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STATE ATTORNEY**

**E. MCRAE MATHIS
CHIEF ASSISTANT**

January 8, 1997

Dennis Burke
White House Council on
Domestic Policy
White House
Washington, DC 20502

Dear Mr. Burke:

I have enclosed a copy of the Florida State University Study that you discussed with Mr. Shorstein. Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,


Jackie Bevel

Enclosure



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January 30, 1996


Dennis Burke
Senior Policy Analyst
Domestic Policy Council
The Old Executive Office Building
Room 218 B
Washington, DC 20502

Dear Mr. Burke:

Thank you for calling me last week concerning your interest in our juvenile justice initiatives. I have enclosed for your review a packet of information which describes in some detail the two-pronged approach my office is taking to address the juvenile crime problem in our community. I have also enclosed a copy of the segment from the News Hour with Jim Lehrer that focused on our efforts. I look forward to talking with you again after you have had an opportunity to review this material.

Once again, thank you for your interest.

Very truly yours,


Harry L. Shorstein

HLS/ek/cc
Enclosures

An Evaluation of Juvenile Justice
Innovations in
Duval County, Florida*

by

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An Evaluation of Juvenile Justice Innovations in Duval County, Florida

by David W. Rasmussen and Yiwen Yu

Executive Summary

This study evaluates a program in the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida that is designed to provide timely interventions for at-risk youth who might be deflected from a criminal career and to incarcerate juvenile habitual offenders so they are prevented from committing more crime. Initiated by the State Attorney's office in 1991, major institutions in Duval County, including the Sheriff's Office, the Board of Education, and a number of other agencies have cooperated to create a program that focuses on the fundamental facts of crime: youthful offenders account for a disproportionate amount of crime, they are in the increasing crime portion of their criminal careers, and that punishment of youthful offenders is often inappropriately light given the gravity of their offenses. Although the juvenile justice initiatives involve several early intervention components, this study focuses on the public safety effects of the Program for At-Risk Students and the incarceration of habitual youthful offenders.

These initiatives have paid significant dividends in terms of public safety according to the evidence reported in this study. To the extent that this program deters or rehabilitates youthful offenders, the benefits reported here are understated.

- Over 7,200 robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts have been prevented by incarcerating habitual youthful offenders during the 1992–1995 study period. Since some violent crimes were also averted, this is a conservative estimate of the program's impact on public safety.
- A conservative estimate of the gross public benefit of this reduced level of property crime is valued at about \$6 million a year or \$21,000 per offender.
- The Program for At-Risk Students may have averted as many as 1,500 property crimes.

Preventing the on-set of criminal activity is the most cost effective strategy to increase public safety, according to most research on crime control. A necessary precondition for such prevention activities is to make sure that young people understand that criminal activity is not tolerated and that infractions have undesirable consequences. The juvenile justice initiatives have contributed to public safety in Duval County and provide the crucial precondition for other efforts to strengthen families and communities that are the most practical ways to reduce criminality among youth in the long run.

An Evaluation of Juvenile Justice Innovations in Duval County, Florida

I. Introduction¹

State legislatures throughout America are getting tough on crime by building more prisons and mandating that convicted criminals serve longer sentences. Concentrating our scarce criminal justice resources on building more prisons is a commitment to restrain established criminals rather than trying to divert budding criminals. Yet it is easily shown that our crime problems are overwhelmingly concentrated among youthful offenders. While we do not have data on the number of offenses committed by youth, arrest data suggest how important it is to develop innovative policies to reduce criminality among young people.

In 1993 juveniles under age 15 accounted for 14.2 percent of all property crime arrests and another 29.1 percent of these arrests were of youths aged 15 to 19. Youths under age 20 also accounted for 27.9 percent of all arrests for violent crimes (Macquire and Pastore, 1995, Table 4.8). Arrest rates for robbery and burglary peak in the sixteen to eighteen age range and fall rapidly thereafter. By age 30, for example, the arrest rate for these crimes is about one-fifth that of the peak age years. Arrests for aggravated assault and murder peak around age 20, but fall more slowly since the arrest rate for these crimes

¹The authors received excellent cooperation from many people in the State Attorney's Office and the Research and Planning Department of the Duval County Sheriff's Office. Special thanks go to B. J. Laster, Harry Shorstein, and David Vanderhoff. Sherry Magill, Executive Director of the Jessie Ball duPont Fund, has been very supportive. Valerie N. Colvin of the Policy Sciences Center prepared the manuscript. Harriet Crawford and Susan Thomas played a major role in gathering data, Jennifer Talone was in charge of data entry, and Jesse Taintor managed the data base. Finally, thanks go to Barbara Morgan and Brian Berkowitz for their comments on a previous draft of this report.

reaches one-half the peak arrest rate about age 35 (Blumstein, 1995). Since youthful offenders are not generally sent to prison and many receive little or no punishment, committing too many criminal justice resources to prison building means that youthful offenders too often learn that their criminal acts have no immediate and undesirable consequences. By putting too few resources into discouraging budding criminals, we may be accomplices in the creation of the criminal careers that will eventually require incarceration. Chronic youthful offenders, of course, must be restrained. Further, most drug-using felons indicate that their criminal careers started long before they used drugs, suggesting that early and firm action against habitual offenders might also deter their entry into drug use that further reduces the chances that they will become productive citizens.

This study is an evaluation of a program in the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida that is designed to provide timely intervention of at-risk youth who might be deflected from a criminal career and to incarcerate juvenile habitual offenders so they are prevented from committing more crimes. This program is designed to "incarcerate repeat and violent juvenile offenders and at the same time intervene at an early age in an attempt to educate and habilitate juveniles at risk of becoming criminals."²

The Programs

The State Attorney's Office, in cooperation with the Sheriff's Office, the Board of Education, and other local organizations have developed a two part juvenile justice program that are evaluated in this report: early intervention and aggressive prosecution of habitual juvenile offenders. The program is designed to protect the public and to deter at-risk youth

²Shorstein (1995), p. 1.

from criminal activity. As the State Attorney notes, "prevention efforts cannot succeed if those not abiding by the law do not believe there is a consequence to criminal behavior."³

The early intervention program that we evaluate here is the Program For At-Risk Students (PAS), which serves students who have had serious discipline problems. Started in October 1993, the basic thrust of the program is to emphasize to these juveniles that there are consequences of criminal behavior. They tour the jail, see a film about life in Florida's prisons, and, according to the State Attorney's Office, "the most meaningful part of the program is when an incarcerated juvenile talks with the students about life in the jail and the importance of avoiding criminal activity and staying in school."⁴

Habitual juvenile offenders are prosecuted as adults and incarcerated in the county jail for up to one year. Started in August 1992, this program is tough on these young offenders, but does not necessarily compromise their ability to lead a crime-free adult life. The offenders are not branded for life with an adult conviction and they are not incarcerated with adults.⁵ In jail they continue their education under the auspices of the Duval County School Board, receive counseling and mentoring services, and are supervised after release by specialized probation officers with reduced case loads. Youth also receive mentoring, counseling, and other services after release.

Several other initiatives have been introduced to dissuade young people from delinquency. One prominent activity is to advertise the fact that juvenile delinquency "will

³Shorstein, 1995, p. 9.

⁴Shorstein, 1995, p. 3.

⁵ This program does not preclude a prison sentence for juveniles who have committed very serious offenses.

not longer be tolerated in Jacksonville."⁶ Other programs aimed at youth include efforts to promote gun safety, improve conflict resolution skills, curb drunk driving, assess juveniles who are at-risk of becoming chronic offenders, and enhance truancy prevention. A Juvenile Assessment Center opened in April 1994. This Center receives and processes juveniles who are taken into custody. Because the Center takes responsibility for juvenile offenders, the law enforcement officers can quickly get back on the street. Sherman (1995) has noted that high arrest rates can backfire by causing more crime when voluminous paper work takes the police off the street for a long time. The Assessment Center means that the police need not take time to find a suitable adult to take charge of the juvenile offender, so it can significantly increase the efficiency of police when they deal with these offenders.

This study focuses on the extent to which two of these initiatives, the Program For At-Risk Students and the incarcerating of habitual youthful offenders, contribute to public safety in Duval County. The remainder of this report is divided into six parts. Methodological issues are discussed in the next section and a simulation of combined program effects is presented in Section III. Section IV evaluates the impact of the incarceration program on public safety. The evaluation of the Program for At-Risk Students is in Section V and a dollar estimate of the programs' benefits is presented in Section VI. Implications for criminal justice policy and concluding comments appear in the final section.

⁶Shorstein, 1995, p. 2

II. Methodological Issues

There are two methodological issues that complicate this study. The first problem deals with the difficulty of measuring program outcomes when the criminal justice system has no reliable measures of crimes committed by juveniles. Second, this evaluation is not being conducted in an experimental setting that could allow us to control for the myriad of influences that affect criminal behavior. The State Attorney's Office contributed to this problem by developing a multi-faceted program to combat juvenile crime. Making many programmatic changes over a short period of time can be good public policy but, alas, it is the analyst's nightmare because it becomes impossible to disentangle the effects of the program's component parts. These issues are discussed in this section. Forewarned about these difficulties, we now turn to a discussion of how these juvenile justice initiatives might affect public safety.

How These Programs Might Work

Standard explanations for how the Duval County juvenile justice initiatives could improve public safety are straightforward. The Program for At-Risk Students is designed to deter future offenders, although its impact should not be large because the treatment is modest compared to the socio-economic and community factors that probably cause some of these youth to commit crimes.⁷ Incarcerating habitual juvenile offenders certainly lowers

⁷Sampson (1995) summarizes recent research on the effect of community factors on crime. This research suggest that places, given their socio-economic and demographic characteristics, can have an independent effect on the propensity to commit crime. The community perspective suggest that places, as well as people, need to be changed.

the number of crimes committed since known offenders are incapacitated in jail.

Rehabilitation of incarcerated youth is also a possibility. This is obviously an intent of the program, since offering education and counseling in jail, the mentoring system, and aftercare once released are all designed to reduce recidivism.⁸

It is possible that these combined program effects have a much larger impact on public safety than an evaluation of the individual components might suggest. If crime is contagious, for example, breaking a vicious cycle of lawless behavior in a community can have much greater impact than a similar effort would be if crime is not subject to contagion effects. Herrnstein (1995, p. 56) states that "Lawbreaking activities are somewhat contagious, as anyone who has witnessed the looting and vandalizing mobs in urban riots should realize."

The theory of crime contagion is not so simple that it can be understood by observing mob behavior, however. The question to be answered is this: why is it that communities with apparently very similar socio-economic and demographic composition have very different crime rates? Glaeser et al. (1995) developed a social interactions model that is one of the most impressive attempts to solve this puzzle. In theory, if individual

⁸Evaluating the program's impact on recidivism among its participants requires a longitudinal study design that is beyond the scope of this study. Even with the program's education and support mechanisms, there is considerable doubt whether the *average* participant will be rehabilitated by the jail experience. Blumstein (1995) reviews the controversy between those who believe that prison makes criminals better and those who believe its effects are essentially criminogenic. Blumstein argues there is merit in both positions, suggesting that for some individuals the experience provides a significant deterrent effect while others are socialized into a criminal career. The disparate impacts of incarceration may explain why studies rarely find that prison offers significant rehabilitation effects, according to Blumstein. The point is that incapacitation may deter some offenders even though this contention would not be confirmed in a statistical analysis.

decisions are independent, then the crime level should represent an average of a large number of independent decisions in the community. Because of the large number of individual decisions, the community average should converge to the population mean. This implies that differences in crime rates across communities should be explained by differences in socio-economic and demographic conditions. The fact that "...youth are increasingly being concentrated in impoverished and underclass neighborhoods characterized by a high degree of social disorganization and high rates of crime and drug use"⁹ does not necessarily imply a contagion theory because the causes of crime could be captured by the neighborhood characteristics. However, the reality is that differences in observable local area characteristics account for relatively little of the variation in crime rates across communities.¹⁰ Glaeser et al. (1995, p 4) have found that less than 30 percent of the variation in crime rates among communities can be explained by differences in local socio-economic attributes. Shaw and McKay (1969) found that high rates of delinquency in Chicago persisted in some neighborhoods over many years, even if there was substantial population turnover. This led them to question individualistic explanations for urban crime and Sampson (1995) claims that there has been a resurgence of research focused on the causes of variations in urban crime.

To explain the high variance of crime rates across communities, a positive

⁹Greenwood, 1995, p. 114.

¹⁰Crane (1991) points out that collective socialization and institutional theories predict a continuous relationship between social problems and neighborhood quality. He identifies an epidemic theory, which is a subset of a broader class of contagion models, as the one model that implies an extremely large and discontinuous increase in the incidence of social problems when some threshold level of neighborhood quality is crossed.

interaction among individual decisions about crime is required. When one person's decision to commit crime influences his neighbor's decision to do the same thing, the aggregate number of crimes will not converge to the population mean. This kind of contagion will cause crime rates to be higher than predictions based on community characteristics would suggest.

Glaeser et al. (1995) build on the work of Sah (1991) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) and create a formal model that predicts a large variation of crime rates across locations when the number of "fixed agents", persons who are not affected by their neighbors' actions, increases.¹¹ Empirical testing of this model clearly reveals the "social interactions" which are contagion effects. Most interesting, their empirical results for New York City precincts and U.S. cities show that the contagion effects seem to be most pronounced for larceny and auto theft (the property crimes that are most likely to be committed by juveniles), somewhat less prominent for robbery, assault and burglary, and low levels of social interaction are reported for murder, rape, and arson. Glaeser et al. (p.6) suggest that "the number of fixed agents can just be seen as a metaphor for the forces that slow social interaction. Forces that slow interaction among potential criminals can include strong parents, or formal schooling, or any force that provides information that counters criminal influences."

¹¹Previous models tended to predict two distinct equilibria crime rates, i.e., communities had either a high or a low crime rate. This is in obvious contradiction to what we observe in crime rate data. Glaeser et al. (1995) assume that social interactions (contagion) take place at the neighborhood level, thereby avoiding the prediction that observed crime rates in jurisdictions should be grouped around a high or a low equilibria.

Contagion effects are also suggested by the fact that association with delinquent peers is one of the best predictors of future delinquency (Greenwood, 1995, p. 113). A significant body of empirical work on specific behaviors has also explored epidemics in social behavior, a phenomenon closely related to the contagion hypothesis. Crane (1991), for example, analyzed the pattern of neighborhood effects on the incidence of dropping out of school and teenage childbearing. Crane concluded his study by saying that the pattern of neighborhood effects on both behaviors are "precisely the one implied by the epidemic theory."

Measuring Public Safety

Developing criteria for success is a crucial starting point for the evaluation process. The most relevant criteria for most criminal justice program evaluations is whether the program contributes to public safety. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find measures of public safety that can reliably compare "safety" in one community with another or, for that matter, measures that indicate that a specific community is more or less safe from one year to the next.

The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) offer the standard measure of crimes known to the police for most jurisdictions in the country. Unfortunately, the UCR does not offer a complete enumeration of crime because a large number of crimes go unreported. The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics conducts an annual survey of crime victimization which shows that about half of violent crimes are reported, about 30 percent of thefts, and about 41 percent of household crimes. The National Crime Victimization Survey interviews about 110,000 persons who are over 12 years of age. They live in 66,000 households. This sample,

unfortunately, is not large enough to obtain accurate reporting rates that could be used to augment state or local UCR reports.

Evaluating programs that are designed to reduce crime by juveniles is immeasurably more complicated because there are no estimates of the number of crimes committed by youthful offenders. One strategy is to compare juvenile arrests across jurisdictions or over time within a jurisdiction. If juvenile arrests fall after a program is put in place, assuming that all other relevant factors are held constant, it might be assumed that there are fewer offenses being committed by juveniles. This conclusion implicitly assumes that police effort at arresting juveniles remains unchanged. Assuming constant police effort is dubious, however. Consider the following example. Suppose the police decide to crack down on juvenile drug users on the assumption that drug users commit burglaries to pay for drugs. If fewer police resources are devoted to solving burglaries, there will be fewer arrests (of both adults and juveniles) for burglaries. The juvenile anti-drug effort is almost guaranteed to be a success if declining juvenile burglary arrests is used to measure its success. Unless the police get more resources to combat drug use, their effort in other areas must fall.¹² An alternative scenario has police getting many new officers, with the result being more juveniles being arrested for drug offenses and burglary. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that an increasing effort against drug offenses was misplaced because there were more juvenile burglary arrests.

¹²See Rasmussen and Benson (1994) and Benson et al. (1992) for a discussion of resource allocation trade-offs faced by law enforcement agencies.

Developing a Juvenile Assessment Center in Duval County is another policy decision that undermines the usefulness of juvenile arrests as a measure of program effectiveness. This institution, in effect, lowers the amount of time police officers must spend when they take a juvenile into custody. In effect, it lowers their "cost" of arresting juveniles and allows them to spend more time on the street. The Assessment Center should lead to an increase in juvenile arrests over what they would otherwise be, all other things staying equal. This policy, like the previous one, suggests that it is important to use outcome measures rather than police activity measures to evaluate the programs being considered here.

Although juvenile arrests cannot be used to indicate the success of programs, they can provide a reliable guide to which crimes are most likely to be deterred by efforts aimed at actual and potential juvenile offenders. According to arrest statistics in Duval County, juvenile offenders are not uniformly distributed among the part one index crimes: in 1991 93.6 percent of juvenile arrests were for robbery, residential burglary, other burglary, theft under \$300, theft over \$300, or motor vehicle theft.¹³ Table 1 shows juvenile arrests as a percentage of total arrests for the index one crimes in Duval County during 1991. Motor vehicle theft is the premier juvenile crime: persons under 18 account for almost half of the arrests for this crime. Juveniles are also disproportionately represented in residential burglary (39.8%), other burglary (36.8%), robbery (32.8%), and theft under \$300 (30.3%). Programs aimed at juvenile offenders are likely to have their greatest impact on the number of reported crimes in these categories. By focusing the analysis on motor vehicle theft and

¹³ The 1991 data probably provide the most accurate representation of the role of juveniles in each crime category because the data for subsequent years are potentially affected by the programs being evaluated here.

Table 1: Juvenile and Adult Arrests in Duval County by Crime, 1991

Crime	Juvenile	Adult	Total	Percent Juvenile
Murder	16	98	114	14.0
Rape	79	304	383	20.6
Other sex offenses	57	158	215	26.5
Robbery	259	531	790	32.8
Aggravated Assault	424	1,994	2,410	17.6
Residential Burglary	485	735	1,220	39.8
Other Burglary	304	523	827	36.8
Theft <\$300	1,871	4,296	6,167	30.3
Total >\$300	191	919	1,110	17.2
Vehicle theft	530	560	1,090	48.6
Total	4,216	10,118	14,326	29.4

Source: Duval County Sheriff's Office.

burglary, for example, it is possible that a discernable program impact on offenses can be found even though such an effect would not be encountered for other crime categories.

An Imperfect Experiment

The ideal scientific experiment changes the treatment while holding the environment constant in all other respects. Social science rarely offers anything resembling the perfect laboratory setting, of course, but the evaluation of criminal justice programs and policies is particularly difficult in this respect. Measurement is a continuing problem because we are not able to accurately discern how many crimes people would have committed during the time they are incarcerated or the number committed by recidivists prior to the time they return to the corrections system.

This study readily reflects the difficulty of drawing definite conclusions about criminal justice programs because we are directly testing only two major components of a multi-faceted effort. Other aspects of the Duval County initiative could contribute significantly to whatever success might be attributed to the PAS or incarceration programs. Rigorously separating the myriad of influences affecting Duval County offense and crime rates after the State Attorney's initiative started in late 1992 is, regrettably, impossible.

Recognizing this reality, we have chosen a methodology that makes the maximum use of the information that can be brought to bear on the question of the impact of these programs on public safety in Duval County. A complete and rigorous cost effectiveness model is not possible given the quality of the available data; nor is such a model practical given the resources available for this project. Significant insights can nevertheless be gained

by viewing these juvenile justice initiatives from diverse perspectives. While no one part of the analysis offers incontrovertible evidence regarding how the Program for At-Risk Students and the incarceration policy contribute to public safety, together they provide evidence from which we can draw conclusions with some confidence.

III. Combined Program Effects

Public safety effects of Duval County's juvenile justice innovations as a group can be studied by comparing crime trends in Duval County with those of similar counties in the state. Comparison counties must be closely matched so that the differences in the time path of crimes between them and Duval county can be attributed to the latter county's juvenile justice innovations. Achieving so close a match is virtually impossible for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are problems associated with unobserved differences in local law enforcement policies and criminal justice practice.

An initial evaluation of Florida's 67 counties revealed that only four of them appeared to be plausible candidates for service as a "match" for Duval. About 675,700 people lived in Duval county in 1990. The counties in the potential match pool were Brevard (401,900), Hillsborough (836,300), Orange (684,100), and Volusia (372,400). To choose the matched counties, several economic and demographic attributes of Duval county were identified: income per capita, unemployment rate, percent of the population age 75 and older, and percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 19. Duval county's income per capita and unemployment rate are below those of the state, it has a relatively small elderly population, and has a higher percentage of persons between the ages of 15 and 19

than the state. The counties used in the following analysis—Hillsborough and Orange—share these economic and demographic characteristics relative to the state average. These county characteristics, along with those of the state, are reported in Table 2.

Communities with similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics can have very different crime rates, as noted above. Comparing property crime rates among Duval, Hillsborough, and Orange counties relative to the state suggests that Hillsborough is better than Orange as a match for Duval County. Each of these counties has a higher property crime rate (including burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) than the state average. In 1991, the year before the programs being studied were started, Duval County's property crime rate per 1,000 population was 88.3 while Hillsborough's was almost identical at 89.9. In contrast, the property crime rate in Orange was 74.4 per thousand, a figure only slightly higher than the overall state rate of 73.6.

Our method is straightforward. Offenses which are most often committed by juveniles are the basic subject of our inquiry. Table 1 showed that juvenile arrests are most numerous in the categories of robbery, burglary, theft, and auto theft. Since the programs being evaluated here were started in late 1992, Table 3 shows the trends in population and the above mentioned offenses committed in Duval, Hillsborough, and Orange Counties from 1991 through 1995.

Examining Table 3 reveals some fundamental differences between these comparison counties. The population growth rate in Orange county was higher than that of Duval and Hillsborough, which may be related to the fact that Orange county experienced an increase in the number of offenses in each category reported in Table 3 except for that of burglary.

Table 2: Economic and Demographic Data for Comparison Counties, 1990

	Florida	Duval	Hillsborough	Orange
Population (1,000's)	-	675.7	836.3	684.1
Income per capita	18,802	17,817	16,997	17,743
Unemployment Rate (%)	5.9	5.4	4.9	5.5
Population over 75 (%)	7.7	4.1	4.8	4.1
Population 15-19 (%)	6.2	6.8	6.8	7.2

Source: The Florida Long Term Economic Forecast, Bureau of Economics and Business Research, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL (June, 1995).

Table 3: Number of Selected Offenses in Duval, Hillsborough, and Orange Counties, 1991-1995

Duval Year	Population (1,000s)	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	M/V Theft	Total Offenses	Total per 1,000 Population
1991	682	4239	17890	36354	5955	64438	94.48
1992	694	3697	16738	36208	7210	63853	92.01
1993	702	3679	15550	35306	7267	61802	88.04
1994	710	3522	14742	35950	6890	61104	86.06
1995	718	2977	12859	34772	5837	56445	78.61
% Change 91-95	0.05	-0.30	-0.28	-0.04	-0.02	-0.12	-0.17
Hillsborough							
Year							
1991	843	4334	20736	44127	10932	80129	95.05
1992	854	4070	18900	42636	12165	77771	91.07
1993	866	4137	17831	41959	13240	77167	89.11
1994	879	4539	16980	46446	16869	84834	96.51
1995	893	3622	14198	43740	10519	72079	80.72
% Change 91-95	0.06	-0.16	-0.32	-0.01	-0.04	-0.10	-0.15
Orange							
Year							
1991	701	2321	14397	33005	4784	54507	77.76
1992	713	2259	14458	33618	5845	56180	78.79
1993	728	2446	14422	34029	5487	56384	77.45
1994	740	2689	13651	37530	6265	60135	81.26
1995	759	2527	12529	36785	5594	57435	75.67
% Change 91-95	0.08	0.09	-0.13	0.11	0.17	0.05	-0.03

Source: Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Uniform Crime Reports, various years.

Orange, like Duval and Hillsborough, experienced a decline in burglary from 1991 to 1995, but its decline was much smaller. Duval county, like Hillsborough, in contrast, reported a decline in each reported offense category between 1991 and 1995. The time path of crime in Duval County is markedly different from those of Orange and Hillsborough, however. The last column of Table 3 shows crimes per 1,000 population. It shows that Duval experienced a steady decline in crimes per capita, while Hillsborough experienced a general decline over the period except for a significant increase in 1994. Orange County, on the other hand, shows no trend in these crimes per capita over the 1991–1995 period.

Table 4 presents the same information in a different format by showing the offense rates per 1,000 population for these counties. Changes in these offense rates over time in these counties play a key role in the policy simulation that follows.

Our fundamental question is this: what would offense rates have been in Duval county after 1992 if the State Attorney's juvenile justice initiative had not been undertaken? We simulate alternative scenarios for Duval county by using the actual experience of Hillsborough and Orange counties over the 1991–1995 period. In essence, we are assuming that if this initiative had not been undertaken, robbery, burglary and theft offenses in Duval county would have grown at a rate identical to that experienced in the matched counties. Next the mechanics of the simulation method are described and the results reported. We then turn to the crucial issue of how the simulation results are to be interpreted.

Using robbery and the Hillsborough experience as the counterfactual that represents what would have happened in Duval in the absence of the programs under consideration, Table 5 shows the mechanics of the simulation method. The Duval county robbery offense

Table 4: Crime Rate per 1,000 Population for Selected Offenses in Duval, Hillsborough, and Orange Counties, 1991-1995

Duval	Population				
Year	(1,000s)	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	M/V Theft
1991	682	6.22	26.23	53.3	8.73
1992	694	5.42	24.54	53.1	10.6
1993	702	5.39	22.8	51.8	10.7
1994	710	5.16	20.76	52.7	10.1
1995	718	4.15	17.91	48.4	8.13
% change 91-95	0.05	-0.33	-0.32	-0.09	-0.07

Hillsborough					
Year					
1991	843	5.14	24.6	52.4	13
1992	854	4.83	22.42	50.6	14.4
1993	866	4.91	21.15	49.8	15.7
1994	879	5.38	20.14	55.1	20
1995	893	4.06	15.9	49	11.8
% change 91-95	0.06	-0.21	-0.35	-0.06	-0.09

Orange					
Year					
1991	701	3.31	20.54	47.1	6.82
1992	713	3.22	20.62	48	8.34
1993	728	3.49	20.57	48.5	7.83
1994	740	3.84	19.47	53.5	8.94
1995	759	3.33	16.51	48.5	7.37
% change 91-95	0.08	0.01	-0.20	0.03	0.08

rate for the years 1991 to 1995 are shown in the row labeled "Actual." Program effects are assumed to be zero until 1993, the first full year of operation.

The simulation in this example works by imposing Hillsborough county's robbery offense *growth* rate in 1993 on the 1992 robberies per capita in Duval county. Thus, the simulated Duval robbery rate for 1993 is 5.51, which is the product of Duval's 1992 offense rate (5.42) and rate of change in this offense rate from 1992 to 1993 in Hillsborough (1.7 percent).¹⁴ The 1994 simulated robbery offense rate is simply the 1993 simulated rate times the 1993–94 change in Hillsborough's offense rate. The simulated offense rates are shown in the first row of the table.

The difference between the simulated and the actual offense rates is shown in row three of the table. Since this is the simulated change in the offense rate per thousand population, the product of this difference and the Duval County population (in thousands) reveals how many more crimes Duval would have experienced if it had Hillsborough's offense growth rate rather than its own after 1993. Table 5 shows that in each year Duval county would have suffered more robberies had it mirrored Hillsborough's experience rather than its own. Of course, this method allows for the possibility that the simulated number of offenses could be smaller than the actual number, indicating the simulated offense rate is preferred to Duval's actual experience.

The simulation results are summarized in Table 6. Given that there are only two negative entries in the table (burglary in the 1995 Hillsborough simulation and motor vehicle theft in Orange for 1993), it is clear that Duval County's actual experience with the

¹⁴The simulated robbery offense rate of 5.51 is 5.42 times 1.017.

Table 5: The Simulation Method: An Example

	Robbery				
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Simulated ^a			5.51	6.04	4.56
Actual	6.22	5.42	5.39	5.16	4.15
Difference			0.12	0.88	0.41
Number of crimes ^b			84	625	294

^a Assumes that Duval County's offense rate grows at the rate of the matched county.

^b The number of additional crimes Duval County would have had if its crime rate was identical to the matched county.

Table 6: Actual and Simulated Offense Rates for Duval County: 1993-95

	Hillsborough County Scenario			Orange County Scenario		
	1993	1994	1995	1993	1994	1995
Robbery						
simulated	5.51	6.04	4.56	5.88	6.46	5.6
actual	5.39	5.16	4.15	5.39	5.16	4.15
difference	0.12	0.88	0.41	0.49	1.30	1.45
number of offenses	84	625	294	344	923	1041
Burglary						
simulated	23.14	22.03	17.38	24.49	23.19	19.67
actual	22.8	21.03	17.91	22.8	21.01	17.91
difference	0.34	1.00	-0.53	1.69	2.18	1.76
number of offenses	239	724	-381	1186	1548	1264
Larceny						
simulated	52.24	57.83	51.41	52.45	57.86	52.36
actual	51.77	52.71	48.43	51.77	52.71	48.43
difference	0.47	5.12	2.98	0.68	5.15	3.93
number of offenses	330	3635	214	477	3657	2822
Motor Vehicle Theft						
simulated	11.51	14.66	8.64	9.93	11.33	9.34
actual	10.66	10.1	8.13	10.66	10.1	8.13
difference	0.85	4.56	0.51	-0.73	1.23	1.21
number of offenses	597	3238	366	-512	873	869

offenses analyzed was superior to those of the matched counties. Recall that a positive number means that Duval County would have experienced more crimes had it had a growth of offenses identical to that of the comparison county. Thus, only in these two cases would the citizens of Duval County have been better off under the alternative experience offered by these comparison counties.

Two aspects of these results stand out. First, when the Orange County experience is superimposed on Duval County, the estimated increase in the number of crimes far exceeds the number shown under the Hillsborough scenario. If Duval County's robbery crime rate rose at the rate of Orange County's, it would have suffered 1,041 more robberies in 1995 (a 35 percent increase). In contrast, the Hillsborough scenario yields a 1995 estimate of 294 more robberies (a 10 percent increase). Compared to the Hillsborough simulations, the Orange County scenario generally yields relatively high crime rates for Duval County in each of the four crime categories analyzed here. Hillsborough is probably a closer match for Duval than is Orange County, an observation that is consistent with the fact that Orange had faster population growth, a higher percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 19, and a much lower property crime rate in 1991.

The second noteworthy aspect of the simulation results is that the annual estimates of crime changes in Duval County vary considerably from year to year even within the simulations based on the Hillsborough experience. For example, the increased number of larcenies is estimated to be 330 (or about one percent) in 1993. In contrast, the 1994 increase is estimated to be 3,635, or about 10 percent of the total for that year. While some variation is expected due to random variations in criminal activity and reporting behavior,

the magnitude of the variation shown in Table 6 is so large that it undermines the reliability of these specific estimates. On the other hand, the *direction* of the simulation results are generally consistent and strongly suggest that Duval County became safer relative to the comparison counties during the study period.

To interpret these results, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Assume that Hillsborough is the best match for Duval county and that changes in the criminal justice system in these two communities during 1993–1995 are dominated by the juvenile justice initiative of Duval County. Under this scenario, we could interpret the number of offenses in Table 6 to be the result of this initiative. That is, if Duval County did not undertake the initiative, in 1993 it would have had 84 more robberies, and so on.

Then the Hillsborough simulation in Table 6 can be interpreted as reporting the maximum possible effect of Duval's juvenile justice initiative. The maximum number "offenses saved" over the three year period include 1,003 robberies (10 percent of the total), 582 burglaries (one percent), 6,105 larcenies (6 percent), and 4,201 motor vehicle thefts (21 percent). In all, the community was relieved of the consequences of 11,891 crimes under these assumptions that generate the maximum effect of these programs.

Unfortunately, Hillsborough County is undoubtedly flawed as a match for Duval, in part because we can be certain that there were many other formal and informal changes in the criminal justice systems of both counties during the time period analyzed here. Another problem with these estimates is rooted in the fact that arrest reports suggest that juveniles account for only a fraction of the crimes analyzed in this report. Juveniles account for about half of all motor vehicle theft arrests (see Table 1), which together with the data in

Table 3 implies that juveniles accounted for about 10,000 vehicle thefts during 1993–1995. Table 6 suggests the program aimed at juveniles prevented 4,201 thefts, a whopping 42 percent of the estimated number of offenses committed by this group. Such success must breed skepticism.

In the next two sections we try to shed light on this overall evaluation by focusing on the impact of the public safety effects of incarcerating habitual juvenile offenders and the Program for At-Risk Youth.

IV. Incarceration Effects

The simulations provide evidence that the juvenile justice innovations in total could have had a potentially large impact on UCR Index I offenses in Duval County. In the next two sections we try to shed light on this overall evaluation by focusing on the public policy impacts of incarcerating youthful offenders and the Program for At-Risk Youth. One potential source of corroboration is found in a study done by the State Attorney's office, the "Juvenile Incarceration Impact Study" (undated). This effort was designed to estimate the number of crimes that were prevented by incarcerating juveniles under this program.

Information on 154 youth who were incarcerated in the Duval County Jail on July 15, 1993 was gathered and the actual time each juvenile would spend in jail was estimated. The estimated jail term included expected gain time. The criminal history of each of the 154 juveniles was analyzed for the period of time identical to the projected time served in order to estimate the number of crimes prevented by incapacitation.

For instance, if a juvenile's actual incarceration time is projected to be six months, his criminal record for the six month period preceding his arrest was examined and the number of crimes he was arrested for during that period determines the number of crimes prevented due to his incarceration. This method was used for each juvenile, resulting in a total of 437 crimes prevented.

Although the basic methodology of this study is sound, several dubious methodological choices were used to come up with an estimated number of crimes prevented.¹⁵

Most egregious was the assumption that the "juveniles would be arrested for every crime they commit." The intent of this assumption was laudable because it would result in a "very conservative" estimate of crimes prevented. This assumption is so far from reality, however, that it cannot be justified. The probability of arrest can be estimated by dividing the number of arrests for an offense by the number of reported offenses.¹⁶ This method yields a probability of being arrested for robbery of .23—only 23 times out of 100 robberies will the perpetrator be apprehended. The implications of this low probability of arrest for the number of crimes prevented are staggering. For example, the SAO study reports that 75 robberies were prevented: a more accurate estimate that recognizes the offenders were only facing a .23 probability of arrest would reveal 326 robberies prevented.

It is important to note that many crimes are not reported. The national victimization survey reveals that about 40 percent of all *completed* robberies and burglaries go

¹⁵The study implicitly assumes that the arrestee is in fact guilty in each case and does not consider the possibility that more than one habitual offender could be arrested for the same crime. This upward bias is offset by other factors, as noted below.

¹⁶See Benson and Rasmussen (1994).

unreported, for example. This problem is less severe for auto theft, but even in this case only 92 percent of completed offenses are reported to the police. Thus, the SAO report suffers from two sources of downward bias that render its estimates not "very conservative" as the report claims, but perhaps ridiculously low.¹⁷

Our simulations reported in Table 6 show that Duval County had slow growth of larceny offenses compared to the comparison counties. The SAO report provides evidence that the incapacitation of juveniles had little to do with this decline: it estimates that only 11 thefts were prevented by incarcerating the 154 youthful offenders. Even adjusting this figure for the probability of arrest, incapacitation effects will account for a relatively small portion of the impact shown in Table 6.

Estimates of offenses prevented by incarcerating habitual juvenile offenders are presented in Table 7 for robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. The estimates from the State Attorney's report are recorded in the first column.¹⁸ The probability of being arrested for each of these crimes is shown in column two. Dividing the SAO estimates by the probability of arrest yields the SAO revised figures in the third column. It shows that incapacitation most likely prevented 1,331 of these offenses rather than the 188 estimated in the report. Recall that there are conflicting biases in this result. The fact that prior arrests

¹⁷Unreported crime, in effect, means that our method of calculating the probability of arrest is biased upward. For example, if 40 percent of robberies are not reported, the actual probability of arrest is about 16 percent instead of the 23 percent used here. This is one of the factors that offset the upward bias reported in the previous note.

¹⁸These offenses represent 43 percent of the 437 crimes prevented in the SAO report. Other large offense prevented categories in this report are misdemeanors (99), attempted murder and murder (24), assault and battery (49), and drugs (31). Combined these categories account for 203 crimes prevented, or 46 percent of the total reported in the SAO report.

Table 7: Crimes Prevented and the Simulation Analysis:
A Comparisons

Offenses	Crimes Prevented ^a	Pa	Crimes	Prevented ^b
			SAO revised	Total
Robbery	75	0.23	326	1,780
Burglary	29	0.12	242	1,320
Motor vehicle theft	84	0.11	764	4,169
Total	188		1,331	7,269

a From the "Juvenile Incarceration Impact Study, State Attorney's Office, undated.

b See text.

are used to estimate the number of crimes and the possibility of multiple arrests for a single offense is ignored suggests this estimate is too high. Creating a downward bias is the assumption that all offenses are reported and the fact that we considered only three offense categories in this analysis. The net effect of these conflicting biases is uncertain, but a large upward bias does not seem likely.

These results are based on the 154 juveniles who were incapacitated as of July 15, 1993. From January 1, 1993 to October 31, 1995, 841 juveniles have been incarcerated as a consequence of this initiative. The State Attorney's Office says that the criteria for incarcerating violent and habitual juvenile offenders as adults has not significantly changed over the life of the program. Assuming this is accurate, the sentences received and the past criminal records of the 154 juveniles included in the SAO report should be representative of the entire incarcerated population.¹⁹ Accordingly, to calculate the total number of crimes prevented from January 1, 1993 to October 31, 1995, we must multiply the crimes prevented in column three by 5.46—the ratio of the actual incarcerated juveniles (841) to the SAO sample (154). The total crimes prevented over the 1993–1995 period are shown in the last column of Table 7: 1,780 robberies, 1,320 burglaries, and 4,169 motor vehicle thefts.

¹⁹This is not strictly true if the worst offenders had a somewhat higher probability of being arrested in the early months of the program. If this is the case, the number of crimes prevented might be higher for the July 15, 1993 sample than for the entire population. The severity of this bias is probably not severe. Only 23 of the 154 offenders in the SAO report had more than five arrests during the period prior to their incarceration. Half (77) had two or fewer arrests. After 1993 it is possible that the habitual offender would be incarcerated long before the fourteenth offense, the number of convictions of the most virulent offender in the SAO sample. If, as is likely, such juveniles would have continued to commit crimes if they were not incarcerated, the SAO sample still provides a reasonable approximation of the criminal behavior of the entire population that has been incarcerated under this program.

Incapacitation of these juveniles has apparently had a substantial effect on the public safety—7,269 part one index crimes were prevented, according to these estimates. These incapacitation effects apparently account for a large portion of the lower crime rates in Duval County that are revealed in the simulations. In the case of robbery, the simulations show offenses increase by 1,003 and 2,308 over the 1993–1995 period for the Hillsborough and Orange scenarios, respectively. The total robberies prevented, 1,780, is not far from the mid-point of these estimates. For burglary, the 1,320 offenses prevented is well within the simulations which range from 582 to 3,998. Motor vehicle thefts prevented in Table 7 is almost equal to the Hillsborough simulation which suggests that Duval County had 4,201 fewer offenses. Duval avoided only 1,230 auto thefts in the Orange county simulation.

The conclusion is clear. Duval County experienced fewer robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts during 1993–1995 because its offense rates grew slowly relative to the matched counties. Incapacitating frequent juvenile offenders under the program started in 1992 has apparently contributed significantly to this result.

Incapacitation is not the only mechanism by which the juvenile justice initiative can work, as noted in Section II.²⁰ Deterrence effects of incarcerating youthful habitual offenders are uncertain for several reasons. First consider specific deterrence, the possibility that the incarceration experience lowers the probability (or frequency) of future criminal behavior for juveniles sentenced to jail. This effect is likely to be relatively small according to deterrence theory. A fundamental tenet of deterrence theory is that the probability of

²⁰We limit this discussion to the deterrence effects of incarceration because we have no evidence regarding contagion effects. The latter effects are discussed in the Section V which evaluates the impact of the Program for At-Risk Students (PAS) on criminal behavior.

punishment is a more effective deterrent than the severity of punishment (Becker, 1968).²¹ An empirical evaluation of specific deterrence requires that the juveniles jailed under this program and a control group be followed for an extended period of time after release. This is beyond the scope of this study.

General deterrence effects of jailing habitual juvenile offenders occur when other juveniles are discouraged from criminal activity because they observe this relatively severe sentence. As in the case of specific deterrence, theory suggests that severe sentences are less effective than a higher chance of being caught. Nevertheless, some idea of the magnitude of the general deterrence effects of incarcerating habitual youthful offenders in Duval County can be ascertained by comparing the incapacitation effects in Table 7 with the simulations shown in Table 6.

The indicator for deterrence effects is straightforward: if the estimated number of crimes "avoided" in the simulation is greater than the crimes prevented by incarceration, the difference could be attributable to deterrence effects.²² The results are mixed. Under the Hillsborough County simulation the number of crimes avoided are far smaller than the simulated number of crimes prevented. Table 7 shows that 1,780 robberies were prevented by the incarceration of juveniles, but the Hillsborough simulation suggests that Duval County had only 1,003 fewer robberies due to the policy being analyzed. If this scenario

²¹This theoretical proposition is reinforced by the fact that imprisonment has been shown to be criminogenic, i.e., it increases post release criminal activity (Grogger, 1991; Blumstein, 1995).

²²Specific deterrence effects, as well as general deterrence effects, are included in this estimate because some of the jailed youth are released during the study period.

reflects reality, there are no discernable deterrence effects. The Orange County simulation tells a different story since it shows that Duval County had 2,308 fewer robberies than suggested by the alternative scenario. This would suggest a deterrence effect.

For each offense category we consider in Table 7, estimating deterrence effects by comparing the results of Tables 6 and 7 is highly ambiguous in that in each case the two simulations yield contradictory indications. This inconsistency of results, combined with the fact that deterrence theory finds the probability of apprehension the most reliable deterrent to criminal activity, does not provide any compelling evidence that incapacitating juvenile offenders provides deterrence effects in addition to the sizable incapacitation effects noted above.

This highly aggregated method of analysis used here is not sufficient to capture the deterrence effects that might be associated with the Program for At-Risk Students (PAS), however. Since this program includes a jail visit which includes a presentation by a jailed youth who describes life in jail and stresses the importance of staying in school, any deterrence effects of PAS could be the product of the policy to incarcerate habitual offenders. The hallmark of this program is to provide juveniles with information about the consequences of criminal behavior. Incarceration is one of those consequences. We now turn to an evaluation of the PAS program.

V. The Program for At-Risk Students

Evaluating the deterrence effects of PAS is necessarily more difficult than discerning the incapacitation effects of jailing habitual juvenile offenders. The problem is to provide

an estimate of the number of crimes that were avoided because at-risk students participated in PAS. In order to identify the deterrence effects of "treating" juveniles with the PAS program, it is necessary to hold constant all other factors that affect the number of offenses.

Although we can not control for all of the factors that might affect the number of offenses in Duval County during the study period, we have designed a multiple regression analysis that approximates this ideal. The basic regression model is:

$$\Delta O_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{PAS} + \beta_2 \text{PAS}^2 + \beta_3 O_{91} + \beta_4 \text{ROC} + \beta_5 \text{ROC}^2 + \beta_6 \text{ADJ} + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable (ΔO_i) is the change in the number of property offenses in beat i between January 1–June 30, 1992 and January 1–June 30, 1995.²³ Focusing on the change in the number of offenses in each beat implicitly controls for beat specific factors that affect criminality but are constant over the 1992–1995 period. Consider an example. If beat i has a very high poverty rate that accounts for a high level of criminality throughout the period being studied, the regression model stipulates that a *change* in poverty would cause a *change* in offenses. Since the underlying conditions that affect poverty in police beats change very slowly, we can safely ignore this variable and many other socio-economic variables because they are likely to be relatively constant over the short three year span covered in this study. In this way, the change specification of the model allows us to ignore many determinants of

²³The dependent variable is constructed so the number of offenses during the first two quarters of 1995 are subtracted from the offenses committed during the first half of 1992. A larger decline in offenses is therefore associated with a larger positive number. The semi-log specification is reported here, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the change in offenses.

crime. This is especially important for this study since beat specific socio-economic data are not available for the required quarters.

The Variables

The constant term (α) captures the general decline in crime over the period, including the incapacitation effects of incarcerating habitual youthful offenders that are not beat specific. The hypothesis that the PAS program contributes to public safety requires that the coefficient on the number of PAS participants in a police beat (β_1) be positive.²⁴ Adding PAS squared (PAS^2) to the regression allows us to test whether the program becomes more or less effective as the number of participants increases. A significant positive PAS^2 coefficient suggests that more participants are associated with a greater decline in the number of offenses. This result could be interpreted as reflecting a contagion effect since it indicates that each additional participant adds more to public safety than the previous participant. The contagion hypothesis provides a theoretical justification for this result. In contrast, a significant negative PAS^2 coefficient indicates decreasing returns to program scale.

This specification implies that PAS participants are likely to engage in crimes of opportunity that occur near their homes, i.e., in the police beat in which they reside. The neophyte offender, as Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p.269–270) put it, see "a momentary opportunity to get something for nothing and he seizes it." The statistical model proposed

²⁴We were able to identify the place of residence for 639 PAS participants. Beats 881, 882, and 883 were not included in the analysis because they are served by separate police departments.

here assumes that these "momentary opportunities" frequently occur close to home for at-risk students.

For each police beat we identify the number of habitual juvenile offenders that have been sentenced under this program during the study period, which is the ROC variable in equation 1. Most of these offenders spend some time in the county jail. If these habitual offenders are highly mobile and commit crimes over a relatively wide area, as is likely, the ROC coefficient will not be a significant determinant of the change in crime among Duval County's police beats. Even with this expectation, there is still reason to put this variable in the model. Since the PAS program is supposed to deter at-risk youth by educating them about the penalties associated with criminal activity, this message might be stronger in communities where the at-risk youths know habitual juveniles offenders who have been sentenced to jail time. Thus, we might expect the PAS coefficient to better reflect the program's impact when we control for the number of incarcerated juveniles from each beat. As in the case of the PAS variable, we include ROC^2 to capture any non-linear effects that suggest increasing or decreasing benefits associated with a bigger program.

The number of crimes committed during the first two quarters of 1991 (O_{91}) is used to control for the level of criminality in the police beat before the juvenile justice program is started. This is required since only high crime areas are capable of large changes in the crime rate. The number of index one crimes committed in police beats adjacent to a beat (ADJ) is included in the model to control for two factors. First, it is probably harder to reduce crime in a police beat that is surrounded by high crime areas than in a beat

surrounded by relatively safe beats. Second, this variable accounts for the possibility that criminal behavior can spillover from one beat to another.

Empirical Results

This analysis of the impact of the PAS program uses the 92 beats in the crime reporting system devised by the Duval County Sheriff's Office.²⁵ Table 8 defines the variables used in the analysis and presents descriptive statistics.

The first regression in Table 9 presents the complete model for property crimes.²⁶ Although only 10 percent of the variation in changing crime among beats is explained by the model, the overall equation is statistically significant at customary test levels. The intercept (α) is positive and highly significant, showing that the average beat had a substantial decline in crime over this period. A positive α coefficient reflects a *declining* number of crimes because we subtracted the number of offenses during the first two quarters of 1995 from the first two quarters in 1993.

Jailing resident habitual offenders in a beat does not affect the change in property crimes in that beat because the coefficients on the ROC and ROC² variables are not significantly different from zero. A higher initial crime rate (O_{91}) does not have a

²⁵The actual regression results are based on fewer observation because the required data were not available for every beat.

²⁶Included in this category are burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft. An analysis of the impact of the PAS program on violent crimes is not presented in this report because extensive statistical research points revealed that this program had no statistically significant impact on the incidence of violent crimes within the police beat of the participant's residence.

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Regression Analysis

Variable	Definition	Mean	Standard deviation
ΔO_i	Natural Logarithm of the change in Property Crime	2.65	1.83
PAS	Number of persons participating in the Program for At-Risk Students	7.03	5.85
PAS ²	PAS squared	83.27	137.43
ROC	Number of persons sentenced as habitual juvenile offenders	8.46	5.99
ROC ²	ROC squared	107.04	136.86
O ₉₁	Number of property crimes during January-June 1991	474.23	186.98
ADJ	Number of Index I crimes committed in adjacent police beats during January-June 1991	1519.75	615.10

Table 9: Determinants of the Change in Property Offenses^a
by Police Beat: 1992-1995

Variable	1	2
Intercept	3.09* (4.25)	2.99* (4.50)
PAS	.207** (2.10)	0.144 (1.55)
PAS ²	-.0099** (2.55)	-.0087** (2.26)
ROC	-0.037 (.36)	
ROC ²	-0.001 (.35)	
O ₉₁	0.0007 (.59)	0.0007 (.65)
ADJ	-.0006*** (1.94)	-.0006** (2.05)
R ²	0.10	0.08
F	2.62**	2.95***
n	89	89

* Significant at .01 (two-tail test).

** Significant at .05 (two-tail test).

*** Significant at .10 (two-tail test).

^a Burglary, motor vehicle theft and theft are included in property crimes. The dependent variable is the natural-logarithm of property offenses.

significant impact on the change in crime, but adjacent police beats with more index one offenses significantly retard the decline in property crime.

The PAS and PAS² coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant. The impact of the PAS program on property crime in the representative beat can be calculated by multiplying the PAS and PAS² coefficients by their mean values and adding them so their net effect on the number of offenses can be measured. This procedure reveals that treating an at-risk youth with the PAS program results in 1.88 fewer property offenses. If this estimate is accurate for the 833 youth who have participated in the program through October 1995, about 1,566 property crimes have been avoided since the founding of the program in 1993 and the end of 1995.

The ROC variables are excised from the second equation in Table 9 in order to see how the addition of these variables affects the PAS coefficients. Recall the hypothesis that led to us to include ROC in the model, i.e., that incarcerating habitual juvenile offenders in a police beat would add credibility to the program's claim that juvenile crime would not be tolerated in Duval County. The overall pattern of coefficients in the second equation offers some support for this hypothesis. The PAS coefficient is considerably smaller and is not statistically significant at normal test levels in this model that does not control for juvenile incarceration. Thus, incarcerating habitual offenders may have the collateral benefit of increasing the deterrent effects of the Program for At-Risk Students.²⁷

Although the overall explanatory power of the equations reported in Table 9 are low,

²⁷The smaller PAS coefficient in the second equation suggests this result but it must be noted that the difference in the PAS coefficients in these two equations is not statistically significant.

the conclusions drawn here do not change with minor changes in model specification.²⁸ When the first model is estimated for individual property crimes the PAS coefficient is positive and significant for motor vehicle theft but not for burglary and theft. Alternative functional forms tend to reduce the significance of the PAS coefficient. When a linear model is used the coefficient is positive and suggests a much larger program impact, but it is not statistically significant at customary test levels ($t=1.45$).²⁹ Given the nature of this statistical analysis and the relatively modest treatment PAS participants get, the results shown in Table 9 are best viewed as an upward bound estimate of the programs effect on public safety. While the exact magnitude of the effect may be debated, it seems certain the program has had a modest but positive effect by reducing property crime in Duval County.

VI. Estimating the Benefits of the Program

Incapacitating habitual juvenile offenders prevented an estimated 7,269 robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts. The dollar benefits associated with preventing these crimes can be estimated if the victim costs associated with each crime category can be determined. Estimates of victim costs are available from two sources. The National Crime

²⁸The relatively modest coefficient of determination (R^2) is expected for a model trying to explain annual changes in offenses rates for small geographic areas such as police beats. Major changes in model specification, defined here as taking out any of the generic variables showed in the first equation in Table 9 tends to reduce the significance of the PAS coefficient. Alternative measures of variables such as the offense rate in adjacent communities do not change the results.

²⁹ It should be noted that there is no reason to expect that the PAS would raise the offense rate in a beat. Therefore, it would be appropriate to use a one-tailed test and the reported t test is significant at the .10 level when this criteria is used.

Victimization Survey (NCVS) presents data on several specific out-of-pocket and time costs sustained by crime victims, including medical expenses, property damage or loss, pay lost due to injuries, prosecution activities, or time spent replacing or repairing property. Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1995) provide victim cost estimates that include quality of life losses in addition to tangible losses. This study estimates that the aggregate cost of crime to victims is about \$450 billion, a staggering figure that has generated considerable controversy because most of the cost is related to quality of life issues.³⁰ Since tangible costs tend to be relatively more important for property crimes than for violent offenses, and robbery is included in our analysis of crimes prevented, it is not surprising that the benefits of crime prevention reported in this study are somewhat sensitive to which cost of crime estimates are used.

The method is straightforward: The benefits of incarcerating habitual youthful offenders in Duval County are the number of offenses prevented times the average victim cost of that crime.³¹ Table 10 shows these estimates for the 1993–1995 period. The costs of robbery are highly sensitive to which cost of crime study is used. Using the NCVS estimate of \$555 to weight the 1,780 robberies yields a total benefit of slightly under \$1 million. In contrast, using the total cost per offense (i.e., Miller et al.'s estimate which include quality of

³⁰See, for example, Austin (1996) and Butterfield (1996).

³¹Since the cost to victims data are national, it is necessary to assume that the national data offer a reasonable approximation to the costs of crime to victims in Duval County.

Table 10: Estimated Benefits of Incapacitating Habitual Juvenile Offenders: 1993-1995

	Crimes Prevented ^a	Cost per Offense		Estimated benefits	
		NCVS ^b	TOTAL ^c	NCVS	TOTAL
Robbery	1,780	\$555	\$8,000	\$987,900	\$14,240,000
Burglary	1,320	834	1,400	1,100,880	1,848,000
Motor vehicle theft	4,169	3,990	3,700	16,634,310	15,425,300
TOTAL	7,269			\$18,723,090	\$31,513,300

^a From Table 7.

^b Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1992. These costs include property loss or damage, medical expenses, and time lost from work.

^c Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996). Total costs include quality of life losses as well as the tangible losses included in the NCVS estimate.

life costs) yields estimated benefits of over \$14 million.³²

Differences in the estimated benefits of fewer burglaries and motor vehicle thefts due to the incarceration of habitual offenders are modest by comparison. The burglary estimates are \$1.1 million (NCVS) and \$1.8 million (total) while the respective benefits of preventing 4,169 motor vehicle thefts are \$16.6 million and \$15.4 million respectively. Using the conservative NCVS data suggests that incapacitating high crime youth yields a gross benefit of \$18.7 million. Miller et al.'s quality of life costs raise this to \$31.5 million, a higher estimate that is entirely the result of their higher cost of robbery.

Estimates of the benefits of PAS are elusive because of the fact that the regression results reveal only that about 1,566 property crimes were avoided. These could be relatively trivial larcenies or more costly car thefts and burglaries. The median value of economic loss from crimes of theft is about \$90, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1994). Assigning this cost to the crimes avoided yields a \$140,000 benefit. Estimated benefits are very sensitive to the assumptions that are made about the kinds of crimes that are avoided, however. About 12 percent of all juvenile property crime arrests were for auto theft in 1995. Assuming that 12 percent of the 1,566 avoided property crimes were auto thefts (each valued at \$3700) and the remaining 88 percent were \$90 thefts, the dollar value of the crimes avoided due to the PAS program over the three year period is \$819,620.³³

³²This is why these new estimates have generated so much controversy. In some respects the NCVS robbery victim costs seem too low: implicitly these estimates say that an auto theft is about 7 times more serious than a robbery. In contrast, Miller et al. (1995) estimates indicate that victim costs of robbery are over twice that of a car theft.

³³Since alternative specifications of the regression model do not confirm a statistically significant relationship between PAS participation and lower crime rates, it could be argued

VII. Conclusions and Implications for Public Policy

Major institutions in Duval County, including the Sheriff's Office, the Board of Education, and the State Attorney's Office have combined their efforts to create a juvenile justice program that focuses on the fundamental facts of crime: juveniles account for a disproportionate amount of crime, youthful offenders tend to be in the increasing crime portion of their criminal careers, and that punishment of youthful offenders is often inappropriately light given the gravity of their offenses. This report suggests this program has contributed to public safety in Duval County. It is estimated that about 7,200 crimes have been prevented by incarcerating chronic youthful offenders and as many as 1500 may have been avoided by the Program for At-Risk Students. Combined the gross public benefits of this reduced level of crime can be valued conservatively at about \$18 million, or about \$6 million per year. This amounts to \$21,400 for each offender sentenced under this program.

Most of these benefits come from incarcerating habitual youthful offenders. Early intervention of this sort for habitual offenders is likely to be much more cost effective than very lengthy sentences for older offenders because criminal behavior tends to decline with age. The general inclination of criminal justice policy is to give chronic juvenile offenders "another chance" and to be very punitive to adults who have committed multiple offenses, as reflected in initiatives such as "three strikes and you are out." This tendency is unfortunate, for as Blumstein (1995) notes, it results in putting most of our resources to incarcerate

that this program should be assigned a value of zero benefits. Given the *a priori* reasons to expect positive program effects, coupled with the fact that the PAS coefficient is always positive in appropriately specified models, assigning zero benefits to the program is inappropriate.

criminals in the waning years of their criminal careers and puts less emphasis on the emerging offenders. Even if this program deters no habitual offenders and discourages no at-risk students, this program contributes significantly to public safety. Since this program is likely to have some deterrent effect, however, it is likely to pay additional long term dividends.

Preventing the on-set of criminal activity is the most cost effective strategy to increase public safety. A necessary precondition of such prevention activities is to make sure that young people understand that criminal activity is not tolerated and that infractions result in immediate and undesirable consequences. The initiatives in Duval County seem to provide these fundamental preconditions for increasing public safety.

The origins of juvenile crime, of course, are far too complex to be solved by the criminal justice system. After all, at their core young habitual offenders are the products of inadequate families that often live in dysfunctional communities with few legitimate economic prospects.³⁴ Initiatives that build communities and programs that support the formation of stronger families must be part of an effective long term program to reduce crime. Economic development of these communities is also required. Freeman (1996) makes a compelling case that the rising tide of juvenile crime is correlated with a steady decline in the legal economic prospects of youth. It is a well established fact that legitimate earning opportunities of low skill men have deteriorated over the last two decades, perhaps by as much as 30 percent. Freeman notes that while criminal earnings are low, they have

³⁴For a compelling account of how these factors are manifested in one family, see Fox Butterfield, *All God's Children: The Bosket Family and the American Tradition of Violence*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.

risen relative to legal earnings, thereby creating incentives for young men to increase their effort in illegal markets and diminish work in the legal sector.³⁵ He concludes that "...if I am correct that the collapse of the job market for less skilled men contributed to their increased involvement in crime... it is difficult to see any long-term solution to crime that does not include some improvement in the labor market opportunities for less skilled youth."

Public safety and programs to improve families, build communities, and create jobs are inextricably bound together. Families and communities cannot prosper in a lawless environment. Nor will businesses prosper in such a place. A precondition for the successful implementation of these social and economic development efforts is the public commitment that crime will not be tolerated and that youthful offenders get this message. From this broader perspective, the juvenile justice initiatives in Duval County are a possible cornerstone for an effective broad based effort that can result in significant long run improvements in public safety.

The Duval County juvenile justice initiative has been successful, according to the evidence presented in this report. To what extent should these program elements be adopted by other state and local jurisdictions? The core lessons of these initiatives, i.e., that juveniles need to know that delinquency will not be tolerated and punishment is certain, should be adopted by state and local jurisdictions so they might better address the crime problem as it emerges rather than late in the criminal career. Any number of crime prevention efforts, including drop out prevention, job training, family counselling, drug treatment and a host of

³⁵In many big cities there is also a "spatial-mismatch" in which low skill workers live in central city areas and appropriate jobs are located in areas that are not reliably served by public transportation. See Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist (1994).

other efforts could be integrated into this basic programmatic theme of intolerance of delinquency. Local jurisdictions wanting to replicate the program can do so, so the fundamental policy question is whether the state should adopt this program and advocate its widespread use.

The record of senior governments imposing innovations on their junior partners is not a happy one, as DiIulio, Smith and Saiger (1995) noted in their analysis of federal-state relationships in the criminal justice arena. The Duval County juvenile justice program emerged because it had a strong advocate in the State Attorney's Office, the Sheriff was willing to cooperate, there was available jail space to house the program which included a school sanctioned by the county's board of education. Active support of each of these players is required to duplicate the incarceration and PAS programs. Resistance of any player, or the absence of adequate jail facilities, could undermine the development of such a program even if the state decided to provide funding to support the effort. Given the extensive cooperation required for the successful implementation of this program, we do not believe it can be successfully reproduced without considerable and widespread local commitment to the enterprise. State support does not assure such local commitment.

The Duval County juvenile criminal justice innovations are good public policy precisely because they are the product of local people and institutions responding to local problems. Ultimately, to the extent that juvenile justice issues can be resolved by public policy, the solutions will originate in local programs that focus on the family and community institutions.

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STATE ATTORNEY

E. MCRAE MATHIS
CHIEF ASSISTANT

February 3, 1997

Dennis Burke
White House Council on
Domestic Policy
White House
Washington, DC 20502

Dear Mr. Burke: *Dennis*

Enclosed for your review is an update of our juvenile program and its results. Please note the comparison chart on page 15 now reflects our past three years since the program was fully implemented. Also, I have included our 1996 arrests and highlighted, by shading, other 1996 changes.

I look forward to your continued interest.

Very Truly Yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Harry".

Harry L. Shorstein

HLS/jeb

Enclosures

February 1, 1997

STATEMENT ON JUVENILE JUSTICE

**HARRY L. SHORSTEIN
STATE ATTORNEY
FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA**

The citizens of our City, State and nation are facing an unprecedented increase in juvenile crime. I share your concern about the failure of the juvenile justice system to effectively deal with this problem. After I took office in July, 1991, I realized that the only way to reduce crime was to attack the issue of juvenile justice. I believe we need a two-pronged approach to dealing with the epidemic of juvenile crime. We must incarcerate repeat and violent juvenile offenders and at the same time intervene at an early age in an attempt to educate and habilitate juveniles at risk of becoming criminals.

It is with these two goals in mind that in March, 1992, I completely revamped the existing Juvenile Division in my office. First, I created the position of Director of Juvenile Justice Divisions. This position is filled by one of my most experienced attorneys. I assigned eleven of our most experienced attorneys to a new comprehensive Juvenile unit under the supervision of the Director. These moves not only represent a doubling of the number of attorneys assigned to Juvenile, but also a complete reprioritization of the resources in our office. Historically, the standard practice in Prosecutors' offices has been to assign the least experienced attorneys to Juvenile. It is my belief that assigning top attorneys to Juvenile is not only an effective way to prosecute, but also a message to the entire community that we must make juvenile crime prevention a top priority.

EARLY INTERVENTION

1. SCHOOL LIAISON

My office has gone beyond the traditional role of a prosecutor and is now directly involved in intervention. I have taken the unprecedented step of hiring a career educator to act as a programming coordinator and liaison with our schools. Our school professionals are on the front line in the war on juvenile crime. It is my belief that only through cooperative efforts with our school system and other youth service institutions can we successfully save our children.

Members of my office including myself and other attorneys and staff members regularly make presentations at schools throughout Duval County about our juvenile program. These presentations are designed to educate our youths about the criminal justice system and warn our young people that juvenile delinquency will no longer be tolerated in Jacksonville. I regularly send letters to all schools in Jacksonville to let students know the consequences of criminal behavior. If juveniles continue to break the law in Jacksonville or if they commit a violent act, they will be treated as adults and will be sentenced to up to one year in the Duval County Jail or to a lengthy term in the Florida State Prison. The response to these letters has been overwhelmingly supportive. Parents, teachers and law enforcement officers have all been in support of our efforts to curb juvenile crime.

2. STATE ATTORNEY SCHOOL OUTREACH PROGRAM

In an effort to increase communication between the schools and the State Attorney's Office, we created the State Attorney School Outreach Program in September, 1995. By September, 1996, twenty-three attorneys from our office had volunteered to work with a school. Because of their dedication we have been able to assign an Assistant State Attorney to every middle school in Duval County. Our office's dedication to working with teachers and schools extends to our outlying counties as well.

Assistant State Attorneys participating in the outreach program maintain regular contact with their schools and are always available to answer questions. They visit their schools and speak to students, staff, teachers, and parents. Additionally, the attorneys serve as sources of information to the schools about State Attorney programs. At the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year, the State Attorney's Office hosted a reception to kick off this year's program. The many attorneys, principals, and teachers that attended were all enthusiastic about the future of the State Attorney School Outreach Program. The Outreach Program is an exciting opportunity for our attorneys to work with students and teachers and to help steer children down the right path before they enter the juvenile justice system.

3. SCHOOL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The State Attorney's Office is actively working with the school system to institute peer mediation in all elementary, middle and high schools in Duval County. This program has been very successful in Clay

County. To date, we have provided peer mediation training to students in thirty-four schools throughout Duval County.

Studies show that if students can resolve problems through peer mediation, further behavior problems or criminal activity can be prevented. We believe this is an effective tool to reduce juvenile crime. If conflicts can be resolved through peer mediation, rather than through the use of violence, our schools will be safer and our teachers can concentrate on teaching. Our office actively supports "Victory Over Violence", and other programs in our schools designed to promote peaceful resolutions of disputes among students.

4. VIOLENCE AND GUN SAFETY EDUCATION

A comprehensive juvenile program would not be complete without focusing on juveniles and firearms. Between 1991 and 1996, more than eighty juveniles died in our circuit as a result of a firearm related incident. These tragedies reinforced my desire to attack the issue of juveniles and guns. We must teach children at a young age that guns are not toys.

In November 1994, I joined forces with the National Rifle Association to promote their Eddie Eagle Gun Safety Program (Eddie Eagle). Eddie Eagle is a friendly safety mascot. Utilizing professionally produced videos and other material Eddie tells children to "Stop! Don't Touch. Leave the area. Tell an adult." Our office assisted the school system in raising enough money to purchase the Eddie Eagle materials for every elementary school in Jacksonville. Preventing firearm related injuries and deaths is not a political issue and I believe Eddie Eagle is an important addition to the prevention efforts in our communities. Because of programs such as Eddie Eagle and others, the number of firearm related deaths amongst juveniles in our circuit went down in 1996.

Even one death of a child because of a firearm is unacceptable and more must be done. Recently, we started a new program with University Hospital in Jacksonville where appropriate juveniles charged with violent misdemeanors or weapons offenses are ordered to attend a program at the hospital emergency room. They speak with medical professionals and see first hand the tragic and senseless results of violence.

5. TRUANCY ARBITRATION PROGRAM

Children must go to school! Studies tell us that serious juvenile offenders begin as habitual truants. This is why the effort to keep children in school is a key component to my comprehensive plan to reduce juvenile crime. My office has worked very closely with the Duval County School Board staff to help address the truancy problem. I have lobbied for the re-emergence of "Attendance Centers" where truants can be brought, identified, and social workers can work with them.

Parents must do their part. My investigators have arrested deadbeat parents for not sending their children to school. In Clay County my office successfully prosecuted a woman who refused to force her children to attend school. She was sentenced to sixty days in jail. My staff is lobbying for more effective laws to hold parents responsible for their children's school attendance.

On October 31, 1995, fourteen State Attorney investigators conducted "Operation Trick or Treat." Beginning at 5:00 in the morning they made arrests throughout Duval County of juveniles who the court had ordered to attend school and parents who failed to send their children to school. Fourteen juveniles and two parents were arrested. School officials tell us that the next day was one of the best days ever for attendance. We intend to continue to prosecute cases against irresponsible parents who do not send their children to school.

In the fall of 1994, we began the Truancy Arbitration Program (TAP) in Duval and Clay County. TAP is based on a process that has been very beneficial in our Nassau County office. The goal is to get children back in school and avoid the necessity of arresting their parents. TAP works in conjunction with the School Board's attendance workers to provide services to students ages six through fifteen. The referral process begins at each individual school. If a child continues to miss school, we summon parents and students to a TAP hearing, conducted in our office. TAP hearings are facilitated by State Attorney volunteers who act as arbitrators for the program. Attendance staff from the schools participate in the hearings. If there is a problem, we attempt to rectify it. When appropriate, students are referred for counseling or tutoring. Parents are referred to parent skills classes. We refer parents to successful programs, such as Communities In Schools and to social service agencies such as the Youth Crisis Center for assistance. After each hearing, the parents and the students are required to sign a performance agreement compelling

school attendance. We admonish each child and parent that all legal avenues will be exhausted to insure school attendance, including criminal prosecution of the parents.

On February 22, 1996, United States Senator Bob Graham spent a day working in the State Attorney's Office. As a part of his workday program, he conducted a TAP hearing with a mother and her three young children, none of whom were attending school. Senator Graham explained the importance of an education to the mother and since the hearing her children have returned to school.

Our efforts to reduce truancy were recognized by the State of Florida and the Department of Juvenile Justice, when we were awarded a \$90,000.00 grant to enhance our program. The grant funding allowed us to hire two full time employees to spearhead our truancy reduction efforts, including a truancy investigator who assists in the prosecution of parents and children when appropriate. Since the grant was awarded, approximately two hundred and seventy truants and their parents have attended TAP hearings. Ninety-three percent of the students who have attended hearings returned to school within four days of their hearing. Additionally, since July 1995, over one hundred juveniles have been ordered to counseling, and sixty-seven parents have been ordered to attend parent skills classes. I am committed to reducing truancy. Our efforts have proven very successful thus far. It is my goal and intention to make every effort to keep our children in school.

6. PROGRAM FOR AT-RISK STUDENTS

When I began my juvenile initiative I directed my juvenile staff and specialists to re-examine our office's programs for juveniles. In conducting this examination, we discovered our community lacked programming for juveniles at-risk of entering the juvenile justice system. In October, 1993, we developed a new and exciting program called Program for At-risk Students (PAS) in an effort to meet this need. The PAS program which began in October, 1993, serves students throughout Jacksonville designated by the schools who have had serious discipline problems. Members of my office visit the students at their schools to explain the program. Afterwards, the students visit the State Attorney's Office and the Courthouse. On a weekly basis, PAS participants attend delinquency hearings in the juvenile courts and discuss with juvenile judges the consequences of their behavior. They also see a film about life in the Florida State Prison and tour the Duval County Jail. Members of my staff discuss my hard line approach toward juvenile criminals

with the students. The most meaningful part of the program is when incarcerated juveniles talk with the students about life in the jail and the importance of avoiding criminal activity and staying in school. At the end of the program each student is given a business card with our office number. We tell them to call us before they get in trouble if they need help. I personally spoke to one student who called concerned about an escalating dispute with another student. One of our Juvenile investigators visited the concerned student and was able to diffuse the situation.

In 1994, we began the "Juvenile Justice Awareness Summer Program." This program offers the same view of the Juvenile Justice System as PAS does to the community at large. We started a hotline for parents to call if they were concerned their children were at risk of becoming involved in juvenile crime. Dozens of parents called and subsequently participated in the program. To date over one hundred and fifty juveniles and their parents have benefited from our summer program. One particular parent wrote me to praise the program. She said she could not describe, "The effect the program had on her son."

In a further effort to reach out to the community, the State Attorney's Office, along with the Duval County Public School System, sponsored a family resource fair on March 31, 1995. The parents of all former PAS participants were invited. At the fair they were provided with information on resources available to help them make a positive difference in their children's lives. This coming year, we will work with the Youth Crisis Center to put on a conference designed to provide valuable information to parents of ungovernable children.

To date, over 1,200 at-risk juveniles have gone through PAS. According to our studies, less than twenty percent of those participants have been arrested since they attended the program. On February 9, 1996, Governor Lawton Chiles participated in PAS. He told the students that day that they had the choice as to which path in life they choose. I believe PAS has an impact on students helping them to avoid a path that leads to incarceration.

During 1996, the Jessie Ball duPont Foundation awarded a grant to evaluate our Juvenile Justice innovations to Dr. David W. Rasmussen, Professor of Economics and Director of Policy Sciences at Florida State University. The study examined the number of crimes prevented by our programs from a purely economic point of view. Rasmussen concluded that PAS "may have averted as many as 1,500 property crimes."

7. VICTIM IMPACT PANELS

We are always searching for creative and effective vehicles to get the message across to young people that they should not choose a life of crime. Often, the human side to crime escapes young people. Therefore, in 1994, the State Attorney's Office began to use Victim Impact Panels (VIP) to let juveniles know how crime effects peoples' lives. Actual victims tell juveniles how crime changed their lives. We began using the panels as a component of PAS. Students participating in PAS attend a VIP several weeks after visiting the courthouse.

The victim message is an important one and one juveniles relate to. Therefore, we have expanded the use of the panels to interested schools and other institutions. I believe victims can give at-risk juveniles a perspective on crime that can save lives. For example, at one VIP held at a school, a family told a group of students how their son was accidentally shot and killed by a juvenile showing off a gun. In a discussion afterward, one student confessed to often bringing guns to school. He stated, after hearing from the victim's family, he was "through with guns."

Thus far, we have conducted VIP's at twenty-two schools in Duval County with approximately 1,700 students participating. We have also conducted VIP's at the jail for incarcerated juveniles to witness. The juvenile inmates have heard emotional pleas from the father of a fourteen year old boy who was gunned down in front of his school, a mother whose son was carjacked and murdered, and the father of a seventeen year old drug dealer who was murdered in a drug deal that went bad. From the letters the inmates have written to these parents, it appears they were deeply affected by the presentations.

8. PEER IMPACT PANEL

The problem of juveniles driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs has led to tragic results and loss of life in our community. In 1994, thirty-six percent of alcohol related traffic fatalities in Duval County involved a victim under the age of twenty-five. "Peer Impact Panel" (PIP) is an awareness program for juveniles sponsored by our office and Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). After implementation of the program, the percentage of alcohol-related fatalities involving a driver under twenty-five fell to twenty-eight percent in 1995.

The PIP program is presented to students at schools throughout the Fourth Judicial Circuit. During the program, representatives from our office, the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office and MADD speak to students about driving under the influence and its consequences. The students also hear from surviving accident victims, families of victims who have died in alcohol-related accidents and juveniles prosecuted by our office for alcohol-related traffic deaths. Since the program was initiated it has been presented in fifty schools to approximately 15,000 students. We believe that bringing these perspectives to our students stops tragedies before they happen.

9. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Experts agree that juveniles who are direct victims of domestic violence or who are indirectly victimized by repeatedly being exposed to violence in their homes are more likely to participate in delinquent and violent behavior. In February, 1994, I directed my staff to explore options to expand our longstanding domestic violence program designed to assist adult victims, to include a juvenile victim component. In addition to aggressively prosecuting anyone who abuses a child we are now seeking to address the psychological needs of children in abusive homes.

The Help At-Risk Kids (HARK) Program is an intervention program for children in abusive homes, run by the Hubbard House domestic violence center. My office requested Hubbard House to design a curriculum for children of all ages exposed to domestic violence and assisted in obtaining funding to implement the program. HARK is the first program of its kind in the nation.

Children are referred to HARK in several ways. First, our victim advocates introduce the children of battered women to the program. Second, I have asked our criminal judges to order abusers to enroll their children into the HARK program and pay for their participation. In addition to these referral sources, we also refer juveniles to HARK if they are in the criminal justice system and we have determined that abuse in their home is a contributing cause for their delinquent behavior.

Our computer experts have developed a program to track police reports of domestic violence and to determine if a juvenile defendant has been exposed to violence in the home. If repeated violence has been reported in a juvenile offender's home we ask the judge to order the juvenile to participate in HARK as a part of his sentence. There are approximately 3,000 juveniles currently entered in our database. In

a recent case in Juvenile Court, State Attorney records revealed a young offender had repeatedly witnessed violence in his home at a very young age. He was removed from his home years earlier, but was not involved in any counseling. Because of our computer program this information was brought to the Judge's attention and the child was ordered to participate in HARK as a part of his probation. We must stop the cycle of violence and destructive behavior.

10. DIVERSION

I strongly believe that an effective juvenile justice system must include a strong diversionary component. We need to take appropriate young non-violent offenders out of the over crowded courts where there are too many children and not enough programs. By using successful diversion programs we enable appropriate early offenders to receive personal attention and we reduce the number of cases in need of our judges' time.

The State Attorney's Office for the Fourth Judicial Circuit has operated a juvenile diversion program for over twenty years. Last year, we closely evaluated our existing juvenile diversion program. In recognition of the changing needs of juvenile offenders, we have significantly changed the structure of our program. We now refer to our juvenile diversion programs collectively as the Youth Offender Program (YOP). Encompassed within YOP are the First Offender Program (FOP) and the Juvenile Alternative Services Program (JASP). In our new program, the majority of juveniles who are unlikely to re-offend are quickly diverted into FOP, which is a shorter term program.

The First Offender Program (FOP) is designed for juveniles without any prior adjudications arrested for a misdemeanor. The program is funded by the State Attorney's Office. Juveniles accepted into FOP participate in arbitration, pay restitution and are assigned sanctions such as work hours, essays and letters of apology. They are referred to community programs for counseling as the needs arise. Because this program is short in duration, our staff is able to devote more time to the smaller number of offenders with greater needs through the Juvenile Alternative Services Program.

The Juvenile Alternative Services Program is funded by the Department of Juvenile Justice. The JASP guidelines call for diverting appropriate third degree felonies and juveniles charged with misdemeanors who have priors for which they were not adjudicated. Every juvenile referred to JASP

participates in an arbitration hearing and is assigned sanctions appropriate for his or her case. A case manager is assigned to each juvenile. The case managers follow up with the juveniles in their homes, schools, and work sites. If the case managers become aware of specific areas of need, appropriate referrals are made to outside agencies who sub-contract with the State Attorney's Office. Our hope is that by working on a more personal basis with these juveniles, the recidivism rate for this target population will be further reduced.

The State Attorney's Youth Offender Program is administered by a licensed mental health counselor who holds a Masters Degree in counseling. In order to fully implement the changes in our juvenile diversion programs and to provide more individualized case management services to referred juveniles, two additional professional staff members were hired, bringing the JASP staff to a total of five case managers. In addition, there is a sixth professional who manages juveniles referred to the First Offender Program. To assist our case managers we now have three full-time support staff employees.

Last year our office diverted 2,898 juveniles out of the courts. Our studies have shown that approximately seventy percent of juveniles referred to our diversion programs do not re-offend. Our programs provide consequences for criminal behavior while at the same time offer an opportunity for change. We believe we can make a difference with young offenders diverted from the criminal system before they become chronic offenders.

11. MULTI-AGENCY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

In the past, our community has suffered greatly from disjointed efforts to serve our youth. We must work together to get to the root of juvenile delinquency. Toward this end we have developed the Multi-agency Assessment Program (MAAP). MAAP is a unique concept based on inter-agency cooperation. My office has organized regular meetings between law enforcement, the schools and the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Professionals from these agencies meet with my staff and closely examine the background of first offenders between ten and fifteen years old. The MAAP partners attempt to identify juveniles who are at-risk of becoming chronic offenders. If a juvenile is impacted by known at-risk indicators, we divert him out of the over-crowded court system and place him into an intensive mentorship program. Identified juveniles are assigned a State Attorney Case Manager who provides intensive

supervision, including school and home visits. In addition, each MAAP participant must complete an eight week violence prevention program.

In the summer of 1994, the Florida Attorney General's Office recognized the importance of the MAAP program by awarding my office a Community Juvenile Justice Partnership Grant in the amount of \$80,000.00. We were one of only three State Attorney Offices in Florida to be awarded a grant. The grant money was used to expand MAAP, thus allowing us to reach more juveniles. We also reached an agreement with the Duval County School Board for the use of a social worker who assists MAAP participants in school and follows their progress.

The success of MAAP was recognized in 1995 and again in 1996 by the Attorney General's Office when our grant was continued for a second year and a third year. Since we received the first MAAP grant our staff has intensively worked with one hundred thirty-seven at-risk juveniles. Our staff has conducted over eight hundred and fifty school and home visits to these youths. Since we began the program, school suspensions and arrests have decreased among MAAP participants, while school attendance and performance has improved.

12. CIVIL CITATIONS

There are currently forty School Resource Officers (SRO's) stationed at schools throughout Jacksonville. As a result of these officers' constant presence on campuses and their ability to quickly respond to campus crimes, we have seen an increase in relatively minor offenses entering the system. I have consistently advocated for SRO's. I believe the positive bond they create with students reduces crime and increases safety in our schools. Unfortunately, the increase in arrests created the problem of SRO's spending a great deal of time away from their schools processing juvenile offenders. In part to solve this problem, we implemented a Civil Citation Program in October, 1996.

School Resource Officers now have the option not to arrest juveniles for certain non-violent misdemeanors occurring on school grounds. Instead, the officer can issue a Civil Citation. To be eligible for a citation, a juvenile offender must admit his crime and agree to perform up to thirty-five community service hours. The work hours are often completed on campus and are supervised by the SRO. The many advantages to the program include reducing the officers' time away from school, reducing the case load of

judges, juveniles case workers and prosecutors, providing an example to other juveniles in the school, and imposing immediate consequences on the offenders for their actions.

13. JUVENILE DRUG COURT

National studies continue to show that substance abuse is a major contributor to crime. In 1995, Duval County began a "drug court" for adults. Defendants targeted for Drug Court are non-violent offenders, whose involvement with the criminal justice system is due primarily to their substance abuse. Repeatedly incarcerating these offenders does little to break the cycle of illegal drug use and crime. We know successful treatment is cost effective and greatly reduces recidivism.

Defendants accepted into Drug Court are immediately enrolled in a multi-phased out-patient program. The program includes frequent urinalysis and regular status hearings before a judge. Defendants who do not comply with treatment are subject to reincarceration until they "get back on track".

In 1996, I successfully lobbied for the implementation of a second Drug Court in Duval County for juveniles. The Juvenile Drug Court, which will begin this year, will be one of the few in the country in the Juvenile System. The court will be modeled after our adult court but will be modified to fit the special needs of juvenile substance abusers. It will include an educational component as well as psychological services for the juvenile and the parents. Juveniles who are not immediately successful will not be rejected from the program, rather they will receive quick tailored sanctions designed to "encourage" success. I truly believe our drug court for juveniles will reduce crime, save money, and save lives.

14. GREATER UTILIZATION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS

We must continue to search for effective diversion options. In an attempt to develop a diversionary program appropriate for repeat offenders, we have worked with Daniel Memorial, a local social service agency, to make the Early Delinquency Intervention Program (EDIP) (a successful program only utilized in Jacksonville in the past through court referrals) available to juveniles diverted out of the court system. Through this endeavor, certain non-violent repeat offenders can be placed in the EDIP Program for short-term residential stays and receive long-term aftercare.

There are dedicated agencies and individuals in our communities who are working with children and making a difference. I have spent many hours discussing innovative programs with the professionals. As an elected official, I have interceded with the Mayor, Chamber of Commerce and other sources to increase funding for appropriate juvenile programs. We must replace rhetoric with resources.

MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Although I firmly believe the existing Juvenile Justice System is broken, I also know there are dedicated professionals working toward improvement. We must work with the new Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to fix what is wrong. My staff is actively involved with DJJ, city leaders and the juvenile judges in an effort to introduce new programs to the juvenile courts that will act to rehabilitate and, when appropriate, punish. We have full-time staff present at the Juvenile Assessment Center, a centralized receiving, processing and intervention facility for arrested juveniles. Our office is active on the Juvenile Justice Councils in Duval, Clay and Nassau counties, as well as the District Juvenile Justice Board. These entities are statutorily mandated to formulate prevention and intervention plans for juveniles.

PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS HABITUAL JUVENILE OFFENDERS AS ADULTS

If the attempt to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents is unsuccessful, then it is my firm belief that we should treat habitual and violent juvenile criminals like adults and jail them. This is the only way to effectively protect the public. Aggressively prosecuting chronic juvenile offenders as adults also serves the dual purpose of providing an incentive to at-risk youth not to violate the law. Prevention efforts cannot succeed if those not abiding by the law do not believe there is a consequence to criminal behavior. I believe that incarceration of juveniles as adults is a crucial deterrent to juveniles not to break the law. I send a personal letter to the principal of the last school where each incarcerated juvenile was enrolled, in the hope that the fate of a former classmate can be used to persuade other students not to break the law. In an ideal system I do not believe incarcerating juveniles as adults would be the proper thing to do;

however, my hands have been tied by the explosion of juvenile crime. We will stop this process only when the juvenile system has shown it is equipped to handle dangerous criminals.

My guidelines for determining which juveniles we prosecute as adults are as broad as the law allows. We aggressively direct-file habitual and violent juvenile offenders as adults and place them in jail or prison. This is certainly more effective than leaving them in the juvenile justice system where they bounce from rehabilitative program to program without any positive results and continue to prey on the community. Four of our juvenile attorneys comprise our "adult juvenile" unit. I have also designated a fifth attorney to concentrate on the serious problem of auto thefts. This attorney's position is funded by a grant through the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office. A significant portion of the auto theft attorney's time is spent strengthening cases against juvenile offenders and insuring that repeat juvenile auto thieves are given meaningful punishments.

When I took office our city was faced with a twenty-seven percent increase in the number of juveniles arrested from 1990 to 1991. Since I took office we have prosecuted over 1,500 juvenile cases in adult court. Since 1993 alone over 600 juveniles prosecuted by my office have been incarcerated in the Duval County Jail and another 129 juveniles have been sentenced to extended time in the Florida State Prison, including seventeen violent juveniles sentenced to life in prison and one juvenile convicted of First Degree Murder sentenced to the death penalty.

Our recent arrest statistics prove that my philosophy has made a difference. After full implementation of our program, Jacksonville experienced an approximate thirty percent decrease in juvenile arrests from 1993 to 1994. During this same period, juvenile arrests went up statewide and nationwide. Most significantly, Jacksonville's decrease included an average forty-seven percent decrease in juvenile arrests in the six major crime categories (weapon offenses, aggravated assault, robbery, auto theft, home burglary, sex crimes). This trend continued from 1994 to 1995. Juvenile crime continued to go up nationwide and statewide. However, from 1994 to 1995 juvenile arrests for serious and violent offenses continued to go down in Jacksonville, including an additional twelve percent decrease in juveniles arrested for Robbery. From 1995 to 1996 juvenile arrests for murder, aggravated assault, robbery and vehicle theft all went down once again.

JUVENILE CRIME COMPARISON

NATIONWIDE			
Number of Persons Under 18 Arrested			
CRIME	1990	1994	% OF CHANGE
Murder	2,508	2,982	+16.0%
Rape	4,433	4,524	+2.0%
Robbery	33,582	45,046	+26.0%
Aggravated Assault	50,425	64,648	+22.0%

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation

FLORIDA			
Number of Persons Under 18 Arrested			
CRIME	1991	1994	% OF CHANGE
Murder	188	197	+5.0%
Rape	782	706	-10.0%
Robbery	3,228	3,710	+15.0%
Aggravated Assault	5,669	7,345	+30.0%

Source: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

DUVAL COUNTY*			
Number of Persons Under 18 Arrested			
CRIME	1993	1996	% OF CHANGE
Murder	18	5	-72.2%
Rape/Sex Offenses	178	86	-51.6%
Robbery	294	136	-53.7%
Aggravated Assault	576	350	-39.2%
Vehicle Theft	782	326	-58.3%
Weapons	251	147	-41.4%

* 1993 was the year the juvenile program was initially, fully implemented

ECONOMIC IMPACT

In the evaluation of our Juvenile Justice innovations conducted by Dr. Rasmussen, he concluded that over 7,200 robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts were prevented by incarcerating habitual juvenile offenders as adults during his study period of 1992-1995. His "conservative estimate" of the economic benefit of this reduced level of property crime was six million dollars a year. Rasmussen's numbers did not include the amount of money saved by the reduction in additional violent offenses.

HABILITATION AND AFTERCARE OF JUVENILES INCARCERATED AS ADULTS

My primary duty as State Attorney is to help protect the public. Incarceration of certain juveniles as adults is a necessary element of this function. However, *the public is best served by efforts to turn around juvenile offenders before it is too late. We are cognizant of two very valid objections to prosecuting juveniles as adults. It is generally counterproductive to brand a juvenile with an adult conviction and to expose a child to incarceration in an adult criminal environment. Most of the time we do neither. Adjudication of guilt is withheld, affording the juvenile another opportunity to modify his or her behavior and when incarcerated in the jail, he or she is housed only with other juveniles.*

1. EDUCATION AND COUNSELING IN JAIL

Simply warehousing juveniles in jail is not a long-term answer. With this in mind, the Director of our Juvenile Justice Divisions chairs a committee of professionals that constantly reevaluates programs in the jail designed to combine punishment and rehabilitation. The "Jailed Juvenile Program" represents a costly investment by our office and other agencies. The Sheriff's Office provides the space and makes available dedicated staff who provide day to day services for incarcerated juveniles. The inmates receive drug counseling and participate in living skills classes and anger control training through social service agencies funded by the city. Last year we also began conducting HARK classes in the Jail to discuss the terrible effects of domestic violence. In addition, Planned Parenthood began conducting classes in the Jail for male and female juvenile offenders to educate these "street-wise" youth on the importance of family planning. On August 3, 1993, I appeared before the Duval County School Board and urged them to provide education

to the jailed juveniles. As a result, all juveniles in jail now attend school in jail as they would if they were in a regular school (assuming they were not truants).

The jail school is served by a full time counselor who monitors each student's progress in jail. Recently the jail school added a computer component. Through the Excel Program, juveniles can earn up to twelve credits in one year. Working on the computers at their own pace, students in the jail can complete an entire course in nine to eighteen weeks. The juveniles receive full credit for what they successfully accomplish in school while incarcerated. To further increase the chances for success for juvenile inmates when they are released, we have recruited retired teachers to provide individual tutoring to juveniles in jail. Also, we are in the process of developing a program with Learn to Read, where their volunteers will work with juveniles with particularly poor reading skills.

In a perfect world all of our youth would be in school and not behind bars. Unfortunately, most of the juveniles in the jail were dropouts or habitual truants before they were arrested. Of the first one hundred juveniles in our program ninety of them were considered dropouts by the school. When these students were enrolled in the school at the jail the Duval County dropout rate was reduced by a full one percent. We have found that many of the juveniles compelled to attend school in jail do excellent work. Where they received failing grades because of lack of attendance and performance before their arrest; many receive A's and B's while in jail.

In July of 1994, former Commissioner of Education Doug Jamerson visited Jacksonville and took a tour of the jail classrooms. He spoke to some of the professionals in charge of the program and said that Jacksonville should be a model for the rest of the state. Governor Lawton Chiles also came to Jacksonville and witnessed firsthand the school program in the jail. He spoke to a class in the jail about the importance of the opportunity they were receiving to get an education. Senator Graham taught several classes in the jail during his workday with our office. On June 9, 1995, we witnessed the fruits of our labors when five juvenile inmates who took advantage of their opportunities graduated from high school in a complete graduation ceremony held in the jail. Last year, fifty juveniles received awards for academic achievement while incarcerated during an inspirational ceremony held in the jail.

2. MENTORS

In addition to an education and assistance from social services, juvenile offenders need support and positive role models in order to better themselves. It is with these needs in mind that my staff organized the Partnership Program. This program, a joint effort with the Duval County Jail staff, matches volunteers with incarcerated juveniles. Many of the volunteers are recruited from the Navy and the local universities. The partners visit the inmates on a regular basis at the jail. Positive bonds are made and our hope is the juveniles will learn there is another road they can take. Many partners continue to work with the juveniles after they are released. In 1996, we recruited thirty-seven new mentors to work with our "adult juvenile" population.

In October 1995, Major General Ronald O. Harrison from the Florida National Guard and I launched the State Attorney's "Youth On Guard" program. The program involves National Guard volunteers who mentor juvenile offenders in jail, and more importantly, after they are released. As a part of this program the youth work with the Guardsman on such issues as conflict resolution, self-esteem and peer pressure.

On Sunday, June 23, 1996, a group of mentors and previously jailed juveniles participated in a Youth-On-Guard day at the Camp Blanding military installation. The National Guard furnished the group with hats, canteens and field rations for lunch. The morning was spent observing military maneuvers and participating in a leadership obstacle course. This activity was part of our ongoing effort to decrease juvenile crime through positive interaction with mentors.

In an effort to enhance the quality of the time our volunteers spend with the juveniles we began the "Menders and Mentors" Program. As a part of this program, juveniles and their mentors work together on community service projects such as building homes for the poor and helping to clean up the St. Johns River. I know that if we can make these troubled youth a part of the solution instead of the problem, we can help to turn them around.

3. SUPERVISION AND AFTERCARE

Most juveniles are placed on probation after being released from jail. They are supervised by specialized probation officers with reduced case loads. As a part of probation each juvenile is ordered to continue his education. Every effort is made to get the child back in school if this can be done without risk

to other students. When appropriate vocational education or other alternatives are explored. There are several other special conditions of each child's probation, including getting a part time job and abiding by a curfew. Participation in a mentorship program is also mandated. It is my office that is doing the work to make sure mentors and programs are available. If a juvenile needs psychological help or special counseling such as anger control or drug abuse classes, he is ordered to participate. Because of the uniqueness of our program, the Department of Corrections obtained funding for advanced counseling services for juveniles on probation. The "Case Management Program" provides comprehensive evaluation and counseling for juvenile offenders free of charge.

The Department of Corrections reports that many juveniles who have left the jail have turned their lives around. These former criminals have graduated from high school, obtained jobs and are productive members of society. We are continuing to evaluate and improve our program. *The most significant and pleasing proof that our program is working is the tremendous reduction in the population of juveniles at the jail. Despite an expansion in the criteria qualifying a juvenile for prosecution as an adult, the population has decreased from a high of 190 in 1994 to a current average of about 60. Since my philosophy remains the same, the only explanation is a decrease in the number of juveniles committing offenses which would qualify them for prosecution in adult court.* I am convinced that the proper combination of punishment, constructive programming and after care will turn criminals into productive citizens.

4. EMPLOYMENT

Many juveniles are ordered to obtain lawful after-school employment after they are released from jail. This not only enables them to earn money to pay restitution and court costs, it assists them in becoming productive members of society with a positive outlook for the future. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to find appropriate employment opportunities for juveniles in general, and especially delinquent youths.

Acknowledging the importance of employment, my office became involved last year in the Youth Employment Service (YES). YES is a collaborative effort of several social service agencies for the purpose of increasing employment opportunities for at-risk teens. YES staff participate in the pre-release staffings for juveniles at the jail. Our office facilitates close communication between YES and the juvenile probation

officers for the purpose of preparing juveniles leaving the jail for employment and helping them find opportunities.

In addition to the YES program, the Jailed Juvenile program began in 1996 to work with project Youth Build. Youth Build is a city funded program designed to provide economically disadvantaged youth the opportunity to earn an income while learning trades in the construction industry. Juveniles in the program participate in apprenticeships offered by the Northeast Florida Builders Association while preparing to take high school equivalency examinations. The goal of the program is to make the participants attractive potential employees.

In an effort to further increase the potential for juveniles on probation to find employment, one of my juvenile staff members undertook the project of producing a video designed to educate juveniles on the proper way to successfully find a job. The video, "On the Real", is being produced through the creative efforts of three former jailed juveniles who have been successful on probation. When the video is completed, we plan to distribute it to the Boys and Girls Clubs and the Department of Corrections. It will also be shown to the juveniles in the jail.

5. FAMILY COUNSELING AND INDEPENDENT LIVING

We recognize that, despite all of our efforts, many juveniles who leave the jail return to the same atmosphere that helped turn them towards a life of crime. We are taking steps to improve this situation. First of all, we now send a letter to the family of every incarcerated juvenile listing resources that they can take advantage of to help prepare themselves for the return home of their child. The letter includes information on family counseling, parent skills training, educational opportunities, and substance abuse and anger control counseling.

In a further effort to prevent recidivism for youth released from the jail, we have recruited Daniel Memorial, a long established and respected social service agency, to pilot a counseling program for youth in jail and their parents. Professional social workers from Daniel Memorial will begin meeting with select juveniles while they are in jail and additionally will hold individual counseling sessions with the parent(s) at their homes. After the juveniles are released, family counseling sessions will continue. The goal of the

program is to increase the juveniles' self-esteem and improve their behavior, while at the same time improving the parents' parenting skills and the overall home environment.

Most juveniles leaving the jail do so with the attitude of not returning. Unfortunately, in many cases, the environment at home is not conducive to maintaining this outlook. Additionally, some juveniles do not have a home to return to. In the past year, we have begun to network with existing independent living programs to place appropriate juveniles. These programs provide housing in a positive environment, employment opportunities, and help to facilitate continued education.

Unfortunately, independent living resources are limited. This year we are working on "Our House". Our House is an ambitious effort facilitated by my staff to obtain and staff transitional housing for those juveniles who are in essence homeless when they are released from jail. We have enlisted the help of our local law school, Coastal School of Law, to assist in putting together a non-profit organization to run the facility. We believe Our House can be the answer for many juveniles who have nowhere positive to go after release from the jail.

6 STOPPING THE CYCLE

One of the known risk factors for juvenile crime is the criminal behavior of family members. In an effort to address this concern, the State Attorney's Office is funding a program designed to counsel children whose parents or siblings are incarcerated. The program will include family and individual counseling. I believe this aggressive approach towards countering risk factors before a future criminal is created will prove to be invaluable in our overall efforts to reduce juvenile crime. We must show these children that there is a path to take other than the one chosen by a parent or older sibling who has been incarcerated.

WHAT OTHERS ARE SAYING

The problem of juvenile crime has not been solved. However, the combination of early intervention for at-risk youth and swift, hard punishment for juvenile criminals is working in our community. We have shown that if we let common sense and not rhetoric guide the system we can greatly reduce juvenile crime. I believe our system can serve as a model for the rest of the State and the nation. Our office has received national attention and acclaim for our programs. I welcome this opportunity to show others there are logical answers. Some of the comments about our approach have included:

"MCNEIL LEHRER NEWS HOUR"

November 4, 1993

The McNeil Lehrer Newshour devoted an entire segment to the State Attorney's Juvenile Justice program, including a panel discussion on which Harry Shorstein appeared live.

It's still not enough, Shorstein said, noting the prevalence of single-parent families and poverty in the lives of the young criminals studied by the Times-Union.

"Incarceration, no matter how aggressive, will not significantly reduce crime without addressing the root causes," Shorstein said."

PAUL HARVEY

January 20, 1995

"THE MIAMI HERALD"

Friday, January 20, 1995

"At a time when arrests of kids are soaring, up 23 percent statewide in the first half of 1994, Jacksonville's juvenile arrests slid by 30 percent.

Word is getting around that getting caught means doing time. More than 600 teens at risk of dropping out of school have toured these cell blocks in what has become a Friday ritual: kids on the inside greeting kids on the outside.

"It wakes them up . . . It's definitely a place you don't want to be," says Rafael Williams, 16, arrested with three friends last year for robbing a bank....

Even State Attorney Harry Shorstein is quick to criticize those who say punishment alone will solve the juvenile crime problem. What they don't understand, he said, is that while he's getting young criminals off the streets, there are new youths taking their places.

Shorstein calls tough punishments the stick half of his "carrot and stick" approach to juvenile crime. The carrot half is a slate of programs for first-time offenders and at-risk students identified by the school district. Those programs include intensive probation, talks with criminals, pictures of crime scenes and the like.

"Let me tell you something. In Jacksonville, Florida, they have an every day ritual. School-agers at risk of dropping out of school are taken on tours of the City Jail. More than 600 have been escorted through the grimy, gray cell blocks and apparently it does get their attention. Stateside in Florida, statewide that is, arrests of young people were up 23% last year, but in Jacksonville, they are down 30%."


"THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION"

Jacksonville Sunday, February 5, 1995

"...With the dual approach that offers a helping hand to youngsters who are testing their limits and handcuffs to those who have exceeded the limits, Shorstein is trying to convince youngsters that there are consequences for their behavior. That is a lesson that could save their lives.


JUVENILE ARRESTS - MURDER

1990 - 1996




JUVENILE ARRESTS - RAPE & OTHER SEX OFFENSES

1990 - 1996




JUVENILE ARRESTS - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

1990 - 1996




JUVENILE ARRESTS - ROBBERY

1990 - 1996



JUVENILE ARRESTS - VEHICLE THEFT

1990 - 1996



JUVENILE ARRESTS - WEAPONS

1990 - 1996

