

Fax Cover Sheet

DATE: April 25, 1996

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TO: Dennis Burke

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FROM: Joan Brody

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RE: Bratton New York Times Op/Ed

Number of pages including cover sheet: *2*

Message

It was great to finally talk without the aid of voice mail. Hope we can do it again soon.

A27

4/5/96
NY Times

How to Win the War Against Crime

By William J. Bratton

Since I became commissioner in 1994, the New York Police Department has been engaged in a full-scale attack on crime. Reported crime continued to decline in the first quarter of 1996 — 33 percent since 1993. Homicides are down 49 percent.

But even before I and several senior staff members resigned, the media and the public had been wondering how long these trends could continue. Their skepticism is understandable, but I believe there is still room for significant reductions. When I became the Transit Police chief in 1990, no one predicted that subway robberies would decline by 76 percent in the next six years, but it happened. The techniques that turned the Transit Police around have been used to re-engineer the N.Y.P.D.

The department's goal for 1996 is to reduce crime by 10 percent. Five steps need to be continued to achieve it.

Empower the precinct commanders. This was probably the most important reform we made. We gave these front-line managers the authority to run their precincts as miniature police departments without a lot of petty interference from headquarters. The best ones rose to this opportunity with enthusiasm and creativity. We should continue to empower them.

Insure accountability. We developed a process called CompStat, to insure that our commanders received strategic guidance. CompStat is a system of accountability that uses computerized crime statistics, electronic pin mapping and intensive strategy sessions, during which the highest ranking managers of the N.Y.P.D. quiz precinct commanders about crime problems. CompStat is essential for further success.

Address quality-of-life offenses. There is no such thing as a minor crime in the sense that lesser offenses create an atmosphere of fear and disorder that sets the stage for major crimes. We have moved against low-level drug dealers, street prostitutes, boom-box cars, squeegee pests and other violators. The department shouldn't slip back into the old view that such offenses are a low priority.

William J. Bratton, New York City's Police Commissioner, will retire on April 15.

Attack crime strategically. Today's department doesn't just try to solve individual crimes. We counter crime patterns and dismantle criminal enterprises. Detectives interrogate everyone arrested — even people arrested for minor crimes — to gather the best intelligence about other crimes and crime patterns. We focus on the fences who help burglars, the chop shops and exporters who serve auto thieves and the gun dealers who supply drug gangs and armed robbers. We have concentrated on the city's trouble spots, cutting handgun homicides by 40 percent in two years.

This tactic takes coordination among patrol officers, detectives and narcotics officers, which was largely

Advice for the new police commissioner.

unheard of in the old days. In the past, many of the department's specialized squads worked 9 to 5, while our competition, the criminals, worked 24 hours a day, seven days a week. No wonder they were winning.

Reward cops. The N.Y.P.D., with 38,000 officers, has had sufficient personnel to attack crime. But officers are increasingly restive about their stagnant wages, reduced overtime, worsening working conditions and declining numbers. These issues must be addressed.

This past week, the department initiated the largest, most comprehensive antidrug initiative ever undertaken by an urban police department. Its goal is to permanently eradicate drug sales in northern Brooklyn, which account for about 20 percent of the city's homicides and shootings. The initiative will help the department achieve its goal of a double-digit decline in crime in 1996.

But the efforts of the police alone are not enough. The continued support of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the public and the criminal justice system will be vital. I am confident that the Mayor and his next Police Commissioner, Howard Safir, who has a broad law enforcement background, will build on the successes of the past six years. □

Date: 10/31/96 Time: 11:44

bFormer NYC Police Commissioner Bratton Endorses Clinton/Gore

To: National Desk, Political Writer

Contact: Lisa R. Davis of Clinton/Gore '96,

202-530-2143

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 /U.S. Newswire/ -- Former New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton, one of the nation's preeminent and most effective police managers, will personally endorse the re-election of President Clinton and Vice President Gore today.

Bratton will join the President at Arizona State University in Phoenix today to present his endorsement.

Bratton is a national leader in community policing and in successfully applying executive management to crime prevention. Under Bratton's leadership, crime in New York dropped to its lowest level in all categories in 25 years. Violent crime decreased by over 38 percent and murders dropped a remarkable 51 percent in New York City during Bratton's tenure. He was police commissioner of the city of New York from January 1994 to April 1996.

Bratton credits President Clinton's crime policies as a key factor in his success. "When it came to passing the Crime Bill, President Clinton delivered. His crime bill is putting 100,000 police on the streets of America and we are now seeing its success. Crime is going down across America and is a result of Bill Clinton's effort," Bratton said. Bratton has noted that funding and other provisions in that legislation greatly assisted New York City in reducing crime.

When Bratton became police commissioner, he announced that he would be "taking the City back from criminals one block, one street, and one neighborhood at a time." The results speak for themselves. As one New York City beat cop remarked, "This is a guy who is ending urban crime as we know it."

Bratton is currently president of First Security Consulting and is working with police departments throughout the United States and abroad to implement the crime reduction strategies that were so successful in New York City.

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/U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/

APNP-10-31-96 1145EST

To: JOAN BRODY
212-554-4167

From: DB

NEWS FOCUS ON U.S. INITIATIVE BRITAIN WANTS TO COPY

BLITZ ON THE YOB CULTURE

Will the zero option really work here?

From yesterday's Daily Mail

THE young man boarding the train at 125th Street in Harlem is only travelling one stop. So he doesn't bother to buy a ticket.

As the guard approaches at the next station, the fare dodger tries to flee but is tripped by a fellow passenger and falls to the platform clutching his knee. Before he can get up, two NYPD officers have pinned him to the ground and he is under arrest.

A minor travel violation is not the policemen's first prime concern. The man will probably be fingerprinted, then grilled about any other crimes he may have committed. For good measure, the officers may search his house for stolen goods, check if he owes any fines or has committed any parole violations. They may also ask him about any criminals of his acquaintance.

They are fairly confident that travelling without a ticket is not his first and only crime.

The scene I witnessed is a perfect illustration of 'zero tolerance' — the crime-fighting revolution from the once-mean streets of New York — in action. As the Daily Mail exclusively revealed yesterday, Home Secretary Michael Howard wants to bring the idea to Britain.

The thinking goes that by tackling minor criminals, police can prevent them turning into major ones. And it is working.

Gone are the days when New Yorkers felt frightened walking the streets, menaced by beggars, squeegee merchants or drug dealers. They go about their business in confidence, reassured by the knowledge that armed police are always close by.

The city, for years a byword for criminality, is enjoying its first rise in the quality of life and safer everyday existence for decades.

It began with the election of Republican mayor Rudy Giuliani in early 1994 and his hiring of a new police commissioner William Bratton.

Under the 'zero tolerance' initiative, police were told to crack down hard on crimes they had habitually ignored — public drinking, beggars, graffiti scribblers, those smoking marijuana on the streets or urinating in public. Judges were urged to put criminals away for longer.

The policy put to the test the 'broken window' principle advanced by criminologists James Wilson and George Kelling in 1982. They argued that minor violations, so-called 'quality of life crimes', create a poor environment which encourages more serious offences.

AS ARRESTS for minor crimes rocketed, the streets of New York became significantly more civil as more serious crimes were deterred. Moreover, those caught for small offences were often found to be guilty of more serious transgressions.

Extending the principle, Bratton decided to target all shootings, believing they are customarily linked to wider weapons possession and possible drug dealing. As gun offences were aggressively investigated, arrests for drug dealing increased.

The results were spectacular and immediate. Reported crime fell by 12 per cent in 1994 and 17 per cent last year, bucking trends which date back before the war.

Specifically, car theft offences were cut from 112,000 to 71,000 — a fall of 36 per cent — while robberies fell from 86,000 to 59,000, a drop of 31 per cent.

Murders plunged by 39 per cent, down from 1,951 in 1993 to 1,182 in 1995. The number of rapes also fell by almost one third.

Nor have crimes been simply shifted to less heavily-policed areas. Neighbouring states do not report corresponding increases, largely because criminals are staying locked up for longer and are thus unable to move elsewhere to commit crime.

Bratton achieved this unprecedented success by challenging the long-held

How the Big Apple took a big bite out of crime



Crackdown: New York police are targeting minor offenders to prevent major crimes

HOW THE CRIME RATES COMPARE

	LONDON	NEW YORK
Murders	174	1,182
Rapes	1,410	2,330
Robberies	26,139	59,721
Burglaries	106,053	75,648

Crime figures for April 1994 to March 1995. The Metropolitan Police in London serves 7million people and has 28,228 officers. The 38,000-strong New York Police Department serves a population of 7.3million. Burglaries refer to break-ins and thefts from homes. Robberies refer to theft from a person or business (bank raids etc) with violence or threat of violence.

liberal view that police cannot do anything about crime figures because they are generated by forces such as poverty, deprivation and racism.

With a corporate background, he put his plans into action by holding regular computer statistics meetings, known as Comstat meetings, with the city's precinct commanders.

This allowed senior personnel to trace patterns of crimes, to a specific street junction if necessary, pouring in officers to an area to give reassurance.

Bratton also added an edge of accountability. During Comstat grillings, precinct commanders who could not produce a strategy for cutting crime, or simply refused to

granted that they were fighting
an unwinnable war.

In Britain, Mr Howard is studying similar proposals for a raft of measures to tackle everything from under-age drinking and swearing in public to buskers, beggars and louts who play loud music in cars.

A team from the Home Office, working with 12 other Ministries, is drawing up the strategy to present to Mr. Major and other senior colleagues next month before the Home Secretary goes public with his proposals in a speech to police chiefs in July.

A Home Office insider said: 'If we can persuade these people that society just won't tolerate mindless nuisance behaviour, there is every reason to think they can be deterred from taking part in more serious criminal activity as well.'

Mr. Howard is not the only politician impressed by New York's experiment. There have been official visits from Frankfurt, Zimbabwe and Taiwan.

Other U.S. cities have copied the scheme with encouraging results. In Seattle and San Antonio, for example, murders are down by 32 per cent and 26 per cent respectively.

The only casualty amid all this has been Bratton himself. He quit in March for the private sector after repeated clashes with Giuliani. The politician was apparently enraged that the policeman, rather than himself, was winning all the plaudits for turning the tide in the war against crime.

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
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28 APRIL 1996

THE SUN *Times magazine*



MEAN STREETS, ROUGH JUSTICE

This cop performed a miracle:
he turned back the tide of crime
and made New York safe again.
So why did it cost him his badge?

Out of the blue

New York's mayor hired Bill Bratton for a mission impossible: to rid the streets of crooks. Trouble is, he succeeded, to the delight of the Big Apple and the rumoured chagrin of City Hall. Russell Miller spent a week on the beat with 'the Chief' as he prepared to throw in his badge. Main photographs by Gigi Cohen



Shortly after dawn, Monday morning in New York. A black sedan with darkened windows is threading through the traffic, heading north out of Manhattan towards the Bronx. In the front are two plain-clothes detectives, a man and a woman, both, as they say, packing heat. In the back is their boss, commissioner William Bratton, chief of the New York Police Department.

He is talking fast, the way he likes to, and using a favourite analogy to explain his attitude towards fighting crime. It is like a melanoma on the skin, he says. If you don't treat it straight away it will spread and get worse. "You can see a melanoma but you can't see what's happening under the skin, the cancer that's eating away at you. That's the one that's dangerous. If the quality of your life deteriorates and doesn't get treated, you can't see the real danger: that it's a sign that something bad is going on and it is going to get worse."

We turn onto the Hudson Parkway and suddenly his attention is caught by a wall sprayed with graffiti, a comparatively rare sight in New York these days. "See that?" he demands. "We paint over the graffiti, then some bas-

Did he jump or was he pushed? Mayor Giuliani (left) says goodbye to Commissioner Bratton (centre) after the 'resignation' announcement

tard comes along and marks it up again. Personally, I'd like to throw them in jail for years. If you go into a neighbourhood and find graffiti everywhere it just looks like nobody is in control. That fosters a sense among the criminal element that anything goes.

"Over 20-odd years in this city, levels of social decency were constantly defined down. So many types of activities were excused because of economic or social conditions or because of ethnicity, like if you came from a place where you used to hang out and drink and party all night you should be allowed to live the same way in New York. In Third World countries public urination is an accepted practice and it was becoming an accepted practice in New York. What we're saying is that, hey, this is no longer acceptable, this is the United States and you don't just urinate against the nearest tree. We are saying the citizens have to raise their standards. We don't accept public

urination. We don't accept graffiti as an art form — we accept it for what it is, vandalism. We are not going to tolerate illegal peddling or drinking on the street or panhandlers or squeegee pests. Social deprivation is not an excuse for aggressive begging..."

This is a familiar litany for Commissioner Bratton, who years ago decided that the way to tackle serious urban crime was to tackle petty urban crime. His argument was that tolerance of minor misdemeanours only encouraged further, escalating offences and that the first priority of law enforcement was to improve the quality of life by running drunks, vandals, panhandlers and assorted lowlife off the streets.

It was a theory that flew directly in the face of the accepted wisdom as propagated by most criminologists and social scientists, who took the view that the crime wave sweeping the US was rooted in social and economic causes and there was little the police could do about it. Bratton, a police officer for nearly 30 years, was first given the opportunity to test out his theories when he was appointed chief of the New York transit police in 1990. At that time virtually every subway car in New York was covered, inside and out, with graffiti, fare dodgers routinely jumped the turnstiles and much of the system was turned into a no-go area. Within a few months of his appointment, the first cleaned cars began rattling down the tracks and legions of outraged graffiti "artists" and surprised turnstile-jumpers found themselves being hauled off to court. Once the transit police demonstrated their determination to improve the "quality of life" on the subways, crime levels began falling spectacularly.

In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani, the city's combative new mayor, asked Bratton to take over the whole of the New York Police Department. Since then what most New Yorkers view as something of a miracle has come to pass. A city that was spinning out of control, with petty crime accepted as part of everyday life, has been transformed. New York, once prominent among the top 20 of America's most dangerous cities, has now fallen to 136th position. The streets are safer and cleaner, tourism is up, whole neighbourhoods are being reclaimed. In short, the Big Apple is no longer rotten.

Who can take credit for this astonishing success story? To the chagrin of the mayor it was Bratton who emerged as the hero of the hour. Certainly, he had become the most famous police chief in the US, which is perhaps why, last month, he was obliged to resign.

☆☆☆☆

Today, we are on our way to a typical Bratton management event — an Executive Staff Retreat at the old snuff mill in the Bronx Botanical Garden. It is an appropriate setting since it is one of the many parks in the city that have been "liberated" by Bratton's policies: pre-Bratton, the botanical garden was a dangerous place, the preserve of junkies, predators, footpads and park-bench winos. Now it is being enjoyed once again by ordinary New Yorkers.

Some 70 senior officers are already assembled by the time Bratton arrives, shortly before 8am. My presence causes some initial consternation, for no correspondent has ever previously been invited to attend an NYPD retreat, but the commissioner explains that nothing I write will compromise the big anti-drug operation they are intending to launch in north Brooklyn.


Most of the morning is taken up with a detailed briefing on the Brooklyn initiative, which is to be the biggest ever undertaken in the country. Bratton, dapper in a double-breasted blue suit, crisp white shirt and silk tie, listens to the speakers with intense, almost disconcerting concentration, only interrupting once when mention is made of criminologists predicting a forthcoming Armageddon generated by a youth population explosion and increasing violence. "Aw come on," he drawls, "that is the same bulls--- we have been hearing for years." After a simple buffer lunch (no alcohol), it is the ➔



Portrait by Nigel Parry



Above: deputy police commissioner Jack Maple outside NYPD headquarters. Bratton plucked him from the ranks of the transit police to head the department's crime control strategies. Sporting boxing gloves rather than a bow tie, Maple meets Bratton in the police gym (below). **Right:** minutes after his resignation announcement, Bratton catches the event on television



turn of each of the city's eight borough commanders, one a woman, to deliver a detailed presentation outlining results for the previous three months and proposals to ensure that crime continues to decline for the next three months. Mindful of the commissioner's steely blue eyes on them, each one makes a point to emphasise their "quality of life" initiatives. "You perhaps noticed," he says afterwards, "that they delivered their presentations with a certain amount of trepidation. That's because they all know they are on trial. I expect all my senior officers to deliver results. They deliver, or they walk."

It is an approach that appears to earn him respect. "I've been on the force 33 years," detective inspector Bob Cividanes confides during a break. "This is the best it's ever been. And it's all down to that guy over there." He nods almost imperceptibly towards Bratton, as if he does not want to be caught talking about the boss. At 4.30 the retreat breaks up, to the apparent relief of most of those

still speaks with a strong Boston accent, quite different from that of New Yorkers. He grew up in a cold-water apartment in a working-class neighbourhood, joined the police force from college and rose rapidly through the ranks, becoming fascinated by the science and psychology of law enforcement. In 1982 he read an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* that had a profound effect on him. It was written by two academics, James Wilson and George Kelling, who argued that the role of the police had shifted to crime-fighting to such an extent that their original function, maintaining public order, was being ignored, with potentially disastrous consequences. They postulated a theory called "broken windows", linking disorder and crime. If a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all the other windows in the building will soon be broken, thus beginning an inexorable process of community breakdown and eventually making a neighbourhood vulnerable to criminal invasion.

Bratton knew instinctively that the authors were right because he could see the "broken windows" process taking place before his eyes every day in the tougher areas of Boston. But nowhere was it more obvious than in New York. "When I first came here in 1990 every highway was covered with graffiti. There was trash everywhere, there were squeegee pests at all the major junctions, there were illegal peddlers everywhere, the homeless sleeping in cardboard boxes on Fifth Avenue. The place looked like a Third World country. Welcome to New York. What kind of Mad Max message did that send out?"

"Squeegee pests" — derelicts with a dirty rag who offered to "clean" your windscreen and threatened to kick in a door panel if you didn't ante up a dollar or two — had become such a bane of New York life that clearing them from the streets was a key platform of Giuliani's election campaign. Bratton's proven record of success in cleaning up the subways made him an obvious candidate, in the new mayor's eyes, to do the job.

Bratton arrived as New York's new police commissioner in January 1994 and promptly announced that he was turning the department's strategy on its head. Henceforth, all the minor misdemeanours that had previously been ignored were to be relentlessly pursued. Police officers were not only to start arresting street peddlers, drunks and vandals, they were to interrogate them, run computer checks on them. "We're going to take back this city," Bratton liked to say, "house by house, street by street, block by block, neighbourhood by neighbourhood."

Many senior police officers predicted disaster. They believed the NYPD barely had the time and resources to deal with serious crime. Killers and rapists were the real enemies, they said, not winos and beggars. Bratton would not be deterred: those who did not agree with his policies were invited to leave. "I let them all go at the same time," he recalls. "It became known as the Friday night massacre. In hindsight I probably should have let them retire in a more honourable fashion, but it showed them I meant business."

Something remarkable happened. The cops discovered that clearing the human flotsam and jetsam from the streets made people feel better about the police, more willing to co-operate and provide information; that many of the guys doing the little stuff were also doing the big stuff; that frisking suspects on the street encouraged them to leave their weapons at home.

During Bratton's tenure, homicides fell by 40%, car thefts by 35%, robberies by 32% and burglaries by 24%. In the last two years every police precinct has recorded a



Chief Tosano Simonetti, of south Brooklyn's 67th Precinct, examines the day's schedule

double-digit decline in overall crime — and that hasn't happened since the end of the second world war.

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Tuesday evening, 20.00 hours, Baruch College, 23rd Street. Tonight the mayor is holding one of his regular public meetings at which ordinary New Yorkers have the opportunity to put questions to the people running the city. Unfortunately, every seat in the hall is filled long before the meeting is due to start, and a large crowd gathers outside demanding, fruitlessly, to be let in.

Inside, all the city commissioners take their seats at a long table on the front of the stage and Giuliani stands in the centre, holding a hand microphone. This is unquestionably going to be his show, but first he introduces each of the city commissioners, to a polite ripple of applause. When he comes to Bratton, there is a great cheer from the crowd. Bratton strives not to look too pleased. A recent poll indicated that 54% of New Yorkers approved of the job he was doing; only 44% thought the same about the mayor.

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Wednesday morning, 06.45 hours, the office of the deputy commissioner, Jack Maple, NYPD headquarters. Maple is drinking his first espresso of the day and changing into a freshly laundered striped shirt. When he has adjusted his bow tie and shrugged on a blue blazer, he looks like a hooper who escaped from the cast of *Guns and Dolls* — a pugnacious, rotund figure with a drooping moustache and a gun in a leather holster strapped to his ankle. His surprisingly small feet are encased in black and white co-respondent shoes: he has a collection in different colours that he says he will show me later. Maple was a lowly lieutenant in the transit police when Bratton plucked him from the ranks and made him deputy commissioner in charge of crime control strategies. "It was probably the biggest promotion in the history of law enforcement," he trumpets. "It was like being in the navy and being promoted from ensign to admiral."

Today, Maple is to escort me to the Comstat meeting, which is due to start in the "War Room" on the floor below in a few minutes. Comstat, an acronym for "computer statistics", is a twice-weekly meeting at which precinct and squad commanders are mercilessly grilled by the department's senior brass. Each of the eight boroughs attends a Comstat every month; if it fails, collectively, to produce the required statistics or the right answers, it is obliged to make a second appearance a few days later. "Listen," Maple growls, "you're gonna see us warts-and-all down there. I'm not kidding you."

I follow him down a couple of flights of stone stairs and into the NYPD's Command and Control Center, a

large, high-ceilinged room crowded with some 200 officers in uniform and plain clothes doing their best not to appear nervous. Today it is the turn of south Brooklyn to deliver the goods. All the deputy commissioners sit in swivel chairs at a long table lit by green desk lamps. The primary inquisitors, Maple and Louis Anemone, the uniformed chief of the department, occupy a position at the centre of the table behind a large monitor and a telephone linked to a high-tech console that can flash up charts, maps and graphs onto three huge video screens. Those being questioned stand at a lectern under the video screens and everyone else tries to make themselves scarce, even though they all know they can be called upon to step forward at any time.

Chief Tosano Simonetti, the borough commander, opens the proceedings at the lectern. Simonetti is a grizzled veteran with more than 40 years' service in the NYPD but even he, he admits later, finds Comstat an ordeal. He runs through the borough's recent crime figures, mentions specific areas of concern and what is being done about them, then turns the lectern over to his precinct commanders, who, one after another, get put through the mill. Each precinct has to supply computerised maps showing locations and types of crime and any number of graphs and charts indicating the incidence of crimes, times of day, arrests and a multitude of other information. If a graph line "spikes", indicating a sudden rise in a certain type of crime, the precinct commander has to explain in detail what he is doing about it. Woe betide anyone without a convincing plan — more than half the precinct commanders have been replaced since Bratton took charge.

The questioning from the top table is tough and relentless. A map flashes up showing a clump of shootings in a three-block area:

"What the heck's going on there?"

"What are you doing about it?"

"Are you co-ordinating?"

"Are you following up?"

The chief of a homicide squad, sweating profusely, gets into a tangle over the search for a 15-year-old murder suspect. He explains that it is his feeling that the boy will eventually return to the neighbourhood and so his house is being kept under surveillance.

"And do you think he doesn't know we know?" Maple asks with heavy sarcasm.

"I am sure he knows we know, that I know," the detective replies, causing a brief ripple of laughter that Maple instantly silences with a glare.

"Look, you gotta turn the heat up. I am concerned this kid is going to kill someone else. Are you working with the warrant squad? Where's the warrant squad?"

"Here, chief," says a voice from the crowd. He is called forward and admits that he has not yet been asked by homicide to help in the search. "What?" Maple bellows. "Here we are, two years later, still stuck in our silos..."

The meeting lasts exactly three hours and ends with an admonition from the first deputy commissioner to keep up the pressure against squeegee pests. "There shouldn't be any backsliding on this," he says. "Keeping the squeegee pests off the streets is the backbone of this [mayoral] administration. This is a warning. In the spring there will be no more warnings."

Back in his office, Maple lights up a cigar, calls for more espresso and explains the importance of the Comstat meetings using military analogies. "Look, we're fighting a war here. What's the first thing you need to fight a war? A map. What's the second thing you need? Accurate and timely intelligence. What's the third... →

thing you need? Effective tactics, deployment and communications. It's like you guys in the second world war. You invented radar, didn't you? Without radar you wouldn't have known where the enemy was coming from or how to find them, but radar gave your pilots accurate and timely intelligence. Comstar is our radar."

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Thursday, late afternoon, 67th Precinct station house, Flatbush, south Brooklyn. "Six-seven" is one of the toughest precincts in the city and recorded the largest number of homicides and shootings last year. The level of casual violence is frightening — during the snowstorm in January this year, one man killed a neighbour for parking in a space he had cleared in the snow.

The 200,000 residents in the precinct are largely West Indian and Haitian immigrants — drugs, domestic violence, illegal social clubs, raves (known here as "jump up" parties), robberies and automobile thefts all combine to keep the cops busy, but it is a very popular precinct to work in. "People enjoy the challenge," says Chief Simonetti. "When you've been in the trenches in six-seven you get to stand a little taller. And you get to tell the best stories in the bar."

The officers with whom I am due to go out on patrol have been diverted — an 11-year-old girl has been raped, allegedly by her grandmother's boyfriend (it's that kind of area) — and so I am reassigned to officers Freed and Flaherty. Devin Freed and Joe Flaherty grew up in the same small town on Long Island, joined the Police Academy together, graduated together, and are now partners. It's a bit like being married, says Flaherty, except there's no sex. Freed is tall and dark; Flaherty is shorter, fair and walks with the swagger of an amateur boxer, which he is.

Before we leave I am offered a bulletproof vest but I demur, since neither of my escorts appears to be wearing one. "You kiddin'?" says Freed. "I wouldn't go out there

Boys on the beat: officers and partners Devin Freed and Joe Flaherty at the 67th Precinct station house. 'Six-seven' is a notorious area

without a vest," and he unbuttons his shirt to reveal the unmistakable canvas padding underneath. I am kitted out in a vest in seconds.

At first sight Flatbush looks like an unexceptional working-class suburb of houses and apartment blocks but, from the front seat of their "blue and white", Freed and Flaherty see it through very different eyes. On their second day on patrol together they had to disarm a hoodlum with a sub-machinegun, and as we drive through the grim streets they identify who was shot where and which street corners are favoured for drug dealing. We pass a video store where a few weeks earlier they had kicked down the door and found a stash of crack and heroin.

They explain that it is hard to make a good drug "col" on the street because the dealers never carry the drugs themselves but use "steerers" to lead customers to where the supply is hidden. Before Bratton they were ordered not to go after street-corner dealers. "They had the idea that we'd get offered drugs all the time and get corrupted," Freed explains. "But we lost a lot of credibility over that. You'd get dealing going on openly on the street and people would see us driving by and think, hey, those guys must be getting paid off. You can't blame 'em."

Our first call is to an apartment block where a junkie has been found living in the basement. The landlord says he keeps putting new locks on the doors, but this guy keeps breaking in. While the junkie is handcuffed and searched, the cops' flashlights pick over his pathetic possessions — an old mattress, a blanket, bits and pieces of junk. He pleads to be let go, but is hauled off.

The next call is a shooting. We follow a trail of blood across the parking lot of the local hospital into the emergency room, and find the victim nursing wounds in his



arm and leg. He says he doesn't know who shot him. Freed says it is probably down to a posse, the Jamaican term for a gang. "Organised crime round here is not guys in suits and fedoras. It's posses."

Not long ago he and his partner were called to a shooting and found a man lying in the street. As they bent over him he whispered the name of the "perp" and promptly died. It was just like the movies. Unfortunately, they never found the perp. He hightailed it out of town, com-

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'em crime going down's got nuttin' to do wid Bratton. It's all to do wid us."

"Hey," he says, suddenly anxious. "That was a joke."

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

Friday pm, Commissioner Bratton's office, police headquarters. Bratton clearly enjoys the sense of history that goes with his office: he sits at the same carved mahogany desk used by Theodore Roosevelt when he was president of the New York City Board of Police Commissioners in 1895. An oil painting of Roosevelt hangs on one wall; on another is the commissioner's shield of office, dating back to 1901 and made of gold and platinum.

It is a matter of considerable pride to Commissioner Bratton that his methods are now being studied by police forces from all over the world, including Britain, which has sent several delegations from the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police.

Cynics assert that many other factors, quite outside of Bratton's control, are responsible for the startling decline of crime in New York — that crime across America was on the decrease anyway, that drug gangs have consolidated their turf and are no longer killing each other, that the prison population has doubled in the last 10 years so that there are fewer criminals around to commit crimes. They are arguments he has heard many times before and that he rejects. "I'm very comfortable that over time I'll be proved correct. I think we are now beginning to show, very clearly, that what is happening here is not a fluke and that we can make a difference.

"I'll tell you this. If the previous administration had stayed in power for four more years, this city would have gone so far down the slippery slope that you could not have brought it back. It would be gone."

But it is Bratton who has gone. If crime figures start to creep up again, New Yorkers may feel the price paid to protect the mayor's ego was too great. They will not be in a forgiving mood when he seeks re-election next year ■

mitted another murder in Miami — the brother of the first victim — and then left for Jamaica.

Back in the "blue and white", the radio crackles urgently: an armed robbery, perp fleeing on foot. Description: black man in his 20s, black jacket, woollen hat, blue jeans.

Within seconds we are on our way, siren wailing and lights flashing. Suddenly it seems the streets are full of police cars tearing back and forth. The perp has been

seen running behind a row of houses. Patrol cars ring the scene, a helicopter with infrared cameras is called up, and a dozen officers scour the area with their flashlights. But the suspect is nowhere to be found.

Freed and Flaherty reckon they're not going to make this collar tonight, so they withdraw and return to their patrol. This is the stuff they like doing. "This is a great job," says Freed. "It's just so exciting." "Hey, you gonna put this in your newspaper?" Flaherty asks. "Okay, tell

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NYPD NEW

Commissioner William Bratton and his executive staff could take satisfaction in the progress made by the New York Police Department (NYPD) toward goals they had set at the outset of 1994 to reduce major crimes in the City. Their efforts had produced more results than even some of them had expected, more even than portrayed in the popular television drama carrying the Department's name. So much, in fact, that the Commissioner recently had trumpeted the City's rapidly improving crime record to a bond rating agency responsible for rating New York City's debt, pointing out that improvements in quality of life would have an eventual favorable impact on the City's desirability as a place to do business, further strengthening its credit-worthiness.

Although the Department was in the process of delivering results desired by the City's residents, many questioned whether and how the highly-publicized, results-oriented emphasis of Bratton's first twenty-four months as Commissioner could be sustained. (Exhibit 1 contains a report of New York's crime experiences compared with other major U.S. cities.)

As Bratton's team of Deputy Commissioners (civilians) and Chiefs (uniformed personnel) gathered in his office on a morning in late January, 1996, he pondered the appropriate strategy that would enable his organization to continue to produce results with the budget shortfalls that the City was experiencing. The Thursday, January 25 copy of The New York Times on his desk, the very same desk used by Teddy Roosevelt when he was Police Commissioner 100 years earlier, carried a front page article headlined, "Giuliani (Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York) Weighing Cuts to Police to Help Decrease Budget Deficit." It was no surprise, in that it reflected his recent discussions with Mayor Giuliani, whose administration faced a \$2 billion (6%) deficit in fiscal 1995 in spite of significant efforts to reduce the budget.

Bratton opened his weekly Executive Staff meeting by pointing out that achieving a further 10% reduction in major crimes during 1996 was beginning to pale in difficulty and complexity to several other challenges facing the Department. These included reduction in funding from the City, restrictions on ways the Department could deploy its resources and reward performance, and the difficulty of sustaining the momentum that had produced greatly improved results in the past two years. After pointing out that the department was "going into a very stressful year," Bratton

Professor James L. Heskett prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

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challenged his deputies to be as creative in responding to these new challenges as they had in reducing crime.

History

Founded in 1845, the New York Police Department was the largest municipal police organization in the U.S. At various times in its history, it had been a model for big city policing. However, like other large municipal police organizations, its work was measured in terms of effort, such as the speed with which 911 (emergency) calls were answered and the number of patrols dispatched. From time to time, it had experienced periodic claims of corruption and police brutality.

As Bratton described it:

We, as an organization, like many police departments in America during the 70s and 80s, became very reactive in our approach to crime...the traditional or professional policing model that was made up of rapid response: Dial 911 and we'll come very quickly...We focused on random patrol as the chief preventive measure--the idea that all these cars riding around would scare the criminals into submission. Thirdly, there was reactive investigation, something we always had done--after-the-fact investigation. And it was often controlled by a strong, centralized organization; in the case of the NYPD, you had to go up to the top of the organization to make even the most basic decisions.¹

The concept of community policing began to sweep police departments in the U.S. in the late 80s. Under this concept, individual officers, often the youngest members of the force, were encouraged to spend more time in the neighborhoods, maintain more visibility, gain the confidence of the citizens of a neighborhood, and collect information that would lead to efforts to deter crime. Nevertheless, specialized units trained to handle particular types of crimes, especially those that were drug-related, continued to exist. This reflected a fear that patrol officers might be tempted to become involved in crimes, such as drug dealing, themselves. In general, community policing initiatives had created a tension between personnel deployment strategies designed to provide maximum visibility of officers and those designed to deal with high-crime areas.

Safe Streets, Safe City Program

In response to increases in crime of near-epidemic proportions, Mayor David Dinkins and the New York City Council had won approval from the State Legislature in 1991 to hire 6,000 officers and pay for them through increased property taxes and a 12.5% surcharge to the City's income tax. The bill specified the total head count of all police in the city to be achieved by August 1 of each year (38,310 for August 1, 1995), although it might fluctuate around that number other times of the year. It also called for more officers "on the beat" as well as greater visibility for them in neighborhoods to which they were assigned. It allotted patrol personnel to various precincts based on workload measures such as 911 calls, crime data, and the needs of community policing plans. It resulted in an increase of police officers in every precinct.

¹ Marie Simonetti Rosen, "Moving the Biggest Mountain," Law Enforcement News, June 30, 1995, pp. 8-10.

The program, called Safe Streets, Safe City, was due to expire on June 20, 1996. Neither Dinkins' successor nor his Police Commissioner had taken a position on whether the program should be renewed.

Giuliani Assumes Office

The election of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in November, 1993 opened a new era for the Department. Giuliani, a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York who had built his reputation as a tough fighter against corruption and organized crime, campaigned and won largely on a campaign that emphasized reductions in New York City's budget deficits and improved crime control. These were to be achieved largely by exempting the Police Department from cuts in budgets for uniformed personnel, cuts that were implemented for nearly every other function of the City's government. However, Giuliani inherited a Police Department that was badly in need of new technology and methods. Work was done by hand that could otherwise be computerized. Communication systems were badly outdated. Often police officers were more poorly armed than the criminals they confronted.

Worse yet, there was a very low level of trust in the Department, even by senior officers. One graphic example of this was the denial of access codes to automated criminal history files. Because of this policy, designed to limit misuse of information, officers in one precinct could not gain access to information about crimes committed outside the precinct. As a result, it was nearly impossible for an arresting officer to check a suspect's criminal record. Focus group meetings with frontline patrol people yielded responses such as "this place is not on the level" and "our bosses don't want to fight crime." John Linder, a consultant who, as part of an ongoing organization change effort, conducted a survey of what patrol officers believed the Department wanted from them, cited as most important: write summonses, hold down overtime, stay out of trouble, and clear the 911 backlog, in that order. Fighting crime was seventh on the list.

One of Giuliani's first actions was to appoint William Bratton, Police Commissioner of Boston, to a similar post in New York. He assumed office on January 10, 1994.

Giuliani's New Police Commissioner

A product of a working class family in Dorchester, Massachusetts whose father held full-time jobs in a metal-plating shop by day and the post office at night, William Bratton credited his first police job as a patrolman in Mattapan, a tough neighborhood of Boston, with giving him the self-assurance that some of his detractors tended to regard as bravado. The experience led him, according to one account, to develop:

...a particularly powerful distaste for precinct bosses who stayed away from volatile situations and weighed in afterward with criticism of their subordinates. "When I was working District Fourteen, in Boston, we had a major broo-ha in one of the public parks, and every cop in the district was there...There were two sergeants, old-school guys, back in the station, and we were calling for P.S.--patrol supervisors--and neither one of those bastards would come out. They were two cowards hiding in the station house. We had a lot of them like that in Boston. They didn't want to see anything."²

² James Lardner, "The C.E.O. Cop," The New Yorker, February 6, 1995, pp. 45-57, at p. 53.

Bratton came to the job of Commissioner with a clear understanding of the problems of police administration in New York City. Before assuming the job that quickly led to his being named Commissioner of Boston's Police Department, he had served as the head of the New York City Transit Police Department between 1990 and 1992. During that time, he had helped transform a somewhat demoralized force policing a transit system confronting increased robbery, fare beating, and a homeless population of about 5,000 living in transit facilities into an effective deterrent to these problems.

Bratton was an avid reader of management literature and fan of war movies. He occasionally referred to citizens as "customers," criminals as "competition," police officers as "sales representatives," and reduced crime as "profit." He and his wife, Cheryl Fiandaca, a former criminal-defense lawyer who was teaching at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, lived with five cats and a dog in a two-bedroom apartment on Central Park South and were frequently seen at cultural events as well as some of the City's better restaurants.

At about the time Bratton was appointed to head up the transit police, Jack Maple, a lieutenant in the transit police, came to the attention of the Commissioner through a plan for reducing crime that he had drafted. Maple, given to drinking espresso and wearing bow ties, blazers, and two-tone wing-tip spectator shoes (with a homburg hat in winter), was a sartorial opposite of Bratton (who tended toward Hermes animal ties) and a somewhat distinctive sight even on the streets of New York. (According to Maple, he adopted the dress because, as a short, stocky person, he attracted no attention in his youth as a conventional dresser.) The two hit it off immediately, with Maple, labeled by one journalist as "the Police Department's secret crime-fighting weapon," becoming a co-architect of a plan to turn the Transit Police Department around. As Bratton said more than once to those curious about his attraction to Maple, "Jack grows on you."

The program to transform the transit police was focused on two main thrusts. The first involved an effort to deter petty as well as major crimes committed on the system by attacking "quality of life" misdemeanors. For example, the force was instructed to begin arresting those avoiding fares ("fare beaters"). The search that was done routinely after arrest often yielded weapons which served to deter more serious crime. In Bratton's words, "A search or the threat of one is, in itself, a deterrent to crime because it encourages people to stop carrying guns." In fact, searches of fare beaters alone had turned up more than 400 concealed weapons in the first year.

The second thrust involved equipping the police with 9 mm. weapons with larger magazines, new autos, and new uniforms to improve their image in their own eyes as well as the public's.

Challenges and Responses: First Steps

Challenges facing the Department in early 1994 included a restive public that had swept Giuliani into office in part for his promises of safer streets; a somewhat demoralized police force whose "business was to stay out of trouble, not to police the city," according to John Linder; and a prior administrative focus on effort (number of patrols dispatched) vs. results (crime reduction).

According to one member of Bratton's executive staff, "there was widespread backbiting, fear of failure, and low performance. The structure of the organization was completely top-down. The Department lacked focus, and without focus a police department can end up being a municipal yo-yo." A former Precinct Commander said that the attitude of the senior staff had been, "You people in the precincts just make work for us."

Upon assuming office, Bratton quickly replaced several senior staff members. Having decided that primary responsibility for day-to-day operations would reside with the 76 precinct commanders, a systematic effort was instituted to determine which of them could adapt to a strategy focused on results. Eventually, three-fourths of all precinct commanders Bratton inherited were moved out of their jobs. In his first 24 months on the job, the average age of the Commissioner's senior staff had fallen from the low 60s to the mid 40s. Bratton took great satisfaction in the result, saying "I would pit my command staff against any Fortune 500 company."

Bratton's reputation among police officers as a "cop's commissioner" was reinforced during his first week on the job as he began pushing for larger 15-shot ammunition clips that he had secured for his transit police several years earlier. These had become the envy of, and a source of resentment among, members of the main force required to use less powerful weapons. Improved bullet-proof vests were ordered along with darker uniforms that conveyed a more authoritative image.

Word got around rapidly among police that this was a commissioner who "backed you up" but who would not hesitate to take disciplinary action if necessary. He was quick to obtain reliable information and, where appropriate, defend officers accused of excessive force. But in the situation involving the disclosure of widespread police corruption in the 30th Precinct just three months into his administration, Bratton accompanied the arresting force, personally removing the badges of offending officers. Later, he called all Precinct Commanders to headquarters, threw the badges on the table, and announced to the assembled group that he was retiring the badges so that no other police officer would ever have to wear them. A short time later, however, he emphasized to a reporter that he had "no intention of becoming an anticorruption zealot."

The public saw in Bratton an articulate spokesman capable of relating to their concerns. Shortly after taking office, he began making frequent references, both inside and outside the Department, to "taking the City back from criminals one block, one street, and one neighborhood at a time." In contrast to Bratton's popular image with the public, reporters used adjectives like "mouthy" and "cocksure" to describe him. One commented that he had a "consuming interest in media relations." Bratton was so effective in these encounters that some reporters sensed a growing rivalry between him and the Mayor, something that both denied.

"Quality of Life" Legislation

Mayor Giuliani, prompted by polls showing that New Yorkers were concerned about a declining "quality of life," characterized by more graffiti and vagrancy, promised to enforce existing laws against those committing what were termed "quality of life" misdemeanors, including urinating in public, spraying graffiti, and panhandling. Much as had been done at the Transit Police Department, police were marshalled to reduce "quality of life" misdemeanors thought to be most important by the citizenry. In the first quarter of 1994, for example, arrests of peddlers, public drinkers, and squeegee cleaners increased 38%, summonses increased 40%, seizures of weapons increased 37%, and sales tax violation citations increased 49% over the previous year. The effort achieved its greatest notoriety when it was used to go after what came to be known as "squeegee pests," people who approached stopped autos, cleaned their windshields, and demanded money from their occupants. Squeegee pests were warned then arrested. By increasing efforts begun in mid-1993, squeegee pests practically vanished from the streets by spring of 1994.

In addition, existing laws were used, for example, to arrest graffiti "artists" who spray-painted municipal and other property as well as slum landlords who had allowed their properties

to fall into a state of disarray. The theory behind these efforts had two different rationales. The first was the "broken windows" theory that if a broken window is not fixed in a building, soon all windows will be broken. The second rationale held that people engaging in one kind of misdemeanor might be inclined to commit others as well, especially that of carrying a concealed or unlicensed gun. Heightened enforcement of these laws resulted in an increased number of searches and increased questioning of a process that turned up several hundred weapons in the first six months of the initiative. Commissioner Bratton referred to these practices as the "linchpin" in his crime-fighting strategies. The idea was not new; when it had been proposed by a consultant to Bratton's predecessor, he had responded, "Give me 50 guys, suspend the Constitution, and we can do that."

Development of the Strategies

One of the first actions of the new administration was to draft the first of what were to become seven Police Strategies. They were titled: (1) Getting Guns off the Streets of New York, (2) Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the Streets, (3) Driving Drug Dealers out of New York, (4) Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence, (5) Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York, and (6) Reducing Auto-Related Crime in New York. In response to continuing concerns about police corruption, a seventh strategy was added in mid-1995 titled, "Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department."

Each strategy statement contained a statement of the problem, current practice, specific conditions warranting the strategy, the strategy itself, and changes in laws as well as departmental policies and procedures that would be necessary to facilitate the strategy.

Excerpts from Strategy No. 5 are shown in Exhibit 2. When first developed, the strategies were labeled "bullshit" by many frontline police officers. Attitudes had begun to change with their implementation.

Merger and Organization

Police work in New York City traditionally had been carried out in three separate organizations. One constituted the force entrusted with general public safety. Another dealt with police work associated with housing issues. The third concerned itself with crime on the city's transit system. (The "head count" for each of these departments by types of jobs is shown in Exhibit 3.) One of the new Commissioner's first objectives was to implement the merger of these three departments, a high priority of the new mayor. The three forces were consolidated in April 1995.

(Bill Andrews' rewrite begins here)

By January 1996 the police force was organized into 76 precincts, led by Precinct Commanders and experienced senior police officers. In addition, the Department maintained a separate detective force comprising ____ detectives. Other major functions controlled from headquarters were _____. Exhibit 4 shows an organization chart for the Department.

Police officers and others, comprising _____ employees, were members of the (union).

In addition, another ____ were subject to civil service regulations.

(Bill Andrews' rewrite ends here)

Management by the Numbers

Among the more important initiatives of the new administration were a new emphasis on results vs. effort, reinforced by efforts to computerize statistics and graphics formerly organized by hand, as well as the institution of twice-weekly "CompStat" (computer or comparison statistics) crime-strategy meetings based on the more-current information. In addition to introducing new performance measures based on this information, other initiatives involved giving more authority to the 76 precinct commanders, redefining the role of the officers policing neighborhoods, reengineering processes, and introducing new technology. All of this effort, and the results it would produce, was a topic of some debate among those knowledgeable about police work and crime control.

New Performance Measures

New performance measures were instituted for Precinct Commanders. Instead of being measured on the amount of effort put forth by their departments, they would now be held accountable for the quality of their plans for dealing with crime problems. Increased emphasis was placed on efforts thought to lead to crime reduction. These included the proportion of people arrested and searched in connection with misdemeanors and the frequency with which those arrested had their past police records checked at the time they were identified and searched. According to Deputy Commissioner Maple: "You don't get into trouble for increased crime, but for not having a strategy to deal with it."

Performance was monitored daily by the NYPD's leadership. As Bratton put it, "Can you imagine running a bank if you couldn't look at your bottom line every day?" In addition, other indicators, such as in- and out-migrations of businesses, were tracked.

Results vs. Effort: Reducing Crime

Whether or not crime could be reduced was a matter of some debate among criminologists and sociologists. Since a study commissioned by the Johnson Administration, "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society," was published in 1967, it had become conventional wisdom to assume that most inner-city crime was the inevitable product of poverty and racism. Among the theories used to explain a widespread decline in major crime in large cities between 1991 and 1995 were an improved economy, a smaller number of young males (representing an especially high crime risk in the population), increased numbers of drug dealers either dead or in jail, a switch from crack cocaine (a violence-inducing drug) to heroin (a depressant) as the drug of choice in cities, the settlement of many gang "turf wars," and reduced racism.³ Rarely was credit given to police ability to control the rate of crime. All of this was perceived by members of the Department as devaluing its achievements of recent months. One newspaper columnist suggested that the reason for the striking

³ This trend was not true for New York City.

results achieved by the Department was that New Yorkers were not reporting crime as frequently as in the past. One of Bratton's predecessors even suggested that the trends were the result of a conscious decision on the part of drug dealers that crime (other than drug dealing) was bad for business.

In response, Bratton pointed to the dramatic results achieved in New York in contrast to other major cities. He argued that most of the theories that discounted the NYPD's recent accomplishments essentially assumed that all police departments were equally effective, a thesis that would be hard to defend. Instead of measuring and rewarding effort, their approach involved identifying the causes of major crime and deploying resources to reduce the likelihood that crime would occur, effectively utilizing information and technology

For example, statistics suggested that there were three major circumstances associated with many murders: drugs, guns, and people with police records. Locations where drugs were dealt were well-known. People carrying licensed guns were known to the police; unlicensed guns were often found during police searches. With improved technology, such as hand phones, quick checks could be run on the police records of individuals stopped for various offenses. By reallocating resources to places where drugs, guns, and people with prior records were found, dramatic reductions in murder could be achieved, according to this philosophy. This was accomplished by giving more authority to New York's 76 precinct commanders and holding them accountable for their performance numbers.

Precinct-Level Authority and Accountability

Prior to Bratton's administration, an emphasis on neighborhood policing had resulted in more police being placed "on the beat" in neighborhoods and more authority being given to them to deal with anti-crime initiatives at the grass-roots level, calling in specialized experts from headquarters when necessary. Problems associated with this approach were that some neighborhoods were so crime-ridden that the young officers placed in them couldn't cope with the challenge, novice police (most likely to be assigned foot patrol in the neighborhood police initiative) were less likely to use good judgement in threatening situations and often were lacking the human relations skills needed by neighborhood police, precinct commanders had too little real control over the neighborhood police working for them, and resources were more difficult to allocate intelligently than under a plan that would place authority and accountability at a higher level. To correct the situation, Bratton's team decided to focus authority and accountability at the level of the 76 precinct commanders.

The rationale for this action was that individuals at this level could bring sufficient deterrents to bear on difficult crime areas, resources could be reallocated from one "hot spot" to another within the precinct, results could be measured with greater consistency and reliability, and the precinct was a large enough unit to support its own specialized forces. Those arguing against greater authority and accountability for precinct commanders claimed that by decentralizing effort at the precinct level there was a risk of corruption if headquarters oversight could no longer be achieved through specialized services provided to the precincts.

As a result of this action, officers on neighborhood patrols were freed to concentrate their efforts on relating to neighborhood needs while obtaining leads on possible criminal activity.

The CompStat Meetings

If the precinct commander became the focal point for carrying out crime-reduction strategies, the CompStat meetings and associated activities became the engine for the effort. They were a product of Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple's favorite four-step philosophy for action, a

philosophy that had become a mantra in the Department: (1) accurate, timely information, (2) rapid, focused deployment, (3) effective tactics, and (4) relentless follow-up and assessment. Prior to the initiation of the meetings, according to one senior staff member, "crime statistics were a way of keeping score at the end of the year, not a means for managing for results."

What became known as the "Louie and Jack Show," twice-weekly CompStat (computer statistics) meetings, required precinct commanders to be ready to review their up-to-date computer-generated crime statistics, relate what they were doing to achieve them, and face questions about what they were going to be doing to improve them. They were led by Chief of Department Louis Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple and were held in the Department's "War Room," containing a number of large computer-fed screens and other devices for displaying statistics, at Headquarters in Lower Manhattan. A reporter sitting in on one meeting described it as follows:

Maple called the precinct commanders to the front of the room in turn, questioning, prodding, cajoling, and occasionally teasing information out of them. They discussed ongoing investigations, special operations, and any unusual criminal activity. When the men and women from the 81st Precinct got their call, they were asked to explain a recent spate of shootings.

"What's going on?" Maple wanted to know. "Why are these shootings happening? Is it a turf war? No? Well, somebody's not happy. Maybe they're cranky 'cause it's hot, but something's happening." When the shooting locations were put up on the huge map projected on the wall, along with those of drug complaints in the precinct, there was a clear overlap. Maple asked what was being done about the drug spots, and one of the narcotics officers said it was a tough area because the business was done inside and there were lots of lookouts. "That's fine," Maple said. "That's why we're detectives. Tell me what tactics we can employ to penetrate these locations." The detective said they would try some buy-and-bust operations and maybe get a couple of the guys behind the Plexiglas to rat when an arrest was hanging over their heads. Maple wasn't satisfied.

"I want you back here next week with a plan," he said to the precinct captain (normally each precinct comes in once every five weeks).⁴

In order to respond to the kinds of questions posed as Compstat meetings, precinct commanders began bringing with them to the meetings representatives from other bureaus (such as detectives) who were assigned to their precincts. The meetings thus encouraged inter-bureau coordination.

CompStat meetings had become well-known throughout the police world. Given the growing success of the Department, they were visited by police administrators and journalists from other parts of the U.S. and other countries. According to one precinct commander, "If your numbers don't look good, these meetings are not fun." Data displayed at a typical CompStat meeting is presented in Exhibit 5.

In addition to organizing CompStat meetings, Chief Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Maple toured the precinct commands, covering as many as 15 in a weekend. During these visits they checked to see, among other things, whether crime strategy maps were up-to-date, proper instructions were being given to patrol officers at roll-call, and communications from headquarters were displayed prominently.

⁴ Craig Horowitz, "The Suddenly Safer City," New York, August 14, 1995, pp. 21-25 ff., at p. 25.

Process and Organization Reengineering

Commissioner Bratton often referred to the work of his team as "reengineering an underperforming organization." He had put 300 members of the Department to work on the specific task of reviewing procedures and practices with representatives from the business world and academia. Twelve teams were organized around the themes of building community partnerships, geographical vs. functional organizational structure, precinct organization, supervisory training, in-service training, productivity, paperwork, integrity, rewards and career paths, discipline, equipment and uniforms, and technology. Management thought leaders such as Jack Welch and Michael Hammer were brought in to address the teams. The process produced more than 600 recommendations, 80% of which were implemented.

Resulting changes ranged from the obvious to the complex. For example, one early finding from the paperwork team was that there were at least 4,000 forms in active use within the Department. John Linder, a consultant to the culture and organization change process commented that the forms played a very distinctive role in the personnel strategies of previous administrations:

These forms were used to hang people down the food chain. As an officer, you had two choices. Either you filled out the form wrong and got flogged for it. Or you filled it out properly and accurately and were asked, "Why didn't you do something about this?" Either way, you couldn't win.

Bratton himself cited several obvious problems with what he termed "bankers' hours":

The auto-theft squad was working nine to five, and the drug units were mostly working ten to six, with a few going two to ten...The warrant unit was getting started at 7:30 a.m., and by the time they read the papers and had their coffee, it was ten before they'd start knocking on doors. The department was not really minding the store.⁵

Another study found that the average amount of police officer overtime associated with an arrest was 12 hours. It resulted from the fact that much of an officer's involvement in the preparation and presentation of a complaint by a District Attorney had to be done in person, although it was solely within the discretion of a D.A. to alter the process. Because overtime was an important source of income for many officers, they did not complain about the waste of their time in the arrest and complaint process.

In the process of reengineering the organization, a reporting level was eliminated. This meant that PC's who reported to one of 17 Division Commanders now reported directly to ----- Commanders.

Because the incidence of drugs and guns often occurred in overlapping geographic patterns, specialized drug units were replaced with Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams who investigated situations involving both. In addition, new crime control strategies purposely required the formation of teams designed to break down the barriers that had separated the Patrol, Detective, and Organized Crime Control Bureaus.

⁵ Craig Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Introduction of New Technology

Efforts to collect, organize, and display crime information by computer, part of a larger effort to modernize the Department's information systems, had required an investment of \$500,000. They had become a cornerstone of the Department's strategy, and were thought to have a high return.

New uses of video conferencing technology allowed officers to interact with district attorneys in precincts in order to reduce the average time, much of it overtime, associated with the arrest-to-arraignment process from 14 to a goal of 2 hours. This was critically important in a police force with wages ranging from \$___ to \$___ per hour, and making ___ arrests per month. (At least one district attorney, when advised of the costs incurred by current procedures, had even approved the use of the telephone for an officer's involvement in the arrest process.) (Note: Mike Farrell will provide data for this paragraph.)

Other technology-based initiatives, supported by a newly-passed federal crime bill, included the installation of mobile data terminals in patrol cars to check criminal records at the time of apprehension and an enhanced 911 emergency response system.

Continuing Challenges

New York City, according to FBI statistics, accounted for 61% of the total reduction in serious crimes for the entire U.S. during the first six months of 1995. Although Commissioner Bratton and his team could take satisfaction from this, it was clear that the job ahead would be made even more challenging by budgetary limitations, possible changes in the process for arbitrating labor wage disputes, restrictions on the deployment of resources, and the inability to reward good performance, all combined with the need to achieve higher productivity. Corruption within the Department was an issue that had to be given continuing attention. There was a persistent belief by some that the price of crime reduction, in terms of reduced civil rights, was high. And finally, it had become apparent that it would take much longer than two years to effect the attitude changes in the police force that were sought. As consultant Linder commented, "It's clear that the message hasn't filtered down into the ranks." But it would be difficult to sustain the high-intensity effort that had characterized Bratton's first two years in office.

All of this had to be achieved in an organization that had to be operated within constraints imposed by its public-sector nature. Exhibit 6 represents one view of basic differences between management in public-sector and private-sector organizations.

Budgetary Limitations

Non-discretionary accounts dominated the Department's annual budget of about \$2.3 billion, as shown in Exhibit 7. They covered salaries, overtime, shift differentials, uniform allowances, annuity payments and holiday pay for employees, and resulted largely from head counts that were mandated by Safe Streets, Safe City and other legislation as well as wage policies that were determined in large part by linkages between 81 labor contracts that the City had with various labor unions, including the police officers' union.

In discussions with the Mayor, it was clear that City Hall expected savings from payroll and other sources of at least \$20 to \$30 million in 1996. This was on top of budgetary constraints

that had been placed on the Department's OTPS (other than personal services) accounts in 1994 and 1995. In an effort to maintain the size of the police force in service, as promised by the Mayor in his election campaign, discretionary budgets had been cut by 30% (down to \$95 million) for fiscal 1996. This had to cover expenditures for such items as supplies, equipment, telephones, fuel, and rent. Some of the results were almost laughable. Jack Maple, for example, pointed out that his department couldn't afford the supplies needed to display crime information in his office.

Perhaps the most significant cuts in discretionary budgets had come from overtime reduction. This account had been reduced from \$113 million in 1993 to \$79 million in 1995. While this had helped the Department meet its budget goals, it had hurt morale among frontline officers in the Department who could no longer count on overtime income to help with such things as mortgage payments.

It was quite possible that the Mayor was ready to consider reductions in the size of the police force, although it would be politically difficult for him to allow any of those reductions in the number of police on patrol. His attitude toward head count had begun to change with the possible expiration of the Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, and a significant change in the arbitration process for the City's negotiations with its police and firefighters unions which could increase pay levels significantly. When queried about whether he was ready to abandon the staffing level of 38,310 mandated by legislation, the Mayor had pointed out that, because of attrition, the Department typically operated for most of the year at levels up to 1,800 persons less than those mandated.

Labor Contract Dispute Arbitration

Led by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of New York City, the State Legislature had passed and sent to the Governor for signature legislation shifting responsibility for contract dispute arbitration from the City's Office of Collective Bargaining to the State Public Employment Relations Board. It was thought that this action would result in larger salary increases from future arbitration. In its deliberations, the City's agency was required to take into consideration such things as the City's ability to pay awards. In contrast, the State agency was required to take into consideration pay levels of surrounding communities, New York's suburbs, which were as much as 35% higher than those in the City.

The bill, although vetoed previously by the Governor, had passed with only 8 legislators out of 200 opposing it. Previously, union officials had said they would make passage of the bill a litmus test for lawmakers when they allocated their much-coveted political campaign contributions.

The Mayor publicly had expressed his opposition to the bill and had asked the Governor not to sign it, weathering the criticism of the unions that had supported his political campaign. Privately, he had discussed with Commissioner Bratton whether or not deeper budget cuts would be required if the legislation were to be enacted. On January 25, alongside the report of the progress of the legislation, The New York Times reported that:

Preliminarily, the Mayor has ordered each of his agencies to cut their budgets for the next fiscal year by 7.5 percent, although he has not said that each would have to cut that much. For the Police Department, a cut that size would total \$170 million, from a \$2.3 billion budget. It remained unclear yesterday what other cuts, if any, (other than 1,000 personnel from the Department yielding

estimated savings of \$20 to \$30 million) would be considered for the Police Department.⁶

Possible Sources of Staffing Reductions

If staffing reductions were required, the Commissioner could achieve them through attrition, which occurred at the rate of about 1,600 police officers and 500 civilians annually, and a postponement of the starting date for the Police Academy class that graduated about 1,800 new recruits each year. The latter would, however, slow down Bratton's efforts to improve the overall quality of Department personnel by imposing tougher entry standards and an improved training program.

This might also require combining positions and moving more officers from "desk jobs" to patrols. In 1995 alone, 500 officers were freed for patrol work who had previously staffed public affairs, personnel, and payroll units prior to the merger of New York City's three police forces.

Restrictions on Resource Deployment

The Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, which established staffing targets for each precinct of the City, was a reflection of a general feeling on the part of residents that each precinct should have its "fair share" of police protection. These targets, which reflected conditions in the City in 1989, influenced the assignment of Police Academy graduates. They had not changed for six years. As a result, precinct staffing levels were difficult to adjust to reflect changing police needs. (See Exhibit 8 for demographic and crime statistics as well as staffing levels for four precincts and Exhibit 9 for a precinct map of the City.) Most people still had not accepted the argument that crime reduction in heavily impacted crime areas would lead to less crime in low-crime neighborhoods, just as many had trouble believing that searches of those committing minor misdemeanors would eventually lead to reductions in serious crimes.

According to Jack Maple, while specialized units, such as Street Crime (plain clothes), Special Narcotics, and Vice, could be moved from one precinct to another for 30 days at a time, fully 18,000 frontline patrol personnel "couldn't be moved at a whim" Nevertheless, he cited the 9th Precinct experience as evidence that moving specialized units worked. He pointed out that the Precinct had started out the first four months of 1995 with major crimes 50% over the previous year. By the end of the year, with the redeployment of specialized units to the Precinct, such crimes were down 4%. Drawing on his extensive reading of military history, Maple cited British use of radar in WWII in defending against enemy aircraft as a model for what the Department should strive for. It provided the RAF with a way of deploying its personnel and equipment quickly.

While attempting to maintain adequate headcount in personnel assigned to precincts, Commissioner Bratton was contemplating assigning 750 of the 1,800 March, 1996 graduates of the Police Academy class to replace more-experienced officers reassigned to the Mayor's announced effort to wage an all-out war against drugs in Brooklyn North. The resulting specialized units would be assigned to ten precincts in which drug-dealing was especially high. This, of course, would make it more difficult to replace frontline personnel in the remaining precincts.

⁶ Steven Lee Meyers, "Giuliani Weighing Cuts to Police To Help Decrease Budget Deficit," The New York Times, January 25, 1996, pp. A1 and B3.

The Brooklyn North initiative would involve the temporary reassignment of 1,200 officers from elsewhere in the Department to the area outlined in Exhibit 8. Reassignments would be made from all bureaus. The initiative had created an air of anticipation and excitement in the Department. It was also thought to be a test of conventional thinking regarding restrictions on the deployment of resources.

Rewarding Performance

Jack Maple pointed out that police officers hadn't had a raise in spite of their increasing levels of effectiveness. The situation had been made more tense by the fact that the City Council had voted senior City officials, including a small number of Police Department officials, pay raises up to 20% as of July, 1995. These officials hadn't received pay raises for eight years.

Union labor contracts and civil service statutes made it very difficult to reward outstanding performance. The primary form of monetary incentives was provided by overtime, which had been reduced significantly through the application of stricter management accountability as well as the increased use of technology.

Other forms of recognition commonly employed within the Department were the temporary assignment of patrol officers to work with detective squads for 30 days and other preferred assignments. More often, a simple letter of recognition was written.

Increased Productivity

A declining budget would require increased productivity if the Department was to meet its goal for 1996. According to data for major U.S. cities, presented in Exhibit 10, New York ranked in the middle in terms of police personnel per capita.

Along with the increased use of information and technology, more controversial means could be attempted to improve productivity. For example, approximately ____ officers could be freed up for other tasks by replacing two-person patrols with one officer. But the outcry from officers, who had fought hard for two-person patrols on the grounds of increased safety, would be great.

Addressing Rising Complaints

With increased enforcement activities and personnel, there had been a 32% increase in 1994 in the number of complaints about police brutality, unfair treatment of citizens by police, and police corruption over the past two years. The Department's analysis of its information discloses that:

...In 1994 ... 4 million calls for service were answered in person by officers, 227,453 arrests were made, 5.4 million summonses were written--with a total of 9,922 complaints made by the public for police misconduct. Of the 2,152 cases reviewed in 1994 by the Civilian Complaint Review Board, an independent arm of city government, 5.1% (or 111 cases) were determined by CCRB to be worthy of prosecution in the Department's disciplinary process.

In February 1995, the Mayor created an independent citizens monitor, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption. At the time, plans already were underway in the Department to take steps to correct a situation disclosed in an early-1994 survey of Department personnel that found that "a long-standing, high-level concern about avoiding scandal and criticism had created within

the NYPD a culture of organizational fear, self-protection, secrecy, and exclusion--which existed alongside continuing, everyday heroic action by individual members of the service."

Rooting Out Corruption

On June 14, 1995 Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting Out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department, was published. One of the biggest challenges of this initiative was describe in the Strategy as follows:

...contemporary corruption in the NYPD occurs in pockets which, despite universal disapproval among honest officers, are protected by the "blue wall of silence." The tradition of not "ratting" on colleagues is common in most professions, but it is even more pronounced in police and military organizations where members sometimes rely on each other for physical survival. Mutual protection under violent circumstances becomes mutual protection under all...The "us versus them" attitude often called the "blue cocoon" can seem to condone disrespect of the public and even abuse of force in these same police and military organizations.

To counteract these tendencies, efforts were initiated to energize the Department's own investigative group, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). This was to be done by changing the entire dynamic by which the IAB interacted with Department personnel. In the past, the relationship had been one of distrust, involving obsessive secrecy on the part of the IAB and an unwillingness to cooperate on the part of police officers. To change it, efforts were underway by the IAB to: (1) involve every command level in reducing corruption and brutality, (2) make available within the department monthly reports for each command on complaints broken out down to the level of the precinct and even tour of duty, (3) computerize master profiles of individual officers that cross-referenced data on corruption, brutality, and discourtesy complaints with that regarding record of sick leave, emergency excusal, arrest activity, commendations, and disciplinary actions, (4) provide training to those in command positions about the detection of patterns leading to corruption. As part of a more proactive approach to deterrence, the IAB was encouraged to observe officers as they interacted with IAB officers posing as civilians who might provide opportunities to commit crimes. In addition, the IAB would continue to initiate parallel investigations of complaints brought before the Civilian Complaint Review Board and implement Commissioner Bratton's order to stop giving one day's notice for random drug tests, which had enabled those tested to prepare.

To support the new policy of inclusion concerning issues of corruption, Strategy No. 7 set forth a new policy advocating consideration of a commander's entire record of performance rather than the career-ending loss of command that previously often had resulted when corruption was discovered in any of their units.

Sustaining the Effort

There was some question about whether the efforts of the first two years could be sustained, especially by a Department whose personnel had not received pay raises. As Jack Maple put it: "Armies like to fight short wars. We're slowin' down."

(Exhibits to be supplied by Bill Andrews)

Exhibit 1

Report of Crime Trends in Major U.S. Cities

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Exhibit 2

Excerpts from Police Strategy 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York

18

Exhibit 3

"Head Counts" for New York's Three Police Forces, Late 1994

Exhibit 4

Organization Chart, New York Police Department, 1995

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Exhibit 5

Example of Data Displayed at CompStat Meetings

NY

Exhibit 6

A Comparison of Management Characteristics in public-sector vs. private-sector Organizations

Exhibit 7

New York Police Department Budgets, 1994-1996

Exhibit 8

Demographic and Crime Statistics for Four Police Precincts, New York City, 1995

1. 2.

Exhibit 9

A Map of New York City Police Precincts

NYC

Exhibit 10

Police Staff Ratios for Major U.S. Cities



William J. Bratton

Police Commissioner of the City of New York

Bratton is currently President of First Security Consulting, a management consulting subsidiary of a large private security company called First Security Services Corp. In 1994, he was appointed 38th police commissioner of the City of New York by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in January 1994. William J. Bratton has embarked on a major reengineering of the New York City Police Department. A strong advocate of community policing, he is moving towards a decentralized police bureaucracy, stronger precinct commands, and better trained and motivated police officers — all to support a comprehensive and assertive strategy for dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and fear in the nation's largest city.

Commissioner Bratton began his career as a police officer in Boston in 1970, rising by 1980 to Superintendent of Police, the highest sworn rank in the Boston Police Department. Since 1983, he has managed five police agencies, accomplishing major reforms in each department as well as significant declines in crime. He served as Chief of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Police and as Superintendent of the Metropolitan District Commission Police, which patrolled the Boston Metropolitan Area. From 1990 to 1992, he won national recognition for his leadership of the New York City Transit Police, initiating reforms and strategies that eventually cut subway crime by nearly 50 percent.

Commissioner Bratton returned to Boston as Superintendent-in-Chief in 1992 and was named Boston Police Commissioner in 1993. Developing a plan of action and a program of cultural diversity training, he guided the department toward full implementation of community policing.

Commissioner Bratton holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from Boston State College. He is a graduate of the FBI Executive Institute. He was a Senior Executive Fellow in Criminal Justice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government in 1987 and was one of the police managers chosen to attend its National Executive Session on Policing in 1988. In 1993, he was elected President of the Police Executive Research Forum, a national organization of progressive police executives from the largest city, county, and state law enforcement agencies. Among his many other honors and distinctions, Commissioner Bratton holds the Schroeder Brothers Medal, the Boston Police Department's highest award for valor, which he earned by facing down a bank robber and rescuing a hostage in 1975.

First Security Consulting is working with police departments throughout the United States and abroad to implement ^{the} crime reduction strategies that were so successful in New York City.

Since Bratton's 2½ years with the NYPD, Jan 94 - April 96, violent crime has decreased by over 38%, murder by 51%.



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Police Strategy No. 5:
Reclaiming the Public
Spaces of New York

Police Strategy No. 5:

Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York

Rudolph W. Giuliani
Mayor of the City of New York



William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner





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FACE TO FACE

The Elliott Ness of the 90s



ARTS

Homage to a famous son



NEWSVIEW


Israel's yuppie army



SPORT

Forlorn in the USA

12-PAGE SECTION



New York

NOT many people make it on to the cover of *Time* magazine, and in its way the fact that William Bratton did has proved his most exasperating problem. Had he not achieved that distinction last January, the war of egos between himself and New York's mayor might have been containable.

However, that picture of Bratton, coat collar upturned, the air of superiority just teasing his facial features, and in the eyes that hard, assured Numero Uno stare... well, the sheer triumphalism of it all so incensed Rudy Giuliani, it led to the final combustion.

In Mayor Giuliani's opinion, the city's police commissioner was cornering too much credit for New York's remarkably precipitous fall in crime. The previous summer *His Honour* had already indicated displeasure by firing the *comish's* press department for doing too good a job. So even then Bratton knew the relationship was inflammable. But it wasn't until last March, after only 27 months in his post, that Bratton announced his decision to quit. The media din of dropping jaws was the immediate response, then came analysis of the signals. Officially the reason for the departure was that the police commissioner had always intended to leave the NYPD for the private sector as soon as the major challenges of his role had been accomplished. If he was now going much more swiftly than expected, that wasn't because his goal had proved untenable but because that old blandishment — an offer too good to refuse — had reached him, like a welcoming arm around the shoulder.

Besides, he had always said he was "a turn-around-and-then-move-on" guy, and in New York the turn-around in mood, in safety, in sheer joie de vivre, and just the general spruceness of the place was conspicuously evident to all. "Homicide down by 50%; subway crime down by about 70%; robberies down around 77%; and overall crime in all neighbourhoods, rich or poor, down in excess of 30%. In a short period of time those are dramatic changes from what was," says Bratton, his diction clipped, his voice a Bostonian monotone.

At 48, born of working-class parents in the Dorchester suburb of Boston, he is unashamedly rapacious in his lust for the high life. But much more than that, Bratton has emerged as the Elliott Ness of our times, and is now regarded as the most spectacular police commissioner in the States. In fact, he has pulled New York crime down to its lowest level in all categories in 25 years.

"This is a guy who is ending urban crime as we know it," says

a beat cop on 42nd Street, just at that point between 5th and 6th Avenues where pimps and card-sharps once reigned but have now been replaced by a landscape of order.

Such crime-buster credentials as Bratton's attract all sorts of wooing, and among the suitors Disney are said to have called, suggesting that he should head their security for an annual salary of \$450,000. As police commissioner his salary was \$133,000, and if the Disney proposition is true (he shrewdly doesn't confirm or refute the rumour), he has turned it down for perhaps the greater challenge of heading the New York division of an as yet nationally obscure Boston company.

At First Security Services Corporation his salary is more than \$200,000 but Bratton has also entered the fat-free league of public speakers, pulling in \$20,000 for every 45-minute lecture. From throughout the country and abroad, the invitations crowd his diary. Some request him to establish law and order programmes in emerging democracies and others wish to exploit his forte in applying Wall Street management theories to policing.

At the NYPD he re-engineered "an under-performing organisation" by pushing technology and forcing his 76 precincts to compete in crime-prevention. If mobsters could run enterprises like Murder Incorporated, he says, the Police Department should turn itself into Cops and Co with balance sheets measured in offences. Bratton mentally privatised his philosophy long ago: he talks of New Yorkers as his "customers", and reduced crime figure as his "profit".

Still, in New York parlance, his speedy goodbye from the NYPD is explained as: "the mayor greased the exit", and the pliancy of the situation hasn't escaped anyone. After all, Bratton was Giuliani's much publicised appointee, when the uncouth Republican and former US Attorney snatched City Hall from the Democrats in the last mayoral election in 1993.

Giuliani had run on the law-and-order ticket, pledging dedication to quality-of-life issues at that moment when New York seemed more disastrously out of control than ever, collapsing so fast into Hades that fear had become the only bond its beleaguered residents really shared.

Today in conversation Bratton is carefully and eloquently evasive about the fact or fiction of the feud with Giuliani. "The clash of egos, that is how the press interprets it," he says. "But I have chosen not to comment." There are those who insist this answer is typical because no mat-



Cop who followed leads to the main prize: William Bratton pulled New York crime down to its lowest level in all categories in 25 years.

ter the height of his ambition, Bratton is a team player. However, other insiders claim that each man's megalomania escalated into free fire so that the only way "up" for Bratton was "out".

Nevertheless, his story thus far contains enough *chutzpah* admiration and envy to make the Tough Cop movie of the decade. No puritan, but disciplined in every aspect of his life, Bratton began his career on the Boston beat but in breaking out of the "blue cocoon" he has acquired a dislike for carrying a gun because it snags the silk lining of his impeccable suits.

"I'm a kid out of a cold-water flat in a triple-decker house in Dorchester. Ten years ago I set out to be police commissioner of New York — and I did it."

It was in 1993, at Giuliani's instigation, that Bratton strode back into New York after just six months as police commissioner in Boston, a post he had gained after three years in New York as head of the transit police, whose department he so thoroughly reformed subway crime was spectacularly reduced. "We started by clamping down on fare evasion. The thrust of my argument is that you cannot cut crime if you don't also pay very significant attention to the signs of crime. I'm a strong adherent to the view that little things mean a lot."

But the situation had spiralled so badly downward in New York that the public perceived the police as either impotent or too corrupt to make a difference. "Basically we retrained the cops to understand the importance of small offences which they'd previously ignored. We began arresting tens of thousands of fare-dodgers, and we found that many were wanted anyway for other offences. One out of every 20 initially had some sort of

small offence, we have had an impact on real crime. As a result police morale has risen — they truly enjoyed making those arrests — and public confidence in the force has returned because people can see the cops actually doing something instead of ignoring a contagious element of menace."

Some 3.5 million people travel by underground in New York each day. Now, in that time, there are fewer than 20 reported crimes.

We will fight for every house in the city. And we will win

Free Society, it has been liberal orthodoxy in America that most inner-city disorder is the ineluctable result of impoverishment and racism. The enlightened view has maintained that without fundamental social change, no law-and-order gains could be made. As a result, many US police departments have operated on the premise that since they don't control social and economic conditions which give rise to crime, they can't control crime either.

Bratton's men so changed subway behaviour that the number of fare-evaders dropped from 200,000 a day in 1990 to the present figure of 35,000. "From one out of every seven already being wanted on a warrant, today's figure stands at one in every 40 or 50, and from one in every 20 carrying a weapon the ratio has now shrunk to one in a hundred or so. By focusing on that seemingly

Ever since a commission set up by the Lyndon Johnson administration issued a study in 1967, called *The Challenge of Crime in a*

However, in the early eighties the American criminologists, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, challenged this wisdom with a memorable essay called *The Broken Window* syndrome. This confirmed Bratton's own philosophy that the police were making grave mistakes in neglecting the minor indications of disturbance which, by then, had become commonplace. But if the small transgressions — shattered windowpanes, public drunkenness, urinating against lamp-posts, aggressive begging and graffiti — were kept in check then these would transmit a message about what behaviour was tolerable, and return the police into regular contact with those causing the most serious trouble. Kelling, in fact, has become one of Bratton's most consistent advisers.

And since it was argued that the active presence of police on the streets, especially in poor neighbourhoods, merely incited hostility, it was presumed to be better for them to pull back and spend their shifts in squad cars, trying to avoid confrontation and responding only to emergency calls.

For Bratton it is as important to maintain the quality of life on 125th Street in Harlem by clearing it of illegal hawkers as it is to move similar pedlars off the luxurious sidewalks of 5th Avenue.

William Bratton is now regarded as the most spectacular police commissioner in America

Return of the untouchable

Of course, many sociologists and crime experts stubbornly refuse to give him and Giuliani credit for any impressive clean-up, if only because that would be an admission of their own error. It is only fair to point out that Bratton's first New York job was gained at the behest of the previous City Hall incumbent, the Democrat David Dinkins, New York's first black mayor. Despite perceptions to the contrary, crime was actually, if only slowly, decreasing under his tenure, but because of some uncharacteristically ill-judged statements about racial bias, Dinkins never had the police department on his side, although he increased its staffing to record levels.

Giuliani raised the NYPD payroll even further, allowing Bratton to deploy officers much more visibly, enrol them in community and ethnic training programmes, insist on improved education before recruitment, and root out corruption in as public a manner as this cop's cop thought fit. Indeed, Bratton had hardly assumed the office of police commissioner when the news broke that at least a dozen police officers at a precinct in upper Harlem had been providing protection to local drug traders and beating up and robbing others who were slow to see the merit of such an arrangement.

In these situations the usual form is for the commissioner to summon a press conference denouncing the traitorous few while heaping praise on the remaining 99% of the force, and then wait for the story to fizzle out. But Bratton's outrage demanded that he accompany the arrest team to the precinct where he personally stripped the offenders of their NYPD shields.

At the following day's roll-call he then warned the sacked cops' colleagues that they could expect, with reason, a lot of ugly looks from the citizenry. Some officers, he suggested, would have committed much the same crimes while others had most certainly known what was happening but had stayed silent.

Today, sitting at his new desk on the 35th floor of an office overlooking Avenue of the Americas, Bratton still speaks of police days in the present tense, saying: "A lot of what I'm about as a police leader is this: 'Look, I trust you, but I will put into place the controls which, if you try to beat the system, will find you out. The vast majority of you I trust to be police, to be fair and not overly aggressive, or intimidating to racial minorities, to apprehend drug-dealers, and to participate in solving the problems of fear in our communities. So while focusing on one strategy, you work on the others.'"

There is no doubt that Bratton was liked by his men. They respected his integrity and vigour, and after decades of dead-eyed cynicism they were excited by his rhetoric which sometimes carried a Churchillian resonance: "We will fight for every house in the city. We will fight for every block. And we will win."

His own zeal was fired by disgust for those precinct bosses who ran from volatile situations, only later to pound their subordinates with criticism. There were others, too, who incurred his loathing. He particularly

remembers a Boston sergeant from his junior days who in arresting a kid for stealing a saddle from a stable decided to teach the felon a lesson. "Back then, some of the old-timers carried what they called an iron claw, a little like a rowlock, which was put on the offender's wrist and caused great pain."

"We went out into the hallway, and the sergeant was going to take a couple more hits at the kid when I pushed him back and said: 'Hey, that's enough.'" From then on, Bratton had made a serious enemy. "It was this unheard of thing — I wouldn't let him beat up on a prisoner." But that sergeant provided Bratton's motivation to seek promotion. "I wanted to get ahead of the corrupt bastards who were supervising me," he has reflected. "Now there's nobody over me. It's worked out quite well."

What about the cancer of police racism? The gentlemanly Dinkins did not make his accusations lightly. Bratton, whose confidence exudes the stillness of a rock, muses in a calm, expressionless voice that the NYPD's relationship with certain neighbourhoods remains a problem. "That's an area we're still working very determinedly to improve. There's a lot of history there — 20 to 30 years of animosity between these groups and the cops. And many residents still believe the police don't respect them enough." But even the worst neighbourhoods are arguably more secure.

Today the city runs joint ventures with the business communities in each district, to ensure adequate street cleaning and the provision of good street furniture and lighting. "By previously not acting against those quality-of-life offences we, the police, presumed some neighbourhoods wanted to live in mayhem." It was a kind of discrimination by neglect, a presumption that certain people were worthless. "But no-one wants to live that way. Folk desire their kids to be able to play in the street. They like talking to their friends in their doorways without getting harassed or shot. These are the core values which everyone deserves and no neighbourhood is happy if it feels it is being treated differently."

New Yorkers, of course, have always revelled in the belief that their city is beyond redemption. Now robbed of high-visibility crime, they increasingly rely on *bad old days* anecdotes. Even so, they worry that Bratton's successor, Howard Safir, the former fire department chief, is considered by many to be a lightweight. This might suit the authoritarian mayor, but if Safir — pronounced *safer* — cannot build on Bratton's singular achievement then his very surname may come to mock him.

Meanwhile, people still remark that for all their fiery differences Bratton and Giuliani remain remarkably alike: both austere of countenance, intense in temperament; both married to TV reporters. Both strong-willed enough to ignore, belittle or generally ride roughshod over any opposition. Together they have made New York immeasurably more civilised by reviving the once-fanciful notion that the root cause of crime is criminals.

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PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON: MEETING AMERICA'S CHALLENGES IN AN AGE OF POSSIBILITY

May 1996

"Now it is time for us to look also to the challenges of today and tomorrow, beyond the burdens of yesterday. The challenges are significant. But America was built on challenges, not promises....I am confident: When Americans work together in their homes, their schools, their churches, their synagogues, their civic groups, their workplace, they can meet any challenge."

— President Clinton, State of the Union Address
January 23, 1996

First Challenge: To Cherish Our Children and Strengthen America's Families

Cherishing Our Children

- Announced a breakthrough agreement with the media and entertainment industry to develop a **television ratings system** to enable parents to protect their children from violence and adult content.
- Gave parents greater control over what their children watch on television by requiring the installation of anti-violence screening chips ("**V-chips**") in all new televisions.
- Proposed targeted measures to cut off **children's access to tobacco products** and to ban **advertising directed at children**.
- Established a Childhood Immunization Initiative to ensure **vaccinations and healthy futures for all children**. The President's initiative contributed to the immunization of 75% of two-year-old children in 1995, an historic high.

Strengthening Our Families

- Enabled **workers to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave** to care for a family member without fear of losing their jobs. (Family and Medical Leave Act)
- Provided **tax relief for 15 million working families** by increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit to allow more families to qualify for tax rebates.
- Helped families move from **welfare to work** by authorizing 37 states to bypass existing welfare rules and set time limits on benefits, require recipients to work or stay in school, provide child care and give employers incentives to hire welfare recipients. These waivers are making work and responsibility a way of life for 75% of all welfare recipients

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
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THE HARRY WALKER AGENCY, INC.

28 APRIL 1995

THE SUN



FORMER
NEW YORK CITY
POLICE COMMISSIONER

WILLIAM J. BRATTON

MEAN STREETS, ROUGH JUSTICE

This cop performed a miracle:
he turned back the tide of crime
and made New York safe again.

if Bill Bratton can bring
New York City under control,
imagine what he might do to *inspire*
your corporate leadership.

HWA

EXCLUSIVE

INTERNATIONAL

MANAGEMENT

Bill Bratton's

street-smart

re-engineering

techniques drove

serious crime down

33% and murder

down 50%.

LECTURE TOPICS

Street-Smart
Re-engineering

Motivating Your
Troops

Winning The War
On Crime

JUSTICE

A Crimebuster's Fall

In New York, intrigue sinks a successful swashbuckler

BY GREGORY BEALS
AND EVAN THOMAS

RUDY GIULIANI, THE MAYOR of New York, was looking forward to the Jan. 15 issue of Time magazine. A politician with national ambitions, Giuliani had plumped hard for the cover story, posing for photos and granting an in-depth interview. He had something important to say—how New York, a city associated with mayhem, had cut serious crime by a quarter and murder by 40 percent in two years. The war on crime, Giuliani proclaimed, can be won.

The mayor's office won't say exactly how Giuliani privately reacted when he was handed the magazine and saw that the face on the cover was not his own but that of a rival he had appointed: Police Commissioner William Bratton. But it wasn't long before the nasty leaks began. New Yorkers learned about Bratton's freebie trips to the Caribbean and his \$350,000 book advance. The outcome was inevitable to anyone who had ever read a Greek tragedy or a New York tabloid. Last week Bratton, who had become an international poster boy for crime-fighting, quit his post, ending one of the most flamboyant New York cop-and-pol stories since Theodore Roosevelt was New York police commissioner in the 1890s.

Bratton, who used Roosevelt's huge mahogany desk in his office at One Police Plaza, rose and fell in part by being presumptuous. For decades, it had been widely assumed that police could do little to reduce crime. Experts held that crime rates were determined by larger social forces like poverty and racism. Nonsense, insisted Bratton, a former Boston police chief who worked his way up from the street. He decided to make New York's police commanders accountable, an astonishing innovation in a sometimes corrupt bureaucracy. On taking over in January 1994, Bratton summarily dismissed supervisors who believed they could cut crime only by 2 or 3 percent. The rest were subjected to grillings



Off the beat: Bratton led a powerful campaign to slice crime

Getting in Crime's Face

Bratton gave cops more latitude on the street, swept up more suspects—and crime fell. Will the reforms stick?

	1993	1995	PERCENT DECREASE
Auto thefts	112,342	71,899	-36%
Murders	1,951	1,182	-39%
Robberies	86,001	59,341	-31%

SOURCES: NYPD AND NEWSWEEK ESTIMATES

in Bratton's "war room" at headquarters. Gone were cops who worked bankers' hours and kept track of crime by putting little pins in maps. Using daily computer surveys, Bratton's men were ordered to pour their troops into high-crime areas.

Bratton subscribed to "community policing," which requires officers to get out of their cruisers and walk the beat. Communi-

ty policing—sometimes publicized, sometimes not—of policemen jump-roping or shooting hoops with kids—can appear touchy. The Bratton style was more in-your-face. Bratton is a believer in the so-called "broken-window theory," which holds that small crimes like vandalism create a climate that leads to bigger crimes. Looking for weapons and drugs, New York's

Finest busted squeegee men and turnstile jumpers, stopped and frisked loiterers caught drinking beer or urinating in public.

The results were remarkable. True, crime rates around the country have generally drifted downward, probably because of demographics (a temporary dip in the high-crime population of 18-to-24-year-olds) and a lull in the crack epidemic. But in New York crime plummeted to its lowest levels in 25 years. Not coincidentally, complaints of police brutality in high-crime neighborhoods increased by 50 percent. Civil libertarians began squawking about Bratton's intrusive tactics. But many New Yorkers saw the commissioner as a hero. Certainly he saw himself that way, citing Winston Churchill and likening his crusade to World War II. He began living the high life, appearing courtside at Knicks games and dining so often with the glitterati at Elia's that some of the mayor's aides began calling the Upper East Side restaurant Two Police Plaza.

Giuliani could barely conceal his resentment. Last year the mayor ordered his commissioner to fire half his PR staff and cancel a police parade Bratton had scheduled on his own birthday. After the Time cover, Giuliani's aides hinted that Bratton would face an ethics probe for accepting a free vacation from billionaire Henry Kravis last month.

Giuliani's aides denied that Bratton was forced out. Randy Mastro, Giuliani's chief of staff, insisted that Bratton has intended for months to "cash in" on a million-dollar job in the private sector. Bratton, who will run a division of a private security firm, told NEWSWEEK that the "basic tension" with Giuliani was over press coverage—"the desire to control the message." For his part, the mayor appointed a low-key loyalist, Howard Safir, as the new police commissioner. It's a gamble. If Giuliani had stuck with Bratton, at election time the mayor would have at least shared the credit for cutting crime. Now, if crime ticks back up, Giuliani will take all the blame.

Police hope to save federal COPS funds

MACOMB DAILY
MT. CLEMENS, MI
DAILY & SUNDAY 47,859
THURSDAY
MAR 28 1996

By Chad Schweski
Macomb Daily Staff Writer

On most days, a single sheriff's deputy patrols six townships in northern Macomb County, an area covering 216 square miles.

"We don't prevent crime. We don't have the time," concedes Sheriff William Hackel. "We just respond to crimes."

Hackel, and other local police chiefs facing similar staffing problems, hope Washington will lend a helping hand. But the tight-fisted approach of Congress may make the problem worse, not better.

The \$1.9 billion COPS program, which provides federal funding for more "cops on the beat," could face elimination today just one year after it was initiated.

The Senate has proposed a 50 percent funding reduction for COPS, or Community Oriented Policing Services. The House wants to cut all funds. A Senate vote on a House-Senate compromise that's being hammered out could come as early as today.

For Macomb County's townships, six sheriff's deputies are at stake. Hackel currently has one federally funded deputy patrolling in Macomb Township.

He has a COPS application pending for five additional officers to patrol the townships of: Washington, Bruce, Armada, Richmond, Ray, Lenox and Harrison.

With the exception of Harrison, which pays extra for deputy patrols, the remaining six townships on the list are those which currently share one deputy on most days.

"We're sorely lacking for police patrols in northern Macomb County," said Hackel. "The whole north end of this county is woefully understaffed."

Ron Smith, Chesterfield Township police chief, agrees with that assessment. Smith has 21 officers, including himself, to protect a township of 30,000 people and 26 square miles. The police department only has two or three officers on patrol at any given time.

"We're at a position where we have half of what we should have," said Smith.

Chesterfield has one federally funded officer on the force and Smith has an application pending for a second COPS officer.

In nearby Richmond, Chief Dennis Watkins is in the same shape — one COPS officer on the street, one more proposed — except that his entire department, including himself, consists of just seven officers.

If the House leadership prevails and COPS is eliminated, Watkins will suffer nearly a 20 percent reduction in personnel.

To build support for the COPS program, U.S. Sen. Carl Levin Thursday took the unusual step of arranging a conference call with 24 Michigan police chiefs and mayors.

A Detroit Democrat, Levin urged them to call his Michigan counterpart, Republican Sen. Spencer Abraham, and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole to lobby for full funding of the COPS program.

"How much of a reduction we get depends on you and how much grassroots support there is for the program," said Levin.

Some 81 police departments across Michigan have applications pending for 224 officers at a cost of \$16.5 million.

Abraham's press secretary, Joe McMonigle, said the senator prefers the Republican budgeting approach which would supply some COPS funding and some block grant funding with no strings.

"He supports the COPS program but the difference (in funding) was made up in the block grants, which can be used for other (law enforcement) programs," said McMonigle. "Michigan will get more money — and we'll rank eighth among the states — with the package that was presented than under the COPS program."

On March 13, Abraham voted against an amendment to fully fund the COPS program. That amendment failed on a 52-48 vote.

COPS was launched last year with the intent of eventually funding 100,000 additional officers across the nation. This "community policing" program emerged from a 1992 campaign pledge by President Clinton.

But critics say the COPS program represents Washington politics at its worst.

Republicans who want to cut the program to help balance the federal budget say there's little evidence the extra officers will reduce crime rates.

One former police chief, Joseph McNamara, has argued that more officers would be on the streets if so many police departments weren't poorly managed and wasteful.

Now a researcher and writer for the Hoover Institution, a California-based conservative think tank, McNamara was chief of police in Kansas City, Mo., and San Jose, Calif.

His 18 years in local government, he said, taught him that the budget process for municipalities is a fair way of setting priorities for spending local tax dollars.

"The police and other city departments were judged on how personnel were used and whether citizens had gotten the kind of service they deserved," he said. "At times it was painful, but this kind of local competition serves taxpayers a lot better than getting funny money from Washington."



NYPD NEW

Commissioner William Bratton and his executive staff could take satisfaction in the progress made by the New York Police Department (NYPD) toward goals they had set at the outset of 1994 to reduce major crimes in the City. Their efforts had produced more results than even some of them had expected, more even than portrayed in the popular television drama carrying the Department's name. So much, in fact, that the Commissioner recently had trumpeted the City's rapidly improving crime record to a bond rating agency responsible for rating New York City's debt, pointing out that improvements in quality of life would have an eventual favorable impact on the City's desirability as a place to do business, further strengthening its credit-worthiness.

Although the Department was in the process of delivering results desired by the City's residents, many questioned whether and how the highly-publicized, results-oriented emphasis of Bratton's first twenty-four months as Commissioner could be sustained. (Exhibit 1 contains a report of New York's crime experiences compared with other major U.S. cities.)

As Bratton's team of Deputy Commissioners (civilians) and Chiefs (uniformed personnel) gathered in his office on a morning in late January, 1996, he pondered the appropriate strategy that would enable his organization to continue to produce results with the budget shortfalls that the City was experiencing. The Thursday, January 25 copy of The New York Times on his desk, the very same desk used by Teddy Roosevelt when he was Police Commissioner 100 years earlier, carried a front page article headlined, "Giuliani (Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York) Weighing Cuts to Police to Help Decrease Budget Deficit." It was no surprise, in that it reflected his recent discussions with Mayor Giuliani, whose administration faced a \$2 billion (6%) deficit in fiscal 1995 in spite of significant efforts to reduce the budget.

Bratton opened his weekly Executive Staff meeting by pointing out that achieving a further 10% reduction in major crimes during 1996 was beginning to pale in difficulty and complexity to several other challenges facing the Department. These included reduction in funding from the City, restrictions on ways the Department could deploy its resources and reward performance, and the difficulty of sustaining the momentum that had produced greatly improved results in the past two years. After pointing out that the department was "going into a very stressful year," Bratton

Professor James L. Heskett prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

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challenged his deputies to be as creative in responding to these new challenges as they had in reducing crime.

History

Founded in 1845, the New York Police Department was the largest municipal police organization in the U.S. At various times in its history, it had been a model for big city policing. However, like other large municipal police organizations, its work was measured in terms of effort, such as the speed with which 911 (emergency) calls were answered and the number of patrols dispatched. From time to time, it had experienced periodic claims of corruption and police brutality.

As Bratton described it:

We, as an organization, like many police departments in America during the 70s and 80s, became very reactive in our approach to crime...the traditional or professional policing model that was made up of rapid response: Dial 911 and we'll come very quickly...We focused on random patrol as the chief preventive measure--the idea that all these cars riding around would scare the criminals into submission. Thirdly, there was reactive investigation, something we always had done--after-the-fact investigation. And it was often controlled by a strong, centralized organization; in the case of the NYPD, you had to go up to the top of the organization to make even the most basic decisions.¹

The concept of community policing began to sweep police departments in the U.S. in the late 80s. Under this concept, individual officers, often the youngest members of the force, were encouraged to spend more time in the neighborhoods, maintain more visibility, gain the confidence of the citizens of a neighborhood, and collect information that would lead to efforts to deter crime. Nevertheless, specialized units trained to handle particular types of crimes, especially those that were drug-related, continued to exist. This reflected a fear that patrol officers might be tempted to become involved in crimes, such as drug dealing, themselves. In general, community policing initiatives had created a tension between personnel deployment strategies designed to provide maximum visibility of officers and those designed to deal with high-crime areas.

Safe Streets, Safe City Program

In response to increases in crime of near-epidemic proportions, Mayor David Dinkins and the New York City Council had won approval from the State Legislature in 1991 to hire 6,000 officers and pay for them through increased property taxes and a 12.5% surcharge to the City's income tax. The bill specified the total head count of all police in the city to be achieved by August 1 of each year (38,310 for August 1, 1995), although it might fluctuate around that number other times of the year. It also called for more officers "on the beat" as well as greater visibility for them in neighborhoods to which they were assigned. It allotted patrol personnel to various precincts based on workload measures such as 911 calls, crime data, and the needs of community policing plans. It resulted in an increase of police officers in every precinct.

¹ Marie Simonetti Rosen, "Moving the Biggest Mountain," Law Enforcement News, June 30, 1995, pp. 8-10.

The program, called Safe Streets, Safe City, was due to expire on June 20, 1996. Neither Dinkins' successor nor his Police Commissioner had taken a position on whether the program should be renewed.

Giuliani Assumes Office

The election of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in November, 1993 opened a new era for the Department. Giuliani, a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York who had built his reputation as a tough fighter against corruption and organized crime, campaigned and won largely on a campaign that emphasized reductions in New York City's budget deficits and improved crime control. These were to be achieved largely by exempting the Police Department from cuts in budgets for uniformed personnel, cuts that were implemented for nearly every other function of the City's government. However, Giuliani inherited a Police Department that was badly in need of new technology and methods. Work was done by hand that could otherwise be computerized. Communication systems were badly outdated. Often police officers were more poorly armed than the criminals they confronted.

Worse yet, there was a very low level of trust in the Department, even by senior officers. One graphic example of this was the denial of access codes to automated criminal history files. Because of this policy, designed to limit misuse of information, officers in one precinct could not gain access to information about crimes committed outside the precinct. As a result, it was nearly impossible for an arresting officer to check a suspect's criminal record. Focus group meetings with frontline patrol people yielded responses such as "this place is not on the level" and "our bosses don't want to fight crime." John Linder, a consultant who, as part of an ongoing organization change effort, conducted a survey of what patrol officers believed the Department wanted from them, cited as most important: write summonses, hold down overtime, stay out of trouble, and clear the 911 backlog, in that order. Fighting crime was seventh on the list.

One of Giuliani's first actions was to appoint William Bratton, Police Commissioner of Boston, to a similar post in New York. He assumed office on January 10, 1994.

Giuliani's New Police Commissioner

A product of a working class family in Dorchester, Massachusetts whose father held full-time jobs in a metal-plating shop by day and the post office at night, William Bratton credited his first police job as a patrolman in Mattapan, a tough neighborhood of Boston, with giving him the self-assurance that some of his detractors tended to regard as bravado. The experience led him, according to one account, to develop:

...a particularly powerful distaste for precinct bosses who stayed away from volatile situations and weighed in afterward with criticism of their subordinates. "When I was working District Fourteen, in Boston, we had a major broo-ha in one of the public parks, and every cop in the district was there...There were two sergeants, old-school guys, back in the station, and we were calling for P.S.--patrol supervisors--"and neither one of those bastards would come out. They were two cowards hiding in the station house. We had a lot of them like that in Boston. They didn't want to see anything."²

² James Lardner, "The C.E.O. Cop," The New Yorker, February 6, 1995, pp. 45-57, at p. 53.

Bratton came to the job of Commissioner with a clear understanding of the problems of police administration in New York City. Before assuming the job that quickly led to his being named Commissioner of Boston's Police Department, he had served as the head of the New York City Transit Police Department between 1990 and 1992. During that time, he had helped transform a somewhat demoralized force policing a transit system confronting increased robbery, fare beating, and a homeless population of about 5,000 living in transit facilities into an effective deterrent to these problems.

Bratton was an avid reader of management literature and fan of war movies. He occasionally referred to citizens as "customers," criminals as "competition," police officers as "sales representatives," and reduced crime as "profit." He and his wife, Cheryl Fiandaca, a former criminal-defense lawyer who was teaching at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, lived with five cats and a dog in a two-bedroom apartment on Central Park South and were frequently seen at cultural events as well as some of the City's better restaurants.

At about the time Bratton was appointed to head up the transit police, Jack Maple, a lieutenant in the transit police, came to the attention of the Commissioner through a plan for reducing crime that he had drafted. Maple, given to drinking espresso and wearing bow ties, blazers, and two-tone wing-tip spectator shoes (with a homburg hat in winter), was a sartorial opposite of Bratton (who tended toward Hermes animal ties) and a somewhat distinctive sight even on the streets of New York. (According to Maple, he adopted the dress because, as a short, stocky person, he attracted no attention in his youth as a conventional dresser.) The two hit it off immediately, with Maple, labeled by one journalist as "the Police Department's secret crime-fighting weapon," becoming a co-architect of a plan to turn the Transit Police Department around. As Bratton said more than once to those curious about his attraction to Maple, "Jack grows on you."

The program to transform the transit police was focused on two main thrusts. The first involved an effort to deter petty as well as major crimes committed on the system by attacking "quality of life" misdemeanors. For example, the force was instructed to begin arresting those avoiding fares ("fare beaters"). The search that was done routinely after arrest often yielded weapons which served to deter more serious crime. In Bratton's words, "A search or the threat of one is, in itself, a deterrent to crime because it encourages people to stop carrying guns." In fact, searches of fare beaters alone had turned up more than 400 concealed weapons in the first year.

The second thrust involved equipping the police with 9 mm. weapons with larger magazines, new autos, and new uniforms to improve their image in their own eyes as well as the public's.

Challenges and Responses: First Steps

Challenges facing the Department in early 1994 included a restive public that had swept Giuliani into office in part for his promises of safer streets; a somewhat demoralized police force whose "business was to stay out of trouble, not to police the city," according to John Linder; and a prior administrative focus on effort (number of patrols dispatched) vs. results (crime reduction).

According to one member of Bratton's executive staff, "there was widespread backbiting, fear of failure, and low performance. The structure of the organization was completely top-down. The Department lacked focus, and without focus a police department can end up being a municipal yo-yo." A former Precinct Commander said that the attitude of the senior staff had been, "You people in the precincts just make work for us."

Upon assuming office, Bratton quickly replaced several senior staff members. Having decided that primary responsibility for day-to-day operations would reside with the 76 precinct commanders, a systematic effort was instituted to determine which of them could adapt to a strategy focused on results. Eventually, three-fourths of all precinct commanders Bratton inherited were moved out of their jobs. In his first 24 months on the job, the average age of the Commissioner's senior staff had fallen from the low 60s to the mid 40s. Bratton took great satisfaction in the result, saying "I would pit my command staff against any Fortune 500 company."

Bratton's reputation among police officers as a "cop's commissioner" was reinforced during his first week on the job as he began pushing for larger 15-shot ammunition clips that he had secured for his transit police several years earlier. These had become the envy of, and a source of resentment among, members of the main force required to use less powerful weapons. Improved bullet-proof vests were ordered along with darker uniforms that conveyed a more authoritative image.

Word got around rapidly among police that this was a commissioner who "backed you up" but who would not hesitate to take disciplinary action if necessary. He was quick to obtain reliable information and, where appropriate, defend officers accused of excessive force. But in the situation involving the disclosure of widespread police corruption in the 30th Precinct just three months into his administration, Bratton accompanied the arresting force, personally removing the badges of offending officers. Later, he called all Precinct Commanders to headquarters, threw the badges on the table, and announced to the assembled group that he was retiring the badges so that no other police officer would ever have to wear them. A short time later, however, he emphasized to a reporter that he had "no intention of becoming an anticorruption zealot."

The public saw in Bratton an articulate spokesman capable of relating to their concerns. Shortly after taking office, he began making frequent references, both inside and outside the Department, to "taking the City back from criminals one block, one street, and one neighborhood at a time." In contrast to Bratton's popular image with the public, reporters used adjectives like "mouthy" and "cocksure" to describe him. One commented that he had a "consuming interest in media relations." Bratton was so effective in these encounters that some reporters sensed a growing rivalry between him and the Mayor, something that both denied.

"Quality of Life" Legislation

Mayor Giuliani, prompted by polls showing that New Yorkers were concerned about a declining "quality of life," characterized by more graffiti and vagrancy, promised to enforce existing laws against those committing what were termed "quality of life" misdemeanors, including urinating in public, spraying graffiti, and panhandling. Much as had been done at the Transit Police Department, police were marshalled to reduce "quality of life" misdemeanors thought to be most important by the citizenry. In the first quarter of 1994, for example, arrests of peddlers, public drinkers, and squeegee cleaners increased 38%, summonses increased 40%, seizures of weapons increased 37%, and sales tax violation citations increased 49% over the previous year. The effort achieved its greatest notoriety when it was used to go after what came to be known as "squeegee pests," people who approached stopped autos, cleaned their windshields, and demanded money from their occupants. Squeegee pests were warned then arrested. By increasing efforts begun in mid-1993, squeegee pests practically vanished from the streets by spring of 1994.

In addition, existing laws were used, for example, to arrest graffiti "artists" who spray-painted municipal and other property as well as slum landlords who had allowed their properties

to fall into a state of disarray. The theory behind these efforts had two different rationales. The first was the "broken windows" theory that if a broken window is not fixed in a building, soon all windows will be broken. The second rationale held that people engaging in one kind of misdemeanor might be inclined to commit others as well, especially that of carrying a concealed or unlicensed gun. Heightened enforcement of these laws resulted in an increased number of searches and increased questioning of a process that turned up several hundred weapons in the first six months of the initiative. Commissioner Bratton referred to these practices as the "linchpin" in his crime-fighting strategies. The idea was not new; when it had been proposed by a consultant to Bratton's predecessor, he had responded, "Give me 50 guys, suspend the Constitution, and we can do that."

Development of the Strategies

One of the first actions of the new administration was to draft the first of what were to become seven Police Strategies. They were titled: (1) Getting Guns off the Streets of New York, (2) Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the Streets, (3) Driving Drug Dealers out of New York, (4) Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence, (5) Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York, and (6) Reducing Auto-Related Crime in New York. In response to continuing concerns about police corruption, a seventh strategy was added in mid-1995 titled, "Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department."

Each strategy statement contained a statement of the problem, current practice, specific conditions warranting the strategy, the strategy itself, and changes in laws as well as departmental policies and procedures that would be necessary to facilitate the strategy.

Excerpts from Strategy No. 5 are shown in **Exhibit 2**. When first developed, the strategies were labeled "bullshit" by many frontline police officers. Attitudes had begun to change with their implementation.

Merger and Organization

Police work in New York City traditionally had been carried out in three separate organizations. One constituted the force entrusted with general public safety. Another dealt with police work associated with housing issues. The third concerned itself with crime on the city's transit system. (The "head count" for each of these departments by types of jobs is shown in **Exhibit 3**.) One of the new Commissioner's first objectives was to implement the merger of these three departments, a high priority of the new mayor. The three forces were consolidated in April 1995.

(Bill Andrews' rewrite begins here)

By January 1996 the police force was organized into 76 precincts, led by Precinct Commanders and experienced senior police officers. In addition, the Department maintained a separate detective force comprising ____ detectives. Other major functions controlled from headquarters were _____. **Exhibit 4** shows an organization chart for the Department.

Police officers and others, comprising _____ employees, were members of the (union).

In addition, another ____ were subject to civil service regulations.

(Bill Andrews' rewrite ends here)

Management by the Numbers

Among the more important initiatives of the new administration were a new emphasis on results vs. effort, reinforced by efforts to computerize statistics and graphics formerly organized by hand, as well as the institution of twice-weekly "CompStat" (computer or comparison statistics) crime-strategy meetings based on the more-current information. In addition to introducing new performance measures based on this information, other initiatives involved giving more authority to the 76 precinct commanders, redefining the role of the officers policing neighborhoods, reengineering processes, and introducing new technology. All of this effort, and the results it would produce, was a topic of some debate among those knowledgeable about police work and crime control.

New Performance Measures

New performance measures were instituted for Precinct Commanders. Instead of being measured on the amount of effort put forth by their departments, they would now be held accountable for the quality of their plans for dealing with crime problems. Increased emphasis was placed on efforts thought to lead to crime reduction. These included the proportion of people arrested and searched in connection with misdemeanors and the frequency with which those arrested had their past police records checked at the time they were identified and searched. According to Deputy Commissioner Maple: "You don't get into trouble for increased crime, but for not having a strategy to deal with it."

Performance was monitored daily by the NYPD's leadership. As Bratton put it, "Can you imagine running a bank if you couldn't look at your bottom line every day?" In addition, other indicators, such as in- and out-migrations of businesses, were tracked.

Results vs. Effort: Reducing Crime

Whether or not crime could be reduced was a matter of some debate among criminologists and sociologists. Since a study commissioned by the Johnson Administration, "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society," was published in 1967, it had become conventional wisdom to assume that most inner-city crime was the inevitable product of poverty and racism. Among the theories used to explain a widespread decline in major crime in large cities between 1991 and 1995 were an improved economy, a smaller number of young males (representing an especially high crime risk in the population), increased numbers of drug dealers either dead or in jail, a switch from crack cocaine (a violence-inducing drug) to heroin (a depressant) as the drug of choice in cities, the settlement of many gang "turf wars," and reduced racism.³ Rarely was credit given to police ability to control the rate of crime. All of this was perceived by members of the Department as devaluing its achievements of recent months. One newspaper columnist suggested that the reason for the striking

³ This trend was not true for New York City.

results achieved by the Department was that New Yorkers were not reporting crime as frequently as in the past. One of Bratton's predecessors even suggested that the trends were the result of a conscious decision on the part of drug dealers that crime (other than drug dealing) was bad for business.

In response, Bratton pointed to the dramatic results achieved in New York in contrast to other major cities. He argued that most of the theories that discounted the NYPD's recent accomplishments essentially assumed that all police departments were equally effective, a thesis that would be hard to defend. Instead of measuring and rewarding effort, their approach involved identifying the causes of major crime and deploying resources to reduce the likelihood that crime would occur, effectively utilizing information and technology

For example, statistics suggested that there were three major circumstances associated with many murders: drugs, guns, and people with police records. Locations where drugs were dealt were well-known. People carrying licensed guns were known to the police; unlicensed guns were often found during police searches. With improved technology, such as hand phones, quick checks could be run on the police records of individuals stopped for various offenses. By reallocating resources to places where drugs, guns, and people with prior records were found, dramatic reductions in murder could be achieved, according to this philosophy. This was accomplished by giving more authority to New York's 76 precinct commanders and holding them accountable for their performance numbers.

Precinct-Level Authority and Accountability

Prior to Bratton's administration, an emphasis on neighborhood policing had resulted in more police being placed "on the beat" in neighborhoods and more authority being given to them to deal with anti-crime initiatives at the grass-roots level, calling in specialized experts from headquarters when necessary. Problems associated with this approach were that some neighborhoods were so crime-ridden that the young officers placed in them couldn't cope with the challenge, novice police (most likely to be assigned foot patrol in the neighborhood police initiative) were less likely to use good judgement in threatening situations and often were lacking the human relations skills needed by neighborhood police, precinct commanders had too little real control over the neighborhood police working for them, and resources were more difficult to allocate intelligently than under a plan that would place authority and accountability at a higher level. To correct the situation, Bratton's team decided to focus authority and accountability at the level of the 76 precinct commanders.

The rationale for this action was that individuals at this level could bring sufficient deterrents to bear on difficult crime areas, resources could be reallocated from one "hot spot" to another within the precinct, results could be measured with greater consistency and reliability, and the precinct was a large enough unit to support its own specialized forces. Those arguing against greater authority and accountability for precinct commanders claimed that by decentralizing effort at the precinct level there was a risk of corruption if headquarters oversight could no longer be achieved through specialized services provided to the precincts.

As a result of this action, officers on neighborhood patrols were freed to concentrate their efforts on relating to neighborhood needs while obtaining leads on possible criminal activity.

The CompStat Meetings

If the precinct commander became the focal point for carrying out crime-reduction strategies, the CompStat meetings and associated activities became the engine for the effort. They were a product of Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple's favorite four-step philosophy for action, a

philosophy that had become a mantra in the Department: (1) accurate, timely information, (2) rapid, focused deployment, (3) effective tactics, and (4) relentless follow-up and assessment. Prior to the initiation of the meetings, according to one senior staff member, "crime statistics were a way of keeping score at the end of the year, not a means for managing for results."

What became known as the "Louie and Jack Show," twice-weekly CompStat (computer statistics) meetings, required precinct commanders to be ready to review their up-to-date computer-generated crime statistics, relate what they were doing to achieve them, and face questions about what they were going to be doing to improve them. They were led by Chief of Department Louis Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple and were held in the Department's "War Room," containing a number of large computer-fed screens and other devices for displaying statistics, at Headquarters in Lower Manhattan. A reporter sitting in on one meeting described it as follows:

Maple called the precinct commanders to the front of the room in turn, questioning, prodding, cajoling, and occasionally teasing information out of them. They discussed ongoing investigations, special operations, and any unusual criminal activity. When the men and women from the 81st Precinct got their call, they were asked to explain a recent spate of shootings.

"What's going on?" Maple wanted to know. "Why are these shootings happening? Is it a turf war? No? Well, somebody's not happy. Maybe they're cranky 'cause it's hot, but something's happening." When the shooting locations were put up on the huge map projected on the wall, along with those of drug complaints in the precinct, there was a clear overlap. Maple asked what was being done about the drug spots, and one of the narcotics officers said it was a tough area because the business was done inside and there were lots of lookouts. "That's fine," Maple said. "That's why we're detectives. Tell me what tactics we can employ to penetrate these locations." The detective said they would try some buy-and-bust operations and maybe get a couple of the guys behind the Plexiglas to rat when an arrest was hanging over their heads. Maple wasn't satisfied.

"I want you back here next week with a plan," he said to the precinct captain (normally each precinct comes in once every five weeks).⁴

In order to respond to the kinds of questions posed as Compstat meetings, precinct commanders began bringing with them to the meetings representatives from other bureaus (such as detectives) who were assigned to their precincts. The meetings thus encouraged inter-bureau coordination.

CompStat meetings had become well-known throughout the police world. Given the growing success of the Department, they were visited by police administrators and journalists from other parts of the U.S. and other countries. According to one precinct commander, "If your numbers don't look good, these meetings are not fun." Data displayed at a typical CompStat meeting is presented in Exhibit 5.

In addition to organizing CompStat meetings, Chief Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Maple toured the precinct commands, covering as many as 15 in a weekend. During these visits they checked to see, among other things, whether crime strategy maps were up-to-date, proper instructions were being given to patrol officers at roll-call, and communications from headquarters were displayed prominently.

⁴ Craig Horowitz, "The Suddenly Safer City," New York, August 14, 1995, pp. 21-25 ff., at p. 25.

Process and Organization Reengineering

Commissioner Bratton often referred to the work of his team as "reengineering an underperforming organization." He had put 300 members of the Department to work on the specific task of reviewing procedures and practices with representatives from the business world and academia. Twelve teams were organized around the themes of building community partnerships, geographical vs. functional organizational structure, precinct organization, supervisory training, in-service training, productivity, paperwork, integrity, rewards and career paths, discipline, equipment and uniforms, and technology. Management thought leaders such as Jack Welch and Michael Hammer were brought in to address the teams. The process produced more than 600 recommendations, 80% of which were implemented.

Resulting changes ranged from the obvious to the complex. For example, one early finding from the paperwork team was that there were at least 4,000 forms in active use within the Department. John Linder, a consultant to the culture and organization change process commented that the forms played a very distinctive role in the personnel strategies of previous administrations:

These forms were used to hang people down the food chain. As an officer, you had two choices. Either you filled out the form wrong and got flogged for it. Or you filled it out properly and accurately and were asked, "Why didn't you do something about this?" Either way, you couldn't win.

Bratton himself cited several obvious problems with what he termed "bankers' hours":

The auto-theft squad was working nine to five, and the drug units were mostly working ten to six, with a few going two to ten...The warrant unit was getting started at 7:30 a.m., and by the time they read the papers and had their coffee, it was ten before they'd start knocking on doors. The department was not really minding the store.⁵

Another study found that the average amount of police officer overtime associated with an arrest was 12 hours. It resulted from the fact that much of an officer's involvement in the preparation and presentation of a complaint by a District Attorney had to be done in person, although it was solely within the discretion of a D.A. to alter the process. Because overtime was an important source of income for many officers, they did not complain about the waste of their time in the arrest and complaint process.

In the process of reengineering the organization, a reporting level was eliminated. This meant that PC's who reported to one of 17 Division Commanders now reported directly to _____ Commanders.

Because the incidence of drugs and guns often occurred in overlapping geographic patterns, specialized drug units were replaced with Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams who investigated situations involving both. In addition, new crime control strategies purposely required the formation of teams designed to break down the barriers that had separated the Patrol, Detective, and Organized Crime Control Bureaus.

⁵ Craig Horowitz, op. cit., p. 25.

Introduction of New Technology

Efforts to collect, organize, and display crime information by computer, part of a larger effort to modernize the Department's information systems, had required an investment of \$500,000. They had become a cornerstone of the Department's strategy, and were thought to have a high return.

New uses of video conferencing technology allowed officers to interact with district attorneys in precincts in order to reduce the average time, much of it overtime, associated with the arrest-to-arraignment process from 14 to a goal of 2 hours. This was critically important in a police force with wages ranging from \$___ to \$___ per hour, and making _____ arrests per month. (At least one district attorney, when advised of the costs incurred by current procedures, had even approved the use of the telephone for an officer's involvement in the arrest process.) (Note: Mike Farrell will provide data for this paragraph.)

Other technology-based initiatives, supported by a newly-passed federal crime bill, included the installation of mobile data terminals in patrol cars to check criminal records at the time of apprehension and an enhanced 911 emergency response system.

Continuing Challenges

New York City, according to FBI statistics, accounted for 61% of the total reduction in serious crimes for the entire U.S. during the first six months of 1995. Although Commissioner Bratton and his team could take satisfaction from this, it was clear that the job ahead would be made even more challenging by budgetary limitations, possible changes in the process for arbitrating labor wage disputes, restrictions on the deployment of resources, and the inability to reward good performance, all combined with the need to achieve higher productivity. Corruption within the Department was an issue that had to be given continuing attention. There was a persistent belief by some that the price of crime reduction, in terms of reduced civil rights, was high. And finally, it had become apparent that it would take much longer than two years to effect the attitude changes in the police force that were sought. As consultant Linder commented, "It's clear that the message hasn't filtered down into the ranks." But it would be difficult to sustain the high-intensity effort that had characterized Bratton's first two years in office.

All of this had to be achieved in an organization that had to be operated within constraints imposed by its public-sector nature. Exhibit 6 represents one view of basic differences between management in public-sector and private-sector organizations.

Budgetary Limitations

Non-discretionary accounts dominated the Department's annual budget of about \$2.3 billion, as shown in Exhibit 7. They covered salaries, overtime, shift differentials, uniform allowances, annuity payments and holiday pay for employees, and resulted largely from head counts that were mandated by Safe Streets, Safe City and other legislation as well as wage policies that were determined in large part by linkages between 81 labor contracts that the City had with various labor unions, including the police officers' union.

In discussions with the Mayor, it was clear that City Hall expected savings from payroll and other sources of at least \$20 to \$30 million in 1996. This was on top of budgetary constraints

that had been placed on the Department's OTPS (other than personal services) accounts in 1994 and 1995. In an effort to maintain the size of the police force in service, as promised by the Mayor in his election campaign, discretionary budgets had been cut by 30% (down to \$95 million) for fiscal 1996. This had to cover expenditures for such items as supplies, equipment, telephones, fuel, and rent. Some of the results were almost laughable. Jack Maple, for example, pointed out that his department couldn't afford the supplies needed to display crime information in his office.

Perhaps the most significant cuts in discretionary budgets had come from overtime reduction. This account had been reduced from \$113 million in 1993 to \$79 million in 1995. While this had helped the Department meet its budget goals, it had hurt morale among frontline officers in the Department who could no longer count on overtime income to help with such things as mortgage payments.

It was quite possible that the Mayor was ready to consider reductions in the size of the police force, although it would be politically difficult for him to allow any of those reductions in the number of police on patrol. His attitude toward head count had begun to change with the possible expiration of the Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, and a significant change in the arbitration process for the City's negotiations with its police and firefighters unions which could increase pay levels significantly. When queried about whether he was ready to abandon the staffing level of 38,310 mandated by legislation, the Mayor had pointed out that, because of attrition, the Department typically operated for most of the year at levels up to 1,800 persons less than those mandated.

Labor Contract Dispute Arbitration

Led by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of New York City, the State Legislature had passed and sent to the Governor for signature legislation shifting responsibility for contract dispute arbitration from the City's Office of Collective Bargaining to the State Public Employment Relations Board. It was thought that this action would result in larger salary increases from future arbitration. In its deliberations, the City's agency was required to take into consideration such things as the City's ability to pay awards. In contrast, the State agency was required to take into consideration pay levels of surrounding communities, New York's suburbs, which were as much as 35% higher than those in the City.

The bill, although vetoed previously by the Governor, had passed with only 8 legislators out of 200 opposing it. Previously, union officials had said they would make passage of the bill a litmus test for lawmakers when they allocated their much-coveted political campaign contributions.

The Mayor publicly had expressed his opposition to the bill and had asked the Governor not to sign it, weathering the criticism of the unions that had supported his political campaign. Privately, he had discussed with Commissioner Bratton whether or not deeper budget cuts would be required if the legislation were to be enacted. On January 25, alongside the report of the progress of the legislation, The New York Times reported that:

Preliminarily, the Mayor has ordered each of his agencies to cut their budgets for the next fiscal year by 7.5 percent, although he has not said that each would have to cut that much. For the Police Department, a cut that size would total \$170 million, from a \$2.3 billion budget. It remained unclear yesterday what other cuts, if any, (other than 1,000 personnel from the Department yielding

estimated savings of \$20 to \$30 million) would be considered for the Police Department.⁶

Possible Sources of Staffing Reductions

If staffing reductions were required, the Commissioner could achieve them through attrition, which occurred at the rate of about 1,600 police officers and 500 civilians annually, and a postponement of the starting date for the Police Academy class that graduated about 1,800 new recruits each year. The latter would, however, slow down Bratton's efforts to improve the overall quality of Department personnel by imposing tougher entry standards and an improved training program.

This might also require combining positions and moving more officers from "desk jobs" to patrols. In 1995 alone, 500 officers were freed for patrol work who had previously staffed public affairs, personnel, and payroll units prior to the merger of New York City's three police forces.

Restrictions on Resource Deployment

The Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, which established staffing targets for each precinct of the City, was a reflection of a general feeling on the part of residents that each precinct should have its "fair share" of police protection. These targets, which reflected conditions in the City in 1989, influenced the assignment of Police Academy graduates. They had not changed for six years. As a result, precinct staffing levels were difficult to adjust to reflect changing police needs. (See **Exhibit 8** for demographic and crime statistics as well as staffing levels for four precincts and **Exhibit 9** for a precinct map of the City.) Most people still had not accepted the argument that crime reduction in heavily impacted crime areas would lead to less crime in low-crime neighborhoods, just as many had trouble believing that searches of those committing minor misdemeanors would eventually lead to reductions in serious crimes.

According to Jack Maple, while specialized units, such as Street Crime (plain clothes), Special Narcotics, and Vice, could be moved from one precinct to another for 30 days at a time, fully 18,000 frontline patrol personnel "couldn't be moved at a whim." Nevertheless, he cited the 9th Precinct experience as evidence that moving specialized units worked. He pointed out that the Precinct had started out the first four months of 1995 with major crimes 50% over the previous year. By the end of the year, with the redeployment of specialized units to the Precinct, such crimes were down 4%. Drawing on his extensive reading of military history, Maple cited British use of radar in WWII in defending against enemy aircraft as a model for what the Department should strive for. It provided the RAF with a way of deploying its personnel and equipment quickly.

While attempting to maintain adequate headcount in personnel assigned to precincts, Commissioner Bratton was contemplating assigning 750 of the 1,800 March, 1996 graduates of the Police Academy class to replace more-experienced officers reassigned to the Mayor's announced effort to wage an all-out war against drugs in Brooklyn North. The resulting specialized units would be assigned to ten precincts in which drug-dealing was especially high. This, of course, would make it more difficult to replace frontline personnel in the remaining precincts.

⁶ Steven Lee Meyers, "Giuliani Weighing Cuts to Police To Help Decrease Budget Deficit," The New York Times, January 25, 1996, pp. A1 and B3.

The Brooklyn North initiative would involve the temporary reassignment of 1,200 officers from elsewhere in the Department to the area outlined in **Exhibit 8**. Reassignments would be made from all bureaus. The initiative had created an air of anticipation and excitement in the Department. It was also thought to be a test of conventional thinking regarding restrictions on the deployment of resources.

Rewarding Performance

Jack Maple pointed out that police officers hadn't had a raise in spite of their increasing levels of effectiveness. The situation had been made more tense by the fact that the City Council had voted senior City officials, including a small number of Police Department officials, pay raises up to 20% as of July, 1995. These officials hadn't received pay raises for eight years.

Union labor contracts and civil service statutes made it very difficult to reward outstanding performance. The primary form of monetary incentives was provided by overtime, which had been reduced significantly through the application of stricter management accountability as well as the increased use of technology.

Other forms of recognition commonly employed within the Department were the temporary assignment of patrol officers to work with detective squads for 30 days and other preferred assignments. More often, a simple letter of recognition was written.

Increased Productivity

A declining budget would require increased productivity if the Department was to meet its goal for 1996. According to data for major U.S. cities, presented in **Exhibit 10**, New York ranked in the middle in terms of police personnel per capita.

Along with the increased use of information and technology, more controversial means could be attempted to improve productivity. For example, approximately ____ officers could be freed up for other tasks by replacing two-person patrols with one officer. But the outcry from officers, who had fought hard for two-person patrols on the grounds of increased safety, would be great.

Addressing Rising Complaints

With increased enforcement activities and personnel, there had been a 32% increase in 1994 in the number of complaints about police brutality, unfair treatment of citizens by police, and police corruption over the past two years. The Department's analysis of its information discloses that:

...In 1994 ... 4 million calls for service were answered in person by officers, 227,453 arrests were made, 5.4 million summonses were written--with a total of 9,922 complaints made by the public for police misconduct. Of the 2,152 cases reviewed in 1994 by the Civilian Complaint Review Board, an independent arm of city government, 5.1% (or 111 cases) were determined by CCRB to be worthy of prosecution in the Department's disciplinary process.

In February 1995, the Mayor created an independent citizens monitor, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption. At the time, plans already were underway in the Department to take steps to correct a situation disclosed in an early-1994 survey of Department personnel that found that "a long-standing, high-level concern about avoiding scandal and criticism had created within

the NYPD a culture of organizational fear, self-protection, secrecy, and exclusion--which existed alongside continuing, everyday heroic action by individual members of the service."

Rooting Out Corruption

On June 14, 1995 Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting Out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department, was published. One of the biggest challenges of this initiative was describe in the Strategy as follows:



...contemporary corruption in the NYPD occurs in pockets which, despite universal disapproval among honest officers, are protected by the "blue wall of silence." The tradition of not "ratting" on colleagues is common in most professions, but it is even more pronounced in police and military organizations where members sometimes rely on each other for physical survival. Mutual protection under violent circumstances becomes mutual protection under all...The "us versus them" attitude often called the "blue cocoon" can seem to condone disrespect of the public and even abuse of force in these same police and military organizations.

To counteract these tendencies, efforts were initiated to energize the Department's own investigative group, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). This was to be done by changing the entire dynamic by which the IAB interacted with Department personnel. In the past, the relationship had been one of distrust, involving obsessive secrecy on the part of the IAB and an unwillingness to cooperate on the part of police officers. To change it, efforts were underway by the IAB to: (1) involve every command level in reducing corruption and brutality, (2) make available within the department monthly reports for each command on complaints broken out down to the level of the precinct and even tour of duty, (3) computerize master profiles of individual officers that cross-referenced data on corruption, brutality, and discourtesy complaints with that regarding record of sick leave, emergency excusal, arrest activity, commendations, and disciplinary actions, (4) provide training to those in command positions about the detection of patterns leading to corruption. As part of a more proactive approach to deterrence, the IAB was encouraged to observe officers as they interacted with IAB officers posing as civilians who might provide opportunities to commit crimes. In addition, the IAB would continue to initiate parallel investigations of complaints brought before the Civilian Complaint Review Board and implement Commissioner Bratton's order to stop giving one day's notice for random drug tests, which had enabled those tested to prepare.

To support the new policy of inclusion concerning issues of corruption, Strategy No. 7 set forth a new policy advocating consideration of a commander's entire record of performance rather than the career-ending loss of command that previously often had resulted when corruption was discovered in any of their units.

Sustaining the Effort

There was some question about whether the efforts of the first two years could be sustained, especially by a Department whose personnel had not received pay raises. As Jack Maple put it: "Armies like to fight short wars. We're slowin' down."



*Sometimes "fixing broken windows" does more
to reduce crime than conventional "incident-oriented" policing*

MAKING NEIGHBORHOODS SAFE


BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING

NEW BRIARFIELD APARTMENTS IS AN OLD, RUN-down collection of wooden buildings constructed in 1942 as temporary housing for shipyard workers in Newport News, Virginia. By the mid-1980s it was widely regarded as the worst housing project in the city. Many of its vacant units provided hiding places for drug users. It had the highest burglary rate in Newport News; nearly a quarter of its apartments were broken into at least once a year.



For decades the police had wearily answered calls for assistance and had investigated crimes in New Briarfield. Not much came of this police attentiveness—the buildings went on deteriorating, the burglaries went on occurring, the residents went on living in terror. Then, in 1984, Detective Tony Duke, assigned to a newly created police task force, decided to interview the residents of New

Briarfield about their problems. Not surprisingly, he found that they were worried about the burglaries—but they were just as concerned about the physical deterioration of the project. Rather than investigating only the burglaries, Duke spent some of his time investigating the *buildings*. Soon he learned that many city agencies—the fire department, the public-works department, the housing department—regarded New Briarfield as a major headache. He also discovered that its owners were in default on a federal loan and that foreclosure was imminent.

The report he wrote to Darrel Stephens, then the police chief, led Stephens to recommend to the city manager that New Briarfield be demolished and its tenants relocated. The city manager agreed. Meanwhile, Barry Haddix, the patrol officer assigned to the area, began working with members of other city agencies to fix up the project, pend-



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

ing its eventual replacement. Trash was carted away, abandoned cars were removed, potholes were filled in, the streets were swept. According to a study recently done by John E. Eck and William Spelman, of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the burglary rate dropped by 35 percent after Duke and Haddix began their work.

Stephens, now the executive director of PERF, tells the story of the New Briarfield project as an example of "problem-oriented policing," a concept developed by Professor Herman Goldstein, of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and sometimes also called community-oriented policing. The conventional police strategy is "incident-oriented"—a citizen calls to report an incident, such as a burglary, and the police respond by recording information relevant to the crime and then trying to solve it. Obviously, when a crime occurs, the victim is entitled to a rapid, effective police response. But if responding to incidents is all that the police do, the community problems that cause or explain many of these incidents will never be addressed, and so the incidents will continue and their number will perhaps increase.

This will happen for two reasons. One is that a lot of serious crime is adventitious, not the result of inexorable social forces or personal failings. A rash of burglaries may occur because drug users have found a back alley or an abandoned building in which to hang out. In their spare time, and in order to get money to buy drugs, they steal

from their neighbors. If the back alleys are cleaned up and the abandoned buildings torn down, the drug users will go away. They may even use fewer drugs, because they will have difficulty finding convenient dealers and soft burglary targets. By the same token, a neglected neighborhood may become the turf of a youth gang, whose members commit more crimes together in a group than they would if they were acting alone. If the gang is broken up, former members will still commit some crimes but probably not as many as before.

Most crime in most neighborhoods is local: the offenders live near their victims. Because of this, one should not assume that changing the environmental conditions conducive to crime in one area will displace the crime to other areas. For example, when the New York City police commissioner, Ben Ward, ordered Operation Pressure Point, a crackdown on drug dealing on the Lower East Side, dealing and the criminality associated with it were reduced in that neighborhood and apparently did not immediately reappear in other, contiguous neighborhoods. Suburban customers of the local drug dealers were frightened away by the sight of dozens of police officers on the streets where these customers had once shopped openly for drugs. They could not—at least not right away—find another neighborhood in which to buy drugs as easily as they once had on the Lower East Side. At the same time, the local population included some people who were willing to



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aid and abet the drug dealers. When the police presence made drug dealing unattractive, the dealers could not—again, at least not for the time being—find another neighborhood that provided an equivalent social infrastructure.

The second reason that incident-oriented police work fails to discourage neighborhood crime is that law-abiding citizens who are afraid to go out onto streets filled with graffiti, winos, and loitering youths yield control of these streets to people who are not frightened by these signs of urban decay. Those not frightened turn out to be the same people who created the problem in the first place. Law-abiding citizens, already fearful, see things occurring that make them even more fearful. A vicious cycle begins of fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of that fear.

A Los Angeles police sergeant put it this way: "When people in this district see that a gang has spray-painted its initials on all the stop signs, they decide that the gang, not the people or the police, controls the streets. When they discover that the Department of Transportation needs three months to replace the stop signs, they decide that the city isn't as powerful as the gang. These people want us to help them take back the streets. 'Painting gang symbols on a stop sign or a storefront is not, by itself, a serious crime. As an incident, it is trivial. But as the symptom of a problem, it is very serious.'



IN AN EARLIER ARTICLE IN THE ATLANTIC (MARCH, 1982) we called this the problem of "broken windows": If the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken. Soon the building will have no windows. Likewise, when disorderly behavior—say, rude remarks by loitering youths—is left unchallenged, the signal given is that no one cares. The disorder escalates, possibly to serious crime.

The sort of police work practiced in Newport News is an effort to fix the broken windows. Similar projects are under way in cities all over America. This pattern constitutes the beginnings of the most significant redefinition of police work in the past half century. For example:

- When a gunfight occurred at Garden Village, a low-income housing project near Baltimore, the Baltimore County police responded by investigating both the shooting and the housing project. Chief Cornelius Behan directed the officers in his Community Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit to find out what could be done to

alleviate the fears of the project residents and the gang tensions that led to the shooting. COPE officers worked with members of other agencies to upgrade street lighting in the area, trim shrubbery, install door locks, repair the roads and alleys, and get money to build a playground. With police guidance, the tenants organized. At the same time, high-visibility patrols were started and gang members were questioned. When both a suspect in the shooting and a particularly troublesome parole violator were arrested, gang tensions eased. Crime rates dropped. In bringing about this change, the police dealt with eleven different public agencies.

- When local merchants in a New York City neighborhood complained to the police about homeless persons who created a mess on the streets and whose presence frightened away customers, the officer who responded did not roust the vagrants but instead suggested that the merchants hire them to clean the streets in front of their stores every morning. The merchants agreed, and now the streets are clean all day and the customers find the stores more attractive.

- When people in a Los Angeles neighborhood complained to the police about graffiti on walls and gang symbols on stop signs, officers assigned to the Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire station did more than just try to catch the gang youths who were wielding the spray cans; they also organized citizens' groups and Boy Scouts to paint over the graffiti as fast as they were put up.

- When residents of a Houston neighborhood became fearful about crime in their area, the police not only redoubled their efforts to solve the burglaries and thefts but also assigned some officers to talk with the citizens in their homes. During a nine-month period the officers visited more than a third of all the dwelling units in the area, introduced themselves, asked about any neighborhood problems, and left their business cards. When Antony Patc and Mary Ann Wycoff, researchers at the Police Foundation, evaluated the project, they found that the people in this area, unlike others living in a similar area where no citizen-contact project occurred, felt that social disorder had decreased and that the neighborhood had become a better place to live. Moreover, and quite unexpectedly, the amount of property crime was noticeably reduced.

These are all examples of community-oriented policing, whose current popularity among police chiefs is as great as the ambiguity of the idea. In a sense, the police have always been community-oriented. Every police officer knows that most crimes don't get solved if victims and witnesses do not cooperate. One way to encourage that cooperation is to cultivate the good will of both victims and witnesses. Similarly, police-citizen tensions, over racial incidents or allegations of brutality or hostility, can often be allayed, and sometimes prevented, if police officers stay in close touch with community groups. Accordingly, most departments have at least one community-relations officer.

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inges meetings between officers and citizens' groups in church basements and other neutral locales.

But these commonplace features of police work are additions, and rarely alter the traditional work of most patrol officers and detectives: responding to radio calls about specific incidents. The focus on incidents works against a focus on problems. If Detective Tony Duke had focused only on incidents in New Briarfield, he would still be investigating burglaries in that housing project; meanwhile, the community-relations officer would be telling outraged residents that the police were doing all they could and urging people to call in any useful leads. If a tenant at one of those meetings had complained about stopped-up drains, rotting floorboards, and abandoned refrigerators, the community-relations officer would have patiently explained that these were not "police matters."

And of course, they are not. They are the responsibility of the landlord, the tenants themselves, and city agencies other than the police. But landlords are sometimes indifferent, tenants rarely have the resources to make needed repairs, and other city agencies do not have a twenty-four-hour emergency service. Like it or not, the police are about the only city agency that makes house calls around the clock. And like it or not, the public defines broadly what it thinks of as public order, and holds the police responsible for maintaining order.

Community-oriented policing means changing the daily work of the police to include investigating problems as well as incidents. It means defining as a problem whatever a significant body of public opinion regards as a threat to community order. It means working with the good guys, and not just against the bad guys.

The link between incidents and problems can sometimes be measured. The police know from experience what research by Glenn Pierce, in Boston, and Lawrence Sherman, in Minneapolis, has established: fewer than 10 percent of the addresses from which the police receive calls account for more than 60 percent of those calls. Many of the calls involve domestic disputes. If each call is treated as a separate incident with neither a history nor a future, then each dispute will be handled by police officers anxious to pacify the complainants and get back on patrol as quickly as possible. All too often, however, the disputants move beyond shouting insults or throwing crockery at each other. A knife or a gun may be produced, and somebody may die.

A very large proportion of all killings occur in these domestic settings. A study of domestic homicides in Kansas City showed that in eight out of ten cases the police had been called to the incident address at least once before; in half the cases they had been called *five times* or more. The police are familiar with this pattern, and they have learned how best to respond to it. An experiment in Minneapolis, conducted by the Police Foundation, showed that men who were arrested after assaulting their spouses were much less likely to commit new assaults than those who were merely pacified or asked to leave the house for a few

hours. Research is now under way in other cities to test this finding. Arrest may prove always to be the best disposition, or we may learn that some kind of intervention by a social agency also helps. What is indisputable is that a domestic fight—like many other events to which the police respond—is less an "incident" than a problem likely to have serious, long-term consequences.

Another such problem, familiar to New Yorkers, is graffiti on subway cars. What to some aesthetes is folk art is to most people a sign that an important public place is no longer under public control. If graffiti painters can attack cars with impunity, then muggers may feel they can attack the people in those cars with equal impunity. When we first wrote in these pages about the problem of broken windows, we dwelt on the graffiti problem as an example of a minor crime creating a major crisis.

The police seemed powerless to do much about it. They could arrest youths with cans of spray paint, but for every one arrested ten more went undetected, and of those arrested, few were punished. The New York Transit Authority, led by its chairman, Robert Kiley, and its president, David Gunn, decided that graffiti-free cars were a major management goal. New, easier-to-clean cars were bought. More important, key people in the Authority were held accountable for cleaning the cars and keeping them clean. Whereas in the early 1980s two out of every three cars were covered with graffiti, today fewer than one in six is. The Transit Police have played their part by arresting those who paint the cars, but they have been more successful at keeping cars from being defaced in the first place than they were at chasing people who were spraying already defaced ones.



WHILE THE PHRASE "COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING" comes easily to the lips of police administrators, redefining the police mission is more difficult. To help the police become accustomed to fixing broken windows as well as arresting window-breakers requires doing things that are very hard for many administrators to do. Authority over at least some patrol officers must be decentralized, so that they have a good deal of freedom to manage their time (including their paid overtime). This implies freeing them at least partly from the tyranny of the radio call. It means giving them a broad range of responsibilities: to find and understand the problems that create disorder and crime, and to deal with other public and private agencies that can help cope with these problems. It

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means assigning them to a neighborhood and leaving them there for an extended period of time. It means backing them up with department support and resources.

The reason these are not easy things for police chiefs to do is not simply that chiefs are slaves to tradition, though some impatient advocates of community-oriented policing like to say so. Consider for a moment how all these changes might sound to an experienced and intelligent police executive who must defend his department against media criticisms of officer misconduct, political pressure to cut budgets, and interest-group demands for more police protection everywhere. With decentralized authority, no one will know precisely how patrol officers spend their time. Moreover, decentralized authority means that patrol officers will spend time on things like schmoozing with citizens, instead of on quantifiable tasks like issuing tickets, making arrests, and clearing cases.

Making the community-oriented officers generalists means letting them deal with other city agencies, a responsibility for which few officers are well trained and which cuts across sensitive questions of turf and public expectations.

If officers are left in a neighborhood, some of them may start taking money from the dope dealers and after-hours joints. To prevent that, officers are frequently moved

around. Moreover, the best people are usually kept in the detective squad that handles the really big cases. Few police executives want their best people settling into a neighborhood, walking around the bus stops and shopping malls.

The enthusiasts for community-oriented policing have answers for all these concerns, but sometimes in their zeal they forget that they are contending with more than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging—that the problems are real and require thoughtful solutions. Many police executives get in trouble not because the crime rate goes up but because cops are accused of graft, brutality, laziness, incivility, or indifference.

In short, police management is driven more by the constraints on the job than by the goals of the job. You cannot cope with those constraints without understanding them. This may be why some of the biggest changes toward community-oriented policing have occurred in cities where a new chief has come in from the outside with a mandate to shake up a moribund department. Lee Brown brought a community orientation to the Houston Police Department under precisely those circumstances—the reputation of the department was so bad that almost any change would have been regarded as an improvement.

What can we say to the worried police chief who is al-

SAVING MEMORY

Summer nights we put pennies on the track.
Even the station was quiet enough for crickets.
Mountains surrounded us, middling high and purple.
No matter where we stood they protected us
with perspective. People call them gentle mountains
but you can die in there; they're thick
with creeper and laurel. Like voodoo,
I drew pictures with a sparkler. A curved line
arced across the night. Rooted in its slope,
one laurel tree big as the mountain holding it.

You can hear the train in the rails.
They're round, not flat, as you'd expect,
and slick. We'd walk the sound, one step, two,
slip, on purpose, in the ballast, hopscotch
and waltz on the ties, watching the big round eye
enter the curve and grow like God out of the purple,
the tracks turning mean, molten silver blazing
dead at us. We'd hula. Tango. And the first
white plume would shoot up screaming long, lonely,
vain as Mamma shooing starlings from her latticed pews.

Sing Mickey Mouse, the second scream rising long, again,
up and up. Stick our right hip out, the third
wailing. Give it a hot-cha wiggle, the fourth
surrounding us. And bidding each other fond adieux,
we'd count to three, turn our backs, flash it a moon,
and materialize, fantastic, run over with light,
the train shrieking to pieces, scared, meaning it,
short, short, short, short, pushing a noise
bigger than the valley. It sent us flying,
flattened, light as ideas, back on the platform,
the Y6B Mallet compound rolling through
southbound, steamborne, out of Roanoke.

It wasn't to make the train jump the track
but to hold the breath-edged piece of copper
grown hot with dying, thin with birth,
wiped smooth of origin and homilies.
To hold such power. As big as the eye
of the train, as big as the moon burning
like the sun. All the perspective
curved and gone.

—Mary Stewart Hammond

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dy running a pretty good department? Start with corruption: For decades police executives and reformers have believed that in order to prevent corruption, you have to centralize control over personnel and discourage intimacy between police officers and citizens. Maybe. But the price one pays for this is very high. For example, many neighborhoods are being destroyed by drug dealers, who hang out on every street corner. The best way to sweep them off the streets is to have patrol officers arrest them for selling drugs and intimidate their customers by parking police cars right next to suspected drug outlets. But some police chiefs forbid their patrol officers to work drug cases, for fear they will be corrupted. When the citizens in these cities see police cars drive past scenes of open drug dealing, they assume the police have been paid off. Efforts to prevent corruption have produced the appearance of corruption.

Police Commissioner Ben Ward, in New York, decided that the price of this kind of anti-corruption strategy was too high. His Operation Pressure Point put scores of police officers on the streets to break up the drug-dealing bazaar. Police corruption is no laughing matter, especially in New York, but some chiefs now believe that it will have to be fought in ways that do not require police officers to avoid contact with people.

Consider the problem of getting police resources and managing political pressures: resources can be justified with statistics, but statistics often become ends in themselves. One police captain we interviewed said that his department was preoccupied with "stacking widgets and counting beans." He asked his superior for permission to take officers out of radio cars and have them work on community problems. The superior agreed but warned that he would be watching to see what happened to "the stats." In the short run the stats—for example, calls answered, average response time—were likely to get worse, but if community problems were solved, they would get better as citizens had fewer incidents to report. The captain worried, however, that he would not be given enough time to achieve this and that the bean counters would cut off his program.

A better way to justify getting resources from the city is to stimulate popular demand for resources devoted to problem-solving. Properly handled, community-oriented policing does generate support for the department. When Newark police officers, under orders from Hubert Williams, then the police director, began stopping city buses and boarding them to enforce city ordinances against smoking, drinking, gambling, and playing loud music, the bus patrons often applauded. When Los Angeles police officers supervised the hauling away of abandoned cars, onlookers applauded. Later, when some of the officers had their time available for problem-solving work cut back, several hundred citizens attended a meeting to complain.

In Flint, Michigan, patrol officers were taken out of their cars and assigned to foot beats. Robert Trojanowicz,

a professor at Michigan State University, analyzed the results and found big increases in citizen satisfaction and officer morale, and even a significant drop in crime (an earlier foot-patrol project in Newark had produced equivalent reductions in fear but no reductions in crime). Citizen support was not confined to statements made to pollsters, however. Voters in referenda twice approved tax increases to maintain the foot-patrol system, the second time by a two-to-one margin. New Briarfield tenants unquestionably found satisfaction in the role the police played in getting temporary improvements made on their housing project and getting a commitment for its ultimate replacement. Indeed, when a department experiments with a community-oriented project in one precinct, people in other precincts usually want one too.



POLITICIANS, LIKE POLICE CHIEFS, HEAR THESE VIEWS and respond. But they hear other views as well. One widespread political mandate is to keep the tax rate down. Many police departments are already stretched thin by sharp reductions in spending that occurred in the lean years of the 1970s. Putting *one* additional patrol car on the streets around the clock can cost a quarter of a million dollars or more a year.

Change may seem easier when resources are abundant. Ben Ward could start Operation Pressure Point because he had at his disposal a large number of new officers who could be thrown into a crackdown on street-level drug dealing. Things look a bit different in Los Angeles, where no big increases in personnel are on the horizon. As a result, only eight officers are assigned to the problem-solving Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire district—an economically and ethnically diverse area of nearly 300,000 residents.

But change does not necessarily require more resources, and the availability of new resources is no guarantee that change will be attempted. One temptation is to try to sell the public on the need for more policemen and decide later how to use them. Usually when that script is followed, either the public turns down the spending increase or the extra personnel are dumped into what one LAPD captain calls the "black hole" of existing commitments, leaving no trace and producing no effects.

What may have an effect is how the police are deployed and managed. An experiment jointly conducted by the Washington, D.C., Police Department and the Police Foundation showed that if a few experienced officers con-

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concentrate on known repeat offenders, the number of serious offenders taken off the streets grows substantially. The Flint and Newark experiences suggest that foot patrols in certain kinds of communities (but not all) can reduce fear. In Houston problem-oriented tactics seem clearly to have heightened a sense of citizen security.

The problem of interagency cooperation may, in the long run, be the most difficult of all. The police can bring problems to the attention of other city agencies, but the system is not always organized to respond. In his book *Neighborhood Services*, John Mudd calls it the "rat problem": "If a rat is found in an apartment, it is a housing inspection responsibility; if it runs into a restaurant, the health department has jurisdiction; if it goes outside and dies in an alley, public works takes over." A police officer who takes public complaints about rats seriously will go crazy trying to figure out what agency in the city has responsibility for rat control and then inducing it to kill the rats.

Matters are almost as bad if the public is complaining about abandoned houses or school-age children who are not in school. The housing department may prefer to concentrate on enforcing the housing code rather than go through the costly and time-consuming process of getting an abandoned house torn down. The school department may have expelled the truant children for making life miserable for the teachers and the other students; the last thing it wants is for the police to tell the school to take the kids back.

All city and county agencies have their own priorities and face their own pressures. Forcing them to cooperate by knocking heads together at the top rarely works: what department heads promise the mayor they will do may bear little relationship to what their rank-and-file employees actually do. From his experiences in New York City government Mudd discovered that if you want agencies to cooperate in solving neighborhood problems, you have to get the neighborhood-level supervisors from each agency together in a "district cabinet" that meets regularly and addresses common concerns. This is not an easy task (for one thing, police district lines often do not match the district boundaries of the school, housing, traffic, and public-works departments), but where it has been tried it has made solving the "rat problem" a lot easier. For example, Mudd reports, such interagency issues as park safety and refuse-laden vacant lots got handled more effectively when the field supervisors met to talk about them than when memos went up the chain of command of one agency and then down the chain of command of another.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF Neighborhood Watch programs may help reduce crime, but we cannot be certain. In particular, we do not know what kinds of communities are most likely to benefit from such programs. A Police Foundation study in Minneapolis found that getting effective community orga-

nizations started in the most troubled neighborhoods was very difficult. The costs and benefits of having patrol officers and sergeants influence the delivery of services from other city agencies has never been fully assessed. No way of wresting control of a neighborhood from a street gang has yet been proved effective.

And even if these questions are answered, a police department may still have difficulty accommodating two very different working cultures: the patrol officers and detectives who handle major crimes (murders, rapes, and robberies) and the cops who work on community problems and the seemingly minor incidents they generate. In every department we visited, some of the incident-oriented officers spoke disparagingly of the problem-oriented officers as "social workers," and some of the latter responded by calling the former "ghetto blasters." If a community-service officer seems to get too close to the community, he or she may be accused of "going native." The tension between the two cultures is heightened by the fact that in many departments becoming a detective is regarded as a major promotion, and detectives are often selected from among those officers who have the best record in making major arrests—in other words, from the ranks of the incident-oriented. But this pattern need not be permanent. Promotion tracks can be changed so that a patrol officer, especially one working on community problems, is no longer regarded as somebody who "hasn't made detective." Moreover, some police executives now believe that splitting the patrol force into two units—one oriented to incidents, the other to problems—is unwise. They are searching for ways to give all patrol officers the time and resources for problem-solving activities.

Because of the gaps in our knowledge about both the results and the difficulties of community-oriented policing, no chief should be urged to accept, uncritically, the community-oriented model. But the traditional model of police professionalism—devoting resources to quick radio-car response to calls about specific crime incidents—makes little sense at a time when the principal threats to public order and safety come from *collective*, not individual, sources, and from *problems*, not incidents: from well-organized gangs and drug traffickers, from uncared-for legions of the homeless, from boisterous teenagers taking advantage of their newfound freedom and affluence in congested urban settings.

Even if community-oriented policing does not produce the dramatic gains that some of its more ardent advocates expect, it has indisputably produced one that the officers who have been involved in it immediately acknowledge: it has changed their perceptions of the community. Officer Robin Kirk, of the Houston Police Department, had to be talked into becoming part of a neighborhood fear-reduction project. Once in it, he was converted. In his words, "Traditionally, police officers after about three years get to thinking that everybody's a loser. That's the only people you're dealing with. In community policing you're dealing with the good citizens, helping them solve problems." □

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MEAN STREETS, ROUGH JUSTICE

This cop performed a miracle:
he turned back the tide of crime
and made New York safe again.
So why did it cost him his badge?

Out of the blue

New York's mayor hired Bill Bratton for a mission impossible: to rid the streets of crooks. Trouble is, he succeeded, to the delight of the Big Apple and the rumoured chagrin of City Hall. Russell Miller spent a week on the beat with 'the Chief' as he prepared to throw in his badge. Main photographs by Gigi Cohen



Shortly after dawn, Monday morning in New York. A black sedan with darkened windows is threading through the traffic, heading north out of Manhattan towards the Bronx. In the front are two plain-clothes detectives, a man and a woman, both, as they say, packing heat. In the back is their boss, commissioner William Bratton, chief of the New York Police Department.

He is talking fast, the way he likes to, and using a favourite analogy to explain his attitude towards fighting crime. It is like a melanoma on the skin, he says. If you don't treat it straight away it will spread and get worse. "You can see a melanoma but you can't see what's happening under the skin, the cancer that's eating away at you. That's the one that's dangerous. If the quality of your life deteriorates and doesn't get treated, you can't see the real danger: that it's a sign that something bad is going on and it is going to get worse."

We turn onto the Hudson Parkway and suddenly his attention is caught by a wall sprayed with graffiti, a comparatively rare sight in New York these days. "See that?" he demands. "We paint over the graffiti, then some bas-

Did he jump or was he pushed? Mayor Giuliani (left) says goodbye to Commissioner Bratton (centre) after the 'resignation' announcement

tard comes along and marks it up again. Personally, I'd like to throw them in jail for years. If you go into a neighbourhood and find graffiti everywhere it just looks like nobody is in control. That fosters a sense among the criminal element that anything goes.

"Over 20-odd years in this city, levels of social decency were constantly defined down. So many types of activities were excused because of economic or social conditions or because of ethnicity, like if you came from a place where you used to hang out and drink and party all night you should be allowed to live the same way in New York. In Third World countries public urination is an accepted practice and it was becoming an accepted practice in New York. What we're saying is that, hey, this is no longer acceptable, this is the United States and you don't just urinate against the nearest tree. We are saying the citizens have to raise their standards. We don't accept public

urination. We don't accept graffiti as an art form - we accept it for what it is, vandalism. We are not going to tolerate illegal peddling or drinking on the street or panhandlers or squeegee poets. Social deprivation is not an excuse for aggressive begging."

This is a familiar theme for Commissioner Bratton, who years ago decided that the way to tackle serious urban crime was to tackle petty urban crime. His argument was that tolerance of minor misdemeanours only encouraged further, escalating offences and that the first priority of law enforcement was to improve the quality of life by running drunks, vandals, panhandlers and assorted lowlife off the streets.

It was a theory that flew directly in the face of the accepted wisdom as propagated by most criminologists and social scientists, who took the view that the crime wave sweeping the US was rooted in social and economic causes and there was little the police could do about it. Bratton, a police officer for nearly 30 years, was first given the opportunity to test out his theories when he was appointed chief of the New York transit police in 1990. At that time virtually every subway car in New York was covered, inside and out, with graffiti, fare dodgers routinely jumped the turnstiles and much of the system was turned into a no-go area. Within a few months of his appointment, the first cleaned cars began rattling down the tracks and legions of outraged graffiti "artists" and surprised turnstile-jumpers found themselves being hauled off to court. Once the transit police demonstrated their determination to improve the "quality of life" on the subways, crime levels began falling spectacularly.

In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani, the city's combative new mayor, asked Bratton to take over the whole of the New York Police Department. Since then what most New Yorkers view as something of a miracle has come to pass. A city that was spinning out of control, with petty crime accepted as part of everyday life, has been transformed. New York, once prominent among the top 20 of America's most dangerous cities, has now fallen to 136th position. The streets are safer and cleaner, tourism is up, whole neighbourhoods are being reclaimed. In short, the Big Apple is no longer rotten.

Who can take credit for this astonishing success story? To the chagrin of the mayor it was Bratton who emerged as the hero of the hour. Certainly, he had become the most famous police chief in the US, which is perhaps why, last month, he was obliged to resign.

★ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

Today, we are on our way to a typical Bratton management event - an Executive Staff Retreat at the old snuff mill in the Bronx Botanical Garden. It is an appropriate setting since it is one of the many parks in the city that has been "liberated" by Bratton's policies: pre Bratton, the botanical garden was a dangerous place, the preserve of junkies, predators, footpads and park bench wipers. Now it is being enjoyed once again by ordinary New Yorkers.

Some 70 senior officers are already assembled by the time Bratton arrives, shortly before 8am. My presence causes some initial consternation, for no correspondent has ever previously been invited to attend an NYPD retreat, but the commissioner explains that nothing I write will compromise the big anti-drug operation they are intending to launch in north Brooklyn.

Most of the morning is taken up with a detailed briefing on the Brooklyn initiative, which is to be the biggest ever undertaken in the country. Bratton, dapper in a double-breasted blue suit, crisp white shirt and silk tie, listens to the speakers with intense, almost disconcerting concentration, only interrupting once when mention is made of criminologists predicting a forthcoming Armageddon generated by a youth population explosion and increasing violence. "Aw come on," he drawls, "that is the same bulls... we have been hearing for years." After a simple buffet lunch (no alcohol), it is the



Portrait by Nigel Parry



Above: deputy police commissioner Jack Maple outside NYPD headquarters. Bratton plucked him from the ranks of the transit police to head the department's crime control strategies. Sporting boxing gloves rather than a bow tie, Maple meets Bratton in the police gym (below). Right: minutes after his resignation announcement, Bratton catches the event on television



turn of each of the city's eight borough commanders, one a woman, to deliver a detailed presentation outlining results for the previous three months and proposals to ensure that crime continues to decline for the next three months. Mordal of the commissioner's steely blue eyes on them, each one makes a point to emphasise their "quality of life" initiatives. "You perhaps noticed," he says afterwards, "that they delivered their presentations with a certain amount of trepidation. That's because they all know they are on trial. I expect all my senior officers to deliver results. They deliver, or they walk."

It is an approach that appears to earn him respect. "I've been on the force 33 years," detective inspector Bob Cividanes confides during a break. "This is the best it's ever been. And it's all down to that guy over there." He nods almost imperceptibly towards Bratton, as if he does not want to be caught talking about the boss. At 4.30 the retreat breaks up, to the apparent relief of most of those





present. Bratton hurries out to his waiting car, beckoning me to follow. I ask if he is able to drop me off somewhere in midtown, but he says no, I will have to come with him all the way to police headquarters. I am thinking this is perhaps rather churlish when the car turns off the road and bumps over the sidewalk into a small park. Round a bend is a clearing and a large NYPD helicopter, its rotor blades already turning. "It takes 45 minutes to get downtown by road," he explains. "This way we can get there in 10 minutes. Quick, hop in."

☆☆☆☆

Tuesday morning, the Intercontinental Hotel, 48th Street. Bratton has suggested continuing the interview over breakfast. He arrives at 7am, precisely on time. When he is well advanced on his poached egg on English muffin I decide to raise the ticklish subject of his relationship with the mayor. It was recently rumoured that the two men did not get along, that "Hizzonner"

was irritated by the police commissioner's high media profile, which threatened to overshadow his own. Last year the NYPD's deputy commissioner for public affairs resigned. It was whispered that Giuliani had him pushed out because he was doing too good a job promoting Bratton.

"It is true that it was widely reported that the mayor and some of his staff were taking umbrage at the favourable publicity the department was getting, and I personally was getting, and that there was political dissatisfaction that the credit was not accruing entirely to him. I'm someone who is comfortable with the media and I want to get the message out that this department is a great success story, so I am arguably the most visible personality in the city next to the mayor. Now, who gets the greater credit for our success is really up to the media and the public. I'm not going to comment on that. Whatever goes on between the mayor and myself are

private discussions. You're never going to see me in a public dispute with the mayor. I'm a team player."

When he first became commissioner, Bratton had made it clear that he would only stay as long as it took to get the job done. Recently it was rumoured that he had already turned down an offer of \$430,000 a year — almost four times his existing salary — to become head of security for Disney. In the end, he accepted a job at an undisclosed salary with a private security firm, First Security Services Corp, based in New York.

After his resignation he admitted he would have liked to stay a little longer as police chief, but that his position was becoming untenable because of friction between his staff and City Hall, exacerbated by media claims that he and the mayor were at odds. Even after his departure, Bratton certainly wasn't going to start bad-mouthing Giuliani; as he says, he's a team player.

Bratton is 48, was born and raised in Boston and → 29

still speaks with a strong Boston accent, quite different from that of New Yorkers. He grew up in a cold-water apartment in a working-class neighbourhood, joined the police force from college and rose rapidly through the ranks, becoming fascinated by the science and psychology of law enforcement. In 1982 he read an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* that had a profound effect on him. It was written by two academics, James Wilson and George Kelling, who argued that the role of the police had shifted to crime-fighting to such an extent that their original function, maintaining public order, was being ignored, with potentially disastrous consequences. They postulated a theory called "broken windows", linking disorder and crime. If a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all the other windows in the building will soon be broken, thus beginning an inexorable process of community breakdown and eventually making a neighbourhood vulnerable to criminal invasion.

Bratton knew instinctively that the authors were right because he could see the "broken windows" process taking place before his eyes every day in the tougher areas of Boston. But nowhere was it more obvious than in New York. "When I first came here in 1990 every highway was covered with graffiti. There was trash everywhere, there were squeegee pests at all the major junctions, there were illegal peddlers everywhere, the homeless sleeping in cardboard boxes on Fifth Avenue. The place looked like a Third World country. Welcome to New York. What kind of Mad Max message did that send out?"

"Squeegee pests" — derelicts with a dirty rag who offered to "clean" your windscreen and threatened to kick in a door panel if you didn't ante up a dollar or two — had become such a bane of New York life that clearing them from the streets was a key platform of Giuliani's election campaign. Bratton's proven record of success in cleaning up the subways made him an obvious candidate, in the new mayor's eyes, to do the job.

Bratton arrived as New York's new police commissioner in January 1994 and promptly announced that he was turning the department's strategy on its head. Henceforth, all the minor misdemeanours that had previously been ignored were to be relentlessly pursued. Police officers were not only to start arresting street peddlers, drunks and vandals, they were to interrogate them, run computer checks on them. "We're going to take back this city," Bratton liked to say, "house by house, street by street, block by block, neighbourhood by neighbourhood."

Many senior police officers predicted disaster. They believed the NYPD barely had the time and resources to deal with serious crime. Killers and rapists were the real enemies, they said, not winos and beggars. Bratton would not be deterred: those who did not agree with his policies were invited to leave. "I let them all go at the same time," he recalls. "It became known as the Friday night massacre. In hindsight I probably should have let them retire in a more honourable fashion, but it showed them I meant business."

Something remarkable happened. The cops discovered that clearing the human flotsam and jetsam from the streets made people feel better about the police, more willing to co-operate and provide information; that many of the guys doing the little stuff were also doing the big stuff; that frisking suspects on the street encouraged them to leave their weapons at home.

During Bratton's tenure, homicides fell by 40%, car thefts by 35%, robberies by 32% and burglaries by 24%.

In the last two years every police precinct has recorded a



Chief Tosano Simonetti, of south Brooklyn's 67th Precinct, examines the day's schedule

double-digit decline in overall crime — and that hasn't happened since the end of the second world war.

☆☆☆☆☆

Tuesday evening, 20.00 hours. Baruch College, 23rd Street. Tonight the mayor is holding one of his regular public meetings at which ordinary New Yorkers have the opportunity to put questions to the people running the city. Unfortunately, every seat in the hall is filled long before the meeting is due to start, and a large crowd gathers outside demanding, fruitlessly, to be let in.

Inside, all the city commissioners take their seats at a long table on the front of the stage and Giuliani stands in the centre, holding a hand microphone. This is unquestionably going to be his show, but first he introduces each of the city commissioners, to a polite ripple of applause. When he comes to Bratton, there is a great cheer from the crowd. Bratton strives not to look too pleased. A recent poll indicated that 34% of New Yorkers approved of the job he was doing; only 44% thought the same about the mayor.

☆☆☆☆☆

Wednesday morning, 06.45 hours, the office of the deputy commissioner, Jack Maple, NYPD headquarters. Maple is drinking his first espresso of the day and changing into a freshly laundered striped shirt. When he has adjusted his bow tie and shrugged on a blue blazer, he looks like a hoofer who escaped from the east of Guys and Dolls — a pugnacious, rotund figure with a drooping moustache and a gun in a leather holster strapped to his ankle. His surprisingly small feet are encased in black and white co-respondent shoes: he has a collection in different colours that he says he will show me later. Maple was a lowly lieutenant in the transit police when Bratton plucked him from the ranks and made him deputy commissioner in charge of crime control strategies. "It was probably the biggest promotion in the history of law enforcement," he trumpets. "It was like being in the navy and being promoted from ensign to admiral."

Today, Maple is to escort me to the Comstat meeting, which is due to start in the "War Room" on the floor below in a few minutes. Comstat, an acronym for "computer statistics", is a twice-weekly meeting at which precinct and squad commanders are mercilessly grilled by the department's senior brass. Each of the eight boroughs attends a Comstat every month; if it fails, collectively, to produce the required statistics or the right answers, it is obliged to make a second appearance a few days later. "Listen," Maple growls, "you're gonna see us warts-and-all down there. I'm not kidding you."

I follow him down a couple of flights of stone stairs and into the NYPD's Command and Control Center, a

large, high-ceilinged room crowded with some 200 officers in uniform and plain clothes doing their best not to appear nervous. "Today it is the turn of south Brooklyn to deliver the goods. All the deputy commissioners sit in swivel chairs at a long table lit by green desk lamps. The primary inquisitors, Maple and Loui Avenne, the uniformed chief of the department, occupy a position at the centre of the table behind a large monitor and a telephone linked to a high-tech console that can flash up charts, maps and graphs onto three huge video screens. Those being questioned stand at a lectern under the video screens and everyone else tries to make themselves scarce, even though they all know they can be called upon to step forward at any time.

Chief Tosano Simonetti, the borough commander, opens the proceedings at the lectern. Simonetti is a grizzled veteran with more than 40 years' service in the NYPD but even he, he admits later, finds Comstat an ordeal. He runs through the borough's recent crime figures, mentions specific areas of concern and what is being done about them, then turns the lectern over to his precinct commanders who, one after another, get put through the mill. Each precinct has to supply computerised maps showing locations and types of crime and any number of graphs and charts indicating the incidence of crimes, times of day, arrests and a multitude of other information. If a graph line "spikes", indicating a sudden rise in a certain type of crime, the precinct commander has to explain in detail what he is doing about it. Woe betide anyone without a convincing plan — more than half the precinct commanders have been replaced since Bratton took charge.

The questioning from the top table is tough and relentless. A map flashes up showing a clump of shootings in a three-block area:

"What the heck's going on there?"

"What are you doing about it?"

"Are you co-ordinating?"

"Are you following up?"

The chief of a homicide squad, sweating profusely, gets into a tangle over the search for a 15-year-old murder suspect. He explains that it is his feeling that the boy will eventually return to the neighbourhood and so his house is being kept under surveillance.

"And do you think he doesn't know we know?" Maple asks with heavy sarcasm.

"I am sure he knows we know, that I know," the detective replies, causing a brief ripple of laughter that Maple instantly silences with a glare.

"Look, you gotta turn the heat up. I am concerned this kid is going to kill someone else. Are you working with the warrant squad? Where's the warrant squad?"

"Here, chief," says a voice from the crowd. He is called forward and admits that he has not yet been asked by homicide to help in the search. "What?" Maple bellows. "Here we are, two years later, still stuck in our silos..."

The meeting lasts exactly three hours and ends with an admonition from the first deputy commissioner to keep up the pressure against squeegee pests. "There shouldn't be any backsliding on this," he says. "Keeping the squeegee pests off the streets is the backbone of the [mayoral] administration. This is a warning. In the spring there will be no more warnings."

Back in his office, Maple lights up a cigar, calls for more espresso and explains the importance of the Comstat meetings using military analogies. "Look, we're fighting a war here. What's the first thing you need to fight a war? A map. What's the second thing you need? Accurate and timely intelligence. What's the third —"

thing you need? Effective tactics, deployment and communications. It's like you guys in the second world war. You invented radar, didn't you? Without radar you wouldn't have known where the enemy was coming from or how to find them, but radar gave your pilots accurate and timely intelligence. Comstat is our radar."

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Thursday, late afternoon, 67th Precinct station house, Flatbush, south Brooklyn. "Six seven" is one of the toughest precincts in the city and recorded the largest number of homicides and shootings last year. The level of casual violence is frightening — during the snowstorm in January this year, one man killed a neighbour for parking in a space he had cleared in the snow.

The 200,000 residents in the precinct are largely West Indian and Haitian immigrants — drugs, domestic violence, illegal social clubs, raves (known here as "jump up" parties), robberies and automobile thefts all combine to keep the cops busy, but it is a very popular precinct to work in. "People enjoy the challenge," says Chief Simonetti. "When you've been in the trenches in six seven you get to stand a little taller. And you get to tell the best stories in the bar."

The officers with whom I am due to go out on patrol have been diverted — an 11-year-old girl has been raped, allegedly by her grandmother's boyfriend (it's that kind of area) — and so I am reassigned to officers Devin Freed and Joe Flaherty. Devin Freed and Joe Flaherty grew up in the same small town on Long Island, joined the Police Academy together, graduated together, and are now partners. It's a bit like being married, says Flaherty, except there's no sex. Freed is tall and dark; Flaherty is shorter, fair and walks with the swagger of an amateur boxer, which he is.

Before we leave I am offered a bulletproof vest but I demur, since neither of my escorts appears to be wearing one. "You kiddin'?" says Freed. "I wouldn't go out there

Boys on the beat: officers and partners Devin Freed and Joe Flaherty at the 67th Precinct station house. 'Six-seven' is a notorious area

without a vest," and he unbuttons his shirt to reveal the unmistakable canvas padding underneath. I am kitted out in a vest in seconds.

At first sight Flatbush looks like an unexceptional working class suburb of houses and apartment blocks but, from the front seat of their "blue and white", Freed and Flaherty see it through very different eyes. On their second day on patrol together they had to disarm a hoodlum with a sub-machinegun, and as we drive through the grim streets they identify who was shot where and which street corners are favoured for drug dealing. We pass a video store where a few weeks earlier they had kicked down the door and found a stash of crack and heroin.

They explain that it is hard to make a good drug "col-lar" on the street because the dealers never carry the drugs themselves but use "steerers" to lead customers to where the supply is hidden. Before Bratton they were ordered not to go after street-corner dealers. "They had the idea that we'd get offered drugs all the time and get corrupted," Freed explains. "But we lost a lot of credibility over that. You'd get dealing going on openly on the street and people would see us driving by and think, hey, those guys must be getting paid off. You can't blame 'em."

Our first call is to an apartment block where a junkie has been found living in the basement. The landlord says he keeps putting new locks on the doors, but this guy keeps breaking in. While the junkie is handcuffed and searched, the cops' flashlights pick over his pathetic possessions — an old mattress, a blanket, bits and pieces of junk. He pleads to be let go, but is hauled off.



The next call is a shooting. We follow a trail of blood across the parking lot of the local hospital into the emergency room, and find the victim nursing wounds in his



arm and leg. He says he doesn't know who shot him. Freed says it is probably down to a posse, the Jamaican term for a gang. "Organised crime round here is not guys in suits and fedoras. It's posses."

Not long ago he and his partner were called to a shooting and found a man lying in the street. As they bent over him he whispered the name of the "perp" and promptly died. It was just like the movies. Unfortunately, they never found the perp. He hightailed it out of town, com-

With coastal waters as clear



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"...crime going down's got nuttin' to do wid Bratton. It's all to do wid us."

Flaherty, he says, suddenly anxious. "That was a joke."

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Friday p.m. Commissioner Bratton's office, police headquarters. Bratton clearly enjoys the sense of history that goes with his office: he sits at the same carved mahogany desk used by Theodore Roosevelt when he was president of the New York City Board of Police Commissioners in 1895. An oil painting of Roosevelt hangs on one wall; on another is the commissioner's shield of office, dating back to 1901 and made of gold and platinum.

It is a matter of considerable pride to Commissioner Bratton that his methods are now being studied by police forces from all over the world, including Britain, which has sent several delegations from the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police.

Cynics assert that many other factors, quite outside of Bratton's control, are responsible for the startling decline of crime in New York — that crime across America was on the decrease anyway, that drug gangs have consolidated their turf and are no longer killing each other, that the prison population has doubled in the last 10 years so that there are fewer criminals around to commit crimes. They are arguments he has heard many times before and that he rejects. "I'm very comfortable that over time I'll be proved correct. I think we are now beginning to show, very clearly, that what is happening here is not a fluke and that we can make a difference."

"I'll tell you this. If the previous administration had stayed in power for four more years, this city would have gone so far down the slippery slope that you could not have brought it back. It would be gone."

But it is Bratton who has gone. If crime figures start to creep up again, New Yorkers may feel the price paid to protect the mayor's ego was too great. They will not be in a forgiving mood when he seeks re-election next year ■

nurtured another murder in Miami — the brother of the first victim — and then left for Jamaica.

Back in the "blue and white", the radio crackles urgently: an armed robbery, perp fleeing on foot. Description: black man in his 20s, black jacket, woollen hat, blue jeans.


Within seconds we are on our way, siren wailing and lights flashing. Suddenly it seems the streets are full of police cars tearing back and forth. The perp has been

seen running behind a row of houses. Patrol cars ring the scene, a helicopter with infrared cameras is called up, and a dozen officers scour the area with their flashlights. But the suspect is nowhere to be found.


Freed and Flaherty reckon they're not going to make this collar tonight, so they withdraw and return to their patrol. This is the stuff they like doing. "This is a great job," says Freed. "It's just so exciting." "Hey, you gonna put this in your newspaper?" Flaherty asks. "Okay, tell

s t h e s e . . . w h a t ' s i n a n a m e ?

Marmara Sea



Mediterranean Sea



A D I S E

TURKEY

Contributors



Nigel Parry photographed William Bratton, until recently New York's police chief, for our cover story this week (page 26). 'I have always wanted to be a New York cop,' says Parry, who is pictured above acting out his fantasy. 'When I shot the cover, I asked if I could have a helicopter hovering in the background. But I was told that the building overlooking the shoot was the mayor's office, and if he saw what we were up to there'd be hell to pay. Within two weeks, Bratton was out'

Lesley White
Interviews

Richard Dreyfuss, whose new movie, *Mr Holland's Opus*, earned him a best actor Oscar nomination for his Capra-esque portrayal of a music teacher.

'When Richard Dreyfuss was 18 he thought he was the greatest actor in America,' she says. 'In his 20s he realised he wasn't. In his 40s he grew tired of the job. Now, with a huge box-office hit, he may delay his career plans to become a history teacher a while longer.' See page 12



BILL ROBINSON

Zoë H

The weather turned hot a couple of days ago, so my boyfriend and I drove to Malibu. But we stopped off at a mini mall to have lunch. I should we see as we sat down outside. A drunken movie star who took me a year and put his hand up my dress bagel and chatting up Minnie Driver appears in *Circle of Friends* (a film which stars — *quelle surprise* — a female lead). In the case, my boyfriend is unconsciously into the evil movie star and starts to go over and talk to him.

I am adamant that I will not. I am that my boyfriend feels not one iota of territorial rage. "You do realise that man, he was attempting to wrap his larynx?" I say. "Sure," my boyfriend probably really regrets it now. "And make friends?" I tell my boyfriend. "celebrity-hound (I use a ruder phrase afterwards, we leave).

As we depart, Minnie Driver is curled about, much to the movie star's brief consideration of going over to war. On second thoughts, I figure I'll leave.

When we get home, I have to pass a session with the Sunday Times photographer. A well-bred young man called Fergus (see above) is okay — I'm leering in a heavy-lidded way and my editor has up so big that, as one reader received it is possible to pick out every one of his arms — but it certainly isn't as hideous a picture was. The problem is, it is: The Sunday Times, being a stickler for Los Angeles shot.

Fergus turns up at my place with a camera. "There are both in the

(Exhibits to be supplied by Bill Andrews)

Exhibit 1

Report of Crime Trends in Major U.S. Cities

Exhibit 2

Excerpts from Police Strategy 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York

Exhibit 3

"Head Counts" for New York's Three Police Forces, Late 1994

Exhibit 4

Organization Chart, New York Police Department, 1995

Exhibit 5

Example of Data Displayed at CompStat Meetings

Exhibit 6

A Comparison of Management Characteristics in public-sector vs. private-sector Organizations

Exhibit 7

New York Police Department Budgets, 1994-1996

Exhibit 8

Demographic and Crime Statistics for Four Police Precincts, New York City, 1995

Exhibit 9

A Map of New York City Police Precincts

Exhibit 10

Police Staff Ratios for Major U.S. Cities

JAMES Q. WILSON

21

CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY

When the United States experienced the great increase in crime that began in the early 1960s and continued through the 1970s, most Americans were inclined to attribute it to conditions unique to this country. Many conservatives blamed it on judicial restraints on the police, the abandonment of capital punishment, and the mollicoddling of offenders; many liberals blamed it on poverty, racism, and the rise of violent television programs. Europeans, to the extent they noticed it at all, referred to it, sadly or patronizingly, as the "American" problem, a product of our disorderly society, weak state, corrupt police, or imperfect welfare system.

Now, thirty years later, any serious discussion of crime must begin with the fact that, except for homicide, most industrialized nations have crime rates that resemble those in the United States. All the world is coming to look like America. In 1981, the burglary rate in Great Britain was much less than that in the United States; within six years the two rates were the same; today, British homes are more likely to be burgled than American ones. In 1980, the rate at which automobiles were stolen was lower in France than in the United States; today, the reverse is true. By 1984 the burglary rate in the Netherlands was nearly twice that in the United States. In Australia and Sweden certain forms of theft are more common than they are here. While property crime rates were declining during most of the 1980s in the United States, they were rising elsewhere (Lynch, Chapter 2 in this volume; Kalish 1988).¹

America continues to lead the industrialized world in murders. There can be little doubt that part of that lead is to be explained by the greater availability of handguns in this country. Arguments that once might have been settled with insults or punches are more likely to be settled by shootings. But guns

When Truth Is Stranger Than Friction

By David Segal

Washington Post Staff Writer

Until recently, Militec Inc. of Rosslyn led a quiet existence, selling a pretty mundane product.

The eight-year-old company, which has six full-time employees, markets a synthetic oil that reduces metal-on-metal friction. Because the oil prevents guns from jamming and corroding, weapon owners are steady customers. And U.S. enforcement agencies, such as the Secret Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration, are among Militec's repeat buyers.

But recently life at Militec got exciting—maybe a little too exciting, said Brad Giordani, the company's founder and president.

Among Militec's enthusiasts, he said, is a group of well-armed guerrillas in the South American jungles of Colombia, where the government buys Militec-1 for its weapons.

The guerrillas made it clear in January that they aren't particularly interested in spending money for the oil. They want it for free and threatened to kill a few of the company's South American distributors if their demands weren't met, company officials said.

"They've called and visited some of our people down there a few times in the last few months and said 'You give us the Militec and we'll let you live,'" Giordani said. "It's sort of flattering on one level. Then again, it's kind of frightening."

The Militec distributors, who reside in Sogamoso, a town about 174 miles, northeast of Bogota, refused to hand over the product. In part, that's because the guerrillas—part of the communist-leaning Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—demanded a lot of oil, 15 cases

at a cost of about \$360 a case. And because there are scores of guerrilla groups in Colombia, Militec-1's distributors also were worried that the threats would be unending if they gained a reputation for giving away their product.

There was another complication, according to the company: The Colombian government bought about \$50,000 worth of Militec-1 in the past three years and told Militec's distributor that it isn't inter-

ested in seeing the outlaws use a product that gives them maximum performance from their guns.

So instead of handing over the oil, Militec's Sogamoso distributors hid the cases and fled for their lives. The company's head sales representative in Colombia, Juan Carlos Garcia, pleads ignorance about the location of the cases.

"I don't know, and I don't want to know," Garcia said. "These guerrillas have no morals, they will kill anyone. The less we know about where our people have gone, the better."

Militec would be useful for FARC's guerrillas, Giordani said, because they have to contend with high humidity, which attracts moisture and dirt and can cause a weapon to misfire.

"I kind of hate to admit this," he said, "but if I were a guerrilla living and fighting in a jungle, I'd want a case of this oil too."

Life at Militec is usually more tranquil.

MILITEC INC.

- **Headquarters:** Rosslyn
- **Founded:** 1987
- **President:** Brad Giordani, 40
- **Product:** Militec-1, a metal conditioner that reduces friction in machine tools, cars and guns.
- **Employees:** Six
- **Customers:** U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, Secret Service.

Giordani, a former logger in Washington state, started the company after years of selling lubricants to mill operators he met in the lumber industry. Having seen the shortcomings of the oils he was pitching, in 1986 Giordani decided to develop his own.

"I had an idea about what an improved lubricant would be able to do, and I thought there would be a large market for it," said Giordani, a 40-year-old California native. "People I talked to suggested I make a product based on synthetic oils,

instead of petroleum. So I started experimenting."

The product appeals to gun owners, Giordani said, because—after a few rounds are fired—the oil bonds with a weapon's surface, which means parts

move freely, enhancing accuracy without leaving an oily residue.

Giordani opened Militec in the Washington area to win over the sort of large government buyers who could give his start-up company some cachet and revenue.

He is tight-lipped about how he developed his product. Worried about keeping his formula confidential because its patent is still pending, he would not say what is in the oil, or identify the people who helped him formulate it, or say where it is manufactured.

Militec is a privately held company and Giordani also would not discuss its revenue and profit. But he said that in addition to selling its products through retail auto parts stores, much of his business is sales to foreign governments in South America and Asia, U.S. enforcement agencies and the military services.

Giordani counts the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Marine Corps, the DEA and the Secret Service as customers. A Secret Service spokesman said Militec is routinely issued to its agents.

"Our 2,000 agents and 1,200 officers are issued a small bottle of the stuff with their guns," said Carl Meyer, a spokesman with the Secret Service. "We've found that it repels water extremely well and keeps weapons operating smoothly. Obviously, that is a high priority for us."

Staff researcher Richard Drezen contributed to this report.

It's not officers on bikes, it's tough, smart policing that reduces crime

A mere three weeks after bipartisan congressional action marking out "a clear path to achieving the mutual objective of putting more police on the street," John P. Walters in his May 16 Op-Ed ("COPS is not going to get cops on the beat") advances the illogical position that adding 100,000 police officers and sheriffs' deputies is not going to get cops on the beat or contribute to the reduction of crime.

Mr. Walters' remarks fly in the face of the conference committee report, which states that funding should be used to provide grants "in order to reach the goal of 100,000 additional police officer by the year 2000." The report's conclusions were further supported by majority votes in the Republican-controlled House and Senate.

I know that no one single factor is responsible for the encouraging trends in crime rates over the past four years. But police chiefs and sheriffs from every part of the country have credited both the additional resources stemming from the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program and proven community policing strategies as making a difference in their communities.

All 43,000 additional officers for which funding already has been approved by the Department of Justice will not appear on the streets overnight. Nor should they. The professional standards for police officers are high. Suitable candidates must be recruited, screened, tested and subjected to background investigations prior to hiring. Many agencies report that only two or three candidates out of every 100 applicants will make it through these processes. Even then, the very best who do qualify to become police officers must successfully complete rigorous academy training, which can typically take four to six months, along with field training programs lasting an equivalent period.

In making grants for new officers, we ask state and local police agencies not to short-circuit their

recruitment and training processes and standards. Mr. Walters sees this as a "bureaucratic pipeline." I see it as a commitment to ensure that only the finest and most qualified are entrusted with serving and protecting the safety of our citizens. As a former police chief, I can tell you that we have learned some valuable lessons from prematurely rushing new officers to the streets in many cities. As every week goes by, more and more COPS-funded officers graduate from academies and join the front lines in the fight against crime — but they are doing so without compromising existing local and state standards for peace officer hiring.

Mr. Walters also criticizes the grants that we have made for state-of-the-art technology, equipment and police hiring which enable police and sheriffs' deputies to allow currently employed officers to leave their desk jobs and get back to the streets. The cost efficiencies from better utilizing already trained and experienced officers are evident, but it is the local agencies that tell us where the potential time savings are in their communities and identify the resources that will help them to make it a reality. This flexible pairing of federal resources to locally identified needs has resulted in a "win-win" situation, where police presence is substantially bolstered at remarkably low cost.

True, the COPS program doesn't pay 100 percent of the cost of hiring a new officer in perpetuity. Nor was it intended to, because the size and scope of commitment to law enforcement should be a local decision and not the product of a new federal entitlement to permanent funding. In the example cited by Mr. Walters, the city manager of Sunnyvale, Calif., seems to oppose this basic principle by arguing for guaranteed federal funding through the next decade. Further, there is no surprise that the federal share of hiring costs would appear low, when Sunnyvale officials compare the funding provided by a three-year

grant program against 10 years of expenses. Balancing apples against oranges never works.

COPS seeks to provide seed money to enable interested communities to expand the size of their police forces. Additional funds are made available to communities in severe fiscal distress. While a relatively small number of agencies have elected not to seek COPS funding because of the requirement that local "matching funds" be paid, today COPS grantees serve over 87 percent of the American public. And the reach of COPS resources grows daily.

Finally, Mr. Walters shows a lack of understanding of what community policing is about. It is not a "Washington knows best" concoction. Community policing was developed, tested and proven at the local level over many years. The federal government only caught the wave. Community policing is not just officers on bikes. Community policing is tough and smart policing, strengthened by community partnerships, a focus on problem-solving and organizational transformation. Mr. Walters is plain wrong to suggest that community policing has nothing to offer homicide detectives or highway patrol officers, and I know of many agencies that would be happy to set him straight.

The COPS program and the supporters of community policing have never sought to take exclusive credit for declining crime rates. But it is folly to deny a connection. Backed in part by federal resources and drawing on community policing tactics, local police and sheriffs are addressing crime problems in a comprehensive fashion. And this is where the credit for declining crime rates truly resides — at the local level and with the officers who risk their lives on a daily basis to make a difference in their communities.

JOSEPH E. BRANN

Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Washington

**OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS
Drug Courts Program Office
Grant Award List**

GRANTEE	STATE	APPROXIMATE AWARD AMOUNT
Tuscaloosa Co. Commission (Implementation)	Alabama	\$ 500,000
Riverside Probation Department (Implementation)	California	\$ 300,000
Board of Co. Commissioners- Hillsborough Co. (Implementation)	Florida	\$ 250,000
Fulton Co. Superior Court (Implementation)	Georgia	\$ 750,000
Kankakee Co. Circuit Court (Implementation)	Illinois	\$ 300,000
Douglas Co. District Court (Implementation)	Nebraska	\$ 450,000
Mental Health and Anti- Addiction Services (Implementation)	Puerto Rico	\$ 650,000
Virginia Department of Corrections (Implementation)	Virginia	\$ 200,000
Spokane Co. Board of Commissioners (Implementation)	Washington	\$ 300,000
Los Angeles Co. (Enhancement)	California	\$ 800,000
Pretrial Services Agency (Enhancement)	District of Columbia	\$ 800,000
Duval County (Enhancement)	Florida	\$ 750,000
Metropolitan Dade Co. (Enhancement)	Florida	\$ 300,000
Kalamazoo Co. Government (Enhancement)	Michigan	\$ 750,000
Clark Co.- 8th Judicial Circuit District Court (Enhancement)	Nevada	\$ 700,000
Pierce Co. Superior Court (Enhancement)	Washington	\$ 650,000
TOTAL AWARDS - 16		\$ 8,450,000

POLICE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK



THE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE

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POLICE COMMISSIONER**

The Civil Enforcement Initiative and
Community Policing

The purpose of this report is to describe the Civil Enforcement Initiative, an innovative program that integrates civil remedies into the problem-solving processes that form the core of the community policing philosophy.

Under community policing, a precinct commander and the other police personnel assigned to that precinct, work closely with the community to identify the various problems of crime and disorder facing that community and to develop strategies to address those problems. The purpose of the Civil Enforcement Initiative is to expand the "menu" of problem-solving techniques to include strategies that combine criminal and civil remedies. Under the Initiative, attorneys from the Police Department's Legal Bureau are assigned to serve as "counsel to the precinct" to assist the commanding officer (and, by extension, the beat officer) in the development of these innovative strategies.

The hypothesis of the Civil Enforcement Initiative is simple: by combining civil remedies with the traditional arsenal of criminal law enforcement, the Police Department will develop strategies that, from a community perspective, are more effective at abating illegal activity. To implement the pilot program, the Police Department created a new office of attorneys within the Legal Bureau, the Civil Enforcement Unit.

The Pilot Phase of The Civil Enforcement
Initiative

The Civil Enforcement Initiative began in the 52nd Precinct in the Bronx in June 1991, was expanded to three more Bronx precincts (the 46th, 48th, and 50th Precincts) in August 1991, and to the 34th Precinct in Northern Manhattan in July 1992. In each instance, the process was the same: attorneys from the Legal Bureau were assigned to work in the precinct, where they met with the precinct commander, the supervisory officers of the community policing units, and the beat officers, to jointly identify problems and develop strategies to address those problems.

In some instances, the strategies that emerged from this process were not new. In others, the strategies reflected the application of existing techniques to new problems. In still others, the involvement of the Legal Bureau attorneys resulted in the expansion of the law into new areas, the generation of legislative proposals to enhance the role of law enforcement agencies, and the development of new public safety partnerships between agencies of state, federal and local government.

The following are examples of the Civil Enforcement Initiative's strategies to address specific problems within a community:

* Street Prostitution: Under "Operation Losing Proposition", female undercover officers pose as street-walking prostitutes and engage prospective patrons in a conversation that results in the arrest of the patron on "john." The defendant's vehicle is then seized and held for forfeiture under the Administrative Code. The Public Morals Division conducts the undercover operation and attorneys from the Civil Enforcement Unit are on site to evaluate the legal basis for the forfeiture of the vehicle. Arrests have been made and cars seized in hundreds of cases.

* Indoor Prostitution: Using either the Padlock Law or the Nuisance Abatement Law, the Police Department has secured closing orders in dozens of indoor prostitution locations. Working with the Mayor's Office of Midtown Enforcement, which is designated to bring Nuisance Abatement actions in Queens, the Department's Public Morals Division has been particularly successful at closing dozens of massage parlors along Roosevelt Avenue. Under these statutes, the locations can be closed for up to a year, thereby abating the illegal activity and depriving the landlord of rental income.

* Gambling: Using either the Padlock Law or the Nuisance Abatement Law, the Department has closed dozens of gambling locations.

* Loud Car Radios: "Operation Soundtrap", an enforcement strategy to deter "boombox" cars, was developed by the Civil Enforcement Unit pursuant to a new provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) which makes the loud playing of a car sound system a violation. This strategy was developed in cooperation with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). Under "Operation Soundtrap", DEP inspectors measure the sound level from car radios to determine whether the noise level exceeds the legal limit. The Police Department then issues summonses to the operators of these vehicles for violation of the VTL and seizes the vehicles as evidence.

* Loud Motorcycles: Under "Operation Cycle Check", an enforcement strategy was developed with the State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to respond to the problem of loud motorcycles on the streets of New York City. Teams of police officers and DMV investigators stop motorcycles to conduct safety checks. These inspection teams check the insurance and registration status of the motorcycle, the validity of the driver's license, and the muffler's compliance with the laws against excessive noise. Summonses are issued for various violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Motorcycles that are unregistered or uninsured are impounded pending compliance.

* Street Narcotics Sales: Under "Operation Chariot", individuals who drive to street-level drug locations to buy drugs are arrested and the vehicles used to facilitate these crimes are seized and held for forfeiture. Thousands of arrests and forfeitures have been effectuated under "Operation Chariot."

* Residential Narcotics Sales: Working with the Office of Operations for Narcotics Control of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development, the Civil Enforcement Unit refers information regarding drug dealing in city-owned buildings. This information is used to institute eviction proceedings against those drug dealers. In cooperation with the Narcotics Eviction Units of the District Attorneys' offices, information contained in search warrant applications is converted into eviction proceedings under the Bawdy House Law.

* Drug Paraphernalia: Under "Operation Parable", the Narcotics Division, working with the District Attorney, the Customs Bureau, and the Civil Enforcement Unit, has developed a three-pronged attack against stores selling drug paraphernalia. The Police Department makes arrests under the Penal Law for selling drug paraphernalia; attorneys in the Civil Enforcement Unit commence forfeiture actions under the Public Health Law or closing actions under the Nuisance Abatement Law; the Law Department works with the Legal Bureau to obtain injunctions under the General Business Law against the sale of drug paraphernalia. The Police Department has also submitted

legislation to make possession of large amounts of these items a felony and to expand the General Business Law to include crack paraphernalia as items that cannot legally be sold.

* Drug-Infested Buildings: Working with federal and state authorities, the Police Department developed information used by the United States Attorney to commence federal forfeiture proceedings to seize a 210-unit building in Washington Heights that had become a source of significant levels of drug dealing. While in litigation under the federal forfeiture statute, the building was managed by a private company under contract with the United States Marshal's Service. After a jury trial, the building was awarded to the government.

* Chop Shops: Working with the Bronx District Attorney's office, the attorneys in the Civil Enforcement Unit converted information contained in a search warrant application into a recommendation to the Corporation Counsel to close a chop shop under the Nuisance Abatement Law. (For unrelated reasons, the closing was not pursued.)

* Sale of Liquor to Minors: In response to the problem of illegal sale of liquor to minors, identified as a problem by Bronx precinct commanders, the Police Commissioner approved a two-part plan under which (1) the Police Department would hold meetings with the bar owners explaining the law and the consequences for failure to observe the law, and (2) the local precinct would send precinct personnel into the establishments

to observe whether the laws were being violated. If violations were found, the Legal Bureau would notify the State Liquor Authority to ask for expedited license hearings on the offense or, in the case of intransigent locations, commence Nuisance Abatement actions. Following the meeting with the owners, compliance improved and the second step involving uniformed personnel and enforcement activity was not needed.

The Results of the Pilot Phase of the Civil Enforcement Initiative

In the Civil Enforcement Initiative's pilot program, these strategies have been found to be effective, both by the community and the police. The principal measure of its effectiveness is in the reduction of illegal activity. Locations engaging in drug selling, prostitution, gambling, dismantling stolen cars, or selling alcohol to minors are all reported as abating or significantly reducing that illegal activity. Locations that are the sites for street prostitution, street drug selling, loud motorcycles, or "boombox" cars are also reported as witnessing a reduction of those activities following an operation that targets, for forfeiture or seizure, the vehicles of those individuals who violate the law. The residents of the building seized under the federal forfeiture law report that a sense of safety has been restored with the implementation of the security measures directed by the federal authorities. At the same building, the local precinct reports a dramatic decrease in drug-related 911 calls for police response.

In short, the strategies developed under the Civil Enforcement Initiative have been successful -- both because they significantly reduce the level of illegal activity, and because they are highly visible indicators that the Police Department is responsive to community concerns.

The Civil Enforcement Initiative at the Division Level

In August 1993, the Police Department expanded the Civil Enforcement Initiative to the 17th Division in Queens, which includes the 102nd, the 107th, the 109th, the 111th and the 112th Precincts. This expansion marked the first time civil enforcement would operate at a Division level instead of at the precinct level. The purpose of this expansion was to test the idea that the civil enforcement process could best be institutionalized at the Division level, where a Division Commander would be able to coordinate enforcement resources and address problems that cross precinct boundaries.

The implementation of the Northeast Queens Civil Enforcement Project began with a strategy to address problems that had plagued these communities for a number of years; drag racing, disorderly youths, underage drinking and loud car radios on Francis Lewis Boulevard. A task force of community police officers, Highway Units, Borough Task Force Units, Department of Environmental Protection inspectors, Department of Transportation Tow Operators and attorneys from the Civil Enforcement Unit was created. Safety checkpoints were

established along Francis Lewis Boulevard over several weekends. The task force enforced vehicle and traffic regulations on loud car radios, excessive speed, driving with suspended or revoked licenses, and parking regulations. Over a six week period, more than 4,000 summonses were issued, over 25 arrests were made and more than 190 vehicles were towed. As a result, traffic on Francis Lewis Boulevard has decreased significantly on weekend evenings, groups of loud youths no longer congregate on the sidewalks, and cars with loud radios no longer double park on the street.

To address problems of underage drinking, particularly along Bell Boulevard, members of the 17th Division, Civil Enforcement attorneys, members of the Public Morals Division, and a representative from the State Liquor Authority met with the owners of the bars and delicatessens in the community. The store owners were advised of the proper proof required to determine a person's age, the types of mechanical devices that aid in the detection of false proof of age, and the increased enforcement of the State Liquor Authority regulations. Since this meeting, undercover operations have established that the sale of alcohol to underage patrons has stopped and the number of disorderly youths has decreased. The Division Commander of the 17th Division is continuing to implement other strategies to address problems facing those communities, particularly the problem of grand larceny auto.

Citywide Expansion of the Civil Enforcement Initiative



The Police Department will expand the Civil Enforcement Initiative citywide. This expansion will take place in three phases, and when completed, the Civil Enforcement Unit within the Police Department's Legal Bureau will be expanded to a total complement of about 45 attorneys. In essence, a new law firm will be created, the first of its kind in the country, to provide legal support for community policing strategies.

The first phase of the citywide expansion began on April 1, 1994. This phase brought the Civil Enforcement Initiative to six Divisions - - the 11th and 14th Divisions in Brooklyn, the 2nd and 5th Divisions in Manhattan, the 8th Division in the Bronx, and the entire borough of Staten Island.

The second phase of this expansion will begin on July 1, 1994, when the Civil Enforcement Initiative will be introduced to six additional Divisions throughout the City. The expansion will be completed by September, 1994 when the remaining six Divisions are added to the program. (Assuming final budget approval of the necessary attorneys.) When completed, each Division in the City will have an average of two attorneys assigned to work with Division personnel to develop strategies to address quality of life concerns in the communities.

The Police Department views this citywide Civil Enforcement as an integral part of its community policing philosophy -- as providing each precinct, and the community served by that precinct, with new tools in the fight against crime, disorder and fear.

FIVE BOROUGHES




POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF NEW YORK
Communications Division
Cartography & Drafting Unit



TOTAL CITY AREA

BOROUGH	SQUARE MILES
MANHATTAN	22.36
BROOKLYN	60.95
QUEENS	118.63
BRONX	41.64
RICHMOND	57.00




FIVE BOROUGHS



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COUNTY

BRONX

NEW JERSEY

HUDSON RIVER

EAST RIVER

BRONX RIVER

QUEENS

NASSAU COUNTY

GOVANUS BAY

BROOKLYN

JAMAICA BAY

SHEEPSHEAD BAY

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
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FIVE BOROUGHS




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are not the whole story. Big American cities have had more homicides than comparable European ones for almost as long as anyone can find records. New York and Philadelphia have been more murderous than London since the early part of the nineteenth century. This country has had a violent history; with respect to murder that seems likely to remain the case. But for most property crimes, much of the rest of the world has caught up and even passed us by.

Indeed, except for homicide, and in particular youthful homicide, things have been getting better in the United States for over a decade. Since 1980, robbery rates (as reported in victim surveys) have declined by 15 percent. The rate at which adults kill each other was no higher in 1990 than it was in 1980, and in many cities it was considerably lower.

This was as it was supposed to be. Starting in around 1980, two things happened that ought to have reduced most forms of crime. The first was the passing into middle age of the postwar baby boom. By 1990 there were 1.5 million fewer boys between the ages of fifteen and nineteen than there had been in 1980, a drop that meant that this youthful fraction of the population fell from 9.3 percent to 7.2 percent of the total. In addition, the great increase in the size of the prison population, caused in part by the growing willingness of judges to send offenders to jail, meant that the dramatic reductions in the costs of crime that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s were slowly (and very partially) being reversed. Until around 1985, this reversal involved almost exclusively real criminals and parole violators; it was not until after 1985 that more than a small part of the growth in prison populations was made up of drug offenders.

Because of the combined effect of fewer young people on the street and more offenders in prison, many scholars, myself included, predicted a continuing drop in crime rates throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. We were almost right. Crime rates did decline, but suddenly, starting in around 1985, youthful homicide rates shot up.

Alfred Blumstein (Chapter 17) has estimated that the rate at which young males, ages fourteen to seventeen, kill people has gone up significantly for whites and incredibly for blacks. Between 1985 and 1992, the homicide rate for young white males went up by about 50 percent but for young black males it *tripled*. Meanwhile the homicide rate for older males scarcely changed at all. The public perception that today's crime problem is different from and more serious than that of earlier decades is quite correct. Youngsters are shooting at people at a far higher rate than at any time in recent history. Since young people are more likely than adults to kill strangers (as opposed to lovers or spouses), the risk to innocent bystanders has gone up. There may be some comfort to be had in the fact that youthful homicides are only a small fraction of all killings, but given their randomness it is not much solace.

Our Two Crime Problems

The United States does not have "a" crime problem, it has at least two. Our high (though now slightly declining) rates of property crime are very much like those to be found in most of the industrialized West. They reflect a profound, worldwide cultural change: prosperity, freedom, and mobility have emancipated people almost everywhere from those ancient bonds of custom, family, and village that once held in check both some of our better and many of our worst impulses. The power of the state has been weakened, the status of children elevated, and the opportunity for adventure expanded; as a consequence, we have experienced an explosion of artistic creativity, entrepreneurial zeal, political experimentation—and criminal activity. A global economy has integrated the markets for clothes, music, automobiles—and drugs.

There are only two restraints on behavior—morality, enforced by individual conscience or social rebuke, and law, enforced by the police and the courts. If society is to maintain a behavioral equilibrium, any decline in the former must be matched by a rise in the latter (or vice versa). If familial and traditional restraints on wrongful behavior are eroded, it becomes necessary to increase the legal restraints. But the enlarged spirit of freedom and the heightened suspicion of the state have made it difficult or impossible to use the criminal justice system to achieve what custom and morality once produced.

This is the modern dilemma; and it may be an insoluble one, at least for the West. The Islamic cultures of the Middle East and the Confucian cultures of the Far East believe that they have a solution. It involves allowing enough liberty for economic progress (albeit under general state direction) while reserving to the state, and its allied religion, nearly unfettered power over personal conduct. It is too soon to tell whether this formula—best exemplified by the prosperous but puritanical city-state of Singapore—will, in the long run, be able to achieve both reproducible affluence and intense social control.

The other crime problem has to do with the kind of felonies we have: high levels of violence, especially youthful violence, often occurring as part of urban gang life and produced disproportionately by a large, alienated, and self-destructive underclass. This part of the crime problem, though not uniquely American, is more important here than in any other industrialized nation. Britons, Germans, and Swedes are upset about the insecurity of their property and uncertain about what response to make to its theft, but if Americans only had to worry about their homes being burgled and their autos stolen, I doubt that crime would be the national obsession we are now experiencing. Crime, we should recall, was not a major issue in the 1984

election and had only begun to be one in the 1988 contest; by 1992 it was challenging the economy as a popular concern and in 1994 it dominates all other matters. The reason, I think, is that Americans believe something fundamental has changed in our patterns of crime. They are right. We were unhappy about having our property put at risk, but we adapted with the aid of locks, alarms, and security guards. But we are terrified by the prospect of innocent people being gunned down at random, without warning and almost without motive, by youngsters who afterwards show us the blank, unremorseful face of a seemingly feral, presocial being.

The Characteristics of Repeat Offenders

Criminology has learned a great deal about who these people are. In studies both here and abroad it has been established that about 6 percent of the boys of a given age will commit half or more of all the serious crime produced by all boys of that age. Allowing for measurement errors, it is remarkable how consistent this formula is—6 percent causes 50 percent. It is roughly true in places as different as Philadelphia; London; Racine; and Orange County, California (Farrington, Ohlin, and Wilson 1986, 50–52; Kurz and Moore 1994).

We also have learned a lot about the characteristics of the 6 percent. They tend to have criminal parents; to live in cold or discordant families (or pseudo-families); to have a low verbal intelligence quotient and to do poorly in school; to be emotionally cold and temperamentally impulsive; to abuse alcohol and drugs at the earliest opportunity; and to reside in poor, disorderly communities. They begin their misconduct at an early age, often by the time they are in the third grade. These characteristics tend to be found not only among the criminals who get caught (and who might, owing to bad luck, be an unrepresentative sample of all high rate offenders), but among those who don't get caught but reveal their behavior on questionnaires (Herrnstein, this volume, Chapter 3; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985, chaps. 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; Farrington 1991). And these traits can be identified in advance among groups of randomly selected youngsters, long before they commit any serious crimes—not with enough precision to predict which individuals will commit crimes, but with enough accuracy to be a fair depiction of the group as a whole. Not everyone in the 6 percent looks like this, and some high rate offenders begin their criminal careers much later in life; but in general few criminologists are any longer surprised to find that the typical chronic offender looks pretty much as I have described him.²

But a puzzle arises: If 6 percent of the males cause so large a fraction of our collective misery, and if young males are less numerous than once was the case, why are crime rates high and rising? The answer, I conjecture, is that the traits of the 6 percent put them at risk for whatever criminogenic forces

operate in society. Magnify those forces and the at-risk boys will respond in exaggerated fashion, though all of us will respond to some degree. As the costs of crime decline or the benefits increase, as drugs and guns become more available, as the glorification of violence becomes more commonplace, as families and neighborhoods lose some of their restraining power—as all of these things happen, almost all of us will change our ways to some degree. For the most law-abiding among us, the change will be quite modest: a few more tools stolen from our employer, a few more traffic lights run when no police officer is watching, a few more experiments with fashionable drugs, and a few more business deals on which we cheat. For the least law-abiding among us, the change will be dramatic: we will get drunk daily instead of just on Saturday night, try PCP or crack instead of illegal cigarettes, join gangs instead of marauding in pairs, and buy automatic weapons instead of making zip guns.

A metaphor: When children play the school yard game of crack the whip, the child at the head of the line scarcely moves but the child at the far end, racing to keep his footing, often stumbles and falls, hurled to the ground by the cumulative force of many smaller movements back down the line. When a changing culture escalates criminality, the at-risk boys are at the end of the line, and the conditions of American urban life—guns, drugs, automobiles, disorganized neighborhoods—make the line very long and the ground underfoot rough and treacherous.

Prevention, Deterrence, and Western Values

Much is said these days about preventing or deterring crime, but it is important to understand exactly what we are up against when we try. Prevention, if it can be made to work at all, must start very early in life, perhaps as early as the first two or three years, and given the odds it faces—childhood impulsivity, low verbal facility, incompetent parenting, disorderly neighborhoods—be massive in scope. Deterrence, if it can be made to work harder (and surely it already works to some degree), must be applied close to the moment of the wrongful act or else the present-orientedness of the would-be offender will discount the threat so much that the promise of even a small gain will outweigh its large but deferred costs.

But in this country, and in most Western nations, we have profound misgivings about doing anything that would give prevention or deterrence a chance to make a large difference. The family is sacrosanct; the family preservation movement is strong; the state is a clumsy alternative. "Crime prevention" programs, therefore, usually take the form of creating summer jobs for adolescents, worrying about the unemployment rate, or (as in a version of the

1994 crime bill) funding midnight basketball leagues. There may be something to be said for all of these efforts, but crime prevention is not one of them. The high rate offender is well launched on his career before he becomes a teenager or has ever encountered the labor market; he may like basketball, but who pays for the lights and the ball is a matter of supreme indifference to him.

Prompt deterrence has much to recommend it; the folk wisdom that swift and certain punishment is more effective than severe penalties is almost surely correct.³ But the greater the swiftness and certainty, the less attention paid to matters of guilt or innocence and the procedural safeguards essential to establishing culpability. The courts exist in part to restrain our desire for swiftness and certainty, and most of us want some such restraints to exist. Despite their good instincts for the right answers, the people, frustrated by the restraints (many wise, some foolish) on swiftness and certainty, vote for proposals to increase severity: if the penalty is ten years, let us make it twenty or thirty; if the penalty is life imprisonment, let us make it death; if the penalty is jail, let us make it caning.

The more draconian the sentence, the less (on the average) the chance of its being imposed; plea bargains see to that. And the most draconian sentences will, of necessity, tend to fall on adult offenders nearing the end of their criminal careers and not on the young ones who are in their criminally most productive years. (The peak ages of criminality are between sixteen and eighteen; the average age of prison inmates is ten years older.) I say "of necessity" because almost every judge will give first-, second-, or even third-time offenders a break, reserving the heaviest sentences for those men who have finally exhausted judicial patience or optimism. Laws that say, "Three strikes and you're out," are an effort to change this, but they suffer from an inherent contradiction: If they are carefully drawn so as to target only the most serious offenders they will probably have a minimal impact on the crime rate, but if they are broadly drawn so as to make a big impact on the crime rate they will catch many petty repeat offenders who few of us think really deserve life imprisonment.

Prevention and deterrence, albeit hard to augment, at least are plausible strategies. Not so with many of the other favorite nostrums. Televised violence may have some impact on criminality (Donnerstein and Linz, this volume, Chapter 11) but I know of few scholars who think the effect is very large. And to achieve even a small effect we might have to turn the clock back to the kind of programming we had around 1945, because the few studies that correlate programming with the rise in violent crime find the biggest changes occurred between that year and 1974. Boot camps made good copy, but so far no one has shown that they reduce the rate at which the former inmates commit crimes (Greenwood, this volume, Chapter 5; Clear and Braga, this volume, Chapter 18). Guns are almost certainly contributors to the lethality of American violence, but there is no politically or legally feasible

way to reduce the stock of guns now in private possession to the point that their availability to criminals would be much affected (compare with Cook and Moore, this volume, Chapter 12). And even if there were, law-abiding people would lose a means of protecting themselves long before criminals lost a means of attacking them. Rehabilitating juvenile offenders has some merit, but there are few big success stories. Individually, the best (and best-evaluated) programs have minimal, if any, effects; collectively, the best estimate of the crime reduction value of these programs is quite modest, something on the order of 5 or 10 percent.⁴

Controlling the Streets

What, then, is to be done? Let us begin with policing, since law enforcement officers are that part of the criminal justice system that is closest to the situations in which criminal activity is likely to occur. It is now widely accepted that, however important it is for officers to drive around waiting for 911 calls summoning their help, doing that is not enough. As a supplement to a reactive strategy, comprising random preventive patrol and the investigation of crimes that have already occurred, many leaders and students of law enforcement now urge the police to be "proactive"—to identify, with the aid of citizen groups, problems that can be solved so as to prevent as well as respond to criminality. This is often called community-based policing. But what, exactly, does this entail? Something more than feel-good meetings with honest citizens, but something less than allowing neighborhoods to assume control of the police function.

Let me suggest that, to the extent their resources permit, the police ought to engage in *directed*, not random, patrol, and should make the following the goal of that direction: to reduce, consistent with fundamental liberties, the opportunity for high-risk persons to do those things that increase the likelihood of their victimizing others. Here are some examples:

Stop and pat down persons who the police reasonably suspect may be carrying illegal guns. The Supreme Court has upheld such frisks when an officer observes "unusual conduct" leading him to conclude that "criminal activity may be afoot" on the part of a person who may be "armed and dangerous." This is all rather vague, but it can be clarified in two ways (see Wilson [1994]). Statutes can be enacted that make certain persons, on the basis of their past conduct and present legal status, subject to pat downs for weapons. And technology can be developed that provides the officer with a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is carrying a concealed weapon. The statutes can, as is now the case in several states, make all probationers and parolees subject to nonconsensual searches for weapons as a condition of their remaining on probation or parole. Since three-fourths of all offenders (and a large fraction of all convicted felons) are in the community rather than

in prison, there are on any given day over three million convicted criminals on the streets under correctional supervision. Many are likely to become recidivists. Keeping them from carrying weapons will materially reduce the chances that they will rob or kill. It is also possible that courts might declare, under statutory authority, certain dangerous street gangs to be continuing criminal enterprises, membership in which constitutes grounds for police frisks. Since I first proposed such a strategy, I have learned that there are efforts under way in public and private research laboratories to develop technologies that will permit the police to detect from a distance persons who are carrying concealed weapons on the streets; should these efforts bear fruit, they will provide the police with the grounds for stopping, questioning, and patting down even persons not on probation or parole or obviously in gangs. Whether or not the technology works, the police can also offer immediate cash rewards to people who provide information of individuals illegally carrying weapons. Spending \$100 on each good tip will have a bigger effect on dangerous gun use than will the same amount spent buying back guns from law-abiding people.⁵ Getting illegal firearms off the streets will require that the police be motivated to do all of these things. But if the legal, technological, and motivational issues can be resolved, our streets can be made safer even without sending many more people to prison.

The same directed patrol strategy might help keep known offenders drug free. Most persons jailed in big cities were using illegal drugs within the day or two preceding their arrest. When convicted, some are given probation on condition that they enter drug treatment programs; others are sent to prisons where (if they are lucky) drug treatment programs operate. But in many cities the enforcement of such probation conditions is casual or nonexistent; in many states parolees are released back into drug-infested communities with little effort to insure that they participate in whatever treatment programs are to be found there (see Boyum and Kleiman, this volume, Chapter 13). Almost everyone agrees that more treatment programs should exist, but what many advocates overlook is that steadfast participation is the key to success and many, probably most, offenders have no incentive to be steadfast. Patrol officers could enforce random drug tests on probationers and parolees on their beats; failing to take a test when ordered, or failing the test when taken, should be grounds for immediate revocation of probation or parole, at least for a brief period of confinement. The goal of this tactic is not simply to keep offenders drug free (and thereby lessen their incentive to steal the money needed to buy drugs and reduce their likelihood of committing crimes because they are on a drug high); it is also to diminish the demand for drugs generally and thus the size of the drug market.

Lest the reader embrace this idea too quickly, let me add that as yet we have no good reason to think that it will reduce the crime rate by very much. Something akin to this strategy (albeit one using probation instead of police officers) has been tried under the name of "intensive supervision programs,"

or ISPs. By means of a set of randomized experiments carried out in fourteen cities, Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner (1993), both then at the Rand Corporation, compared the rearrest rates of offenders assigned to ISPs (with their panoply of drug tests, house arrests, frequent surveillance, and careful records) with those of offenders in ordinary probation. There was no difference. But this study does not settle the matter. For one thing, since the ISP participants were under much closer surveillance than the regular probationers, the former were bound to be caught breaking the law more frequently than the latter. It is possible that a higher fraction of the crimes committed by the ISP group than of those committed by the control group were detected and resulted in a return to prison, which would mean, if true, a net gain in public safety. For another thing, "intensive" supervision was in many cities not all that intensive—in five cities, contacts with the probationers occurred only about once a week, and for all cities drug tests occurred on average only once a month. Finally, there is some indication that participation in treatment programs was associated with lower recidivism rates.

Both antigun and antidrug police patrols will, if done systematically, require big changes in police and court procedures and a significant increase in the resources devoted to both, at least in the short run. (The ISP approach is not cheap, and it will become even more expensive if it is done in a truly intensive fashion.) Most officers have at present no incentive to search for guns or enforce drug tests; many jurisdictions, owing to crowded dockets or overcrowded jails, are lax about enforcing the conditions of probation or parole (Langan 1994). The result is that the one group of high-risk people over which society already has the legal right to exercise substantial control is often out of control, "supervised," if at all, by means of brief monthly interviews with overworked probation or parole officers.

Much crime is opportunistic: idle boys, usually in small groups, sometimes find the opportunity to steal or the challenge to fight irresistible. It is possible to deter such crimes by a credible threat of prompt sanctions, but deterring present-oriented youngsters who want to appear fearless in the eyes of their comrades while indulging their thrill-seeking natures is a tall order. It is easier to reduce their chances for risky group idleness in the first place. Realizing this, many cities are beginning to enforce truancy and curfew laws.

In Charleston, South Carolina, for example, Chief Reuben Greenberg instructed his officers to return all school-age children to the schools from which they were truant and to return all youngsters violating an evening curfew agreement to their parents. As a result, groups of school-age children were no longer to be found hanging out in the shopping malls or wandering the streets late at night. Burglaries and larcenies declined. There has been no careful evaluation of these efforts in Charleston (or, so far as I am aware, in any other big city), but the rough figures are impressive—the Charleston crime rate in 1991 was about 25 percent lower than the rate in South

Carolina's other principal cities and, for most offenses, lower than what that city reported twenty years earlier.

All of these tactics have in common putting the police, as Lawrence Sherman phrases it, where the "hot spots" are (Sherman, this volume, Chapter 14). Most people need no police attention except for a response to their calls for help. A small fraction of people (and places) need constant attention. In Minneapolis, for example, *all* of the robberies during one year occurred at just 2 percent of the city's addresses. To capitalize on this fact, the Minneapolis police began devoting extra patrol attention, in brief but frequent bursts of activity, to those locations known to be trouble spots. A careful evaluation suggested that robbery rates fell by as much as 20 percent and public disturbances by even more.

Some of the worst hot spots are outdoor drug markets. Because of limited resources, a fear of police corruption, or a desire to catch only the drug kingpins, the police in some cities (including, from time to time, New York) neglect street-corner dealing. By doing so, they get the worst of all worlds. The public, seeing the police ignore drug dealing that is in plain view, assumes that they are corrupt whether or not they are. The drug kingpins, who are hard to catch and are easily replaced by rival smugglers, find that their essential retail distribution system remains intact. Casual or first-time drug users, who might not use at all if access to supplies were difficult, find access to be effortless and so increase their consumption. People who might remain in treatment programs if drugs were hard to get drop out when they learn that they are easy to get. Interdicting without merely displacing drug markets is difficult but not impossible, but it requires motivation which some departments lack and resources which many don't have.

The sheer number of police on the streets of a city probably has only a weak, if any, relationship with the crime rate; what the police do is more important than how many there are, at least above some minimum level. But patrol directed at hot spots, loitering truants, late night wanderers, probationers, parolees, and possible gun carriers, all in addition to routine investigative activities, will require more officers in many cities. Between 1977 and 1987, the number of police officers declined in a third of the fifty largest cities and fell relative to population in many more. Just how far behind police resources have lagged can be gauged from this fact: In 1950 there was one violent crime reported for every police officer; in 1980 there were three violent crimes reported for every officer.

Prison

I have said little so far about penal policy, in part because I wish to focus attention on those things that are likely to have the largest and most immediate impact on the quality of urban life. But given the vast gulf between what

the public believes and what many experts argue should be our penal policy, a few comments are essential. The public wants more people sent away for longer sentences; many (probably most) criminologists think we use prison too much and at too great a cost and that this excessive use has had little beneficial effect on the crime rate.

My views are much closer to those of the public, though I think the average person exaggerates the faults of the present system and the gains of some alternative (such as "three strikes and you're out"). The expert view as it is expressed in countless op-ed essays often goes like this: "We have been arresting more and more people and giving them longer and longer sentences, producing no decrease in crime but huge increases in prison populations. As a result we have become the most punitive nation on earth."

Scarcely a phrase in those sentences is accurate. The probability of being arrested for a given crime is lower in 1994 than it was in 1974. The amount of time served in state prison has been declining more or less steadily since the 1940s: the median time served for burglary, for example, was thirty months in 1945 and thirteen months in 1984. Only for rape are prisoners serving as much time today as they did in the 1940s. Taking all crimes together, time served fell from twenty-five months in 1945 to thirteen months in 1984. The net effect of lower arrest rates and shorter effective sentences was that the cost of the average adult burglary fell from fifty days in 1960 to fifteen days in 1980. That is to say, the chances of being caught and convicted, multiplied by the median time served if imprisoned, was in 1980 less than a third of what it had been in 1960.⁶

Beginning in around 1980 the costs of crime began to inch up, the result, chiefly, of an increase in the proportion of convicted persons who were given prison terms. By 1986 the "price" of a given burglary had risen to twenty-one days. Also beginning in around 1980, the crime rate (as measured by household surveys) began to decline. It would be foolhardy to explain the drop in crime by the rise in imprisonment rates; many other factors, such as the aging of the population and the self-protective measures of potential victims, were also at work. Only a controlled experiment (for example, randomly allocating prison terms for a given crime among the states) could hope to untangle the causal patterns, and happily the Constitution makes such experiments unlikely. But it is worth noting that changes in the age structure of the population cannot explain even half of either the increase or the decrease in crime rates and that nations with different penal policies have experienced different crime rates. According to David Farrington of Cambridge University, property crime rates rose in England and Sweden at a time when both the imprisonment rate and time served fell substantially, while property crime rates declined in the United States at a time when the imprisonment rate (but not time served) was increasing (Farrington and Langan 1992; Farrington and Wikstrom 1993).

Though one cannot measure the effect of prison on crime with any

accuracy, it would be astonishing if it had no effect. For example: By 1986 there were 55,000 more robbers in prison than there had been in 1974. Assume that each imprisoned robber would commit five such offenses per year if free on the street. That means in 1986 there were 275,000 fewer robberies in America than there would have been had these 55,000 men been left on the street.

Nor does America use prison to a degree that vastly exceeds what is found in any other civilized nation. Compare the chance of going to prison in England and the United States if one is convicted of a given crime. According to Farrington and Langan (1992), your chances were higher in England if you were found guilty of a rape, higher in America if you were convicted of an assault or a burglary, and about the same if you were convicted of a homicide or a robbery. Once in prison, you would serve a longer time in this country than in England for almost all offenses save murder. James Lynch has reached similar conclusions from his comparative study of criminal justice policies (this volume, Chapter 2). His data show that the chances of going to prison and the time served for homicide and robbery are roughly the same in the United States, Canada, and England.

Starting in the mid-1980s, drug sentences began to change American penal practice radically. In 1982, only about 8 percent of state prison inmates were serving time on drug convictions. In 1987 that started to increase sharply; by 1994 over 60 percent of all federal and about 25 percent of all state prisoners were there on drug charges. In some states, such as New York, the percentage was even higher. This change can be attributed largely to the advent of crack cocaine. Whereas snorted cocaine powder was expensive, crack was cheap; whereas the former was distributed through networks catering to elite tastes, the latter was mass marketed on street corners. The public was rightly fearful of what crack was doing to their children and demanded action; as a result, crack dealers started going to prison in record numbers. These penalties may or may not deter dealing, but they do not have the same incapacitative effect as sentences for robbery. A robber taken off the street is not replaced by a new robber who has suddenly found a market niche, but a drug dealer sent away is replaced by a new one because an opportunity has opened up.

Reducing drug use requires reducing the demand for drugs, and that in turn requires either prevention programs on a scale heretofore unimagined or treatment programs with a level of effectiveness heretofore unachieved. Any big gains in prevention and treatment will probably have to await further basic research into the biochemistry of addiction and the development of effective and attractive drug antagonists that reduce the appeal of cocaine and similar substances.⁷

In the meantime, it is necessary to build much more prison space, find some other way of disciplining drug offenders, or both. There is very little to be gained, I think, from shortening the terms of existing nondrug inmates in

order to free up more prison space. Except for a few elderly, nonviolent offenders serving very long terms, there are real risks associated with shortening the terms of the typical inmate. Scholars disagree about the magnitude of those risks, but the best studies, such as the one of Wisconsin inmates done by Professor John DiIulio of Princeton, suggest that the annual costs in crime committed by an offender on the street are probably twice the costs of putting him in a cell (DiIulio and Piehl 1991; see also Cavanaugh and Kleiman [1990]). That ratio will vary from state to state because states differ in what proportion of convicted persons are imprisoned—some states dip deeper down into the pool of convictees, thereby imprisoning some with minor criminal habits.

But I caution the reader to understand that there are no easy prison solutions to crime, even if we build the additional space. The state prison population more than doubled between 1980 and 1990, yet the victimization rate for robbery fell by only 23 percent. Even if we assign all of that gain to the increased deterrent and incapacitative effect of prison, which is implausible, it is not a vast improvement. Of course it is possible that the victimization rate would have risen, perhaps by a large amount, instead of falling if we had not increased the number of inmates, but we shall never know.

Two things need to be said about imprisonment as a way of reducing crime. The first applies to its incapacitative effect. Very large increases in the prison population can produce only modest reductions in crime rates. That seems counterintuitive. If we double the number of prison inmates or double the sentences they serve, should not the crime rate fall by a like amount? The reader should understand why this doesn't happen; why, that is, that doubling the prison population probably produced only a 10 to 20 percent reduction in the crime rate.

One reason is that judges already send the most serious offenders with the longest records to prison. Very few judges, contrary to what some people think, give slaps on the wrist to robbers and assaulters who are three-time losers. This fact means that as you increase the proportion of convicted offenders who go to prison instead of being put on probation, you dip deeper into the bucket of persons eligible for prison, dredging up offenders with shorter and shorter criminal records. The marginal utility (where utility is the prevention of a crime) of sending each additional offender to prison will, on the average, decline.

Moreover, the most serious offenders typically get the longest sentences. All offenders have a criminal career of a finite length. (Some thugs may mug and murder until the day they die, but they are the exception. Age slows us all down, mugger and victim alike.) Alfred Blumstein and his colleagues have estimated that the criminal career of the average adult who has committed a violent crime is about ten years (Blumstein, Cohen, and Hsieh 1982). This means that if you lengthen the sentence of the persons already going to prison, you shorten the length of their criminal career. At some point you will

be keeping them in prison during the years of their life when, if they were on the streets, they would have stopped offending. This does not mean inmates should be set free as soon as some social scientist predicts their careers are over; social scientists cannot make such predictions accurately for given individuals, and in any case many of these inmates (Charles Manson comes to mind) have committed such heinous acts that justice requires very long sentences, or even execution. But lengthening time served beyond some point will, like increasing the proportion of convicted criminals sent to prison, encounter diminishing marginal returns.

The second problem has to do with deterrence. The threat of punishment deters almost all of us to some degree. Even if sending a higher fraction of all criminals to prison for longer periods has only modest (but still quite worthwhile) crime reduction effects, wouldn't the increased chances of going to prison deter would-be offenders? Maybe. A lot depends on what drives the chances of going to prison and how feasible it is to increase those chances in a meaningful way.

Recall my discussion of the decline in the costs of crime, measured by the number of days in prison that result, on average, from the commission of a given crime. It is vastly lower today than in the 1950s. But much of that decline (and since 1974, nearly all of it) is the result of a drop in the probability of being arrested for a crime, not in the probability of being imprisoned once arrested (see Langan [1991]). By my rough calculations, the odds that a robbery reported to the police would result in an arrest for robbery fell, between 1960 and 1989, by about 16 percent. Langan (1991) found that during the period (the late 1970s and early 1980s) when the chances of an accused person going to prison were rising, the chances of a crime resulting in an arrest were still declining. By his account, the arrest rate for robbery fell by 20 percent between 1974 and 1986. Between arrest and conviction lies the prosecutor's decision whether or not to charge, what plea bargain to accept, and what penalty to request. We have few data on how prosecutorial behavior has changed (compare Forst, this volume, Chapter 16).

All of this means that increasing the deterrent effect of prison is not as easy as it may first appear. You will have to first increase the arrest rate; more cops would help, but that is not enough. You will have to find more prosecutors (and public defenders) and make them work harder, because if the chances of prison for a given offense go up, the chances of a defendant taking a plea bargain go down. Then you would have to shrink judicial discretion, something that judges will fight to the bitter end. They don't like mandatory sentencing laws, and some are willing to find ways of evading those that exist.

Thinking clearly about prison in a democratic society is hard for two reasons. Some people believe (wrongly) that prison is fundamentally incompatible with a free society and so wish to use it as little as possible, while others feel (rightly) that prison is essential to the protection of our freedoms but exaggerate how much can be achieved by its extensive use.

Possibly we can make larger gains by turning our attention to the unexplored area of juvenile justice. Juvenile (or family) courts deal with young people just starting their criminal careers and with chronic offenders when they are often in their peak years of offending. We know rather little about how these courts work or with what effect. There are few, if any, careful studies of what happens, a result in part of scholarly neglect and in part of the practice in some states of shrouding juvenile records and proceedings in secrecy. Some studies, such as one by the *Los Angeles Times* of juvenile justice in California, suggest that young people found guilty of a serious crime are given sentences tougher than those meted out to adults (reported in Greenwood, this volume, Chapter 5). This finding is so counter to popular beliefs and the testimony of many big city juvenile court judges that some caution is required in interpreting it.

There are two problems. The first lies in defining the universe of people to whom sanctions are applied. In some states, such as California, it may well be the case that a juvenile *found guilty of a serious offense* is punished with greater rigor than an adult; but many juveniles whose behavior ought to be taken seriously (because they show signs of being part of the 6 percent) are released by the police or probation officers before ever seeing a judge. And in some states, such as New York, juveniles charged with having committed certain crimes, including such serious ones as illegally carrying a loaded gun or committing an assault, may not be fingerprinted. Since persons with a prior record are usually given longer sentences than those without one, the failure to fingerprint can mean that the court has no way of knowing whether the John Smith standing before it is the same John Smith that was arrested four times for assault and so ought to be sent away or a different John Smith whose clean record entitles him to probation.

The second problem arises from the definition of a "severe" penalty. In California, a juvenile found guilty of murder does, indeed, serve a longer sentence than an adult convicted of the same offense—sixty months for the former, forty-one months for the latter. Many people will be puzzled by a newspaper account that defines five years in prison for murder as a "severe" sentence, and angered to learn that an adult serves less than four years for such a crime.

The key, unanswered question is whether prompt and more effective early intervention would stop high rate delinquents from becoming high rate criminals at a time when their offenses were not yet too serious. Perhaps early and swift though not necessarily severe sanctions could deter some budding hoodlums, but we have no evidence of that as yet.

Attacking the Causes

For as long as I can remember, the debate over crime has been between those who wished to rely on the criminal justice system and those who wished to

attack the root causes of crime. I have always been in the former group because what its opponents depicted as "root causes"—unemployment, racism, poor housing, too little schooling, a lack of self-esteem—turned out, on close examination, not to be major causes at all.

Of late, however, there has been a shift in the debate. Increasingly those who want to attack causes have begun to point to real causes—temperament, early family experiences, and neighborhood effects. The sketch I gave earlier of the typical high rate young offender suggests that these factors are, indeed, causal. The problem now is to decide whether any can be changed by plan and at an acceptable cost in money and personal freedom.

If we are to do this, we must confront the fact that the critical years of a child's life are ages one to ten, with perhaps the most important being the earliest years. During those years, some children are put gravely at risk by some combination of heritable traits, prenatal insults (maternal drug and alcohol abuse or poor diet), weak parent-child attachment, poor supervision, and disorderly family environment. If we knew with reasonable confidence which children were most seriously at risk, we might intervene with some precision to supply either medical therapy or parent training or (in extreme cases) to remove the child to a better home. But given our present knowledge, precision is impossible, and so we must proceed carefully relying, except in the most extreme cases, on persuasion and incentives.

But we do know enough about the early causes of conduct disorder and later delinquency to know that the more risk factors (such as parental criminality and poor parental supervision of children) that exist, the greater the peril to the child. It follows that programs aimed at just one or a few factors are not likely to be successful; the children most at risk are the ones that require the most wide-ranging and fundamental changes in their life circumstances. The goal of these changes is, as Travis Hirschi has put it, to teach self-control (this volume, Chapter 6).

Hirokazu Yoshikawa (1994) has recently summarized what we know about programs that attempt to make large and lasting changes in a child's prospects for improved conduct, better school behavior, and lessened delinquency. Four in particular seemed valuable—the Perry Preschool Project in Ypsilanti, Michigan; the Parent-Child Development Center in Houston, Texas; the Family Development Research Project in Syracuse, New York; and the Yale Child Welfare Project in New Haven, Connecticut. All had certain features in common. They dealt with low-income, often minority, families; they intervened during the first five years of a child's life and continued for between two and five years; they combined parent training with preschool education for the child; and they involved extensive home visits. All were evaluated fairly carefully, with the follow-ups lasting for at least five years, in two cases for at least ten, and in one case for fourteen. The programs produced (depending on the project) less fighting, impulsivity, disobedience, restlessness, cheating, and delinquency. In short, they improved self-control.

They were experimental programs, which means that it is hard to be confident that trying the same thing on a bigger scale in many places will produce the same effects. A large number of well-trained and highly motivated case workers dealt with a relatively small number of families, with the workers knowing that their efforts were being evaluated. Moreover the programs operated in the late 1970s or early 1980s before the advent of crack cocaine or the rise of the more lethal neighborhood gangs. A national program mounted under current conditions may or may not have the same result as the experimental efforts.

Try telling that to lawmakers. What happens when politicians encounter experimental successes is amply revealed by the history of Head Start: they expanded the program quickly without assuring quality, and stripped it down to the part that is the most popular, least expensive, and easiest to run, namely, preschool education. Absent from much of Head Start are the high teacher-to-child caseloads, the extensive home visits, and the elaborate parent training—the very things that probably account for much of the success of the four experimental programs.

In this country we tend to separate programs designed to help children from those that benefit their parents. The former are called "child development," the latter "welfare reform." This is a great mistake. Everything we know about long-term welfare recipients indicates that their children are at risk for the very problems that child-helping programs later try to correct. The evidence from a variety of studies is quite clear: even holding income and ethnicity constant, children (and especially boys) raised by a single mother are more likely than those raised by two parents to have difficulty in school, get in trouble with the law, and experience emotional and physical problems (Wilson 1993; Dawson 1988; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Furstenberg et al. 1989). Producing illegitimate children is not an "alternative lifestyle" or simply an imprudent action; it is a curse. Making mothers work will not end the curse; under current proposals, it won't even save money. The absurdity of divorcing the welfare problem from the child development problem becomes evident as soon as we think seriously about what we want to achieve. Smaller welfare expenditures? Well, yes, but not if it hurts children. More young mothers working? Probably not; young mothers ought to raise their young children, and work interferes with that unless *two* parents can solve some difficult and expensive issues. What we really want is *fewer illegitimate children*, because such children, except in unusual cases, by being born out of wedlock are being given early admission to the underclass. And failing that, we want the children born to single (and typically young and poor) mothers to have a chance at a decent life.

Letting teenage girls set up their own households at public expense neither discourages illegitimacy nor serves the child's best interests. If they do set up their own homes, then to reach those with the fewest parenting skills and the most difficult children will require the kind of expensive and

intensive home visits and family support programs characteristic of the four successful experiments mentioned earlier. One alternative is to tell a girl who applies for welfare that she can receive it only on condition that she live either in the home of *two* competent parents (her own if she comes from an intact family) or in a group home where competent supervision and parent training will be provided by adults unrelated to her. Such homes would be privately managed but publicly funded by pooling welfare checks, food stamps, and housing allowances. One model for such a group home (albeit one run without public funds) is the St. Martin de Porres House of Hope on the south side of Chicago, founded by two nuns for homeless young women, especially those with drug abuse problems. The goals of the home are clear: accept personal responsibility for your lives and learn to care for your children. And these goals, in turn, require the girls to follow rules, stay in school, obey a curfew, and avoid alcohol and drugs (Driscoll 1993). Those are the rules that ought to govern a group home for young welfare mothers.

Group homes funded by pooled welfare benefits would make the task of parent training much easier and provide the kind of structured, consistent, and nurturant environment that children need. A few cases might be too difficult for these homes, and for such children boarding schools—once common in American cities for disadvantaged children, but now almost extinct—might be revived.

Such homes also make it easier to supply quality medical care to young mothers and their children. Such care has taken on added importance in recent years with discovery of the lasting damage that can be done to a child's prospects from being born prematurely and with a very low birth weight, having a mother who has abused drugs or alcohol, or being exposed to certain dangerous metals. Lead poisoning is now widely acknowledged to be a source of cognitive and behavioral impairment; of late, elevated levels of manganese have been linked to high levels of violence (Gottschalk et al. 1991; see also Fishbein and Pease [1988]).⁸ These are all treatable conditions; in the case of a manganese imbalance, easily treatable.

My focus on changing behavior will annoy some readers. For them the problem is poverty and the worst feature of single parent families is that they are inordinately poor. To even refer to a behavioral or cultural problem is to "stigmatize" people. Indeed it is. Wrong behavior—neglectful, immature, or incompetent parenting; the production of out-of-wedlock babies—*ought* to be stigmatized. There are many poor men of all races who do not abandon the women they have impregnated and many poor women of all races who avoid drugs and do a good job of raising their children. If we fail to stigmatize those who give way to temptations we withdraw the rewards from those who resist them. This becomes all the more important when entire communities, and not just isolated households, are dominated by a culture of fatherless boys preying on innocent persons and exploiting immature girls.

We need not merely stigmatize, however. We can try harder to move


children out of those communities, either by drawing them into safe group homes or facilitating (through rent supplements and housing vouchers) the relocation of them and their parents to neighborhoods with intact social structures and an ethos of family values. Much of our uniquely American crime problem (as opposed to the worldwide problem of general thievery) arises, not from the failings of individuals, but from the concentration of people at risk for failing in disorderly neighborhoods (compare Sampson, this volume, Chapter 9). That concentration is partly the result of prosperity and freedom (functioning families long ago seized the opportunity to move out to the periphery), partly the result of racism (it is harder for some groups to move than for others), and partly the result of politics (elected officials do not wish to see settled constituencies broken up).

Conclusions

I seriously doubt that this country has the will to address either of its two crime problems, save by acts of individual self-protection. We could in theory make justice swifter and more certain, but we will not. We could vastly improve the way in which our streets are policed, but some of us won't pay for it and the rest of us won't tolerate it. We could alter the way in which at-risk children experience the first few years of life, but the opponents of this—welfare rights activists, family preservationists, budget cutters, and assorted ideologues—are numerous and the bureaucratic problems enormous. Instead we debate the death penalty, wring our hands about television, lobby to keep prisons from being built in our neighborhoods, and fall briefly in love with trendy nostrums that seem to cost little and promise much.

Meanwhile, just beyond the horizon, there lurks a cloud that the winds will soon bring over us. The population will start getting younger again. By the end of this decade there will be a million more people between the ages of fourteen and seventeen than there are now; this increase will follow the decade of the 1980s when people in that age group declined, not only as a proportion of the total but in absolute numbers. This extra million will be half male. Six percent of them will become high rate, repeat offenders—thirty thousand more young muggers, killers, and thieves than we have now.

Get ready.



M E M O R A N D U M

To: Joshua Horwitz
From: Robin Katcher
Date: July 10, 1996
Subject: CDC Funding

The Labor, Health and Human Service and Education Appropriations Committee has removed \$2.6 million dollars from the Centers for Injury and Prevention Control's fiscal year 1997 budget, with the understanding that the cut would eliminate firearms injury prevention research.

Background

The National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (NCIPC) is the division of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that works with other federal, national, state and local agencies, research institutions and local health departments in the study of home and recreational injuries and violence prevention.

The center's research is aimed at reducing injuries such as traumatic brain injury from car accidents, hip injury with the elderly, injury from fires and burns, bike and pedestrian injury recreational injury, gun violence injury, etc. Only \$2.6 million or 5% of the NCIPC's \$43 million budget goes toward research on firearms related injuries. Nevertheless, there have been numerous attempts to eliminate its funding.

The NRA targets NCIPC because it fears academically sound, peer reviewed research such as the research conducted by NCIPC, could be used to undermine their policies. A September 21 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine characterizes attempts to defund NCIPC as "yet another example of the corrupting influence that powerful lobbies for special interests exert on members of Congress."

FROM THE DESK OF...

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NCIPC has proven to fill a unique national niche, effectively coordinating and initiating original injury research focusing on prevention, acute care, and rehabilitation. Both the General Accounting Office and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have concluded that the research conducted by NCIPC is distinct from other agencies. NCIPC is the only body linking injury research to health outcomes, while developing a comprehensive overview of injuries.

NCIPC's research is desperately needed. In 1993, firearms surpassed motor vehicles as the leading cause of injury death in 10 states and the District of Columbia. Firearms injury is the leading cause of death for African American youth ages 15-24 and the second leading cause of death among white youth ages 15-24. More male youth in this age range die of firearm wounds than from all natural causes combined. Annually firearms violence costs America approximately \$40 billion per year in medical costs and lost productivity. It is clear that injury prevention is necessary, cost effective and saves lives.

Legislative History

FY 96 Appropriations

Senator Robert C. Smith (R-NH) drafted an amendment that would eliminate funding for the center claiming that NCIPC is duplicative and politically biased. On October 19, 1995, ten senators sent a letter to Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) who chairs the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education And Related Agencies Subcommittee saying that they were sympathetic to a proposal that would eliminate NCIPC's funding. The letter was signed by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KA) and Senators Trent Lott (R-MS), Christopher Bond (R-MO), Larry E. Craig (R-ID), Don Nickles (R-OK), Ted Stevens (R-AK), Richard Shelby (R-AL), Lauch Faircloth (R-NC), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), and Max Baucus (D-MT). The letter accused the NCIPC of "enthusiasm to promote a political agenda against gun ownership".

The fiscal year 1996 Labor, Health and Human Services, Education Appropriation bill never reached the floor and Senator Smith did not have the opportunity to offer his amendment. CDC received all of its funding for fiscal year 1996 in a stop gap spending measure known as a continuing resolution (CR).

FY 97 Appropriations

The NRA again attempted to block funding and dismantle the NCIPC for fiscal year 1997. The House Labor, HHS, Education Appropriations Subcommittee held public witness hearings. There were several speakers including Dr. Wheeler of Doctors for Responsible Gun Ownership that testified against future funding of NCIPC. The result was that Representative John Porter (R-IL) requested that Dr. Mark Rosenberg director of NCIPC be present with the heads of CDC when they come before the committee to testify. Thus providing CDC with the opportunity to defend their program.

Later, Representative Dickey measure to cut CDC funding in the Labor, Health and Human Service Appropriations Subcommittee failed. The bill that passed the subcommittee does include language that would prohibit CDC from "advocat[ing] or promot[ing] gun control."

On June 25, the full House Appropriations Committee passed an amendment to reduce funding for CDC's budget by 2.6 million, with the understanding that the cut would eliminate firearms research conducted by NCIPC. The 2.6 million was redirected to the Health Resources and Services Administration with the understanding that the increase would benefit the Area Health Education Centers (AHEC). (AHEC links university health science centers with community health delivery systems to provide training sites for students, faculty and

actioners. Before the amendment the AHEC program had received a 12% increase over last years funding level.)

Current Status

Representatives Nita Lowey and Michael Castle (R-DE) is expected to offer a Floor amendment to the Labor, HHS Appropriations bill to restore the \$2.6 million to CDC. This bill is likely to reach the floor July 11, 1996. In the Senate, the subcommittee will pass its version of the Labor, HHS Appropriations bill the week of July 15. Additional attempts to cut CDC's funding are likely to emerge in the Senate again.



Coalition to Stop Gun Violence
100 Maryland Ave., NE Washington, DC 20002-5625
(202) 544-7190 FAX: (202) 544-7213

FAX TO:

Name ANN BROOKSAGENCY WHITE HOUSE

CITY _____

FAX# 456 7028

FAX FROM:

Name ROBIN KATCHERPAGES(plus cover) 5

DATE: _____

TIME _____

I found the raw tracing data for 1990-'95 from ATF. Unfortunately the 1989 numbers are deep within my files. Please note the drop in '95, after the Assault Weapons Ban ~~became~~ was in effect.

I have also included the CDC firearms-injury research info. This is an in house document so please let me know if you distribute it widely.

Feel free to call me with any questions.
541-1111



COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE

100 Maryland Avenue, NE, Suite 402, Washington, DC 20002-5625 • phone: (202) 544-7190
fax: (202) 544-7213 • e-mail: noguns@aol.com • website: <http://www.gunfree.inter.net>

Assault Weapons Ban

The Danger of Assault Weapons

- Assault weapons, such as those banned in the 1994 Crime Bill, do not belong in the hands of the general public. These military-style weapons are designed to kill people. These guns are not necessary for protecting one's home or for recreational shooting.
- Increasingly, these guns have become attractive to criminals. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), assault weapons make up less than 1% of the 220 million guns privately owned in America, yet they account for 6-10% of guns used in crimes. In 1991, the ATF traced 2,991 assault weapons used in crimes. Only two years later, the number increased to 4,532. According to one study, at least 1 in 10 police officers killed in the line of duty will be killed with an assault weapon.
- A Department of Justice survey of state prison inmates found that, of those inmates who admitted to owning or possessing a gun, more than 21% said that they had owned or possessed either a "military-type" or fully-automatic weapon prior to their arrest. Yet, less than 1% of all legally owned guns are assault weapons.
- Support for a ban on assault weapons is overwhelming among Americans. A March, 1993, *CNN-USA Today-Gallup* poll found that Americans favored a ban on assault weapons by at least 2 to 1. An *NBC* poll taken in January 1995 found that 76% of Americans want the assault weapons ban to remain in place.

The Assault Weapons Ban of 1994:

- Prohibits future manufacture, transfer and possession of semi-automatic assault weapons and ammunition magazines that hold more than 10 rounds.
- Defines assault weapons as (1) 19 named weapon types and (2) guns which have specific assault weapon characteristics. For example, weapons that are semi-automatic and have detachable magazines, but do not have other listed features are NOT assault weapons.
- Expressly exempts all manual weapons (e.g. slide, bolt, lever and pump action guns), including all antique guns and more than 670 rifles and shotguns commonly used for hunting and recreational shooting.
- Does not apply to guns that were manufactured before the effective date of the bill, nor does it include registration or surrender requirements for guns currently owned. The ban does not apply to firearms and ammunition manufactured for military and law enforcement agencies.
- Received support from the President, Attorney General, and law enforcement professionals such as the International Brotherhood of Police Officers and International Association of Chiefs of Police. The ban also was backed by major medical, educational, health, religious, governmental and civil rights groups.

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FIREARMS TRACED FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1990-1995

<u>CALENDAR YEAR</u>	<u>TOTAL FIREARMS TRACED</u>	<u>ASSAULT WEAPONS TRACED</u>	
1990	37,181	2,770	(7.5%)
1991	42,258	2,972	(7.0%)
1992	45,104	3,243	(7.2%)
1993	55,208	4,503	(8.2%)
1994	85,132	5,357	(6.3%)
1995	77,000	3,269	(4.3%)
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>341,883</u>	<u>22,114</u>	<u>(6.5%)</u>

ONLY THE 19 BANNED WEAPONS BY NAME ARE INCLUDED IN
THESE STATISTICS

NOTE: THIS DATA INCLUDES ONLY THOSE INSTANCES WHERE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS REQUESTED TRACES ON
RECOVERED FIREARMS. NOT ALL RECOVERED FIREARMS ARE
REFERRED TO ATF FOR TRACING.

benefits both nations. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and should remain an undivided city accessible to people of all faiths. We also support close ties with states in the Arab and Islamic world committed to the goals of peace and non-aggression.

Promoting democracy. America remains a beacon of hope to all who cherish democracy and human rights, and America's security benefits from the enlargement of the community of market democracies. The Clinton-Gore Administration has actively promoted the consolidation and spread of democracy and human rights -- in the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, Haiti, South Africa, and throughout Latin America, Asia and Africa. The Democratic Party supports the aspirations of all those who seek to strengthen civil society and accountable governance. To this end, we support continued funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Marti and other efforts to promote democracy and the free flow of ideas.

Resources for diplomacy. There is a price to be paid for America's security and its leadership in world affairs -- and the Republican Party now refuses to pay that price. Even though less than one percent of the federal budget goes to foreign policy spending, the Republican Party has savaged our diplomatic readiness, defaulted on treaty obligations to pay dues to the United Nations, slashed assistance to the poorest and most vulnerable populations on earth, and pushed the United States to dead last among developed nations in the global fight against starvation, infant mortality, natural disasters and environmental degradation and other worldwide problems. The Democratic Party understands that these efforts strengthen our security and express our values, and is committed to ensure adequate resources for our diplomacy, as well as our humanitarian efforts abroad.

COMMUNITY

Across America, in far too many places, the bonds of community that tie us together and remind us that we rise or fall together, have too often frayed. Today's Democratic Party believes we must reawaken the strong sense of community that has helped America to prosper for 220 years. America is uniquely suited to lead the world into the 21st century because of our great diversity and our shared values. We must never let our differences divide us from each other; instead we must come together on a new common ground, based on the enduring values we share. When Americans work together -- in our homes, our schools, our houses of worship, our civic groups, our businesses -- we can meet any challenge, and realize every dream.

Fighting crime. Today's Democratic Party believes the first responsibility of government is law and order. Four years ago, crime in America seemed intractable. The violent crime rate and the murder rate had climbed for seven straight years. Drugs seemed to flow freely across our borders and into our neighborhoods. Convicted felons could walk into any gun shop in the country and buy a handgun. Military-style assault weapons were sold freely. Our people didn't feel safe in their homes, walking their streets, or even sending their

1 children to school. Under the thumb of special interests like the gun lobby, Republicans
2 talked tough about crime but did nothing to fight it.

3 Bill Clinton promised to turn things around, and that's exactly what he did. After a
4 long hard fight, President Clinton beat back fierce Republican opposition, led by Senator Dole
5 and Speaker Gingrich, to answer the call of America's police officers and pass the toughest
6 Crime Bill in history. The Democratic Party under President Clinton is putting more police on
7 the streets and tougher penalties on the books; we are taking guns off the streets and working
8 to steer young people away from crime and gangs and drugs in the first place. And it is
9 making a difference. In city after city and town after town, crime rates are finally coming
10 down.

11 *Community policing.* Nothing is more effective in the fight against crime than police
12 officers on the beat, engaged in community policing. The Crime Bill is putting 100,000 new
13 police officers on the street. We deplore cynical Republican attempts to undermine our
14 promise to America to put 100,000 new police officers on the street. We pledge to stand up
15 for our communities and stand with our police officers by opposing any attempt to repeal or
16 weaken this effort. But we know that community policing only works when the community
17 works with the police. We echo the President's challenge to Americans: If 50 citizens joined
18 each of America's 20,000 neighborhood watch groups, we would have a citizen force of one
19 million strong to give our police forces the backup they need.

20 *Protecting our police, our children, and our neighborhoods from criminals with guns.*
21 Bob Dole, Newt Gingrich, and George Bush were able to hold the Brady Bill hostage for the
22 gun lobby until Bill Clinton became President. With his leadership, we made the Brady Bill
23 the law of the land. And because we did, over 60,000 felons, fugitives, and stalkers have
24 been stopped from buying guns. President Clinton led the fight to ban 19 deadly assault
25 weapons, designed for one purpose only -- to kill human beings. We oppose efforts to restrict
26 weapons used for legitimate sporting purposes, and we are proud that not one hunter or
27 sportsman was forced to change guns because of the assault weapons ban. But we know that
28 the military-style guns we banned have no place on America's streets, and we are proud of the
29 courageous Democrats who defied the gun lobby and sacrificed their seats in Congress to make
30 America safer. We will not allow the Dole-Gingrich Congress to repeal the Brady Bill or the
31 assault weapons ban. Now we must do more to protect police officers, and the first thing we
32 should do is pass a ban on cop-killer bullets. Any bullet that can rip through a bullet-proof
33 vest should be against the law; that's the least we can do to protect the brave police officers
34 who risk their lives to protect us.

35 *Tough punishment.* We believe that people who break the law should be punished, and
36 people who commit violent crimes should be punished severely. President Clinton made three-
37 strikes-you're-out the law of the land, to ensure that the most dangerous criminals go to jail
38 for life, with no chance of parole. We established the death penalty for nearly 60 violent
39 crimes, including murder of a law enforcement officer. We provided almost \$8 billion in new

1 funding to help states build new prison cells so violent offenders serve their full sentences.
2 We call on the states to meet the President's challenge and guarantee that serious violent
3 criminals serve at least 85 percent of their sentence. The American people deserve a criminal
4 justice system in which criminals are caught, the guilty are convicted, and the convicted serve
5 their time.

6 *Fighting youth crime and violence.* Nothing we do to fight crime is more important
7 than fighting the crime and violence that threatens our children. We have to protect them from
8 criminals who prey on them -- and we have to teach them good values and give them
9 something to say yes to, so they stay away from crime and trouble in the first place.

10 The Democratic Party understands what the police have been saying for years: The best
11 way to fight crime is to prevent it. That's why we fought for drug-education and gang-
12 prevention programs in our schools. It's why we made it a federal crime for any person under
13 the age of 18 to carry a handgun except when supervised by an adult. It's why Democrats
14 fought to pass, and President Clinton ordered states to impose, zero tolerance for guns in
15 school, requiring schools to expel for one year any student who brings a gun to school.

16 At the same time, when young people cross the line, they must be punished. We
17 established boot camps for young non-violent offenders, to make certain they were punished.
18 If Senator Dole and the Republicans are serious about fighting juvenile crime, they should
19 listen to America's police officers and support the steps Democrats have taken, because they
20 are making a difference, and then they should join us as we work to do more.

21 We want parents to bring order to their children's lives and teach them right from
22 wrong, and we want to make it easier for them to take that responsibility. We support schools
23 that adopt school uniform policies, to promote discipline and respect. We support community-
24 based curfews to keep kids off the street after a certain time, so they're safe from harm and
25 away from trouble. We urge schools and communities to enforce truancy laws: Young people
26 belong in school, not on the street. But when young people commit crimes like adults, we
27 believe they should be prosecuted as adults.

28 We also know that we must do everything we can to help families protect their
29 children, especially from dangerous criminals who have made a dark habit of preying on
30 young people. Study after study shows that sex offenders are likely to repeat their crimes again
31 and again. Under President Clinton, we have taken strong steps to help keep children safe.
32 We required every state in the country to compile a registry of sex offenders. The President
33 signed Megan's Law to require that states tell a community whenever a dangerous sexual
34 predator enters its midst. We support the President's directive to the Attorney General, calling
35 on her to work with the states and Congress to develop a national sex offender registry. This
36 will ensure that police officers in every state can get the information they need from any state
37 to track sex offenders down and bring them to justice when they commit new crimes.

1 *Battling illegal drugs.* We must keep drugs off our streets and out of our schools.
2 President Clinton and the Democratic Party have waged an aggressive war on drugs. The Crime
3 Bill established the death penalty for drug kingpins. The President signed a directive requiring
4 drug testing of anyone arrested for a federal crime, and he challenged states to do the same for
5 state offenders. We established innovative drug courts which force drug users to get treatment or
6 go to jail. We stood firm against Republican efforts to gut the Safe and Drug Free Schools effort
7 that supports successful drug-education programs like D.A.R.E. The Clinton Administration
8 went to the Supreme Court to support the right of schools to test athletes for drugs. The President
9 launched Operation Safe Home to protect the law-abiding residents of public housing from
10 violent criminals and drug dealers who use their homes as a base for illegal activities. We
11 support the President's decision to tell those who commit crimes and peddle drugs in public
12 housing: You will get no second chance to threaten your neighbors; it's one strike and you're
13 out. We are making progress. Overall drug use in America is dropping; the number of
14 Americans who use cocaine has dropped 30 percent since 1992. Unfortunately casual drug use
15 by young people continues to climb.

16 Earlier this year, the President appointed General Barry McCaffrey to lead the nation's
17 war on drugs. General McCaffrey is implementing an aggressive four part strategy to reach
18 young children and prevent drug use in the first place; to catch and punish drug users and
19 dealers; to provide treatment to those who need help; and to cut drugs off at the source before
20 they cross the border and pollute our neighborhoods. But every adult in America must take
21 responsibility to set a good example, and to teach children that drugs are wrong, they are illegal,
22 and they are deadly.

23 *Ending domestic violence.* When it strikes, nothing is a more dangerous threat to the
24 safety of our families than domestic violence, because it is a threat from within.
25 Unfortunately, violence against women is no stranger to America, but a dangerous intruder we
26 must work together to drive from our homes. We know that domestic violence is not a
27 "family problem" or a "woman's problem." It is America's problem, and we must all fight it.
28 The Violence Against Women Act in the 1994 Crime Bill helps police officers, prosecutors,
29 and judges to understand domestic violence, recognize it when they see it, and know how to
30 deal with it. In February, the President launched a 24 hour, seven-day, toll-free hotline so
31 women in trouble can find out how to get emergency help, find shelter, and report abuse to the
32 authorities. The number is 1 800 799-SAFE. Everyone who knows it should pass it on to
33 anyone who might need it. Every American must take the responsibility to stop this terrible
34 scourge. As we fight it, we must remember that the victims are not to blame. This is a crime
35 to be punished, not a secret to be concealed.

36 We must do everything we can to make sure that the victims of violent crime are
37 treated with the respect and the dignity they deserve. We support the President's call for a
38 constitutional amendment to protect the rights of victims. We believe that when a plea bargain
39 is entered in public, a criminal is sentenced, or a defendant is let out on bail, the victims ought
40 to know about it, and have a say. A constitutional amendment is the only way to protect those

Crime

"So those in Congress who would attempt to repeal the Brady Bill or the assault weapons ban, or our pledge to put 100,000 new police officers on the street, let me say one more time, you're going nowhere fast. If you do succumb to the political pressure from extremist groups to repeal any of these measures, I will veto them in a heartbeat."

President Clinton

Fraternal Order of Police, August 1, 1995

The Toughest, Smartest Crime Bill in History

- o Breaking Gridlock. In 1994, after more than 6 years of gridlock, a bipartisan majority in Congress passed the smartest, toughest crime bill in the nation's history.
- o Unprecedented Support. The Crime Bill passed with the strong support of every major law enforcement organization in the country, as well as prosecutors, mayors, and state and local officials of both parties.
- o Cut and Invest. The Crime Bill was paid for by cutting the federal bureaucracy by more than 250,000 people over five years.
- o Under Budget and Ahead of Schedule. And by cutting the red tape and implementing the new law in a non-bureaucratic way, support for the Crime Bill has become more broad-based.

Crime Bill's Four Point Plan

More Police and Community Policing

- o Law enforcement experts agree that the single most important thing we can do to reduce crime is to put more police on the street. The President's plan to put 100,000 more police on the street in community policing is the biggest commitment ever to local law enforcement.
- o This plan is working. Half the nation's law enforcement agencies -- jurisdictions of all sizes -- have received grants to hire more than 25,000 new police officers.

Tougher Penalties and More Prison Space

- o The Crime Bill includes tough new punishments and more prison cells to help keep criminals behind bars. It includes:
 - a targeted "three strikes and you're out" provision to keep career violent offenders behind bars for life;
 - the death penalty for the murder of a federal law enforcement officer and other heinous crimes;
 - increased penalties for sex offenders;
 - \$7.9 billion for 100,000 more prison cells to help states make sure that violent offenders serve their full sentences; and
 - \$1.9 billion to help states pay for incarcerating criminal aliens.

Tough, Smart Strategy on Youth Crime

- o Youth crime and violence is at the heart of America's current crime crisis. While overall crime rates have been dropping, kids today are increasingly the perpetrators --and the victims -- of some of society's most violent crimes.
- o Be Firm. The Crime Bill sends a strong "no gangs, guns and drugs" message to the 6% of young criminals who commit a majority of serious crimes. It bans handguns for juveniles; creates stiff penalties for crime-committing gang members; establishes Boot Camps and Drug Courts to discipline first-time, non-violent and drug offenders; and provides for hardened young criminals -- as young as 13-years-old -- to be tried as adults.
- o Be Smart. But the Crime Bill also reinforces the difference between right and wrong by giving at-risk kids positive alternatives to say "yes" to. It invests billions of dollars for after-school, weekend and summer programs for at risk youth; and other efforts that provide kids with safe havens and teach them the dangers of drugs, gangs and guns.

Keep Guns Out of the Hands of Criminals

- o In 1993, Congress passed the Brady Bill to provide for a 5-day waiting period and background check of prospective handgun buyers. That law has stopped more than 40,000 fugitives and felons from buying guns.
- o The Crime Bill also includes a ban on the 19 deadliest assault weapons and their copies, while specifically protecting more than 650 legitimate sporting weapons.
- o In June 1995, the President announced his support for legislation to ban armor-piercing bullets.

Drug Talking Points

"...I'm going to do everything I can to implement the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy...We propose to work more closely with foreign governments to cut drugs off at the source. We propose to boost community efforts to educate young people about the dangers and penalties of drug use...We will work to break the cycle of crime and drugs providing treatment to hardcore drug users, who consume most of the drugs and cause much of the crime and health problems. And we will punish people who break the law more severely."

February 8, 1995, 1995 Drug Strategy Announcement

Illegal Drugs Still a Problem

- **Widespread Use.** Today, 1 in 3 Americans has used an illicit drug; 1 in 9 have tried Cocaine. Fully one half of high school seniors have tried drugs, and 1 in 5 use drugs regularly.
- **Alarming New Trends.** Kids: After years of decline, in 1991, we started to see signs of increasing drug use among adolescents. And surveys show that fewer 8th, 10th and 12th graders have a clear understanding of the risks associated with drug use -- and are using more drugs. Drug Availability: Illegal drugs remain ready available to anyone who wants to buy them. Cocaine and heroine street prices are low and purity is high. And marijuana -- 10 times as potent as in previous years -- threaten to entice a new generation of drug users.
- **The Costs of Drug Use.** Drugs cost society an estimated \$67 billion -- 70% of which covers crime costs; 30% of which covers health-related costs. That's why, despite shrinking government and reducing the deficit, the Administration's Drug Strategy/Budget is the largest ever -- \$14.6 billion.

Here's the Drug Strategy's Four Point Plan:

STEP ONE: CRACK DOWN ON HARDCORE DRUG USE

- Heavy drug users consume a majority of the nation's illegal drug supply. Although hardcore users account for only about 20% of all cocaine users, they consume about two-thirds of the available cocaine. And hardcore drug use is linked to a disproportionate amount of crime and violence. On any given day, more than half the arrestees in our cities test positive for drug use. Treating these drug users can save us money -- as much as \$7 per treatment dollar -- and reduce crime. That's why our Strategy includes --

-- \$919.8 million for the Substance Abuse Performance Partnership, including a \$60 million set-aside for the heaviest drug users;

h

-- \$150 million for Drug Courts and \$40.2 million for treatment in prisons, so we can use our courts, jails and prisons to turn crime-committing addicts around.

STEP TWO: SEND A STRONG "NO USE" MESSAGE TO OUR KIDS

- Recent surveys show that adolescent drug -- and the feeling that drugs are "cool" and not dangerous -- is on the rise. Studies also show an alarming level of violence in our schools, much of which is tied to drug use. Our kids need to get a strong "no use" message on drugs -- as well as on guns and gangs. Here's what our Strategy proposes:

-- \$500 million for the Department of Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools program, to give states the money to fund drug prevention programs like DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), train parents on the warning signs of drug use and to pay for more police and metal detectors; and

-- Implementation and funding of the Crime Bill's prevention programs, to help keep kids in school, off drugs and out of trouble.

STEP THREE: REDUCE DRUG-RELATED CRIME AND VIOLENCE

- **Implement the 1994 Crime Bill.** The Nation took a major step forward when Congress passed the President's Crime Bill. It includes key tools and resources to help communities reduce drug use and trafficking, such as --

-- 100,000 more police in community policing, to do everything from helping break-up open-air drug markets to teaching kids about the dangers of drugs;

-- multijurisdictional drug enforcement task forces; and

-- increased resources for the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF).

- **Tough Federal Drug Enforcement.** The Strategy calls for increased coordination of federal anti-drug enforcement efforts, including --

-- a new comprehensive initiative to reduce marijuana cultivation;

-- targeted investigative resources on major drug traffickers;

-- expanded border control drug enforcement; and

-- increased coordination with private sector to crack down on money laundering.

STEP FOUR: CUT DRUGS OFF AT THE SOURCE

- Last year, the President signed a Presidential Decision Directive outlining a 4-pronged strategy to reduce the flow of cocaine from the Andean countries. It includes (1) strengthening the law enforcement and judicial institutions in source countries; (2) destroying narcotrafficking organizations; (3) work to interdict drugs at their source as well as en route to the United States and (4) increase international cooperation on the drug issue.



This

Quick: Name one notable event involving the police commissioner who succeeded William J. Bratton.

Maybe we should try an easier one: Just name the current police commissioner.

Missed both? Then Rudy Giuliani is delighted. It is entirely to his purpose that until recently almost no

one knew—or could remember—the name of Police Commissioner Howard Safir.

But what must *really* make Rudy Giuliani's day, week, month, and year is a sight he has never witnessed but can easily imagine: William Bratton seated in the small, anonymous, Sixth Avenue office of

For Hire

by Jesse Kornbluth

Former top cop William Bratton has a lucrative book deal and a cushy job. But can a tough guy find happiness in the private sector? Jesse Kornbluth sifts through the evidence.

photograph by Nigel Parry

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"You can't have 'tolerance' for small crimes, or soon you have larger ones."

a firm that provides security guards and investigative services. There, Bratton makes phone calls to important people. He writes his book—"a pain in the ass; I make more giving speeches"—for Random House. He takes home three or four times the \$133,000 salary he earned in his last months as police commissioner.

None of that matters to Rudy Giuliani. His joy is that William Bratton is neutered. That is, Bratton—who once got a 54 percent approval rating in a poll to the mayor's 44 percent—now makes scarcely a ripple in the press. It's all Giuliani now.

William Bratton doesn't feel he has traded celebrity for an anonymous prosperity. For one thing, the most famous police chief in this city since Theodore Roosevelt has a record of crime-reduction that the mayor will have a hard time taking sole credit for. And the book he's writing might just arrive in New York on the eve of next year's mayoral election. Most of all, there's the small matter of the downsizing of New York's police force.

"The public doesn't want to stay with any one issue for long, and the surge in policing we have seen in the last few years will wane as crime goes down," Bratton explains, sounding more like an academic than a public official who was muscled out

of his job by a mayor who can't live with any employee more popular than himself. In the next few years, the police will be reduced by 1,500 to 2,000 officers. We'll have better technology—but we'll also have 2,000 fewer cops. And that could be the beginning of a trend."

This is where First Security Services, which has hired Bratton as its vice-chairman, comes in. If the city's police force does shrink significantly and there's less media focus on crime control, more and more companies may feel the need to supplement city services. Who will get that business? Kroll Associates? The Investigative Group? Those are solid, well-established firms. But then there's the new guy on the block, the top cop who presided over a police force at a time when homicides dropped 40 percent, burglaries fell 24 percent, robberies declined 32 percent, and car theft was reduced by 35 percent.

Looking at those figures, which represent the most dramatic drop in New York crime since World War II, you have to think that Bratton's company is going to get a lot of this new business—and that success will rocket Bratton to a new level of prominence. In that scenario, we could see William Bratton running a small but

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SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.

Available in limited areas only.

Lights 1 mg. tar, 0.9 mg. nicotine—Kings 1.1 mg. tar, 0.9 mg. nicotine av. per cigarette by FTC method.

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potent private police squad that gives him power and visibility without any possibility of interference from City Hall.

Think that would frost Rudy Giuliani? William Bratton wears a crisp white shirt with presidential cuff links. "A gift from the president for my work on the crime bill," he explains. "As police commissioner of Boston, I was in the Rose Garden when he announced the initiative. Everybody pooh-poohed it, because no one had done anything in this area for twelve years. And then, as police commissioner of New York City, I was privileged to be in the Rose Garden again when the bill passed and was signed."

Politics and policing. The two go hand-in-hand. And although Bratton will not come right out and say it, he finds it curious that the Republican party has such a poor record in this area.

Ask him about gun control, for example, and he'll volunteer that he's a strong advocate. And then he'll go on: "The Republicans have injured themselves significantly this year by attacking the ban on assault weapons. If they lose the presidential election, they'll realize that the 'law-and-order' party missed public sentiment on this issue."

And then there's the city's most promi-

nent Republican: Rudy Giuliani.

Bratton has no small ego, but he was, as police commissioner, always careful to use the first-person-plural. When asked about the drop in the crime rate that seemed to have begun on the day he became police commissioner, he'd say, "It's not the weather. It's not demographics. What's happening is that you have 38,000 hard-working cops, a mayor who supports us, and a public who is with us."

That wasn't good enough for Giuliani, so he gutted Bratton's press office. Will Bratton deal with that in his book? "That was a significant and overt move," Bratton says, with an edge that suggests there's real fury beneath his carefully-modulated response. "It caused phenomenal damage. It was uncalled for, and it's never been adequately explained. In the book, I can't dance around that."

The emasculating of Bratton's press office did not, however, stop Bratton from being consistently hailed as—well, as the greatest crime-fighter since Rudolph Giuliani was U.S. Attorney and tried to put all of the Mafia and most of Wall Street in jail. Last January, the mayor posed for a *Time* magazine article about the remarkable drop in New York crime statistics. His clear understanding was that he would be pic-

tured on *Time*'s cover. There was a New Yorker on that cover—but it was Bratton.

"That was a precipitous event," Bratton says, deadpan again. "Press interest in the perceived conflict between the mayor and me did increase after that."

And so did Giuliani's desire to see Bratton trade his badge for the much-desired private sector job he had, apparently, told the mayor he was itching to take. William Bratton liked the use of the police chop-pers. He liked the dinners at Elaine's with the city's media and business elite. But what he really liked was the power. "It was," he admits, "good to be king."

And yet he always knew he would resign long before the next city election. "I didn't want the police to get jammed up with that," he says. "If I had spent nine months more in the job—which was my intention—we would have had a chance for the cement to harden. But the new philosophy had been communicated and implement-ed. The forms were in place."

The question he doesn't quite say is whether Giuliani will be able to take sole credit for the initiatives Bratton brought to the police—or, if the crime figures start inching back up, how the city's most prominent Republican can claim Bratton's departure had nothing to do with that spike. >50





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crimefile

(continued from page 19)

William Bratton's approach to crime-fighting couldn't be simpler. It's to make arrests. For everything. A misdemeanor is as good as a felony bust—and, because there are more small crimes committed in public, these "quality of life" arrests may accomplish as much good as a two-ton drug bust.

The genesis of this approach came from a 1982 *Atlantic Monthly* article called "Broken Window," which argued that maintaining public order was the first concern of the public—and the most effective way for the police to impact crime. Bratton tested that theory in Boston by going to neighborhood meetings with his community representative. "In the highest crime areas, the subject of crime didn't even come up," he told me. "The people talked about prostitution, noise, littering—what they faced every day. I saw that little things really do count, that what people most want is to reduce the fear they feel in their everyday lives."

In 1992, Bratton came to New York—at the invitation of Democratic Mayor David Dinkins—to head the transit police. Soon his officers were making arrests for littering, graffiti, sucking tokens out of fare boxes—minor crimes, as these things go. But the arrests had a powerful effect: In his twenty-two months in that job, subway crime plunged 17 percent. (Since his move to the police department in 1994, Bratton says, the policies he introduced have produced a 75 percent drop.) "You don't hear about crime in the subways anymore," he notes. "Now the stories are about subway maintenance."

Once he moved above-ground, Bratton directed the cops to arrest some very easy targets: "Squeegee-men" who stood at red lights and threatened drivers if they didn't let them wash their windshields; men who urinated in public; peddlers who illegally sold their wares in front of the city's most prestigious stores; homeless people who menaced pedestrians. "Improving the quality of life makes people happy," Bratton explains. "It also stops more crime than you'd think. You arrest a guy for public urination, find he's carrying a gun, run a check on him, learn there's a warrant out for him. It moves up fast."

As a manager, Bratton turned a heavily-bureaucratic police department into an entrepreneurial environment that gave precinct commanders almost total control of their cops—and made them completely responsible not only for making arrests, but for preventing crime. "What's wrong with having a positive attitude?" Bratton asks.

Bratton emphasizes that the enemy is behavior, not poverty, homelessness, and other social conditions. "Behavior is learned," he says. "For twenty years, kids in Harlem have been exposed to public urination, drug-taking, and public misbehavior. We changed the learning environment. Now they see that crime may not be so cool after all."

And it's not just Harlem.

I mention the recent penchant of the police to jail white men in suits for the dubious crime of smoking joints in public.

"Screw 'em," he replied.

"Well, how about Max Ferguson?" I ask. "Max was a student of mine at NYU. He invited me to his new painting show in SoHo, so I took my step-son down one Saturday to see the work and meet the artist. We went home. But Max went to jail for thirty hours—you may have read about it in the *Times*—for putting up a poster for his show."

"The way I look at it: screw him," Bratton said. "And shame on the *Times* for giving him that space. You've got a city of eight million 'exceptions.' But that won't work. Society has

established certain norms for everyone. You can't have 'tolerance' for small crimes, or you soon have larger ones."

Whether you agree with him or not, William Bratton had just uttered six sentences far more interesting than anything his successor—Howard Safir, in case you forgot—may ever be allowed to say. □

resources

ON THE PROWL

page 40: Katharine Hamnett Collection, Barneys New York, 660 Madison Avenue, (212) 826-8900. Yves Saint Laurent shoes, \$200, Saks Fifth Avenue, 611 Fifth Avenue, (212) 753-4000, and Bloomingdale's, 1000 Third Avenue, (212) 705-2000. Agatha necklace, \$29, Agatha, 158 Spring Street and 610 Fifth Avenue, (800) AGATHA-7.

pages 41: Vintage jeans, The Antique Boutique, 712-714 Broadway, (212) 460-8830. Calvin Klein bikini, \$78, Saks Fifth Avenue. Bettina Duncan for Fragments necklace, \$100, Fragments, 107 Greene Street, (888) 6-FRAGMENTS.

page 42: Cynthia Rowley dress, \$163, Cynthia Rowley, 112 Wooster Street, (212) 334-1144. Robert Sekulovich for Fragments necklace, \$350, Fragments.

page 43: Chanel top, \$640, Chanel, 15 East 57th Street, (212) 355-5050. Yves Saint Laurent trousers, \$470, Yves Saint Laurent Boutique, 855 Madison Avenue, (212) 988-3821. Agnès b. belt, \$62, Agnès b., 118 Prince Street, (212) 925-4649 and 1063 Madison Avenue, (212) 570-9333. Agatha necklace, \$29, Agatha. Norma Kamali sunglasses, \$180, OMO Norma Kamali, 11 West 56th Street, (212) 957-9797.

pages 44: Malia Mills bikini top, \$66, and bottom, \$62, Intermix, 125 Fifth Avenue, (212) 533-9720, and Manna, 66 Newtown Lane, East Hampton, (516) 329-3900.

pages 45: Agnès b. hat, \$70, and T-shirt, \$42, Agnès b. Ralph Lauren bracelet, Saks Fifth Avenue and Bloomingdale's.

liv tyler

(continued from page 31)

Stipe was there and I was sleeping!"

But the bucolic days of existing in two worlds came to an end at a 1986 Todd Rundgren concert, when Buell introduced Tyler as a friend to 9-year-old Liv. He immediately started sending gifts. Rundgren strenuously objected. But Tyler, Buell says, was cleaning up his act. He had married Cyrinta Foxe and had a daughter, Mia, who was 18 months younger than Liv. Buell wanted her daughter to know him. At an Aerosmith concert the next year, Liv finally learned the true identity of her father when she saw Mia for the first time.

"There was a girl standing on the side of the stage," says Liv. "She was chubby with a perm just like me. It was me standing there. We were twins. I just knew. Everyone kept asking us if we were sisters. I didn't say anything, but she'd say, 'Yes.' She told me later that Cyrinta used to tell her that she had a sister."

During the concert, Buell took her daughter aside and explained their relationship to Tyler. Liv, who had just turned 11, took it in stride. "The next morning I remember waking up and sitting on my mom's leopard-covered chaise lounge all day. I think I probably talked less that day than ever before—and I talk a lot. I just sat there quiet and stunned, contemplating everything. When I saw Todd again I gave him a bigger hug than I'd ever given him in my life and told him that I loved him so much."

But Rundgren was furious—so furious that he has not seen or spoken to Buell since 1990. "Todd felt that Steven did not deserve parental privileges," says Buell. "I don't think it's up to Todd or me. I left it up to Liv. She asked me if Steven was her father. What could I do? Lie?" Since then, Todd and Liv—who's kept Rundgren as her middle name—have had infrequent contact. >52

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Youth Drugs + Violence —

National Rally — Sept. 7 —

Imitations —

Illinois —

Theme → Families + Children —

Invited President
Jesse Jackson — prayer

thousands of people

families + children —

community + school —

Rally on Sept. 7 —

NAACP

Urban League

School Indendants —
WW

50,000 - 60,000

people —

Riverfront ^{Pink} Banks of Mississippi —

Family Day —



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Michael J. Cashman
Executive Director
618-656-2929

SAFE SCHOOLS RALLY

How YOU CAN GET INVOLVED!!!!

1. SPREAD THE WORD!

Tell other people about the rally. Put up flyers. Put up posters. Send out announcements on your electronic networks. Tell your friends, neighbors, and co-workers. Ask the organizations you belong to and the businesses you support to get involved. Put announcements in your church bulletin. Send notices to your local newspapers, radio stations, and cable stations.

2. ORGANIZE!

Organize a group from your area to come to the rally. Bring your family and friends to the rally. Contact your local school, church, parent and student groups, and teacher organizations to encourage them to spread the word about the rally. Encourage individuals and groups from your area to TAKE A STAND FOR SAFE SCHOOLS.

3. BE CREATIVE!

Think of unique ways to get more people involved! Find sponsors to help you attend the rally. Sponsor another person to attend the rally. Ask businesses and organizations in your community send a group of students or teachers to the rally. Raise funds to help make it happen.

4. STAY INFORMED!

Visit our WEB site (<http://www.dtsvc.com>) for informational updates on the rally. Pass the information on to others. If you need more information, call us at (618)656-2929 or (800)467-7719, or write SAFE, 7067 Marine Road, Edwardsville, Illinois, 62025.

4. COME TO THE RALLY ON SEPTEMBER 7!

Come to the rally in Alton, Illinois on September 7, 1996 and TAKE A STAND FOR SAFE SCHOOLS. Help kick off the 1996-1997 school year by standing up with people from all across the nation and making a commitment to do your part to keep our schools safe.

5. DON'T JUST STAND THERE - DO SOMETHING!

After you've come to the rally to TAKE A STAND FOR SAFE SCHOOLS, DO SOMETHING! Return to your home community with a renewed sense of commitment. Share your commitment with others. Get involved in your local schools and community. Do your part to keep your schools safe.

Thank You For Helping Keep Your Schools Safe!



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SAFE SCHOOLS - SAFE STREETS:

MISSION POSSIBLE RALLY

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1996

Juvenile and school violence are issues that are becoming an increasing concern for more and more Americans. Creating safer schools and streets for our children is possible if we all work together!

We invite every person that is concerned about the growing violence among our youth and in our nation's schools to join us and **TAKE A STAND FOR SAFE SCHOOLS!**

WHAT: SAFE SCHOOLS - SAFE STREETS: MISSION POSSIBLE RALLY.
A time and place for people from across the nation to meet to:

- Take a stand for safer schools and streets for our children.
- Join together in fellowship with a common purpose.
- Renew their sense of commitment to their local schools and communities, and pledge to do their part to keep their schools safe.
- Be motivated and inspired by prominent national speakers.

WHEN: SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1996.
To kick off the 1996-1997 school year.

WHERE: RIVERFRONT PARK IN ALTON, ILLINOIS.
Alton, Illinois is located in the St. Louis Metro-East Area (approximately a 30 minute drive from St. Louis). Riverfront Park is next to the Clark Bridge on the Mississippi River.

WHO: SAFETY & FIREARMS EDUCATION (SAFE) AND THE CITY OF ALTON.
SAFE is a grassroots nonprofit organization committed to decreasing school violence and creating safer schools and streets for our children. (More information about SAFE is available on this Web site).
THE CITY OF ALTON is hosting and co-sponsoring the event.

WHY: TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE!

Nearly 3 million thefts and violent crimes occur on or near school campuses every year. That is 16,000 incidents per school day, or one every six seconds.

Each day an estimated 200,000 students carry a gun to school. An estimated 430,000 students have taken some kind of weapon to school to protect themselves.

More than 2,000 students are physically attacked on school grounds every hour. Some 900 teachers are threatened, and 40 are physically attacked each hour in our nation's schools.

School violence is considered to be one of the leading causes of truancy. Approximately 150,000 students will miss school on any given day for fear of being hurt by other students.

Thank You For Helping Keep Your Schools Safe!

66493

Teresa -
we have it -

Bratton's aides: He's mayor type

By ALICE McQUILLAN

Daily News Staff Writer

Former Police Commissioner William Bratton's closest advisers are urging him to test the waters to run for mayor.

Bratton's top aides are floating the idea of a campaign for City Hall, arguing that their man has a positive public image as a successful crime-fighter. That image, they say, has bi-partisan appeal.

"He would be able to reach people on both sides of the aisle, he's not viewed as just a Democrat or Republican," said an aide. "He's seen as a savvy manager who made the quality of life better for New Yorkers."

The potential Bratton candidacy was discussed last month at an informal strategy session of his confidantes, according to a source close to the ex-top cop.

Bratton, 48, who resigned in March, was credited with re-engineering the Police Department and presiding over an unprecedented drop in crime. His departure came amid reports that Mayor Giuliani, who replaced him with low-key Howard Safir, was uncomfortable with the high profile of his key commissioner. Both men denied there was friction between them.

But Bratton reveled in the limelight as police commissioner and yesterday did not seek to completely quash the political speculation.

"I never rule out anything in life because you never know what happens," he said.

Bratton quickly returned a telephone call from the Daily News after being reached on a business trip to Atlanta. He said he was too busy in his

new job heading the New York office of a Boston-based security firm to contemplate entering politics.

While denying that he presided over a campaign strategy session, Bratton said an array of New Yorkers — from jet-setters to the man and woman in the street — had urged him to run. He is a registered Independent.

"I have a lot of other things on my mind besides running for mayor of the City of New York," he said. "I'm flattered to be considered, that is very flattering from somebody from Boston. I get a lot of that from the man in the street to very prominent people in the city."

Giuliani spokeswoman Colleen Roche declined comment.

Former Mayor Edward Koch, a harsh critic of Giuliani, said Bratton would be a more attractive candidate than two likely Democratic challengers — Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer and Manhattan Borough President Ruth Messinger.

"He would be an excellent candidate, and I think he would enter as an underdog in a race against Giuliani, but he would have a potential of winning," Koch said. "I think the reason Giuliani maintains a majority support is that there is no candidate running that people think are his equal in the Democratic Party. I believe that Bratton will ultimately be seen as a very strong candidate."

Bratton's supporters estimate they would need at least a \$10 million campaign war chest for the political neophyte. Giuliani had nearly \$5 million in his campaign war chest after a fund-raiser last month.

Other obstacles include Bratton's lack of a political base, inexperience in running a campaign and uncertainty about where he stands on an array of issues — from abortion rights to the city's budget troubles.

In addition, Bratton has expressed a desire to earn a higher private-sector salary because he has no pension. He also is drawing \$20,000 per speech and has received a six-figure book advance.

Bratton, a native of Massachusetts, headed Boston's police department before running the NYPD for 27 months. He resigned March 26 after months of tension with Giuliani that peaked over his book deal and freebie trips with wealthy friends.

Simpson puts trip on hold

LOS ANGELES — O.J. Simpson has postponed his mystery trip to South America until July, but he didn't explain the delay, a source told the Daily News yesterday.

Simpson had been slated to head to Argentina and Chile this week, but he's decided to wait until next month, the source said. He may make speeches and explore business opportunities during the jaunt.

"He's still going, but not this week," the source said, adding that Simpson did not divulge his itinerary for the trip.

Michelle Caruso

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dennis
FROM: Dwight 
SUBJECT: "The Tipping Point"
DATE: 24 June 1996

The article, "The Tipping Point", appeared in the June 17 issue of the New Yorker. Written by Malcolm Gladwell, the author ties the Theory of Broken Windows to epidemic theory.

Gladwell considers crime to be an epidemic. He compares crime to the 48-hour flu. If 50 Canadians exposed to the 48-hour flu infected one person in Manhattan on December 15, the entire city would be flu-infected by Christmas Day. Epidemiologists use this example to explain epidemic theory. Epidemic theory is the spread of a disease to a level that the entire community is exposed or ill by the contagious disease. The same theory can be applied to crime. He deduces that crime is a epidemic.

Yet, what is the "tipping point" for communities that turn to crime seemingly overnight. Gladwell statistically claims that white flight has been that "tipping point". In conservative/racist communities, the tipping point occurs when five percent of the population is comprised of a racial minority. In liberal communities, the percentage is closer to 60 percent. However, this can be prevented if the new arrivals contain community leaders. Communities will not rebuild themselves if there are few or no community-wide leaders that command respect. These people are educators, doctors, lawyers, community advocates, older citizens, etc. If they are present and seen, crime is less likely to happen.

Their presence also controls other factors within a community. For example, communities that exist with respected professionals have lower teen pregnancy rates and teenage dropout rates. However, the author reminds the reader that teenagers are teenagers. Not even community norms and laws can control hormones.

Politically, this is a very hard sell. Conservatives think that communities should correct themselves and there should be little or no federal involvement. Liberals tend to think we should send a few more thousand dollars to solve the problem. They always want a few more thousand dollars.

The author contends that epidemic theory is like a bottle of ketchup - first its nothing then there is a lot. Like the broken windows theory, a paradigm shift in the implementation of the theory. But once it works, it works very well. Therefore, he

concludes that crime is an epidemic. With proper medicine, it can be corrected. But it takes time to cure it. We must work to maintain the cure.

Can NY Kick Tobacco
Stock? Page 19

Venture Capital: Who's
Investing, Who Gets
Money Page 20

CRAIN'S

NEW YORK BUSINESS

**MALL S
IDENT
AFTER L
NAMES
PAGE**

Vol. XII, No. 21

May 20-26, 1996



BUCK ENNIS

HANDCUFF LINKS: William Bratton will try to leverage the fame he gained in New York to grow First Security Services' investigations business.

Arresting results

*Bratton tries to shift commish success
to hotly contested investigations sector*

PROFILE

BY ALICE LIPOWICZ

When looking for a description of former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, taking advice from others isn't necessarily first on the list of his outstanding attributes. Even so, Mr. Bratton will tell you himself that he owes a lot to his very good friend, security executive Robert Johnson.

It was Mr. Johnson, it turns out, who gave the commissioner the idea of setting goals on fighting crime in

the precincts, such as those a sales executive might establish for his sales force.

"We set the first-year goal at a 10% reduction in crime," says Mr. Bratton, "and everyone's eyes rolled."

But within a short time the target was met, and exceeded.

So maybe it isn't such a stretch for Mr. Bratton to believe that other police chiefs would value similar business know-how for improving the performance of a police department. Then again, he wasn't paying

See BRATTON on Page 33

C'ty taps taxpayers to fund Connecticut

Partners go for high returns, not local jobs

The Discovery Fund debuted in February 1995 as a private/public venture capital fund

But John Barry, a partner at manager, Prospect Street Investr

Bratton tries shifting NYC success to private sector

BRATTON from Page One
for the advice he received.

Now as Mr. Johnson's man in New York and his vice chairman for strategy, Mr. Bratton will definitely be asking people to pay for his insight. He is setting up a local office of Boston-based First Security Services Corp., and kick-starting what he believes will one day become a thriving consulting unit specializing in providing strategic planning for police forces nationwide as well as an investigative operation.

"Everyone is very interested in what's working in reducing crime in New York," says Mr. Bratton. "I think there's a phenomenal market. I'll bring a lot of attention to it."

Competitive field

The question is whether New York's celebrated former top cop can in fact bring in a lot of business, particularly at a time when even experienced executives concede competitive pressures on investigative services are mounting and prices are beginning to soften.

"William Bratton is very smart and able and I know he'll succeed,"

says Robert McGuire, another former NYPD commissioner and president of the biggest spy on the block, Kroll Associates Inc. "But this is a very tough business environment. It won't be easy."

The softness in pricing reflects not only increased competition from accounting and law firms, but also the proliferation of freelance and retired investigators willing to work at low cost. That pool of talent—heavily utilized as subcontractors—is constantly being replenished by government and corporate downsizing.

"The abundance of investigators is a significant factor in keeping prices down," says James Cook, founder of Information Professionals Network, an on-line consulting firm based in Reno, Nev.

Another factor is the availability of databases from on-line services or the Internet.

The pressure on prices and profit margins appears to be strongest on bread-and-butter services, such as standard background checks, although Kroll, the industry's 800-pound gorilla, claims to have been

able to increase prices for more sophisticated investigative work.

Perhaps because Kroll doesn't come cheap and is known for its high overhead, a tier of small but growing investigative firms continues to prosper. The companies, which include Investigative Group Inc., Strang-Hayes Consulting Inc., Decision Strategies International, and Fairfax Group Ltd., all report thriving global niches in investigating corporate acquisition targets, computer and software crime, patent infringement and corporate financial frauds.

Litigation drives demand

Demand for investigative services has exploded as U.S. corporations look overseas for ventures with foreign partners, and as the sophistication of white-collar fraud increases. Litigation also is driving up the demand for investigators.

"There's been tremendous opportunity as U.S. businesses have started to move into other parts of the world," says Robert Strang, president of Strang-Hayes. A typical 10-day background investigation of a foreign executive could cost \$5,000, he says.

Drew McKay, executive vice president of the Fairfax Group, agrees. "There are still untapped markets and geographic areas that haven't been served yet," he says.

While Kroll still seems to control some of the glitziest cases, such as its investigative role in the Orange County, Calif., municipal bond scandal, its competitors have snaggled some prize accounts. Strang, for instance, handles George Steinbrenner's investigative needs and it worked for Woody Allen when he was attempting to vindicate himself of charges of sex-

ually abusing his children.

Even so, there's no questioning Kroll's dominance, with revenues of \$60 million and growing. Just this year, the company opened offices in Beijing, New Delhi and Sao Paolo.

Mr. Bratton's new firm has made only a limited commitment to investigative work up until now, pulling in most of its \$90 million in revenues from its principal business of supplying security guards. With the addition of Mr. Bratton, Mr. Johnson says the business is turning a serious eye to the investigations business, particularly in the area of corporate due diligence and security consulting, and, of course, Mr. Bratton's baby—advising police departments.

"William Bratton is a rainmaker," says Mr. Johnson of his gold-plated, big-name executive, who still sits on a White House task force on crime, and now and then jets to London to do an interview for a magazine profile.

Mr. Bratton already has approached law enforcement officials from New Orleans and even Venezuela about possible consulting stints, adding that there is a "real fascination overseas with what we've done in New York."

The former commissioner says he realizes that money may be tight for police departments, but he expects business communities to see the value of his advice and underwrite the costs.

Mr. Bratton does acknowledge his limited experience with managing finances. This deficiency, he says, was the main reason he was willing to accept a second-in-command position at First Security.

"I'll be on a learning curve," he jokes. "I'll have to get used to not being No. 1 anymore." ■