

Amelia
Botwin
2500
Rivermont Ave
Box 51
Lyacbury VA
24503

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

**CLINTON/GORE '96
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT**

SWITCHBOARD 202-331-1996

MAIN PHONE 202-496-5056

MAIN FAX 202-496-4890

FAX COVER SHEET

TO: Tadon

FAX #: 456-5709 # OF PAGES: 4

FROM: Joe Tabor

DATE: 9/17/96 TIME: 5:05

RE: Re: name & Cover

IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE WITH THIS TRANSMISSION,

PLEASE CALL Joe Tabor AT (202) 244-1232.

COMMENTS: _____

THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED. THIS MESSAGE MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS VIA THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE. THANK YOU.

PAID FOR BY THE CLINTON/GORE '96 PRIMARY COMMITTEE, INC. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CLINTON/GORE '96 ARE NOT TAX DEDUCTIBLE.

Jordan,

I spoke with you earlier this afternoon about finding placement in the White House. As I mentioned on the phone I have been volunteering at the campaign for the past eight months. I've been working with Craig Smith who has been helpful in providing me with assignments that put me in contact with senior staff. However, I have been unable to secure consistent responsibilities that would allow me to demonstrate my talents. I have a night job that limits the amount of time that I am able to contribute to the campaign. It is a very frustrating position to be in.

Ron suggested that it would be valuable for me to spend some time at the White House in order to make my name and face known to those in a position to offer opportunities for paid employment. In large part due to the needs of the campaign I have been tracked into research and writing positions. I am more interested in policy and communication than political operations. If I had my choice in placement I would work in the Secretary of State's office.

I sincerely believe that I belong on the Clinton team. I moved to D.C. in November of last year to work on the campaign with only a couple names and phone numbers to get me started. I have been patient and have worked hard but still feel a bit locked out due to my not having a natural base of contacts through friends or family. If spending time at the White House will give me a chance to establish an open rapport with people in a decision making capacity I would like to come over.

Thank you for your help. I will give you a call later this week to see what you think. If you have any questions please feel free to call me at (202) 244-1232.

Thanks again.

Joel Taylor

Joel Taylor
3920 Harrison Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20015
(202)244-1232

EDUCATION:

Willamette University
Bachelors of Science, May 1993
Grade Point Average 3.5

**EMPLOYMENT
HISTORY:**

Volunteer. Clinton Gore 1996. Washington, D.C.
Temporary assistant to the Director of Political Affairs, Craig Smith:
Facilitated correspondence, scheduling, and document production.
Coordinated primary travel schedule with the D.N.C. and White House
staff for the Office of Scheduling and Advance. Assistant to the
Director of Political Communications, Shelly Loos, wrote thank you
letters for the President's Convention train/bus tour, coordinated field
office Web Site photo submission.

Intern. U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.
Provided research and communications assistance for the Office of
Environmental Technologies Mexico desk. Updated with significant
revision the Environmental Technologies Export Market Plan and
Market Profile for Mexico.

Advance. Pacific Rim Economic Conference. Portland, Oregon
Coordinated Cabinet Control office and volunteers, facilitated
transportation and on site movement for principals and staff.
Provided event briefings and information packets for Cabinet
Advance. Selected furnishings and backdrop for Cabinet interviews

Production Assistant / Event Coordinator. Art Access, Seattle
Washington.
Recruited, scheduled, and hosted performances for the Art
Express, a two day event organized with the Regional Transit
Authority to promote commuter light rail services in the Puget Sound
area. Assisted in the production of Art Access, Seattle's guide to the
arts.

Coach. Bainbridge Lacrosse Club. Bainbridge Island, Washington
Coached Bainbridge freshman Lacrosse to its first undefeated season,
doubling the number of participants. Promoted mid-season to head
junior varsity coach. Awarded gratuity bonus and certificate of
appreciation from club parents.

Assistant of Forensics. Willamette University. Salem, Oregon.
Trained students in public speaking and argumentation. Developed
syllabus and research assignments for topic analysis and competition.
Provided significant administrative support for event planning,
scheduling and travel.

Writing Lab Coordinator. Willamette University. Salem, Oregon.
Supervised university computer writing facilities tutoring students in
software application, advanced writing skills and network
communication. Taught two week mini-courses in collaborative
writing to first year English classes.

Student Body President. Willamette University. Salem, Oregon.

Chaired student council, initiating the reconfiguration of the student senate, conducted university wide sexual harassment survey. Represented students to the Board of Trustees, faculty council, and university policy committees.

Research Intern. Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Johannesburg, S.A.

Conducted field research on community development needs, program effectiveness and public participation. Served as a liaison between the D.B.S.A. and unrecognized non-governmental organizations.

Resident Assistant. Willamette University. Salem, Oregon.

Organized community building and educational programs.

Administered university policy and regulations. Provided counseling and dispute resolution services.

ACTIVITIES:

Willamette Lacrosse: First line center midfield/ assistant coach

Forensics: Six years national competition

Published: "Techniques of Irony in James Joyce's Ulysses",
Proceedings: National Conference of Undergraduate
Research Conference 1993.

Editor: Competent Dilettantes: Freelance literary magazine.

**COMPUTER
SKILLS:**

Windows 96, Lotus Notes, Excel, Word, Presentations.

CLINTON/GORE '96 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

SWITCHBOARD 202-331-1996

MAIN PHONE 202-496-5056

MAIN FAX 202-496-4890

FAX COVER SHEET

TO: JordanFAX #: 456-5709 # OF PAGES: X 10FROM: Sal TalarDATE: 9/17/96 TIME: 5:20RE: Will Sage: Cover letter and documentation
for previous application to Secure Krupp and Ochs
Communications.

IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE WITH THIS TRANSMISSION,

PLEASE CALL Sal AT (202) 244-1232.

COMMENTS: _____

THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED. THIS MESSAGE MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS VIA THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE. THANK YOU.

PAID FOR BY THE CLINTON/GORE '96 PRIMARY COMMITTEE, INC. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CLINTON/GORE '96 ARE NOT TAX DEDUCTIBLE.

June 29, 1990

Bennett Radcliff
Vice President
S.K.O. Communications
Fax. 202-543-6911

Here is what I have. I hope it is useful. I will give you a call tomorrow to talk about it.

At its most innocuous Senator Dole's pre-war diplomacy with Iraq contributed to the failed policy of appeasement pursued by the Bush administration in hopes of gaining market access to a war torn, oil rich nation. Dole's home state of Kansas directly benefited from the sales of agricultural products purchased under credit guarantees issued by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Dole was a strong advocate for continuing credit guarantees at a time when Iraq was becoming increasingly hostile to its neighboring nations. His testimony before Congress contributed to a perception of improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq, arguably misleading the Senate, and preventing stronger indications of U.S. opposition to Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait.

It is not unreasonable to believe that Senator Dole did or should have had knowledge of the misuse of CCC loan guarantees issued to Iraq. As early as 1987 the General Accounting Office reported evidence of "irregularities" in GSM-102 and GSM-103 programs. As a member of the Senate Agricultural Committee Senator Dole had access to and a responsibility to act on reports of the misuse of funds. As later investigations revealed money was being diverted through a system of kick backs to finance Iraq's military build up.

One can also speculate as to Dole's role in the direct transfer of sensitive technology to Iraq's non-conventional weapons program. It is indisputable that the Bush administration was aggressively seeking contracts in Iraq for non-military and dual use technology. The BNL scandal revealed an extensive network of Iraqi front companies and questionable business deals involving former Reagan Administration officials that were facilitated by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. There were a number of controversial contracts pending at a time when Senator Dole was carrying on high level discussions with Iraqi government officials.

I have cited as an example the case of a proposed sale of high temperature furnaces to Iraq capable of fabricating components for nuclear warheads. In the months immediately proceeding the invasion of Kuwait the license of sale was being contested by outside parties, reporters and members of the Senate, after two years of administrative support. At the same time Dole was carrying on discussions with the Iraqi embassy in an effort to improve commercial ties between the two countries. Six days after the contract was suspended by order of President Bush Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. Did the sale ever come up in conversation? Did Dole lobby for the sale to go through, or other sales of a similar nature?

Dole is beating us over the head with foreign policy issues. His mishandling of Iraqi aggression may be an effective means of gaining the upper hand on the issue. Peace through strength is a euphemism for tolerance of dictators and a free reign for arms merchants.

Specifically the issue can be used in the following manner:

- In response to GOP inquiries into President Clinton's role in the Iranian arms transfers to Bosnia.

- As an example of Dole's courtship of the U.S. military industrial complex and willingness to contenance the abuse of human rights in favor of profitable contracts.
- As a response to his call for an anti-ballistic missile system for the United States. "If you hadn't encouraged proliferation in the 80's we wouldn't be worried about rogue states in the 90's."

Or in a more pre-active approach of introducing the topic to public discussion.

- If it was revealed that specific contracts were discussed between representatives of Iraq and Senator Dole;
- If any companies that profited from unauthorized contracts have contributed to the Dole campaign;
- If information was disclosed by the United Nations investigations of Iraqi research facilities that indicated that United States technology was knowingly transferred during the Bush administration that contributed to Iraq's war fighting capability..

There is much more that needs to be done with this topic. It represents not only a difference ~~in~~ values but a failure in judgment. Dole supported an immoral policy that failed.

Joel Taylor

CHRONOLOGY

- August 4, 1989 Surprise investigation of BNL by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- January 1990 CCC credit guarantees cut by \$500 million pending BNL investigations. Sources familiar with Saddam Hussien prior to the August invasion suggest that the decision to reduce the amount of credit extended to Iraq through the CCC contributed to Hussien's perception of hostile intentions on the part of the United States. Marshal Wiley of the U.S. Iraq Business Forum goes so far as to suggest that it was a "factor in their final decision to invade Kuwait."¹
- April 2, 1990 Saddam Hussein threatened to burn "half of Israel"
- April 12, 1990 Senator Dole and delegates met with Saddam Hussein. Senators Dole, Metzenbuam, Murkowski, Simpson and McClure traveled to Baghdad where they were flown in Hussein's private plane to Mosul. There they met with Hussein for two and a half hours. The meeting was suggested by Senator Spector, and arranged by President Mubarak. The delegation presented a letter of intent to President Hussein with the prior approval of President Bush. Dole reported the protocol of the meeting to the Senate on April 20th.
- I would stress that we told President Saddam Hussein, as the President told us the night before, and as we set forth in a letter we delivered to President Hussein, so that nobody would distort what had been said, that we want to improve our relations with Iraq.²
- April 20, 1990 Senator Dole reported to the Senate about his trip to the Middle East. Dole began his remarks on Iraq by stating that he found President Hussein's anti-Israel rhetoric "distasteful". He went on to provide a sympathetic assessment of President Hussein:
- I think we came away with the feeling that here is an intelligent man; here is a man whose country has just ended a 7-year war with its neighbor Iran; it has its own problems, including a \$50 billion debt; but at the same time it is a country that cannot be ignored. It produces the second largest quantity of oil in the region. It is the second biggest

¹ Wiley Marshal (President U.S. Iraqi Business Forum); Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs House of Representatives; October 16, 1990, p.5

² Senator Dole; Congressional Record; April 20, 1990; p. S4789

country, population wise in the area. ³

Senator Dole dedicated the remainder of his comments to clarifying Saddam Hussein's threat to burn half of Israel. On two occasions in his report he testified as to Hussein's intent to use chemical weapons only in self defense against a first strike by Israel.

May 17, 1990

Dole blocks amendment to discontinue credit to Iraq. Senator D'Amato introduced an amendment to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act of 1989 that would block U.S. credit to Iraq including CCC loan guarantees. The purpose of the amendment was to:

...restrict United States assistance for the Republic of Iraq until that country opens to international inspection sites suspected of being involved in the production of nuclear, Chemical or biological weapons, and ratifies the Convention On Biological Weapons. ⁴

In a passionate exchange Senator D'Amato referred to Hussein as the "Killer of Baghdad" and the new "Mad Dog of the Middle East". Dole responded in a coordinated rejoinder with fellow members of the Baghdad delegation. Repeating his position from his April 20th report to the Senate, Dole restated President Hussein's intention to use chemical weapons only in the case of a nuclear strike by Israel and repeated Hussein's claim that "he had no plans for nuclear weapons, and all they were doing in the so-called biological area was basic research." ⁵

Dole challenged the amendment as an obstacle to ongoing negotiations.

The President indicated to us he would like to improve our relations with that country and with its people notwithstanding the record of President Saddam Hussein. We indicated to the President that there were some potential for improving our relationships...It just seems to me that this amendment at this time on this legislation would, in effect, kill it....it is saying to Saddam Hussein, 'Keep up your tactics; we do not want to improve our relationship, we do not want any influence in that part of the world.' And I believe it would be a major mistake. ⁶

Dole and Senator Metzenbaum maintained the position that the

³ Senator Dole; Congressional Record, April 20 1990, S4789

⁴ Senator D'Amato; Congressional Record; May 17, 1990, S6421

⁵ Senator Dole; Congressional Record, May 17, 1990; S6416.

⁶ Senator Dole; Congressional Record, May 17, 1990, S6427

Amendment was poorly timed and should be reintroduced after a 30 to 60 day waiting period to assess the results of an ongoing dialogue between the Senate delegation and the Ambassador of Iraq. Senator D'Amato withdrew his amendment.

July 19, 1990

President Bush blocked shipment of skull furnaces to Iraq. In controversial inter departmental battle the Department of Commerce approved a license to sell multiple "general purpose furnaces" that could be used to cast highly enriched uranium for nuclear bomb cores or to melt titanium for fabricating ballistic missile components. According to Consarc President "We were being encouraged by the Commerce Department in Washington and by the U.S embassy in Baghdad to go get this order."⁷

The President intervened on June 27th. blocking the shipment in port within days of its scheduled departure. On July 19th the President suspended the license under Section 778.3 of the Export Administration Regulations on the grounds that the exporter must get a license if he or she "knows or has reason to know" that the commodity "will" be used in "fabricating...nuclear weapons."⁸

Bush acted after a reporter notified customs of the anticipated sale and members of Congress wrote a letter of protest to the President in response to media pressure.

August 3, 1990

Iraq invades Kuwait.

⁷ Roberts (President Consarc Corporation) House Report #102-137; Strengthening the Export Licensing System; July 2, 1991; p. 21.

⁸ U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration; Report to the Hearing Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives; September 27, 1990; p.2

THE COMMODITIES CREDIT CORPORATION

The GSM-102 and GSM-103 programs are export credit guarantee programs operated by the CCC under the general authority of section 5(f) of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, by which CCC was directed by Congress to develop programs to "export, of cause to be exported, or aid in the development of foreign markets for, agricultural commodities." Essentially the CCC guarantees operate to attract credit from the private sector to finance sales of U.S. agricultural commodities, rather than having the government provide credit directly. The CCC guarantee is a promise to the exporter that CCC will pay the exporter, or its assignee, for the sale in the event that the approved foreign bank should default on its payment obligation under the letter of credit

Iraq began purchasing U.S. commodities under the GSM programs in 1983. Between 1983 and August of 1990 Iraq purchased approximately \$5 billion in U.S. agricultural commodities under the GSM programs. In 1989 U.S. exports to Iraq were approximately \$1.5 billion of which approximately \$1 billion were agricultural commodities exported under the CCC guarantees. As of August 1, 1990 Iraq stopped payment on all its foreign debts. Unpaid Iraqi obligations for which CCC has issued guarantees under the GSM-102 or GSM-103 programs total approximately \$2 billion.¹

An administrative review conducted by the CCC of its GSM programs to Iraq revealed significant abuses in commodity transactions. Prices for agricultural commodities were inflated to account for shipping costs not covered by GSM grantees. Evidence was also found of requests for "after sales services" (i.e. kick backs) to Iraqi government enterprises for non-agricultural products (e.g. truck parts, tires, use of specified Iraqi shipping companies). Inflated prices contributed to a pool of soft money used to finance the purchase of dual use technologies.

According to Allan Mendelowitz of the U.S. General Accounting Office, evidence of irregularities with respect to GSM-102 and GSM-103 programs had been surfacing since 1987.²

Prior to August of 1990 no end user oversight existed to confirm the contents of the shipping manifest arriving in Iraq. "Currently, as long as the paper trail appears in order and nobody files a claim for reimbursement, there is no way FAS would look into a shipment... What can happen as the program is currently constituted, we could give a loan guarantee to Iraq,....a commodity could be exported and diverted on the high seas to another country. Iraq could use the money for whatever they choose and so long as they continued to service the guaranteed loans, nobody would be the wiser."³ The CIA didn't begin collecting intelligence on Iraqi end

¹Paul Dickerson (Associate Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service and General Sales Manager, Commodity Credit Corporation); Before the Committee on Banking and finance United States House of Representatives; October 16, 1990; p.10.

²Allen Mendelowitz (Director, International Trade, Energy, and Finance Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office); Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs House of Representatives; October 16, 1990; p.21

³Mendelowitz; 1990; p31

users until the fall of 1990.⁴

⁴House Report 102-137; Strengthening the Export Licensing System; July 2, 1991. p.32

**BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO
(BNL)**

BNL was by far Iraq's largest source of private credit. Between February of 1988 and April of 1989, BNL committed \$2.15 billion in loans to Iraq which was earmarked for the purchase of Western equipment, technology and know-how. Up to \$900 million of those loans were guaranteed by the United States Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation.¹ Only \$67 million of this amount was reported to the state and federal bank regulators. Press reports and the Italian government have linked BNL financing to companies that sold armaments to Iraq over the past several years.²

The loan commitments to the Central Bank of Iraq were designed ostensibly to provide medium-term financing for Iraq's industrialization program. However, during the August 4 examination by the Atlanta Federal Reserve, it was discovered that some of the letters of credit did not specify the goods being financed. And, during a brief period in 1989, BNL Atlanta sent the Central Bank of Iraq \$107 million without supporting trade documents.³

There is evidence to suggest that top ranking officials from Cabinet level departments had knowledge that BNL money was used to purchase military goods.⁴ Stephen Bryen, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Defense Technology Security Administration between 1981 and 1988, in testimony before the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs concedes that it was "official U.S. policy" to "not provide military support to either Iran or Iraq...For that reason we never sold any weapons to Iraq" and that "dual use equipment that can be used to manufacture arms were regarded as the same as the sale of arms."⁵ He goes on to denounce actual policy toward Iraq.

It is important to note that the United States is obliged to follow the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act, the Geneva Conventions on Chemical and Biological Warfare and, after 1987 the Missile Technology control Regime. There is no doubt in my mind that these instruments were violated in spirit and in fact by public officials who were more interested

¹ Background Report; Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs House of Representatives; April 9, 1991; p. 1

² Representative Gonzalez; Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs House of Representatives; October 16, 1990; p. 1.

³ Terry Smith (Senior Vice President, Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta); Statement submitted to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs House of Representatives; Oct 16, 1990; p. 8.

⁴ Representative Gonzalaz; Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives; April 9, 1991; p. 2

⁵ Stephen Bryen; report to the Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs; April 9, 1991; p. 80.

in appeasing a dictator in Iraq then conforming to international law and approved policy.⁶

BNL funding was Saddam Hussien's line. The capital it provided allowed the Iraqi government to concentrate its resources on weapons procurement. BNL financing was critical to development of Iraq's chemical weapons industry.⁷

⁶ Stephen Bryen (Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy and Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration); Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs House of Representatives; April 9, 1991; p. 80.

⁷ W.Seth Carus (Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy); Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs U.S. House of Representatives; April 9, 1991.