

NY Times 7-01-97

JOAN'S LAW

NEW JERSEY

Parole Law Is Proposed

A Federal version of "Joan's Law" — the two-month-old New Jersey law that mandates a life sentence without parole for child molesters who kill their victims — was proposed yesterday. The measure, announced by Representative Robert D. Franks, a Union County Republican, is broader in some ways than New Jersey's law: it would require a life sentence for anyone who kills a child under 14 in the course of committing any of 15 crimes, including robbery and kidnapping. But the law would apply only to crimes committed across state lines, on Federal property or during acts of terrorism.

MEMORANDUM

TO: TOM FREEDMAN

FROM: MARY L. SMITH

RE: NO PAROLE FOR MURDERERS OF CHILDREN

DATE: JUNE 4, 1997

*→ Cross
State laws*

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SUMMARY

"Joan's Law" is a New Jersey law, signed by Governor Christine Todd Whitman on April 3, 1997, that mandates life imprisonment without parole for anyone who sexually abuses and murders a child under the age of 14. Joan's Law does not apply retroactively. [P.L. 1997]

BACKGROUND

Joan was abducted while delivering Girl Scout cookies to a neighbor in 1973. Three days later, on Easter Sunday, her nude and battered body was found in a ravine about 15 miles away.

SIMILARITY TO MEGAN'S LAW

Both Megan's Law and Joan's Law were introduced in 1995. Megan's Law requires notification to schools, camps, women's and youth groups, and, in some cases, neighbors, of paroled sex offenders. Megan's Law is currently being litigated in federal court. Joan's Law, however, is not expected to have the same constitutional challenges because it does not apply retroactively.

DOES NOT MAKE RADICAL CHANGES TO EXISTING LAWS

In New Jersey, most murderers convicted after 1982 must serve 30 years before they are considered for parole. The only other New Jersey law similar to Joan's Law is a law passed in the fall of 1996 that mandates life sentences without parole for murderers of law-enforcement officers, when the death penalty does not apply.

SIMILAR LAWS IN OTHER STATES

Officials at the National Conference of State Legislatures in Denver state that the only similar law in the nation was a 1996 Wyoming law that imposed a life term without parole for anyone convicted of first-degree sexual assault against a minor, regardless of whether the child was murdered.

CRITICISM OF JOAN'S LAW

Susan Keiser of the Jon Jay College of Criminal Justice, a sociology instructor who specializes in children's law, described Joan's Law as a "cheap approach" to reducing child abuse and murder because it does not solve the societal problem. Governor Whitman defended the law by saying that even though the state cannot totally stop child molesters, this law still sends a strong message to criminals.

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THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
BILL TEXT
STATENET

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NEW JERSEY 207TH LEGISLATURE

SENATE BILL 250

P.L. 1997, CHAPTER 60, APPROVED APRIL 3, 1997
1997 SENATE NO. 250 (SECOND REPRINT)

1996 NJ S.B. 250

VERSION: Enacted

VERSION-DATE: April 3, 1997

SYNOPSIS:

AN ACT concerning eligibility for parole in certain cases and amending
N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:47-5 and P.L.1979, c.441.

DIGEST:

Provides for life term of imprisonment without parole for persons convicted
of murder in conjunction with sexual offense against a child.

NOTICE:

[A> UPPERCASE TEXT WITHIN THESE SYMBOLS IS ADDED <A]
[D> Text within these symbols is deleted <D]

TEXT: BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New
Jersey:

1. N.J.S.2C:11-3 is amended to read as follows:

2C:11-3. Murder.

a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4 criminal homicide constitutes murder
when:

(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in
death; or

(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in
death; or

(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more

other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or criminal escape, and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and

(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and

(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and

(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

b. [A] (1) [A] Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole [A] , [A] or [A] BE SENTENCED [A] to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.

[A] (2) IF THE VICTIM WAS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER AND WAS MURDERED WHILE PERFORMING HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES OR WAS MURDERED BECAUSE OF HIS STATUS AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, THE PERSON CONVICTED OF THAT MURDER SHALL BE SENTENCED, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION C. OF THIS SECTION, BY THE COURT TO A TERM OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT, DURING WHICH THE PERSON SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE. [A]

[A] (3) A PERSON CONVICTED OF MURDER AND WHO IS NOT SENTENCED TO DEATH UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE SENTENCED TO A TERM OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE IF THE MURDER WAS COMMITTED UNDER ALL OF THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES: [A]

[A] (A) THE VICTIM IS LESS THAN [A] [D] 13 [D] [A] 14 YEARS OLD; AND [A]

[A] (B) THE ACT IS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF THE COMMISSION, WHETHER ALONE OR WITH ONE OR MORE PERSONS, OF A VIOLATION OF [A] [D] subsection a. or b. of [D] [A] N.J.S.2C:14-2 OR N.J.S.2C:14-3. [A]

[A] THE DEFENDANT SHALL NOT BE ENTITLED TO A DEDUCTION OF COMMUTATION AND WORK CREDITS FROM THAT SENTENCE. [A]

c. Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in

JOHN'S
LAW

N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, shall be sentenced as provided hereinafter:

(1) The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.

Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good cause, the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted the defendant's plea or who determined the defendant's guilt and before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. On motion of the defendant and with consent of the prosecuting attorney the court may conduct a proceeding without a jury. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the participation of an alternate juror in the sentencing proceeding if one of the jurors who rendered the guilty verdict becomes ill or is otherwise unable to proceed before or during the sentencing proceeding.

(2) (a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection but shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.

(b) The admissibility of evidence offered by the State to establish any of the aggravating factors shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.

(c) Evidence admitted at the trial, which is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, shall be considered without the necessity of reintroducing that evidence at the sentencing proceeding; provided that the fact finder at the sentencing proceeding was present as either the fact finder or the judge at the trial.

(d) The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor.

(e) Prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceeding, or at such time as he has knowledge of the existence of an aggravating factor, the prosecuting attorney shall give notice to the defendant of the aggravating factors which he intends to prove in the proceeding.

(f) Evidence offered by the State with regard to the establishment of a prior

homicide conviction pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) of this subsection may include the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant.

(3) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth in writing the existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. If any aggravating factor is found to exist, the verdict shall also state whether it outweighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors.

(a) If the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factors exist and that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.

(b) If the jury or the court finds that no aggravating factors exist, or that all of the aggravating factors which exist do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.

(c) If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.

(4) The aggravating factors which may be found by the jury or the court are:

(a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;

(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;

(c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;

(d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;

(e) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;

(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;

(g) The offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping;

(h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;

(i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as

defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense or (ii) committed the offense at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;

(j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2; or

(k) The victim was less than 14 years old.

(5) The mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the court are:

(a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;

(b) The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted in his death;

(c) The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;

(d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;

(e) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;

(f) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;

(g) The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder; or

(h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.

[A] (6) WHEN A DEFENDANT AT A SENTENCING PROCEEDING PRESENTS EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER OR RECORD PURSUANT TO SUBPARAGRAPH (H) OF PARAGRAPH (5) OF THIS SUBSECTION, THE STATE MAY PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE MURDER VICTIM'S CHARACTER AND BACKGROUND AND OF THE IMPACT OF THE MURDER ON THE VICTIM'S SURVIVORS. IF THE JURY FINDS THAT THE STATE HAS PROVEN AT LEAST ONE AGGRAVATING FACTOR BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND THE JURY FINDS THE EXISTENCE OF A MITIGATING FACTOR PURSUANT TO SUBPARAGRAPH (H) OF PARAGRAPH (5) OF THIS SUBSECTION, THE JURY MAY CONSIDER THE VICTIM AND SURVIVOR EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE PURSUANT TO THIS PARAGRAPH IN DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO GIVE MITIGATING EVIDENCE PRESENTED PURSUANT TO SUBPARAGRAPH (H) OF PARAGRAPH (5) OF THIS SUBSECTION. <A]

d. The sentencing proceeding set forth in subsection c. of this section shall not be waived by the prosecuting attorney.

e. Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in

similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Proportionality review under this section shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed under subsection c. of this section. In any instance in which the defendant fails, or refuses to appeal, the appeal shall be taken by the Office of the Public Defender or other counsel appointed by the Supreme Court for that purpose.

f. Prior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if the defendant is not sentenced to death. The jury shall also be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in sentencing by the court pursuant to subsection b.

g. A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall not be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection c. but shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.

h. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, no evidence shall be admissible concerning the method or manner of execution which would be imposed on a defendant sentenced to death.

i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. (cf: P.L.1996, c.115, s.1)

2. N.J.S.2C:47-5 is amended to read as follows:

2C:47-5. Parole.

a. Any person committed to confinement under the terms of this chapter shall be released under parole supervision when it shall appear to the satisfaction of the State Parole Board, after recommendation by a special classification review board appointed by the commissioner that such person is capable of making an acceptable social adjustment in the community.

b. The Chief Executive Officer of the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center shall report in writing at least semiannually to the special classification review board concerning the physical and psychological condition of such person with a recommendation as to his continued confinement or consideration for release on parole.

c. Any person paroled pursuant to this section shall be subject to the provisions of Title 30 of the Revised Statutes governing parole and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.

d. When a person confined under the terms of this chapter has not been paroled in accordance with subsection a. of this section and is scheduled for release, not less than 90 days prior to the date of the person's scheduled release the Chief Executive Officer shall:

(1) Notify the Attorney General and the prosecutor of the county from which the person was committed of the scheduled release:

(2) Provide the Attorney General and the county prosecutor with the officer's opinion as to whether the person may be "in need of involuntary commitment"

within the meaning of section 2 of P.L.1987, c.116 (C.30:4-27.2); and

(3) Without regard to classification as confidential pursuant to regulations of the State Parole Board or the Department of Corrections, provide the Attorney General and county prosecutor with all reports, records and assessments relevant to determining whether the person is "in need of involuntary commitment." All information received shall be deemed confidential and shall be disclosed only as provided in section 4 of P.L.1994, c.134 (C.30:4-82.4).

e. Upon receipt of the notice, advice and information required by subsection d. of this section, the Attorney General or county prosecutor shall proceed as provided in section 4 of P.L.1994, c.134 (C.30:4-82.4).

[A] F. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION TO THE CONTRARY, A PERSON CONFINED FOR LIFE AT THE ADULT DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT CENTER, FOR A CRIME WHOSE CIRCUMSTANCES CONFORM TO THOSE ENUMERATED IN PARAGRAPH <A> [D] (2) <D> [A] (3) OF SUBSECTION B. OF N.J.S.2C:11-3, SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE OR A DEDUCTION FOR COMMUTATION OR WORK CREDITS. <A> (cf: P.L.1994, c.134, s.3)

3. Section 7 of P.L.1979, c.441 (C.30:4-123.51) is amended to read as follows:

7. a. Each adult inmate sentenced to a term of incarceration in a county penal institution, or to a specific term of years at the State Prison or the correctional institution for women shall become primarily eligible for parole after having served any judicial or statutory mandatory minimum term, or one-third of the sentence imposed where no mandatory minimum term has been imposed less commutation time for good behavior pursuant to N.J.S.2A:164-24 or R.S.30:4-140 and credits for diligent application to work and other institutional assignments pursuant to P.L.1972, c.115 (C.30:8-28.1 et seq.) or R.S.30:4-92. Consistent with the provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (N.J.S.2C:11-3, 2C:14-6, 2C:43-6, 2C:43-7), commutation and work credits shall not in any way reduce any judicial or statutory mandatory minimum term and such credits accrued shall only be awarded subsequent to the expiration of the term.

b. Each adult inmate sentenced to a term of life imprisonment shall become primarily eligible for parole after having served any judicial or statutory mandatory minimum term, or 25 years where no mandatory minimum term has been imposed less commutation time for good behavior and credits for diligent application to work and other institutional assignments. If an inmate sentenced to a specific term or terms of years is eligible for parole on a date later than the date upon which he would be eligible if a life sentence had been imposed, then in such case the inmate shall be eligible for parole after having served 25 years, less commutation time for good behavior and credits for diligent application to work and other institutional assignments. Consistent with the provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (N.J.S.2C:11-3, 2C:14-6, 2C:43-6, 2C:43-7), commutation and work credits shall not in any way reduce any judicial or statutory mandatory minimum term and such credits accrued shall only be awarded subsequent to the expiration of the term.

c. Each inmate sentenced to a specific term of years pursuant to the "Controlled Dangerous Substances Act," P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-1 through 45) shall become primarily eligible for parole after having served one-third of the

sentence imposed less commutation time for good behavior and credits for diligent application to work and other institutional assignments.

d. Each adult inmate sentenced to an indeterminate term of years as a young adult offender pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-5 shall become primarily eligible for parole consideration pursuant to a schedule of primary eligibility dates developed by the board, less adjustment for program participation. In no case shall the board schedule require that the primary parole eligibility date for a young adult offender be greater than the primary parole eligibility date required pursuant to this section for the presumptive term for the crime authorized pursuant to N.J.S.2C:44-1(f).

e. Each adult inmate sentenced to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, Avenel, shall become primarily eligible for parole upon recommendation by the special classification review board pursuant to N.J.S.2C:47-5, except that no such inmate shall become primarily eligible prior to the expiration of any mandatory or fixed minimum term imposed pursuant to N.J.S.2C:14-6.

f. Each juvenile inmate committed to an indeterminate term shall be immediately eligible for parole.

g. Each adult inmate of a county jail, workhouse or penitentiary shall become primarily eligible for parole upon service of 60 days of his aggregate sentence or as provided for in subsection a. of this section, whichever is greater. Whenever any such inmate's parole eligibility is within six months of the date of such sentence, the judge shall state such eligibility on the record which shall satisfy all public and inmate notice requirements. The chief executive officer of the institution in which county inmates are held shall generate all reports pursuant to subsection d. of section 10 of P.L.1979, c.441 (C.30:4-123.54). The parole board shall have the authority to promulgate time periods applicable to the parole processing of inmates of county penal institutions, except that no inmate may be released prior to the primary eligibility date established by this subsection, unless consented to by the sentencing judge. No inmate sentenced to a specific term of years at the State Prison or the correctional institution for women shall become primarily eligible for parole until service of a full nine months of his aggregate sentence.

h. When an inmate is sentenced to more than one term of imprisonment, the primary parole eligibility terms calculated pursuant to this section shall be aggregated by the board for the purpose of determining the primary parole eligibility date, except that no juvenile commitment shall be aggregated with any adult sentence. The board shall promulgate rules and regulations to govern aggregation under this subsection.

i. The primary eligibility date shall be computed by a designated representative of the board and made known to the inmate in writing not later than 90 days following the commencement of the sentence. In the case of an inmate sentenced to a county penal institution such notice shall be made pursuant to subsection g. of this section. Each inmate shall be given the opportunity to acknowledge in writing the receipt of such computation. Failure or refusal by the inmate to acknowledge the receipt of such computation shall be recorded by the board but shall not constitute a violation of this subsection.

j. Except as provided in this subsection, each inmate sentenced pursuant to

N.J.S.2A:113-4 for a term of life imprisonment, N.J.S.2A:164-17 for a fixed minimum and maximum term or N.J.S.2C:1-1(b) shall not be primarily eligible for parole on a date computed pursuant to this section, but shall be primarily eligible on a date computed pursuant to P.L.1948, c.84 (C.30:4-123.1 et seq.), which is continued in effect for this purpose. Inmates classified as second, third or fourth offenders pursuant to section 12 of P.L.1948, c.84 (C.30:4-123.12) shall become primarily eligible for parole after serving one-third, one-half or two-thirds of the maximum sentence imposed, respectively, less in each instance commutation time for good behavior and credits for diligent application to work and other institutional assignments; provided, however, that if the prosecuting attorney or the sentencing court advises the board that the punitive aspects of the sentence imposed on such inmates will not have been fulfilled by the time of parole eligibility calculated pursuant to this subsection, then the inmate shall not become primarily eligible for parole until serving an additional period which shall be one-half of the difference between the primary parole eligibility date calculated pursuant to this subsection and the parole eligibility date calculated pursuant to section 12 of P.L.1948, c.84 (C.30:4-123.12). If the prosecuting attorney or the sentencing court advises the board that the punitive aspects of the sentence have not been fulfilled, such advice need not be supported by reasons and will be deemed conclusive and final. Any such decision shall not be subject to judicial review except to the extent mandated by the New Jersey and United States Constitutions. The board shall, reasonably prior to considering any such case, advise the prosecuting attorney and the sentencing court of all information relevant to such inmate's parole eligibility.

[A] K. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION OR N.J.S.2C:47-5 TO THE CONTRARY, A PERSON SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT PURSUANT TOPARAGRAPH (2) OR (3) OF SUBSECTION B. OF N.J.S.2C:11-3 SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE. <A] (cf: P.L.1982, c.71, s.2)

4. This act shall take effect immediately, and shall be applicable to any person sentenced on or after the effective date.

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