MEMORANDUM

TO: BRUCE REED
ELENA KAGAN

FROM: TOM FREEDMAN
MARY L. SMITH
DREW HANSEN

RE: REPORT ON THE FAMILY

DATE: JULY 18, 1997

A possible "Report on the Family" could include the following statistics:

Employment

- avg. monthly unemployment rate
- unemployment rate by age group

Family

- divorce rate
- birth rates
- out-of-wedlock birthrates
- number of female- and male-headed households

Poverty

- poverty rate, by family structure
- out-of-wedlock births, by income status ?

Education

- educational enrollment/attainment
- monthly income, by degree earned
- enrollment of 3- to 5-year-olds, by education and labor force status of mother and family income

Crime

- crime rates
- victims by race/sex
- arrests by race/sex
- drug use by arrestees by race/sex

TRB® FROM WASHINGTON

Lazy he calls us

Lazy? Hey buster, are you calling American workers *lazy??*

That's what he said, all right. Japanese officials want to portray this recent remark by Yoshio Sakurauchi, speaker of the Japanese parliament, as the maundering of a senile nonentity. But it apparently reflects the views of the Japanese public. According to a *New York Times*/CBS poll, 66 percent of Japanese think Americans are "lazy" and only 13 percent think we're "hard-working." (Polling—now there's a great American export.)

The view that Americans are lazy is widespread in America, too. In this very journal, last week's Diarist was brooding on the subject, and praising Asian Americans for showing "that hard work is still rewarded here, in a country that needs more hard work."

Whatever ails the American economy, though, it cannot be blamed on laziness. Americans work astonishingly hard, compared with both our own recent past and most of our trade competitors. Juliet B. Schor, an associate professor of economics at Harvard, dishes the grim figures in her intriguing new book, *The Overworked American* (Basic Books). The average working American puts in 163 more hours a year than twenty years ago. That's the equivalent of an extra month of work. Men are working on average two-and-a-half weeks longer, women seven-and-a-half weeks longer. The pattern is consistent across various occupations and income levels. More women are working. More teenagers are working (53.7 percent). Average American work time is way up even if you include those whose work time is zero (retirees, students, the unemployed, etc.).

Commuting time is up, too—by an average of twenty-three hours (almost three working days) a year. Paid vacation time is down by 3.5 days a year. Despite the huge increase in the number of working wives, time spent on household chores has not declined. Women do a bit less, men do a bit more, the total is constant. Decades of technological advances from indoor plumbing through vacuum cleaners to food processors have simply illustrated Parkinson's Law: "With all these labor-saving innovations, no labor has been saved. Instead, housework expanded to fill the available time." (The one exception: microwave ovens.) Schor blames excessive American standards of cleanliness.

From their peak in the pits of the Industrial Revolution, working hours declined steadily until the 1940s. Everyone assumed this would continue. During the Depression, the Senate actually passed a bill mandating a thirty-hour work week to relieve unemployment. As late as the 1950s sociologists heartached over what Americans would do with all their leisure time. But the "leisure crisis" has turned out to be the exact opposite: people and society are frazzling from the stress of overwork.

Schor's take on all this is a bit odd. She sees the essential villain as consumerism, spurred by the capitalist system's ever receding mirage of material bliss. Convinced that the next purchase will satisfy us, we work harder to buy it, only to want something else. We are on a treadmill, "imprisoned in capitalism's 'squirrel cage,'" caught in an "insidious cycle of 'work and spend.'" Noting primly that "there are numerous examples of societies in which *things* have played a highly circumscribed role," Schor also observes that money can't buy happiness: the percentage of Americans reporting to pollsters that they were "very happy" peaked in 1957.

Schor's solution? A conscious social decision—implemented in a variety of government policies—to accept a lower standard of living in exchange for more leisure time. I wonder how many Americans would actually be interested in such a deal. Although Schor seems quite left-wing, her best allies here might be social-issue conservatives, eager for more women to stay home and tend to their families. How many of them will admit, though, as Schor frankly does, that their social engineering project implies a lower gross national product?

Make of Schor's vision what you will (and I don't dismiss it out of hand), you needn't agree about the evils of materialism in order to explain the increase in American working hours. As a new study by the congressional Joint Economic Committee ("Families on a Treadmill") points out, even in strictly material terms Americans are running

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Antoinette) crosses the border from sanity to insanity.

But in straying from the stringent discipline of hate and in venturing into the psyche of the Other, Rhys ended up writing a novel that, despite its many local beauties, often feels fabricated as none of the rest of her fiction does. She set out to defend her heroine, and made her defenseless in precisely the way that her other women rarely are. Antoinette is the only heroine to embark on an actual act of revenge, and yet as she leaves the attic of Thornfield Hall with a lighted candle in hand and arson in mind, the violence in store feels less willed than the passivity to which Rhys's previous protagonists succumbed. Mr. Rochester, given the chance to explain himself, becomes curiously unconvincing compared with Rhys's earlier male characters, whose impenetrability was a crucial part of their allure and their cruelty.

A similar aloofness is an essential quality in Rhys herself and in her writing. The great strength of her fiction is also its potentially fatal weakness: the absence of easy sympathy. The starkly lit characters and the unforgiving authorial voice—which achieves a perfect pitch of self-mockery in *Good Morning, Midnight*, the most disturbing and virtuosic of all her novels—testify to a chilling world more eloquently than any moralizing might. And although those figures and that voice inevitably rouse curiosity about the life of the actual woman who created them, pursuing the biographical urge proves in the end to be the opposite of enlightening.

Perhaps the real contribution of this exhaustive book is finally to establish the grounds on which Rhys's reputation should rest, or at least the grounds on which it should not rest. Rhys's true claim on our attention, it's clear after hundreds of pages of mundane detail, has little to do with the legendary figure—the delicate face, the desperate life and its raggedly unliterary course. It lies in her accomplishments as a writer, though readers will have to turn to her books, not to Angier's commentaries on them, for proof of that. Rhys herself rarely gave in to the tragic illusion that her sordid life was the price she paid for her fiction. Instead, she sometimes managed a cruelly comic perspective. Her work, she once wrote in a merciless diary she kept, was the price she had to pay for dying: "I must write. If I stop writing my life will have been an abject failure. It is that already to other people. But it will be an abject failure to myself. I will not have earned death." •

TRB *continued from page 6*

ever faster just to stay in the same place.

The study compares two-parent families with children in 1979 and 1989. For most, the wife's real hourly pay rose only slightly and the husband's actually declined. Except for the top fifth, any increase in total family income came from working longer hours, not from better pay for hours worked. If you're working harder to afford the same lifestyle, your standard of living has declined, even if the official standard of living statistics don't reflect that.

Working harder is not the answer for the American economy. We are already working harder, and it's getting us nowhere. Yes, the Japanese still put in more hours a year than we do, on average. Schor figures they outwork us by six weeks a year. She paints a convincingly gruesome picture of a society where "thousands of workers have become victims of karoshi, or 'death by overwork.' Otherwise perfectly healthy, they keel over at their desks...." (West Germans, on the other hand, work an average of eight weeks a year less than we do.) But longer hours cannot explain Japan's economic performance. That's because Japan's work hours have been decreasing, America's have been increasing, and even so their economy has been growing far faster than ours.

Since 1975 Japan's output per person has increased by almost half while America's has increased by a mere 12 percent. This Japanese achievement is not the result of working longer hours—Japanese work fewer hours than they did in 1975. It is mainly the result of Japan's high rates of savings and investment—including the social investment in education.

Thus Juliet Schor may be right for the wrong reason. America's desire for immediate and unending consumer gratification may or may not be leading us to work too hard, but it's definitely leading us to save and invest too little. Unless we curb our present appetites, we won't see the gains in productivity that could allow us to have more things and more time as well in the future.

But meanwhile, just don't call us lazy.

MICHAEL KINSLEY

CORRESPONDENCE *continued from page 5*

say of state legislatures: "The inquiry constantly is what will *please*, not what will *benefit* the people." Of the people themselves, Hamilton complained that they "murmur at taxes, clamor at their rulers," and "change one incapable man for another more incapable."

Hamilton was a republican but feared that voters would not have the wisdom to elect the best among them to public office. I wonder if Hamilton would have any cause to change his opinion on these matters were he alive today?

TIM HACKLER
Alexandria, Virginia

The editors welcome correspondence from readers. Letters should include the writer's full name, address, and telephone number; be typed double-spaced; and be held to under 200 words. Letters may be edited for space. Please address letters to: Correspondence, TNR, 1220 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

MEMORANDUM

TO: TOM FREEDMAN, MARY L. SMITH

FROM: DREW HANSEN

RE: REPORT ON THE FAMILY

DATE: JULY 25, 1997

SUMMARY

Attached are some demographic statistics that might be relevant to a possible report on the family. The attached data are the modern counterparts to some of the statistics used in the Moynihan report.

MOYNIHAN REPORT STATISTICS (MODERN COUNTERPARTS)

The Moynihan report argued that the black family was in crisis due to the influences of slavery, reconstruction, urbanization, unemployment, and low wages. The signs of the crisis in the black family were high rates of divorce/separation, illegitimate births, and female-headed families. The results of the crisis were welfare dependency, matriarchal families, educational failure of black youth, delinquency and crime, inability to enter the armed forces, and alienation among young black men.

A. Causes of family crisis
   1. Employment status of males, 1960-1995
   2. Minimum wage, 1950-1996
   3. Poverty threshold, 1959-1995
   4. Ability of minimum-wage worker to support a family at poverty threshold, 1961-1995

B. Signs of family crisis
   1. Marital status of persons 15 Years and over, by Age and Sex, 1994
   2. Ratio of births to unmarried women, 1940-1992
   3. Household composition, 1940-1994

C. Results of family crisis
   Receipt of AFDC by family status: 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992

Employment status of males, 1960 to 1995

Year	*Total male*	*Employed*	*Emp/pop. ratio*	*Unemp.*	*Unemp %*	*Not in labor*	*% not in labor force*
1960	46388	43904	78.9	2486	5.4	9274	16.7
1970	51228	48990	76.2	2238	4.4	13076	20.3
1980	61453	57186	72	4267	6.9	17945	22.6
1985	64411	59861	70.9	4521	7	20058	23.7
1990	69011	65104	72	3906	5.7	21367	23.6
1992	69964	64440	69.8	5523	7.9	22306	24.2
1993	70404	65349	70	5055	7.2	22927	24.6
1994	70817	66450	70.4	4367	6.2	23538	24.9
1995	71360	67377	70.8	3983	5.6	23818	25

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996

Minimum Wage for Non-Farm Workers, 1950-1996

Year	*Laws prior to 1966*	*1966 and later*
1950	$0.75	
1956	$1.00	
1961	$1.15	
1963	$1.25	
1967	$1.40	$1.00
1968	$1.60	$1.15
1969	$1.60	$1.30
1970	$1.60	$1.45
1971	$1.60	$1.60
1974	$2.00	$1.90
1975	$2.10	$2.00
1976	$2.30	$2.20
1977	$2.30	$2.30
1978	$2.65	$2.65
1979	$2.90	$2.90
1980	$3.10	$3.10
1981	$3.35	$3.35
1990	$3.80	$3.80
1991	$4.25	$4.25
1992	$4.25	$4.25
1993	$4.25	$4.25
1994	$4.25	$4.25
1995	$4.25	$4.25
1996	$4.25	$4.25

Note: "prior to 1966" applies to workers covered prior to 1961 amendments and, after 1965, to workers covered by 1961 amendments. "1966 and later" applies to workers newly covered by amendments of 1966, 1974, and 1977, and Title IX of Education amendments of 1972.

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996

Avg. Poverty Threshold for a Family of Four, Constant Dollars: 1959-1995

Year	*Poverty Threshold*
1959	$2,973
1960	$3,022
1961	$3,054
1962	$3,089
1963	$3,128
1964	$3,169
1965	$3,223
1966	$3,317
1967	$3,410
1968	$3,553
1969	$3,743
1970	$3,968
1971	$4,137
1972	$4,275
1973	$4,540
1974	$5,038
1975	$5,500
1976	$5,815
1977	$6,191
1978	$6,662
1979	$7,412
1980	$8,414
1981	$9,287
1982	$9,862
1983	$10,178
1984	$10,609
1985	$10,989
1986	$11,203
1987	$11,611
1988	$12,092
1989	$12,674
1990	$13,359
1991	$13,924
1992	$14,335
1993	$14,763
1994	$15,141
1995	$15,569

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, "Poverty in the United States: 1995" Series P60, No. 194.

Ability of Minimum-wage Worker to Support a Family of Four at the Poverty Threshold, 1961-1995

Year	*Minimum Wage*	*Annual Earnings*	*Poverty Threshold*	*Earnings/Pov.*
1961	$1.15	$2,300	$3,054	0.75
1962	$1.15	$2,300	$3,089	0.74
1963	$1.25	$2,500	$3,128	0.80
1964	$1.25	$2,500	$3,169	0.79
1965	$1.25	$2,500	$3,223	0.78
1966	$1.25	$2,500	$3,317	0.75
1967	$1.40	$2,800	$3,410	0.82
1968	$1.60	$3,200	$3,553	0.90
1969	$1.60	$3,200	$3,743	0.85
1970	$1.60	$3,200	$3,968	0.81
1971	$1.60	$3,200	$4,137	0.77
1972	$1.60	$3,200	$4,275	0.75
1973	$1.60	$3,200	$4,540	0.70
1974	$2.00	$4,000	$5,038	0.79
1975	$2.10	$4,200	$5,500	0.76
1976	$2.30	$4,600	$5,815	0.79
1977	$2.30	$4,600	$6,191	0.74
1978	$2.65	$5,300	$6,662	0.80
1979	$2.90	$5,800	$7,412	0.78
1980	$3.10	$6,200	$8,414	0.74
1981	$3.35	$6,700	$9,287	0.72
1982	$3.35	$6,700	$9,862	0.68
1983	$3.35	$6,700	$10,178	0.66
1984	$3.35	$6,700	$10,609	0.63
1985	$3.35	$6,700	$10,989	0.61
1986	$3.35	$6,700	$11,203	0.60
1987	$3.35	$6,700	$11,611	0.58
1988	$3.35	$6,700	$12,092	0.55
1989	$3.35	$6,700	$12,674	0.53
1990	$3.80	$7,600	$13,359	0.57
1991	$4.25	$8,500	$13,924	0.61
1992	$4.25	$8,500	$14,335	0.59
1993	$4.25	$8,500	$14,763	0.58
1994	$4.25	$8,500	$15,141	0.56
1995	$4.25	$8,500	$15,569	0.55

*Minimum wage in laws prior to 1961
*Annual earnings assuming a 40hr week and a 50-week year.

Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, "Poverty in the United States: 1995" Series P60, No. 194.

Marital Status of Persons 15 Years and Over, by Age and Sex

	Total (15+)	15-17yrs	18-19yrs	20-24yrs	25-29yrs	30-34yrs
Both sexes	200800	10814	6916	18559	19626	22320
Never married	54873	10668	6527	13631	8387	5525
Married, spouse present	10523	76	292	4168	9361	13379
Married, spouse absent	6730	36	66	421	749	1063
*separated	4755	25	38	287	540	801
*other	1975	10	27	134	210	262
Widowed	13295	0	5	16	38	86
Divorced	17379	13	26	323	1091	2067
Percent						
Never married	27.3%	98.8%	94.4%	73.4%	42.7%	24.8%
Married, spouse present	54.0%	0.7%	4.2%	22.5%	47.7%	60.8%
Married, spouse absent	3.4%	0.3%	0.9%	2.3%	3.8%	4.8%
*separated	2.4%	0.2%	0.6%	1.5%	2.7%	3.6%
*other	1.0%	0.1%	0.4%	0.7%	1.1%	1.2%
Widowed	6.6%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%
Divorced	8.7%	0.1%	0.4%	1.7%	5.6%	9.3%
Male	96768	5546	3462	9221	9765	11108
Never married	30228	5502	3375	7469	4910	3298
Married, spouse present	54261	28	64	1546	4152	6491
Married, spouse absent	2807	11	16	112	270	449
*separated	1780	8	9	66	171	301
*other	1026	4	7	46	98	148
Widowed	2222	0	2	5	9	6
Divorced	7250	5	5	89	424	864
Percent (Male)						
Never married	31.2%	99.2%	97.5%	81.0%	50.3%	29.7%
Married, spouse present	56.1%	0.5%	1.8%	16.8%	42.5%	58.4%
Married, spouse absent	2.9%	0.2%	0.5%	1.2%	2.8%	4.0%
*separated	1.8%	0.1%	0.3%	0.7%	1.8%	2.7%
*other	1.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.5%	1.0%	1.3%
Widowed	2.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Divorced	7.5%	0.1%	0.1%	1.0%	4.3%	7.8%
Female	104032	5268	3454	9338	9861	11212
Never married	24645	5187	3152	6162	3476	2228
Married, spouse present	54261	48	228	2622	5209	7089
Married, spouse absent	3924	24	50	309	480	614
*separated	2975	18	29	220	368	500
*other	949	7	20	89	111	113
Widowed	11073	0	3	11	29	80
Divorced	10129	9	21	234	667	1202
Percent(female)						
Never married	23.7%	98.5%	91.2%	66.0%	35.3%	19.9%
Married, spouse present	52.2%	0.9%	6.6%	28.1%	52.8%	63.2%
Married, spouse absent	3.8%	0.5%	1.4%	3.3%	4.9%	5.5%
*separated	2.9%	0.3%	0.8%	2.4%	3.7%	4.5%
*other	9.0%	0.1%	0.6%	0.9%	1.1%	1.0%
Widowed	10.6%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.7%
Divorced	9.7%	0.2%	0.6%	2.5%	6.8%	10.7%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
Current Population Reports
Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1994." Series P20, No. 484.

35-39yrs	40-44yrs	45-54yrs	55-64yrs	65-74yrs	75-84yrs	85+	Total, 18+
21970	19557	29522	20737	18087	9857	2835	189986
3514	2164	2077	980	775	386	218	44185
14527	13494	21197	14875	11499	4671	785	108447
1035	968	1143	659	375	160	55	6695
786	730	811	446	220	56	16	4729
250	238	333	212	155	105	39	1965
167	177	841	1828	4171	4258	1707	13295
2728	2754	4264	2396	1267	382	69	17366
16.0%	11.1%	7.0%	4.7%	4.3%	3.9%	7.7%	23.3%
66.1%	69.0%	71.8%	71.7%	63.6%	47.4%	27.7%	57.1%
4.7%	4.9%	3.9%	3.2%	2.1%	1.6%	2.0%	3.5%
3.6%	3.7%	2.7%	2.2%	1.2%	0.6%	0.6%	2.5%
1.1%	1.2%	1.1%	1.0%	0.9%	1.1%	1.4%	1.0%
0.8%	0.9%	2.8%	8.8%	23.1%	43.2%	60.2%	7.0%
12.4%	14.1%	14.4%	11.6%	7.0%	3.9%	2.4%	9.1%
10892	9651	14454	9933	7924	3888	924	91222
2094	1255	1185	539	390	147	64	24727
7140	6644	10900	7733	6174	2859	530	54233
463	460	462	301	179	66	16	2795
338	319	279	179	91	17	2	1772
125	141	184	122	88	49	15	1023
31	31	137	327	695	681	299	2221
1164	1262	1770	1033	486	135	15	7245
19.2%	13.0%	8.2%	5.4%	4.9%	3.8%	7.0%	27.1%
65.5%	68.8%	75.4%	77.9%	77.9%	73.5%	57.4%	59.5%
4.3%	4.8%	3.2%	3.0%	2.3%	1.7%	1.8%	3.1%
3.1%	3.3%	1.9%	1.8%	1.1%	0.4%	0.2%	1.9%
1.1%	1.5%	1.3%	1.2%	1.1%	1.3%	1.6%	1.1%
0.3%	0.3%	0.9%	3.3%	8.8%	17.5%	32.3%	2.4%
10.7%	13.1%	12.2%	10.4%	6.1%	3.5%	1.6%	7.9%
11078	9906	15068	10805	10163	5969	1911	98765
1420	909	892	440	386	240	153	19458
7387	6850	10296	7142	5324	1811	255	54214
572	508	681	358	196	94	39	3899
447	411	532	267	129	38	15	2957
125	97	149	90	67	56	24	942
135	146	705	1501	3476	3577	1409	11073
1563	1492	2494	1364	781	247	55	10120
12.8%	9.2%	5.9%	4.1%	3.8%	4.0%	8.0%	19.7%
66.7%	69.2%	68.3%	66.1%	52.4%	30.3%	13.3%	54.9%
5.2%	5.1%	4.5%	3.3%	1.9%	1.6%	2.0%	3.9%
4.0%	4.1%	3.5%	2.5%	1.3%	0.6%	0.8%	3.0%
1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	0.8%	0.7%	0.9%	1.3%	1.0%
1.2%	1.5%	4.7%	13.9%	34.2%	59.9%	73.7%	11.2%
14.1%	15.1%	16.6%	12.6%	7.7%	4.1%	2.9%	10.2%

Total, 65+
30779
1379
16954
591
292
299
10137
1178
4.5%
55.1%
1.9%
0.9%
1.0%
32.9%
5.6%
12736
601
9564
262
110
152
1675
636
4.7%
75.1%
2.1%
0.9%
1.2%
13.1%
5.0%
18043
779
7390
329
182
147
8462
1082
4.3%
41.0%
1.8%
1.0%
0.8%
46.9%
6.0%

Ratio of Births to Unmarried Women: United States, 1940-1992

Year	*Ratio*
1940	37.9
1941	38.1
1942	34.3
1943	33.4
1944	37.6
1945	42.9
1946	38.1
1947	35.7
1948	36.7
1949	37.4
1950	39.8
1951	39.1
1952	39.1
1953	41.2
1954	44
1955	45.3
1956	46.5
1957	47.4
1958	49.6
1959	52
1960	52.7
1961	56.3
1962	58.8
1963	63.3
1964	68.5
1965	77.4
1966	83.9
1967	90.3
1968	96.9
1969	100.2
1970	106.9
1971	112.9
1972	123.7
1973	129.8
1974	132.3
1975	142.5
1976	147.8
1977	155
1978	163.2
1979	171.1
1980	184.3
1981	189.2
1982	194.3
1983	202.8
1984	210
1985	220.2
1986	233.9



1987	244.9
1988	257.1
1989	270.8
1990	280.3
1991	295.3
1992	301.3

Source: Vital Statistics of the United States, 1992 vol. 1: Natality. USDHHS, 1996
Ratio: births per 1,000 live births

Household Composition: 1940-1994

	Married-couple Family	Other family Male hh	Other family Female hh	Nonfamily Male hh	Nonfamily Female hh
1940	76	4.3	9.8	4.6	5.3
1950	78.2	2.7	8.3	3.8	7
1960	74.3	2.3	8.4	5.1	9.8
1970	70.5	1.9	8.7	6.4	12.4
1980	60.8	2.1	10.8	10.9	15.4
1990	56	3.1	11.7	12.4	16.8
1994	54.8	3	12.8	12.8	16.6

hh=householder

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports.
Household and Family Characteristics: March 1994." Series P20, No. 483



Receipt of AFDC by Family Status: 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992

	Avg. monthly Number *thousands	Percent	Ever Number *thousands	Percent
1992	11862	4.7%	15111	6.0%
In families	11590	5.3%	14677	6.8%
*married-couple	3012	1.7%	4881	2.8%
*female householder, no spouse present	8287	22.4%	9485	26.0%
Unrelated individuals	272	0.8%	434	1.3%
1991	11869	4.7%	15714	6.4%
In families	11544	5.4%	15156	7.1%
*married-couple	3001	1.8%	4664	2.7%
*female householder, no spouse present	8257	23.2%	10028	28.5%
Unrelated individuals	325	0.9%	558	1.6%
1990	10573	4.3%	12847	5.3%
In families	10329	4.9%	12469	6.0%
*married-couple	2495	1.5%	3874	2.3%
*female householder, no spouse present	7576	22.3%	8233	25.3%
Unrelated individuals	245	0.7%	378	1.1%
1987	10385	4.3%	13432	5.7%
In families	10052	4.8%	12890	6.3%
*married-couple	2544	1.5%	3758	2.2%
*female householder, no spouse present	7366	22.5%	8889	27.5%
Unrelated individuals	332	1.0%	542	1.8%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
Current Population Reports
Program Participation 1990 to 1992" Series P70, No. 41, and
"Program Participation 1991 to 1993" Series P70, No. 46.

MEMORANDUM

TO: TOM FREEDMAN, MARY L. SMITH

FROM: DREW HANSEN

RE: REPORT ON THE FAMILY

DATE: JULY 25, 1997

SUMMARY

Attached are some demographic statistics that might be relevant to a possible report on the family. The attached data are the modern counterparts to some of the statistics used in the Moynihan report.

MOYNIHAN REPORT STATISTICS (MODERN COUNTERPARTS)

The Moynihan report argued that the black family was in crisis due to the influences of slavery, reconstruction, urbanization, unemployment, and low wages. The signs of the crisis in the black family were high rates of divorce/separation, illegitimate births, and female-headed families. The results of the crisis were welfare dependency, matriarchal families, educational failure of black youth, delinquency and crime, inability to enter the armed forces, and alienation among young black men.

A. Causes of family crisis
  1. Employment status of males, 1960-1995
  2. Minimum wage, 1950-1996
  3. Poverty threshold, 1959-1995
  4. Ability of minimum-wage worker to support a family at poverty threshold, 1961-1995

B. Signs of family crisis
  1. Marital status of persons 15 Years and over, by Age and Sex, 1994
  2. Ratio of births to unmarried women, 1940-1992
  3. Household composition, 1940-1994

C. Results of family crisis
  Receipt of AFDC by family status: 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992

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A. Causes of family crisis
   1. Male unemployment rate, 1960-1995
   2. Minimum wage, 1950-1996
   3. Poverty threshold, 1959-1995
   4. Ability of minimum-wage worker to support a family at poverty threshold, 1961-1995

B. Signs of family crisis
   1. Marital status of persons 15 Years and over, by Age and Sex, 1994
   2. Ratio of births to unmarried women, 1940-1992
   3. Household composition, 1940-1994

C. Results of family crisis
   Receipt of AFDC by family status: 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992

Table D. **Receipt of Public Assistance by Family Status**

Family status	Average monthly participation (thousands)				Persons ever participating (thousands)				Persons participating all 24 months (thousands)				Median spell duration (months)		Median monthly benefits (1992 dollars)	
	Calendar year 1991		Calendar year 1992		Calendar year 1991		Calendar year 1992		Calendar years 1991 and 1992 (91 panel)		Calendar years 1990 and 1991 (90 panel)					
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	91 panel	90 panel	Calendar year 1991	Calendar year 1992
ALL PROGRAMS[1]																
Total	31 695	12.7	33 954	13.4	40 606	16.4	42 470	17.0	20 244	8.3	18 093	7.6	7.9	7.9	451	436
In families	26 721	12.5	29 063	13.4	34 852	16.4	36 899	17.1	16 910	8.1	15 108	7.4	7.8	7.8	503	471
In married-couple families	11 436	6.7	12 895	7.5	17 033	10.0	18 862	10.9	5 821	3.4	5 533	3.3	7.3	7.3	358	341
In families with a female householder, no spouse present	14 232	40.1	15 068	40.7	16 467	46.9	16 762	46.0	10 547	30.8	9 154	29.0	14.9	11.4	591	586
Unrelated individuals	4 973	13.6	4 891	13.5	5 754	16.5	5 571	16.3	3 334	10.0	2 985	9.3	10.8	8.6	199	192
AFDC OR GENERAL ASSISTANCE																
Total	11 869	4.7	11 862	4.7	15 714	6.4	15 111	6.0	6 777	2.8	5 634	2.4	7.4	10.4	374	363
In families	11 544	5.4	11 590	5.3	15 156	7.1	14 677	6.8	6 692	3.2	5 530	2.7	7.4	10.9	377	366
In married-couple families	3 001	1.8	3 012	1.7	4 664	2.7	4 881	2.8	1 160	0.7	1 041	0.6	5.6	5.8	389	397
In families with a female householder, no spouse present	8 257	23.2	8 287	22.4	10 028	28.5	9 485	26.0	5 380	15.7	4 414	14.0	12.0	18.2	376	364
Unrelated individuals	325	0.9	272	0.8	558	1.6	434	1.3	85	0.3	104	0.3	3.9	5.7	210	202
FOOD STAMPS																
Total	19 383	7.8	20 700	8.2	25 837	10.5	27 113	10.8	10 402	4.3	9 102	3.8	9.6	8.8	206	206
In families	17 582	8.2	18 848	8.7	23 587	11.1	24 703	11.4	9 335	4.4	8 125	4.0	9.5	8.6	226	224
In married-couple families	6 566	3.9	7 313	4.2	10 196	6.0	11 352	6.6	2 588	1.5	2 602	1.5	7.2	7.0	238	232
In families with a female householder, no spouse present	10 474	29.5	10 968	29.7	12 629	35.9	12 643	34.7	6 556	19.2	5 424	17.2	19.3	11.5	215	223
Unrelated individuals	1 801	4.9	1 853	5.1	2 250	6.5	2 409	7.1	1 067	3.2	977	3.0	11.3	10.5	52	51

[1]All programs include AFDC, General Assistance, SSI, food stamps, Medicaid, and housing assistance. Median monthly benefits from all programs include benefits from the AFDC, General Assistance, SSI, and Food Stamp programs only.

CPS P70-46
Prog Part
1991 to 1993

Umbrella Contracts Leave Small Businesses in the Rain

By RODNEY HO
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

GOVERNMENT Watch

CONTRACT "BUNDLING" hurts small businesses, a study finds.

A recent report sponsored by the Small Business Administration says the number of small businesses getting federal contracts for the first time plunged 44% in a recent four-year span. One reason, the report said, is that the Office of Federal Procurement is increasing its use of "bundled" contracts, which lump a broad array of services or products under one umbrella contract. The contract is often so large that the bid winner has to subcontract much of the work.

Such contracts let the office get lower prices and increase efficiency, officials say. "It's leveraging our buying power," says Steven Kelman, administrator of the office, which handles all government contracting. But Jere Glover, head of the SBA's office of advocacy, notes that bundling can hurt small contractors because "logically, it's harder for smaller businesses to bid or win very large contracts."

The report said overall federal contract spending dropped 8.7% in the four fiscal years through Sept. 30, 1995, while the number of contracts awarded fell 11%. On the other hand, the number of contractors dropped only 6.5% and minority and female contractors in the special SBA 8(a) set-aside program gained market share.

Sen. Christopher "Kit" Bond (R., Mo.), chairman of the Senate Small Business Committee, says he fears that concentration of contracts in the hands of a few might actually raise prices down the road as smaller competitors get stomped. He includes antibundling language in his recent SBA budget reauthorization bill.

The procurement office's Mr. Kelman says he would like to ensure that small businesses aren't ignored as bundling becomes more prevalant.

"We can mitigate problems through subcontracting or teaming arrangements with small businesses," Mr. Kelman says. "Government shouldn't have a laissez-faire attitude about bundling's potential impact."

* * *

AN OSHA RULING makes it harder for some private groups to sue.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration last month clarified a five-year-old California state OSHA rule that allowed private citizens and organizations in the Golden State to sue companies for violations of the state OSHA's hazardous-chemical reporting requirements. In other states, only federal agencies can sue over such violations.

Washington's move means that as long as out-of-state manufacturers meet federal OSHA standards, they aren't subject to California's OSHA standards. The state's standards are more restrictive than federal rules on wording of hazardous-chemical warnings. Companies affected include aerosol-paint manufacturers, propane-gas distributors and industrial cleaning-product companies, among others. (A company that manufactures in California is still subject to state standards.)

Federal OSHA officials acted using their authority over similar state agencies. Under the previous California rule, hundreds of small businesses were threatened by private "bounty hunters," says Rep. James Talent (R., Mo.), who heads the House Small Business Committee.

For example, As You Sow Foundation, a private California nonprofit organization that seeks OSHA-rule violators, sued Midco Products Co. of Chesterfield, Mo., in 1995 for allegedly using improper chemical-warning labels on its aerosol cans sold in California. The small-manufacturing company, which says it sells very little product in California, believes the alleged violations were minor and defensible, but chose to settle for $11,500 rather than go to court.

"There was no intended wrongdoing," says Randy Garland, Midco's vice president of operations. "And what galls me is this [the foundation] isn't even a regulatory agency." Officials of the foundation couldn't be reached for comment.

Clifford Chanler, a San Francisco attorney who has handled more than 900 cases involving chemical-hazard warnings, says he worries that the restriction "gives an avenue for chemical-product manufacturers not to comply with warning laws."

As Mr. Chanler notes, the federal OSHA ruling acknowledges that the private-enforcement method "has resulted in increased protection for some workers."

* * *

BLUSHING OFFICIALS plan improvements after a snafu.

In May, an independent congressional study found a major error in calculating how much money the Small Business Administration's largest loan program needs to cover future losses, otherwise called the subsidy rate. The agency at the time was projecting a major shortage in funds. But once the error was discovered, the so-called 7(a) program suddenly had $2.5 billion extra in lending authority, abruptly ending the crisis.

During a House Small Business Committee hearing last week, SBA Administrator Aida Alvarez conceded that the error in the subsidy model "has served to expose significant weaknesses in the SBA's internal control environment." She says she has hired Price Waterhouse to undertake a review of the agency's financial controls. She says the agency also has improved security on its computers and taken other measures to prevent future problems.

* * *

PENDING LEGISLATION would encourage small-business pensions.

Several provisions that would make retirement planning simpler for small-business owners and employees are surviving so far in tax bills now working their way through the House and Senate, legislative aides say.

One proposal would encourage small-business owners that do not offer any retirement plans to allow employees to take payroll deductions for individual retirement accounts. Currently, few small businesses use this option for fear that it would subject them to Internal Revenue Service scrutiny and to liability under federal pension rules, says Russ Sullivan, a spokesman for Sen. Bob Graham (D., Fla.), who sponsored many of the small-business provisions. The proposal would free small businesses from such liability.

Another proposal would allow owners of unincorporated businesses to participate in the matching retirement plans, such as 401(k) programs, that their employees can now use. Current law bars unincorporated businesses from offering such plans to the owners.

Mr. Sullivan says offering equal benefits to the owners would encourage them to offer matching contributions in general to all employees.

* * *

SMALL TALK: The Small Business Administration has launched Pro-Net, an Internet-accessible database that allows federal contracting officers and others to search for small businesses that can fill their needs. . . . Congress and the administration support delaying the new requirement that small businesses file tax payments electronically, but still disagree on a timetable.

Marital status

p. 1 (% all, % age group)

p. 4 (urban)

p. 7-9 (region)

for '15 - A3

Preg Aust

p. 10, p. 9

Stat Abs

393

429

P70-41 Prog Part 1990 to 1992

Table B. **Program Participation Status, by Family Status: 1990 and 1987**

[Numbers in thousands. Bases for percentages can be found in the detailed tables]

Participation and family status	1990								1987							
	Major means-tested assistance programs[1]		AFDC or General Assistance		Food stamps		Housing assistance		Major means-tested assistance programs[1]		AFDC or General Assistance		Food stamps		Housing assistance	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Average Monthly Participation																
Total	28,461	11.5	10,573	4.3	17,136	6.9	10,694	4.3	27,412	11.4	10,385	4.3	17,365	7.2	9,222	3.8
In families	23,951	11.3	10,329	4.9	15,576	7.4	8,461	4.0	23,323	11.2	10,052	4.8	15,822	7.6	7,384	3.6
In married-couple families	10,405	6.1	2,495	1.5	5,817	3.4	2,876	1.7	10,350	6.2	2,544	1.5	6,528	3.9	2,426	1.4
In families with a female householder, no spouse present	12,640	37.2	7,576	22.3	9,358	27.6	5,270	15.5	12,277	37.4	7,366	22.5	9,065	27.6	4,703	14.3
Unrelated individuals	4,510	12.6	245	0.7	1,561	4.4	2,232	6.2	4,089	12.6	332	1.0	1,543	4.8	1,838	5.7
Persons Ever Participating																
Total	35,663	14.8	12,847	5.3	21,941	9.1	13,745	5.7	34,856	14.8	13,432	5.7	24,221	10.3	11,424	4.9
In families	30,405	14.6	12,469	6.0	19,923	9.6	11,052	5.3	30,190	14.7	12,890	6.3	22,242	10.8	9,260	4.5
In married-couple families	15,571	9.2	3,874	2.3	8,971	5.3	4,450	2.6	15,230	9.1	3,758	2.2	10,480	6.3	3,297	2.0
In families with a female householder, no spouse present	13,799	42.4	8,233	25.3	10,461	32.1	6,289	19.3	14,102	43.7	8,889	27.5	11,341	35.1	5,698	17.6
Unrelated individuals	5,258	15.9	378	1.1	2,018	6.1	2,693	8.2	4,666	15.8	542	1.8	1,979	6.7	2,164	7.3

[1]Major means-tested assistance programs include AFDC or General Assistance, SSI, food stamps, Medicaid, and housing assistance.

from 2.0 percent in 1987 to 2.6 percent in 1990 (table B). Persons in female householder families experienced an increase in the proportion covered by Medicaid on a long-term basis, from 18.3 percent in 1987 and 1988 to 21.5 percent in 1990 and 1991 (table B1).

Persons in female-householder families had longer median spells than persons in married-couple families for major programs taken together and for AFDC/General Assistance, food stamps, or Medicaid separately. As can be seen in table B3, persons in married-couple families received AFDC/General Assistance for 5.8 months, compared with 18.2 months for persons in female-householder families. The shorter AFDC stay of married-couple families is partly caused by the transitory nature of unemployment (needy married-couple families must have an unemployed parent in order to receive AFDC). Longer welfare spells generally reflect the inability of female-householder families to exit poverty. As shown in a companion report, persons in female householder families have significantly longer poverty spells than persons in married-couple households.[7]

[7]U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-70, No. 42, *Dynamics of Economic Well-Being: Poverty, 1990 to 1992*, forthcoming.

Unrelated individuals had significantly longer spells of receiving housing assistance and food stamps than persons in married-couple families. As can be seen in table B3, spells in both programs were about 50.0 percent higher for unrelated individuals than for persons in married-couple households.

Persons in married-couple families had longer food stamp and Medicaid spells during the 1990 panel than during the 1987 panel. It can be seen in table B3 that their median food stamp spells increased from 4.9 to 7.0 months, and their median Medicaid spells from 5.4 to 7.9 months. (There was no significant difference between the median spell durations for food stamps and Medicaid in either year.) Persons in female householder families, on the other hand, experienced a large increase in the spell duration of the major programs combined, from 6.8 percent in the 1987 panel to 11.4 percent in the 1990 panel.

Persons in married-couple families had significantly higher AFDC/General Assistance benefits than persons in female-householder families; the opposite held true for benefits from major programs and from SSI, as shown in table B2. Median combined family benefits for persons in female-householder families amounted to $529 in 1990, which is substantially higher than the $334 received by their counterparts in married-couple

CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
Population Characteristics
P20-484

Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1994

by Arlene F. Saluter

U.S. Department of Commerce
Economics and Statistics Administration
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

Table 1. Marital Status of Persons 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin, Metropolitan Residence, and Region: March 1994

[Numbers in thousands. For meaning of symbols, see text]

Subject	Total, 15 years and over	15 to 17 years	18 and 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 29 years	30 to 34 years	35 to 39 years	40 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 to 74 years	75 to 84 years	85 years and over	Total, 18 years and over	Total, 65 years and over
UNITED STATES															
All Races															
Both sexes	200 800	10 814	6 916	18 559	19 626	22 320	21 970	19 557	29 522	20 737	18 087	9 857	2 835	189 986	30 779
Never married	54 873	10 688	6 527	13 631	8 387	5 525	3 514	2 164	2 077	980	775	386	218	44 185	1 379
Married, spouse present	108 523	76	292	4 168	9 361	13 579	14 527	13 494	21 197	14 875	11 499	4 671	785	108 447	16 954
Married, spouse absent	6 730	36	66	421	749	1 063	1 035	968	1 143	659	375	160	55	6 695	591
Separated	4 755	25	38	287	540	801	786	730	811	446	220	56	16	4 729	292
Other	1 975	10	27	134	210	262	250	238	333	212	155	105	39	1 965	299
Widowed	13 295	–	5	16	38	86	167	177	841	1 828	4 171	4 258	1 707	13 295	10 137
Divorced	17 379	13	26	323	1 091	2 067	2 728	2 754	4 264	2 396	1 267	382	69	17 366	1 718
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	27.3	98.8	94.4	73.4	42.7	24.8	16.0	11.1	7.0	4.7	4.3	3.9	7.7	23.3	4.5
Married, spouse present	54.0	.7	4.2	22.5	47.7	60.8	66.1	69.0	71.8	71.7	63.6	47.4	27.7	57.1	55.1
Married, spouse absent	3.4	.3	.9	2.3	3.8	4.8	4.7	4.9	3.9	3.2	2.1	1.6	2.0	3.5	1.9
Separated	2.4	.2	.6	1.5	2.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	2.7	2.2	1.2	.6	.6	2.5	.9
Other	1.0	.1	.4	.7	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	.9	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.0
Widowed	6.6	–	.1	.1	.2	.4	.8	.9	2.8	8.8	23.1	43.2	60.2	7.0	32.9
Divorced	8.7	.1	.4	1.7	5.6	9.3	12.4	14.1	14.4	11.6	7.0	3.9	2.4	9.1	5.6
Male	96 768	5 546	3 462	9 221	9 765	11 108	10 892	9 651	14 454	9 933	7 924	3 888	924	91 222	12 736
Never married	30 228	5 502	3 375	7 469	4 910	3 298	2 094	1 255	1 185	539	390	147	64	24 727	601
Married, spouse present	54 261	28	64	1 546	4 152	6 491	7 140	6 644	10 900	7 733	6 174	2 859	530	54 233	9 564
Married, spouse absent	2 807	11	16	112	270	449	463	460	462	301	179	66	16	2 795	262
Separated	1 780	8	9	66	171	301	338	319	279	179	91	17	2	1 772	110
Other	1 026	4	7	46	98	148	125	141	184	122	88	49	15	1 023	152
Widowed	2 222	–	2	5	9	6	31	31	137	327	695	681	299	2 221	1 675
Divorced	7 250	5	5	89	424	864	1 164	1 262	1 770	1 033	486	135	15	7 245	636
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	31.2	99.2	97.5	81.0	50.3	29.7	19.2	13.0	8.2	5.4	4.9	3.8	7.0	27.1	4.7
Married, spouse present	56.1	.5	1.8	16.8	42.5	58.4	65.5	68.8	75.4	77.9	77.9	73.5	57.4	59.5	75.1
Married, spouse absent	2.9	.2	.5	1.2	2.8	4.0	4.3	4.8	3.2	3.0	2.3	1.7	1.8	3.1	2.1
Separated	1.8	.1	.3	.7	1.8	2.7	3.1	3.3	1.9	1.8	1.1	.4	.2	1.9	.9
Other	1.1	.1	.2	.5	1.0	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.1	1.2
Widowed	2.3	–	.1	.1	.1	.1	.3	.3	.9	3.3	8.8	17.5	32.3	2.4	13.1
Divorced	7.5	.1	.1	1.0	4.3	7.8	10.7	13.1	12.2	10.4	6.1	3.5	1.6	7.9	5.0
Female	104 032	5 268	3 454	9 338	9 861	11 212	11 078	9 906	15 068	10 805	10 163	5 969	1 911	98 765	18 043
Never married	24 645	5 187	3 152	6 162	3 476	2 228	1 420	909	892	440	386	240	153	19 458	779
Married, spouse present	54 261	48	228	2 622	5 209	7 089	7 387	6 850	10 296	7 142	5 324	1 811	255	54 214	7 390
Married, spouse absent	3 924	24	50	309	480	614	572	508	681	358	196	94	39	3 899	329
Separated	2 975	18	29	220	368	500	447	411	532	267	129	38	15	2 957	182
Other	949	7	20	89	111	113	125	97	149	90	67	56	24	942	147
Widowed	11 073	–	3	11	29	80	135	146	705	1 501	3 476	3 577	1 409	11 073	8 462
Divorced	10 129	9	21	234	667	1 202	1 563	1 492	2 494	1 364	781	247	55	10 120	1 082
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	23.7	98.5	91.2	66.0	35.3	19.9	12.8	9.2	5.9	4.1	3.8	4.0	8.0	19.7	4.3
Married, spouse present	52.2	.9	6.6	28.1	52.8	63.2	66.7	69.2	68.3	66.1	52.4	30.3	13.3	54.9	41.0
Married, spouse absent	3.8	.5	1.4	3.3	4.9	5.5	5.2	5.1	4.5	3.3	1.9	1.6	2.0	3.9	1.8
Separated	2.9	.3	.8	2.4	3.7	4.5	4.0	4.1	3.5	2.5	1.3	.6	.8	3.0	1.0
Other	.9	.1	.6	.9	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	.8	.7	.9	1.3	1.0	.8
Widowed	10.6	–	.1	.1	.3	.7	1.2	1.5	4.7	13.9	34.2	59.9	73.7	11.2	46.9
Divorced	9.7	.2	.6	2.5	6.8	10.7	14.1	15.1	16.6	12.6	7.7	4.1	2.9	10.2	6.0
White															
Both sexes	168 791	8 531	5 559	14 941	15 967	18 336	18 191	16 408	25 230	18 048	16 082	8 920	2 579	160 261	27 580
Never married	41 939	8 430	5 205	10 646	6 238	3 917	2 435	1 572	1 536	760	652	355	193	33 509	1 200
Married, spouse present	96 436	58	269	3 672	8 186	11 937	12 773	11 790	18 790	13 388	10 545	4 286	741	96 377	15 572
Married, spouse absent	4 555	29	56	333	547	710	622	640	743	421	262	142	49	4 526	453
Separated	3 107	21	32	233	397	533	459	469	505	270	133	43	11	3 086	187
Other	1 449	8	23	100	150	177	163	172	238	152	129	99	38	1 441	266
Widowed	11 302	–	3	10	38	71	122	126	623	1 431	3 554	3 791	1 531	11 301	8 877
Divorced	14 559	13	26	280	957	1 700	2 240	2 280	3 538	2 047	1 068	345	65	14 547	1 479
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	24.8	98.8	93.6	71.3	39.1	21.4	13.4	9.6	6.1	4.2	4.1	4.0	7.5	20.9	4.4
Married, spouse present	57.1	.7	4.8	24.6	51.3	65.1	70.2	71.9	74.5	74.2	65.6	48.1	28.7	60.1	56.5
Married, spouse absent	2.7	.3	1.0	2.2	3.4	3.9	3.4	3.9	2.9	2.3	1.6	1.6	1.9	2.8	1.6
Separated	1.8	.2	.6	1.6	2.5	2.9	2.5	2.9	2.0	1.5	.8	.5	.4	1.9	.7
Other	.9	.1	.4	.7	.9	1.0	.9	1.0	.9	.8	.8	1.1	1.5	.9	1.0
Widowed	6.7	–	.1	.1	.2	.4	.7	.8	2.5	7.9	22.1	42.5	59.4	7.1	32.2
Divorced	8.6	.1	.5	1.9	6.0	9.3	12.3	13.9	14.0	11.3	6.6	3.9	2.5	9.1	5.4
Male	82 026	4 387	2 816	7 525	8 047	9 204	9 152	8 203	12 474	8 748	7 116	3 513	840	77 639	11 469
Never married	23 704	4 358	2 737	5 977	3 823	2 442	1 538	970	912	423	339	135	50	19 346	525
Married, spouse present	48 260	18	61	1 366	3 647	5 712	6 301	5 801	9 653	6 962	5 630	2 612	499	48 242	8 740
Married, spouse absent	1 966	8	12	102	206	308	287	308	327	210	124	57	16	1 958	197
Separated	1 214	6	7	57	138	207	201	213	199	123	52	10	2	1 208	64
Other	752	2	5	45	68	101	86	95	129	87	73	46	15	750	134
Widowed	1 878	–	2	2	9	6	23	24	101	253	607	590	260	1 878	1 458
Divorced	6 218	4	5	79	362	737	1 003	1 100	1 481	899	415	120	15	6 215	550
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	28.9	99.3	97.2	79.4	47.5	26.5	16.8	11.8	7.3	4.8	4.8	3.8	6.0	24.9	4.6
Married, spouse present	58.8	.4	2.2	18.2	45.3	62.1	68.8	70.7	77.4	79.6	79.1	74.3	59.3	62.1	76.2
Married, spouse absent	2.4	.2	.4	1.4	2.6	3.3	3.1	3.8	2.6	2.4	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.5	1.7
Separated	1.5	.1	.2	.8	1.7	2.3	2.2	2.6	1.6	1.4	.7	.3	.2	1.6	.6
Other	.9	.1	.2	.6	.8	1.1	.9	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.7	1.0	1.2
Widowed	2.3	–	.1	–	.1	.1	.3	.3	.8	2.9	8.5	16.8	31.0	2.4	12.7
Divorced	7.6	.1	.2	1.0	4.5	8.0	11.0	13.4	11.9	10.3	5.8	3.4	1.7	8.0	4.8

See footnotes at end of table.

Table 1. **Marital Status of Persons 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin, Metropolitan Residence, and Region: March 1994**—Con.

[Numbers in thousands. For meaning of symbols, see text]

Subject	Total, 15 years and over	15 to 17 years	18 and 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 29 years	30 to 34 years	35 to 39 years	40 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 to 74 years	75 to 84 years	85 years and over	Total, 18 years and over	Total, 65 years and over
NORTHEAST															
All Races															
Both sexes	40 554	1 902	1 358	3 497	3 902	4 376	4 260	3 955	6 170	4 350	3 902	2 286	596	38 652	6 783
Never married	12 119	1 884	1 318	2 919	1 921	1 319	816	560	567	322	295	134	65	10 235	493
Married, spouse present	21 105	8	27	504	1 701	2 543	2 812	2 676	4 268	3 040	2 353	1 029	144	21 097	3 526
Married, spouse absent	1 526	8	8	54	170	225	241	213	312	165	77	37	14	1 518	129
Separated	1 055	7	6	35	116	160	177	158	214	115	41	23	3	1 049	67
Other	471	2	2	19	54	66	64	54	98	50	36	15	12	469	62
Widowed	3 033	–	2	2	7	17	24	34	208	377	970	1 026	367	3 033	2 363
Divorced	2 770	2	3	17	104	272	367	473	814	446	207	59	6	2 768	272
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	29.9	99.1	97.1	83.5	49.2	30.1	19.1	14.2	9.2	7.4	7.6	5.9	10.8	26.5	7.3
Married, spouse present	52.0	.4	2.0	14.4	43.6	58.1	66.0	67.7	69.2	69.9	60.3	45.0	24.2	54.6	52.0
Married, spouse absent	3.8	.4	.6	1.5	4.4	5.2	5.7	5.4	5.1	3.8	2.0	1.6	2.4	3.9	1.9
Separated	2.6	.3	.5	1.0	3.0	3.7	4.2	4.0	3.5	2.6	1.1	1.0	.5	2.7	1.0
Other	1.2	.1	.2	.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.2	.9	.6	2.0	1.2	.9
Widowed	7.5	–	.1	.1	.2	.4	.6	.9	3.4	8.7	24.9	44.9	61.6	7.8	34.8
Divorced	6.8	.1	.2	.5	2.7	6.2	8.6	12.0	13.2	10.3	5.3	2.6	1.1	7.2	4.0
Male	19 291	963	737	1 718	1 906	2 116	2 076	1 948	2 992	2 112	1 669	860	192	18 328	2 721
Never married	6 517	955	727	1 527	1 096	734	482	309	316	192	135	30	15	5 562	180
Married, spouse present	10 552	3	5	175	729	1 209	1 347	1 325	2 208	1 586	1 247	620	98	10 549	1 965
Married, spouse absent	544	3	3	11	39	68	92	79	131	69	30	11	7	541	49
Separated	313	3	2	7	23	38	67	48	69	43	10	4	–	310	14
Other	231	–	1	5	16	30	25	31	62	26	20	7	7	231	35
Widowed	559	–	2	–	1	3	4	10	29	76	188	175	70	559	433
Divorced	1 118	2	–	5	41	102	151	225	309	189	68	24	2	1 116	94
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	33.8	99.1	98.7	88.8	57.5	34.7	23.2	15.9	10.5	9.1	8.1	3.5	7.6	30.4	6.6
Married, spouse present	54.7	.3	.7	10.2	38.3	57.1	64.9	68.0	73.8	75.1	74.7	72.0	51.0	57.6	72.2
Married, spouse absent	2.8	.3	.4	.7	2.1	3.2	4.4	4.1	4.4	3.3	1.8	1.3	3.9	3.0	1.8
Separated	1.6	.3	.2	.4	1.2	1.8	3.2	2.5	2.3	2.0	.6	.5	–	1.7	.5
Other	1.2	–	.2	.3	.8	1.4	1.2	1.6	2.1	1.2	1.2	.8	3.9	1.3	1.3
Widowed	2.9	–	.3	–	.1	.1	.2	.5	1.0	3.6	11.3	20.3	36.7	3.0	15.9
Divorced	5.8	.2	–	.3	2.1	4.8	7.3	11.5	10.3	8.9	4.1	2.8	.9	6.1	3.4
Female	21 263	938	621	1 778	1 996	2 260	2 184	2 007	3 178	2 238	2 232	1 425	405	20 324	4 062
Never married	5 602	929	591	1 393	825	584	334	251	252	130	159	104	50	4 673	313
Married, spouse present	10 552	5	22	329	971	1 334	1 465	1 351	2 061	1 454	1 105	409	46	10 548	1 561
Married, spouse absent	982	5	5	43	131	157	149	134	181	96	47	26	7	977	80
Separated	742	3	5	28	93	122	110	110	146	72	32	19	3	739	53
Other	240	2	1	14	38	35	39	24	36	24	15	8	4	238	27
Widowed	2 475	–	–	2	5	14	21	24	179	300	781	851	297	2 475	1 929
Divorced	1 652	–	3	12	63	170	215	248	505	257	139	35	5	1 652	178
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	26.3	99.0	95.2	78.3	41.3	25.9	15.3	12.5	7.9	5.8	7.1	7.3	12.4	23.0	7.7
Married, spouse present	49.6	.5	3.5	18.5	48.7	59.0	67.1	67.3	64.8	65.0	49.5	28.7	11.5	51.9	38.4
Married, spouse absent	4.6	.5	.9	2.4	6.6	7.0	6.8	6.7	5.7	4.3	2.1	1.8	1.7	4.8	2.0
Separated	3.5	.4	.7	1.6	4.7	5.4	5.0	5.5	4.6	3.2	1.4	1.3	.7	3.6	1.3
Other	1.1	.2	.1	.8	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.2	1.1	1.1	.7	.5	1.0	1.2	.7
Widowed	11.6	–	–	.1	.3	.6	.9	1.2	5.6	13.4	35.0	59.7	73.3	12.2	47.5
Divorced	7.8	–	.5	.7	3.2	7.5	9.9	12.4	15.9	11.5	6.2	2.4	1.1	8.1	4.4
MIDWEST															
All Races															
Both sexes	47 064	2 602	1 612	4 423	4 608	5 206	5 186	4 520	6 858	4 934	4 072	2 327	716	44 462	7 115
Never married	12 937	2 580	1 548	3 318	1 991	1 247	805	505	431	208	144	99	61	10 357	303
Married, spouse present	25 570	13	45	955	2 157	3 188	3 455	3 182	5 108	3 666	2 580	1 013	207	25 557	3 800
Married, spouse absent	1 075	5	6	70	130	180	173	145	141	128	53	36	7	1 070	96
Separated	745	4	4	39	88	132	146	107	112	78	27	6	2	741	36
Other	330	1	2	32	42	48	27	38	30	50	26	30	5	329	60
Widowed	3 242	–	2	5	16	28	31	44	170	436	1 004	1 079	428	3 242	2 511
Divorced	4 239	4	10	74	314	563	722	645	1 008	495	291	100	13	4 235	404
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	27.5	99.1	96.0	75.0	43.2	24.0	15.5	11.2	6.3	4.2	3.5	4.2	8.5	23.3	4.3
Married, spouse present	54.3	.5	2.8	21.6	46.8	61.2	66.6	70.4	74.5	74.3	63.4	43.6	28.9	57.5	53.4
Married, spouse absent	2.3	.2	.4	1.6	2.8	3.5	3.3	3.2	2.1	2.6	1.3	1.6	1.0	2.4	1.4
Separated	1.6	.1	.3	.9	1.9	2.5	2.8	2.4	1.6	1.6	.7	.3	.3	1.7	.5
Other	.7	–	.1	.7	.9	.9	.5	.8	.4	1.0	.6	1.3	.6	.7	.8
Widowed	6.9	–	.1	.1	.4	.5	.6	1.0	2.5	8.8	24.7	46.4	59.8	7.3	35.3
Divorced	9.0	.2	.6	1.7	6.8	10.8	13.9	14.3	14.7	10.0	7.1	4.3	1.8	9.5	5.7
Male	22 549	1 334	779	2 137	2 312	2 580	2 610	2 222	3 312	2 347	1 796	884	237	21 215	2 917
Never married	6 998	1 329	767	1 738	1 159	753	486	290	235	100	84	44	15	5 670	143
Married, spouse present	12 785	3	12	354	965	1 505	1 732	1 581	2 572	1 916	1 398	616	130	12 782	2 144
Married, spouse absent	477	2	–	23	56	86	76	62	64	62	28	17	3	476	48
Separated	317	2	–	14	35	55	66	43	44	36	18	4	–	315	22
Other	160	–	–	9	21	31	10	19	20	25	11	13	3	160	26
Widowed	511	–	–	5	5	–	2	2	20	66	164	161	86	511	411
Divorced	1 777	–	–	17	127	236	315	287	421	203	121	46	4	1 777	171
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	31.0	99.6	98.5	81.3	50.1	29.2	18.6	13.1	7.1	4.2	4.7	5.0	6.2	26.7	4.9
Married, spouse present	56.7	.3	1.5	16.6	41.8	58.3	66.4	71.1	77.7	81.7	77.8	69.7	54.7	60.2	73.5
Married, spouse absent	2.1	.1	–	1.1	2.4	3.3	2.9	2.8	1.9	2.6	1.6	1.9	1.2	2.2	1.7
Separated	1.4	.1	–	.6	1.5	2.1	2.5	1.9	1.3	1.6	1.0	.5	–	1.5	.8
Other	.7	–	–	.4	.9	1.2	.4	.8	.6	1.1	.6	1.4	1.2	.8	.9
Widowed	2.3	–	–	.2	.2	–	.1	.1	.6	2.8	9.1	18.2	36.5	2.4	14.1
Divorced	7.9	–	–	.8	5.5	9.1	12.1	12.9	12.7	8.6	6.8	5.2	1.5	8.4	5.9

See footnotes at end of table.

Table 1. Marital Status of Persons 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin, Metropolitan Residence, and Region: March 1994—Con.

[Numbers in thousands. For meaning of symbols, see text]

Subject	Total, 15 years and over	15 to 17 years	18 and 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 29 years	30 to 34 years	35 to 39 years	40 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 to 74 years	75 to 84 years	85 years and over	Total, 18 years and over	Total, 65 years and over
MIDWEST—Con.															
All Races—Con.															
Female	24 515	1 268	834	2 286	2 296	2 626	2 576	2 298	3 546	2 587	2 277	1 442	479	23 247	4 198
Never married	5 939	1 251	782	1 581	832	494	320	215	195	109	60	55	46	4 687	161
Married, spouse present	12 785	9	33	602	1 192	1 683	1 722	1 601	2 538	1 750	1 182	397	77	12 776	1 657
Married, spouse absent	598	3	6	47	74	94	97	83	78	67	25	19	4	594	48
Separated	428	2	4	25	52	77	80	64	68	42	9	2	2	426	14
Other	170	1	2	22	22	17	17	19	10	25	15	17	2	169	34
Widowed	2 731	–	2	–	11	28	29	42	150	370	841	917	341	2 731	2 100
Divorced	2 462	4	10	57	187	327	407	358	587	292	169	54	10	2 458	233
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	24.2	98.7	93.8	69.1	36.2	18.8	12.4	9.3	5.5	4.2	2.6	3.8	9.6	20.2	3.8
Married, spouse present	52.2	.7	4.0	26.3	51.9	64.1	66.9	69.7	71.5	67.6	51.9	27.5	16.1	55.0	39.5
Married, spouse absent	2.4	.2	.8	2.1	3.2	3.6	3.8	3.6	2.2	2.6	1.1	1.3	.9	2.6	1.2
Separated	1.7	.1	.5	1.1	2.3	2.9	3.1	2.8	1.9	1.6	.4	.1	.5	1.8	.3
Other	.7	.1	.3	1.0	.9	.6	.7	.8	.3	1.0	.7	1.2	.4	.7	.8
Widowed	11.1	–	.3	–	.5	1.0	1.1	1.8	4.2	14.3	36.9	63.6	71.3	11.7	50.0
Divorced	10.0	.3	1.2	2.5	8.2	12.5	15.8	15.6	16.6	11.3	7.4	3.7	2.0	10.6	5.5
SOUTH															
All Races															
Both sexes	69 919	3 961	2 503	6 429	6 790	7 689	7 548	6 728	10 323	7 216	6 453	3 330	947	65 958	10 731
Never married	18 122	3 910	2 339	4 368	2 676	1 745	1 067	671	692	292	214	95	53	14 213	362
Married, spouse present	38 268	31	128	1 715	3 381	4 684	4 994	4 710	7 421	5 107	4 167	1 680	250	38 237	6 098
Married, spouse absent	2 613	19	28	180	265	430	408	367	439	252	149	51	24	2 593	224
Separated	1 925	14	18	116	215	328	318	288	322	193	94	11	9	1 911	114
Other	688	6	10	65	50	103	90	79	117	59	55	40	15	682	110
Widowed	4 617	–	1	6	7	34	79	66	286	708	1 453	1 382	595	4 617	3 430
Divorced	6 298	1	7	160	460	795	1 001	914	1 485	858	470	122	25	6 297	617
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	25.9	98.7	93.4	67.9	39.4	22.7	14.1	10.0	6.7	4.1	3.3	2.9	5.6	21.5	3.4
Married, spouse present	54.7	.8	5.1	26.7	49.8	60.9	66.2	70.0	71.9	70.8	64.6	50.5	26.4	58.0	56.8
Married, spouse absent	3.7	.5	1.1	2.8	3.9	5.6	5.4	5.5	4.3	3.5	2.3	1.5	2.6	3.9	2.1
Separated	2.8	.3	.7	1.8	3.2	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.1	2.7	1.4	.3	1.0	2.9	1.1
Other	1.0	.1	.4	1.0	.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	.8	.9	1.2	1.6	1.0	1.0
Widowed	6.6	–	–	.1	.1	.4	1.0	1.0	2.8	9.8	22.5	41.5	62.8	7.0	32.0
Divorced	9.0	–	.3	2.5	6.8	10.3	13.3	13.6	14.4	11.9	7.3	3.7	2.7	9.5	5.8
Male	33 522	2 027	1 245	3 230	3 329	3 858	3 665	3 251	5 102	3 367	2 811	1 356	284	31 496	4 450
Never married	9 993	2 007	1 200	2 489	1 549	1 052	610	380	396	154	100	37	18	7 986	155
Married, spouse present	19 134	14	31	639	1 516	2 280	2 432	2 280	3 860	2 628	2 241	1 035	178	19 120	3 455
Married, spouse absent	1 106	6	9	56	94	197	195	178	156	112	76	24	4	1 101	104
Separated	742	3	5	31	73	136	148	125	101	74	41	6	–	739	46
Other	365	3	4	25	21	61	47	54	56	38	35	18	4	362	57
Widowed	721	–	–	1	2	2	22	12	62	109	206	224	82	721	512
Divorced	2 567	–	4	45	168	328	406	401	627	364	187	37	2	2 567	225
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	29.8	99.0	96.4	77.1	46.5	27.3	16.6	11.7	7.8	4.6	3.6	2.7	6.3	25.4	3.5
Married, spouse present	57.1	.7	2.5	19.8	45.5	59.1	66.4	70.1	75.7	78.1	79.7	76.3	62.8	60.7	77.6
Married, spouse absent	3.3	.3	.7	1.7	2.8	5.1	5.3	5.5	3.1	3.3	2.7	1.8	1.4	3.5	2.3
Separated	2.2	.1	.4	1.0	2.2	3.5	4.0	3.8	2.0	2.2	1.4	.4	–	2.3	1.0
Other	1.1	.1	.3	.8	.6	1.6	1.3	1.6	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.3
Widowed	2.2	–	–	–	.1	–	.6	.4	1.2	3.2	7.3	16.5	28.8	2.3	11.5
Divorced	7.7	–	.3	1.4	5.0	8.5	11.1	12.3	12.3	10.8	6.6	2.7	.7	8.2	5.1
Female	36 397	1 935	1 258	3 200	3 461	3 832	3 883	3 477	5 222	3 850	3 642	1 974	664	34 462	6 280
Never married	8 129	1 902	1 139	1 879	1 127	693	457	290	296	138	114	59	35	6 227	207
Married, spouse present	19 134	18	96	1 075	1 865	2 405	2 562	2 431	3 561	2 479	1 926	645	72	19 117	2 643
Married, spouse absent	1 507	14	19	124	171	234	213	189	283	140	73	27	20	1 493	120
Separated	1 183	11	14	85	142	192	170	163	221	119	53	6	9	1 173	68
Other	323	3	6	39	29	42	43	26	62	21	20	21	11	320	53
Widowed	3 896	–	1	5	5	32	57	54	224	599	1 246	1 158	513	3 896	2 918
Divorced	3 731	1	3	115	292	468	595	513	858	494	283	85	23	3 730	392
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	22.3	98.3	90.5	58.7	32.6	18.1	11.8	8.4	5.7	3.6	3.1	3.0	5.3	18.1	3.3
Married, spouse present	52.6	.9	7.6	33.6	53.9	62.8	66.0	69.9	68.2	64.4	52.9	32.7	10.8	55.5	42.1
Married, spouse absent	4.1	.7	1.5	3.9	4.9	6.1	5.5	5.4	5.4	3.6	2.0	1.4	3.1	4.3	1.9
Separated	3.3	.5	1.1	2.6	4.1	5.0	4.4	4.7	4.2	3.1	1.5	.3	1.4	3.4	1.1
Other	.9	.2	.4	1.2	.8	1.1	1.1	.7	1.2	.5	.6	1.1	1.7	.9	.8
Widowed	10.7	–	.1	.2	.2	.8	1.5	1.6	4.3	15.6	34.2	58.7	77.3	11.3	46.5
Divorced	10.3	.1	.2	3.6	8.4	12.2	15.3	14.7	16.4	12.8	7.8	4.3	3.5	10.8	6.2

See footnotes at end of table.

Table 1. Marital Status of Persons 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin, Metropolitan Residence, and Region: March 1994—Con.

[Numbers in thousands. For meaning of symbols, see text]

Subject	Total, 15 years and over	15 to 17 years	18 and 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 29 years	30 to 34 years	35 to 39 years	40 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 to 74 years	75 to 84 years	85 years and over	Total, 18 years and over	Total, 65 years and over
WEST															
All Races															
Both sexes	43 263	2 348	1 442	4 210	4 325	5 049	4 977	4 354	6 170	4 237	3 660	1 915	576	40 915	6 151
Never married	11 694	2 315	1 322	3 025	1 799	1 214	827	429	387	157	122	58	40	9 379	220
Married, spouse present	23 580	24	92	994	2 121	3 164	3 266	2 926	4 399	3 062	2 398	948	184	23 556	3 530
Married, spouse absent	1 516	4	23	116	185	227	214	244	250	113	96	36	9	1 513	141
Separated	1 030	2	10	97	121	181	145	177	162	60	57	15	2	1 028	75
Other	486	2	13	19	64	45	69	66	88	53	38	21	8	485	67
Widowed	2 402	–	–	4	8	7	33	33	177	307	744	772	318	2 402	1 834
Divorced	4 071	6	6	71	213	436	638	722	957	598	300	101	25	4 066	425
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	27.0	98.6	91.7	71.8	41.6	24.1	16.6	9.8	6.3	3.7	3.3	3.0	6.9	22.9	3.6
Married, spouse present	54.5	1.0	6.4	23.6	49.0	62.7	65.6	67.2	71.3	72.3	65.5	49.5	31.9	57.6	57.4
Married, spouse absent	3.5	.2	1.6	2.8	4.3	4.5	4.3	5.6	4.1	2.7	2.6	1.9	1.6	3.7	2.3
Separated	2.4	.1	.7	2.3	2.8	3.6	2.9	4.1	2.6	1.4	1.6	.8	.3	2.5	1.2
Other	1.1	.1	.9	.4	1.5	.9	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.1
Widowed	5.6	–	–	.1	.2	.1	.7	.8	2.9	7.2	20.3	40.3	55.2	5.9	29.8
Divorced	9.4	.2	.4	1.7	4.9	8.6	12.8	16.6	15.5	14.1	8.2	5.3	4.3	9.9	6.9
Male	21 406	1 222	702	2 136	2 217	2 554	2 541	2 230	3 048	2 107	1 648	787	212	20 184	2 648
Never married	6 719	1 210	682	1 716	1 107	759	516	275	238	93	70	35	18	5 509	122
Married, spouse present	11 790	8	15	378	941	1 497	1 628	1 459	2 261	1 603	1 288	588	125	11 782	2 000
Married, spouse absent	679	1	4	21	81	98	101	140	112	59	44	15	2	677	61
Separated	408	–	3	15	40	72	58	103	65	25	22	3	2	408	28
Other	270	1	1	6	41	27	43	38	46	34	22	11	–	269	33
Widowed	431	–	–	–	–	1	4	7	26	75	137	121	60	431	318
Divorced	1 787	3	1	21	89	199	292	348	412	277	110	28	7	1 785	146
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	31.4	99.1	97.2	80.3	49.9	29.7	20.3	12.3	7.8	4.4	4.2	4.5	8.3	27.3	4.6
Married, spouse present	55.1	.7	2.1	17.7	42.4	58.6	64.1	65.4	74.2	76.1	78.1	74.7	58.9	58.4	75.5
Married, spouse absent	3.2	.1	.6	1.0	3.7	3.8	4.0	6.3	3.7	2.8	2.7	1.9	1.1	3.4	2.3
Separated	1.9	–	.4	.7	1.8	2.8	2.3	4.6	2.1	1.2	1.4	.4	.9	2.0	1.0
Other	1.3	.1	.2	.3	1.9	1.0	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.4	.2	1.3	1.3
Widowed	2.0	–	–	–	–	–	.2	.3	.8	3.6	8.3	15.4	28.3	2.1	12.0
Divorced	8.3	.2	.1	1.0	4.0	7.8	11.5	15.6	13.5	13.1	6.7	3.6	3.5	8.8	5.5
Female	21 858	1 126	741	2 074	2 108	2 495	2 435	2 124	3 121	2 130	2 012	1 127	364	20 731	3 503
Never married	4 975	1 105	640	1 309	692	455	310	153	149	63	53	23	22	3 871	98
Married, spouse present	11 790	16	77	616	1 181	1 667	1 638	1 468	2 139	1 459	1 111	360	59	11 774	1 530
Married, spouse absent	838	2	19	95	104	129	113	103	139	55	51	22	7	835	80
Separated	622	2	7	82	81	110	87	74	97	35	35	12	–	620	47
Other	216	1	12	13	23	19	26	29	42	19	16	10	7	215	33
Widowed	1 971	–	–	4	7	7	28	26	151	232	607	651	258	1 971	1 516
Divorced	2 284	3	5	50	124	238	346	374	544	321	190	73	17	2 281	279
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never married	22.8	98.1	86.4	63.1	32.8	18.3	12.7	7.2	4.8	3.0	2.6	2.0	6.1	18.7	2.8
Married, spouse present	53.9	1.4	10.4	29.7	56.0	66.8	67.2	69.1	68.5	68.5	55.2	31.9	16.3	56.8	43.7
Married, spouse absent	3.8	.2	2.5	4.6	4.9	5.2	4.6	4.9	4.4	2.6	2.6	1.9	2.0	4.0	2.3
Separated	2.8	.2	.9	3.9	3.8	4.4	3.6	3.5	3.1	1.6	1.7	1.1	–	3.0	1.3
Other	1.0	.1	1.6	.6	1.1	.8	1.1	1.4	1.3	.9	.8	.9	2.0	1.0	.9
Widowed	9.0	–	–	.2	.3	.3	1.2	1.2	4.8	10.9	30.2	57.7	70.9	9.5	43.3
Divorced	10.4	.3	.7	2.4	5.9	9.5	14.2	17.6	17.4	15.1	9.4	6.4	4.8	11.0	8.0

[1]May be of any race.

Family Report

PRELIMINARY DRAFT -- NOT FOR CITATION

Families and the Changing Labor Market

Executive Summary

American families have been in the midst of change in the last three decades -- changes in time worked for pay; changes in income and who it is earned by; changes in family size; and changes in how child care and household tasks are accomplished. This report assesses these changes and the challenges and opportunities they create.

- The hours American parents work in paid jobs have increased enormously since 1969, due to a dramatic shift of mothers' time from the household to the labor market. Both married mothers and single parents are working more for pay today than 30 years ago.

- Average family income has increased as a result of the increase in paid work hours, so that families can purchase more goods and services than in the past. The average American family is clearly better off economically today than in 1969.

- These gains have not been universal, however. Families with less-educated parents had lower inflation-adjusted incomes in 1996 than their counterparts had in 1969, although their situation has been improving in the strong economic expansion of the 1990s.

- Progress would have been even more striking if the share of families with a single parent had not also grown dramatically since 1969. The typical single parent has less than half as much potential income and only half as much total time as two parents have. The rising number of single parents has increased the proportion of families who are "cash-strapped" and "time-poor."

- At the same time, families are having fewer children. Fewer children take less time and also cost less. As a result, *per-person* family income has risen faster than overall family income and parental non-work time available *per child* has increased even though total time spent in child care has declined somewhat.

- The increase in work among women appears to have produced some reduction in the time parents spend with their children, although the evidence on time use within families is limited. Most of the extra time spent earning income has come at the expense of housework, not child care or leisure activities.

- Increased time in market work among parents raises a key set of policy questions, including the need for flexibility in paid work hours; the need for available and affordable child care; effective ways to support the earnings of families with low-wage earning parents; and the need to encourage two-parent families to form and stay together. In all of these areas, the Clinton Administration has actively worked to improve the situation of American families.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT -- NOT FOR CITATION

Families and the Changing Labor Market

I. Introduction

Dramatic changes have occurred over the last thirty years in how families combine work and family life. During the last three decades women have devoted more and more time to market work. Combined with hourly earnings increases among women, this means women's earnings have gone up substantially, while their time available for work in the home has declined. In contrast, men's average hours of paid work and earnings have remained relatively stable. As a result, families have higher incomes, but they have less time for other activities. In short, American families have been in the midst of change -- changes in time worked for pay; changes in income and who it is earned by; changes in family size; and changes in how child care and household tasks are accomplished. This report assesses these changes since 1969 for families with children under age 18.

1. Single Parent Families as Share of All Families



2. Average Number of Children per Family



Two other trends in family life are also likely to affect the well-being of families with children, occurring along with changes in their income and time allocations. First, the share of families with children that are headed by a single parent has increased significantly (see figure 1). Since single parents typically have both lower incomes *and* less total adult time available for work in the home than married-couple families, this trend tends to increase the proportion of families who are "cash-strapped" and "time poor." Second, families have also decreased in size as the average number of children in families with children has declined (see figure 2). This should ease some of the time pressures on parents.

This paper will examine how families with children are faring in the face of all these changes. Key questions to be addressed include:

- How much have hours of market work increased for families?
- How have the extra hours worked by families affected family incomes? How have these trends differentially affected families that differ in skill level, minority status, and number of parents in the household?

- What have these changes in market work and income meant for how families use their time in the home? In particular, how have these changes affected parental time available for children?

Some have argued that Americans are facing more and more of a "time bind" as they work longer and longer hours in order to attain an increasing standard of living.[1] Others have argued that, even with increases in hours of paid work, families are not realizing significant income gains, or that families are working harder and harder "just to stay in the same place."[2] No such "one size fits all" characterization adequately captures the variety of experience in different segments of the population. Different types of families have experienced different changes in paid work time and income.

Overall, we find that parents today are spending more time working to earn income. Time available for children has declined, but parents have protected child-rearing time by spending less time on household chores. The decline in parents' time at home is also mitigated by the decrease in family size. For most groups, family income has increased. ~~With~~ fewer children, parents are able to buy more goods and services for themselves and their children. The average American child -- particularly if he or she is living in a family headed by a married couple -- is better off today than in 1969 by many measures. ?

There are some groups for whom the picture is not as rosy, however. The continuing increase in the share of children living in single-parent families has substantially diminished the progress that families with children would otherwise have made, limiting both their income and their time. Less educated parents, who have not experienced the wage gains of other families, are working more hours without an increase in income. It is encouraging to note, however, that most of these families have experienced income gains in recent years during the strong economic expansion of the 1990s, making it easier for them to effectively combine work and family life.

Underlying and reinforcing the trends toward more paid work time and smaller families has been the long-term growth of women's wages. Rising wages pull women into the labor market by making it more expensive for them to stay at home, in terms of foregone income. Higher wages also make children more expensive because the time devoted to bearing and rearing children is now more valuable in the labor market. Rising wage levels for women in the labor market, combined with other changes in attitudes toward market work among women, make it unlikely that families will ever return to the way they were in 1969. With both mothers and fathers in the labor market, we have no realistic alternative but to help parents balance paid work and family life as effectively as possible. Who

[1] Hochschild (1998); Schor (1991).

[2] Bluestone and Rose (1997).

II. Trends in Hours of Market Work

The most dramatic change in the time allocation of families has been in time spent at work for pay. Since 1969, both married-couple and single-parent families have substantially increased their annual hours of paid work. These increases have come almost entirely from the women in these families, who are working more outside the home -- more weeks in the year and more hours in the week -- than they did thirty years ago. However, while the increase in paid work time has been widespread, the size of the increase has varied considerably across families, depending on the number of parents, their education, whether they have a preschool-age child, and their race or ethnicity.

The estimates of annual hours of work presented in this section are based on the March Current Population Survey (CPS), a large representative survey of over 50,000 households each year.[3] While the CPS is the only large-scale representative sample which consistently measures hours of work and family incomes on an annual basis and is therefore the standard data set used for labor market analyses, some have argued that the CPS may be inaccurate because individuals may not be able to recall accurately their usual hours of work during the last year.[4] In section IV of this report we discuss alternative estimates of paid work time based upon "time diaries," which require individuals to maintain detailed accounts of how they spent their time during a day.

For purposes of this analysis, we use the same definition of a "family" as the Census Bureau: all related individuals living together in the same household. We restrict the analysis to families whose head is at least eighteen years old and where there is a child under age 18. A mother (or couple) and her (their) children living in a household headed by another family member are part of the head's family, and an unmarried parent co-habiting with a domestic partner is classified as a single parent. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, the terms "wives" and "married women" refer only to those with children.

[3] We are using the March 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1997 CPS data sets. The data collected each March refer to the previous calendar year. Thus we refer to data for 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1996. We chose those years because they represent peak years (or upswing, in 1996) in the business cycle and thus permit valid historical comparisons. For 1979, 1989, and 1996, information on annual hours of work was derived from two questions which ask how many weeks each individual worked in the previous year and how many hours they "usually worked" in the weeks they worked. Multiplying weeks worked by usual hours worked per week provides a measure of annual hours of work. The 1969 data are not strictly comparable to later years due to differences in data reporting . We have developed an imputation procedure to make these data more comparable to information in later years.

[4] Juster and Stafford (1991); Robinson and Godbey, chapter 4 (1997).

3. Annual Hours of Work, Married-Couple Families



4. Annual Hours of Work by Single Parents



As shown in figures 3 and 4, annual hours of paid work have increased substantially for both married-couple and single-parent families. (All families with children under 18 are included in figures 3 through 6, including parents with zero hours of paid work.) A person who works forty hours a week for 50 weeks a year (a traditional "full-time" job) will work 2,000 hours in a year. For two-parent families (figure 3) annual hours of paid work increased by 496 hours (18 percent) from 1969 to 1996; for single-parent households (figure 4) they increased by 297 hours (28 percent).

Virtually all of the increase in families' market hours of work has come from increases in women's hours. Conceptually, the increase in women's hours can be divided into three components: more women are employed, employed women are working more hours per week, and employed women are working more weeks per year.

The most dramatic change has been in the percentage of women employed. In 1969, 38 percent of married women with children worked for pay, while in 1996, 68 percent did so -- a 79 percent increase in employment. The increase in employment for single parents has been less dramatic: 53 percent worked for pay in 1969 and 66 percent in 1996.

Average annual hours worked *by those who worked for pay* also increased over time, showing that not all of the increase in hours came simply from more women entering the labor force. This increase was much greater for wives (who experienced a 24 percent increase) than for single parents (who experienced an 8 percent increase). This is not surprising since on average, single parents in 1969 worked more hours per year for pay than wives did in 1996. Both hours worked per week and weeks worked per year increased for wives and single parents, among those who worked for pay. Each of these components of annual hours, like the total, increased more for wives than for single parents. Increases in hours worked per week were more dramatic than increases in weeks worked per year.

While annual hours of paid work by all wives increased greatly -- by 576 hours, or 93 percent -- husbands' hours of paid work decreased slightly from 1969 to 1996. This is the result of husbands working fewer weeks per year, without significantly changing their usual number of hours worked per week. These trends are consistent with estimates reported elsewhere in the literature, based on a variety of data sources.[5]

The increase in family hours of paid work has been widespread throughout the population. All types of families -- whether defined by the head's education level, spouse's education level, presence of young children, or race or ethnicity of the household head -- have experienced substantial increases in hours of paid work from 1969 to 1996. In virtually every case, the increase in family hours of paid work reflects increases by wives and by single parents, rather than by husbands.

While the basic trends have been similar, however, the magnitude of the increase in hours of paid work has differed substantially across different demographic groups. In part, this is because some groups, such as women with preschool-age children, had lower hours to start with, and therefore more room for expansion, than others.

5. Change in Annual Hours Worked, 1969-96
by education level of head of household



- *Families whose head had gone to college have increased their hours of paid work much more than those whose head had less education* (see figure 5). For married couples with a college-educated husband, annual hours of paid work increased by 644 hours (23 percent) -- more than twice the increase for couples in which the husband had a high school diploma or less. The difference was due to the wives' hours increasing more and the husbands' hours decreasing less in the college-educated families. For single parents with a college degree, hours of paid work increased by 322 hours (20 percent), compared to 165 hours (16 percent) for single parents with a high school diploma or less.

6. Change in Annual Hours Worked, 1969-96
by presence of child under age 5



- *Families with a young child increased their hours of paid work more than those with only school-age children* (see figure 6). For single parents with a child under age five,

[5] Rones, Ilg and Gardner (1997) and Leete and Schor (1994) used CPS data, Bluestone and Rose (1997) used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and McGrattan and Rogerson (1998) used decennial Census data. All of these studies show increases in hours of work for women (or wives and single parents), and decreasing or stable hours of work for men (or husbands) when nonemployment is taken into account.

hours of paid work increased by 400 hours (50 percent), compared to 246 hours (21 percent) for single parents without a young child. For married couples, hours of paid work increased by 537 hours (20 percent) for families with a child under age five, compared to 457 hours (15 percent) for families without a young child.

- *Married couples with a white or black husband increased their hours of paid work nearly twice as much as married couples with a Hispanic husband.* By contrast, single Hispanic parents increased their hours slightly more than either white or black single parents.[6]

Why have parents changed their hours of paid work? Trends in wages and trends in paid work hours influence each other. Rising wages tend to draw more individuals into the labor force, while falling wages (especially relative to the rewards from other activities) tend to reduce participation. In turn, more work experience leads to faster wage growth, and vice versa. As a result, wages and paid work time tend to move up (or down) together, in a virtuous (or vicious) cycle.

Trends in hours of paid work for both men and women have roughly paralleled the trends in their wages since 1969, discussed below (in section III-A).[7] However, the magnitudes of the changes in paid work time are still not completely understood, as they are not easily "explained" by changes in key economic variables.[8] The increases in paid work among women seem to be much more closely related to increases in their own wages than to the changes in their husband's wages over this period. Declining male wages do not appear to be the main reason why women are increasing their market work.[9] Increased work among women may also be affected by such hard-to-measure things like changes in assumptions about women's role in the family, diminished discrimination against women in the workplace, or falling barriers to women entering non-traditional occupations. Highly educated women have benefitted more from diminished discrimination than have women with less education, as higher-level professional and management jobs have opened up to them. Whatever the reason, large increases in market work hours among women have substantially changed the time allocation and income of families.

Are there constraints in the labor market that have led workers to choose more work hours than they would want? For instance, perhaps more full-time workers would rather work part-time. A worker's decision about how many hours to work on a job is determined by a number of factors. When workers accept a job, they are agreeing to a formal contract of hours and wages as well as to implicit contract about career development. They are *jointly* choosing

[6] Trends for Hispanic families are difficult to interpret because changing immigration patterns resulted in significant changes in the composition of the Hispanic population over this time period.

[7] Blank, chapter 3 (1997); Juhn & Murphy (1997).

[8] Blau (1998), Danziger and Reed (1997).

[9] Juhn and Murphy (1997).

the type of work they do, the environment in which they do it, the wages and benefits they earn, the job's future prospects, and the hours they work. It is possible that employees are working more hours than they would like, but that they value the other characteristics of their jobs sufficiently to work those extra hours.

III. Trends in Family Income

The upward trend in hours of market work raises questions about trends in family well-being. A family's economic well-being is typically measured by its income. Earnings are the largest part of family income, which also includes transfer payments such as welfare and unemployment insurance, interest, dividends, and other unearned income such as child support. Earnings, in turn, are equal to hours worked for pay multiplied by the hourly wage. Rising work hours should lead to rising incomes, but the magnitude of this effect depends on changes in wages and other income sources that might be occurring at the same time.

A. Wages

During the same period in which women's hours of paid work have increased, inflation-adjusted wages have been increasing for women on average. Female college graduates' wages have risen more than wages among the less educated. In fact, female high school dropouts' wages have stagnated or even declined slightly. Men's wages have grown very little on average. They have fallen for men without college degrees and remained virtually constant for men with at least a BA.[10] Because fringe benefits have grown since 1969, workers' hourly compensation (including the value of fringe benefits) has improved more than their wages alone.

As we discussed above, these wage changes are positively related to changes in hours of work. More educated women have shown the largest increase in their market work, and their earnings have gone up even faster as wages and hours of work rose together. Less educated men have experienced both declining wages and declining hours of work (due to decreased labor force participation and increased unemployment), leading to earnings reductions.

B. Total Family Income

Putting the trends in wages and hours together, to what extent have increases in hours of paid work within families translated into increases in family income -- the measure we ultimately care about? To answer this question, we present estimates of average family incomes, by income component, to provide one assessment of how the changes in hours have affected the standard of

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[10] Blau (1998). These are the trends in mean weekly earnings of full-time workers aged 25-64. Other wage measures such as average hourly earnings or median weekly earnings show slightly different trends, but all show a similar relationship between education levels.

living of families in the United States.[11] Our income measure, as described earlier, is based upon before-tax cash income only, including cash benefits such as welfare and unemployment insurance benefits, and does not include other family resources, such as fringe benefits, food stamps, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). While these other resources and taxes are important, they are difficult to measure accurately or consistently for individual families. Because food stamp use grew rapidly in the 1970s and the EITC expanded greatly in the 1990s, the income measure we use omits more of the resources available to low-income families today than in the 1960s. Our estimates therefore understate the gains made by low-income families since 1969.[12]

Trends in income and in the various components of income (earnings, government transfers, other sources of income) have varied across different types of families.[13]

1. Trends in Income by Family Structure

Both married-couple families and single-parent families achieved increases in inflation-adjusted income from 1969 to 1996 (see figures 7 and 8). However, even though single parents had substantially higher rates of growth in paid work hours, married-couple families experienced a much larger average increase in income.

7. Average Family Income of Married Couples



8. Average Family Income of Single-Parent Families



[11] To adjust for changes in prices over time, these estimates use the CPI-U-X1 price index measure, which is commonly used in federal statistics such as the current poverty threshold. Some have argued that this measure overestimates the actual rate of change in price levels over time. Estimates that assume a lower rate of inflation produce higher estimates of inflation-adjusted income growth over time.

[12] For estimates of changes in family incomes using a broader definition of income, see Levy (1996).

[13] Throughout the following analysis we use mean (that is, average) income, rather than the median or another indicator of the distribution. Changes in mean income can be decomposed into changes in means of the components of income, whereas changes in the median cannot. There has been a more positive change in mean income than in median income, as disproportionate growth in the upper tail of the income distribution pulls up the mean without affecting the median.

- *The incomes of married-couple families increased by more than their increase in paid work time.* Their average family income increased by almost a third from 1969 to 1996 ($14,800 in 1996 dollars), while their annual hours of paid work increased by less than a fifth.

- *For single-parent families, incomes increased by much less than paid work time.* They also increased much less than the incomes of married-couple families over this period, after adjusting for inflation. Average income of single-parent families increased by less than ten percent ($1,900 in 1996 dollars) from 1969 to 1996, while their paid work hours increased by more than a quarter.

Increases in the earnings of wives and single parents generated most of the income growth from 1969 to 1996. Single parents' earnings increased more than their total family incomes did, as earnings increases were offset by a forty percent decline in average government cash transfer payments. For two-parent families, increases in the wives' earnings represented two thirds of the increase in family income, with the remainder attributable to an increase in the husbands' earnings and an increase in unearned income from sources other than government transfer payments.

Among both wives and single parents, their increased earnings reflect an increase in hours of work and an increase in hourly earnings rates. Rising earnings among wives reflected a startling 93 percent increase in their hours and a 53 percent increase in their earnings per hour. For single parents, hours of work increased by 28 percent, while hourly earnings increased by 18 percent.

2. Trends in Income by Other Demographic Characteristics

As with hours of paid work, trends in average family incomes differ substantially across groups of families classified by education, race or ethnicity, or presence of young children. Income growth has been greater for families whose head is highly skilled, for families headed by a white person, and for families with preschool-age children.

- *More-educated families had greater income growth from 1969 to 1996.* Married couples' income grew by almost a third if the husband had a college education, but less than ten percent if the husband had a high school diploma or less. For single parents, inflation-adjusted incomes grew by eight percent if they had a college degree, but incomes *fell* by five percent for single parents with a high school diploma or less. Much of this difference in income growth reflects larger earnings increases for highly skilled wives and single parents, and larger earnings declines for low skilled husbands. Erosion of the purchasing power of cash welfare benefits also helps explain why the inflation-adjusted incomes of less-educated single parents fell.

- *Average income growth for whites was substantially higher than for blacks or Hispanics.* Among families headed by a white person, average incomes grew by almost twenty percent for both married couples (19 percent) and single parents (17 percent) from 1979 to 1996.[14] For blacks, average incomes grew by less than ten percent for both two-parent families (9 percent) and single-parent families (6 percent). Finally, for Hispanics, average incomes *fell* by almost five percent for married couples (4 percent) and single parents (3 percent). These results are striking, given the relatively large increases in hours worked for pay by Hispanic single parents over this period. Declining wages as well as declining cash welfare benefits help explain why Hispanics' incomes fell. In addition, an increasing share of the Hispanic population were recent immigrants with lower education and wage levels.

- *Families with a child under age five had greater average income growth than families with older children.* For married couples, average incomes increased by 38 percent for families with a child under age five, compared to 27 percent for families with only older children. For single parent families, mean incomes increased by 17 percent for those with young children, but by just 6 percent for families with only older children.[15]

3. Recent Trends in Family Income

Trends in family income from 1992 to 1996 are considerably more favorable than the longer term trend since 1969. Even families headed by single parents with a high school diploma or less, whose income deteriorated from 1969 through 1992, made income gains from 1992 to 1996 during the sustained period of economic expansion under the Clinton Administration.

C. The Distribution of Family Per Capita Income

To assess the implications of income growth for families with children, we need to take account of the increasing share of single-parent families, whose incomes are lower and grew much less than the incomes of married-couple families (see section III-B above). We also need to consider the decrease in family size, because a given family income provides more resources per child when there are fewer children in the family. Moreover, because less-skilled, lower-income parents have had slower income growth than highly skilled, higher-income parents, it is important to consider the trends in income for lower-income and higher-income families, not just the average family.

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[14] Our race and ethnicity comparisons begin in 1979 because the CPS did not identify Hispanics in 1969.

[15] Of course, having a younger child often implies being a younger parent. We do not control for the age of the parent in this analysis.

Figure 9 presents estimates which incorporate the combined effects of the increasing share of single-parent families and decreasing average family size, to assess changes in incomes for families with children. To reflect changes in the share of single-parent families, the diagram shows changes for the *combined* family income distribution of single-parent and two-parent families. In addition, as a crude way of adjusting for the differences in family size between two-parent and one-parent families and for the decreases in family size over time, family incomes are presented in per-capita terms. (This is a crude measure because two people do not cost twice as much as one. On the other hand, two do cost more than one. The true measure of equivalent income for different family sizes lies somewhere between per capita and total income.) The chart shows the change in average income per person for the lowest quarter, the highest quarter, and the middle half of the distribution of all families' per-capita incomes.

9. Mean Family Income, Per Capita



These estimates indicate that while there has been substantial per-capita income growth for high-income families, incomes have been either stable or decreasing for lower-income families when 1996 is compared with 1969. During the economic expansion from 1992 to 1996, however, lower-income families also experienced rising per-capita incomes.

- *Since 1969, the top quarter of families gained, while the lower quarter lost and the middle half remained nearly constant in per-capita income terms, after adjusting for inflation.* The top quarter gained 20 percent ($4,400 in 1996 dollars) from 1969 to 1996, while families in the lower quarter of the income distribution had declines of 11 percent ($410). For families in the middle half of the family per-capita income distribution, average family incomes have remained relatively constant, with income gains of 4 percent ($452).

Since family size has been decreasing, it follows logically that increases in mean income are less dramatic, and decreases are more dramatic, when calculated on a family basis rather than on a per capita basis.

IV. How Do Families Respond? Implications for Family Time Use Outside the Job

The trends in hours of paid work and family incomes described above have had a major impact on family life. Increasing hours of paid work may mean higher incomes, which provide more resources for parents and children. But increasing paid work time also means less time for other activities. The evidence on time allocation to non-market activities is much more limited than the data on hours of paid work and income and therefore conclusions must be more tentative.

Before we even look at the data, it is intuitively clear that the increase in hours of mothers' paid work would not necessarily translate fully into a decrease in time spent with children. There are other non-market activities -- cooking, cleaning, shopping, exercising, entertainment, watching TV, sleeping -- that may be reduced by working mothers in order to devote time to their children. Fathers and grandparents may spend more time with the children when their mother works. Husbands may do more of the household chores. Goods and services may be purchased with some of the extra income, so that less of the parents' time is required to produce meals, clean clothes and rooms, and do other things that contribute to the quality of family life. Household appliances (microwave ovens, dishwashers) also reduce the time required for household tasks. Standards of housekeeping, styles of entertaining, and even types of housing (condos without private lawns and gardens) may change in time-saving ways -- though these new conditions may be less satisfying to families in some ways. While parents can minimize the loss of time spent with children when they work more hours for pay by spending less time on other activities, these changes in lifestyle may induce stress. In particular, even if time spent with children does not decrease for a particular family, if hours spent on leisure or sleep decrease, or if the overall pace of household activity is speeded up, the family may feel increased stress.

The CPS, with its larger sample size, only allows us to examine hours spent on paid work (and therefore hours available for other activities) along with changes in family size and structure. We have limited data on what people actually do with the time they do not spend on paid work, mainly from time-use diary studies. These studies have complete data only for a small sample of people. We begin with the CPS data regarding basic trends and then discuss the more detailed time-use diary data.

A. Trends in Current Population Survey Data

What can the CPS tell us about how the changes of the past several decades have affected the number of home hours that families have available for caring for children and maintaining a household? On the one hand, families may have less time available for child care because they are spending more time in the labor market and because there is a growing share of single parent families. On the other hand, the number of children per family has fallen, which would tend to increase parental time per child.

While it is impossible to precisely determine exactly how much time parents spend with a given child, it seems logical to assume that raising two children takes more time than one child, but not twice as much time. By considering how parental time not spent on paid work has changed both on a per-family and on a per-child basis, we can see the range of possibilities without needing to decide exactly how much more time each additional child requires. We discuss the two extreme cases -- *total* parental time available and parental time available *per child* -- in order to establish upper and lower limits to the impact on children. Neither measures the actual impact, which lies somewhere between the two extremes.



Figure 10 shows the trends in non-market time that custodial parents potentially had available to spend with all their children, after subtracting time spent at paid work and allowing eight hours per day for sleep. We emphasize the fact that this is only time *potentially available* in the home; there is no information in the CPS on how parents actually spend their non-market work time. Figure 10 illustrates the extreme case of comparing time available in the home regardless of the number of children (as if one child required as much time as two). It shows that from 1969 to 1996, both married couple and single parent families experienced a decrease in time not spent on paid work. The overall decrease is greater than the decreases within either family type because the proportion of single-parent families increased over this period.

The other extreme is to assess changes in total parental time potentially available *per child*. The per-child calculation assumes that two children take twice as much time as one. In other words, it assumes that if one child receives attention from a parent, a sibling cannot receive any parental attention at the same time. While this assumption is clearly false, it gives us a lower limit to the impact on children. Despite increases in paid work hours for each type of family, the amount of non-market time available *per child* has *increased* for both married-couple and single-parent families since 1969. When single-parent and married-couple families are added together, however, the amount of family time per child has remained relatively constant. This reflects the fact that a shift toward more single parents tends to decrease parental time available to children, because it reduces the number of custodial parents available to spend time with children.

This extreme case suggests that, *at best*, parents have about as much time available to spend with their children as before, while under more realistic scenarios, the time potentially available for them to be at home with their children has declined. Interpreting what these changes in potential time available at home mean for actual time spent with children is difficult however.

B. Time Use in the Home Estimated from Time-use Diaries

Fortunately, we have an alternative -- and somewhat more informative -- source of data: time-use diary surveys, which ask respondents to keep a detailed diary recording how they spend their time during a specific day. These surveys provide an alternative, more accurate method of measuring paid work time, as well as time spent in various kinds of unpaid activity, such as commuting, housework, child care, shopping, recreation, and personal care. The trends in hours of paid work time and non-market time described above are based on data which report individuals' estimates of their usual hours worked per week in the previous year. Such estimates may not accurately portray the actual hours worked for pay because the question is somewhat ambiguous and respondents may not be able to report accurately on a "usual" week in the few minutes allowed during the CPS interview. Time-use diary measures tend to show shorter paid work hours and sometimes even different trends than the CPS.[16]

Unfortunately, such time-use diary surveys are conducted much less frequently and with much smaller samples than the CPS. The latest available data were collected in 1985; results of a survey done in 1992-94 are not yet available. Because of the small samples, time-use diary surveys cannot be used to examine trends for smaller subgroups of the population, such as single parents or blacks. Moreover, the individuals who complete the diaries may not represent the U.S. population as well as the CPS sample does. These surveys do, however, provide information about how much time is spent in different types of unpaid work at home, such as child care and housework, in leisure pursuits, and sleep.





1. Averages

Time-use diary surveys show that most of the increase in women's formal working hours between 1965 and 1985 was offset by decreases in time spent on household chores (see figure 11). These decreases were coupled with increases in time spent on household chores by both employed and nonemployed men over this period (see figure 12). There was very little reduction in time spent with children, and "free time" spent watching TV actually increased.[17] These trends are rather surprising, since they are not consistent with the feeling by many that leisure time has become less available.

One possible way to reconcile these numbers with a general sense of "time stress" may be to note that many women have moved from the "nonemployed" to the "employed" category, which dramatically changes their time use patterns. In any single year, employed women spend about 45 percent less time on both child care and household tasks than women without paid jobs,

[16] Robinson and Godbey (1997), chapter 4.

[17] Robinson and Godbey (1997), chapters 6 & 8.

but still have less free time.[18] Time-use surveys conducted in the U.S. in 1965, 1975, and 1985 show that employed mothers spent virtually the same amount of time taking care of children in 1985 (6.7 hours per week) as in 1965 (6.3 hours per week). Mothers without paid jobs spent 12 hours a week on child care in both years. (But note that nonemployed women are more likely to have young children.) This is consistent with other analyses of these time-use surveys, which show no decline in child care time within mothers' employment category.

13. Percent Employed



Source: Time-Use Diary Surveys (Robinson & Godbey 1997)

When the shift of women into employment (shown in figure 13) is taken into account , however, mothers' time in child care declined by 10 percent overall, from ten to nine hours per week (see figure 11). Fathers did not make up the difference; their child care time remained about 2.5 hours per week from 1965 to 1985 (see figure 12). This suggests that the increase in market work among women has reduced their time with children. There are, however, some major caveats to these numbers.

- *These estimates of parents' child care time include only "primary" care, when the child is the sole focus of the parent's attention.* They omit "secondary" or "shared" time spent with children, when the child is present and perhaps participating with the parent in another activity, such as eating or watching TV. Thus, the total amount of time spent with children is estimated to be almost four times greater than the numbers shown above.[19]

We have no information on how total contact time -- primary time and secondary time -- has changed between parents and children.

- *In many cases parental time with children has been replaced by the time of other adult child-care providers.* It is not at all clear that this is "worse" in any sense; it is simply a different way of raising children. In fact, studies of children in child care suggest that these children show no negative developmental effects.[20]

Time spent in personal care and commuting to work did not change much. The time-use diary estimates of commuting time are corroborated by Census department data. Surprisingly, "free time" activities *increased* by 4 to 5 hours per week for both men and women, due almost entirely to an increase in television-watching (including watching TV with children). What "gave" for women was household chores.

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[18] Robinson and Godbey (1997), pp.102-3.

[19] Robinson and Godbey, chapter 6 (1997).

[20] National Research Council (1990)

2. Differences among families

These estimates are based on average trends. They may miss important distinctions between high and low income groups, or between single-parent and two-parent families. The effect of women's increased hours in the labor market on families is likely to vary between college-educated parents, whose incomes have been rising because their hours and wages both increased, and less-educated parents, whose incomes may have fallen despite increased work hours because of falling wages. It may be harder for families with more limited resources to cut back on housework by buying time-saving services and appliances. The effect of women's increased hours in the labor market on families is also likely to vary between married couples, who can shift some housework and child care from working wife to husband, and single parents, who cannot. Within married-couple families, moreover, there are likely to be differences across education levels in this shifting of tasks, as child care time by fathers rises with their education. Unfortunately, the time-use diary survey samples are too small to be broken down into these subsamples.

C. Elder care

The media have paid significant attention to the so-called "sandwich generation": those adults who take care of both their own child(ren) and their elderly disabled parent(s). While a number of people are in this position, the popular press likely overstates the scope of the problem.[21] Women are more likely than men, and adult female children of the disabled elderly are more likely than their spouses, to provide elder care. Data from 1982 and 1984 show that close to one million women had a disabled parent, a full-time job, and children under the age of 15. About 1 in 5 of these potential elder care providers were actually engaged in elder care activities while holding a job and raising children.[22] Of course, there are also many caregivers who do not work full-time for pay and/or do not have children at home.

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[21]Company-specific surveys have yielded estimates that as many as 20 to 30 percent of employees are caring for elderly disabled parents. These surveys, however, have often used very broad definitions of care, including support which is solely financial or emotional, and may not represent a large commitment of time by the caregiver. When the definition of "caregiver" is restricted to those spending time helping elderly parents with activities of daily living (eating, transferring, toileting, dressing, and bathing) or instrumental activities of daily living (meal preparation, light housework, laundry, getting around outside, grocery shopping, telephoning, taking medication, and financial management), data from the much larger samples of the 1982 National Long-Term Care Survey and the 1984 Current Population Survey indicate that just under one percent of Americans who are working full-time provide care for elderly parents by participating in any of the activities listed above.

[22] Stone and Kemper (1989).

Relatively few parents with children at home are giving direct elder care themselves, but many more are managing the care of -- and worrying about -- their disabled parents, which is a source of stress even when little time is spent in direct care. Financial support for elderly and disabled relatives is also a burden for some families. If a family member is spending significant amounts of time caring for the relative instead of working for money, this also contributes to the financial strain. As the number of the "oldest old" (persons at least 85 years old) increases at a faster rate than any other age group, concerns regarding their care are affecting a growing segment of the population.

V. Key Policy Issues That Relate to These Changes in American Family Life

The enormous changes in the ways American families function create new opportunities, but also present new policy challenges, both to private employers as well as to the government. There are four key areas of policy that are important in helping families better balance work and family life: improving access to high quality, affordable child care; increasing the flexibility of market work; supporting income among low-income working families; and encouraging the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.

A. Improving access to high quality, affordable child care

Most parents adjust to an increase in their paid work time by increasing their use of child care providers other than themselves. As mothers go to work, families have more income to spend. Some of it has been spent on paid child care. The availability, cost, and quality of child care which can be purchased in the market affects the employment decisions and financial status of families.

The primary child care arrangements for preschool-age children of employed mothers in the fall of 1994 were divided roughly equally among care in the child's home (by a relative or nonrelative), care in another home (by a relative or nonrelative), and care in an organized child care facility. Since comparable data were first collected in 1986, the trend shows a relatively constant proportion of children receiving care in their own homes, relatively fewer children receiving care in another home, and relatively more children receiving care in an organized facility. The share of monthly income spent on child care by those purchasing this service rose from 6.3 percent to 7.3 percent between 1986 and 1993.[23]

[23] The earliest comprehensive data on families' child care arrangements was collected by the Bureau of the Census in 1977. The earliest data that are compatible with the most recent data are from fall 1986. We use the 1986 data for consistency.

This Administration has consistently emphasized the importance of child care availability and quality. Since 1993, child care subsidies for low-income families have grown by 80 percent. In addition, expansions in the Dependent Care Tax Credit have been proposed.
<Were earlier expansions enacted in the first term?>

B. Increasing the flexibility of paid work

The effect of parents' market work time on children also depends on when and where it is performed. By shifting from work in the home to work in the market, many women find themselves with far less flexible schedules to respond to other family needs. Key employment arrangements that affect hours flexibility include:

- *Flexible work arrangements* (defined as allowing workers to vary the time they begin or end work) are an increasingly popular approach to decreasing the tension between work and family. In 1997, 28 percent of full-time wage and salary workers had flexible work schedules. This was up sharply from 15 percent in 1991, the most recent prior year when data were collected.[24]

- *Shift work* may enable parents to share child care more easily by working different shifts. If shift work is to ease the task of combining paid work and child care, however, the choice of shifts must be voluntary. For those workers who cannot determine their own schedules, the combination of shift work and work in the home is a potential source of stress and expense. Non-standard working hours may make it difficult both to find time to spend with children when they are awake and not in school and to arrange for child care while working. In 1997, 83 percent of full-time wage and salary workers were on regular daytime schedules, 4.6 percent were on evening shifts, 3.9 percent were on employer-arranged irregular schedules, 3.5 percent were on night shifts, and 2.9 percent were on rotating shifts.

- *Working at home for pay* can sometimes increase parents' flexibility. In 1997, 3.3 percent of all wage and salary workers were doing work at home for pay, up from 1.9 percent in 1991. An additional ten percent of all wage and salary workers in 1997 were doing work at home without receiving extra pay for it. Nearly 9 out of 10 wage and salary workers who were paid for work at home were in "white-collar" occupations. Single parents, particularly single mothers, had much higher work-at-home rates than single workers without children.

Maintaining high productivity need not be inconsistent with allowing flexibility in work arrangements, as many private sector employers have discovered. In addition, this Administration has played a major role in increasing flexibility among families by helping enact

[24] Data on alternative work arrangements comes from the 1991 and 1997 May supplements to the CPS.

the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which enables workers to take up to 12 weeks unpaid leave to care for a new baby or ailing family member without jeopardizing their jobs. In 1997, xx **<get number>** million workers took advantage of the FMLA to spend necessary time with their family. The Federal government has also led by example, instituting "flextime" which allows employees some discretion in when they work their allotted hours.

C. Income support for working low-income families

While incomes have been rising for most people, families at the bottom of the income distribution, particularly the less educated and single parents whose inflation-adjusted incomes were lower in 1996 than in 1969, still face serious economic hardship. Recent policy changes that have helped these families cope include: Expansions in the *Earned Income Tax Credit* (EITC), to assure that persons who work hard on their jobs can take home enough money to support their families; Increases in the *minimum wage* from $3.35 in 1990 to $5.15 in 1997; Expanded *child support enforcement* provisions, which help ease the economic burden on single mothers and enforce responsibility for economic support of children on both parents; Major *welfare reform legislation* which has helped single mothers move from welfare to work; Employer tax credits have also been enacted to help create jobs for welfare recipients; Substantial expansions in *support for vocational education, community college, and skill development* among persons in lower-income families. This has included the creation of Hope Scholoraships, an 80 percent increase in the maximum Pell Grant, and the passage of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998.

In addition, it is hard to underestimate the importance of a strong economy and steady economic growth, which creates jobs, reduces unemployment, and raises wages for all workers, especially the less skilled who are most affected when jobs are scarce.

D. Encouraging two-parent families

When two-parent families form and stay together in a supportive relationship, many of the economic and emotional stresses of balancing work and family are eased. Two-parent families have greater earnings potential and more potential time to spend with their children than do single-parent families. Among the recent policies which have helped maintain married couple families:

- Changing the *eligibility rules for Medicaid* and other programs so as not to penalize two parent families for staying together.
- *Domestic violence services* for perpetrators as well as victims.
- *Family planning* services which enable parents to choose their family size and timing of births, so they can devote sufficient time to each child.

VI. Conclusion

A massive shift of women's time from the home to the labor market has occurred in the last generation. For most families, increasing incomes have accompanied mothers' increasing paid employment, although the shift from married couple to single parent families has reduced both income and time available for many children. While smaller family sizes have helped offset the increase in market work, many parents still find it difficult to balance jobs and children. Raising children is not easy; even in the past when more women stayed at home while their children were young, many of them found full-time homemaking extremely stressful.

Single parents face the most difficulties. They have only half as much total time available as two parents, and they typically have less than half as much earning power as a married couple because women's wages are lower than men's. Lack of income limits most single parents' ability to purchase time-saving goods and services and high quality child care. Thus, they may face a severe time and money bind.

Men without college educations have faced declining wages. Increases in work among their wives has helped maintain their families' standard of living, but these increased hours of market work have not resulted in income gains. This also limits the ability of these families to buy time-saving goods and services, including child care. Moreover, less-educated workers are less likely to have jobs that permit parents to arrange their hours to accommodate family needs.

Better educated parents, whose increased time in the labor market has been rewarded with considerably higher incomes than in 1969, can better afford to pay for high quality child care, household help, and other time-saving goods and services. Married couple families, particularly those where the husband has a college degree, have seen substantial improvements in their economic situation over the last three decades. Yet, even these couples often express dissatisfaction with the stresses involved in balancing work and family.

It may be that changing social norms have increased the income requirements for raising children, making even married women in families whose income has gone up over time feel that they cannot afford to stay at home as their mothers did. Moreover, even high income two-earner couples may find that their jobs entail longer hours and a more demanding, stressful pace than they would freely choose, although these jobs may also provide the income, long-term career prospects, and personal fulfillment that they desire. But a job comes as a total package, and these families cannot give up some income for more time at home without giving up the rest of the package, which they find attractive on the whole. Therefore they, too, are looking for help in balancing the demands of job and family.

The changes in parents' paid work time and family size of the past three decades have been driven by the long-term increase in women's wages and job opportunities; hence they are not likely to be reversed. These increases in women's earning power may have other long-term positive effects besides their immediate effect on family incomes. It may increase their decision-making leverage within the family, which in turn may increase resources spent on children.

Moreover, as women gain more (and more continuous) market work experience, their earning potential also increases. Young women, expecting to spend more time in the labor market, increasingly prepare themselves for more skilled and higher-paying jobs. These developments all work to increase the long-term economic security of women and their families.

In the meantime, both employers and public policy-makers need to continue to search for creative ways to help productive workers also function as effective parents and responsible family members.

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Are Americans Overworked?

By William Shew

DARREN CHING

Schor estimates that the average American worked almost a month longer in 1987 than in 1969.... After nearly a century of gradually shrinking work hours, so significant a reversal cannot be explained away as merely a blip.

A woman observes that most people she knows have turned their ovens into planters. At a Friendly's restaurant, meanwhile, it is 10:00 p.m. on a school night, and Carolyn Collignon is just beginning her eighth hour of drudgery. An apocalyptic view of life in the twenty-first century? Not quite. These scenes appear in a nonfiction best-seller by a Harvard economist. What the woman whose oven has gone to seed and the student toiling at Friendly's have in common—along with almost everyone populating the pages of this book—is overwork. Dinner parties are the stuff of nostalgia, students are too exhausted to pursue their studies, and, across the land, overwork has drained the pleasure out of life.

Who is to blame? In *The Overworked American*, Professor Juliet B. Schor finds no lack of culprits. First and foremost are greedy capitalists, employing both carrot and stick to drive Americans to work longer hours—all to the end of increasing corporate profits. In this, they have no end of accomplices. A quiet word to government is usually enough to forestall policies that might encourage leisure. Advertisers guilefully stimulate ever-increasing consumption, however frivolous, forcing debt-ridden families into ever-lengthening hours of toil. For that matter, consumers need little encouragement in their joyless pursuit of goods, committed as they are to the Sisyphean task of keeping up with the Joneses. Even labor unions, seemingly the natural champions of cashing in productivity gains for shorter hours, have been enticed to worship at the altar of Mammon.

Much of this may sound tiresomely familiar. But it is not hard to understand why this book has attracted the attention it has. After all, many of us at times do feel overworked. Professor Schor assures us we are not alone by artfully interweaving anecdotes (the woman with the oven-planter) and statistics (more on them later).

But is it overwork or simply working hard? Does it represent immiserating economic growth or an embrace of expanding opportunities in the labor market? Despite the book's many statistics on America's working habits, the answer is less clear than Professor Schor claims.

Rising Prosperity, Less Leisure?

Consider first her view that rising prosperity should lead to more leisure. Between 1969 and 1987, the years that Professor Schor compares, real hourly earnings (adjusted for inflation) increased 2 percent in manufacturing and 7 percent in the service sector. While these gains are modest, they mean that people could work less without reducing their standard of living. But should we expect them to? Not necessarily. Greater earning power creates a familiar dilemma: It makes it possible to take life a bit easier but also makes it tempting to work more because of greater returns to each hour on the job.

Should we really care how people adapt to a changing labor market? Profes-

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An individual's hours of employment can increase without another minute being worked as long as the employer offers a more generous package of paid leave.

sor Schor feels we should, for several reasons. Although earnings for most have increased, less fortunate workers may have to work long hours merely to keep up. In addition, employees typically do not have as free a hand in determining the hours they work as they do in deciding, say, whether to buy one more or less shirt or movie ticket. So for some, lengthening hours may be a sign of the need to make ends meet or employer pressure rather than a response to growing rewards of work.

But what about the factual underpinning of her argument—are Americans working longer than they did in the past? They are, according to the centerpiece of Professor Schor's book. She estimates that the average American worked almost a month longer in 1987 than in 1969—indisputably a dramatic increase. In 1969, she says, paid employment for the typical full-time worker amounted to 1,786 hours; by 1987, the figure had risen to 1,949—an increase of 163 hours per year. The additional four weeks might be less troubling if people were spending correspondingly less time on work at home—food preparation, child care, home maintenance, gardening, and so forth. But non-marketplace work hours have remained almost constant, according to her estimates (which she cautions are less reliable than her estimates of the marketplace work).

After nearly a century of gradually shrinking work hours, so significant a reversal cannot be explained away as merely a blip. It is surprising in addition—as Professor Schor reminds us—because of the common expectation that growing earning power will be used to work less as well as to consume more.

The Extra Month of Work

So why did Americans increase the amount of time they spent on the job by a full month between 1969 and 1987? Professor Schor has a variety of intertwined hypotheses, none of them very cheering. But how does she know that Americans are spending another month per year at work?

The provenance of this remarkable fact, it turns out, is somewhat obscure. Her estimates of work are derived from data the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects on hours of paid employment. Those hours include a good deal more than what one normally thinks of as time on the job—vacation, paid holidays, sick leave, and so forth. Using this definition, an individual's hours of employment can increase without another minute being worked as long as the employer offers a more generous package of paid leave, as indeed has been the trend.

True, the annual hours for which full-time employees are paid have been on the rise. But how does Professor Schor know that Americans are actually *working* much longer hours? She doesn't. She believes they are, because she estimates that increases in paid time off can account for only three to twelve hours of the additional month of employment. She concedes that other researchers believe that paid leave has grown substantially faster. Her estimates are derived from splicing together two trends, the earlier one confined to the manufacturing sector and the later one to the entire economy. The few details she provides of her methodology make it all but impossible to evaluate the meaningfulness of the result. She concedes that other researchers believe that paid leave has grown substantially faster.

The changes in work patterns over the last two decades, as revealed by data compiled by the government, are at odds with much of her narrative. She stresses the pressures on Americans to lengthen their work day—white-collar workers laboring later into the night merely to retain their jobs; blue-collar employees working more overtime and moonlighting more frequently simply to make ends meet. Yet the statistics do not seem to bear her out. The average hours per week Americans reported working—including overtime and second jobs—remained practically constant between 1969 and 1987. According to her own estimates, the average work week of the full-time worker increased negligibly, from 39.8 to 40.7 hours. The Current Population Survey actually reported a slight decline, from 43.4 to 43.1 hours.

Of course, it still might be asked why the work week did not decline significantly over this period. One does not have to look far for explanations that seem neither sinister nor oppressive. Not least of these is the steady flow of workers from manufacturing to service industries, where the work week for a full-time worker has traditionally been longer. With the proportion of people employed in the service sector rising 17 percent over the period, it cannot be too surprising that the work week did not drastically shrink.

If the average work week has been essentially flat, what accounts for the additional month per year of employment? Almost all of it, according to Professor Schor's estimates, is attributable to employees being on the payroll for a higher proportion of the year. The average number of weeks for which full-time workers were paid, she estimates, increased from 43.9 to 47.1 between 1969 and 1987.

That there was any change may come as something of a surprise because we normally think of full-time employment as involving a 52-week year. But for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a full-time employee is anyone working at least 35 hours per week, regardless of the number of weeks.

Still, most full-time employees *are* paid for a 52-week year. That has traditionally been true of every age group, with the exception of those between 16 and 24, whose "full-time" work is often confined to the summer. But a truncated work-year is

Who has been working a longer year? Not noticeably men. For women, however, there has been marked change.

not limited to them. Within every age group, a minority of "full-time" workers spend only part of the year in paid employment, either because they prefer to do so or because they have not been able to obtain a full-year job.

Who has been working a longer year? Not noticeably men. Paid weeks per year for them changed little between 1969 and 1987. For women, however, there has been marked change. The substantial rise in the proportion of women working has been accompanied by a marked trend from part-year to full-year employment (see Table 1). The proportion of full-time female employees on the payroll at least 50 weeks rose from less than 60 percent to 74 percent over this period—a 25 percent increase.

Students also have played a role in the lengthening work year, in a roundabout fashion. For men and women taken together, the proportion of full-time workers paid for at least 50 weeks per year rose from slightly over 71 percent to almost 77 percent. Almost half of that 6-percentage-point gain corresponds to a decline in those working 13 or fewer weeks per year, a group traditionally dominated by students. Part of the trend towards a longer average work year is attributable to the diminished importance of students, whose full-time work tends to be confined to the summer. Their shorter working season reduces the average work year less than in the past because they have come to account for a smaller proportion of the labor force, and those working had a noticeably lower propensity to work full time in 1987 than in 1969 (see Table 2 page 30).

These figures cast a somewhat different light on the estimated extra month of work that lies at the heart of Professor Schor's book. Longer hours are not quite the pervasive phenomenon that *The Overworked American* suggests. The growth that has occurred is confined largely to women and consists preponderantly of being on the payroll for a longer stretch of the year. The length of the average work week changed little and probably declined.

Measuring Leisure

Do the growing number of people with year-round jobs have less leisure? Some of the growth in weeks of employment is offset by increases in paid leave. Professor Schor thinks little; others believe more. And as women spend more time in the workplace, both theory and experience suggest that most of them are spending less time on domestic chores. Professor Schor's estimates, which she admits are not entirely trustworthy, reveal no such decline. But the growth in day-care centers, labor-saving appliances, and restaurant dining suggests otherwise.

In principle, the uncertainties about whether work is increasingly crowding out leisure might be resolved by looking at the time people spend on leisure-time activities. Unfortunately, systematic data on leisure hours are not typically available.

There are, however, a few important exceptions. The amount of time Americans spend watching television is regularly collected by rating agencies because it provides valuable information to advertisers. Between 1969 and 1987, according to the National Association of Broadcasters, average household television viewing increased from 5.75 hours per day to over 7 hours, scarcely evidence of a decline in leisure.

Television viewing, however, may not provide a reliable guide. The number of television channels available to the public has increased substantially. It would therefore not be surprising if families came to devote an increasing proportion of their leisure time to television. Moreover, if Professor Schor is right, exhaustion from mounting hours of work would provide yet another reason why a greater share of leisure might be given over to such an untaxing activity. So the 20 percent increase in hours spent watching television does not rule out the possibility that leisure has been on the decline.

But movie attendance also seems to contradict the notion of shrinking leisure. The length of movies is fairly standard, so annual ticket sales per capita provides a good indication of time spent watching films in movie theatres. And unlike television, there are reasons to expect that going to a film is seen as a less enticing leisure activity than 20 years ago. The decline in the number of new releases (from 183 in 1969 to 128 in 1987) has been accompanied by a feeling

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF FULL-TIME WORKERS BY WEEKS OF PAID EMPLOYMENT

Weeks Worked Per Year	Men 1969	Men 1987	Women 1969	Women 1987	Total 1969	Total 1987	Change 1969–1987
1–13	4.7%	3.9%	11.1%	5.2%	7.1%	4.4%	2.7%
14–26	4.1	4.7	10.5	6.5	6.4	5.4	1.0
27–39	4.7	5.0	8.8	5.9	6.1	5.4	0.7
40–47	4.9	5.3	6.8	6.0	6.0	5.6	0.4
48–49	3.2	2.2	3.5	2.4	3.2	2.3	0.9
50–52	78.4	78.9	59.3	74.0	71.2	76.9	5.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Work Experience of Population," derived from the Current Population Survey, March 1970 and March 1988.



Some people are working more than their counterparts 20 years ago. In part, this reflects expanded opportunities offered by the workplace.

that movies are not as good as they used to be. Even more significant is the widespread availability of recent films released on video cassettes, providing overworked families with a less demanding way of watching films. Nevertheless, ticket sales indicate that Americans spent just as much time going to movies in 1987 as they did in 1969.

None of this is to deny that some people are working more than their counterparts of 20 years ago. In part, this reflects expanded opportunities offered by the workplace. For most Americans, the financial rewards of work are significantly greater than they were in 1969. Add to that the growing importance of the service sector, which offers work that is less physically taxing and, for most, more mentally rewarding than an assembly line.

Is More Work Bad?

So if some people are choosing to work more, should we really be concerned? Professor Schor thinks so for three reasons.

First, she frets, people do not always know what is good for them. She laments the crass materialism that she sees rampant in America, epitomized for her by the ubiquitous shopping mall. In this, no doubt she has many sympathizers. But while some are content with silent disdain, she calls for government intervention to help restore the lifestyle that she imagines prevailed in medieval times—a disinterest in accumulating material possessions and an enthusiastic embrace of leisure.

Her second concern deserves more serious attention. Some occupations, typically those requiring little education, have experienced declining real wages, leaving those affected with little choice but to work more if they are to maintain their standard of living. Adjustments to straitened conditions have, by all accounts, often imposed severe strains on families. But the families themselves seem to reject less work as the solution. And Professor Schor's nostrum of a higher minimum wage, with the layoffs that it would provoke, would only exacerbate the problem for many.

Third, she may well be right in saying that many employers have been unimaginative in setting their policies on work hours. In some settings, more flexible work schedules can benefit employer and employee alike. But Professor Schor is unwilling to acknowledge practical limits to flexibility beyond which letting each employee individually select his or her own hours becomes impractical. Many of the impediments to individually selected work schedules are explained by real efficiency considerations, not the theories of capitalistic exploitation favored by Professor Schor. Not least of these impediments is the obvious need of a firm to be able to coordinate the schedules of its employees—having a truck driver report for work is of little avail if no one is available to load the truck. The need to coordinate work schedules means, inevitably, reaching some compromise among employees' differing preferences for how much and when they work. Here, as is true of all compromises, some people must settle for an outcome that seems to them short of ideal—or look for another job.

TABLE 2
WORKERS AGE 16-24

	As a Proportion of Total Work Force		Proportion Working Full Time	
Age	1969	1987	1969	1987
16–17	5.6%	4.0%	13.2%	7.7%
18–19	5.0	3.9	43.3	32.9
20–24	11.0	10.1	65.7	60.7

Note: Full-time workers (final two columns) are expressed as a percentage of those in the age group who are in the labor force.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Work Experience of Population," derived from the Current Population Survey, March 1970 and March 1988.

Where avoidable impediments to flexible work schedules do occur, often as not they are artifacts of government. One need look no farther than our system of payroll taxes, which gives business artificial disincentives to employ part-time and seasonal workers.

If employees were given a completely free hand in deciding how many hours to work at their existing wage rates, would they work more or less? Close to half, apparently, would work the same hours as they do now, according to researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Of the remainder, most would prefer to work longer hours at their current wage rates. For each person who would put in shorter hours if allowed, it has been variously estimated that anywhere between three and ten workers would prefer to work more hours.

What, then, is one to make of Professor Schor's book? Her thesis that Americans are burdened with an increasing work load has obviously touched a sensitive nerve in America. Yet there is less to her facts than meets the eye. The "extra month" turns out to reflect primarily a diminishing number of women on the payroll only part of the year. That trend is noteworthy, especially for what it suggests about the gains women have made towards greater equality in the workplace. And in making us think about that and other changes in work patterns over the last two decades, Professor Schor has provided a valuable service. Unfortunately, the lenses of Marx and Veblen through which she often peers at evolving work patterns do more to distort than to illuminate.

▲

WORK & FAMILY

BY SUE SHELLENBARGER

Do We Work More Or Not? Either Way, We Feel Frazzled

HARVARD ECONOMIST Juliet Schor declared in 1991 that Americans are working an average 163 more hours a year than in the 1960s. Her book "The Overworked American" was embraced by the media, striking a chord with stressed-out workers.

In 1997, University of Maryland's John Robinson and Penn State's Geoffrey Godbey declared Americans were working 2.8 hours LESS a week (or 140 hours a year assuming 50 weeks of work) compared with the 1960s. Their book, "Time for Life," was embraced by the media, with one newsmagazine delivering stressed-out workers a verbal slap upside the head with a headline, "Get over it."

What's going on? Are Americans working more or less?

The dispute has experts duking it out anew over an old issue, the best way to measure Americans' work effort. It also sheds new light on our pursuit of the Holy Grail of the '90s: more time.

First, a look at the conflicting studies. How can researchers reach such different conclusions, studying roughly the same time period, about how much Americans work?

Basically, they're measuring different things. Dr. Schor, contending Americans are working more weeks each year, gauges annual rather than weekly work hours. She corrects for growth in unemployed and underemployed workers, pushing work hours higher. She relies mostly on a monthly government survey of 50,000 households, the Current Population Survey, that asks people to estimate time spent at work.

DR. ROBINSON and Dr. Godbey measure weekly work hours, counting only time actually spent working (not schmoozing or goofing off at work). They draw on three smaller studies at 10-year intervals in which 1,200 to 5,400 people filled out detailed "time diaries" accounting for every minute of the day. Each camp criticizes the other's yardsticks on points too complex to analyze here.

Whom to believe? You should probably join the Robinson-Godbey camp if you think only time spent actually working should be counted as "work" (the more important measure to empiricists, including employers) and if you favor precision over breadth (the small diary studies are unmatched in accuracy).

The Schor camp is probably for you if you think all time spent at work should be counted as "work" (the more important measure to those concerned with work's effect on family and community life) and if you favor breadth over precision (the Current Population Survey is unmatched in scope and continuity).

Like Dr. Schor, other economists see a trend toward increased work time. The Bureau of Labor Statistics says employed women are working 233 more hours a year than in 1976, men 100 more hours. That helps acccount for Americans' feeling so pressed for time, says Dr. Schor, whose new book, "The Overspent American," is to be published in January.

But even the 163 additional hours of annual work time she sees Americans putting in isn't enough, in my opinion, to explain the profound sense of time pressure Americans report in surveys. On that question, the Robinson-Godbey team has come up with another, equally interesting explanation. Like Dr. Schor, they say Americans' "sense of the necessary," their desire for goods, services and experiences, has expanded too fast.

But by training a microscope on our workdays, Dr. Robinson and Dr. Godbey also document a trend toward integrating work and personal life that is changing the way people experience time. Where the two were separate domains, we increasingly blend them into "a seamless web," Dr. Godbey says.



Carol Lay

VACATIONS are shorter, and "leisure" has become part of the actual workday, with 25 of Americans' 40 hours of weekly spare time (excluding all personal and family chores) coming during the week in such short bursts we can't immerse ourselves in calming, refreshing pursuits. Also, work spills into personal life — aided by technology and a sense of rising demands — with workers "at home working, in an office working, at the beach working."

The result: In our rush, we forget how to fully experience each moment.

As we become a nation of integrators of personal and work pursuits, it would make sense for employers to let their staffers shape their own work hours and workplaces. Then, employees could do their work when and where they are most efficient.

There's a message for individuals, too: If we integrate too much, too fast, we may blur boundaries so badly that the moment loses integrity. For many, savoring the here and now means separating work and personal realms, with no support from our fast-paced culture.

Marketing manager Brendan Carr is pulled many ways by his job and life with his wife and three children. But he draws broad borders around his workday, arriving at 7 a.m. to make the most of the quiet early hours, working intensely for 10 hours, then leaving.

"I don't sneak out the door. I walk out saying, 'Good night, good night, good night.' "

Home time is similarly self-contained. "Flying by the seat of your pants doesn't work," he says. "You've got to plan and manage your time. Otherwise, it's just gone."

Until more people draw better boundaries, "just gone" will continue to describe our national perception of time.

To discuss work-life issues on my radio show, call 800-WSJ-TALK or fax 503-636-6951.

Resignations At Columbia/HCA Won't Slow Probe

By EVA M. RODRIGUEZ
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The resignation of top officials at Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. won't slow down or derail the criminal investigation of the beleaguered health-care giant, law enforcement officials say.

But the change in leadership and subsequent abandonment of Columbia's more controversial practices could go a long way toward minimizing its exposure to civil and criminal penalties, if it is charged with wrongdoing.

Columbia facilities in at least seven states are being probed for possible Medicare and Medicaid fraud; more than 50 search warrants have been served in the process, and investigators in Florida have begun subpoenaing Columbia employees for testimony in what could lead to criminal indictments.

Columbia's chairman and chief executive officer, Richard L. Scott, and its president, David Vandewater, resigned under pressure last week. Thomas F. Frist Jr., Columbia's vice chairman, assumed the top post at the company.

Dr. Frist has said that Columbia would cease certain initiatives — such as offering physicians ownership stakes in Columbia hospitals — that have become the focus of the federal investigation.

"It doesn't change a thing," says one federal law enforcement official who asks not to be identified. "We don't care that much about having a person leave office. We're not there to shape the company, but to enforce the law." Spokeswomen for Columbia and the Justice Department both declined to comment.

Columbia's managerial changes could give it a little bit of leverage in a settlement negotiation, according to legal experts. One provision in the sentencing guidelines calls for the reduction of potential fines if the company demonstrates that it has taken steps to rectify past indiscretions. Among the measures a company could take to minimize its exposure: dismissing officials and other employees believed to be responsible for infractions, and abandoning practices that may have skirted the law.

"One key factor for prosecutors is 'What effort has an organization taken to change its ways?' " says Pamela Bucy, a former federal prosecutor who is a professor at the University of Alabama School of Law. "Changing top management is about the biggest change you can make."

In a sign that Columbia is taking a more active stance regarding the government investigation, the company has tapped a full-time government relations executive. The position will be manned by Parker Sherrill, who headed government relations at both HCA and Healthtrust before they were acquired by Columbia, according to a person close to Columbia.

Directors view the tapping of Mr. Sherrill — who is president of the Nashville, Tenn.-based Public Policy Management Group and a close associate of Dr. Frist and board member R. Clayton McWhorter — as a way of building closer ties to the government. Mr. Sherrill couldn't be reached for comment.

—Anita Sharpe in Atlanta contributed to this article.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1997

It's 2 A.M., LET'S GO TO WORK

Or play golf. Or shop. Companies love an economy that rocks around the clock. A lot of people can barely stay awake.

■ *by Jaclyn Fierman*

LEON LEONWOOD BEAN, that taciturn merchant from Maine, would have shuddered at being called trendy. But he was the standard-bearer for the 24-hour economy—nonstop commerce by and for those who can't pack it all into the daytime. Maine hunters and fishermen always knew they could count on L.L.: if at 4 A.M. they needed long underwear, or a warm cap, or a pair of his famous rubber-bottomed boots. They'd give the sleigh bells on his front door a yank, and he'd roll out of bed to make a sale. Today, L.L. Bean is a billion-dollar-a-year operation that does nearly 40% of its business after hours.

No longer does the night belong to prowlers, insomniacs, and autoworkers on the graveyard shift. Chances are, it belongs to you. Here's why: An astonishing *two-thirds* of all American workers—over 75 million people—put in anything but traditional hours. Rather, they clock more than half their workday outside Ward Cleaver's time zone, the one that starts after breakfast and ends before supper, Monday through Friday. That's the big surprise in a new analysis of government data by University of Maryland sociologist Harriet Presser.

From big-name financial service outfits to no-name repair shops, businesses are responding to a collective impatience—to a country full of anglers who know that the bass bite best in the dark. Increasingly, the attitude is, "If I'm up, why aren't you?"

REPORTER ASSOCIATE *Jane Furth*

PHOTOGRAPHS BY MARK PETERSON—SABA

10:00 P.M. It's a hard day's night for Brittney Moss, 4, and it won't end until 2 A.M. She and her friends at Toyota's child-care center in Kentucky have just returned from an evening picnic while their parents work the late shift.

Working parents want to do their banking, buying, and bookkeeping when it's convenient for them—after the kids go to sleep. The people who serve them, in turn, want to eat and shop at their convenience. And folks who work the late shift want to take care of some household chores on the way home. That they can do, in any of 319 Walgreen drugstores, 410 Safeway supermarkets, and 291 Wal-Marts open all night around the country.

Unwinding late at night with a round of golf is a bigger challenge. But Heartland Golf Park in Deer Park, Long Island, will let you tee off until 3 A.M. Open only since May, Heartland frequently has a 2½-hour wait at midnight. "We've got lawyers playing with plumbers playing with factory workers," says David Wolkoff, 28, who built the course with his father and brother. "Some people come off work at midnight, and others want to play a few holes before they head for the office."

Slicers needn't worry about losing balls in the dark. As Wolkoff says, "The place is lit up like Shea Stadium." But the 24-hour economy is not without its dangers, even on a golf course. Heartland is so bright that the Federal Aviation Administration is concerned that planes with faulty instruments might mistake it for nearby MacArthur Airport. Says Wolkoff: "The FAA told us they'll let us know if we need to run for cover."

Manufacturing companies in everything from autos to steel to Cheerios have had multiple shifts for years, in part because it's cheaper to keep plants operating continuously than to shut them down and start them up again. The real growth in round-the-clock operations has been in the service sector. Like a long row of dominoes, one 24-hour service pushes against another and forces it to fall in line. If you can get a taco at 3 A.M., there'd better be a drugstore nearby where you can buy Alka-Seltzer at 3:45. And if you're stuck working on a holiday, you don't want to be stranded without your support systems. "I was in the Denver airport on Christmas Day and wondered if my insurance would cover a rental car," says William Lewis, head of McKinsey & Co.'s Global Institute, which analyzes economic trends. "I called Geico, and an agent gave me the go-ahead."

Companies that don't take the 24-hour initiative may find the choice taken out of their hands: Consumers are beginning to expect no less. If you can't fix my computer at 2 A.M., fine. I'll find someone who will. Anne Applebaum, a journalist on assignment in New York, ran into trouble one Friday at 8 P.M. when her computer broke down just as she was preparing to file a story to London. PC Computer Doctor, a repair shop, picked up the machine, fixed it within hours, and gave a 90-day guarantee. You won't find that kind of service in London—or anywhere else in Europe, where hours tend to be short, lunches long, and weekends inviolable. Says Applebaum: "All the so-called 24-hour companies tell you to call back on Monday."

The economy that never stops has its downside. "Left to its own devices, this is a trend that could eat you alive," says Morgan Stanley's chief economist, Stephen Roach, who gets frequent middle-of-the-night phone calls. It can also lead to some big mistakes. "When you're tired, vats boil over and tools drop into machines," says Martin Moore-Ede, a physiology professor at Harvard medical school and director of the Institute for Circadian Physiology in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Indeed, some of the world's worst industrial disasters have occurred at night, including those at Chernobyl, Bhopal, and the Exxon *Valdez* oil spill. Moore-Ede estimates that the costs of fatigue—from accidents to lost productivity—add up to a staggering $80 billion a year.

Relationships suffer. Children whose parents work odd hours must make hard adjustments at tender ages (see box). Adults on the second or third shift often find they are totally out of sync. "I'm the one leaving the party when everyone else is arriving," says Janet Mirasola, 37, managing director of Birch Brokerage Co. in Holmdel, New Jersey. Mirasola, a Brit, still lives on London time because she trades copper, aluminum, and other base metals that are most active on the London exchange. Her workday begins at 2 A.M., when she straggles into her home office, chats with her Asian clients, and settles down to four hours of trading. At 6 A.M. she drives ten minutes to her firm's office. By noon, she calls it a day. Before she goes to bed at 7 P.M., she likes to exercise, do a little shopping, and have dinner with her husband. The dinner part can be tough: As chief financial officer of Birch Brokerage, Michael Mirasola keeps traditional hours. Says his wife: "I'm forever calling and saying, 'When are you coming home?' "



As the clock shows, there's lots of activity in the wee hours. The real growth in nighttime work is in the service sector, where hardly anyone keeps bankers' hours anymore.

Indifferent markets—and some convincing economics—leave men and women no choice but to cope. Just how much extra business can a 24-hour operation attract? Companies that pioneer the night for their industries often find the gains to be prodigious. But International Data Corp., a research firm in Framingham, Massachusetts, says even companies trying to catch the trendsetters can add 5% to revenues—no small change in these growth-starved times. "You have to assume that some of the business done at 4 A.M. would have been done during the day," says McKinsey's Lewis. "But not all of it."

International Data Corp. estimates that more than 40% of large U.S. companies work under the stars, at least in some aspects of their business. And that's just the beginning, says Bruce Marlow, chief operating officer of Progressive Corp., the Cleveland auto insurer that is a 24-hour trailblazer: "You're talking about a tidal wave that will roll through every one of our service and distribution industries." As the folks at CNN say, it's always prime time somewhere.

KINKO'S INC., a privately held chain of copy shops, moved to a 24-hour schedule when people literally started banging on its windows after hours. "Sometimes we'd be working overtime to finish a project, and people would pass by and see the lights on," says Greg Melheim, president of Kinko's of Illinois. "They started knocking on the glass, begging us to let them in. 'Please, please,' they'd say, 'can I just make five copies?'"

Peer into Kinko's, and you see the 24-hour world at work. The company's 803 stores around the country are magnets for ambassadors of the night: everyone from dreamers pursuing secret schemes and second careers to executives putting the final touches on tomorrow's presentation. "A police officer on the night beat always comes in on his breaks to use our printers," says Jim Chapman, a Kinko's employee in Kansas City. "Turns out he's a comic book illustrator on the side." Another of Chapman's regulars runs a hotel shoeshine. He breezes by around 5 A.M. to run off fliers that read FAST EDDIE, THE BEST SHOESHINE IN TOWN.

In Chicago, Kinko's has hooked into a different dimension of the 24-hour economy by opening an office in the lobby of the Stouffer Renaissance hotel, a favorite spot of foreign executives. Explains the hotel's general manager, John Bruns: "Our customers were coming down at odd hours asking us to fax things abroad and help them with their desktop publishing. We weren't equipped to meet their needs." So last Christmas, Stouffer and Kinko's began collaborating; now business is booming, Melheim says. "The hotel guests love it because their bodies are running on a different clock, and we're in sync with them."

Except for what's stowed under people's mattresses, money doesn't sleep anymore, and neither does the financial services industry (see box). Somewhere around the world, markets are open. George Milling-Stanley, a precious-metals analyst for Lehman Brothers in New York, remembers what he did when war broke out in the Gulf. "I was sitting down to dinner in Chinatown with some friends. Just as the food arrived, we heard that planes were on their way to Baghdad. We got the check, took doggie bags back to the trading desk, and worked well into the night."

Banks have long since given up bankers' hours, what with the strange lives their customers lead. It used to be that ATMs and automated voices handled the after-hours crowd. Now many banks are adding warm bodies around the clock who provide much more than basic account information. A leader is Huntington Bancshares in Columbus, Ohio. If in perusing the newspaper late at night you see an ad for the car of your dreams, call a Huntington loan officer. She'll tell you within ten minutes whether you should dream on. Huntington books 10% of its loans in off hours. Boston's BayBanks has distributed a 53-page catalogue that lets after-hours customers choose services ranging from a safe deposit box (catalogue No. SP-2301) to a $1,000 credit line and overdraft protection (No. CL-2301). Business generated by its 24-hour number (800-BAY-FAST) equals that of 30 full-service branches.

The economics of running a business nonstop are elementary—and utterly compelling. As David Ricci, a retail analyst at securities firm William Blair & Co., puts it: "What does it cost to keep a place open? A

2:30 A.M.

Metals trader Janet Mirasola keeps London hours in her New Jersey home office.

11:30 P.M.

By the light of the moon—not to mention powerful floodlights—this golfer in Deer Park, New York, will reach the ninth hole at midnight.



few heads and a little electricity." There are even hidden bargains. Pennsylvania Power & Light charges its largest industrial users about 30% less for electricity purchased after hours. And small retail outlets pay Detroit Edison only half as much in off-peak hours.

Fidelity, which was first among mutual fund companies to offer 24-hour service, says using its brick and mortar more efficiently saves millions of dollars a year in capital costs. Explains executive vice president Roger Servison: "If we held all our business to daytime hours, we'd need a lot more buildings to house the staff required to handle the calls." Servison estimates that roughly 40% of Fidelity's telephone business comes in during off-hours: "You might say that having been first, we enjoy more than our fair share of night owls."

When a company breaks the barriers of a nine-to-five world, 24 hours at full steam is hardly the only alternative. A skeleton crew may be all that's needed on the graveyard shift. And sometimes two shifts are enough to meet demand. Maintenance crews often take over for a portion of each day; Heartland Golf Park, for example, has to close for a few hours to replace divots and water the greens.

Many services can be delivered from anywhere in the world. This allows workers to quit at a reasonable hour and pass their spreadsheets to colleagues in another time zone—ideally where labor and land cost less. Why should the Citibank customer in New York know or care that his late-night query goes to a call center in Nevada—or South Dakota—as long as someone takes care of his problem?

Progressive Corp. says it has eliminated millions of dollars in waste—and doubled its market share—since leading the night charge for the auto insurance industry in 1991. As readers of FORTUNE's recent story (August 7) on the company and its bizarre, gifted boss may recall, a Progressive claims rep will meet policyholders on the road anytime of the day or night if they have an auto accident. The prompt response saves money because it makes policyholders less likely to hire an attorney to settle their claims. If an attorney stays out of things, a person with a lower-back or neck injury gets an average of $2,100 from the insurance company; when a lawyer is involved, the settlement averages $9,400. That's because

PAGING DR. ROACH

Not so long ago, Morgan Stanley's chief economist, Stephen Roach, was a well-rested, hands-off boss. Occasionally he'd cross paths with a member of his staff and exchange ideas. Otherwise, he'd leave his people alone—and they him. No more. Not since institutional investors, in their frantic search for yield, started keeping all-night vigils. Not since bond dealers in Hong Kong began hanging on Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan's every word with the same intensity as Wall Streeters. And not since the amount of money moving around the world's equity markets nearly doubled to $10 trillion annually in just two years.

In response to the huge increase in volume, Morgan Stanley is spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year on computer technology that will allow capital, analysis, and data to flow continuously across borders. Roach has divided the day into three eight-hour segments, defined by the markets in New York, London, and Hong Kong. Says he: "Every eight hours we try to pass the risk, the insight, the commentary, and the analysis from one time zone to the next."



Straddling many time zones on little sleep, the itinerant Roach tries to stay in touch with the U.S. economy from Tokyo.

But like a doctor, Roach finds himself nearly always on call. "I'm exhausted," he says. He gets just three hours of sleep a night during one of his frequent trips abroad. And late-night calls at home from traders or members of his staff are not uncommon. Says Roach: "My wife is saying, 'If I had wanted to marry a surgeon, I would have hung out in a medical school.'"

Roach hasn't figured out how his carefully divided day can incorporate a personal time zone. "It's real tough," he says. "You do need to sleep, and you do need a fresh change of clothes and a shower. You can't just work until you drop, then show up at your front door and roll into bed." Yet that's exactly what he does—until his phone rings with someone, somewhere in the world, relaying news or asking for advice.

THERE ARE NO BEDTIME STORIES HERE

Right about the time most kids her age were being tucked into bed at home, 5-year-old Twynea Manning and her friends boarded a yellow school bus and began an adventure. They were off on a twilight picnic—one of the many ways children at Toyota Motor's child-care center in Georgetown, Kentucky, pass the time while their parents work the late shift.

Home to 230 children during the day and 90 at night, the Toyota Child Development Program, as it's called, is one of only a handful of subsidized corporate facilities that offer 24-hour care. Toyota's center keeps the children busy at night while their parents operate and maintain the assembly lines—beginning at 5:15 P.M. and winding down around 2 A.M., unless there's overtime. Parents pay $75 a week for infants and toddlers, and $68 for children between the ages of 2 and 13.

In an effort to preserve some semblance of normal family life, the center tries to keep the children on their parents' schedules. Starting about nine o'clock, the kids fight sleep by baking cookies, climbing monkey bars, and banging on musical instruments—the usual, but at a most unusual hour. At midnight they go down for a two-hour nap, until their parents can take them home to bed.

Hardly ideal. But for the moms and dads on the late shift, the center is a godsend. Engine assembler Terry Manning, 28, Twynea's father, recently quit his job at a nearby detention center so he could take advantage of Toyota's day-care —make that night-care—benefit. "I don't get to read Twynea bedtime stories. That's hard," he says. "But we do get to spend the day together now." Ironically, that's probably more time than most fathers who work a traditional schedule spend with their children.

A quick snooze should help these kids stay up till midnight at Toyota's center.

9:45 P.M.

someone who has legal representation tends to see more doctors who recommend more medical procedures. An independent study done by the Insurance Research Council shows that after paying their doctor and lawyer fees, policyholders who hire an attorney pocket an average of $100 less than those who don't. The upshot: The number of Progressive's accident victims who use an attorney has declined 20%.

THE GOOD WILL generated by continuous service is harder to measure than the profits. But L.L. Bean, for one, has built the business on it. To this day, nocturnal outdoorsmen fearful of being caught in a storm are welcome to sleep in tents set up for sale on the showroom floor. The payoff comes next morning, when the indoor campers stock up on supplies before heading out again.

The biggest challenge posed by the nonstop economy may be a physiological one: how not to sleep through it. As physiologist Moore-Ede says, "We're simply not designed for this 24-hour world we've created. Our internal clocks adapted us perfectly to a world where we slept by night and hunted by day." He recommends that night workers take frequent catnaps. Kinko's Chapman agrees: "A ten-minute power nap will keep you going for hours." Connie Lehman, who sometimes works nights as CNN's director of video resources, says her solution is to maintain a well-lit, high-adrenalin environment, and then to sleep well during the day. "Put up black curtains in your room," she says. "Don't let your body know the sun is shining."

Naps may take care of our bodies. But how about our souls? What's clear in the tales of men, women, and children who have joined the army of the night is that human nature and relentless commerce are fundamentally at odds. Yes, as Progressive's Marlow says, "We can't hold back the 24-hour economy." But even God rested on Sunday. And during the winter of 1967, L.L. Bean shut down—on the day that Leon Leonwood was buried. ■

Leon Gorman—the grandson of L.L. Bean and president of the 24-hour company—heads out when the bass run best.

5:00 A.M.



Working 5 to 9

All work and no play doesn't just make you dull—it can also drive you crazy

By Michelle Cottle

ONE ENCHANTED EVENING LAST March, I found myself hurtling through the darkened sky in a Boeing 747, suspended 30,000 feet above the still-frozen midwest: I was on the red-eye, the only travel option that would permit me to make a late afternoon meeting in San Francisco and my morning appointment in Boston. The in-flight movie had played itself out, and I'd flipped through the stack of memos and journal articles in my shoulder bag. Now all I wanted to do was sleep.

But I could not drift off. My eyes were glued to one of those individual video screens airlines are now installing on the backs of passenger seats. In between invitations to play video games (for a nominal fee) or peruse the entertainment and sports news of the day, the screen kept flashing a warning at me: "You can't afford to be out of touch. Use the Airfone to contact your office or clients right now."

I was overcome with panic. Should I call the office and check my voice-mail? What if a crisis were erupting that very minute that I wouldn't know about until we landed in another two hours? What if my boss needed to reach me but couldn't because I was busy dragging my carcass across the continent on a bit of company business?

What if, indeed.

The American worker is doomed. Not only do we have to worry about downsizing and stagnant wages and increased productivity demands, we have become the target of a movement, led by shrewd entrepreneurs and by our own employers, to help us minimize the number of seconds we are not actively engaged in job-related activities. What's worse, their efforts are being aided by the unwitting victims themselves, pathologically ambitious worker bees who wear their beepers during sex and develop a nervous tic if they go more than 10 minutes without checking voice-mail.

The Airfone is a prime example of the key role technology plays in this absurd crusade. I don't care if you are the chairman of Philip Morris, chances are there is nothing going down with the Marlboro man that can't be put on hold until you've deplaned. But thanks to the wonders of modern telecommunications (and clever marketing), business travelers have been made to feel we're doing our companies a disservice by being out of touch for the duration of a domestic flight. God forbid we should read a book, write our congressman, meditate, or fritter away our time with some other non-work-oriented pursuit for a few hours. As for travelers so career-crazed they get the shakes at the mere thought of missing a client call: You don't need an Airfone. You need a tranquilizer.

Back on terra firma the situation is even uglier, with faxes, cellular phones, and modems making it possible for us to work anytime, anyplace. No longer does leaving the office signal the end of the work day. People can now send us voice mail and e-mail at 8:00 p.m. on Christmas Eve. And since we can access these systems remotely, there's the constant pressure to respond promptly or have our work ethic questioned. Fortunately, also thanks to cell phones and beepers, a busy parent can easily set up a conference call from the middle of his third-grader's ballet recital. One well-adjusted executive at my old company even managed to conduct sales calls from her hospital bed just hours after delivering her first child. Now that's time well spent.

Recognizing that a workaholic culture might clash with the current hooplah over family values, computer and telecommunications companies have begun marketing their products and services as "family friendly" conveniences that help employees balance work and personal obligations. Just recently GTE aired a commercial asking if you'd ever tucked your child into bed from 1,000 miles away. Presumably, viewers were supposed to send up a great cheer when the ad assured us that someday soon we'd be able to do just that thanks to video hookups on our home computers. What an ingenious breakthrough in work/child management: remote parenting. Just log on at night for a quick bedtime story, then log off for eight hours of restful, guiltless sleep. As for the kids, what six-year-old wouldn't want a parent that came with an on/off switch?

Already these inspirational child-rearing techniques are gaining popularity. *U.S. News & World Report* recently ran a heart-warming piece about the rise of "virtual parents," who, while working late at the office or away on business, correct their children's homework by fax, oversee their dating life by phone, and keep track of their whereabouts by beeper. Forget all that messy personal interaction. Here's a system in which everyone prospers: Companies don't need to fret about employees being distracted by non-work issues. Parents don't have to feel guilty about not being there for their kids. And children get to have that great latchkey-kid freedom, but with the security that, if they hear a strange noise outside or feel the urge to begin a life of crime because of parental neglect, they can just beep Mom or Dad for a little electronic emotional support. With any luck, in another five or six years we'll have successfully eliminated the need for all physical contact whatsoever with our offspring—maybe even our spouses. Forget Windows 97; Bill Gates should perfect the cyberhug.

One well-adjusted executive at my old company placed sales calls from her hospital bed just hours after delivering her first child.

Kill Them With Kindness

Still, it would be too easy to blame technology for our inability to disengage from work. Many of the developments blurring the line between our professional and private lives are decidedly low-tech. Among the hottest is the new breed of employment benefits thoughtfully designed to help stressed-out workers "balance" their personal lives right out of existence:

- Since 1987, the Washington, D.C.-based Arnold & Porter law firm has run an emergency back-up child care center that operates at night and on weekends, for use solely when parents are working overtime. The firm estimates that this family-friendly center clears the way for an additional $800,000 in billable hours a year.
- The Principal Financial Group in Des Moines, Iowa, has established an onsite "lactation center" where new mothers can go to express breast milk. According to a Principal spokesperson, this helps speed women's return to work following childbirth. (It's essential not to let newborns get too accustomed to parental attention, lest they develop a sense of entitlement.)
- At the Milwaukee headquarters of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, employees can enjoy free lunch in the company cafeteria—the company having calculated the money and time lost by people leaving the premises to eat.

Quick to spot a profitable trend, the market has come up with an offering that makes it even easier for companies to provide time-saving benefits: corporate concierge service. Typically managed by an outside contractor, a company's concierge can handle employees' every need—from standing in line at the DMV to retrieving clean dress socks from someone's home (or delivering expressed breast milk).

Now, granted, we'd all love to have someone fluff and fold our underwear and cook dinner for us every night, but these perks aren't about achieving balance so much as about making it easier, and more acceptable, for people to work non-stop. After all, if your company provides after-hours daycare, it suddenly becomes much more reasonable for an employer to expect you to work overtime. And if one phone call to the office concierge can take care of your automotive, grocery, and home-furnishing needs, as well as organize your four-year-old's birthday party, why would you ever need to leave your desk? As one systems analyst whose firm offers such benefits told the *Indianapolis Star*, "I can concentrate on my work and do a good job without having to worry about my personal obligations."

Companies insist (and may even believe) that their goal is not to chain workers to their desks, but the reality is that these programs are being provided within the framework of a business culture that still equates job commitment with hours spent at the office. Even with benefits like flex-time and paternity leave now available in many companies, the unspoken rule remains: He who stays the latest gets the promotion—

or at least doesn't get canned. Notes Boston University researcher Laura Nash, "Companies seem willing to do anything for people—except for the employee who says, 'I just want to go home at 5:00 p.m. and have dinner with my family.' That's unheard of."

Employees know this, and the uncertain job market makes them wary of testing employers' humanity. All those media stories about the GM engineer "let go" after 15 years and the UCLA grad forced to shovel fries at Jack-in-the-Box have made people too afraid to leave their desks. We are convinced that, were we to sneak out of the office before 9:00 p.m., we'd find a hungrier, "more dedicated" employee entrenched in our cubicle by morning.

Noses to the Grindstone

So if most people are going to work all night regardless of who's cooking dinner, what's wrong with at least providing them the conveniences?

For starters, these arrangements allow both employers and employees to avoid confronting the true costs involved in achieving a real balance of work and personal demands. We have a desperate desire to believe that what works is the same as what's good. For example, reports show that more and more companies are providing sick/emergency child care. This magnanimous effort to save parents the hassle of scrambling for a sitter when Junior is too contagious to be around other children has led to much back-slapping and self-congratulations throughout Corporate America. Well, this is super news, because four out of five pediatricians surveyed say the best possible treatment for a sick toddler is to be handed off to a bunch of strangers as quickly as possible so as not to interrupt Mommy and Daddy's work day.

Quick reality check: Complicated problems rarely have simple solutions. In reality, hiring someone to videotape your child's Little League game does not make working all weekend okay. Similarly, while paying someone to fetch employees' dry cleaning is a nice gesture, it does not counterbalance the increased productivity demands feeding their anxieties and driving them to put in such long hours. In a 1996 Gallup poll, one quarter of employees surveyed said they feel "stressed out" at work every single day. While great news for the makers of Maalox, this bodes ill for our society's overall mental health.

Americans claim they are ready for a change. A 1994 Gallup poll showed that approximately one third of those surveyed would take a 20 percent pay cut in exchange for fewer work hours for them or their spouse. But it will take more than a few office errand boys to effect the required change. At this point, most Americans don't need any help in obsessing over work. By and large, we're a culture that has taken the Protestant work ethic one step too far, gauging people's worth by their professional (and financial) status. Even as we bemoan our chaotic schedules, we're suspicious of those who aren't on the fast track. Twenty-somethings who don't come flying out of college ready to beg, borrow, or commit investor fraud to make company VP within five years are labeled "slackers" and expected to move to Seattle and serve up espressos at Starbucks.

No one is looking to undermine America's global competitiveness. We simply need to accept that the law of diminishing returns applies to workloads, and we need to start formulating workplace policy based on that understanding. But don't look for Uncle Sam to lead the way: Executing a bold move in exactly the wrong direction, the IRS ruled in December that companies can now give employees the option to, instead of taking their allotted vacation days, have a percentage of their vacation pay placed into tax-deferred 401k retirement accounts. (Just think of what a nice funeral that fund will provide for when you drop dead from exhaustion at age 45.)

Reform-minded employers may have to take the first step, making better use of part-time work arrangements, and setting limits on the hours people work and the vacation days they must take. Otherwise, we'll continue to learn the hard way about the ugly results of all work and no play. My former employer certainly did: Just a few weeks into my job, I discovered that the woman who'd previously held my position had been wheeled away on a stretcher one afternoon after a small "stress attack" she'd had in front of the elevators.

Needless to say, no one there pushed me to work weekends. ●

WHY (AND HOW) MORE PEOPLE ARE DROPPING OUT OF THE RAT RACE



Source: Merck Family Fund Poll, nationwide telephone survey, February 1995.

Complaints about excessive consumerism were rampant in the '80s, but lately people seem to be rejecting the "I shop, therefore I am" credo in deed as well as word. The Trends Research Institute, a social-analysis think tank in Rhinebeck, N.Y., named "voluntary simplicity" one of its Top 10 trends of 1994. "This movement is mushrooming," says Vicki Robin, co-author of the best-selling *Your Money or Your Life* and guru of the voluntary-simplicity movement.

And women are in the forefront. A new, nationwide telephone poll of 800 Americans, commissioned by the Merck Family Fund, found that 89% of women and 75% of men feel Americans buy far more than they need, and 85% of women and 75% of men agree that, as a nation, we are addicted to shopping. For many, consuming is a "substitute for what's missing in our lives," according to 75% of women and 69% of men. Michael Jacobsen and Laurie Mazur of the Center for the Study of Commercialism report in their new book, *Marketing Madness: A Survival Guide for a Consumer Society*, that businesses spend over $2,200 a year to bombard each family of four with advertising in the hope that we'll continue to shop till we drop.

My own poll at one of the nation's largest telecommunications companies echoes the Merck findings: 88% of the women and 83% of the men agree or strongly agree that "Americans are too materialistic"; 89% of the women and 70% of the men feel that "today's youth are too oriented toward money and material success"; 68% of the women and 64% of the men say simply that "Americans spend too much time shopping."

Personal Downshifting

In the Merck poll, the three things people said they needed to make their lives more satisfying were spending more time with family and friends, reducing stress and doing more to make a difference in their communities. And significant numbers of people are now making changes along those lines. The Merck poll included an estimate of "personal downshifting," a trend that has been widely reported but never before quantified, with 28% of those polled responding affirmatively to the question "In the last five years, have you voluntarily made changes in your life which resulted in your making less money?"

Not surprisingly, there is a gender gap: 32% of women and 23.5% of men report downshifting. Among those with children, 45% of women—and 31% of men—have slowed down. Voluntary downshifters are more likely to be under 40 and nonwhite, and, contrary to popular opinion, are not necessarily well-off; the majority (56.5%) make below $34,000. Unfortunately, the Merck poll did not ask respondents about their presimplified income. But downshifters can be found in every group, from less than $10,000 (37%) to the $100,000-plus range (24%).

The three most popular forms of downshifting were changing to a lower-paying job, reducing work hours and quitting work outside the home. The most common motives for downshifting were to have a less stressful life (cited by 70% of the moms, 58% of the dads), a more balanced life (72% of the moms, 74% of the dads) and more time (68% overall). Many mothers (87%) and fathers (72%) said they wanted to spend more time caring for their children.

These downshifters, especially the women, are overwhelmingly happy about the changes they have made. Only 6% of the women and 13% of the men said they were unhappy with their decision.

What Stops the Rest of Us

With growing numbers of Americans feeling rushed, wishing for more time off and looking for balance, why don't more of us opt out of the rat race? In my poll, 69% of the respondents said they'd like to cut back on their working hours but just can't afford to now. The most commonly cited reason: debt. Only 29% of my sample, which is more affluent than the national average, pays off all credit card charges each month. And in the Merck survey, only a third of the sample is debt-free, excluding mortgage debt. Other impediments include lack of scheduling flexibility in jobs, job insecurity and personal inertia. In other words, making dramatic life changes is hard work in itself. —Juliet Schor



Source: Merck Family Fund Poll, nationwide telephone survey, February 1995.

Not all categories included, so figures do not add up to 100%.

Working Shorter

It's been more than 50 years since the United States adopted the 40-hour workweek. With the nation's unemployment rate still above 6 per cent, is a shorter workweek an idea whose time has finally come? Probably not.

BY KIRK VICTOR

For the members of Local 1 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) in St. Louis, the decision to push for a shorter workweek was a no-brainer. Sure, it involved a big hit in pay for those already working a 40-hour week, but by agreeing to "share" their work, they gave lots of other union members a chance to pick up desperately needed paychecks after being out of work for long stretches.

"We were faced with unemployment extending to 11 months for some of these fellows," Donald G. Bresnan, Local 1's business manager, said in an interview. "On a personal level, in many instances, it [sharing work] made the difference, so that workers avoided the loss of whatever savings they had, their health and welfare benefits, and it eliminated an awful lot of hardships on their families."

In grappling to come up with a plan to alleviate the hardships brought on by a sour economy in the St. Louis area, the union had reviewed the total hours worked by its 2,200-2,300 wiremen and construction workers. The results were startling: About 60 per cent of them did the vast bulk of the work, while the other 40 per cent either were seriously underemployed—working half-time or less—or without any work at all.

To reduce this disparity in the workload, the union sought the right to juggle the schedule so that its members essentially would work four-day weeks, spreading the available jobs around to more workers. The union's proposal called for a reconfigured work schedule that would go into effect whenever 225 of its members had been unemployed for at least eight weeks.

When the proposal was first broached, employers balked. In June 1991, the union went on strike over the issue, but management caved quickly (after just two days). Bresnan argues that the plan has worked well.

"There was not one complaint from contractors that the guy [substituting for one of the regular crew] had the attitude, 'Well, I'll only be here [a short time], so I'll dog it,' " Bresnan said. "As a matter of fact, it was quite the opposite."

The 18-month work-sharing provision in the union's three-year contract is ending just as unemployment in the St. Louis area has begun to drop. Obviously delighted that the union's members had so willingly accepted the approach, Bresnan, a veteran of more than 40 years in Local

Richard A. Bloom

Thomas R. Donahue, the AFL-CIO's secretary-treasurer The goal: "more work opportunities for more people."



Richard A. Bloom

American Enterprise Institute's Marvin H. Kosters
A shorter workweek won't lower unemployment.

1, concluded: "There were no gifts in this. I can't say enough about their cooperation."

As for whether going to the shorter workweek and job sharing is the best way to attack unemployment, Bresnan said, "I don't know how else they [government officials] will accomplish it—if they don't do that, you're going to give it out in unemployment benefits anyhow."

Ask Patrick Murphy about the plan and you get quite a different story. Murphy, the president and owner of Crest Electrical Co. in St. Louis, which was one of the contractors affected by the work-sharing plan, complained that it was "very expensive." It forced the company to substitute new workers for its "normal, productive work force" about a fifth of the time, he said.

Workers who came to the job from the union's hiring hall as "a general rule" were less productive than the company's full-time employees, Murphy said, though he acknowledged that there were exceptions. Still, he said, the foreman had to spend time getting newly hired workers up to speed—a big difference, he added, from having a regular crew that "you can count on for 'x' amount of work."

"From our customers' standpoint, it was hard to understand why we weren't manning the jobs and having the same group of workers there every day rather than constantly rotating people in and out," Murphy said. "The work flow is just not the same as when you have a steady crew."

Crest, which has about 150 employees, does lots of work for telephone companies, electric utilities, hospitals, retail malls and offices. "Depending on our workload, we'd have to hire additional people to keep the work going," Murphy said. "That was the union's idea behind it—to stimulate our hiring."

Murphy argues that work sharing is a lousy way to combat high unemployment. "The only way you're going to stimulate employment is to stimulate the jobs for people to do, not to artificially take work from people to create opportunities for some," he said. "We hurt the mass to help the few. Our [company's] bottom line has suffered—if that's any indication, it was a costly affair for us."

Before the next contract is negotiated, he said, contractors will do a study to evaluate precisely how much the work-sharing hurt them. Such a study is imperative, he said, because Local 1 is likely to make it a strike issue again in June 1995.

"What's happened, unfortunately, is that other unions in the country have picked up on this as their salvation, and in almost every contract that is under negotiation, this is one of the items that is being asked for," Murphy said. "We want to give other [contractors] fair warning about what they're signing up for and what it's going to cost them in the long run."

Indeed, labor analysts agree that the issue is likely to crop up with increasing frequency in labor negotiations. "What we could well see is major trendsetting contracts moving in this direction, followed by legislation," Harley Shaiken, a professor who specializes in workplace issues at the University of California (Berkeley), said in an interview.

The issue has also been thrust into the spotlight in recent months as some Western European governments and corporations look to four-day workweeks as a way to combat persistently high unemployment. "This idea has clearly entered into the serious political debate in Europe," Shaiken said. "It is obviously very controversial there, but it is taken quite seriously. Companies are moving in that direction. My sense is that that could well put it on the agenda in the United States."

But business lobbyists as well as many economists dismiss the idea as farfetched and not something that should be pursued at a time when the United States is seeking to compete more effectively in a cutthroat global economy. They are quick to point out that if the government were to mandate a shorter workweek, companies would be forced to hire new workers, with huge up-front expenses, including the increasingly high cost of fringe benefits.

The European experiments with shorter workweeks, they argue, represent a desperate effort by government officials and corporate chieftains there to dodge political hot potatoes and salvage their careers by avoiding more layoffs at a time when unemployment is sky-high.

"People have been talking about this happening in Europe," Audrey Freedman, a labor economist who heads her own consulting firm in New York City, said in an interview. "My reaction is, 'Wonderful—then we'll have a wonderful competitive advantage over the Europeans.' "

40 HOURS, 55 YEARS

In Washington, where the notion of "global competitiveness" has become the mantra of many lawmakers and policy makers, there isn't much sentiment that a shorter workweek will advance U.S. interests. The most that the usually loquacious Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich has publicly said about it is to tell a reporter for *The New York Times* in October, "I need to think about it more."

Labor leaders are the likeliest candidates to try to push the issue from the political back burner, but even they have higher-priority items on their legislative agenda, including health care reform, worker retraining and the passage of a measure to bar companies from hiring permanent replacement workers for strikers. Nonetheless, they're still quick to give rhetorical bows to the idea.

"I think we are going to see continuing shrinkage of work opportunities on the manufacturing side, and there is no evidence that any society in history has been able to support itself in a full-service economy," Thomas R. Donahue, the AFL-CIO's secretary-treasurer, said in an interview. "That means to me that if you're going to have full employment, you're going to have to have some reduction in working hours to provide more work opportunities for more people.

"If this nation were doing what it ought to be doing, we would have the concept of a full-employment economy as the driving goal, and that goal would require the phasing in—in an orderly fashion and not [through a process] which drives costs through the roof—of shorter workweeks."

Europe's experiments with shorter workweeks, some argue, represent a desperate effort to dodge political hot potatoes and avoid more layoffs at a time when unemployment already is sky-high.

Some also argue that more than 50 years after the federal government first prescribed the 40-hour workweek in the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), it's time to reexamine it. "There's nothing magical about a 40-hour week except in the old-fashioned concept of three-shift-a-day industries, when the 40 hours made sense," Donahue said.

"Government policy had always equated reduced hours with progress—a chief reason people don't work 70 hours anymore," Geoffrey Godbey, a professor of leisure studies at Pennsylvania State University, said. "The 40-hour workweek has suddenly solidified as being normal or natural, but there is no normal or natural here. The five-day workweek is not sacrosanct. It doesn't make any more sense than a three-day week or a seven-day week."

But if the point is to drive down unemployment, Marvin H. Kosters, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, said that such an effort is misdirected. "I think one would be really rather hard-pressed to find any evidence that shortening hours leads to lower unemployment," he said. "Employment relates to a potential worker and a potential employer getting together—or someone striking out on his own. A mandatory shorter workweek really doesn't do anything to help that over any long period of time."

Freedman also pointed out that neither the two-day weekend nor the 11 or so national holidays were standard at the time the FLSA was enacted. "We *have* been shortening the work year," she said. "From 1938 to the present, you'd probably see much more reduction in total weeks worked in the year [when] vacations and holidays" are taken into account.

Other economists deride the notion that there's only a finite amount of work to be divided among workers. An alternative view is that there are numerous unmet needs that require greater output, and that governments should generate more jobs to address these needs.

But such arguments do not dampen the enthusiasm of a longtime champion of the shorter workweek: former Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., who keeps an office in the Library of Congress, just a short hop from his old digs. He sees amending the FLSA and cutting the standard workweek as a way not only to reduce unemployment, but also to promote greater leisure time—so that parents can spend more time with their children, for example—and to advance other social benefits.

Proxmire, who was known for his maverick streak and willingness to push unconventional ideas on Capitol Hill, recently sent lawmakers with jurisdiction over labor issues a letter detailing his proposal, which he insisted in an interview is "a conservative approach." Proxmire said that he would shave one hour from the standard workweek whenever the national unemployment rate in the previous year exceeded 7 per cent and maintain the shorter workweek at that level for at least the next three years. Should unemployment remain high, he would allow additional one-hour reductions every three years.

"That kind of approach would have a much better crack at it because it wouldn't alienate business so much," Proxmire said. "It can still make a profit out of increased productivity and wages could still go up, but we'd have more people working. I'd reinforce it by having a premium payment of double-time for overtime instead of time and a half."

But William T. Archey, a U.S. Chamber of Commerce vice president, contended that such proposals aren't sensitive to the far more competitive international context in which U.S. businesses must operate. "There is no such thing as a domestic policy any longer," he said. "Everything is informed by how it relates to international competitors. Twenty years ago, that proposal [of Proxmire's] would have been seen as a purely domestic issue of how we deal with our workers. Today, the question is, what will it do to our competitiveness—will it increase costs? In that kind of atmospherics, it wouldn't get out of committee."

But the University of California's Shaiken argues that critics of the idea want to dismiss it out-of-hand when, at the very least, it should be given serious attention. "The moment you mention shorter work time, you might as well mention outer space—you have left the realm of serious discussion," he said. "That's very, very unfortunate because it precludes [debate of] an important way to deal with a serious problem—continued joblessness.

"A shorter workweek is by no means a magic solution, but it addresses the problem in a way that we haven't addressed it since the end of the Second World War—that is, productivity in this country has gone way up, [but] work time has been frozen. If you examine the record from the late 19th century onward, any time there has been a reduction in work

Susan M. Muniak

Former Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis.
A shorter workweek would also give families more leisure time.

Richard A. Bloom

William T. Archey, a vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
"The question is, what will it do to our competitiveness—will it increase costs?"

hours, it has been met with very loud choruses of 'we simply won't be able to compete effectively.' In each case, that was proven wrong."

THE EUROPEAN EXPERIMENTS

The recent announcement by Volkswagen AG (VW), the German automaker, that its usually combative union had agreed to a four-day, 28.8-hour workweek beginning in January instead of its current five-day, 36-hour week—with an almost commensurate reduction in pay—sent shock waves through Europe. It may now well provide the impetus for others to try it, according to some analysts.

VW's experiment "gives more credibility" to the idea, Pierre Henri Guignard, a press attaché at the French Embassy in Washington, said in an interview. In November, the French Senate narrowly passed legislation that would allow employers to adopt four-day, 32-hour workweeks on a trial basis. The French workweek was cut from 40 to 39 hours in 1981 when the Socialists took power, but with no corresponding reduction in pay.

The French proposal calls for 8 per cent cuts in pay and is bound to meet resistance from labor unions. Companies that try the shorter workweek would be exempt from some payroll welfare taxes if they agree to use the savings to create jobs.

The proposal must still make its way through the national assembly, which earlier rejected a similar measure.

Although passage of the bill is far from certain, French politicians are under increasing pressure to at least give the impression that they are doing something about the nation's high unemployment rate, which is close to 12 per cent. Guignard said that on a recent trip to France, he was "surprised" to see the extent to which people are feeling "desperate."

"Everyone you meet is now concerned about unemployment," he said. "They all seem to know someone affected in one way or another by unemployment."

Desperation also seems to have been the motivating force behind VW's move. Its workers were given a Hobson's choice: either accept the shorter workweek and a cut in pay or the company would have to slash its 100,000-person work force by 30 per cent to deal with its huge losses, poor sales and extremely high production costs.

The agreement, which is expected to save VW nearly $1 billion, will preserve the base pay of the workers by spreading traditional holiday bonuses and vacation pay over a longer period.

That such work arrangements are being discussed with increasing frequency and seriousness in Europe isn't surprising in light of its bleak employment picture. The 12-nation European Community now counts some 19 million Europeans as unemployed (more than 10 per cent), and that number is projected to exceed 20 million within a year. Little wonder that the Europeans are scrambling for some way to reverse this troubling and politically ruinous trend.

If Europe pushes the idea further, it may pick up a bit of momentum in the United States, said Dean Baker, a staff economist at the labor-backed Economic Policy Institute, who supports the idea. "Europe's economy, whatever you might say, is not collapsing, and they have done this partway and they are talking about going further," he said. "They take it quite seriously. To just rule it out and say it can't be considered really refle[cts] [the critics'] ideology."

But even within the institute th[ere are] sharp disagreements about th[e] merits. "If you let the hours red[uction] take the place of wage increases, th[at's a] holding action," Eileen Appelbau[m,] associate research director, said [in an] interview. "It will preserve jobs, an[d it's] certainly better than continuing to [lose] jobs, but it's not going to create a [whole] lot of new jobs."

Others are even more dismissive [of the] European experiment. "It won't w[ork]," Archey said. "It works in Europe be[cause] they didn't do what American comp[anies] began doing six years ago—restruc[turing] and streamlining. I mean, Volksw[agen] isn't going to fire 30,000 people out[right] but [rather] make them take a 20 per[cent] pay cut and work four days a wee[k]. [As] painful as the streamlining here [has] been—and it may continue—it wa[s a] necessary step to deal with this wh[ole] notion of international competitive[ness] and the world economy. . . . We may b[e at] a point in which we may see an up[tick] in employment precisely because th[e] companies got streamlined."

But Shaiken thinks that the good t[imes], if they come, will not offset the da[mage] wrought in recent years and that th[ose] who argue otherwise are wrong. "[They] are putting their heads in the sand," [he] said. "There will be some rehiring, bu[t no] one expects it to be remotely like wh[at has] been in the past. Despite the recent [good] news, we are engulfed in some long-[term] trends which are very damaging [to] employment growth."

Shaiken said that shortening the w[ork]week and adding workers to pay[rolls] could even boost the competitivene[ss of] U.S. companies. "It's adding produc[tivity] and potential benefits in all kinds of ways—by reducing real costs surroun[ding] stress, absenteeism and job turnover," [he] said. "It isn't simply a clearcut mea[sure]ment of reducing hours from 40 to 35 [and] that's it. There are important poten[tial] benefits."

But the idea is likely to remain a lo[ng] shot. Congress last considered cutting [the] 40-hour workweek in 1983, when R[ep.] John Conyers Jr., D-Mich., spearhead[ed] an effort to reduce it to 32 hours o[ver] eight years. But there were no hearing[s to] examine the proposal, which attrac[ted] even less support than did a more am[bi]tious bill that Conyers introduced in 19[..] with 13 co-sponsors.

Although the European experim[ents] have sparked new interest in usin[g a] shorter workweek to reduce unemp[loy]ment, politicians in the United State[s] seem to view it as an idea whose ti[me], even after more than 50 years, has no[t] come.

LABOR **KIRK VICTOR**

CLOCK-WATCHING



Mark A. Casso opened a press briefing earlier this month by saying that a few years ago he would never have imagined that he would now be embroiled in a lobbying effort to change federal labor laws.

After all, as general counsel of the American Consulting Engineering Council, Casso represents an industry whose highly skilled workers have not historically become caught up in battles over such bread-and-butter labor matters as overtime pay.

Recently, however, Casso said that he has been getting dozens of calls every week about a Labor Department ruling, which has been supported by a series of court cases, that could have a drastic impact on companies that allow salaried workers to take unpaid leave for less than a full day.

Under the "partial-day docking rule," the department has held that the Fair Labor Standards Act requires an employer that grants leave without pay to a salaried employee for part of a day to treat that employee as an hourly worker. If there is a company-wide policy on such partial leave, all other salaried employees would also have to be treated as hourly workers.

Although the issue appears arcane, it could have megabuck consequences. The department's position means that an employer could be liable for overtime pay to employees who work more than 40 hours even if they are at the top echelons of a company and are making six-figure salaries. The employer also could be liable for overtime performed as far back as the statute of limitations extends—two years or, for willful violations, three.

Potential damages to employers could reach $40 billion in back pay, according to a recent study by the Employment Policy Foundation, an industry-supported research group.

The customary practice has been for companies to provide leave without pay to salaried employees who must take part of a day off after having exhausted their paid leave. In so acting, employers often are trying to accommodate their workers' needs, according to the briefing by the Flexible Leave Coalition, which represents more than a dozen business groups.

Under the department's regulations, employees are considered "salaried" if they are executive, administrative or professional workers and their pay is not subject to reduction because of the quality or quantity of their work. Reductions are permitted for absences of a day or more for these employees.

But when deductions are taken for less than a day's leave, the workers are converted to hourly status, according to the Labor Department and court rulings. Their rationale essentially is that such docking of pay is inconsistent with salaried status and should apply only to hourly workers.

That the rulings can have a severe impact was brought home to John H. Foster, chairman and chief executive officer of Malcolm Pirnie Inc., a White Plains (N.Y.)-based engineering firm with about 400 professional employees. When 24 salaried employees took partial days of unpaid leave, the department ruled that they had become hourly employees. The company paid them $3,300 in back overtime pay, but that did not end the matter.

The department next sued for back pay for the company's entire work force, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held Malcolm Pirnie liable for $875,000. (The Supreme Court declined to review.)

"The reason that I am spending time on this is that I don't want to see it happen to other people in our system," Foster said at the briefing. "I don't think our society can afford it. We really got shafted."

William J. Kilberg, a former Labor Department solicitor, blasted the courts and the department for adopting an inflexible rule. "The end result of these judicial interpretations is the civil law equivalent of capital punishment for spitting on the sidewalk," he told the House Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor Standards last month.

In an interview, Kilberg said the coalition doesn't seek to deny overtime pay to employees who are not clearly exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act. Recently introduced bills, he said, would give an assistant manager at a fast-food joint who works in excess of 40 hours without overtime pay but whose employer tries to dock him for short absences the right to that overtime compensation.

But organized labor isn't persuaded. "If a worker is expected to work long hours in one period, it is just plain wrong to cut their pay when they need a few hours off," John Zalusky, head of the AFL-CIO's economic research department, said in testimony to the Labor Standards Subcommittee.

And John R. Fraser, the deputy administrator of the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division, agrees that employers want it both ways. "Employers have generally argued that they want to accommodate the family and personal needs of their employees," he said in an interview. "What they then say, whether explicitly or not, is, 'We don't want to pay them for it and we don't want to have to pay them for more than 40 hours in a week.' "

Kilberg argues that the department's approach is simplistic. "It is silly. No one doubts that the chief executive officers of any *Fortune* 100 company are exempt and don't have to be paid time and a half for hours after 40 hours a week," he said. "The idea, given the huge salaries paid to these people, . . . that on top of that the Labor Department needs to protect their interest is crazy."

Kilberg may have a point. After all, Congress has already recognized that salaried employees need flexibility to take unpaid leave. The 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, which went into effect this month, allows employees to take partial days' unpaid leave to attend to family or medical emergencies without becoming hourly workers.

The business groups have fashioned a pretty good rule of thumb: Ease of enforcement is not always the best reason for policy decisions. And "bright-line tests" are often not the most felicitous basis for judicial pronouncements. A dash of common sense can make all the difference. ■

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Title: VIEWPOINTS; ALL WORK AND NO PLAY: IT DOESN'T PAY
Authors: JULIET B. SCHOR;Juliet B. Schor, the author of 'The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure,' teaches economics at Harvard University.
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Subjects: LABOR; WORKING HOURS

Abstract: Juliet B. Schor discusses the increasing number of hours Americans are working and evidence supporting the argument that employees are more productive if they are not overworked.

Article Text:

HERE'S some advice for companies in search of a better bottom line: Send your workers home early.

Sound silly? It certainly does to most executives. If anything, they say, hours will have to rise. According to a survey by Fortune magazine, for instance, 77 percent of American executives believe that 'large U.S. companies will have to push their managers harder' to achieve global success.

This belief in 'working long' strongly affects the economy and individual businesses. Why do we have a 'jobless recovery?' Because, in part, employers are using record levels of overtime instead of hiring new workers. Why are many companies -- both failing and profitable -- slashing their work forces by thousands? Because, in part, they believe the road to profit is to be lean and mean, to push their employees harder and longer.

'Working long' is hardly new. While earlier eras were interested in the promise of shorter working hours, for the past 20 years job time has been rising. After World War II, the United States had the shortest work time of all advanced industrial countries. Today, our hours are topped only by Japan. While the average working American put in 1,786 hours on the job in 1969, by 1989 annual work time had risen to 1,924 hours -- adding almost a 13th month of work to the year.

It is time to critically examine this 20-year trend, and the assumptions behind it. Is it true that longer hours improve the bottom line? Or, conversely, is it true that shorter hours are unacceptably expensive? If history is any guide, the answers are no and no. At the least, corporate fears about the costs of shorter work time are unfounded. During the shift after 1910 from a 10- to an 8-hour day, for instance, workers produced more per hour. Why? Because the 10-hour day simply proved too tiring for maximum productivity.

Generally, as the workday has gotten shorter over the past 100 years, the efficiency of work has increased. For example, studies of American and British companies in the 1970's -- when there was still some management interest in shorter hours -- have reached a compellingly consistent conclusion: Shrinking the 40-hour work week by up to five hours without shrinking pay leads to less absenteeism, less turnover, less personal business on company time and lower costs.

These results still hold true today. Last summer, when New York Life Insurance gave its employees Friday afternoons off, its chief executive reported that the work was made up during the rest of the week. His experience was not atypical: The rise in hourly productivity from a shorter day often fully makes up for the reduction in hours.

FREQUENTLY, in fact, the shorter day more than makes up for the lost time. When the Kellogg Company adopted a 6-hour day in the 1930's, workers packed more cereal than they had in an 8-hour shift The Kellogg experience is hardly unique. Late 19th-century estimates showed that, for three-fourths of all companies, reducing daily hours not only raised productivity per hour, but also each worker's total daily production.

Aside from productivity, shorter hours can soothe the growing problems of stress, burnout and disrupted personal lives that long hours incur. This is no small advantage. The International Labor Organization recently reported that three of four Americans describe their jobs as stressful, and believe that work pressure is increasing. And, according to a 1991 Gallup poll, 43 percent of working parents experience 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of conflict between work and family, and more than 75 percent say their personal life bears the burden.

Of course, the shorter workday is only one way to reduce work time. Another option is job sharing, which combines the diverse strengths of two people, offers flexibility in total weekly hours without the use of overtime, and can dramatically reduce absenteeism. Other alternatives include permanent part-time employment and employee trade-offs of income for free time.

Reducing work time -- particularly through job-sharing, permanent part-time employment and longer vacations -- can also ease our growing problem with jobs. It is no coincidence that, as work time has increased since the 1970's, unemployment and underemployment have doubled. Given the dim outlook for national and global growth in demand, reducing work time may now be the only feasible way to generate significant numbers of jobs.

But convincing Corporate America to offer these options won't be easy. For 20 years, 'working smart' has been confused, more and more, with 'working long.' But this confusion is not inevitable. Early this century, the value of shorter hours was widely appreciated. It is time to regain that appreciation.

Caption:
Table: 'Comparing Workloads,' lists hours worked by manufacturing workers in selected countries in 1991. (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics)

Drawing

Access No: 9300073672 ProQuest - The New York Times (R) Ondisc
Title: LABOR WANTS SHORTER HOURS TO MAKE UP FOR JOB LOSSES
Authors: PETER T. KILBORN, Special to The New York Times
Source: The New York Times, Late Edition - Final
Date: Monday Oct 11, 1993 Sec: A National Desk p: 10
Length: Long (1200 words) Illus: Photo
Subjects: LABOR; REFORM & REORGANIZATION; UNEMPLOYMENT & JOB MARKET; WORKING HOURS

Abstract: The discussion among union leaders and some economists concerning the adoption of a shorter workweek to make up

for the disappearance of high-paying jobs is examined.

Article Text:

SAN FRANCISCO, Oct. 8 -- Union leaders and some economists are beginning to talk seriously about what once seemed a far-fetched remedy for disappearing high-pay jobs: a shorter workweek.

This may not sound like a particularly novel idea; millions of part-timers already work far fewer than 40 hours a week. But the unions would insist that regular full-time workers whose weeks are cut to 35 hours or so keep their 40-hour pay and benefits.

'There's no question that the long-term salvation of work lies in reducing working hours,' said Thomas R. Donahue, secretary-treasurer of the 95-union American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, which met here this week.

Promoting a shorter workweek may smack of economic snake oil. At a time when several thousand workers are still being laid off every week, asking businesses to take on the added costs of new employees might seem just another of labor's occasional pie-in-the-sky causes.

Certainly no one in Congress is offering legislation that would require a shorter week, and few unions are demanding it at the bargaining table.

Unemployment Antidote

But unions, despite the long decline of their membership and influence, still introduce many innovations in the workplace, particularly in manufacturing, where they are strongest. And a shorter week looms as a novel way to deal with the continuing loss of high-paying, often highly skilled jobs.

In a letter to the House and Senate Labor Committees released last week, William Proxmire, who was considered a leading advocate of labor's causes during his 32 years in the Senate, argued that a shorter workweek would cut unemployment.

It is not uncommon today in some industries for employees to work less than 40 hours. But few workplaces have crossed the 35-hour threshold. Postal carriers, telephone operators and press operators at some newspapers routinely work 35-hour weeks, and some construction workers have 32-hour weeks.

Some labor scholars are promoting shorter weeks, too, both to spread the available work and to relieve the stress of certain jobs.

'The Tooth Fairy'

The most visible scholar of employment practices, Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich, flatly spurned shorter weeks in an interview in February. But before addressing the convention on Tuesday he said, 'I need to think about it more.'

Predictably, business advocates show little enthusiasm for the shorter week if it means higher labor costs. Martin Lefkowitz, a labor relations expert at the National Chamber Foundation in Washington, equated the notion with 'the tooth fairy.'

But David Lewin, director of the Institute of Industrial Relations at the business school of the University of California at Los Angeles, called it 'a legitimate proposition,' adding, 'I think the difficulty is not in the conception but in the implementation.'

Currently, he said, many employers prefer to pay overtime wages of time and a half, because it is cheaper than taking on full-time permanent workers. Unions are fighting that trend by pressuring employers to pay double wages for overtime.

Another incentive for overtime -- it incurs no additional health insurance costs -- could change if President Clinton's health care plan is implemented.

The Productivity Factor

Advocates also argue that many employers can accommodate shorter workweeks at current pay levels because technology and automation have helped raise workers' productivity, especially in industries like steel and telecommunications.

Last week's A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention was the first in decades at which a shorter workweek was on everybody's mind.

'It's becoming a higher and higher item on the agenda as we watch this alleged economic recovery unfold without creating enough jobs,' said Lynn Williams, president of the United Steelworkers of America.

One reason for the unions' interest is their view that the Clinton Administration's answer to the decline in well-paid factory positions -- retraining programs -- usually leads to worse jobs or to no jobs at all.

'They talk about retraining, but retraining for what?' said Vincent R. Sombrotto, president of the letter carriers union. 'As the population grows and we're squeezed out of manufacturing, we have to think about how to stretch jobs to more people.'

Advocates From Academia

Outside the labor movement, some economists and other scholars are urging shorter hours either to spread work or to relieve the strain of 40-hour and longer weeks on two-worker families.

Juliet B. Schor, an economist at Harvard, said the average American worked 1,924 hours in 1989 compared with 1,786 hours two decades earlier, an increase of 7.7 percent. After examining the effects of reductions in workers' hours, she concluded that 'shrinking the 40-hour workweek by up to five hours leads to less absenteeism, less turnover, less personal business on company time and lower costs.'

Dr. Schor added that given the dim outlook for economic growth, 'reducing work time may now be the only feasible way to generate significant numbers of jobs.'

Benjamin K. Hunnicutt, a professor of history at the University of Iowa and an editor of a newsletter for a group called the Society for the Reduction of Human Labor, said demand for shorter workweeks was strong in Europe, where high unemployment had proved intractable.

Whether the same happens in the United States, he said, depends on whether unemployment continues to rise. 'I think the critical point is 10 or 12 percent,' he said. In August the rate was 6.7 percent in the United States and about 10 percent in Europe. But here in California, the most populous state, the rate was 9 percent. The figures for September, announced on Friday, showed the national rate flat at 6.7 percent but California's rate up, at 9.4 percent.

Dangerous Overtime Gambit

In addition to shorter workweeks, he said, workers can be offered extra time off in lieu of raises, vacations can be stretched to five or six weeks, the norm in Europe, and longer leaves can be granted for sickness and child bearing.

For years, unions have resisted temptations to resurrect demands for fewer hours because many of their members covet their right to time and a half for overtime, and many have come to depend on it.

What is more, the assumption that double pay for overtime would lead to more hiring has not faced a real test. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, a professor at the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell, doubts that it would. Instead of hiring more workers, he said, companies that balked at paying double wages might well opt for increased automation, which would result in fewer jobs.

Some union leaders warn that unions must not become so absorbed in shorter workweeks that they abandon the greater goal of strong economic growth and good jobs for all. Shorter workweeks, said Vernon Watkins, an official of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 'just spread the level of misery.'

And Donald Bushey, an official of the Washington State labor council, said that pushing for shorter weeks 'just says these jobs are forever gone. The answer is to do something about the reasons the jobs are gone.'

Caption:
Photo: Lynn Williams, president of the United Steelworkers of America, says the shorter workweek is rising on the agenda. (Associated Press)

Access No: 9300078963 ProQuest - The New York Times (R) Ondisc
Title: VIEWPOINTS; FLEXTIME: THE IMAGINARY INNOVATION
Authors: LINDA K. STROH and KAREN S. KUSH
Source: The New York Times, Late Edition - Final
Date: Sunday Nov 27, 1994 Sec: 3 Financial Desk p: 11
Length: Medium (525 words)
Subjects: LABOR; WORKING HOURS

Abstract: Linda K. Stroh and Karen S. Kush report the results of a survey about companies' flextime programs refuting the commonly held belief that flextime, or flexible working hours, is commonplace. Stroh and Kush say that of the 64 responding companies, only 14% confirmed they had flextime, and of the 86% of companies without flextime, fully 92% said it was unlikely they would ever adopt it.

Article Text:

CALL it the revolution that wasn't. Or isn't, yet.

In the 1980's and early 1990's, conventional wisdom held that 'flextime' -- the use of flexible working hours so employees could balance career and family life -- was the new way of the workplace. The popular press treated this change as a certainty.

Numerous studies provided the proof. In 1989, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that 61.4 percent of 10,345 employers who were surveyed allowed for flexible schedules. In a study by the Conference Board in 1990, half of 521 large companies reported that they had flextime. And in a 1992 survey by the Society of Human Resource Management, 57 percent of more than 1,000 companies said they used the practice and 14 percent more said they were considering it.

Yet, doubts have grown over flextime. Skeptics wonder if the belief in its prevalence is based on wishful thinking or media exaggeration. The newness of the subject also makes it hard to perform finely tuned research. In any event, many suspect that companies that say they use flextime may actually do so just temporarily or experimentally, confine it to a small number of employees or practice it only on a case-by-case

basis.
To address these doubts, we surveyed 121 private companies in the Chicago area with employees ranging from one to 5,000 and revenues from $30 million to $2.4 billion. How many companies, we wanted to know, have formal, permanent flextime programs that are available to a significant portion of the work force?

Our results confirmed the suspicions. Among these small to medium-size enterprises -- the kind which will grow fastest in the coming decade -- flextime has hardly conquered the workplace.

Of the 64 responding companies -- ranging from manufacturers to utilities to wholesalers to retailers -- only 14 percent confirmed they had flextime programs. And in one company the program was unavailable to managers, while in another it was active only in the summer.

Moreover, of the 86 percent of companies without flextime, fully 92 percent said it was unlikely or very unlikely they would ever adopt it.

These employers had many explanations for why they did not use, nor expect to use, flextime. Among the more common: pivotal employees must work during standard hours (84 percent); flextime is not suitable for a customer or service business (70 percent); the flow of work demands coordinated schedules (68 percent); the 'project' nature of the company's work means everyone must be there at the same time (42 percent), and workers might abuse flexible schedules (32 percent).

Thus, flextime is both uncommon in fact, with few significant, continuing programs, and it is held in theoretical disregard by many businesses. Both results may be unfortunate, for much research suggests that once employers try flextime, they like it. In a study of 4,300 accountants, for instance, 85 percent of the responding managers who had permitted workers to use nonstandard hours said they would do so again.

But more fundamentally, policy makers, employers and employees must not assume flextime is a common feature of working life.

It isn't. Linda K. Stroh is an associate professor of organizational behavior at Loyola University Chicago. Karen S. Kush is director of human resources at Whittman-Hart L.P., in Lombard, Ill. The study is also discussed in the fall issue of Indiana University's Business Horizons.

Access No: 9300031735 ProQuest - The New York Times (R) Ondisc
Title: CHILDLESS WORKERS DEMANDING EQUITY IN CORPORATE WORLD
Authors: LENA WILLIAMS
Source: The New York Times, Late Edition - Final
Date: Sunday May 29, 1994 Sec: 1 National Desk p: 1
Length: Long (1380 words) Illus: Photo
Subjects: LABOR; CHILDREN & YOUTH; SINGLE PERSONS
Names: WILLIAMS, LENA

Abstract: The movement by childless workers to attain consideration equal to that given to employees with children is discussed. Workers across the US are complaining that co-workers with children are allowed more time off and other considerations and that childless workers often have to take up the slack.

Article Text:

Leslie Lafayette, a high school English teacher in Sacramento, Calif., says she applauds employers' trying to accommodate the needs of working parents by assisting with child care or providing flexible work schedules.

But she says she is angry about filling in for colleagues who leave early to take their children to the doctor or to a soccer game. She is frustrated, too, that she does not get any special consideration for her needs; a request for time off, say, to see her accountant is not met with the same empathy that a co-worker with a sick child would get. Ms. Lafayette says that because she is childless, she is required to do more than her share to fill in for those with children.

'My experience has been that people without kids have always come in second best and are expected to shut up about it,' she said.

As American businesses struggle to find effective ways to respond to the needs of working parents by developing policies like flexible time, job sharing and on-site child care, they are encountering difficulties among childless employees who feel they are not being given equal consideration.

The problem, quietly simmering since significant numbers of women began entering the work force in the 1970's, has come to the fore in recent years, management experts suggested, as companies began implementing policies to accommodate workers with younger children, without adjusting to employees with other family needs.

Of 14,000 workers questioned by Hewitt Associates, an employee-benefits consulting firm in Lincolnshire, Ill., more than 20 percent said that they were made to work longer hours, tackle more difficult assignments or in other ways cover for parents they worked with.

That lament was echoed across the country in dozens of interviews with workers without children.

'When the boss is missing more days than the staff, there's a problem,' said a 30-year-old securities analyst in Los Angeles, who would not speak for attribution because she said she did not want to worsen an already tense situation with her boss. 'Maybe, if you're raising young children, you have to turn down that promotion to head the section because it may mean working later hours or weekends.'

Caught in the middle are employers who are struggling to find a happy medium in an often fractious, emotional battle over professional commitment and personal priorities. These tensions are in part a function of the general state of overwork in corporate America, management consultants say: many workers are feeling put upon, so special policies for parents are just one more insult.

What Do Singles Want?

'There is some resentment there from singles, a feeling of 'What do we get?' ' said Philip Castro, coordinator of the Los Angeles Water and Power Company's fathering program, a family-care program. 'But when we say, 'What do you want?' it's not easy for them to articulate that. There is a sense that they're not getting something, but we're having a difficult time pinpointing what that is.'

In some cases, employees without children are forming networks to lobby for equal privileges in the workplace like sabbaticals and elder-care benefits. Two years ago, for instance, Mrs. Lafayette founded the Childfree Network, which she described as an 'advocacy group for people to consider child-free living as a valid option.' She said the group had 2,500 members or subscribers to its newsletter and 60 chapters in 33 states.

Although the Family and Medical Leave Act that went into effect last August requires companies with 50 or more employees to grant unpaid leave for family emergencies, many companies and organizations are in a quandary over how to handle requests for leave under other circumstances.

Does a single employee who wants time off to climb the Himalayas deserve the same consideration as one who needs a few days to visit an ailing parent? Does caring for a sick child or relative rank with helping an ailing pet? Should workers who assume the job responsibilities of colleagues on leave be offered compensation for doing so?

More and more companies are answering yes to many such requests. 'As long as the job gets done' is management's new mantra.

Paying for Flexibility

Working parents say their childless colleagues are mistaken if they think parents are getting preferential treatment. They say parents are indeed expected to carry their weight in the workplace. And sometimes they take on lighter schedules, and pay for it by slowing down their careers.

'I work a flexible schedule and my pay reflects that,' said Cathy Haas, who is the mother of two boys and works as a secretary in the legal department at Corning Inc., the fiber-optic and ceramic products company in Corning, N.Y.

Andrew Whittaker, a single, childless employee at Unum Life Insurance Company in Portland, Me., asked for and was granted a flexible work schedule so that he could play drums in a local reggae band.

'My managers and my peers have always been very supportive, the bottom line being that it's O.K. as long as the work gets done on time and there is no abuse of the system,' said Mr. Whittaker, a team development and organizational design consultant.

The Kodak Company in Rochester recently expanded its personal-leave policy, under which employees may take leaves of absence for 'a compelling personal need or education,' to include leaves 'for a unique personal experience.'

'So if you wanted to compete in America's Cup races, as long as your job gets done, no problem,' said Kathy W. Olson, manager of Kodak's work-life programs.

Redefining Equity

Indeed, many companies are asking both sides to bend. Parents who cannot work overtime in the office are asked to take work home. Out-of-town assignments are made on rotation across the board, with parents being given weeks, months, even a year to find a convenient time for travel.

'A lot of this goes back to rethinking the definition of equity,' said Ms. Olson. 'In the past, Kodak has tended to think that equity meant everybody gets the same thing. We've come to challenge that paradigm. Everyone should have access to the same, fair, consistent decision-making process, but the outcomes may be different.'

Corning responded to the voiced concerns of a group of its childless employees, first by changing the name of its program from family-support to work-life, which many workers considered a more inclusive definition, then by implementing programs intended to give single and childless workers more flexibility in their jobs, often granting leaves of absence for personal reasons like doing volunteer work.

Melanie Reynolds, a widow who works as a marketing communications liaison at Corning, was among those who believed that single people were being taken advantage of and was pleased that the company did something about it.

'Assumptions Were Made'

'We hoped to get Corning more sensitized to the fact that singles have some things that need to be considered as well,' said Mrs. Reynolds, adding that the group included married couples who either did not have children or whose children were grown and not living at home. 'On the career side, there have been situations where assumptions were made on behalf of people who were single, concerning out-of-town assignments that spanned maybe two weekends and whether they needed to return home.'

The assumption, Mrs. Reynolds said, was that employees with children would come home on the weekends and those without children would not.

Debra Gilbert, who has worked at Arthur Andersen, the accounting firm, in Washington since her 14-year-old daughter was 2, said there were valid arguments on both sides. She also said that some of the same single, childless people who were complaining about parental benefits today might become parents and the beneficiaries of those policies tomorrow.

'The whole country needs to grow up,' said Shoshana Alexander, a single mother and the author of 'In Praise of Single Parents' (Houghton Mifflin, 1994). 'The ones who say, 'I want mine, too' are still being children themselves. We don't recognize that children belong to a society. We regard them as if they are the property of those who have them: 'They're your kids, you take care of them.' '

Caption:
Photo: Andrew Whittaker, a childless employee, was granted a flexible work schedule so he could play drums in a reggae band. (David Rodgers/Unum Corporation) (pg. 22)

ARTICLES

SEYMOUR CHWAST

growth of the benefit-less contingency labor force, many corporations are doing the same thing to middle-class men. Meanwhile, modern families have grown more ambiguous: It's a little less clear than it once was who's supposed to take care of whom, how much and for how long. So we've grown more anxious. Given our tradition of individualism, many of us feel alone in this anxiety, and insofar as work is our rock, we cling to it.

In this context, the idea of cutting back the workday is an idea that seems to have died, gone to heaven and become an angel of an idea. We dream about it, but it's something we'd never really expect to do. No matter how a movement for work-family balance is structured, in the long run, no such balance will ever take hold if the social conditions that would make it possible—men who are willing to share parenting and housework, supportive communities, and policy-makers and elected officials who are prepared to demand family-friendly reforms—remain out of reach. It is by helping to foster these conditions that a broad social movement could have its greatest effect.

The moment has come to adjust the old workplace to the new work force—to challenge the premises of our long-hour work culture.

The moment has come to adjust the old workplace to the new work force. As history has shown us, the only effective way to bring about basic change is through collective action. Such a movement would have to face certain fundamental issues. As a start, since the corporation absorbs increasing amounts of family time, it is the corporation that we most need to change. Research on large companies indicates that it is hardly prudent to rely on company executives as our architects of time. Whatever their stated goals, whatever they believe they e doing, they are likely to exacerbate, not relieve, the time bind of their workers.

Therefore, a time movement would need to find its center outside the corporation, however important it may be to cooperate with advocates of family-friendly policies inside the company. The struggle for the eight-hour day that began in the nineteenth century and triumphed in the thirties was spearheaded mainly by unionized male workers. A new time movement would have to be made up of a wider range of stakeholders and the organizations that represent them. Male and female workers, labor unions, child advocates and feminists, as well as work-family balance advocates and even the leaders of some progressive companies, would act as the vanguard of such a campaign.

Supporters of the eight-hour day strove to expand the leisure time of workers but said little about families per se. Perhaps this was because most unionized workers at that time were men not responsible for the direct care of children. But now that most mothers are on the job, work time is inextricably linked to family life. A new time movement would need to focus far more on the nature of this linkage. On the other hand, corporations that do provide family-friendly programs tend to associate these programs only with middle-class women, leaving out middle-class men as well as the working class and poor of both genders. Clearly, although women would be a significant constituency of a time movement, men have just as much to gain. Male workers, who often average longer hours than women and whose presence is often sorely missed at home, need a time movement at least as much as women do.

As my study of Amerco (a pseudonym for a Fortune 500 company that offers options for shorter hours that few workers take advantage of) has shown, however, even when the jobs of working parents are secure, pay a sufficient wage and provide family-friendly programs, many working parents are still reluctant to spend more time at home. American fathers spend less time at home than mothers do, expand their work hours when children are small and, if Amerco is any indication, are reluctant to take paternity leaves. We know from previous research that many men have found a haven at work. This isn't news. The news is that growing numbers of working women are leery of spending more time at home as well. They feel guilty and stressed out by long hours at work, but they feel ambivalent about cutting back on those hours.

Women fear losing their place at work; having such a place has become a source of security, pride and a powerful sense of being valued. As a survey conducted by Bright Horizons (a Boston-based company that runs on-site daycare centers in twenty-three states) indicates, women are just as likely to feel appreciated as men at the workplace; as likely as men to feel underappreciated at home; and even more likely than men to have friends at work. To cut back on work hours means risking loosening ties to a world that, tension-filled as it is, offers insurance against even greater tension and uncertainty at home. For a substantial number of time-bound working parents, the stripped-down home and the community-denuded neighborhood are simply losing out to the pull of the workplace.

Many women are thus joining men in a flight from the "inner city" of home to the "suburbs" of the workplace. In doing so, they have absorbed the views of an older, male-oriented work world about what a "real career" and "full commitment to the job" really mean. Women now make up nearly half the labor force. The vast majority of them need and want to be there. There is definitely no going back. But women have entered the workplace on "male" terms. It would be less problematic for women to adopt a male model of work—to finally enjoy privileges formerly reserved for men—if the male model of work were one of balance. But it is not.

All this is unsettling news, in part because the children of working parents are being left to adjust to or resist the time bind—and all of its attendant consequences—more or less on their own. It is unsettling because while children remain precious to their parents, the "market value" of the world in which they are growing up has declined drastically. One need not compare their childhoods with a perfect childhood in a mythical past to conclude that our society needs to face up to a serious problem.

Arlie Russell Hochschild, a professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of The Second Shift *(Avon). This article is adapted from* The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work, *which was published this month by Metropolitan Books.*

But the role of a movement for the reform of work time should not be limited to encouraging companies to offer policies allowing shorter or more flexible hours. As my research shown, such policies may serve as little more than fig leaves concealing a long-hour work culture. A time movement would also need to challenge the premises of that work culture. It would ask: Are workers judged mainly on the excellence of their performance, or mainly on the amount of time they are present at the workplace? Is there a culture of trust that allows workers to pinch-hit for one another as needs arise? Is there job security? The answers to these questions are crucial, for shorter hours can have little appeal as long as employees fear that the long hours they now work may disappear entirely.

To start with, a time movement should press to restructure corporate incentives. For example, the Commerce Department could be pressured to broaden the criteria for receipt of its coveted Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (annually given to companies for outstanding achievement in meeting the standards of "performance excellence") to include the successful implementation of family-friendly programs as measured by the number of employees who actually use them. How many working parents at a given company report that they have enough time for their families? How many go to P.T.A. meetings? How many volunteer in the schools? These could be signs of a company's success in establishing a work-family balance.

Then, too, a time movement must not shy away from opening a national dialogue on the most difficult and frightening aspect of our time bind: the need for emotional investment in family life in an era of familial divestiture and deregulation. It would have to force a public reckoning with private ways out of the time bind—emotional asceticism, the love affair with capitalism, the repeatedly postponed plans of the potential self—that seem only to worsen the situation.

Finally, a time movement would need to compel us to face the issue of gender. In the early stages of the women's movement many feminists, myself included, pushed for restructuring work life to allow for shorter hours, more flexible jobs and restructuring of home life so that men could get in on the action. But over the years, this part of the women's movement seems to have surrendered the initiative to feminists more concerned with helping women break through the corporate glass ceiling into long-hour careers. A time movement would have to bring us all back to the question of how women can truly become men's equals in a more child-oriented and civic-minded society.

A time movement would need to tackle a number of other tough questions as well. How many hours a day, a week, a should people work? How can we press for better work environments without inadvertently making them havens from life at home? How can both partners in a relationship achieve a stable and compatible understanding of work-family balance? In an era of growing income inequality, how can more time be made available to the working poor as well as to the better off?

Sweden, a global competitor long held up as a model of work-family balance, allows 360 days of parental leave, thirty at 85 percent pay and 210 at 75 percent—and 78 percent of fathers take part of it. In addition, Sweden offers up to 120 days of leave a year at 75 percent of income for the care of sick children.

Travelers in Sweden quickly sense that they are in a child-friendly environment. (Even trains have children's play areas with little slides, crawl spaces and tables.) Swedish family policy specifies that children have the right to be looked after properly while their parents work. The government subsidizes childcare, maintaining high standards for secure and stimulating environments at childcare centers nationwide.

In the nineties, Sweden has become a model in a more unexpected way as well. Pressured by more conservative members of the European Union, Sweden has taken tentative steps to cut back on family benefits for working parents. In response, grassroots protest groups have sprung up across the country. The Children's Lobby, established in 1991, is fighting cuts in children's benefits, as is Support Stockings, a group formed by women from all the main political parties. It has even threatened to create a separate party if politicians don't work harder to support family-friendly issues. In opinion polls, a third of Swedish women indicated that they might vote for such a party.

Any successful movement for social change begins with a vision of life as it could be, with the notion that something potential could become real. So let's imagine a mother picking up her daughter at childcare twice a week at 3 P.M. instead of 6 P.M. Picture a father working half-day Fridays and volunteering at his child's center. Let's imagine P.T.A. meetings to which a large majority of the parents come, and libraries where working parents can afford to devote their spare time to reading or literacy programs, or community gardens in which they and their children have the leisure to grow vegetables. Picture too the voting booths in which parents choose candidates who make flexible work-time possible.

But vision alone will not be enough. A time movement will not succeed without changes in many of the underlying social conditions that make it necessary. The rising power of global capitalism, the relative decline of labor unions and the erosion of civil society will all test the resolve of such a movement. Yet it should not be forgotten that such trends not only tighten the time bind we live with but highlight the urgent need for a way to gain release from it. Job scarcity can make people "work scared" (and thus work longer hours), but it could also allow corporations and unions to look at ways to share more lower-hour jobs. Under the right political and social conditions, the growth of technology, which is extending the "anywhere, anytime" workplace into the home, might help people balance work and family, even as it squeezes non-worktime even more.

Finally, I believe that the rising number of women in the labor force—and their partners—are a growing constituency for a time movement. This is especially true for those in the middle ranks of the corporate world. It is these workers whose potential selves—if not yet their real ones—are clamoring for more time at home. At a hypothetical meeting of time activists, a unionized auto worker who wants to cut down on overtime in order to give hours back to laid-off comrades may yet join together with an upper-middle-class, nonunion working mom who wants to job-share. Both could find common cause in their children. The most ardent constituency for a solution to the time bind are those too young as yet to speak up. ■

SOCIETY

What 'Cultural Diversity' Means

"A World View of Cultural Diversity" by Thomas Sowell, in *Society* (Nov.–Dec. 1991), Rutgers—The State Univ., New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

"Cultural diversity" is frequently invoked today as a shining ideal. Some of its crusading advocates, notes Sowell, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, "seem to want to preserve cultures in their purity, almost like butterflies . . . in amber." That, he points out, is not the way in which, over the centuries, cultures and civilizations and indeed the whole human race have advanced. The long history of "cultural diversity," Sowell observes, presents "not a static picture of differentness but a dynamic picture of competition in which what serves human purposes more effectively survives while what does not tends to decline or disappear."

Paper and printing—which originated in China and yet today are integral parts of Western civilization—are but two examples of how cultural advances have been transferred from one group to another and from one civilization to another. Such transfers have marked the entire history of the human race, and they signify much more than just cultural diversity, Sowell argues. They imply that some cultural features were *better* than others.

"The very fact that people—all people, whether Europeans, Africans, Asians, or others—have repeatedly chosen to abandon some feature of their own culture in order to replace it with something from another culture implies that the replacement served their purposes more effectively," he says. For example, Arabic numerals (which actually originated among the Hindus of India) are better than, not just different from, Roman ones. "This is shown by their replacing Roman numerals in many countries whose own cultures derived from Rome, as well as in other countries whose respective numbering systems were likewise superseded by so-called Arabic numerals." Roman numerals today may be fine for numbering kings and Super Bowls, but they can hardly match the efficiency of Arabic numerals in most mathematical operations.

Some contemporary champions of diversity acknowledge the fact of cultural change but insist that such change should come about only through collective or political decisions. This, Sowell says, "is not how cultures have arrived where they are." Decisions about change are made rather by individuals in the course of their daily lives. "In this way, cultures have enriched each other in all the great civilizations of the world."

No culture has grown great in isolation, Sowell says. Intellectuals who, in the name of "cultural diversity," promote "a multiplicity of segregated ethnic enclaves" are not doing the people in those enclaves any favor, he maintains. "However they live socially, [those people] are going to have to compete economically for a livelihood. Even if they were not disadvantaged before, they will be" if they are confined to what exists in their immediate subculture. The advances made in behalf of the human race belong to all people, and "all people need to claim that legacy, not seal themselves off in a dead-end of tribalism or in an emotional orgy of cultural vanity."

The Incredible Expanding Workweek

"Work and Leisure: On the Reporting of Poll Results" by Richard F. Hamilton, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall 1991), Inst. for Social Research, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106.

In a 1989 cover story on "The Rat Race," *Time* magazine declared that "America Is Running Itself Ragged" and cited surveys by pollster Louis Harris to prove the point. The median workweek increased from 40.6 hours in 1973 to 48.8 hours in 1985,

Periodicals *continues on page 118*

Continued from page 16

the Harris polls found, before dipping slightly two years later. Meanwhile, the amount of leisure available to Americans shrank from 26.2 hours a week to only 17.7 in 1985 (and 16.6 two years later). Reporting the 1973–85 survey results in his book, *Inside America* (1987), Harris said they pointed to "the fact that *time* has become a premium in the kind of society emerging in America." Publications from the *New York Times* to *Psychology Today* took up the theme. In a recent, much-publicized book, *The Overworked American* (1991), Harvard economist Juliet B. Schor, despite certain reservations, cited the Harris data to support her contention that Americans have suffered a decline in leisure. Ohio State University political scientist Hamilton, however, after closely examining the Harris findings, says that they are fatally flawed. "There was no dramatic increase in 'work' between 1973 and 1985," he asserts, "nor was there a dramatic decrease in leisure."

Harris's striking findings, Hamilton contends, were apparently caused by significant changes in the methodology used in his surveys. In the 1973 survey, the key question was: "About how many hours a week does your job or occupation take, in-

Impoverished Children

A Survey of Recent Articles

There are roughly 64 million children in the United States, about the same number as three decades ago. Meanwhile, the adult (under 65) population has increased by more than half, from 100 million to 152 million, and the number of elderly Americans has risen from 17 to 31 million. That should have been good for the well-being of children, note Victor R. Fuchs and Diane M. Reklis of the National Bureau of Economic Research in *Science* (Jan. 3, 1992). Instead, the lot of American kids generally has grown worse.

One indicator is child poverty, which dropped sharply (along with adult poverty) during the 1960s but has been on the rise since the 1970s. By 1988, 20.3 percent of all American children were living in poverty. Adult poverty, on the other hand, remained largely unchanged at 11 percent.

Writing in *American Sociological Review* (Dec. 1991), Pennsylvania State University's David J. Eggebeen and Daniel T. Lichter highlight the profound impact that changes in the composition of families during the 1980s—chiefly, the rise in the proportion of female-headed families, produced by divorce and illegitimacy—have had on the economic status of children. In 1987, more than 20 percent of all American children lived with only their mothers, up from eight percent in 1960. If the patterns of family structure in 1988 had been the same as they were in 1960, according to Eggebeen and Lichter's analysis of Census Bureau data, the overall child poverty rate would have been 13.8 percent, not 20.3 percent. Indeed, if even the patterns of 1980 had held steady thereafter, the rate in 1988 would have been lower—18 percent. Half of the 1980s increase was due to the breakdown of the family.

It is well known that black children have fared much worse than white children. By 1988, nearly half (45.6 percent) of all black children were poor, as opposed to 15.4 percent of white children. The rapid rise in black female-headed families explains much of the difference. By 1988, half of all black children (compared with 16 percent of white children) lived only with their mothers. If black family breakdown had not increased since 1960, "only" 28.4 percent of black children would have lived in poverty in 1988.

The deterioration of the family cannot be blamed for all of the increase in poverty among black children, Eggebeen and Lichter say, but it "clearly *exacerbated* long-standing racial differences in child poverty. Indeed, if the black family had not deteriorated faster than the white family, the 1960–1988 period would have brought substantial *convergence* in racial differences" in child poverty. The poverty rate declined throughout those decades for black children living with both parents (from 61.2 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1988); the rates fell even during the 1980s when the povcluding travel time?" Interviewers were instructed to include students and housewives among their respondents. In the 1980 survey, the question was different: "First, we would like to know approximately how many hours a week you spend at your job or occupation, and that includes keeping house or going to school as well as work for pay or profit. How many hours would you estimate you spend at work, housekeeping, or studies, including any travel time to and from the job or school?" Just this change in wording alone, Hamilton comments, "could easily have generated the 'dramatic' result. It certainly invites a more generous reading of 'work' than [did] the original question."

Moreover, Harris's findings conflict with data from other sources. The National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys (whose question—"How many hours did you work last week, at all jobs?"—has not varied) indicate little change: 39.9 hours of work per week in 1973 and 41.2 hours in '85. Even Schor (whose book Hamilton does not mention) bases her case less on a longer workweek than on an increased number of weeks worked per year. The U.S. Labor Department's *Current Employment Statistics*,

erty rates among corresponding white children were increasing (from 7.3 percent in 1980 to nine percent in 1988).

Of course, remaining above the poverty line does not necessarily mean living well. For some children, black and white, the escape from poverty carried a price: Both parents had to work. Overall, poverty for children in intact families was 10.1 percent in 1988, and it would have been more than one-fifth higher had more and more mothers not taken jobs.

Whether they were poor or not, children by 1988 were likely to enjoy less parental care than children had received only a few decades ago. As Fuchs and Reklis note, the proportion of children under age six whose married mothers worked outside the home went from a mere 18.6 percent in 1960 to a stunning 57.1 percent in 1988. This undoubtedly affected what economists dryly call the "nonmarket production" of goods and services for children. By 1986, Fuchs and Reklis calculate, white parents had about 10 fewer hours per week to spend with their children than they had in 1960, and black parents had about 12 fewer hours.

What can be done? Conservative analysts contend that only a return to the traditional family and to traditional values can provide America's children with the combination of care and discipline that they need. Some have urged more stringent divorce laws or holding parents responsible for the crimes or antisocial acts of their children. But fashioning public policies to try to reverse the cultural changes of recent decades is not easy, Fuchs and Reklis note, in the face of resistance to tighten divorce laws or other limits on "what many claim are fundamental individual rights." Most children's advocates instead focus on improving children's material well-being, through new or expanded government programs in such areas as education, health, and child care.

Harvard's Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood, writing in *Harvard Business Review* (Sept.–Oct. 1991), note that providing some sort of "children's allowance" to the family of every child is "a practice common in virtually every industrialized trading partner of the United States." There is, to be sure, a U.S. personal tax exemption for children, but its value has been dramatically eroded by inflation over the years. Lately, support for tax credits or larger exemptions for families with children has come from conservatives as well as liberals. The National Commission on Children, created in 1987 by Congress and President Reagan, last year recommended replacing the current exemption with a refundable tax credit of $1,000 per child. That, Bane and Ellwood observe, is a "children's allowance by another name." What it would require, they add, is "raising the taxes of those without children and of those with very high incomes."

Beyond that, however, there remains a fundamental disagreement between liberals and conservatives about the causes of the plight of children today. "There seems to be some truth to both conservative critiques of the cultural changes that were launched in the 1960s as well as liberal complaints about the uneven prosperity of the 1980s," Fuchs and Reklis point out. "But mutual recrimination does little based on employer reports from a national sample of firms, indicate the average workweek for production workers even *declined*, from 36.9 hours in 1973 to 34.9 hours in 1985. The Census Bureau's *Current Population Surveys* of households, however, which pick up data missed in the employer reports, show virtually no change over recent decades in the length of the American workweek.

"No change," Hamilton says, is the best single conclusion to draw about what has happened to the American workweek in recent decades. That may be so, but it is not a finding likely to inspire any magazine cover stories.

The Mother of Mother's Day

"The Commercialization of the Calendar: American Holidays and the Culture of Consumption, 1870–1930" by Leigh Eric Schmidt, in *The Journal of American History* (Dec. 1991), Organization of American Historians, 112 N. Bryan St., Bloomington, Ind. 47408–4199.

Cynics might assume that Mother's Day was invented by the florist and greeting-card industries. Not exactly, says Schmidt, a Drew University historian. The popular holiday (celebrated on May 10 this year) was actually the brainchild of Anna Jarvis. A schoolteacher who lived in Grafton, W. Va., with her mother (also named Anna) until she was 27, Jarvis was devastated by her death in 1905. "To Jarvis, her mother's life had been one of sacrifice and much suffering," writes Schmidt. Seven of her eleven children died in early childhood, and she had forgone a college education in order to raise her family.

In 1907, Jarvis began a vigorous letter-writing campaign to promote her cause, sending impassioned missives to newspaper editors, politicians, and church leaders. On the second Sunday in May 1908, the first Mother's Day was officially observed in a number of towns and cities. Jarvis kept up her efforts, and in 1914 they were crowned with success: President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed Mother's Day a national holiday. Yet by then the celebration already had begun to depart from what Jarvis originally had in mind.

"Every mother should receive a card with just the right sentiment," advised Greeting Cards: When and How to Use Them *(1926).*

She had urged people to observe the first Mother's Day in 1908 by wearing a single white carnation, her mother's favorite flower. That, notes Schmidt, provided "the opening wedge" for the florist industry. First it recommended wearing a bright flower if one's mother were still alive and a white one as a memorial. Then it urged that churches, homes, Sunday schools, and cemeteries be decorated with flowers. Mother herself, the trade suggested, deserved nothing less than a full bouquet. "All the other holidays of the year have features that are taken advantage of by various lines of business,"

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

WOMEN'S BUREAU

FIRST LADY AND LABOR SECRETARY CALL FOR EMPLOYERS TO ADOPT FAMILY-FRIENDLY WORKPLACE POLICIES

Tues., October 31, 1995

For more information call: 202/219-6652, x107.

Officials Meet with Families and Business Leaders from Around Nation, Urge Employers and Others to Join "Working Women Count Honor Roll"

At a White House ceremony today, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich saluted corporate executives who have pledged to invest $100 million in family-friendly workplace programs that will benefit workers in 50 communities.

Urging every employer in the country to adopt policies that help workers balance their family and work responsibilities, the First Lady and Reich discussed the historic investment with families who benefit from these family-friendly policies.

Senior executives from 20 lead companies of the American Business Collaboration for Quality Dependent Care (ABC) attended the event, as well as families of their employees. ABC recently made an historic pledge to invest $100 million over six years in child and elder care programs. James Schiro, chief executive officer of Price Waterhouse, one of ABC's lead companies, was featured at the event, along with working families from around the country.

The First Lady and Reich urged employers, organizations and individuals throughout the nation to join the Working Women Count Honor Roll. Launched on Labor Day by the Labor Department's Women's Bureau, this nationwide initiative is designed to improve the working lives of a million Americans by next spring. The Honor Roll encourages employers, organizations and individuals to implement new policies in the three areas working women care about most: building the family-friendly workplace, improving pay and benefits, and valuing women's work. ABC has pledged to join the Honor Roll, and a variety of other Honor Roll participants from across the nation also attended the event.

Among the families who met with the First Lady were Susan O'Neil, an administrative assistant at Deloitte & Touche in Boston, and her three-year-old daughter, Stephanie. O'Neil and her self-employed husband were able to find child care for Stephanie with help from a company-sponsored referral program. O'Neil also takes advantage of flex-time, working from 7:30 AM to 4:00 PM, and she uses a company plan that allows her to set-aside up to $5,000 of her pay before taxes to cover child care costs.

"This Administration is challenging other businesses and organizations to make work better for women, men and their families. By encouraging and rewarding family friendly policies, the Working Women Count Honor Roll exemplifies the creative partnerships government and business must enter into if we are to do what is best for our families and what is best for our growing economy. Hundreds have taken up the challenge, but thousands more need to accept," said the First Lady.

"Investing in programs that improve the quality of life for U.S. workers pays off on the bottom line," Reich said. "Workers who are successful in balancing work and family are also the most successful workers. These corporations send an important message that helping workers balance work and family is good for business."

Representatives from the following ABC companies participated in the White House event: Aetna Life & Casualty, Allstate Insurance Company, American Express, AMOCO, AT&T, Chevron, Citicorp, Deloitte and Touche, Eastman Kodak Company, Exxon, GE Capital Services, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Johnson and Johnson, Mobil, NYNEX, Price Waterhouse, Texaco, Texas Instruments and Xerox.

Other families who met with the First Lady included:

- Susan Cohen, Joel Silberman, and their two daughters, six-year- old Julia and four-year-old Rebecca. Both parents work for IBM in Austin, Texas and use flexible scheduling options to be home when a child is sick or to attend family events. The children are enrolled in IBM-sponsored child care centers.
- Alma Ramon, an executive secretary with the YWCA of the City of New York. Ramon is the single mother of a nine-year-old son, Michael. The YWCA's family-friendly policies let Ramon bring Michael to work on his days off from school, and send him to a YWCA summer camp with a new tuition discount for employees.
- Suzanne Sherman, a physician with Kodak's Medical Preventive Service in Rochester, N.Y. She and her husband, a building contractor, have two sons -- six-year-old Alexander and five-year-old Bowen. Dr. Sherman relies on Kodak's emergency and back-up child care services to keep her family on track.

The Women's Bureau was founded by Congress in 1920 with a mandate to "promote the welfare of wage-earning women." Seventy-five years old this year, the Women's Bureau is the only federal agency designated to serve women in the workforce.

Last year, the Women's Bureau launched Working Women Count!, a national initiative through which more than a quarter of a million women told policy makers what they like and don't like about their jobs. This spring, President Clinton accepted a set of policy recommendations designed to address the concerns women raised from Reich and Women's Bureau Director Karen Nussbaum. The Women's Bureau is distributing Honor Roll application materials nationwide. Honor Roll materials are available to anyone who calls the Women's Bureau's toll-free hotline: 1-800-827-5335.

NOTE: A list by state of corporate and family participants in today's White House event is attached. For more information about specific attendees, call Lisa Lederer at 202/371-1999.

WHITE HOUSE EVENT -- TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31 at 2:30 PM

FAMILIES SCHEDULED TO ATTEND WORK IN:

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Connecticut    Hartford, Stamford
Distict
of Columbia    Washington
Georgia        Atlanta
Illinois       Chicago
Maryland       Hagerstown
Massachusetts  Attleboro, Boston
Minnesota      Minneapolis
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New Jersey	Cherry Hill, New Brunswick, Warren
New York	Harrison, New York City, Rochester, Westchester County
Texas	Austin, Houston
Virginia	Fairfax

AMERICAN BUSINESS COLLABORATION COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES SCHEDULED TO ATTEND FROM:

California	Palo Alto, San Francisco
Connecticut	Hartford, Stamford, Wilton
Distict of Columbia	Washington
Illinois	Chicago, Northbrook
Massachusetts	Boston
Minnesota	Minneapolis
New Jersey	Morristown, New Brunswick
New York	Armonk, Long Island City, New York City, Rochester, Tarrytown, White Plains
Texas	Dallas, Irving
Virginia	Fairfax

HONOR ROLL PARTICIPANTS ATTENDING WILL REPRESENT:

Arizona	State of Arizona Family Friendly Task Force
California	Bay Area Emergency Care Consortium (San Francisco)
Colorado	Work Options Group (Denver)
D.C.	National Federation of Black Women Business Owners
Kentucky	Jefferson County/Louisville Area Chamber of Commerce
Massachusetts	City of Boston
Missouri	City of Kansas City
	Communications Workers of America and City of Lee's Summit
New Jersey	Kwasha Lipton (Fort Lee)
New York	YWCA (New York City)
Ohio	Charles W. Eliot Middle School (Cleveland)
Oregon	Oregon Commission for Child Care (Salem)
	Oregon Community Foundation's Child Development Fund (Portland)
Texas	Fort Worth Star Telegram
Washington	Seafirst Bank (Seattle)

---DISCLAIMER---

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Washington Report

This page is updated every Friday. Check back weekly.

Previous Washington Reports

Senator Tim Hutchinson's Washington Report
May 9, 1997

As we take time this "Mother's Day" to honor the special women in our lives who have reared us, it is fitting we recognize our mothers' hard work, sacrifice, and contributions to our families and communities. I want to pay special tribute to my mother for her love and commitment to her family, and I wish to honor my wife Donna, the mother of my three sons for the wonderful role model she has provided for our family.

With the increased pressures of today's society, many mothers are left struggling to "do it all," -- everything from bringing home the family paycheck to nurturing the children to managing a household. I'm sure most mothers feel there aren't enough hours in the day to get everything accomplished. Certainly, the increasing number of families with two parents working full-time means less time spent with children. In fact, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1960 just 39% percent of women with children between the ages of 6 and 17 were in the workforce. Today, 76% percent of mothers with school-age children work outside the home.

This week, we have the opportunity to give these mothers a precious gift — more time with their families. By passing the Family-Friendly Workplace Act, we would give working mothers, as well as fathers, the ability to develop flexible work schedules and spend more quality time at home. This legislation would allow a mother to consult with her employer and voluntarily decide how to coordinate their work hours. For example, a mother may decide to take an hour off work on a Tuesday to attend a child's softball game and make that hour up on a Thursday. This bill makes no change in overtime laws. If an employee works overtime, he or she is paid time-and-a-half. This bill is simply a way to make it easier for a mother to care for a sick child, attend a parent-teacher conference or take a family vacation.

The Family Friendly Workplace Act isn't a radical idea. It's a commonsense proposal which will give the majority of the American workforce the same benefits that federal employees have enjoyed for years. Since 1978, federal employees and their employers have had the option to practice mutually beneficial, flexible, and modern workplace policies. Two decades of flex-time experience in the federal workplace have proven it to be a fair, workable, and extremely popular option among both employees and employers. Studies involving over 30,000 federal employees - half of whom are women - have concluded that "the use of flextime significantly helped mothers improve their work/family balance."

In addition to giving employees greater freedom, this bill includes several provisions to ensure employees' rights are fully protected. The measure guarantees employees are not forced to participate in these programs and prohibits employers from using flexible scheduling as a condition of employment.

As hard as it is to work full-time and raise a family today, working moms deserve a break. It's time we pass a common-sense bill that makes it easier for parents to spend more quality time with their children.

I'm Senator Tim Hutchinson and I welcome your comments and views. You can write me at my Washington address at 245 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington D.C. 20510.

The Senate Continues to Debate "Comp Time" Legislation.

On June 2nd, Senator Daschle released a letter from six leading women's organizations opposing the Republican comp time bill, S.4. An excerpt from the letter reads, "The Family Friendly Workplace Act, fails to offer real flexibility to the working women it purports to help while offering a substantial windfall to employers...The comp time bill would cut women's options and pay."

At his press briefing, Senator Daschle said, "We want to ensure that the choice is every bit as much the employee's as it is the employer's. And the one way you can do that, in a way that I think most employees would accept, is to say, look, an employee, in all circumstances involving hours after 40 in any given week, would be given the option of either time-and-a-half in pay or in time off. That would protect them. But our Republican colleagues are unwilling to do that."

Please click here to read a copy of the DPC Special Report: Women and Comp Time.

Women Lose Under GOP Comp Time Scheme

Hourly Workers Lose Overtime Pay

- **56% of Hourly Workers are Women**
- **60% of Minimum Wage Workers are Women**
- **80% of Overtime Workers Earn Less Than $28,000 per Year**

Return to Democratic Leadership Committees' Homepage

The Negro Family: The Case for National Action   Daniel P. Moynihan
(US DoL 1965)

Problem: gap b/t blacks / rest of nation ↑ –
mainly b/c family structure

" Negro social structure, in particular the Negro family..... is in the deepest trouble." (4)

2 - THE NEGRO AMERICAN FAMILY

shapes experience, etc. (5)

Family v. impt – must Δ black family structure to ⓢ any problem (5)

LC Black family unstable / breaking down (5)

* though MC doing (5-6)

1.) 25% black marriages are dissolved
(→ divorce, separation, live apart from husbands) (6, + * table)

v. high rates in Northeast, urban areas (8, + * table)

% ever-married black ♀ w/ ♂ present ↓ in every age group b/t 1950 -1960 (8, + * table)

2.) Almost 25% Black births are illegitimate

Both white/black illegit ↑,
tho' from v. diff bases (8 + * table p. 9 1940-1963) — by city, 1960 and 1962 — p. 10
Also, high rates of divorce (p. 9)

3.) Almost 25% Black families headed by ♀

White ♀-headed ↓, but black ↑ —
1949-1962, + spec. family structure
v. diff b/t black/white (p. 11 * table)

4.) ~~Black family~~ → ↑ welfare Dependency

Far more (%) of black ~~kids~~ are on welfare than white kids.

Now, far more children on AFDC have father absent than in 1940 (12, + * graph)
Also graph unemp rate w/ cases opened under AFDC (13)

3 - THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

1 - SLAVERY (15-16)

Awful

2 - RECONSTRUCTION

Jim Crow laws → ∅ strong black male. This = reversal of normal family relations. (16-17)

3 - URBANIZATION

Abrupt mvt to cities → severe social disruption. Blacks more urban than whites, and black families in cities more frequently ♀-headed than those in country. (17, + * table)

Cities generally (↓) black family structure (18-19)

Coincidentally, lots nonwhite children live in broken homes (*graph p.18)

Example: v. high illegitimacy rates in central Harlem (p.19)

4- UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY

Unemployment really (h) families, → matriarchy. To survive, ♂ must work —

BUT no work for black ♂ !!! (20, + *chart)

in North, esp. N. urban areas.

Now, unemp + l ys → broken families! (p.22, *chart)

"During times when jobs were reasonably plentiful... the Negro family became stronger and more stable. As jobs became more and more difficult to find, the stability of the family became more and more difficult to maintain." (21)

evidence: DC census tracts w/ high unemp. have high illegitimacy (p.23 *graph)

5- THE WAGE SYSTEM

Minimum wage too low to enable a worker to sprt a family (23-24)

Blacks have a) largest children b) lowest wages → black ♂ can't sprt family (25)

Problen is ↑ – more blacks as % of population,
blacks have more kids (25),
inev. → ↑ black unemployment,
esp. * jobs for black youth (26)

Young black ♀ have kids →
drop out of school → have
to raise kids (27)

4. THE TANGLE OF PATHOLOGY

Black family forced into v. bad matriarchal structure
= kids fall into "tangle of pathology"

a. MATRIARCHY (30–31)

Generally, black families ♀-headed — but also
education (♀ do better than men)
tables 31

employment (in 2-income black families, ♂
less likely to be principal
worker than in 2-income
white families)
(32–33)

+ more ♀ in white-collar
occupations.

b. FAILURE OF YOUTH

Black youth @ disadv vs. white youth b/c ∅
father → lower IQ / test scores (36, + * table)
(b/c broken homes)

- black w/ ♂ vs. black w/o ♂
- black vs. white

+ black youth ∅ talk ~~re~~ employment w/ fathers,
∅ apprenticeship.

c- DELINQUENCY & CRIME

blacks commit lots of crimes (38-39, w/ tables)

b/c broken homes (39-40)

d- ARMED FORCES

Lots blacks fail the exam (40) →
blacks underrep in Army, which is route to advancement
a- =ity
b- ↑ ♂ lives (42)

e- ALIENATION

Can't find many black ♂ - are out of labor mkt (43-44), often → drug addiction (44)
+ ~~r~~ residential segregation, still v. high (44)
school segregation

5- THE CASE FOR NATIONAL AXN

Need ~~n~~ nationwide strategy to ④ (47-48)