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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	re: Report on Demonstration of Russian Commitment to Comply with Three Agreements... (14 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Susan Brophy and Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Report on Demonstration of Russian Commitment... (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Congress and Russia])
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2015-0183-S

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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TO: BYRD, ROBERT C
ET AL

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 01 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CBW
CONGRESSIONAL

RUSSIA
LEGAL ISSUES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL RPT ON DEMONSTRATION OF RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO COMPLY
W/ THREE AGREEMENTS ON CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD LTRS

DUE DATE: 04 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HARRIS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
DANVERS
HARRIS
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DOC 3 OF 3

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 12/12/14
2015-0183-5

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RECORD ID: 9407991

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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002 PRESIDENT
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Z 94100308 FOR SIGNATURE
X 94100308 PRESIDENT SGD LTRS

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 941001
002 941001
003 941001 BYRD, ROBERT C
003 941001 OBEY, DAVID R
003 941001 HATFIELD, MARK O
003 941001 MCDADE, JOSEPH M

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 01 OCT 94

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1994

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to Section 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.L. 103-306), I hereby transmit the attached report in both classified and unclassified form, on Russia's demonstration of a commitment to comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons; upon Russian ratification and entry into force, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and the Wyoming "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons."

It is my hope that the submission of this report well in advance of the statutory deadline of January 30, 1995, will enable the Senate to complete its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention during the current legislative session.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Byrd", with a stylized, cursive script.

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Sincerely,



The Honorable David Obey
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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~~OF SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1994

Dear Senator Hatfield:

Pursuant to Section 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.L. 103-306), I hereby transmit the attached report in both classified and unclassified form, on Russia's demonstration of a commitment to comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons; upon Russian ratification and entry into force, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and the Wyoming "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons."

It is my hope that the submission of this report well in advance of the statutory deadline of January 30, 1995, will enable the Senate to complete its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention during the current legislative session.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1994

Dear Representative McDade:

Pursuant to Section 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.L. 103-306), I hereby transmit the attached report in both classified and unclassified form, on Russia's demonstration of a commitment to comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons; upon Russian ratification and entry into force, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and the Wyoming "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons."

It is my hope that the submission of this report well in advance of the statutory deadline of January 30, 1995, will enable the Senate to complete its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention during the current legislative session.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

The Honorable Joseph M. McDade
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Report on Demonstration of Russian Commitment to Comply with Three Agreements on Chemical and Biological Weapons

Pursuant to Section 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.L. 103-306), the following report addresses whether or not Russia has demonstrated a commitment to comply with:

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons;

Upon Russian ratification and entry into force, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and

The Wyoming "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons."

I. Demonstration of Russian Commitment to Comply with the Biological Weapons Convention

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BWC) was signed by the Soviet Union in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. This treaty prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also prohibits weapons, equipment or delivery means designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

The U.S. has determined that the offensive biological weapons (BW) program that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union violated the BWC through at least March 1992. An offensive research program was confirmed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in March 1992. In April 1992, President Yeltsin issued a decree prohibiting activities inconsistent with the BWC. Following his decree, Russia claimed significant reductions in funding and personnel for biological R&D programs, closure of open-air BW test facilities and described other measures to bring Russia into compliance with the BWC. In August 1992, the Russian parliament passed a new law making participation in offensive BW research, development, production or weaponization a criminal offense. Following Yeltsin's decree, the actual status of the Russian offensive program was unclear.

In September 1992, senior U.S. and U.K. officials met with their Russian counterparts in Moscow to discuss the BW issue. The U.S., the U.K. and Russia agreed at the conclusion of the talks on a joint statement outlining a series of steps, some that Russia would take unilaterally and others that Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. would take jointly, to increase confidence that Russia has terminated its offensive BW program.

Among other things, the Trilateral Statement provides for: visits to non-military and military biological facilities in all three countries; data exchanges on past offensive BW programs and on the status of dismantlement of offensive capabilities; and meetings between experts. Between September 1992 and September 1994, the following Trilateral Statement activities were undertaken:

- Visits to Non-Military Biological Facilities. Joint U.S./U.K. teams conducted visits to non-military biological facilities in Russia in late 1993 and early 1994. These U.S./U.K. visits to Russian facilities were followed by Russian visits to U.K. and U.S. non-military biological facilities in early 1994.
- Answers to Questions. In late 1992, the U.S. and U.K. submitted a list of BW-related questions to Russia. Russia provided responses to most of these questions in late 1993. Russia recently provided a further response to these questions following a request for clarification by the U.S. and U.K.
- BW Experts Meeting. The first Trilateral BW working group meeting was held in London in the Spring of 1994. At this meeting, the U.S., U.K. and Russia discussed issues related to the initial visits to non-military facilities, and steps toward implementation of other trilateral activities.

Senior U.S. officials and their Russian counterparts have also addressed the issue of U.S. concerns regarding Russian compliance with the BWC.

At the January 1994 Moscow Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the BWC and implementation of the September 1992 Trilateral Statement. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed to support the convening of a Special Conference of the States Parties to the BWC in order to consider measures that would contribute to transparency and thereby strengthen confidence in compliance with the Convention and its effectiveness.

In April 1994, Russia submitted its annual BWC data declaration to the UN, pursuant to voluntary confidence-building measures adopted at past BWC review conferences. It provides no additions to Russia's 1992 declaration of past offensive BW activities.

The Trilateral working group heads-of-delegation met in mid 1994 in Vienna to assess the status of the Trilateral Statement implementation process. Among the issues discussed were procedures and guidelines for implementing the remaining activities outlined in the Trilateral Statement.

At the Special Conference of States Parties to the BWC in Geneva (19-30 September 1994), both the U.S. and Russian delegations supported the drafting of a mandate for an ad hoc committee to devise a regime to strengthen the BWC. This ad hoc committee, charged to complete its work as rapidly as possible, is to devise a legally binding regime of measures, including both declarations and on-site activities, to help deter violations of the BWC.

At the September 1994 summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed on the importance of full and continued implementation of the September 1992 Trilateral Statement as a means of gaining confidence that offensive BW programs have been terminated. The Presidents also agreed that their experts, along with those of the U.K., would meet without delay for a further working group meeting.

The U.S. continues to have concerns about Russia's compliance with the BWC. On the other hand, President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly expressed their commitment to compliance to their American counterparts. Under the September 1992 Trilateral Statement, Russia has carried out facility visits, information exchanges and experts meetings. These positive statements and actions demonstrate that the senior Russian leadership is committed to compliance with the BWC. However, Russia must still take concrete steps to follow through on this commitment and rectify existing problems. The U.S. will judge Russia's BWC compliance by its actions.

The U.S. firmly believes that the best course to ensure Russian compliance with the BWC is to pursue transparency and openness of BW-related activities and to seek continued implementation of the Trilateral Statement. The U.S. and U.K. have been aggressively and intensively pursuing implementation of the Trilateral Statement. We will continue actively to follow up and do our part to help ensure the elimination of the offensive BW program that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union.

The status of Russian compliance performance remains under our constant careful review.

II. Demonstration of Russian Commitment to Comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention Upon Ratification and Entry into Force

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) was completed in September 1992 and opened for signature in Paris in January 1993. Russia was one of the original signatories of the CWC, along with 129 other countries, including the United States. The CWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons (CW). Parties that possess chemical weapons are required to destroy their stockpiles and former chemical weapons production facilities within ten years of the Convention's entry into force. Russia has not yet ratified the CWC, nor has the Convention entered into force. As a signatory, however, Russia is obligated to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention.

Following Russia's signing of the CWC, the Duma committee responsible for the Convention prepared and presented to President Yeltsin a plan for ratification, including prepared statements supporting the Convention. The Duma began hearings on the CWC on March 24, 1994 -- two days after the U.S. Senate began its hearings on the CWC. Duma deputies are taking an active interest in ratification and hearings have been scheduled for the fall. Other Russian officials, including some from the MFA, have indicated their strong commitment to CWC ratification.

While the CWC has not yet entered into force, Russia has been actively involved with other signatory states at the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in The Hague, where efforts are underway to develop CWC implementation procedures and to lay the groundwork for the organization charged with implementing the Convention, known as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Several factors complicate Russia's prospects for a smooth and quick ratification process. These include financial, technical, political, bureaucratic and environmental issues, which have been raised by Russian officials, local politicians, scientists, environmentalists and the media. Russian officials have acknowledged that in light of Russian economic problems, Russia will have some difficulty fulfilling in a timely fashion its obligations under the CWC. The CWC ratification process is also being impeded by a cumbersome intergovernmental decision-making process. Political resistance to CW destruction

also exists on the local level, where there is concern about the public-health, environmental and economic effects of destruction activities. Despite these difficulties, Foreign Minister Kozyrev noted in a February 1992 speech to the Conference on Disarmament that Russia assumes full responsibility for destruction of its CW stockpile.

Since early 1992, the United States has been working with Russia to help facilitate its CW destruction program, but the process has been moving slowly. In January 1994, the U.S. and Russia signed a plan of work that paved the way for up to \$55 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance to help Russia develop a comprehensive chemical weapons destruction program. The U.S. hoped that execution of the work plan would result in quick and tangible progress in the planning and destruction of Russia's CW stockpile. However, progress to date has been disappointing. The significant cost of a destruction program on the scale needed to destroy the Russian stockpile in an environmentally sound manner mitigates against rapid progress in this area. U.S. assistance will be necessary to help Russia destroy its chemical weapons within the time-frames established by the CWC.

Even though the CWC has not yet entered into force, the U.S. is concerned about reports regarding Russia's chemical weapons program. In 1987, Russia publicly acknowledged that it possessed chemical weapons and declared that it had ceased production. Allegations by Russian scientists who worked on the program have contributed to U.S. concerns.

The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized at all levels of the Russian Government the importance of responding to reports of Russian CW activities. The U.S. will continue to press its concerns until they are resolved.

President Yeltsin and other senior Russian officials are on record as supporting the Chemical Weapons Convention, including the obligation to destroy their chemical weapons. In speeches on January 29 and 31, 1992, President Yeltsin firmly committed Russia to destroying its chemical weapons and expressed support for the CWC. President Yeltsin's commitment was further evidenced by his April 20, 1993 declaration, in which he stated that "these mountains of what are now useless and dangerous chemical weapons are a burdensome legacy of our past. In the interest of the entire world, Russia must rid itself of these weapons."

At the January 1994 Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issued an important statement on nonproliferation, demonstrating their commitment to stemming the spread of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. In the statement, the Presidents,

as the leaders of the countries that have the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles, acknowledged particular responsibility for eliminating their chemical weapons. In this context, they declared their resolute support for the CWC and their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry into force of the Convention not later than 1995. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also reaffirmed their desire to facilitate chemical weapons destruction and applauded completion of the 1994 plan of work which led the way for the U.S. to provide up to \$55 million in destruction assistance. The U.S. also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.

At the September 1994 summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed that their experts would meet without delay to resolve outstanding chemical weapons-related issues. The Presidents also agreed on the need for adherence by all states to the Chemical Weapons Convention and for universal application of its provisions, as well as the need for adoption without delay of measures that make it possible to bring the CWC into force.

The U.S. has a number of questions and concerns about Russian CW activities and recognizes that Russia is encountering difficulties in putting into place a comprehensive program to destroy the large stockpile it inherited from the former Soviet Union. However, President Yeltsin and other senior Russian officials have expressed strong support for the CWC and for chemical weapons destruction; Russia has also been an active and continuous participant at the CWC Preparatory Commission in The Hague. These positive statements and actions demonstrate that the senior Russian leadership is committed to and intends to comply with the CWC upon ratification and entry into force. Russia must still take concrete steps to follow through on this commitment and rectify existing problems. The U.S. will judge Russia's future compliance by its actions.

The Administration believes that U.S. ratification of the CWC will trigger a large number of ratifications by other countries, thus increasing the pressure on Russia to ratify quickly so as to be among the original parties to the Convention. Russia has a strong incentive to ratify the CWC because unless it is a Party to the Convention, it will not be able to sit on the OPCW Executive Council or have its nationals employed by the Organization and its inspectorate. As a Party to the Convention, Russia, like other countries, will also have a strong incentive to provide accurate declarations on its chemical weapons capabilities because of the Convention's verification provisions.

Until Russia ratifies the Convention, the U.S. will continue to underscore to Russia its obligation to refrain from acts that

would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention. The U.S. will also stress the importance of prompt Russian CWC ratification. U.S. leverage in this effort will be enhanced once the U.S. itself has ratified the Convention.

III. Demonstration of Russian Commitment to Comply with the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding

In September 1989, the United States and Soviet Union signed a memorandum of understanding in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Known as the Wyoming MOU, the 1989 agreement provides for activities in two phases:

Phase I of the MOU obligates the Parties to provide general data on their chemical weapons capabilities and provides for a series of visits to relevant military and civilian facilities.

Phase II of the MOU obligates the Parties to provide detailed data on their chemical weapons capabilities and to permit on-site inspections of relevant military and civilian facilities to verify the accuracy of data declarations.

It should be noted that the purpose of the Wyoming MOU when it was signed by the U.S. and Russia in 1989 was to build confidence in each country's commitment to banning chemical weapons capabilities and thus facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. At the time of the signing of the Wyoming MOU, the CWC seemed unlikely to be completed in the near future. Although the CWC has been concluded, the MOU is still a valuable instrument to build confidence and to help prepare for CWC implementation.

Phase I of the MOU was implemented between December 1989 and February 1991. In December 1989, the Soviet Union and the U.S. exchanged initial declarations on their chemical weapons programs. Overall, the U.S. judged that the CW data declared by the Soviet Union was reasonably consistent with the U.S. understanding of the Soviet CW program. In June 1990, the Soviet Union and the United States began to implement Phase I visits to military and civilian facilities. These visits were completed in February 1991. Following the completion of the visits, discussions continued on the data exchanged under Phase I and on information obtained during the visits.

In Spring 1992, the U.S. and Russia began work on plans for implementing the Phase II data exchange and inspections. The two sides agreed that the approach originally foreseen should be

revised and initiated work on detailed implementation provisions, including declaration formats and inspection procedures. However, reaching agreement proved difficult.

During the January 1994 Moscow Summit, the implementing documents for Phase II of the Wyoming MOU were signed by Russia and the United States. These documents included a timeline for carrying out the remaining steps of the MOU, including dates for providing detailed CW data declarations and a period for conducting inspections at declared CW facilities. Since January 1994, the Russians have implemented the following Phase II measures:

- Data Declaration. The Russian Government provided both parts of its Phase II data declaration -- in April 1994 and May 1994, respectively. After receipt of the Russian data, the U.S. submitted questions to the Russians asking for clarification of their data declaration. Russian answers provided some clarification of the Russian data, although several key questions and concerns were not resolved. As noted below, outstanding issues are being pursued through the consultative mechanisms provided under the MOU.
- Inspections. In August 1994, the U.S. conducted the first of five inspections under Phase II of the Wyoming MOU. The purpose of this inspection, which was a trial challenge inspection, was to give both U.S. and Russian officials practical experience in carrying out challenge inspections and to confirm to the extent possible the accuracy of the data provided by the Russian Government on this particular facility. The experience gained from this first inspection will be reflected in the remaining MOU inspections and in inspections carried out under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

During the August inspection, Russian personnel at the inspection site were cooperative and helpful. However, there were some problem areas. A Russian inspection team arrived in the U.S. in late September to conduct its first inspection under Phase II of the Wyoming MOU.

- Bilateral Consultations. Bilateral consultations were held in late August - early September 1994 in Moscow to discuss U.S. concerns about Wyoming MOU implementation. Overall, these initial consultations revealed a lack of agreement on certain issues related to MOU implementation.

Russian implementation of the Wyoming MOU has been problematic. The U.S. believes that this can be explained, in part, by substantive differences within the Russian interagency

process over how to handle their CW data declaration. In addition, the firing in the spring of 1994 of Anatoliy Kuntsevich, former Chairman of the President's Committee on Convention-Related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, left a vacuum, creating a certain amount of confusion within the Russian government regarding CW policy.

The U.S. has had and continues to have an ongoing dialogue at all levels of the Russian Government on Wyoming MOU implementation. At the Vancouver Summit in April 1993, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin welcomed progress achieved toward implementing documents for Phase II of the Wyoming MOU. At the January 1994 Summit in Moscow, both Presidents welcomed the conclusion of the implementing documents. At the same time, senior U.S. officials have repeatedly discussed Russian implementation of the Wyoming MOU with various senior-level Russian officials.

At the September 1994 summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed that their experts would meet without delay to resolve outstanding issues related to implementation of the Wyoming MOU.

The U.S. continues to have concerns about Russian implementation of the Wyoming MOU. Nevertheless, President Yeltsin and other senior Russian officials have expressed support for the MOU and Russia has taken steps, albeit imperfectly, to implement the agreement. These positive statements and actions demonstrate that the senior Russian leadership is committed to compliance with the MOU. Russia must still take concrete steps to follow through on this commitment and rectify existing problems. The U.S. will judge Russia's future MOU compliance by its actions.

In all of our approaches with Russia, we have stressed that we expect the Russian Government to comply fully with its commitments with regard to the Wyoming MOU. We have also noted the importance of the confidence-building aspects of the MOU. We will continue to press the Russians in our ongoing dialogue for complete implementation of all aspects of the Wyoming MOU.

~~SECRET~~

7991

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: *RBK* ROBERT BELL/DANIEL PONEMAN *SD*

FROM: ELISA D. HARRIS *EA*

SUBJECT: Report on Demonstration of Russian Commitment to
Comply with Three Agreements on Chemical and
Biological Weapons

At Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding for the President's signature a report to Congress on whether Russia has demonstrated a commitment to comply with three agreements on chemical and biological weapons. We made a commitment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would submit the report by September 30 in order that they could review the report prior to further action on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers *EA*, Alan Kreczko *AK*, Rose Gottemoeller *EA*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Letter to Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman

Tab B Letter to House Appropriations Committee Chairman

Tab 1. Report to Congress

Tab C Letter to Senate Ranking Member

Tab D Letter to House Ranking Member

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *MA* NARA, Date *12/12/14*

2015-0187-5

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Susan Brophy and Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Report on Demonstration of Russian Commitment... (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Congress and Russia])
OA/Box Number: 2298

FOLDER TITLE:

9407991

2015-0183-S

rs1160

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]