents that each precinct should have its "fair share" of police protection. These targets, which reflected conditions in the City in 1989, influenced the assignment of Police Academy graduates. As a result, precinct staffing levels were difficult to adjust to reflect changing police needs. (See Exhibit 8 for demographic and crime statistics as well as staffing levels for four precincts and Exhibit 9 for a precinct map of the City.) Most people still had not accepted the argument that crime reduction in heavily impacted crime areas would lead to less crime in low-crime neighborhoods, just as many had trouble believing that searches of those committing minor misdemeanors would eventually lead to reductions in serious crimes.

According to Jack Maple, while specialized units, such as Street Crime (plain clothes), Narcotics, and Vice, could be moved from one precinct to another for 30 days at a time, fully 18,000 frontline patrol personnel "couldn't be moved at a whim."

Nevertheless, he cited the 9th Precinct experience as evidence that moving specialized units worked. He pointed out that the Precinct had started out the first four months of 1995 with major crimes 50% over the previous year. By the end of the year, with the redeployment of specialized units to the Precinct, such crimes were down 4%. Drawing on his extensive reading of military history, Maple cited British use of radar in WWII in defending against enemy aircraft as a model for what the Department should strive for. It provided the RAF with a way of deploying its personnel and equipment quickly.

While attempting to maintain adequate headcount in personnel assigned to precincts, Commissioner Bratton was contemplating assigning 750 of the 1,800 March, 1996 graduates of the Police Academy class to replace more-experienced officers reassigned to the Mayor's announced effort to wage an all-out war against drugs in Brooklyn North. The resulting specialized units would be assigned to ten precincts in which drug-dealing was especially high. This, of course, would make it more difficult to replace frontline personnel in the remaining precincts.

The Brooklyn North initiative would involve the temporary reassignment of 1,200 officers from elsewhere in the Department to the shaded area outlined in Exhibit 9. Reassignments would be made from all bureaus. The initiative had created an air of anticipation and excitement in the Department. It was also thought to be a test of conventional thinking regarding restrictions on the deployment of resources.

Rewarding Performance

Jack Maple pointed out that police officers hadn't had a raise in spite of their increasing levels of effectiveness. The situation had been made more tense by the fact that the City Council had voted senior City officials, including a small number of Police Department officials, pay raises up to 20% as of July, 1995. These officials hadn't received pay raises for eight years.

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Union labor contracts and civil service statutes made it very difficult to reward outstanding performance. The primary form of monetary incentives was provided by overtime, which had been reduced significantly through the application of stricter management accountability as well as the increased use of technology.

Other forms of recognition commonly employed within the Department were the temporary assignment of patrol officers to work with detective squads for 30 days and other preferred assignments. More often, a simple letter of recognition was written.

Increased Productivity

A declining budget would require increased productivity if the Department was to meet its goal for 1996. Staffing data for major U.S. cities is presented in Exhibit 10.

Along with the increased use of information and technology, more controversial means could be attempted to improve productivity. For example, officers could be freed up for other tasks by replacing two-person patrols with one officer. But the outcry from officers, who had fought hard for two-person patrols on the grounds of increased safety, would be great.

Addressing Rising Complaints

With increased enforcement activities and personnel, there had been a 32% increase in 1994 in the number of complaints about police brutality, unfair treatment of citizens by police, and police corruption over the past two years. The Department's analysis of its information disclosed that:

... In 1994... 4 million calls for service were answered in person by officers, 227,453 arrests were made, 5.4 million summonses were written—with a total of 9,922 complaints made by the public for police misconduct. Of the 2,152 cases reviewed in 1994 by the Civilian Complaint Review Board, an independent arm of city government, 5.1% (or 111 cases) were determined by CCRB to be worthy of prosecution in the Department's disciplinary process.

In February 1995, the Mayor created an independent citizens monitor, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption. At the time, plans already were underway in the Department to take steps to correct a situation disclosed in an early-1994 survey of Department personnel that found that "a long-standing, high-level concern about avoiding scandal and criticism had created within the NYPD a culture of organizational fear, self-protection, secrecy, and exclusion—which existed alongside continuing, everyday heroic action by individual members of the service."

Rooting Out Corruption

On June 14, 1995 Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting Out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York City Police Department, was published. One of the biggest challenges of this initiative was described in the Strategy as follows:

... contemporary corruption in the NYPD occurs in pockets which, despite universal disapproval among honest officers, are protected by the "blue wall of silence." The tradition of not "ratting" on colleagues is common in most professions, but it is even more pronounced in police and military organizations where members sometimes rely on each other for physical survival. Mutual protection under

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violent circumstances becomes mutual protection under all . . . The "us versus them" attitude often called the "blue cocoon" can seem to condone disrespect of the public and even abuse of force in these same police and military organizations.

To counteract these tendencies, efforts were initiated to energize the Department's own investigative group, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). This was to be done by changing the entire dynamic by which the IAB interacted with Department personnel. In the past, the relationship had been one of distrust, involving obsessive secrecy on the part of the IAB and an unwillingness to cooperate on the part of police officers. To change it, efforts were underway by the IAB to: (1) involve every command level in reducing corruption and brutality, (2) make available within the department monthly reports for each command on complaints broken down to the level of the precinct and even tour of duty, (3) computerize master profiles of individual officers that cross-referenced data on corruption, brutality, and discourtesy complaints with that regarding record of sick leave, emergency excusal, arrest activity, commendations, and disciplinary actions, (4) provide training to those in command positions about the detection of patterns leading to corruption. As part of a more proactive approach to deterrence, the IAB was encouraged to observe officers as they interacted with IAB officers posing as civilians who might provide opportunities to commit crimes. In addition, the IAB would continue to initiate parallel investigations of complaints brought before the Civilian Complaint Review Board and implement Commissioner Bratton's order to stop giving one day's notice for random drug tests, which had enabled those tested to prepare.

To support the new policy of inclusion concerning issues of corruption, Strategy No. 7 set forth a new policy advocating consideration of a commander's entire record of performance rather than the career-ending loss of command that previously often had resulted when corruption was discovered in any of their units.

Sustaining the Effort

There was some question about whether the efforts of the first two years could be sustained, especially by a Department whose personnel had not received pay raises. As Jack Maple put it: "Armies like to fight short wars. We're slowin' down."

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Exhibit 1 Report of Crime Trends in Major U.S. Cities

The percentage decrease in crime for New York City for the first six months of 1995 was 15.7%. This compared with a nationwide percentage change of -1%.

Total Crime Index for 25 Largest Cities, Listed in Order of Population*

City	1st 6 mos. 1995	1st 6 mos. 1994	% Change
New York	219132	259988	-15.7%
Los Angeles	134099	138265	-3.0%
Houston	63889	63476	0.7%
Philadelphia	52348	49843	5.0%
San Diego	33645	39748	-15.4%
Phoenix	58276	52003	12.1%
Dallas	46761	50020	-6.5%
Detroit	56756	57694	-1.6%
San Antonio	39072	43657	-10.5%
San Jose	18449	18446	0.0%
Las Vegas	29580	28022	5.6%
Baltimore	44448	43742	1.6%
Jacksonville	30396	31995	-5.0%
Columbus	28090	25780	9.0%
Milwaukee	23026	22991	0.2%
Memphis	31023	29158	6.4%
Washington, D.C.	31915	28640	11.4%
El Paso	20034	20211	-0.9%
Boston	25565	24093	6.1%
Seattle	27645	27910	-0.9%
Nashville	26797	24607	8.9%
Denver	16073	17823	-9.8%
Cleveland	18678	18459	1.2%
New Orleans	26288	24084	9.2%
Fort Worth	19700	21490	-8.3%

*Notes: The following cities were not listed on the FBI report due to incomplete submissions:

Chicago, Illinois (3rd largest city)

Indianapolis, Indiana (12th largest city)

San Francisco, California (14th largest city)

Austin, Texas (25th largest city)

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Exhibit 2

Excerpts from the Communication to Police Describing Police Strategy 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York



NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
WILLIAM J. BRATTON, POLICE COMMISSIONER

FYI

July 8, 1994

Vol. 2 No. 11

"Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York"

Police Strategy No. 5

On Wednesday, July 6th, Mayor Giuliani and I made public this Department's ambitious agenda for combating the wide range of criminal behavior we commonly refer to as quality-of-life offenses: street prostitution, aggressive panhandlers, sales of alcohol to minors, graffiti vandalism, public urination, unlicensed peddlers, reckless bicyclists and car-splitting noise churned out by "boombox" cars, loud motorcycles, clubs and spontaneous street parties.

Legally, these crime and disorder problems are classified as misdemeanors and petty offenses. But in the hearts and minds of many New Yorkers, they carry felony weight. No one knows this better than you - the police officers, supervisors and precinct commanders who often hear local residents and merchants register their frustration at community meetings and on the beat.

Linchpin Strategy

Police Strategy No. 5, "Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York," will serve as a linchpin, holding fast our overall efforts to significantly reduce crime and fear. Like our previous strategies, this plan builds on past successes and seeks to empower precinct commanders.

Tall Order

Clearly, the mayor and the Department's top leadership understand that we are asking a lot of you. Reversing what amounts to decades of declining standards for acceptable behavior on the city's streets is, after all, a tall order. It will take years of hard work. But we will make sure you have the training, the equipment and the support you need to get the job done.

Independence

First, the 75 precinct commanders will have more latitude and direct control over resources to meaningfully address specific quality of life conditions in their respective precincts. They will be relying less on other city agencies and the Department's specialized units, such as PMD, and more on the police officers and supervisors in their commands. For example, precincts battling chronic street prostitution were formerly dependent on fewer than 200 officers from Public Morals to run decoy operations. Now, commanders will be able to routinely deploy precinct personnel, trained by PMD, as undercovers to arrest individuals who patronize prostitutes (Operation John) or arrest "johns" and seize their cars (Operation Losing Proposition) - both formidable proven deterrents.

Similarly precincts with persistent "boombox" car conditions will be given sound meters and the training to conduct Operation Soundtrap to summons motorists and seize their cars.

Limiting Summonses

We are going to be more careful about who gets summonses

Additionally, we are compiling a computerized list of about 10,000 misdemeanor recidivists. Individuals with a history of five or more misdemeanor arrests within the last five years will not be eligible for DATs. Quite simply, we want summonses and DATs to be worth the paper they are written on. The time you spend issuing them is too valuable to waste.

Learning Civility

The Department will continue to make the most of civil laws to put smoke shops, crack houses, illegal massage parlors and other criminal enterprises out of business. We have doubled the Police Department's Civil Enforcement initiative to make a total of 34 attorneys available to assist precincts.

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Exhibit 2 (continued)

Chronic EDPs

On June 1st, we kicked off a 90-day pilot program regarding emotionally disturbed people who pose a danger to themselves or others. Our goals are twofold: provide doctors, judges and prosecutors with information they need to make decisions and reduce the amount of time you spend guarding EDPs in hospital emergency rooms. We're partners in this program with Bellevue and Elmhurst Hospitals, the city Health and Hospitals Corporation, the state and city Offices of Mental Health and John Jay. We will closely evaluate its progress.

Moreover, we are developing a computer database of emotionally disturbed persons repeatedly taken into police custody so behavior that is either criminal or otherwise dangerous can be brought to the immediate attention of judges, prosecutors and psychiatrists.

Under-age Drinking

Precinct commanders who have identified bars, delis and clubs that persistently sell alcohol to minors will set up meetings with proprietors and representatives of the State Liquor Authority. Precinct captains and inspectors will explain the law, issue warnings and advise bar and deli owners that specially trained uniformed supervisors will be making regular inspections. Violators risk having their licenses revoked by the SLA. We will also expand our use of police cadets in sting operations.

Graffiti Vandalism

We will be making more use of night scopes to catch criminal mischief makers in the act. Additionally, Deputy Commissioner for Community Affairs Walter Alicea is organizing a conference to brainstorm ideas and duplicate successful programs (like one in the 104th Precinct) which combine education, vigorous enforcement and community service sentences for vandals.

Legislative Boost

Too often, police officers who earnestly try to address quality of life conditions are frustrated by a criminal justice system that fails to support your efforts. We have put together a legislative agenda to lobby for local laws against aggressive panhandling and reckless bicyclists, as well as state legislation allowing police to fingerprint unlicensed peddlers and motorists who drive with suspended licenses.

Meanwhile, we will assertively enforce existing statutes - harassment, assault, menacing, disorderly conduct and criminal mischief - to arrest aggressive panhandlers and others engaging in criminal behavior.

We know the most effective solutions to quality of life offenses combine sustained enforcement action, community involvement and a well coordinated effort by police, prosecutors, judges and other government agencies.

Finally, as the mayor and I stressed to reporters, this initiative will not take away from our strategies to get guns off the street, curb drug sales and reduce violent crime. It will, in fact, help.

As Chief of Department John F. Timoney puts it:

"If you take care of the little things, the big things will follow."



PRIDE, COMMITMENT, RESPECT

NYPD New

336-293

Exhibit 3 NYPD Structure and "Head Counts," By Position, January, 1996; and Staffing Levels, August, 1990 to March, 1996

Management Structure

The top management responsibilities in the NYPD were divided among uniformed managers called chiefs and civilian managers called deputy commissioners. Although there were important exceptions, the uniformed chiefs were primarily responsible for police operations and the civilian deputy commissioners oversaw various support functions such as budget, planning, community affairs and technology development.

The Police Commissioner, a civilian appointed by the mayor, was the chief executive officer of the police department with a wide range of responsibilities outside and inside the organization.

The Chief of Department was a four-star chief, the highest uniformed rank in the NYPD. He ran the day-to-day policing business. Reporting directly to the Chief of Department were five three-star bureau chiefs, also known as superchiefs, responsible for the Patrol Services Bureau, the Transit Bureau, and the Housing Bureau.

The Patrol Services Bureau (PSB) managed the 76 precinct commands which were overseen by eight borough commands. (Staffing: 20,838 uniformed personnel and 2,045 civilian personnel).

The Detective Bureau was the investigative arm of the department. There were detective squads in each of the precincts (usually commanded by a lieutenant) and reporting to detective borough commands. The borough commands also oversaw homicide and major crime squads. A traditional problem in the department had been a lack of coordination between detective and patrol operations because they had separate reporting structures in separate bureaus. (Staffing: 3,385 uniformed personnel and 305 civilian personnel).

The Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) was established in 1971 on the heels of the Knapp Commission scandals to place all corruption-prone enforcement functions under a single, centralized command. Like the detective bureau, OCCB had a separate command structure, including divisions for Narcotics, Vice Enforcement, Auto Crime, and Organized Crime Investigations. (Staffing: 2,141 uniformed police and 108 civilians).

The Transit Bureau policed the city's vast subway system. The Transit patrol force worked out of 12 district commands supervised by four borough commands. The Transit Bureau also maintained a Homeless Outreach Unit, a Canine Unit and a Vandals Squad. (Staffing: 3,270 uniformed police and 181 civilians).

The Housing Bureau maintained nine police service areas (PSAs) to police the 330 public housing developments operated by the New York City Public Housing Authority. (Staffing: 2,155 uniformed police and 178 civilians).

Also reporting to the Chief of Department were the Operations Division, which managed major events and disaster response, and the Support Services Bureau, headed by a civilian director and responsible for the auto fleet, the property clerk, and other support services.

The reporting relationships described above were the formal ones. In practice, the Police Commissioner met with many managers besides his direct reports, and the deputy commissioners, bureau chiefs, and borough chiefs gathered for weekly executive staff meetings with the Police Commissioner, First Deputy Commissioner, and Chief of Department.

Uniform Rank Structure

Police officers had a defined civil service career path. Up to the rank of captain, promotion was controlled by civil service exams for each rank. The entry rank was police officer and the successive ranks were sergeant, lieutenant, and captain. The department's 37,171 uniformed personnel, as of January, 1996 included 25,909 police officers, 4,229 sergeants, 1,365 lieutenants, and 391 captains. The ranks above captain were discretionary, but no one who had not attained the rank of captain could serve in them. There were 121 deputy inspectors, 65 inspectors, 27 deputy chiefs (one-star), 17 assistant chiefs (two-star), eight bureau chiefs (three-star) and one chief of department (four-star).

396-293.

NYPD News

The title of detective was not a rank but a discretionary designation. Detectives were paid more than police officers of comparable rank and served in three grades, with Detective Third Grade being the lowest and Detective First Grade being the highest. Detectives retained their underlying civil service title (i.e. police officer). Most detectives served in the Detective Bureau, although there were numerous exceptions serving in other investigative and specialist assignments. There were about 5,000 detectives in the NYPD.

Most of the department's personnel were represented by unions, including all uniformed personnel up to and including the rank of deputy chief. Police officers were represented by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (LBA) and captains and all higher unionized ranks by the Captains Endowment Association (CIA). Among 37,171 uniformed personnel there were only 25 positions that are not unionized.

About 85 percent of the department's 6,800 civilian employees, including most clerical workers and the 911 operators, were represented by various locals of District Council 37, the union which represented the largest share of New York City municipal workers. About 10 percent were represented by the Teamsters Union, with the balance represented by the Communication Workers Union and other unions. Only 83 civilian managers were not unionized.

Staffing Levels, August, 1990 to March, 1996

Personnel Pool	August 22, 1990 (Pre-Safe Streets)	February 28, 1994 (Post-Safe Streets)	March 31, 1995 (Pre-Merger)	March 4, 1996 (Post-Merge)*
NYPD	25,465	31,532	29,985	32,134
Transit	4,288	4,216	4,280	3,139
Housing	2,200	2,565	2,804	2,038
Total uniform	31,953	38,311	27,069	37,311
Civilian	7,722	7,746	7,137	7,183
Total department	39,675	46,057	44,206	44,494

*Transit merged April 1, 1995; Housing merged May 1, 1995.

Exhibit 4 Organization Chart, New York Police Department, 1995




Exhibit 5 Example of Precinct-Level Data Displayed at CompStat Meetings

PRECINCT COMMANDER PROFILE

033 PRECINCT

JOANNE JAFFE



COMMANDING OFFICER

Rank: DEPUTY INSPECTOR C.O. Prev Commands: 001 PCT
 Years in Rank: 0yrs 6mos Current Eval: 08/94-AS Date Assigned C.O.: 12/04/95
 Appointment Date: 11/07/79 Date of Promotion: 08/04/95
 Education: BA, MA Resident Pct:
 Other Training: FBI TRAINING CONF
 City Council Members:
 S. MICHAEL (D.7); G. LINARES (D.10)

JOHN FREISEN



Executive Officer

Precinct Demographics

Total: 0
 White: 0.00 %
 Black: 0.00 %
 Hispanic: 0.00 %
 Asian: 0.00 %
 Amer Ind.: 0.00 %
 Other: 0.00 %

Unfounded Radio Runs

1994	1995	%Change	%CW95	%boro95
2753	11619	121.00	-9.94	-11.74

Domestic Violence (1995)

Radio Runs	DIR's	%Compliance
2198	1904	86.62

Uniform Absence (Avg. Days YTD)

1994	cw94	1995	cw95	LOD94	cwLOD94	LOD95	cwLOD95
0.00	5.78	4.95	6.31	0.00	3.93	1.92	2.98

Legend: All Data through 01/31/96 except: Overtime, paid thru 02/02/96
 Uniform Absence thru 12/31/95, Integrity Monitoring through 12/31/95,
 Unfounded Radio Runs through 12/31/95, and Domestic Violence through 12/31/95.

Transit

District: 03
 C.O.: DEP. INSP. JACKSON
 Facilities: 174TH ST. YARD

Housing

PSA: 6
 C.O.: CAPTAIN DUNNE
 Facilities

Precinct Personnel

	pre-safe	1995	1996	%Change
Uniform	0	215	212	-1.40%
Civilian	0	17	15	-11.76%
RIP	No	---	---	---
Dom Viol	---	0	1	---
Youth Off	---	0	3	---
SNEU	---	0	7	---

Precinct Non-Crime

	1995	1996	%Change	%CW
RMP Acc	3	1	-66.67	14.59
Arr O/T	\$0	\$17179	---	-57.36
Oper O/T	\$0	\$10793	---	-27.93
Total O/T	\$0	\$44077	---	-28.69
Park Sum.	7395	6108	-17.40	-10.09
Mov Sum.	1937	909	-53.07	-31.38
Qual Life	830	632	-23.86	-20.79

Integrity Monitoring

	1994	1995	%Change	%C/W	94ratio	95ratio
Bribe Arr	1	8	700.00	-21.7	1:215.0	1:25.50
Tot CCIB	18	41	122.25	-7.70	1:13.44	1:5.17
Force	0	28	---	---	---	---
Abuse	0	12	---	---	---	---
Discourtesy	0	18	---	---	---	---
Off. Lang.	0	1	---	---	---	---

Exhibit 5 (continued)

WEEKLY CRIME/COMPLAINT COMPARISON REPORT
REPORT COVERING THE WEEK OF 02/05/96 THROUGH 02/11/96

Date Prepared: 02/13/96

033 PRECINCT

CRIME COMPLAINTS

	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	%CHANGE	1996 MTD	1995 MTD	%CHANGE	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	CURRENT %CHANGE	1994 YTD	1 YEAR %CHANGE	1993 YTD	3 YEAR %CHANGE
MURDER	0	0	%	0	0	%	3	2	50.00%	0	%	0	%
RAPE	1	0	%	1	0	%	8	6	33.33%	5	60.00%	0	%
ROBBERY	6	11	-45.45%	13	17	-23.53%	73	65	12.31%	66	10.61%	0	%
FEL. ASSLT	8	12	-33.33%	11	16	-31.25%	40	52	-23.08%	42	-4.76%	0	%
BURGLARY	4	7	-42.86%	8	12	-33.33%	50	70	-28.57%	77	-33.06%	0	%
GR.LARCENY	3	5	-40.00%	7	9	-22.22%	26	48	-45.83%	31	-16.13%	0	%
G.L.A.	8	7	14.29%	11	11	0.00%	45	49	-8.16%	74	-39.19%	0	%
TOTAL	30	42	-28.57%	51	65	-21.54%	245	292	-16.10%	295	-16.95%	0	%
SHOOT VIC.	2	2	0.00%	2	2	0.00%	7	7	0.00%	6	16.67%	0	%
SHOOT INC.	2	1	100.00%	2	1	100.00%	7	5	40.00%	6	16.67%	0	%
RAPE I*	0	0	%	0	0	%	6	3	100.00%	0	%	0	%

ARREST STATISTICS

	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	%CHANGE	1996 MTD	1995 MTD	%CHANGE	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	CURRENT %CHANGE	1994 YTD	1 YEAR %CHANGE	1993 YTD	3 YEAR %CHANGE
MURDER	0	0	%	0	0	%	1	2	-50.00%	0	%	0	%
RAPE	0	0	%	0	0	%	3	2	50.00%	0	%	0	%
ROBBERY	0	3	-100.0%	3	3	0.00%	20	13	53.85%	0	%	0	%
FEL. ASSLT	9	9	0.00%	11	12	-8.33%	28	39	-28.21%	0	%	0	%
BURGLARY	1	2	-50.00%	2	2	0.00%	8	13	-38.46%	0	%	0	%
GR.LARCENY	2	0	%	4	1	100.00%	12	11	9.09%	0	%	0	%
G.L.A.	1	3	-66.67%	1	4	-75.00%	8	16	-50.00%	0	%	0	%
TOTAL	13	17	-23.53%	21	22	-4.55%	80	96	-16.67%	0	%	0	%
GUN ARRESTS	1	2	-50.00%	2	4	-50.00%	6	21	-71.43%	0	%	0	%
NARC ARREST	51	72	-29.17%	71	124	-42.74%	265	442	-40.05%	0	%	0	%
PSB ARRESTS	79	103	-24.76%	106	180	-41.11%	438	689	-36.43%	0	%	0	%
OCED ARR.	15	11	36.36%	30	24	25.00%	132	81	62.96%	0	%	0	%
D.B. ARR.	3	5	-40.00%	4	5	-20.00%	16	21	-23.81%	0	%	0	%
H.B. ARR.	0	12	-100.0%	0	14	-100.0%	4	20	-80.00%	0	%	0	%
T.B. ARR.	5	2	150.00%	6	3	100.00%	48	64	-25.00%	0	%	0	%
ALL ARRESTS	111	140	-20.71%	159	234	-32.05%	668	916	-27.07%	0	%	0	%

SUMMONS ACTIVITY

	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	%CHANGE	1996 MTD	1995 MTD	%CHANGE	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	CURRENT %CHANGE	1994 YTD	1 YEAR %CHANGE	1993 YTD	3 YEAR %CHANGE
PARKING	1308	1460	-10.41%	1676	2654	-36.85%	5752	8895	-35.33%	...	...	...	...
MOVING	380	345	10.14%	455	699	-34.91%	1236	2555	-51.62%	...	...	...	...
CRIMINAL	211	80	163.75%	252	177	42.37%	536	687	-21.98%	...	...	...	...
ECB	70	0	%	97	2	4750.0%	204	14	1357.1%	...	...	...	...

FIGURES ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO FURTHER ANALYSIS AND REVISION

PARKING
MOVING
CRIMINAL
ECB

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NYPD New

Exhibit 6 A Comparison of NYPD Operations and Private Sector Operations

Budget

As a city agency, the Police Department did not control either its operating or capital budget. Especially in difficult fiscal times, the Mayor's Office of Management and Budget, in negotiation with the department, set the budget goals and timetables. Budget cutting was a special challenge in the NYPD because 96 percent of the \$2.3 billion budget went for salaries, including 7 percent for uniformed salaries. In recent years the cuts had come from either civilian attrition or from other than personnel services (OTPS).

Press

The NYPD received more press scrutiny than any private business and all but a few public agencies. Seven reporters worked full time in police headquarters. The tabloids and the local TV stations filled from a quarter to half their space with crime stories. What police did was news, what police didn't do was news, what police did wrong was big news. Business was conducted in a fishbowl, and it was easy to be distracted from the primary missions of the organization by the heavily covered issue of the day.

Civil Service

The civil service rules constrained management from many practices common in private business. In the lower ranks, people who did good work couldn't be rewarded with promotions. People who were good at exams were offered were the most likely to advance to the captain's rank. On the other hand, some high performers in the field might spend their entire careers as police officers or detectives. Because their titles were discretionary, detectives were an exception to this rule. A first grade detective might be paid as much as lieutenant without passing any exams.

Union

The police unions has considerable political power especially at the state level. In response to union prompting, the New York State legislature had passed a number of laws enhancing the privileges of police officers and restricting the power of the police commissioner and other police managers.

The Public

The NYPD was accountable to the public at every level. The Police Commissioner, as a mayor's appointee, and the NYPD, as a department of the city government, were directly accountable to the Mayor. The department personnel also interacted with many other elected officials from the state and city governments. Precinct commanders attended community board meetings and regularly met with a variety of community representatives. And of course, police officers on patrol interacted with millions of civilians each year. There was an independent Civilian Complaint Review Board which made recommendations to the Police Commissioner in cases where civilians had complained of police misconduct.

NYPD New

Exhibit 7 New York Police Department Budgets, Fiscal 1994-1996

Budgets (in thousands)

	FISCAL 1994	FISCAL 1995	FISCAL 1996
Personal Service	1,656,371	1,930,906	2,167,000
Other Than Personal Service	89,026	120,454	95,228
TOTAL	1,745,397	2,051,360	2,262,228

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NYPD New

Exhibit 8 Demographic and Crime Statistics for Four Police Precincts, New York City, 1995

	014	046	075	103
Population	17162	118435	161387	92559
Total Households	7814	37369	49183	27445
—with persons <18 yrs	6.68%	55.02%	52.10%	46.73%
Same house > 5yrs (%)	44.81%	54.77%	62.10%	60.50%
Median household income	\$31,860	\$14,605	\$20,682	\$30,092
Median family income	\$44,680	\$14,915	\$22,537	\$33,280
per capita	\$23,804	\$6,428	\$8,013	\$10,860
households with public assist (%)	5.52%	36.53%	25.03%	13.96%
Persons below poverty	25.52%	44.08%	30.79%	17.10%
families below poverty	10.07%	42.62%	29.00%	13.93%
persons over 3 yrs	17226	110276	152095	88289
pre-primary %	0.59%	1.60%	1.60%	1.27%
elem or HS %	3.99%	26.33%	24.55%	20.50%
College %	12.55%	7.49%	6.88%	9.24%
males less than 16	8774	34670	49399	32494
males unemp %	7.07%	12.26%	9.91%	8.08%
Females less than 16	7813	45319	64848	37910
Female unemp %	5.82%	7.22%	6.49%	6.69%
Persons 16-19	505	8086	11378	5417

Seven Crimes:

from 1995 Preliminary Data (COMPSTAT)

Murder	4	43	44	16
Rape	39	100	144	69
Robbery	1329	1591	2397	1488
Assault	470	1085	1280	787
Burglary	1893	1857	1531	1055
Gr. Larceny	6315	646	918	985
Gr. Larc. Auto	253	588	1717	1088
Total:	10303	5910	8031	5488

Personnel:

Uniform	433	346	403	286
Civilian	38	27	26	27

27


395-293

NYPD New

Exhibit 10 Police Staff Ratios for Major U.S. Cities, 1995

City	Population	# Uniform Employees	Employees Per 100,000 Population
Washington, D.C.	570,000	4,106	720
New York	7,336,224	36,606*	499
Chicago	2,802,494	12,971	463
Philadelphia	1,560,576	6,101	391
Houston	1,758,016	4,935	281
Dallas	1,062,677	2,777	261
San Francisco	741,568	1,823	246
Los Angeles	3,550,381	7,869	222
Phoenix	1,076,108	2,088	194
San Antonio	999,900	1,696	170
San Diego	1,168,785	1,972	169
San Jose	815,235	1,209	148

*Includes Transit and Housing uniform employees, as of May 1995.



William J. Bratton

Police Commissioner of the City of New York

Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani appointed William J. Bratton as New York City's 38th Police Commissioner on January 10, 1994. During the 1980s, while heading two Massachusetts police departments, Commissioner Bratton earned a national reputation for results-focused, innovative management. Between 1990 and 1992, he led the Transit Police in New York City and is widely credited for a 50% reduction in subway crime. Prior to returning to New York in 1994, he served as Police Commissioner of the City of Boston, where he developed and implemented that city's community policing strategy. Today, Commissioner Bratton's influence and interests extend beyond New York City. In 1993, he was elected President of the Police Executive Research Forum, a national policy and research organization comprised of many of the country's progressive police leaders. The Commissioner is a graduate of the FBI National Executive Institute, the Senior Executive Fellows Program at Harvard and holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in law enforcement from Boston State College. Among his many other honors and distinctions, Commissioner Bratton received the Boston Police Department's highest award for valor, the Schroeder Brothers Medal, which he earned by facing down a bank robber and rescuing a hostage in 1975.





Police Commissioner's Office

William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner



Police Department
City of New York

1 Police Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10038

Telephone: (212) 374-6756
Fax: (212) 227-6861

Pager

1-800-913-1710

Facsimile Message

Date:

12/14/95

Time Sent:

11:34 AM

To:

Dennis Burke

Office:

Fax:

202 456 7028

Number of Pages including cover sheet:

11

From:

Joan Brady

Office:

PCM:

Special Instructions/Notes:

Dennis - This resume is very out of date
A new one will be ready next week. The one page bio,
however, is current. - Joan

pager 1-800-913-1710

Thank You

William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner of the City of Boston
Boston Police Department
154 Berkeley Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
617 343-4500
(212) 374-5577

New version will be ready
next week

Please see
attached shorter bio.

This older version does
not include

- ① NYPD - Police Commissioner
- ② PERF presidency

Experience

Boston Police Department
Boston, Massachusetts, 1992-Present

Working to make the nation's oldest police agency the first major urban department to exploit the full potential of Community Policing, thus reducing crime and fear until every Boston neighborhood is secure in both reality and perception.

In January 1992, after a Mayoral review committee concluded that the Boston Police Department had major problems in training, technology, and management, William J. Bratton was appointed to the agency's top uniformed position, Superintendent-in-Chief. He became Commissioner on June 29, 1993.

Police Commissioner (June 1993-Present)

- Ordered immediate broad-based action to institutionalize principles of fairness, professionalism, and integrity in a police culture long vulnerable to outside influence.
- Initiated collaborative web of relationships between BPD and area universities, including Harvard and Northeastern, to develop cutting-edge crime and fear-reduction programs.
- Now aggressively seeking state and federal support for full-scale, multi-agency assault on crime and fear in Boston.

Superintendent-in-Chief (February 1992-June 1993)

- Created task forces consisting of personnel from all ranks to conduct systematic self-assessment of department's equipment, facilities, technology, training, discipline, supervisory procedures, and racial and cultural attitudes.
- Developed Plan of Action based on task-force findings to define strategy and tasks for leveraging existing resources and instilling commitment throughout the organization to make Community Policing a matter of daily practice at every level.
- Revised and greatly expanded training for all executives, supervisors, and police officers to convey skills and understanding essential to Community Policing.
- Assumed operational control of Boston's model multi-agency anti-gang, anti-violence program.
- Initiated a video-based training program to carry cultural-diversity training rapidly into every local command, to ensure respectful treatment of all citizens by police officers.

Results: Part I crime in 1992 down to lowest level in 18 years.

New York City Transit Authority
New York, New York, 1990-1992

Protecting the 5 million daily riders of the nation's largest surface and rail transportation system, with responsibility for the direction and control of the country's seventh largest urban police force — authorized strength of 4,200 sworn officers and 848 civilians and an annual budget of \$306,000,000; securing all the facilities of the Transit Authority (New York City's second-largest manufacturer), with responsibility for agency's proprietary force of unarmed security guards.

In April 1990, subway crime had been rising for thirty months, with robbery growing two-and-a-half times faster than in the city at large. Vandalism in the train yards and employee theft were also rising.

Chief of Police

- Initiated and designed a comprehensive five-year plan to serve as a blueprint for attacking serious crime and disorder, and for expending \$260,000,000 to modernize all computer systems, communications and department facilities.
- Addressed interim emergency needs for improved communications, vehicle maintenance and purchases, new firearms and training.
- Reduced command staff levels; reorganized department structure; implemented community-style preventive-policing patrol strategy to reduce robbery, farebeating and disorder.
- Created department's first EEO office to monitor compliance and expand minority recruitment.
- Became the second-largest department in U.S. to gain accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.
- Significantly expanded and modernized the department's academy, recruitment methods, curriculum and training to include a contemporary field-training-officer program for new officers.

Senior Vice President, Property Protection

- Conducted comprehensive security review of all yard and depot facilities.
- Developed a multi-year program for more effectively training, equipping and deploying unarmed guards in all facilities.
- Introduced electronic and other surveillance equipment and techniques to reduce vandalism and employee theft.

Results: Felony crime in the subway down 35% (robbery down 40%) since strategy took effect in Autumn 1990.

**Metropolitan Police Department
Boston, Massachusetts, 1986-1990**

Servicing the Metropolitan District Commission with responsibility for the direction and control of a 640-member full-service police department (third largest in Massachusetts) with a \$26,000,000 annual budget. The Commission managed many of the highways, parks, beaches, public facilities and waterways in the Greater Boston area.

In May 1986, the department, rocked by corruption scandals, was demoralized and dysfunctional.

Superintendent of Police

- Initiated and designed a value-oriented plan of action to serve as a blueprint for revised strategic direction as well as for multi-million-dollar modernization of the department's communications and computer systems, facilities, firearms, vehicle and marine fleets.
- Installed new management and audit systems for the control of the department's budgets, overtime and sick leave.

- Implemented strong affirmative action initiatives which resulted in doubling of minority supervisors, appointment of 25% minority district commanders and first woman Chief of Patrol.
- Revised completely the department's rules, policies and procedures to include state of the art use-of-force and high-speed-pursuit policies.

Results: Activity levels increased while serious crime declined.

**Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Police Department
Boston, Massachusetts, 1983-1986**

Serving the nation's oldest public transit system, with responsibility for the direction and control of a 135-member police department. Had multi-county jurisdictional responsibilities in seventy-nine cities and towns serviced by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.

Violent crime on MBTA facilities had grown nearly 50% between 1979 and 1981, and remained at high levels in 1982.

Chief of Police

- Designed and initiated a comprehensive and successful multi-million dollar anti-crime program, which doubled the size of the department, installed its first system-wide communications network, and doubled again the agency's enforcement reach by training bus and train inspectors as special police officers.
- Developed a coordinated program with thirteen municipal police departments to jointly respond to MBTA-related crime problems.
- Created an Internal Security Unit to deal with employee and vendor theft throughout the transit agency.
- Initiated and directed the accreditation project which culminated in conferral of accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.

Results: Violent crime in final year in office declined by 37% compared with the year before assumption of office, and by 22% compared with the baseline year of 1979.

**Boston Police Department
Boston, Massachusetts, 1970-1983**

Reporting directly to the Police Commissioner, with responsibility for management of delivery of police service by the 2,700-member force.

Superintendent of Police, 1980-1983

Served in highest sworn rank; assignments included Executive Officer, Inspector of Bureaus and Director of Labor Relations.

Lieutenant, 1977-1980

Served as Director of Neighborhood Responsive Policing Program, one of nation's first community policing initiatives.

Sergeant, 1975-1977

Served as a Field Supervisor with patrol and administrative responsibilities for a thirty-officer platoon.

Served as Staff Assistant to the Police Commissioner, with program development and monitoring responsibilities.

Police Officer, 1970-1975

Education**Boston State College**

Course work for Masters of Public Management, 1980

B.S. Law Enforcement, 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation

National Executive Institute, 1989

Harvard University

John F. Kennedy School of Government

Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management

National Executive Session on Policing, 1988

Senior Executive Fellows Program, 1987

Program for Senior Executives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1984

Police Executive Research Forum

Senior Management Institute for Police, 1982

New England Institute of Law Enforcement Management

Command Training Program, 1978

United States Secret Service

Executive Protection Training Program, 1977

LEAA Executive Training Program

Managing Patrol Operations, 1977

Managing Criminal Investigations, 1977

Boston Police Academy

Hostage Negotiation Program, 1976

Publications and Reports

Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative Problem, 1993

Paper prepared for Harvard University Executive Session on Policing, published in the Harvard University/ National Institute of Justice "Perspectives on Policing" series (July, Co-author)

Neighborhood Policing: A Plan of Action for the Boston Police Department, 1992

A comprehensive needs assessment, organizational analysis, and strategic plan for transforming the operations of the Boston Police Department (Co-Author)

Taking Back the Subway for the People of New York, 1991

A comprehensive management analysis and five-year action plan for the New York City Transit Police (Co-Author)

Post Arrest Training, 1991

Article for the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (November, Co-Author)

Semi-Automatic Handguns: Opposing Views of Police Firearms, 1991

Article for Police Union News, a service of IUPA, AFL-CIO (February)

Transit Police and Their Communities, 1991

Article for the national transit police newsletter, "Transit Police" (Co-author)

Case Study: "Evan Sweeney and the Police," 1988

Case study prepared as basis for discussion at the Seminar for Massachusetts Mayors, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Co-author)

Metropolitan Police Plan of Action, 1987

A management analysis action plan for the modernization of the Metropolitan Police

Accreditation - A Goal Worth Striving For, 1986

Article for the Massachusetts Police Association magazine, The Sentinel

MBTA Police Plan of Action for Transit Security, 1983

A report to the Governor of Massachusetts detailing the department's seven-point modernization and crime reduction plan

A Report to the Commissioner: Neighborhood Responsive Policing Program Analysis, 1979

A detailed analysis for the Boston Police Department of its innovative community-oriented policing initiative (Co-author)

Honors

American Society for Public Administration - New York Metropolitan Chapter
"Excellence in Public Service Award" (outstanding organization of the year), 1992

New York City Transit Police Benevolent Association
"Man of the Year" Award (for outstanding leadership and courage), 1991

Police Executive Research Forum
"Gary P. Hayes Award for Outstanding Initiative" (for dedication to improving policing practices), 1988

Boston Jaycees Ten Outstanding Young Leaders Designation, 1982

American Legion Law and Order Award, 1977

New England Association of Chiefs of Police Meritorious Service Award (for valor), 1977

Boston Herald American Police Officer of the Month, July 1976

International Brotherhood of Police Officers Outstanding Service Award (for valor), 1976

Boston Police Department Schroeder Medal for Courageous Police Service
(Department's highest award for valor), 1976

Boston Police Department Medal of Honor (for valor), 1976

Appointments

President, Police Executive Research Forum, 1993-1995

Member, Massachusetts Security and Law Enforcement Executives Forum, 1992

Chairperson, International Association of Chiefs of Police Special Police Section. 1991-1992

Director, American Academy for Professional Law Enforcement. 1991-1992

Member, International Association of Chiefs of Police Communications Committee. 1991-1992

Member, Executive Session on Policing. Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government
and National Institute of Justice. 1990-1992

Chairperson, International Association of Chiefs of Police Massachusetts Membership Committee. 1985-1990

Member, Governor's Massachusetts Statewide Anti-Crime Council. 1985-1990

Chairperson, Governor's High Tech Crime Control Committee. 1985-1990

Chairperson, Governor's Police Accreditation Team (GPAT), 1986-1990

Chairperson, Massachusetts Chief of Police Association Accreditation Committee, 1986-1990

Member, Governor's Committee on Crime Prevention, Investigation and Arrest, 1985-1990

Guest Lecturer/Speaker

Numerous radio, television, conferences, panel and public appearances, 1977-present

American Public Transit Association Annual Conference, 1991

Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council, 1985-1990

International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1987

University of Massachusetts, Boston, 1984-1986

National Institute of Justice, Second and Third National Policing State of the Art Conference, 1985, 1987

Affiliations

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)

American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS)

Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW)

Public Relations Advisory Board

Shriners Burns Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, 1983-1989

Professional Activities***Division of School Safety******New York City Public Schools******New York, New York, 1993******Resource allocation plan to decentralize school safety operations.******RTD Transit Police Department******Los Angeles, California, 1991******Peer review of the operational capabilities of the RTD Police.******Baile Creek Police Department******Baile Creek, Michigan, 1976******Field consultant for resource allocation project.******Rochester Police Department******Rochester, New York, 1978-1980******Field consultant for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant to the Rochester Police Department for a gun abuse reduction squad.******Sarpy County Sheriff's Department******Omaha, Nebraska, 1976******Consultant to Omaha area police agencies for a court-ordered school desegregation plan.***