

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2294				
Document ID: 9406038				
Row: 46	Section: 1	Shelf: 11	Position: 1	Stack: V

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9406038
RECEIVED: 25 JUL 94 18

TO: LAKE

CHRON FILE

FROM: DEGRASSE, BETH C
MEYER, SEAN

DOC DATE: 01 JAN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES RUSSIA
EUROPE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO LAKE FM CONGRESSIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON POST COLD WAR RELATIONS
FWDS ANNUAL RPT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 28 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9406038

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94072519 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

UNCLASSIFIED

6038

CONGRESSIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON POST - COLD WAR RELATIONS

Conveners

Sen. William S. Cohen
Rep. Harry Johnston
Rep. Jim Leach
Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes

January 1994

The Honorable Anthony Lake
National Security Adviser
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Planning Committee

June Bingham
Dr. Anne Cahn
Hon. Dick Clark
Hon. Ray Cline
Arthur Macy Cox
Judith Davison
Dr. Herbert Ellison
Alton Frye
Gregory Guroff
John P. Hardt
Lara Iglitzin
Rep. Jim Leach
Hon. James F. Leonard
Robert E. Meyerhoff
Hon. Jim Moody, *Chair*
Hon. John F. Seiberling
Sen. Paul Simon
Jeremy Stone
Casimir Yost

Dear Mr. Lake:

We are pleased to send you the annual report of the Congressional Roundtable on Post-Cold War Relations, the only forum for all Members of Congress focusing on U.S. relations with the nations of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This report summarizes the 1993 program which included sessions with U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large to the Former Soviet Union Strobe Talbott and investor George D. Soros.

Please note the enclosed reference map within the report and its special section highlighting the major ethnic conflicts now brewing in the region.

We plan to open our 1994 session in early February with the Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey and the Librarian of Congress James H. Billington on the changing of politics of Russia.

Program Adviser


Edith B. Wilkie


We welcome your ideas for this unique forum serving Members of Congress as we tackle some of the fundamental issues of the post-Cold War world.

Director

Beth Cohen DeGrasse

Sincerely,


Beth C. DeGrasse
Executive Director
Peace Through Law
Education Fund


Sean Meyer
Director
Congressional Roundtable
on Post-Cold War Relations

enclosure

CONGRESSIONAL ROUNDTABLE

ON POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS


The Roundtable greeted 1993 with the assumption that it was to be a year of new challenges and concerns for the Roundtable: the challenges of addressing more than one hundred new Members of Congress in an anti-foreign policy climate, matched with new emerging post-Cold War concerns of ethnic conflict, United Nations peacekeeping and conflict prevention. As is often the case, assumptions had to be jettisoned, and the Roundtable had to adapt its lofty, long-range goals to current reality and breaking history.

The reason is aptly illustrated by the dramatic image on this page. Not once, not twice, but three


times the Roundtable had to scrap its planned program on the post-Cold War concepts outlined above to hold emergency briefings on Russia — that troubled, enigmatic land mass covering 11 time zones, stretching from Central Europe to Asia, endowed with vast natural resources, inhabited by more than 147 million people of more than 100 disparate ethnicities and nationalities, littered by decades of environmental neglect, and possessing in its

Continued on page 2

1 9 9 3



R E P O R T



U.S. assistance for the former Soviet Union: A critical examination

GEORGE SOROS,
GENNADI BURBULIS AND
ROBERT KAISER

In remarks that punctuated a day-long conference on aid to Russia among Members of Congress, top experts and aid administrators — sponsored jointly by the Roundtable and the Twentieth Century Fund — international financier-philanthropist George Soros, top Yeltsin political strategist Gennadi Burbulis, and Washington Post Managing Editor and Russia expert Robert Kaiser called for a renewed emphasis on, and new assistance for, the floundering Russian

economy and democracy. A unique proposal of George Soros to establish an internationally-financed "social safety net" for Russia received enthusiastic support from both other speakers as a new idea for the Clinton Administration to consider championing among the G-7 nations.

Gennadi Burbulis, a former Russian deputy prime minister and chief political aide to President Yeltsin, urged the U.S. to focus on five critical areas: the "practically irreversible" regional conflicts in the former Soviet Union which need "a precise form of action worked out by the U.S. and Russia;" nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons on "unstable territories" and the likelihood of prolif-

1993 at a glance

Continued from page 1

midst tens of thousands of nuclear bombs. In the Roundtable's zeal to plan for a new world, the old world kept rearing its head with awesome regularity.

Communists and long-repressed nationalists were everywhere fighting for power. Age-old disputes between giants like Russia and Ukraine overshadowed the rebirth of nation states. Economies and infrastructures resembling America in the 1920's and 30's were uncovered after years of being hidden from the Western world. And the image of the Russian White House burning became etched in history.

With such turmoil to address and no practice in governing, like a decade of dirty laundry with no modern washing machines to clean it, it is no wonder that the Roundtable kept returning to the crises and problems of Russia and its neighbors. A valuable lesson was learned by all Members of Congress who attended this year's Roundtable sessions. As U.S. Ambassador-at-Large to the Former Soviet Union Strobe Talbott put it, "we [the U.S.] are in this for the long haul." So the Roundtable had no choice but to educate Members of Congress about the drama of disintegration and rebirth occurring in the former Soviet Union and the potential for U.S. policy to affect the outcome.

The Roundtable heard from Russian ex-

pert and Washington Post Managing Editor Robert Kaiser, the world's most written about investor-philanthropist George Soros, network television's favorite Russia analyst Dimitri Simes, and influential top Clinton advisers Ambassador Strobe Talbott, the National Security Council's Soviet military expert Rose Gottemoeller, and senior Clinton campaign adviser Michael Mandelbaum. We heard from top Russian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh officials. And when the world seemed on fire in late fall with wars continuing unabated in Georgia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia, we finally turned to United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to lay out the world body's challenges.

1993 came to a close accompanied by a grim reminder of the unpredictable course of the new era: right-wing nationalists led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky captured a stunning 25% of the vote in the Russian parliamentary elections. The West shuddered in the wake of the elections, amid calls for a dramatic rescue of the depression-stricken former Soviet lands before dictatorship, or even worse, fascism returned.

It is these many challenges that the Roundtable seeks to address next year — and not in a purely academic sense but with a mission to build a collective expertise in the Congress to meet the challenges head on. ■

eration of those weapons; the tremendous shortage of professionals trained in market economics; the problem of closed economic markets in Europe and Asia; and finally, the need for outside assistance to help build Russian democracy.

Robert Kaiser, an expert on Russia as well as one of the nation's most prominent jour-

"Even today, [we] are still dealing with a unique communist empire that is falling apart."

GLENNADI BURBULIS

nalists and observers of today's society, identified a deeper problem that prevented an effective aid program for the former Soviet Union. Saying that the Russians were not the only ones in a confused state after the Cold War, Kaiser provided an almost introspective message for the American audience when he remarked, "We have lost *our* moorings. We do not have a national strategy in this country. Worse yet, we have no debate about these [issues]....anyone in this room who thinks that our grandchildren are going to forgive us for this should have another bowl of strawberries. This is a *really* serious failure of the American political system...."

Mr. Burbulis described the former Soviet Union as a society which had gone out of control. "Even today," he imparted, "[we] are still dealing with a unique communist empire that is falling apart." George Soros agreed by observing that the former Soviet Union is in

"American policy towards the former Soviet Union has been nothing short of a disaster for the past three or four years."

GEORGE SOROS

a process of disintegration "without any end in sight." "It is slipping into a black hole," he said, and "if there is any lesson to be learned from Yugoslavia, it is that when a country slips into a black hole, the rest of the world cannot remain unaffected."

Labeling the current I.M.F. program for Russia unworkable and U.S. policy toward

the former Soviet Union "nothing short of a disaster," Soros detailed his proposal for a \$10 billion internationally financed social safety net for Russia. The program would provide minimum wages for people who lose their jobs from the closure of former state controlled enterprises, minimum pensions, and supplementary wages to essential employees such as police and teachers.

Underscoring a key feature of his proposal, the benefits would be issued in notes that are freely convertible into dollars by an internationally managed monetary authority established for this task. The benefits of this proposal would be to (a) protect the most vulnerable in society from hyperinflation because a hard currency would be introduced alongside of the ruble in which business could be transacted; (b) create the preconditions for balancing the budget because while the subsidy is distributed directly to beneficiaries, failing enterprises could be shut down; and, (c) through closing those enterprises, reduce

"We [the U.S.] have lost our moorings. We do not have a national strategy in this country. Worse yet we have no debate about these [issues]...."

ROBERT KAISER

the inter-enterprise debt, which paralyzes the economy.

According to Mr. Soros, the I.M.F. is the only source for these funds. He challenged the I.M.F. to change its current "dogma" which would prevent such a program from ever taking effect by establishing a new I.M.F. facility "for countries that have fallen into more than two pieces." This, he said, would exclude Czechoslovakia but include the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, he argued, the money provided should be in the form of a loan, because countries such as Russia should be able to pay in the medium term.

All three speakers were hopeful that the new administration would undertake a new policy towards the former Soviet Union. Robert Kaiser's sober admonition that the audience's grandchildren would not forgive them for failing to act gave added intensity to the message of all the speakers. ■

Briefing on the crisis between President and Parliament in Russia

DIMITRI K. SIMES

In an emergency briefing held during the spring 1993 Russian political war between the executive and legislative branches which eventually forced President Yeltsin to hold a nationwide referendum on his presidency, Professor Dimitri K. Simes, Chairman of the Center for Russian and Eurasian Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, called for a more even-handed approach from the Clinton Administration in dealing with the major competitors in the power struggle in Moscow, and for greater outreach to and dialogue with pro-reform elements in Russia, beyond simply President Yeltsin. He laid blame for this crisis on both President Yeltsin and the Parliament, and predicted that both would compromise and reach agreement rather than confront a constitutional crisis.

Professor Simes warned that Yeltsin's call for an April 1993 referendum — on his Presidency and competing constitutions offered by the Executive and legislative branches — could produce "results that are quite unpredictable." In his opinion, the U.S. should back early elections for *both* the executive and legislative branches, instead of a referendum.

In analyzing Parliament, Professor Simes observed that the (now former) speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov had virtually no power in Russia or even in his own province of Chechen, but that he had tremendous power within the legislature because members feared early elections and would support the person who provided them with perks — cars, dachas and apartments. Indeed, many members of Parliament came from districts that no longer existed and were not either democrats or communists. "They are nothing," Simes postulated. He warned that one result of early elections could be a more *conservative* Parliament, since conservatives have honed their political skills in contrast to Yeltsin and his supporters who have not yet built a foundation or party for their cause. He said the President was isolated in the Parliament and controlled only 20% of the votes there and 10-15% of the votes in the country.

Of equal concern, Professor Simes said, was the scene outside of Moscow, where the

media rarely ventures. He asserted that the signs of potential disintegration of Russia are evident, and he described a situation in which Russian military and security forces are increasingly tied to local leaders. He painted a picture of the future where a number of warlords — "all moving in their own directions" — could rule over a disintegrated Russia. In a country with thousands of tactical and nuclear weapons, he warned, the implications were enormous.

Professor Simes underscored a deep concern about the National Salvation Front — the growing nationalist organization which appeared to be gaining ground in the country and which had formed local organizations and strong ties to the military. He strongly cautioned against the Clinton Administration having *any* dealings with the National Salvation Front, and urged a policy of "no tolerance" for this movement — including a refusal even to have a dialogue with other Russian leaders who have relations with them. If the Parliament and the President "continue to mutilate each other," he warned, then the National Salvation Front could end up on top

"A number of local warlords...all moving in their own directions [could ultimately preside over a] disintegrated Russia with nuclear weapons."

DIMITRI K. SIMES

— with very serious consequences. If these neo-fascists come to power, they will not respect the current borders of Russia "any more than Milosevic in Yugoslavia," he argued, and said Russia would then be like "Weimar Germany."

In response to questions, Professor Simes called for two more policy initiatives by the U.S.

First, he suggested that President Clinton should appoint a coordinator to oversee the whole area of U.S. private investment in Russia, since the State Department does not have this mandate and is not equipped to undertake this function. He argued that this effort should be targeted to local provinces, not Moscow.

The second initiative related to agricultural loans in the form of credit guarantees and Russia's inability to pay the loans.

Simes urged that the agricultural loans should be turned into real assistance, and that short-term guarantees be converted into long term guarantees or loan forgiveness. Profes-

sor Simes also called for more assistance to Russia and endorsed a proposal being considered by the Clinton Administration to help fund a "social safety net" for Russia as it converts to a market economy.

In sum, he said, we should "help Yeltsin with deeds, not words." ■

APRIL 28, 1993

Special briefing on Russian referendum results

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER AND
STEPHEN SESTANOVICH

After months of a political tightrope walk that culminated in the April 1993 Russian referendum, President Yeltsin emerged in a stronger position to retain the Presidency. Nonetheless, two senior Russian specialists, Presidential adviser Dr. Rose Gottemoeller and think-tank expert Dr. Stephen Sestanovich, argued that to establish his credibility fully, Yeltsin needs to show that he can deliver Western aid.

While Dr. Sestanovich believed that some Western aid would be forthcoming, simply on the basis of Russian intentions to pursue reforms and evidence of some progress, he doubted that the Russians would satisfy conditions for the release of substantial aid from the world community through the International Monetary Fund.

Dr. Gottemoeller stressed that the Administration's proposed aid for military housing and training for demobilization was a very high priority. Furthermore, she underscored that the pressure for actual delivery of the aid formed a strong undercurrent at the April 1993 summit between President Clin-

"If federalism is not strengthened, we could see warlordism developing."

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

ton and President Yeltsin in Vancouver.

Though Dr. Gottemoeller interpreted the referendum results as a strong showing of support by military leaders for democracy and the institution of the Presidency, she worried that their lack of support for Yeltsin himself led to some contradictions. For example, she said that in the regions, local military leaders have experienced an increase in power, with "local triumvirates developing between mili-

tary, political, and economic leaders" that are split from Moscow. She argued that a question remains as to how the center, over time, can restore links to the regions and encourage federalism.

If federalism is not strengthened, Dr. Gottemoeller predicted that warlordism could develop, and cited the 14th Army in Moldova as an example. She stated that while the Gen-

"[Yeltsin] won [the referendum] because confrontational politics works best for him."

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH

eral Staff of the Russian military was still strong, the role of Russian General Shaposhnikov, commander of the C.I.S. forces and a Yeltsin ally, was more limited and circumscribed than it had been. Dr. Gottemoeller did not favor a unified C.I.S. military, but instead encouraged increased economic ties between the newly independent states.

In regard to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, Dr. Gottemoeller stated that the Administration would proceed according to the road map laid out by the congressionally-passed Hatfield legislation, which prohibited nuclear tests for nine months and severely limited them in the future, with a total test-ban by 1995. With the Russians "dogged by difficulties" at their own test site, Dr. Gottemoeller thought the Russian military understood and supported the Hatfield provision.

Dr. Sestanovich worried that the West will think of Yeltsin "as god" because he pulled off the April referendum victory and expectations will be artificially high. "[Yeltsin] won because confrontational politics works best for him," Sestanovich argued. Both speakers agreed that aid was not any less important given the referendum results, and underscored that the most damaging outcome for Yeltsin was not to get what he was promised by the West. ■

The Commonwealth of Independent States

RUSSIA

Population 147 million (1989 census).

Ethnic Breakdown
120 million (82%) Russian
5.5 million (4%) Tatar
4.4 million (3%) Ukrainian
1.8 million (1%) Chuvash

Leadership President: Boris Yeltsin

Nuclear weapons 204 SS-18 silo-based ICBMs
170 SS-19 silo-based ICBMs
36 SS-24 mobile ICBMs
10 SS-24 silo-based ICBMs
270 SS-25 mobile ICBMs
172 SS-N-8 SLBMs
224 SS-N-18 SLBMs
120 SS-N-20 SLBMs
112 SS-N-23 SLBMs
29 strategic bombers (440 ALCMs)
15,000 tactical weapons

BELARUS

Population 10.2 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
7.9 million (78%) Belarusan
1.3 million (13%) Russian
418,000 (4%) Polish
291,000 (3%) Ukrainian
112,000 (1%) Jewish

Leadership Chairman, Supreme Soviet: Stanislav Shushkevich

Nuclear weapons 72 SS-25 mobile ICBMs

UKRAINE

Population 51.4 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
37.4 million (73%) Ukrainian
11.3 million (22%) Russian
486,000 (1%) Jewish
440,000 (1%) Belarusan

Leadership President: Leonid Kravchuk

Nuclear weapons 46 SS-24 silo-based ICBMs
130 SS-19 silo-based ICBMs
42 strategic bombers (564 ALCMs)

MOLDOVA

Population 4.3 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
2.8 million (65%) Moldovan
600,000 (14%) Ukrainian
562,000 (13%) Russian
153,000 (4%) Gagauzi
88,000 (2%) Bulgarian
66,000 (2%) Jewish

Leadership President: Mircea Snegur

GEORGIA

Population 5.4 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
3.8 million (69%) Georgian
437,000 (9%) Armenian
341,000 (5%) Azeri
164,000 (3%) South Ossetian
96,000 (2%) Abkhazian

Leadership President: Eduard Shevardnadze

ARMENIA

Population 3.3 million (1989 census)


Ethnic Breakdown
3.1 million (93%) Armenian
85,000 (3%) Azeri
56,000 (2%) Kurdish
52,000 (2%) Russian

Leadership President: Levon Ter-Petrosyan



th tates

n of Independent States and
All data is from the Library of
estimates of nuclear weapons
(no detailed unclassified U.S.
at while Russia has continued
5s, it has deactivated a large
arines and bombers, and all of
ferent ICBMs and SLBMs carry
SS-14 (10), SS-25 (1), SS-N-8



KAZAKHSTAN

Population 16.5 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
6.5 million (40%) Kazakh
6.2 million (38%) Russian
958,000 (6%) German
896,000 (5%) Ukrainian
332,000 (2%) Uzbek
328,000 (2%) Tatar

Leadership President: Nursultan Nazarbayev

Nuclear weapons 104 SS-18 silo-based ICBMs
40 strategic bombers (370 ALCMs)

KYRGYZSTAN

Population 4.3 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
2.2 million (52%) Kyrgyz
917,000 (22%) Russian
550,000 (13%) Uzbek
108,000 (3%) Ukrainian
101,000 (2%) German

Leadership President: Askar Akayev

TAJIKISTAN

Population 5.1 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
3.2 million (62%) Tajik
1.2 million (24%) Uzbek
388,000 (7%) Russian
72,000 (1%) Tatar
64,000 (1%) Kyrgyz

Leadership Chairman, Parliament: Imomali Rakhmanov

UZBEKISTAN

Population 19.9 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
14.1 million (71%) Uzbek
1.6 million (8%) Russian
934,000 (5%) Tajik
808,000 (4%) Kazakh
468,000 (2%) Tatar
412,000 (2%) Karakalpak

Leadership President: Islam Karimov

TURKMENISTAN

Population 3.5 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
2.5 million (72%) Turkmen
334,000 (10%) Russian
317,000 (9%) Uzbek

Leadership President: Saparmurad Niyazov

AZERBAIJAN

Population 7 million (1989 census)

Ethnic Breakdown
5.8 million (83%) Azeri
392,000 (6%) Russian
391,000 (6%) Armenian
433,000 (6%) other

Leadership President: Heydar Aliyev (acting)

Major ethnic conflicts in the former Eastern Bloc



Former Yugoslavia

In a three-way civil war, Serbs battle Croats and Bosnian Muslims over territorial and political control and ethnic identity.

Fatalities: 141,000
Refugees: 3.5 million
UN Peacekeeping Presence: 24,281 troops



Abkhazia, Georgia

Abkhazian separatists, opposed by Georgian troops backed by Russian troops, seek to secede from Georgia.

Fatalities: 4,000
Refugees: 250,000
UN Peacekeeping Presence: 88 authorized observers (8 present)



North Ossetia

Predominantly Sunni Muslim Ingush seek to reincorporate the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia.

Fatalities: 900
Refugees: 30,000
UN Peacekeeping Presence: 0



South Ossetia

South Ossetians seek to secede from Georgia and join with Russia's North Ossetia.

Fatalities: 700
Refugees: 10,000
UN Peacekeeping Presence: 0



Nagorno Karabakh

Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh region seek independence from Azerbaijan.

Fatalities: 10,000
Refugees: 1.3 million
UN Peacekeeping Presence: 0



Tajikistan

Democratic and Islamic fundamentalist opposition groups engage in civil war against the communist-led government.

Fatalities: 20,000
Refugees: 120,000
UN Peacekeeping Presence: 0

Other trouble spots

Additional festering tensions threaten to explode or expand in numerous regions, including the **Kosovo** region in Serbia, where Serbs threaten to open battle against the Albanian Muslim majority, which has declared independence; the Baltic nations of **Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia**, where repression of Russian minorities is on the increase; **Moldova**, where the Russian and Ukrainian population of the Trans-Dniestr region is trying to gain independence; the Russian republics of **Tatar and Chechen**, where elements are seeking independence from Russia; the **Crimean peninsula** in Ukraine, where Tatars, Russians and Crimeans all seek political and ethnic identity; **Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania**, where right-wing elements are intensifying violence against Gypsies; and **Germany**, where neo-Nazi elements have targeted and killed foreign workers and others and escalated their anti-Semitic rhetoric.

Memorandum of conversation: Demilitarization and prospects for nuclear dismantlement

BULAT JANASAYEV,
VALERY P. KAZAKOV AND
SERGEI KORTUNOV

On May 27, 1993, a high-level delegation of experts on military issues from the former Soviet Union requested a meeting with conveners of the Roundtable. While this meeting was open to a smaller number of Members of Congress than other Roundtable meetings, a number of telling points were made — most notably that the *pace* of demilitarizing of the former Soviet Union if not the actual demilitarizing itself would be conditional on ongoing U.S. financial assistance. Other points of interest were as follows:

- On the issue of Ukraine and nuclear weapons, Ukraine's Deputy Minister for Conversion Valery P. Kazakov suggested that Ukraine's ratification of the START nuclear arms reduction treaty would be contingent on a significant level of financial aid from the

United States and that the U.S. should consider granting security guarantees in exchange for Ukraine giving up nuclear weapons.

- On the status of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Supreme Soviet's Chairman of its National Security and Defense Committee, Bulat Janasayev, implied that the U.S. failure to disburse dismantlement funds to his country made it difficult for Kazakhstan to meet the conditions of the START Treaty. He proposed that his country consider building its own dismantling facilities rather than handing them to Russia.

- On Russia's pace of dismantlement, senior Russian arms control official Sergei Kortunov called on the Clinton Administration to address what he saw as the primary issue surrounding dismantlement — the storage of fissile materials, more specifically the construction of fissile material containers. In retrospect, Kortunov also suggested that Russia's insistence on return of all ex-Soviet nuclear weapons to its territory for dismantlement might have been a mistake, if it was slowing efforts in his country. ■

JUNE 17, 1993

The Clinton administration policy on Russia: Prospects for U.S. aid

AMBASSADOR
STROBE TALBOTT

During an off-the-record session of the Roundtable, the newly-confirmed Ambassador-at-Large to the Former Soviet Union, the Honorable Strobe Talbott, presented the Clinton Administration's case for aiding the beleaguered former Soviet republics. The Ambassador labelled the Administration's FY 94 \$2.5 billion request for aid "an investment in U.S. security and that of our key friends and allies from abroad."

In a departure from Bush Administration policy, Ambassador Talbott discussed two major characteristics that would govern U.S. assistance efforts. First, with acknowledgment that past U.S. aid efforts were plagued by inefficiency and tardiness, the Ambassador pledged to provide concrete evidence that the Clinton Administration was actually *delivering* its promised aid. Calling this a crucial requirement for success, Mr. Talbott said that prompt and efficient implementation of U.S. policy was not only for Congressional

consumption. "It must be tangible to the citizens of the former Soviet Union," he said, "so that they have a stake in the reforms that we are supporting and, that they themselves will be the beneficiaries of our policy."

Second, the Ambassador underlined the Administration commitment to support the "irreversible process of reform" and all those carrying it out, rather than "a single leader" in any of the newly independent states. In addition, he stressed that the FY 94 proposed aid would flow to reformers "wherever we can find them," not only in capitals such as Moscow or Bishkek. He cited the examples of Gorky, the site of Andrei Sakharov's exile, now a laboratory for free market economics, and the new board of directors of Uralmash, a heavy machinery plant in the Urals undergoing privatization and defense conversion.

The Ambassador also pointed enthusiastically to another whole category of recipients of U.S. aid: those who will be coming to the U.S. to live, work, and study in communities and schools under exchange programs contained in the aid package. If the \$1.3 billion program announced by President Clinton following the Vancouver Summit is approved,

the Ambassador explained, as many as 20,000 students and other citizens will take part in these programs. Ambassador Talbott spoke of the importance of this initiative, telling Members that this approach will enable these people to be part "of the process of repro-

"[U.S. aid is] an investment in U.S. security and that of our key friends and allies from abroad."

AMBASSADOR STROBT TALBOTT

gramming the economic and political software of the system there."

In an appeal to the Members to keep the U.S. engaged, Ambassador Talbott defined the near-term and long-term *benefits* of the U.S. policy of assistance:

- as Russia and the other newly independent states are redefining their roles in the world and their relations with each other - a traumatic and tumultuous process - *the U.S. has a clear stake in keeping that process peaceful*;
- as the newly independent states grapple with explosive relationships among nationalities and minority groups within their borders

and the instability that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet empire, *the U.S. has a clear interest in advancing the cause of Eurasian security and stability*, particularly given the presence of so many nuclear weapons. "What would happen, in short, if there were to be a nuclear Yugoslavia spread out over eleven time zones?" he asked;

- *the U.S. has a clear interest in stability in Central Asia*, where the geopolitical ambitions of countries like Iran are of immediate concern to both the U.S. and Russia, and similarly, stability in the Far East is of concern to both the U.S. and allies there; and
- as the natural resources of Russia and the other newly independent states are developed, these nations will become a source for raw materials and manufactured products and a *market for American goods and services*.

Finally, the Ambassador underscored that the U.S. must make a long-term investment to receive long-term benefits. "Having successfully led the international coalition against Soviet communism for nearly half a century, we must now lead a strategic alliance for post-Soviet reform," he said. "A strategic alliance implies that we are in this for the long haul." ■

OCTOBER 6, 1993

Russia on the brink: Questions and answers for U.S. policy

MICHAEL DOBBS AND
MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

In the Roundtable's third emergency briefing on Russia in 1993, John Hopkins University professor and senior Clinton campaign adviser Michael Mandelbaum and former Washington Post Moscow bureau chief Michael Dobbs disagreed about the long term impact of President Yeltsin's decision to storm and assault the Parliament building in Moscow in September. While Professor Mandelbaum argued that it was a victory for Yeltsin and reform, Michael Dobbs portrayed the outcome as a failure for Yeltsin and democracy. Dobbs argued further that Yeltsin will have debts to pay to the military as a result of their support during the attempted coup by Parliament leaders.

The implications for U.S. policy, according to both Mr. Dobbs and Professor Mandelbaum respectively, are that "the transition to democracy will be a very, very rocky ride" and that the events prove that "we [the U.S.] cannot relax." Mr. Dobbs offered a wide

array of potential outcomes, including democracy, the possibility of civil war, or, perhaps most ominously, the installation of a "brown-red regime" of nationalists and communists.

While underscoring the long-term obstacles facing Russia, Professor Mandelbaum appeared more optimistic about democracy, reform and Yeltsin. His chief concerns centered on the prospect for hyper-inflation,

"Yeltsin has become more beholden to the Army."

MICHAEL DOBBS

which he called the "greatest threat to Russia's future."

Responding to criticisms leveled at Mr. Yeltsin, Professor Mandelbaum asserted that the Russian President did not set democracy back by violating the constitution in his government's disbanding of and attack on the Parliament, because there is no real constitution or rule of law in Russia "as we know it." While Mr. Dobbs agreed that the constitution had "no status above politics," he argued

that the dissolved Parliament had resulted from relatively free elections, even though they were before the August 1991 coup.

In further defense of U.S. support for President Yeltsin, Professor Mandelbaum contended that the Russian leader's policies serve U.S. interests. He argued that on foreign policy, Yeltsin's opponents were neo-imperialists whose policies, if implemented, could conceivably lead to war with Ukraine; while on the economic front, Yeltsin had given power to real reformers such as Gaidar and Fyodorev while his opponents controlled the Central Bank and its policies which contributed to hyper-inflation.

Taking a more critical view, Mr. Dobbs contended that Yeltsin did little to frame the debate in Parliament on these issues; that he

"[Russia] must destroy the old [economic] system, and that will create displacement."

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

failed to develop democratic institutions overall; and that his choice of tactics, alternating between passivity and hard autocratic control, contributed to the final showdown in Moscow. While Mr. Dobbs conceded that the U.S. had followed the right course in supporting Yeltsin over the unacceptable alternatives, he looked ahead to a change of the

guard and a new generation of politicians — individuals such as Yegor Gaidar, Grigory Yavlinsky and Sergei Shakrai. He called upon U.S. policymakers to make a major initiative to try and nurture these leaders, adding "If I can be optimistic, it is about these leaders."

On the economic front, the two speakers differed in emphasis on the correct economic assistance approach for Russia. Professor Mandelbaum adhered strongly to the idea that the "shock therapy" plan applied in Poland was the best route, even as he admitted that the treatment for their economic diseases had severe side effects. "They *must* destroy the old system, and that will create displacement." In Mr. Dobbs' view, the U.S. should concentrate on lifting trade barriers to make it easier for Russia to export goods.

In a final colloquy as to whether NATO should be expanded to include former Eastern European and Soviet republics, the two experts made brief comments. Professor Mandelbaum observed that the NATO plan to include East European nations would "not necessarily create an organization against Russia" but "it would create one *without* Russia." Further, he argued, the West "needs to rethink European security in a way that includes Russia." Mr. Dobbs stated that since the storming of the Parliament, "Yeltsin has become more beholden to the Army," and predicted that as a result, Russia would oppose more strongly the inclusion of eastern European countries in NATO. ■

NOVEMBER 9, 1993

U.N. peacekeeping: Seeking reconciliation

U.N. SECRETARY-
GENERAL
BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

In a session reflective of the strained relationship between the United States and the United Nations, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali appeared before the Roundtable just as the debate on U.N. peacekeeping peaked with a late session vote in the Congress on withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. In this unprecedented session with Members of Congress — the first occasion where the U.N. leader has met with Members outside of the Congressional leadership and committees handling foreign affairs — Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali underscored *both* his understanding of the importance of U.S. military, financial and moral support of the

U.N., and his desire to reshape the global body into a powerful force for peace and security in the post-Cold War era. "Without U.S. military and financial support," the Secretary-General declared, "the U.N. cannot fulfill its peacekeeping mission." Yet, with policy failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti as a backdrop, the U.N. leader faced challenging questions from the Members of Congress on a host of issues.

The Secretary-General began his remarks by proposing the creation of a U.S.-U.N. hotline similar to that which existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This proposal was offered as one specific way, the Secretary-General stressed, in which the U.S. and the U.N. could better communicate and work together as they face a rapidly changing global security environment.

After a full season of negative press accounts, the Secretary-General also commented directly on the fundamental challenge the United Nations faces in "overcoming the difficulty of international public opinion" and in convincing all of the 184 member-states, all with their own internal problems, to recognize their national self-interest in a vi-

"Without U.S. military and financial support, the U.N. cannot fulfill its peacekeeping mission."

SECRETARY-GENERAL
BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

brant, pro-active U.N. system. "The U.N. is theirs...to use in their interests," the U.N. leader observed.

In a lengthy question and answer period which touched on a broad range of issues, the Secretary-General continually emphasized the positive accomplishments of the U.N., particularly in regard to its 22 peacekeeping operations, while underlining the institutional difficulties he faces in getting his "184 bosses" to agree on anything.

On Somalia, the Secretary-General vehemently denied a suggestion that personal animosity between him and Somalia warlord General Aideed was driving U.N. policy. Rather, Boutros-Ghali stated, "After 50 years in this [diplomatic] business, I'm a professional..." and, "the U.N. is trying our best to promote reconciliation...but it cannot be solved in 2 weeks or 4 weeks, it will take years of hard work."

On Yugoslavia, he pointed to efforts to reinvigorate the peace process through the London committee, the fact that the U.N. has already helped two million refugees there, and the success of placing troops preemptively on the border of Macedonia to prevent the spread of conflict. There are six separate U.N. working groups meeting regularly to tackle the myriad issues facing the region, the U.N. leader told the Members of Congress.

When the discussion turned to U.N. institutional reforms, the Secretary-General faced some of the most difficult questions. He was reminded that Congress had recently approved legislation which stipulated a 10% reduction in U.S. contributions if an Inspector General position was not established within the U.N. Both the U.N. leader and Under-

Secretary for Management Melissa Wells, who was also present, stressed that the decision to establish such a position was up to the General Assembly, and that the Secretary-General's office was conducting a thorough investigation to determine what the responsibilities of that position would be and what reform issues need to be addressed.

When asked about the recently established U.N. arms sales registry, the Secretary-General pointed out that the U.N. was giving more attention than it had in the past to conventional weapons issues, while acknowledging that no system presently exists to verify whether countries have provided accurate reports on the number of weapons they possess or have purchased. "We have rightly paid attention to atomic arms and chemical arms" [in recent decades], he said, "but now we must pay attention to conventional arms — especially in the developing world."

The U.N. leader also noted that the United Nations is paying careful attention to the ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union and has U.N. observers and fact-finding missions dispatched to several of these newly independent republics, including Georgia, Tajikistan, and the Baltics. In addition, he

"We have rightly paid attention to atomic and chemical arms [in recent decades]...but now we must pay attention to conventional arms — especially in the developing world."

SECRETARY-GENERAL
BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

said that the U.N. has offices in every former republic and that he had met with the all the heads of the newly independent states. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced to the Members that he would be traveling to Kiev and Moscow early in 1994 to reinforce that they are full-fledged members of the community of nations.

At the conclusion of this special, final 1993 session of the Roundtable, the U.N. leader and the Members of Congress voiced the strong hope that the Roundtable meeting constituted a beginning of a much-needed dialogue to be continued in 1994 and beyond. ■

1993 ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPATION

Rep. Peter Barca (D-WI)
Rep. Herbert H. Bateman (R-VA)
Rep. Anthony C. Beilenson (D-CA)
Rep. Helen Delich Bentley (R-MD)
Sen. Robert Bennett (R-UT)
Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-NE)
Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-CA)
Rep. James H. Bilbray (D-NV)
Rep. Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY)
Rep. Sherrod Brown (D-OH)
Rep. Charles Canady (R-FL)
Rep. Eva Clayton (D-NC)
Sen. William S. Cohen (R-ME)
Rep. George (Buddy) Darden (D-GA)
Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ)
Rep. Norman D. Dicks (D-WA)
Rep. Robert K. Dornan (R-CA)
Rep. Chet Edwards (D-TX)
Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA)
Rep. Hamilton Fish (R-NY)
Rep. Elizabeth Furse (D-OR)
Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY)
Rep. Dan Glickman (D-KS)
Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA)
Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-FL)
Rep. Rod Grams (R-MN)
Rep. Fred Grandy (R-IA)
Rep. James C. Greenwood (R-PA)
Rep. Joel Hefley (R-CO)
Rep. Maurice D. Hinchey (D-NY)
Rep. Martin R. Hoke (R-OH)
Rep. Stephen Horn (R-CA)
Rep. William J. Hughes (D-NJ)
Rep. Nancy L. Johnson (R-CT)
Rep. Harry Johnston (D-FL)
Sen. Robert Kerrey (D-NE)
Rep. Herb Klein (D-NJ)

Rep. Ron Klink (D-PA)
Rep. John J. LaFalce (D-NY)
Rep. H. Martin Lancaster (D-NC)
Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA)
Rep. Greg Laughlin (D-TX)
Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA)
Rep. Frank McCloskey (D-IN)
Rep. David Minge (D-MN)
Rep. James P. Moran (D-VA)
Rep. Constance A. Morella (R-MD)
Rep. Stephen L. Neal (D-NC)
Rep. Bill Orton (D-UT)
Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI)
Rep. Pete Peterson (D-FL)
Rep. Thomas E. Petri (R-WI)
Rep. Owen B. Pickett (D-VA)
Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-ND)
Rep. David E. Price (D-NC)
Rep. Deborah Pryce (R-OH)
Rep. Ralph Regula (R-OH)
Sen. Charles S. Robb (D-VA)
Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD)
Rep. Bill Sarpalius (D-TX)
Rep. Thomas C. Sawyer (D-OH)
Rep. Bud Shuster (R-PA)
Rep. David Skaggs (D-CO)
Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA)
Rep. Floyd Spence (R-SC)
Rep. John M. Spratt, Jr. (D-SC)
Rep. Charles W. Stenholm (D-TX)
Rep. John S. Tanner (D-TN)
Rep. Charles H. Taylor (R-NC)
Rep. Esteban Edward Torres (D-CA)
Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ)
Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA)
Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA)

List does not include spouses or guests.

1993 ANNUAL INFLATION RATE FOR THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES

Armenia	2,000%
Azerbaijan	1,500%
Belarus	2,000%
Georgia	700%
Kazakhstan	1,500%
Kyrgystan	1,000%
Moldova	800%
Russia	1,500%
Tajikistan	1,500%
Turkmenistan	800%
Ukraine	3,000%
Uzbekistan	1,500%

Note: All data is from the Economic Intelligence Unit, a private research firm, based in London.

The 1993 Roundtable series gratefully acknowledges grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the W. Alton Jones Foundation, and gifts from a large number of individuals who contributed to The Peace Through Law Education Fund.

THE CONGRESSIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS *A project of The Peace Through Law Education Fund*

Conveners

Sen. William S. Cohen Rep. Harry Johnston
Rep. Jim Leach Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes

Planning Committee

June Bingham Lara Iglitzin
Dr. Anne Cahn Rep. Jim Leach
Hon. Dick Clark Hon. James F. Leonard
Hon. Ray Cline Robert E. Meyerhoff
Judith Davison Hon. Jim Moody, Chair
Dr. Herbert Ellison Hon. John F. Seiberling
Alton Frye Sen. Paul Simon
Gregory Guroff Jeremy Stone
 Casimir Yost

Director

Beth C. DeGrasse

THE PEACE THROUGH LAW EDUCATION FUND

The Peace Through Law Education Fund is a private, non-profit organization which provides the Congress, its staff and the U.S. public a common ground of information and alternative approaches to the crucial problems of international cooperation, world security, and world peace. It works closely with the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus of the U.S. Congress, a bipartisan caucus of 140 House and Senate members which seeks to analyze and formulate legislative solutions to these issues.

Board of Directors

Hon. John F. Seiberling Hon. Dick Clark
Chairman Mary Jane Dellenback
Rep. Jim Leach Sen. Mark O. Hatfield
President Hon. James F. Leonard
Michael F. Brewer Robert E. Meyerhoff
Secretary-Treasurer Sen. Paul Simon
June Bingham Richard H. Stanley
Mortimer M. Caplin, Esq. Edith B. Wilkie

Executive Director

Edith B. Wilkie

For more information about Roundtable activities or the Education Fund, please write:

Peace Through Law Education Fund
2700 Virginia Ave., N.W. #807
Washington, D.C. 20037