



FIREARM FACTS

Firearms are so pervasive in America that sometimes we forget the price we pay for all-too-easy access to guns. Consider some basic facts...

There are approximately 192 million privately owned firearms in the U.S. -- 65 million of which are handguns.

In 1997, 10,369 people were murdered with firearms in this country.

In 1996, firearms were used in 2 out of 3 murders committed in the U.S. Handguns were used in 54% of all murders.

In 1996, 8 out of 10 of those murdered with firearms were murdered with handguns.

In 1997, there were only 190 justifiable handgun homicides by private citizens in the United States.

Thinking of buying a gun to protect your home? You may want to remember that...

Guns kept in the home for self-protection are 22 times more likely to kill a family member or friend than to kill in self-defense.

The presence of a gun in the home triples the risk of homicide in the home.

The presence of a gun in the home increases the risk of suicide fivefold.

Guns are a blight upon our young people. For instance...

In 1994, firearms were the number two killer of men and women 10-24 years of age -- second only to motor vehicle crashes.

In 1994, the firearm injury death rate among males 15-24 years of age was 32% higher than the motor vehicle traffic injury death rate.

In 1994, firearm homicide was the leading cause of death for black males ages 15-34.

In 1997, over 11 children and teens, ages 19 and under, were killed with guns every day in this country.

Surprised? You shouldn't be, because...

In 1997 alone, 32,436 Americans were killed with firearms, in homicides, suicides, and accidents. In comparison, 33,651 Americans were killed in the Korean War and 58,148 Americans were killed in the Vietnam War.

Licensed firearms dealers sell an estimated 7.5 million guns every year, of which 3.5 million are handguns.

Of all accidental fatalities involving firearms, 71% involve handguns.

Finally, you may want to consider one more statistic...

In 1996, handguns were used to murder 2 people in New Zealand, 15 in Japan, 30 in Great Britain, 106 in Canada, 213 in Germany and 9,390 in the United States.

Last updated: 9/16/99

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[- robbery

— 1990-1994 data
— published in 1998

2. THE CRIME SITUATION IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Jan J.M. van Dijk, Carolyn Block and Natalia Ollus¹

2.1. Constructing indices of eight different types of crime

In the previous chapter the construction of the eight crime indices was briefly described (section 1.6). Here we will elaborate on this description and present the national scores on these indices.

In the initial stages of our work, the decision was made to focus exclusively on the countries which, on the basis of available data, could with a high degree of certainty be qualified as either low crime or high crime countries. Dr Block selected variables which seemed relevant indicators of the types of crime at issue (e.g. for burglary both police data on recorded burglaries and ICVS data on urban and rural areas seemed relevant). She subsequently selected the countries which showed high scores on most of these variables (which were called the source variables). If a country had high scores on most source variables and no low scores on any others, it was classified as a high burglary country. In other words, countries were classified as high if their source variables consistently indicated high or at least moderately high levels of that type of crime. Countries that scored highly on some source variables and low on others were classified in an intermediate group (a group about which inconsistent information is available). Countries about which no information was available on most source variables were classified in a second intermediate group (a group about which insufficient data are available). The low crime category was ascertained in a way comparable to the high crime category: countries consistently showing low or moderately low scores on all source variable were classified as low crime countries. This procedure resulted in dichotomies between low crime and high crime countries for all eight types of crime.

This procedure has the advantage that certain countries can be classified with a high degree of certainty as experiencing low or, alternatively, high levels of particular types of crime. An important drawback appeared to be that almost half of the countries could not be categorized as either low or high. They ended up in one of the two intermediate categories. As a consequence no information was available about the level of crime in half of the countries. A second drawback is that a dichotomous qualification overlooks the differences within the high crime or low crime group (for example, no differentiation is made between countries with very high and those with moderately high levels). In this way much information about differences in the crime situation is lost. The possibilities of multivariate analyses of the correlates of crime indices are severely restricted if the indices only differentiate between low and high crime countries.

After careful consideration, it was decided to explore whether other, more refined differentiation procedures could be applied. As described in section 1.6 indices were calculated by averaging rank numbers on the source variables. This procedure results in rank numbers for all countries instead of the former dichotomy between high and low crime countries with many countries in intermediate categories. We subsequently checked how the new ranking compared with the previous dichotomy of high crime and low crime countries. It was found that the new rankings correlated highly with the old dichotomous rankings.² Countries with higher rank numbers were almost without exception also classified as high crime countries according to the careful procedure followed by Dr. Block to determine high crime and low crime countries. This result indicates that although the new ranking procedure may result in erroneous rank numbers for some individual countries, the over-all ranking seems as valid as the previous high-low dichotomies. Since the new ranking has, as explained, many

¹We would like to thank Mr Johan van Kesteren and Ms Lieke Bootsma for their invaluable assistance with the statistical analysis.

²The correlation coefficients between the dichotomy (with the first intermediate group as an "in between" category) and the new ranking were as follows: for burglary .68 (n=35; p=0.000), for motor vehicle crime .81 (n=44; p<0.01), for petty crime (n.a.), for non-fatal violence (n.a.), for homicide .87 (n=46; p=0.000), for serious violence .82 (n=48; p=0.000), for violence against women .83 (n=43; p=0.000), and for corruption .76 (n=41; p<.01). Since the 'dichotomous' variable has three categories, the maximum correlation can never reach 1.00. The highest possible correlation is about 0.92.

This room is named in honor of James S. Brady, White House Press Secretary from January 23, 1981 until January 20, 1989. Mr. Brady served his nation with honor and distinction, strengthening the bond between government and press. May his courage and dedication continue to inspire all who work in this room and beyond.



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
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Piecing Together the Cross- National Crime Puzzle

*by Jan van Dijk and
Kristiina Kangaspunta*

Understanding national crime levels has proven to be a difficult task. In the United States, for example, cities that have experienced dramatic declines in their crime rates in recent years may link those declines to increased enforcement, a decrease in crack markets, and better job opportunities. On the other hand, cities with similar social and economic developments experience no commensurate decline in their crime rates.

Uncovering the mystery of why and how crime varies cross-nationally is even more difficult: Why, for example, is serious violent crime more prevalent in certain Central and Eastern European countries and the United States than in the European Union countries and Canada?

Understanding the variation in crime rates across countries can help policymakers put crime in their own countries into perspective.

To develop a deeper understanding of how crime varies across countries, a team of researchers at HEUNI, the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control affiliated with the United Nations,¹ regularly analyzes criminal justice data collected by the UN from its member states.²

HEUNI's latest analysis focuses on the differences among European and North American countries and is based on the Fifth United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems 1990-1994, as well as on data from the International Crime-Victim Survey (ICVS).

The HEUNI study is the first ever attempt to construct multisource measures of crime that do not suffer from the well known difficulties of measures based on the number of crimes reported to the police in various countries. (See "The Difficulties of Analyzing Crime Data Across Countries.") The study may signify a

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The Difficulties of Analyzing Crime Data Across Countries

Researchers face some well known and frequently rehearsed difficulties when analyzing the data on reported crime for different countries, cultures, or jurisdictions. Cross-national comparisons present their own problems.

■ One such problem is **varying definitions**. Different legal codes define crimes in different ways, so that the set of acts that constitute a given crime type in one country may not be identical to the set of acts to which the same label is applied in another.

■ **Recording practices** are another problem. Different police forces, in particular, have different rules for when an event should be recorded as a crime and when it should not. For example, in some countries the police are said to be very careful about recording every theft of a bicycle, whereas in other countries the police may not record every bicycle theft because the department has a higher workload of more serious crimes, has fewer resources, and may be less organized.

■ A third difficulty is that of **operating practices**. In some countries, the main decisions regarding a case are made at the prosecution stage, so that many cases, especially trivial ones, do not appear in the records of those countries until that stage. Countries also vary with respect to common law and codified civil law; therefore, comparisons between the raw numbers of different systems can be risky unless the person making the comparison is familiar with the details of the operations of the system and their implications for statistical recording.

■ There also are large **factual inequalities** among countries as to their population size, population makeup (for example, percent urban and rural, and percent older than 60 and younger than 25), and the size of the crime problem. Even in comparisons that take these differences into account, hidden factors will affect the outcome.

■ Finally, there are a set of problems specifically associated with recorded crime. The numbers provided by governments are regarded as indicators of the input into, and therefore the workload of, the criminal justice system. They are not regarded as accurate statements as to the actual prevalence and incidence of a given crime type in a given jurisdiction, although they may be that. Further information would be needed to validate the figures. It is general criminological wisdom that the less serious the crime type, the more questionable the officially reported figures. It also is widely accepted that victim surveys provide more valid data in regard to the incidence of most types of crime.

All of these issues are good reasons to construct measures of crime that are based on multiple sources of data.

Source: Burnham, R.W. "A First Analysis of the United Nations Data Set on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems." Unpublished final report for NIJ grant 97-MU-CX-0002.

HEUNI's full report also contains an in-depth discussion of these topics. See Kangaspunta, K., Joutsen, M., and Ollus, N. (ed.) *Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe and North America, 1990-1994*. HEUNI Publication No. 32 (Helsinki, 1998).

breakthrough in comparative crime statistics.

This article focuses on three of the eight crimes HEUNI researchers studied: Property crime, violence, and corruption in Central and

Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and North America.³ Before considering these findings, however, it is important to be aware of the pitfalls related to statistical comparisons of crime in different countries.

The Pitfalls of Using International Statistics

The dangers of using official reported statistics as a reflection of crime within one's own country are well documented. Reported crime is not the same as actual crime, and statistics are collected for administrative purposes, not to satisfy research interests. The vagaries of changing laws and statistical practice and the idiosyncrasies of defining criminal incidents make it difficult to draw conclusions when comparing statistics from different areas or different times. In addition, the "traditional" offenses (those usually noted in the statistics) may not necessarily have the greatest economic and social consequences for society.

International comparisons are even more rife with misunderstandings, as has been repeated throughout discussions about the UN surveys. The major problems with comparing international crime data are differences in laws and in definitions of legal terms, improper statistical classifications, procedural differences among countries, ambiguous coding structures, and differences in the units of count used.

HEUNI researchers have attempted to lessen any misinterpretation by using data from different sources to see if they point in the same direction and by measuring different dimensions of the same phenomenon. HEUNI's cross-national analysis is based on more than the official reported crime statistics of countries responding to the Fifth UN Survey. It also is based on results of the ICVS—fully standardized victimization surveys on the general public's experiences with crime, which were carried out in more than 60 coun-

tries. Added to these data are data from organizations such as the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Transparency International, an organization that collects data on corruption.⁴

The use of different data sources yielded a measure of crime that is more scientifically robust than those previously available. This measure can be used reliably for comparative purposes across countries in Europe and North America.

Sociological and Behavioral Factors Related to Crime

Crime levels can be interpreted as the convergence of sufficient numbers of motivated offenders, relatively weak mechanisms of social control, and the presence of suitable targets of crime.⁵ For this study, the researchers analyzed data related to: (1) motivational factors, including level of affluence, alcohol consumption (both beer and strong alcohol), and a concept referred to as strain, or a person's reaction to a shortfall in the achievement of goals (usually socioeconomic goals); and (2) opportunity factors, including vehicle ownership, handgun ownership, patterns of outdoor recreation, proportion of single-person households, and strength of informal social control.

Motivational Factors. According to conventional criminological theories, crime is related to economic and/or social deprivation or inequalities. A key concept is strain, which the HEUNI team defined as the number of people in a country for whom criminal activities might be economically rewarding and for

whom the involvement in criminal activities is a viable option. As a measure of strain, the team used the rate of young people (16 to 29 years) who are dissatisfied with their income and/or who are unemployed (per 100,000 inhabitants).

Opportunity Factors. According to opportunity theory, the level of crime also is determined by the presence of suitable targets of crime and the extent of informal social control. A well documented example is the relationship between vehicle ownership and vehicle-related crime. Included in HEUNI's recent analyses were known risk factors, such as the frequency of outdoor visits for recreational purposes, number of one-person households, composition of housing (apartment buildings or detached houses), and ownership rates of motor vehicles, motorcycles, and bicycles. In addition to these factors, the researchers studied the prevalence of the possession of handguns as a possible facilitator of violent crime and the prevalence of antiburglary device use.

Urbanization and modernization have been linked to high crime rates due to lower levels of social control in urban areas.⁶ In previous analyses of ICVS data, the level of victimization by crime was strongly related to the proportion of the population living in a large city. For its study, HEUNI used data on urbanization taken from the UN Compendium on Human Settlement, which reflect the proportion of the national population living in settlements of 20,000 inhabitants or more.

The Interplay of Motivational and Opportunity Factors.

Crime in societies is determined by the interplay between motivational and opportunity factors.

Motivational factors can be seen as determinants of the "demand side" of national crime markets. To the extent that motivational factors are more prevalent in a country, there will be more potential offenders looking for opportunities to offend. Structural characteristics that provide viable opportunities for crime can be seen as the "supply side" of the crime market. Owners of expensive cars and consumer goods are the reluctant "suppliers" of opportunities for crime. In countries where suitable targets of crime are plenty and the level of social control is reduced, there are more potential victims of crime.

Affluence can be considered both a motivational and an opportunity factor. It acts as both an important inhibiting factor of certain forms of crime as well as a catalyst of others. In more affluent countries, there is less "demand" for crime—there are proportionately fewer individuals who are motivated to commit crimes or who are looking for criminal opportunities. Important motivational factors, such as income inequalities, dissatisfaction with income, and unemployment, tend to be lower in more affluent countries. If levels of affluence rise—and if the newly acquired wealth is evenly spread—the pool of motivated offenders in a given society decreases. This trend will contribute to a reduction in the level of crime. At the same time, affluence goes together with the ownership of commodities that can be stolen with relative ease, and also with a more outgoing lifestyle, which increases exposure to criminal victimization by strangers. Higher prosperity will invite higher levels of opportunistic forms of crime.

However, there are no straightforward, linear relationships between affluence and crime. The dynamics of crime in the big picture are further complicated by the increased use of sophisticated security measures by potential victims in more affluent, high-crime nations. These measures reduce opportunities for crime and, therefore, inhibit the occurrence of certain types of property crime.

Comparing Crime in Three Regions

To understand how and why crime varies across countries, researchers examined data from 49 countries in three regions—Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and North America. The researchers found that the most important predictor of high crime rates was the percentage of the population who were young males, ages 16 to 29, who were dissatisfied with their income or were unemployed. The results of the HEUNI team's analysis concerning the three regions can be summed up as follows.



Crime in Central and Eastern Europe. The motivation to offend appears greater in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are in transition to a market-based economy, than in Western Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, there are more male adolescents experiencing strain, and socioeconomic deprivation and alcohol abuse appear to help in the formation of a breeding ground for different forms of violent crime. Assaults, homicides, and robberies appear to be more prevalent in countries where many young males experience the strain of unfulfilled aspirations.

Also, alcohol use is endemic in these countries.

Corruption also appears to be much more common in Central and Eastern European countries than in North America and Northern Europe. Corruption is related to a lack of transparency and accountability in the public domain, characteristics that are common among the developing countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Corruption in government circles appears to be lower in the countries where economic and political restructuring is relatively advanced—for example, in Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. In fact, the level of corruption in some of these countries is lower than in some Western countries. These findings are encouraging. If the restructuring in other countries in the region continues, the long-term prospects for decreasing levels of corruption seem fairly good.

In the short term, the economic crisis in the Russian Federation and in some other countries in the region may exacerbate existing economic and social problems. In the long term, the overall economic prospects might be better, but this probably will not reduce the prevalence of strain among the lower social strata. Socioeconomic inequality is growing, and the rates of unemployment will probably remain high for many years to come.

In most of the countries in transition, people in urban areas typically live in apartments and car ownership is still relatively rare. These factors may have so far inhibited further increases of property crimes. During the past 10 years, affluence has increased in most Central and



Eastern European countries, particularly in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Baltic states. If the gross national product of these countries, which are among the first candidates for entry into the European Union, continues to increase, vehicle-related crimes and some forms of petty crimes are likely to increase. Household burglary rates also are likely to increase if households start to possess more expensive commodities but do not invest in antiburglary devices.

Eventually, investments in self-protection against car theft and burglary will increase and the rates of property crimes will stabilize.

However, if strain among adolescents remains prevalent due to high unemployment, some of the offenders prevented by improved security from committing less serious property crime may be desperate enough to switch to more risky, violent forms of property crime (street robbery, car jacking, and household robbery). The easy availability of firearms in many countries in the region will facilitate this. The crime profile of the countries in transition may start to resemble that of South Africa or the more affluent Latin American countries, where property is relatively well protected but robbery rates are high.

To sum up, the level of crime in the countries in transition is relatively high, and the overall criminological outlook is fairly bleak. Even if they overcome their current economic problems, the rates of violent crimes probably will remain high due to high levels of unemployment among young males and the high consumption of strong alcohol.

Crime in Western Europe. The crime situation in the more industrialized and affluent nations of Western Europe must be understood in terms of special opportunity structures. Countries such as England and Wales that rely largely on cars for transportation experience high rates of vehicle-related crimes. Countries such as The Netherlands and Sweden, where bicycles are common, experience high rates of bicycle theft. Countries where more people live in homes rather than apartments experience high burglary rates. As protection against car theft, theft from cars, bicycle theft, and household burglaries has increased, the overall level of property crimes has declined. Since the level of self-protection continues to increase, crime rates are likely to continue to fall.

Paradoxically, crimes of violence—particularly violent juvenile crime—show an upward trend in several member states of the European Union. Street robberies might be increasing as a result of displacement due to improved protection of property. The emergence of an ethnic underclass in the larger cities of Western Europe also might be contributing to violence because strain among some ethnic parts of the urban population might be rising. The main challenge for Western European countries seems to be the social and economic integration of young immigrants in the urban areas.

The outgoing lifestyle of young people and their use of alcohol and drugs might also be a causal factor behind juvenile violent crime. One of Western Europe's main assets is the relatively low level of handgun ownership, which probably is an important factor inhibiting homicides.

Relatively low levels of manifest corruption by public officials appear to be typical of affluent nations with stable democratic traditions. This relationship also can be understood in terms of criminal opportunities and motivations. In open democracies with relatively unregulated markets, there are fewer opportunities for public officials to require bribes for their services. In such societies, public officials receive better salaries than those in countries in transition, and the norms against corruption are stronger and more generally shared.

Crime in North America. Since 1988, the level of crime in the United States and Canada has declined, according to both ICVS and police data. The level of self-protection against crime is high, and the level of strain appears to be relatively low.

Crime in the United States differs less from Canada, the United Kingdom, and The Netherlands than is commonly assumed.⁷ Both the United States and Canada have relatively high levels of burglaries and car-related crimes in urban settings, but conventional crime and corruption in the United States are not exceptionally high. The most important difference appears to be the high level of homicides and robberies, which in the United States often involve guns. The most probable cause of this deviation from the European pattern is the exceptionally high rate of gun ownership in the United States.

Selected Country-Specific Findings

Property Crimes. The United States, Canada, and the Czech Republic rank among the highest in burglary, motor vehicle theft, and petty crimes. Other countries with relatively high levels of these types of crimes are Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia.

Countries with relatively low levels of property crimes are Belarus, Norway, Switzerland, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Violence. Serious violent crimes tend to be relatively more prevalent in the countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation.

The United States stands out with a high score on serious violence, which contrasts with much lower levels in Canada and the Western European countries.

Countries with low levels of violence tend to be found in Western Europe. Hungary and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also have relatively low levels.

Corruption. High levels of corruption tend to be concentrated in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe.

Editor's Note: Another study based on victim surveys and police statistics has concluded that crime rates are much higher in England than in the United States. The authors of the study report that in 1995, the results of a victim survey indicated that England's burglary rate was almost double America's and its motor vehicle theft rate was more than double America's. See Langan, Patrick A., and Farrington, David P., *Crime and Justice in the United States and in England and Wales, 1981-96*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998, NCJ 169284.

Framing the International Debate on Crime Reduction

Despite the cautions needed when working with the available international data, the HEUNI team's analyses indicate that we are beginning to piece together some important parts of the intricate international puzzle of crime.

Crime indicators based on a combination of police statistics and survey findings proved to be useful for analyzing the determinants of crime. National crime profiles can be understood as the outcome of the dynamic interplay between motivational and opportunity factors.

High levels of crime are found in both poor and rich countries. However, the factors responsible for high crime rates differ across regions.

In Central and Eastern Europe, much crime is demand-driven—crimes are committed by young males as a means to survive in dire economic situations.

In Western Europe and North America, much crime is supply-driven—the prevalence and shape of crime are related to special opportunity-structures (the availability of targets and levels of social control and self-protection). This conclusion has important implications for criminal justice policy.

For More Information

This article is based on *Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe and North America, 1990–1994*, edited by Kristiina Kangaspunta, Matti Joutsen, and Natalia Ollus (Helsinki, 1998). The report provides a full discussion of the HEUNI team's research and methodology, including background on the Fifth UN Survey and analyses of different countries' types of crime; a description of criminal justice system resources, case flow, and performance; and a review of sanctions.

HEUNI also has published a volume of criminal justice profiles of all European and North American countries with an independent criminal justice system. HEUNI research reports are available on its Web site at <http://www.vn.fi/om/suomi/heuni/>.

For more information on the UN Survey and the International Crime Victim Survey, see also: Graeme Newman (ed.), *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1999.

Policies that have worked in one country or region may be less useful or even counterproductive in countries where crime is determined by another set of factors. In the international debate on best practices in crime reduction, whether in the framework of the United Nations crime program or elsewhere, differentiations in policies ought to be made on the basis of criminologically informed crime profiles.

NCJ 180081

Notes

1. HEUNI is the European link in the network of institutes operating within the framework of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme. HEUNI, which is based in Helsinki, Finland, was established through an agreement between the United Nations and the government of Finland, signed December 23, 1981.

2. The UN has gathered information on crime and criminal justice from its member states since 1975. The first survey covered the period 1970 through 1975. In these surveys the information on crime is based on national police statistics and reflects the numbers of offenses recorded by the police. HEUNI has carried out the European and North American analysis of the second, third, fourth, and fifth United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operation of Criminal Justice Systems.

3. For its most recent analysis, HEUNI used crime data on 40 Western, Central, and Eastern European countries as well as on Canada and the United States. Researchers studied eight different types of crime: nonfatal violence (assaults and robberies), homicides, serious violence (a combination of nonfatal violence and homicides), burglary, violence against women

(sexual violence and assaults), vehicle crimes (theft of and from cars), corruption, and petty crimes (bicycle theft, motorcycle theft, noncontact personal theft, car vandalism, nonviolent sexual incidents, and threats).

4. Previous UN surveys relied almost exclusively on UN survey data. The analyses of the Fifth Survey differ considerably from previous ones because additional sources of comparative data were used. The HEUNI research team relied on a database called the Crime Guide, which consists of data from various sources, including the Fifth UN Survey, the International Crime Victim Survey, health and mortality statistics collected by the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and data on corruption from Transparency International and the International Institute for Management Development, which collects information on improper practices in the public sector and in the workplace.

The Crime Guide database draws data from studies of firearm ownership, alcohol consumption, substance abuse, gender equality, urbanization, and employment and compensation.

5. Cohen and Felson, "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach," *American Sociological Review*, 44(1979): 588–608; van Dijk, J.J.M., "Opportunities for Crime: A Test of the Rational-

Interactionist Model," report at the Eleventh Criminological Colloquium of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, November 28-30, 1994.

6. Shelley, Louise, *Crime and Modernisation: The Impact of Industrialisation and Urbanisation on Crime*, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981.
7. Editor's Note: Other research based on victim surveys and police statistics has concluded that crime rates are much higher in England than in the United States. (See Langan, Patrick A.,

Acknowledgments

HEUNI's analyses of the Fifth UN Survey were carried out by an international expert working group consisting of Jan van Dijk, Kristina Kangaspunta, Carolyn Block of the United States, Matti Joutsen of HEUNI, Andre Kuhn of Switzerland, and Ineke Haen Marshall of The Netherlands and United States. Adam Bouloukos of the UN's Centre for International Crime Prevention and Ejilasa Zvekic of the UN's Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute assisted the group in its work.

and Farrington, David P., *Crime and Justice in the United States and in England and Wales, 1981-96*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998, NCJ 169284.) These seemingly con-

tradictory findings provide at least suggestive reinforcement for the authors' argument for the use of multiple sources of data when making cross-country comparisons.



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These are the background data
from which the article was drawn.
Look at how these indices were
constructed to interpret the
data

advantages over the high-low dichotomies, the decision was made to use it in the subsequent analyses.

2.2. The crime indices per country: Introductory remarks

In this chapter we will briefly comment on the ranking of the countries in terms of the eight indices of crime. The commentary will be largely descriptive. In the next chapter the national crime indices scores will be analysed against the background of relevant economic and social factors (the opportunity and motivation factors). The focus is on those countries whose scores belong to the ten countries with the highest, and respectively with the lowest scores.

The reader is reminded that the national scores are not always based on information on all relevant source variables. In some cases, for example, no information from the International Crime Victim Survey is available. In such cases the index may be exclusively based on information on officially recorded crimes and should be treated with extra caution. The national scores should be checked against more reliable data, preferably based on future ICVS results.

The commentary on the scores of individual countries will occasionally refer to the lack of information on source variables. Information on the index scores and the source variables available per country is given in appendix B. Readers who are interested in the crime situation in particular countries are advised to consult the details given in this appendix.

To facilitate the comparison of national scores on the crime indices, the HEUNI "Crime Guide" contains information on the quartile to which national scores belong.³ For instance for burglary, Switzerland belongs to the lowest quartile (which means that it is among the 25% countries with the lowest scores) and Estonia belongs to the highest quartile (which means that it is among the 25% countries with the highest scores). In this chapter average scores for the countries of the Central and Eastern European countries, for all Western European countries, for the member states of the European Union and for the United States and Canada (North America) are presented. These group averages allow the reader to compare national scores with the scores of countries belonging to the same geopolitical group.

2.3. Burglaries

Household burglaries

Household burglaries are, even more than other types of crime, a cross-cultural phenomenon. In all Western countries most citizens live alone or with family members or friends in private homes where many of their private possessions are stored. These private possessions stored in the house are suitable targets for burglars. The prevalence of burglary is apparently not to any considerable extent influenced by country-specific opportunity structures. The availability of targets is roughly the same everywhere.

Previous analyses of the ICVS data have shown that burglary rates are the best predictors of over-all crime victimisation rates. If burglary rates in a country are high, the over-all victimisation rate of the public is usually relatively high as well (Van Dijk, 1998). It was also found that national household burglary rates correlate highly with national burglary rates of business premises (Van Dijk, Terlouw, 1996).

³This Crime Guide summarizes the data from different sources used in the preparation of the report. The Crime Guide was used in order to ensure that all members of the group of experts used the same data. See appendix A.

Table 1. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for burglary*

Burglary low		Burglary high	
<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>		<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>	
Azerbaijan	4	Kyrgyzstan	68
Belarus	17	Czech Republic	75
Kazakhstan	25	Slovakia	76
Moldova	27	Albania	79
Romania	29	Georgia	82
		Bulgaria	94
		Estonia	98
<i>West</i>		<i>West</i>	
Malta	18	Canada	79
Switzerland	18	United States	80
Cyprus	23	England/Wales	81
Germany	25		
Norway	25		
<i>Central and Eastern Europe mean</i>			53
<i>Western Europe mean</i>			45
<i>North American mean</i>			80
<i>EU mean</i>			52

The average score in North America (80) is much higher than those of Western Europe (45) and Central and Eastern Europe (53).

If we look at the ten highest scores on our index for household burglary, we see that the highest scores are in Estonia, Bulgaria and Georgia. At the fourth and fifth place stand England and Wales and the United States. Canada and Albania are at the sixth/seventh place *ex aequo*. The other countries belonging to the "top ten" are Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Kyrgyzstan.

From a geopolitical perspective, the countries with the highest level of household burglaries constitute a fairly heterogeneous group. The levels of burglary are the highest in some Central and Eastern European countries as well as in England and Wales, the United States and Canada. One explanation for the relatively high rates of England and Wales and North America is the high proportion of households in these countries living in detached or semi-detached houses rather than in apartment buildings (Mayhew, Van Dijk, 1997). Detached and semi-detached houses have been found to be more vulnerable for burglary. Another country (not included in this analysis) with a high proportion of detached houses is Australia. In Australia the rate of burglaries is even higher than in England and Wales.

Among the countries with the lowest scores we find several Western European countries (Malta, Switzerland and Norway) but also Belarus and Romania. Other countries with low scores are some other Central and Eastern European countries, and Cyprus and Germany. In the latter cases, however, the index score is based on just one or two source variables and the scores should be validated before any conclusions are drawn (see appendix C).

*Computing the indices see section 1.6 and appendix B.

2.4. Motor vehicle crimes

Table 2. Countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for motor vehicle theft

Motor vehicle crimes low		Motor vehicle crimes high	
<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>		<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>	
Tajikistan	4	Czech Republic	79
Kyrgyzstan	10	Bulgaria	92
Kazakhstan	12		
Belarus	16	<i>West</i>	
Romania	18	France	80
Ukraine	23	Malta	83
FYR Macedonia	23	Luxembourg	89
		Italy	89
<i>West</i>		England/ Wales	90
Turkey	6	United States	93
Switzerland	11	Denmark	97
Cyprus	22	Spain	99
<i>Central and Eastern Europe mean</i>			42
<i>Western Europe mean</i>			55
<i>North American mean</i>			82
<i>EU mean</i>			64

The average scores for motor vehicle crimes - theft of or from a car- are higher for North America (82) and Western Europe (55) than for Central and Eastern Europe (42). The highest scores were calculated for Spain, Denmark, the United States, England and Wales and Italy. The countries with the lowest scores are mainly situated in Central and Eastern Europe. It seems highly plausible that the prevalence of car thefts is related to the prevalence of car ownership. There are few exceptions to this pattern. In Switzerland the level of motor vehicle theft is low, although the rate of car ownership is among the highest in the world. Of the Central and Eastern European countries the Czech Republic and Bulgaria are exceptional in having high scores. In these countries the car ownership rate in urban areas is somewhat higher than in most other countries in transition (66 and 64% respectively).

2.5. Petty crimes

In the ICVS all respondents who report victimisations were asked to assess the seriousness of their own victimisation on a three-point scale (very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious). The ranking of types of crime in terms of seriousness showed marked similarity across countries (Van Dijk, 1998). The most serious crimes were robberies with a weapon, car theft, sexual assault, joyriding and burglary with entry (completed burglary). Car vandalism, theft from garages, theft from a car, bicycle theft, indecent behaviour, attempted burglary, personal theft and threats were considered least serious. Thefts from cars were included in the index for motor vehicle crimes. Our index for petty theft consists of the percentage of respondents victimised by at least one of the six other less serious types of crime or of theft of a motorcycle (a type of crime rated as moderately serious by the victims). Since police figures of less serious crime are notoriously unreliable due to widely varying legal definitions and reporting patterns, no attempt was made to include official statistics in the index of petty crime.

Table 3. Countries with the lowest and highest scores on the index for petty crime (ICVS data)

Petty crimes low	Petty crimes high
---------------------	----------------------

Central and Eastern Europe

Belarus	8
FYR Macedonia	11
Georgia	13
Croatia	14
Hungary	17
Albania	30

West

Northern Ireland	4
Norway	15
Belgium	18
Spain	27

*Central and Eastern Europe mean**Western Europe mean**North American mean**EU mean**Central and Eastern Europe*

Slovakia	73
Latvia	74
Russian Federation	75
Estonia	80
Czech Republic	90
Ukraine	97

West

Sweden	72
United States	76
Canada	78
Netherlands	99

52

44

77

45

The average scores are again the highest for North America (77). The averages of Western Europe (44) and Central and Eastern Europe (52) do not differ much.

The Netherlands ranks first on the index of petty crime. This position is largely accounted for by its exceptionally high rates of bicycle theft and car vandalism (9% and 10% per year respectively). Among the countries with high scores are some countries from Central and Eastern Europe (the Ukraine, Czech Republic, Estonia and the Russian Federation) as well as Canada, the United States and Sweden.

Belarus, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Croatia and Hungary appear to experience relatively few victimisations by petty crimes. This is also true for Northern Ireland and Norway. In all these countries bicycle thefts are relatively rare.

2.6. Violent crimes

Four different indices were constructed for types of violent crime: non-fatal violent crime, homicides, serious crime (a combination of the latter) and violence against women (including serious sexual violence). Since the first three indices are strongly correlated (see chapter 3), we will only present the national scores for serious violence and the violence against women index. The data on non-fatal violence and homicide are summarized below.

Non-fatal violence

This variable is based on the ICVS victimisation rates for assaults and threats and for robbery. North America has an average score of 80 and Central and Eastern Europe of 58. The average score of Western Europe is markedly lower (40).

Estonia shows the highest rate, followed by the United States and the Russian Federation, Bulgaria and Poland. No Western European country is among the ten countries with the highest rates.

Austria and Hungary are lowest on this index.

Homicide

Central and Eastern Europe shows the highest group score (68), closely followed by North America (64). The Western European group shows a much lower score (35).

The homicide rates are highest for the Russian Federation, Estonia, Latvia, Northern Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the United States. The mean scores of Central and Eastern Europe (68) and North America (64) are almost twice as high as that of Western Europe (35). All ten countries with the lowest scores are situated in Western Europe.

Serious violence

The comprehensive index of homicide and non-fatal violence shows the same ranking as homicides, with Estonia, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the United States on top and Western European countries at the low end (see table 4).

Table 4. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for serious violence

Serious violence low		Serious violence high	
<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>		<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>	
FYR Macedonia	30	Azerbaijan	68
		Georgia	70
<i>West</i>		Poland	71
Ireland	8	Bulgaria	71
Cyprus	14	Kyrgyzstan	73
Turkey	17	Armenia	80
Andorra	18	Kazakhstan	88
Austria	22	Russian Federation	93
Greece	28	Estonia	96
France	31		
Switzerland	31	<i>West</i>	
Norway	32	United States	86
<i>Central and Eastern Europe mean</i>		<i>64</i>	
<i>Western Europe mean</i>	36		
<i>North American mean</i>	73		
<i>EU mean</i>	40		

Ireland stands out as the country with the lowest level of violence. Of the Central and Eastern European countries, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shows a remarkably low score on this index.

Violence against women

The violence against women index is based on ICVS data on assaults and sexual assaults (rapes, attempted rapes and serious sexual harassment) and official rape statistics. Table 5 shows the countries with high and low scores.

Table 5. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for violence against women

Violence against women

Violence against women

low		high	
<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>		<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>	
Armenia	7	Kyrgyzstan	80
Azerbaijan	10	Russian Federation	83
FYR Macedonia	21	Kazakhstan	84
Poland	25	Czech Republic	90
<i>West</i>		<i>West</i>	
Turkey	5	Denmark	74
Cyprus	6	Finland	76
Malta	15	Germany	81
Italy	16	Sweden	82
Greece	22	United States	84
Spain	22	Canada	90
<i>Central and Eastern Europe mean</i>		51	
<i>Western Europe mean</i>		45	
<i>North American mean</i>		87	
<i>EU mean</i>		52	

The countries with high scores on the violence against women index can be divided in three main groups: Central and Eastern European (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation), North American (the United States and Canada) and North Western European (Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden). The first two groups show similarly high scores on other indices of violent crime. This is not true for the third group, however. The Czech Republic does not fit in any of these groups.

The scores of the four Central and Eastern European countries with the lowest scores are based on official rape statistics only and need further scrutiny. Other countries with low scores are situated in Southern Europe (Malta, Italy, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Spain).

2.7. Corruption (taking of bribes by government officials)

The corruption index is based on information from three independent sources. As mentioned earlier, the source variables of this index were highly intercorrelated. Somewhat surprisingly it was found that even the ICVS ranking of street level corruption of public officials was strongly correlated with the Transparency International ranking of corrupt practices as perceived by the business sector ($r=.86$; $n=11$; $p=0.001$). This finding suggests that corruption on different levels of society is somehow interrelated. Corruption at the highest levels seems to go hand in hand with street-level corruption.

The mean scores of Central and Eastern Europe, North America and Western Europe are 78, 32 and 45. Most countries with the highest scores are situated in Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Italy and Greece (see table 6).

Table 6. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for corruption

Corruption		Corruption	
low		high	
<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>		<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>	

<i>West</i>		Lithuania	86
Denmark	4	Latvia	86
Netherlands	6	Yugoslavia	87
Finland	10	Bulgaria	94
Iceland	12	Russian Federation	95
Sweden	19	Georgia	98
United Kingdom	24	Kyrgyzstan	98
Switzerland	24	<i>West</i>	
Norway	25	Greece	88
Canada	31	Italy	93
United States	33	Turkey	94
<i>Central and Eastern Europe mean</i>			78
<i>Western Europe mean</i>			45
<i>North American mean</i>			32
<i>EU mean</i>			45

All countries with low levels of corruption are situated in either North-Western Europe or North America.

2.8. General conclusions

The United States, Canada and the Czech Republic rank among the highest on burglary, motor vehicle theft and petty crimes. Other countries with relatively high levels of these types of crime are Bulgaria, Slovakia and Estonia.

Countries with relatively low levels of property crimes are Belarus, Switzerland, Norway and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Serious violent crimes apparently tend to be most prevalent in the countries of the former Soviet Union (e.g. the Russian Federation, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan).

The United States stands out with a high level on serious violence, which contrasts with much lower levels in Canada and the Western European countries.

Countries with low levels of violence tend to be found in Western Europe. Hungary and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also appear to have relatively low levels of violence.

The levels of violence against women tend to be highest in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United States, Canada and several Northern European countries also show high scores on the index for violence against women. However, the latter scores might well be an artefact of higher awareness of this type of crime in the most gender-balanced societies. This issue will be taken up in section 3.1.4.

High levels of manifest corruption tend to be concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe.

In the next chapter national scores on the crime indices will be related to economic, social and cultural factors.



February 07, 1997 / 46(05);101-105

CDE

Rates of Homicide, Suicide, and Firearm-Related Death Among Children -- 26 Industrialized Countries

During 1950-1993, the overall annual death rate for U.S. children aged less than 15 years declined substantially (1), primarily reflecting decreases in deaths associated with unintentional injuries, pneumonia, influenza, cancer, and congenital anomalies. However, during the same period, childhood homicide rates tripled, and suicide rates quadrupled (2). In 1994, among children aged 1-4 years, homicide was the fourth leading cause of death; among children aged 5-14 years, homicide was the third leading cause of death, and suicide was the sixth (3). To compare patterns and the impact of violent deaths among children in the United States and other industrialized countries, CDC analyzed data on childhood homicide, suicide, and firearm-related death in the United States and 25 other industrialized countries for the most recent year for which data were available in each country (4). This report presents the findings of this analysis, which indicate that the United States has the highest rates of childhood homicide, suicide, and firearm-related death among industrialized countries.

* In the 1994 World Development Report (5), 208 nations were classified by gross national product; from that list, the United States and all 26 of the other countries in the high-income group and with populations of greater than or equal to 1 million were selected because of their economic comparability and the likelihood that those countries maintained vital records most accurately. In January and February 1996, the ministry of health or the national statistics institute in each of the 26 countries were asked to provide denominator data and counts by sex and by 5-year age groups for the most recent year data were available for the number of suicides (International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision {ICD-9}, codes E950.0-E959), homicides (E960.0-E969), suicides by firearm (E955.0-E955.4), homicides by firearm (E965.0-E965.4), unintentional deaths caused by firearm (E922.0-E922.9), and firearm-related deaths for which intention was undetermined (E985.0-E985.4); 26 (96%) countries, including the United States, provided complete data *. Twenty (77%) countries provided data for 1993 or 1994; the remaining countries provided data for 1990, 1991, 1992, or 1995. Cause-specific rates per 100,000 population were calculated for three groups (children aged 0-4 years, 5-14 years, and 0-14 years). The rates for homicide and suicide by means other than firearms were calculated by subtracting the firearm-related homicide and firearm-related suicide rates from the overall homicide and suicide rates. Rates for the United States were compared with rates based on pooled data for the other 25 countries. Of the 161 million children aged less than 15 years during the 1 year for which data were provided, 57 million (35%) were in the United States and 104 million (65%) were in the other 25 countries.

* Overall, the data provided by the 26 countries included a total of 2872 deaths among children aged less than 15 years for a period of 1 year. Homicides accounted for 1995 deaths, including 1177 (59%) in boys and 818 (41%) in girls. Of the homicides, 1464 (73%) occurred among U.S. children. The homicide rate for children in the United States was five times higher than that for children in the other 25 countries combined (2.57 per 100,000 compared with 0.51) (Table 1).

Suicide accounted for the deaths of 599 children, including 431 (72%) in boys and 168 (28%) in girls. Of the suicides, 321 (54%) occurred among U.S. children. The suicide rate for children in the

United States was two times higher than that in the other 25 countries combined (0.55 compared with 0.27) (Table 1). No suicides were reported among children aged less than 5 years.

A firearm was reported to have been involved in the deaths of 1107 children; 957 (86%) of those occurred in the United States. Of all firearm-related deaths, 55% were reported as homicides; 20%, as suicides; 22%, as unintentional; and 3%, as intention undetermined. The overall firearm-related death rate among U.S. children aged less than 15 years was nearly 12 times higher than among children in the other 25 countries combined (1.66 compared with 0.14) (Table 1). The firearm-related homicide rate in the United States was nearly 16 times higher than that in all of the other countries combined (0.94 compared with 0.06); the firearm-related suicide rate was nearly 11 times higher (0.32 compared with 0.03); and the unintentional firearm-related death rate was nine times higher (0.36 compared with 0.04). For all countries, males accounted for most of the firearm-related homicides (67%), firearm-related suicides (77%), and unintentional firearm-related deaths (89%). The nonfirearm-related homicide rate in the United States was nearly four times the rate in all of the other countries (1.63 compared with 0.45), and nonfirearm-related suicide rates were similar in the United States and in all of the other countries combined (0.23 compared with 0.24).

The rate for firearm-related deaths among children in the United States (1.66) was 2.7-fold greater than that in the country with the next highest rate (Finland, 0.62) (Figure 1). Except for rates for firearm-related suicide in Northern Ireland and firearm-related fatalities of unknown intent in Austria, Belgium, and Israel, rates for all types of firearm-related deaths were higher in the United States than in the other countries. However, among all other countries, the impact of firearm-related deaths varied substantially. For example, five countries, including three of the four countries in Asia, reported no firearm-related deaths among children. In comparison, firearms were the primary cause of homicide in Finland, Israel, Australia, Italy, Germany, and England and Wales. Five countries (Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, and Taiwan) reported only unintentional firearm-related deaths.

Reported by: Div of Violence Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC.

Editorial Note

Editorial Note: The findings in this report document a high rate of death among U.S. children associated with violence and unintentional firearm-related injuries, particularly in comparison with other industrialized countries. Even though rates in all other countries were lower than those in the United States, rates among other countries varied substantially and were particularly low in some countries. Although specific reasons for the differences in rates among countries are unknown, previous studies have reported on the associations between rates of violent childhood death and low funding for social programs (6), economic stress related to participation of women in the labor force (7,8), divorce, ethnic-linguistic heterogeneity, and social acceptability of violence (9).

The findings of the analysis in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, although the data were obtained from official sources and were based on ICD-9 codes, the sensitivity and specificity of the vital records and reporting systems may have varied by country. Second, because 21 (81%) countries each reported less than 10 firearm-related deaths among children aged 0-14 years, the firearm-related death rates for those countries, when not pooled, are unstable and may vary substantially for different years. Finally, only one half of the countries (including the United States) reported all four digits of the ICD-9 codes for firearm-related deaths; the fourth digit distinguishes whether deaths were caused by injuries from firearms or by other explosives. For countries in which this distinction could not be made, the firearm-related death rates may be overestimated slightly.

In May 1996, the 49th World Health Assembly adopted a resolution that declared violence a leading worldwide public health problem and urged all member states to assess the problem of violence and to communicate their findings to the World Health Organization (10). Cross-cultural comparisons may identify key factors (e.g., attitudinal, behavioral, educational, socioeconomic, or regulatory) not

evident from intranational studies that could assist in the development of new country-specific strategies for preventing such deaths.

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 - o Complete data were provided by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Scotland, Singapore, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States. In this analysis, Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, and Taiwan are considered as countries.

Table 1


Note: To print large tables and graphs users may have to change their printer settings to landscape and use a small font size.

TABLE 1. Rates * of homicide, suicide, and firearm-related death + among children aged <15 years

[Return to top.](#)

Figure_1

FIGURE 1. Rates* of firearm-related death† among children aged <15 years – 26 industrialized countries‡



* Per 100,000 children aged <15 years and for 1 year during 1990–1995.

† Homicides by firearm (International Classification of Diseases Ninth Revision codes E985.0–E985.4), suicides by firearm (E965.0–E965.4), unintentional deaths caused by firearm (E922.0–E922.9), and firearm-related deaths for which intention was undetermined (E985.0–E985.4).

‡ All countries classified in the high-income group with populations ≥1 million (–) that provided complete data. In this analysis, Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, and Taiwan are considered as countries.

† Reported only unintentional firearm-related deaths.

[Return to top.](#)

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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT*

	At 1990 prices and 1990 exchange rates							Volume**	at current prices and exchange rates			
	1985	1990	1993	1995	1996	1997	1998	1998 — 1997	1993	1996	1997	1998
	Billion dollars							ann. %	Billion dollars			
Canada	498.0	572.7	581.2	616.7	624.3	647.4	666.7	3.0	552.9	592.3	607.7	581.7
Mexico	241.8	262.7	289.3	283.4	298.1	319.0	334.4	4.8	403.2	329.5	401.9	415.5
United States	4845.9	5554.1	5790.4	6179.0	6439.8	6780.5	7043.6	3.9	6341.6	7418.7	7844.0	8230.9
Australia	253.0	295.6	311.7	341.7	354.3	364.1	382.7	5.1	285.5	395.2	392.9	351.9
Japan	2368.9	2970.1	3124.1	3190.5	3351.6	3399.4	3303.6	-2.8	4275.0	4599.3	4197.5	3783.7
Korea	157.3	253.7	307.6	363.8	389.5	411.0	387.0	-5.8	332.8	484.6	442.5	297.9
New Zealand	42.1	43.1	45.8	50.1	51.4	52.4	52.0	-0.8	43.7	65.4	65.0	53.1
Austria	136.3	159.5	168.0	174.9	178.4	182.9	188.9	3.3	182.7	228.1	206.0	212.3
Belgium	168.9	196.1	199.3	209.2	211.9	218.3	224.6	2.9	214.0	268.2	242.5	250.5
Czech Republic	..	27.4	23.6	25.9	26.9	27.2	26.4	-2.7	34.4	56.5	52.0	55.0
Denmark	125.0	133.4	138.1	150.7	155.5	160.7	165.4	2.9	138.8	184.0	170.0	174.9
Finland	114.1	134.8	119.4	131.2	135.8	144.0	150.7	4.7	84.4	125.0	119.8	124.8
France	1029.8	1195.4	1201.8	1260.5	1278.3	1307.3	1349.2	3.2	1249.7	1538.8	1394.1	1433.9
Germany ***	1420.8	1640.1	1703.4	1770.9	1793.6	1833.1	1883.5	2.8	1913.5	2341.6	2089.9	2135.7
Greece	75.6	82.9	84.7	88.2	90.4	93.4	96.7	3.5	92.2	123.3	119.8	120.4
Hungary	..	35.8	30.4	31.7	32.2	33.6	35.3	5.1	38.6	44.7	45.3	47.4
Iceland	5.3	6.3	6.2	6.5	6.8	7.1	7.5	5.0	6.1	7.3	7.4	8.2
Ireland	36.2	45.5	50.7	61.3	66.3	73.4	81.1	10.4	49.2	72.0	77.2	83.2
Italy	945.1	1093.9	1099.8	1156.7	1164.4	1181.9	1198.8	1.4	985.1	1213.7	1145.4	1172.3
Luxembourg	7.9	10.7	13.0	14.0	14.4	15.0	15.8	5.7	13.2	17.6	16.4	17.4
Netherlands	243.4	283.7	298.2	314.8	324.6	336.5	349.3	3.8	313.1	397.0	363.3	377.5
Norway	106.3	115.5	126.3	138.4	145.9	151.0	154.1	2.1	116.1	158.2	153.4	146.2
Poland	..	59.0	58.4	65.8	69.8	74.6	78.1	4.8	86.0	134.6	135.6	150.2
Portugal	52.9	69.1	71.7	75.4	77.8	80.7	83.8	3.9	83.7	108.8	101.3	105.9
Spain	394.9	491.9	500.7	525.8	538.5	557.6	578.7	3.8	479.0	582.2	532.0	553.3
Sweden	205.2	229.8	219.0	235.2	238.2	242.4	249.4	2.9	185.8	251.7	227.8	226.9
Switzerland	199.9	228.4	225.2	227.5	228.3	232.1	236.9	2.1	236.7	296.0	256.0	264.6
Turkey	115.0	150.7	174.1	176.5	188.8	203.1	208.7	2.8	180.4	181.5	189.9	198.7
United Kingdom	828.2	975.5	970.7	1040.5	1064.6	1100.5	1123.2	2.1	942.9	1153.4	1282.9	1357.2
OECD	14460.5	16941.5	17512.7	18419.7	19022.2	19683.6	20129.3	2.3	19368.7	22648.7	22204.1	22380.7
Major seven	11936.8	14001.8	14471.3	15214.9	15716.6	16250.2	16568.7	2.0	16260.8	18857.7	18561.4	18695.4
OECD-Europe	6210.8	7243.2	7370.2	7758.3	7902.7	8120.8	8346.3	2.8	7466.8	9248.3	8695.1	8963.9
EU15	5784.3	6742.4	6838.4	7209.4	7332.8	7527.6	7739.1	2.8	6927.5	8605.4	8088.5	8346.3
Euro zone	4550.3	5320.9	5426.0	5694.8	5784.1	5930.6	6104.4	2.9	5567.7	6893.0	6288.0	6466.9

largest economy

* Sources: Data are broadly consistent with those in the latest issue of the annual OECD national accounts publication. However, where revised data are available from countries' submissions, they have been used in compiling this table.

** Various base years, GDP/GNP growth rate.

*** Figures prior to 1991 are unofficial. These are Secretariat estimates based on information from the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung and the East German Statistical Office.

Dec 1999

7 major OECD : industrialized
 7 major OECD : US, Canada, Italy, UK, France, Germany, Japan

firearm homicide rate / US highest among high income countries

GDP PER CAPITA, 1997

at current prices, in US dollars

PIB PAR TÊTE, 1997

aux prix courants, en dollars des États-Unis

wealthiest

OECD Member Countries	based on current exchange rates	based on current purchasing power parities	Pays Membres de l'OCDE
Canada	20 064	23 761	Canada
Mexico	4 298	7 697	Mexique
United States	29 326	29 326	États-Unis
Japon	33 212	24 574	Japon
Korea	9 622	14 477	Corée
Australia	21 202	21 949	Australie
New Zealand	17 272	17 846	Nouvelle Zélande
Austria	25 549	23 077	Autriche
Belgium	23 820	23 242	Belgique
Czech Republic	5 050	13 087	République Tchèque
Denmark	32 179	25 514	Danemark
Finland	23 314	20 488	Finlande
France	23 789	21 293	France
Germany	25 470	22 049	Allemagne
Greece	11 438	13 912	Grèce
Hungary	4 461	9 875	Hongrie
Iceland	27 292	24 836	Islande
Ireland	21 104	20 634	Irlande
Italy	19 913	21 265	Italie
Luxembourg	37 346	33 119	Luxembourg
Netherlands	23 280	22 142	Pays-Bas
Norway	34 815	26 771	Norvège
Poland	3 509	7 487	Pologne
Portugal	10 184	14 562	Portugal
Spain	13 530	15 990	Espagne
Sweden	25 746	20 439	Suède
Switzerland	35 897	25 902	Suisse
Turkey	2 979	6 463	Turquie
United Kingdom	21 740	20 483	Royaume-Uni
OECD - Total (1)	22 428	21 487	OCDE - Total (1)
OECD - Europe (2)	19 334	18 698	OCDE - Europe (2)
European Union (EU15)	21 617	20 546	Union Européenne (UE15)
OECD Member	en utilisant les taux de change	en utilisant les parités de	Pays Membres

OECD Member Countries	taux de change courants	parités de pouvoir d'achat courantes	Pays Membres de l'OCDE
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(1) Excluding Korea, Czech republic, Hungary and Poland.

(1) *Non compris la Corée, la République Tchèque, la Hongrie et la Pologne.*

(2) Excluding Czech republic, Hungary and Poland.

(2) *Non compris la République Tchèque, la Hongrie et la Pologne.*

Source: *OECD National Accounts, Main aggregates, Volume 1*

Source: *Comptes Nationaux de l'OCDE, Principaux agrégats, Volume 1*

February/février 1999

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs




Bureau of Justice Statistics


Crime and Justice in the United States and in England and Wales, 1981-96

In 1995 victim surveys, crime rates for robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft are higher in England (including Wales) than in the United States.


Robbery: Survey crime rate per 1,000 population




Assault: Survey crime rate per 1,000 population



Burglary: Survey crime rate per 1,000 households



Motor vehicle theft: Survey crime rate per 1,000 households



U.S. Department of Justice
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Bureau of Justice Statistics



Crime and Justice in the United States and in England and Wales, 1981-96

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October 1998, NCJ 169284

Contents

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Highlights iii

Crime rates from victim surveys	1
Crime rates from police records	4
Reporting of crime to police	7
Police recording of crime	10
Victim surveys versus police records	12
Convictions per 1,000 population	14
Convictions per 1,000 offenders	17
Percent sentenced to incarceration	21
Incarcerations per 1,000 population	24
Incarcerations per 1,000 offenders	27
Incarceration sentence length	30
Time served	32
Percent of sentence served	34
Days at risk of serving	36
Justice system's impact on crime	38
Justice system changes	41
Racial disparities in incarceration	44
Methodology	45
Comparability	45
International crime victim surveys	47
Sources of American data	50
American survey offenses	50
American police-recorded offenses	50
American convictions	51
American probability of incarceration	53
American sentence length, time served, and days at risk of serving	54
American homicide	56
An American offender's probability of arrest, and an arrested offender's probability of conviction	56
Racial disparities in American incarceration rates	57
Sources of English data	58
English survey offenses	58
English police-recorded offenses	58
English convictions	58
English probability of incarceration	59
English sentence length, time served, and days at risk of serving	59
English homicide	59
Racial disparities in English incarceration rates	60
Prior research	60
Notes on figures 1-82	61
References	64
Appendix 1: Data used in figures 1-82	67
Appendix 2: U.S. and English-Welsh databases for the study	81

Highlights

• Whether measured by surveys of crime victims or by police statistics, serious crime rates are not generally higher in the United States than England. (All references to England include Wales.) According to 1995 victim surveys — which measure robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft — crime rates are all higher in England than the United States (figures 1-4 of the report beginning on page 1). According to latest (1996) police statistics — which measure incidents reported to police of murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft — crime rates are higher in England for three crimes: assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft (figures 5-10). The 1996 crime rate for a fourth crime (robbery) would have been higher in England than the United States had English police recorded the same fraction of robberies that came to their attention as American police (figure 15).

• The major exception to the pattern of higher crime rates in England is the murder rate. The 1996 U.S. murder rate is vastly higher (nearly six times) than England's, although the difference between the two countries has narrowed over the past 16 years (below, and figure 5 of the report).



• Firearms are more often involved in violent crimes in the United States than in England. According to 1996 police statistics, firearms were used in 68% of U.S. murders but 7% of English murders, and 41% of U.S. robberies but 5% of English robberies.

• Since 1981, an offender's risk of being caught, convicted, and sentenced to incarceration has risen in the United States for all six measured crimes (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft) but has fallen in England for all but murder (figures 43-48).


• U.S. crime rates — whether measured by surveys of crime victims or by police statistics — generally fell in the early 1980's, rose thereafter until around 1993, and then fell again (figures 1-10). For most U.S. crimes (survey estimated assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft; police-recorded murder, robbery, and burglary), the latest crime rates (1996) are the lowest recorded in the 16-year period from 1981 to 1996. By comparison, English crime rates as measured in both victim surveys and police statistics have all risen since 1981. For half of the measured English crime categories, the latest crime rates (1995 for rates from victim surveys; 1996 for rates from police statistics) are the highest recorded since 1981 (figures 1-10).

As a result of different crime trends in the two countries —

• the U.S. robbery rate as measured in the victim survey was nearly double England's in 1981, but in 1995 the English robbery rate was 1.4 times America's (figure 1)

• the English assault rate as measured in the victim survey was slightly higher than America's in 1981, but in 1995 the English assault rate was more than double America's (figure 2)

• the U.S. burglary rate as measured in the victim survey was more than double England's in 1981, but in 1995 the English burglary rate was nearly double America's (below, and figure 3 of the report)



• the English motor vehicle theft rate as measured in the victim survey was 1.5 times America's in 1981, but in 1995 the English rate for vehicle theft was more than double America's (figure 4)

• the U.S. murder rate as measured in police statistics was 8.7 times England's in 1981 but 5.7 times in 1996 (figure 5)


• the U.S. rape rate as measured in police statistics was 17 times England's in 1981 but 3 times in 1996 (figure 6)

• the U.S. robbery rate as measured in police statistics was 6 times England's in 1981 but 1.4 times in 1996 (figure 7)

- the U.S. assault rate as measured in police statistics was 1.5 times England's in 1981, but in 1996 the English assault rate was slightly higher than America's (figure 8)


- the U.S. burglary rate as measured in police statistics was slightly higher than England's in 1981, but in 1996 the English burglary rate was more than double America's (below, and figure 9 of the report)

Burglary: Police-recorded crime rate per 1,000 population



and convicted (below, and figures 25-30 of the report)


Rape convictions per 1,000 alleged rapists



- courts in the United States are generally more likely to sentence a convicted offender to incarceration (for robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft, but not murder or rape) than courts in England (figures 31-36)

- for all offenses (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft), courts in the United States sentence convicted offenders to longer periods of incarceration than courts in England (below, and figures 49-54 of the report)

Average incarceration sentence imposed on convicted murderers, in months




- for all offenses (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft), the length of time in confinement before being released is longer for incarcerated offenders in the United States than in England (figures 55-60)

- the fraction of the sentence served before release is generally about the same in the United States and England (figures 61-66).

Since 1981 —

- an offender's risk of being caught, convicted, and incarcerated has been rising in the United States but falling in England (below, and figures 43-48 of the report)

Number of incarcerated motor vehicle thieves per 1,000 alleged vehicle thieves



- the English motor vehicle theft rate as measured in police statistics went from 1.4 times America's in 1981 to nearly 2 times in 1996 (figure 10).

According to statistics on the criminal justice systems in the two countries (1994 in the United States; 1995 in England) —

- a person committing a serious crime in the United States (rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft, but not murder) is generally more likely than one in England to be caught

- sentences for serious crime generally have not been getting longer in the United States, while in England sentences generally have been getting longer for violent crimes (figures 49-54)

- in general, the length of time in confinement before release has not been rising in the United States but it has been rising for violent crimes in England (murder, rape, and robbery) (figures 55-60)

- the fraction of the sentence served before release has not been showing any clear general trend in the United States, while in England the sentence fraction served has been staying fairly stable for murder, rape and robbery, but has been dropping for assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft (figures 61-66)

- the risk of criminal punishment has been rising in the United States and falling in England (figures 67-72).

Crime rates from victim surveys

Robbery: Survey crime rate per 1,000 population




Figure 1

Assault: Survey crime rate per 1,000 population




Figure 2

Burglary: Survey crime rate per 1,000 households




Figure 3

Motor vehicle theft: Survey crime rate per 1,000 households




Figure 4

For additional information on these graphs, see the section labeled *Notes on figures 1-82*.

One of the best ways to determine the level of serious crime in a country is through crime victim surveys. In these surveys of the general public, samples of persons are asked whether they had been victimized by crime in the recent past. Interviewers ask about all crime, whether reported to police or not.

National crime victim surveys are conducted in both the United States and England (including Wales). In 1995 —

- survey-estimated *robberies* totaled 1.1 million in the United States and 313,000 in England
- survey-estimated *assaults* totaled 1.9 million in the United States and 823,000 in England
- survey-estimated *burglaries* totaled 4.8 million in the United States and 1.8 million in England
- survey-estimated *motor vehicle thefts* totaled 1.1 million in the United States and ½ million in England.

The higher volume of crime in the United States is due, at least in part, to the greater population size of the United States. A more meaningful comparison is between the crime rates of the two countries.

According to victim surveys, which country has higher crime rates?

- In 1995 (the latest year that could be compared), serious crime rates measured in victim surveys were all higher in England than in the United States (statistically significant at the 95% confidence level).

According to 1995 crime victim surveys, the —

- English *robbery* victimization rate was 1.4 times the U.S. rate (7.6 per 1,000 population versus 5.3) (figure 1)
- English *assault* victimization rate was 2.3 times the U.S. rate (20.0 versus 8.8) (figure 2)
- English *burglary* victimization rate was 1.7 times the U.S. rate (82.9 per 1,000 households versus 47.5) (figure 3)
- English *motor vehicle theft* victimization rate was 2.2 times the U.S. rate (23.6 versus 10.8) (figure 4).

According to national surveys of crime victims, is the crime rate increasing or decreasing in each country?

- U.S. crime rates as measured in victim surveys generally (robbery, assault, and motor vehicle theft) fell in the early 1980's, rose thereafter until around 1993, and then fell again (figures 1, 2, and 4). For survey estimated assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft, the latest U.S. rates (1996) are the lowest recorded in the 16-year period since 1981. By comparison, English crime rates as measured in victim surveys all rose. For robbery and assault, the latest English rates (1995) are the highest recorded since 1981 (figures 1-4).

Comparing 1981 crime rates from victim surveys to rates for 1995 (the latest year that U.S. and English surveys have in common), the rate of victimization from —

- *robbery* rose 81% in England (4.2 per 1,000 population rising to 7.6), but fell 28% in the United States (7.4 dropping to 5.3) (figure 1)
- *assault* rose 53% in England (13.1 rising to 20.0), but declined 27% in the United States (12.0 dropping to 8.8) (figure 2)
- *burglary* doubled in England (40.9 per 1,000 households rising to 82.9), but was cut in half in the United States (105.9 declining to 47.5) (figure 3)
- *motor vehicle theft* rose 51% in England (15.6 rising to 23.6), but stayed virtually unchanged in the United States (10.6 in 1981, 10.8 in 1995) (figure 4).

As a result of different crime trends in the two countries —

- the U.S. victim survey rate for *robbery* was nearly double England's in 1981, but in 1995 the English robbery survey rate was 1.4 times America's (figure 1)
- the English victim survey rate for *assault* was slightly higher than America's in 1981, but in 1995 the English assault survey rate was more than double America's (figure 2)
- the U.S. victim survey rate for *burglary* was more than double England's in 1981, but in 1995 the English burglary survey rate was nearly double America's (figure 3)
- the English victim survey rate for *motor vehicle theft* was 1.5 times America's in 1981, but in 1995 the English survey rate for vehicle theft was more than double America's (figure 4).

Crime rates from police records

Murder: Police-recorded crime rate per 1,000 population




Figure 5

Rape: Police-recorded crime rate per 1,000 female population




Figure 6

Robbery: Police-recorded crime rate per 1,000 population




Figure 7

Assault: Police-recorded crime rate per 1,000 population




Figure 8

Burglary: Police-recorded crime rate per 1,000 population




Figure 9

Motor vehicle theft: Police-recorded crime rate per 1,000 population




Figure 10

For additional information on these graphs, see the section labeled *Notes on figures 1-82*.

Police in both the United States and England (including Wales) keep annual statistics on the volume of crime that comes to their attention. According to latest police statistics (1996) —

- police-recorded *murders* totaled 19,650 in the United States and 681 in England
- police-recorded *rapes* totaled 95,770 in the United States and 5,759 in England
- police-recorded *robberies* totaled 537,050 in the United States and 74,035 in England
- police-recorded *assaults* totaled 1,029,810 in the United States and 228,636 in England
- police-recorded *burglaries* totaled 2,501,500 in the United States and 1,164,583 in England
- police-recorded *motor vehicle thefts* totaled 1,395,200 in the United States and 493,489 in England.

The higher volume of crime recorded by the police in the United States is due, at least in part, to the larger population of the United States (265 million in 1996) as compared to that of England and Wales (52 million). A more meaningful comparison is between the crime *rates* of the two countries.

According to latest police statistics (1996), is the serious crime rate higher in the United States or England?

- In 1996, rates of murder, rape, and robbery recorded by the police were all higher in the United States than in England, while assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft rates were all higher in England than in the United States.

According to police statistics for 1996 —

- the U.S. *murder* rate was 5.7 times higher than England's (0.074 per 1,000 population versus 0.013) (figure 5)
- the U.S. *rape* rate was about 3 times higher than England's (0.71 per 1,000 female population versus 0.22) (figure 6)
- the U.S. *robbery* rate was 1.4 times higher than England's (2.0 versus 1.4) (figure 7)
- the English *assault* rate was 1.1 times higher than the U.S. rate (4.4 versus 3.9) (figure 8)
- the English *burglary* rate was 2.4 times higher than the U.S. rate (22.4 versus 9.4) (figure 9)
- the English *motor vehicle theft* rate was 1.8 times higher than the U.S. rate (9.5 versus 5.3) (figure 10).

According to police statistics, is the crime rate increasing or decreasing in each country?

- U.S. crime rates as measured in police statistics generally (all crimes except burglary) fell in the early 1980's, rose thereafter until around 1993, and then fell again (figures 5-10). For murder, robbery, and burglary recorded by the police, the latest U.S. rates (1996) are the lowest recorded in the 16-year period from 1981 to 1996. By comparison, crime rates as measured in English police statistics have all risen since 1981. For rape, robbery, and assault recorded by the police, the latest English rates (1996) are the highest recorded since 1981 (figures 6, 7, and 8).
- The major exception to the U.S. pattern is the steady decline in the burglary rate since 1981. The major exception to the English pattern is

downturns since 1993 in rates of burglary and motor vehicle theft.

According to police statistics —

- the English *murder* rate rose slightly after 1981 (0.011 per 1,000 population in 1981, 0.013 in 1996), while the U.S. rate fell in the early 1980's, increased thereafter until 1991, and then fell again, reaching a 16-year low in 1996 (0.098 in 1981, 0.074 in 1996) (figure 5)
- the English *rape* rate rose almost continuously after 1981, reaching a 16-year high in 1996 (0.04 per 1,000 female population in 1981, 0.22 in 1996), while the U.S. rate fell in the early 1980's, rose thereafter until 1992, and then fell again, returning in 1996 to its 1981 level (0.7) (figure 6)
- the English *robbery* rate rose fairly continuously since 1981, reaching a 16-year high in 1996 (0.4 in 1981, 1.4 in 1996), while the U.S. rate fell in the early 1980's, rose thereafter until 1991, and then fell again, reaching a 16-year low in 1996 (2.59 in 1981, 2.02 in 1996) (figure 7)
- the English *assault* rate rose fairly continuously since 1981, reaching a 16-year high in 1996 (2.0 in 1981, 4.4 in 1996), while the U.S. rate fell in the early 1980's, rose thereafter until 1992, and then fell again (2.9 in 1981, 3.9 in 1996) (figure 8)
- the English *burglary* rate generally rose from 1981 to 1993 and fell thereafter (14.5 in 1981, 22.4 in 1996), while the U.S. rate fell fairly continuously after 1981, reaching a 16-year low in 1996 (16.5 in 1981, 9.4 in 1996) (figure 9)
- the English *motor vehicle theft* rate generally rose from 1981 to 1993 and fell thereafter (6.7 in 1981, 9.5 in 1996), while the U.S. rate fell in the early 1980's, rose thereafter until 1991, and then fell again (4.7 in 1981, 5.3 in 1996) (figure 10).

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
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LEVEL 2 - 1 OF 345 STORIES

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The Plain Dealer

February 6, 2000 Sunday, FINAL / ALL

SECTION: FORUM OPINION & IDEAS; Pg. 3H

LENGTH: 841 words

HEADLINE: THE PRISON BOOM: 2 MILLION AND GROWING

BYLINE: By Neal Peirce

BODY:

In a few short days, on Feb. 15, America moves past the 2 million mark in the number of people incarcerated in its prisons and jails.

That's the estimate of the Justice Policy Institute, a nonprofit research group that advocates alternatives to incarceration. No one seems to dispute its figures.

Two million represents a fivefold increase over this nation's 1972 prison population. Or check back to 1910: for every 100,000 Americans then, 122 were imprisoned. Today the figure is 724 inmates for every 100,000. We've passed Russia as the world's incarceration leader. We're putting people behind bars at six to 10 times the rate of other industrialized nations.

Clearly, there's something desperately wrong when a powerful nation, respected globally and swimming in economic ebullience, feels obliged to deny freedom to so many of its own people.

But to President Clinton, in his almost euphoric State of the Union address, the incarceration craze was a nonissue. Ditto the nation's governors, except for a few who referred to crime prevention in their state of the state addresses.

Even in the media-intense presidential campaign, Texas Gov. George W. Bush has faced few questions about the incredibly rapid expansion of Texas prison slots - from 41,000 to 150,000 - since he took office.

For 20 years, courts have sought to force humane standards on Texas prisons. In refusing to lift the controls, a federal judge recently ruled that Texas inmates face an unacceptable threat of violence, living in "a fear that is incomprehensible to most of the state's free-world citizens."

Is that "compassionate conservatism"?

There are also ugly racial overtones, so popular with politicians anxious to show their "toughness" on crime. African-Americans represent about 13 percent of the nation's population and 15 percent of its drug users, but about 50 percent of prison inmates in an era when drug offenses have been the driving force in prison expansion.



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Blacks suffer from gross sentencing disparity. The powder form of cocaine preferred by wealthier, usually white consumers requires 100 times as much weight to trigger the same penalty as the crack form. Crack users were originally thought to be beyond help, but recent studies show crack is less addictive than nicotine, and treatable.

Yet Congress refuses to change the law to comparable penalties. Is that "equal protection of the laws"?

Some 1.4 million African-American men, or 13 percent of the adult male population, have lost their right to vote because of involvement with the criminal justice system. One study, based on 1996 figures, found more African-Americans in prison than in universities.

The United States' "War on Drugs" juggernaut also catches whites and Hispanics, condemning hundreds of thousands of small-time addicts and street dealers of all backgrounds to years behind bars, away from productive employment, their families and children.

Yet there's little public outcry, little demand for justice.

So, have today's harsh penalties helped drive down the crime rate?

Well, maybe a little. Take habitual offenders and put them under tight supervision - in prison, or on probation - and it follows that crime will drop (temporarily, at least).

But New York had the country's second slowest growing prison population when it experienced sensational drops in homicides and other violent crimes in the mid-to-late '90s. California, by contrast, was adding inmates wildly, and its violent crime rates dropped much more slowly.

Bottom line: There's little correlation between incarceration and crime rates.

Few people oppose hunting down, prosecuting, imprisoning truly violent and incorrigible criminals. Yet as Marc Mauer showed in his 1999 book, "Race to Incarcerate," despite three decades of ballooning prison populations, crime rates, before and after the prison buildup, were about the same.

Just look back past the bulge of the crack epidemic, notes Lynn Curtis of the Eisenhower Foundation, and the lack of progress is apparent: "We have a policy that not only doesn't work but breeds more and more destruction."

And it's the nature of that destruction - the pursuit of legions of nonviolent, petty offenders - that has made war zones of so many inner-city neighborhoods, decimated families, compromised police, and still besmirches American democracy as we enter this new century. The key words for these times need to be prevention, treatment, outreach to the imperiled communities. Yet our official dollars for treatment are paltry, spasmodic, insufficient.

We could do better. In 1966, notes San Diego Union-Tribune columnist Richard Louv, Arizona voters passed an initiative mandating treatment instead of prison for nonviolent drug offenders. In 1998 they passed it again, overriding their



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state legislature's attempt to kill it.

It turns out more than three-quarters of the Arizona offenders have tested drug-free at the end of their treatment programs. And they're not in prison.

Couldn't we collectively, as a nation, get so smart?

GRAPHIC: ART: NO CREDIT

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: February 7, 2000



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LEVEL 2 - 6 OF 345 STORIES

Copyright 2000 American Lawyer Newspapers Group, Inc.
New Jersey Law Journal

January 24, 2000

SECTION: Pg. 27

LENGTH: 1659 words

HEADLINE: Two Million and Counting: Why Do We Lock Up So Many Citizens?; (159
N.J.L. J. 327)

BODY:

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POP: We can afford to be so punitive only because the burden of our tough-on-crime policies does not fall on the majority, but on a disempowered minority group. By David Cole

The author is a professor at Georgetown University Law Center, a volunteer staff attorney with Center for Constitutional Rights, and author of No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System.

*dropcap*According to the Enlightenment philosopher Montesquieu, "as freedom advances, the severity of the penal law decreases." He obviously hadn't seen the United States.

We are simultaneously one of the world's freest countries and a leader of the incarcerated world. Was Montesquieu wrong? How might America's dual character be explained? Consider first the facts.

This year, the total number of people in America's prisons and jails will reach 2 million -- a quarter million more people than the entire population of Houston. The United States boasts 5 percent of the world's population, but fully 25 percent of the population behind bars. Our per capita incarceration rate is second only to Russia's, and five times higher than that of the next highest Western nation. According to statistics compiled by the Justice Policy Institute, we've reached this dubious leadership position only in the past two decades.

During the first 80 years of the 20th century, the prison population saw a slight increase, roughly matching our general population growth, and it actually fell during two decades, the 1940s and 1960s. Since 1980, however, the prison population has mushroomed. The growth in the 1990s, when we added nearly 700,000 prisoners, is nearly 30 times higher than the average growth from 1920 through 1970.

The penalties we impose on criminals are also increasingly severe, largely as a result of mandatory minimum sentencing laws and "three strikes" statutes. Our sentences are far more harsh than those of countries with which we generally compare ourselves. No other Western nation routinely imposes sentences of longer than two years on its criminal offenders. In 1991, however, 39 percent of state



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New Jersey Law Journal, January 24, 2000

prisoners in the United States were serving sentences of 10 years or longer.

Perhaps the most troubling sign of the severity of our penal system is the death penalty. In 1999, Russia, our rival on the incarceration front, commuted the death sentences of all 700 people on its death row. In the same year, we executed 98 people, more than in any year since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. A record number of nations have abolished the death penalty, including all of Western Europe. And the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has called for a moratorium. Meanwhile, we have 3,625 people on death row, and are looking for ways to speed up the execution process.

Only five countries other than the United States executed a juvenile offender in the 1990s, and they're not company we generally like to keep: Iran, Nigeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. We killed 13 juvenile offenders in the past decade, and another 70 juvenile offenders are on death row. We are the only country in the world other than Somalia (which doesn't have a functioning government) that has failed to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits the execution of persons who committed their crimes while under 18 years of age. Why is it, then, that on issues of criminal punishment, we tend to be grouped not with Western Europe, but with countries like Iran, Yemen, and the republics of the former Soviet Union?

One explanation sometimes offered is that we have higher crime rates than Western Europe, and that our incarceration rates and penalties are simply a proportional response to a bigger problem. With the exception of homicide, however, our crime rates are not the highest among Western countries. And many Western nations experienced increases in crime rates equivalent to ours in the 1970s and 1980s, without coming close to America's record in locking up prisoners. Our incarceration rate has increased most dramatically in the past 20 years, even though crime rates have steadily decreased over that period. Moreover, criminologists who have studied the history of crime rates and incarceration rates have consistently found no clear relationship between the two.

Does Freedom Breed Crime?

Another explanation sometimes advanced takes the form of a direct challenge to Montesquieu. It is precisely because we are a free country, the argument goes, that we are compelled to impose such harsh penalties. According to one version of this theory, freedom breeds license, which breeds criminal behavior and then demands punishment. William Bennett, among others, argues that we have lost our sense of morals in our commitment to freedom, and that moral failing has led to our crime problem. But that account is difficult to square with the findings that our incarceration rates have mushroomed as crime rates have dropped.

An alternative version of the freedom-begets-incarceration theory argues that the incarceration boom is a response to judicial decisions protecting the constitutional liberties of criminal defendants. When courts throw out criminal convictions for constitutional violations, they are often criticized by politicians and the public for being soft on crime. Because such decisions are based on the Constitution, however, they are not subject to legislative revision. What legislatures can do is increase criminal sentences. And so we get three strikes and you're out.

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But this rationale is also difficult to square with the facts. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s did substantially expand criminal defendants' rights, but since then the Court has consistently cut back on those rights. The Rehnquist Court in particular has made a concerted effort to trim the rights of criminal defendants, directly curtailing or overruling Warren Court precedents or restricting defendants' ability to have their claims heard in federal court on habeas corpus.

Unless the American public has a memory for Supreme Court criminal procedure decisions that it lacks for virtually all other history, it seems unlikely that the incarceration boom can be attributed to outrage over defendants' rights.

Who Is Incarcerated?

To understand more fully the incarceration boom, we need to look at another set of facts: who exactly is being incarcerated. The answers are deeply disturbing. In the 1950s, when segregation was legal, African-Americans made up 30 percent of the nation's prison population. Yet today they are half of those behind bars, even though they are only 13 percent of the general population. The per capita incarceration rate among blacks is nearly seven times that of whites. This means that at current trends, one of every four black male babies born today will be sentenced to more than a year of prison time during his life. The analogous figure for white male babies is one in 25. And it also means that on any given day, one in three young black men between the ages of 20 and 29 are in prison or jail, or on probation or parole.

Even more troubling, much of the increase in black incarceration has occurred while black violent crime rates have dropped. From 1970 to 1996, the percentage of blacks in prison increased by 25 percent while the black proportion of violent crime arrests fell by 20 percent. The principal reason: the war on drugs, which has been waged predominantly against minorities.

From 1986 to 1991, the height of the drug war, the number of white drug offenders in state prisons increased by 110 percent, but the number of imprisoned black drug offenders grew by 465 percent. Among juveniles during the same period, drug arrests of minorities increased by 78 percent, but arrests of nonminority juveniles decreased by 34 percent.

These demographics suggest another explanation for the incarceration boom: We can afford to be so punitive only because the burden of our tough-on-crime policies does not fall on the majority, but on a disempowered minority group. Imagine what the politics of crime would look like if one in four white male babies could expect to be sentenced to a year or more of prison time. Or if the white per capita incarceration rate were seven times that of blacks, rather than vice versa. You can be sure that we would all be exploring alternatives to prison, education, job training and early intervention to help stop children from falling into a life of crime, rather than mandatory minimums and more death sentences.

There is strong evidence that the war on drugs has been enforced disproportionately. African-Americans constitute about 14 percent of the nation's illegal drug users according to self-report data compiled by the U.S. Public Health Service, yet they make up 35 percent of those arrested for drug



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possession, 55 percent of those convicted for drug possession and 74 percent of those sentenced to serve time for their crimes. Thus, for a crime they commit in proportion to their representation in the population at large, blacks are six times more likely to be incarcerated.

But even if all the disparities in incarceration could be fully explained by higher offending rates among blacks, our current approach would be tainted by racial discrimination. When the majority chooses to increase prison sentences, build more prisons, or expand the death penalty, it knows that minority groups, and particularly African-Americans, will bear the brunt of those actions.

Unless we would maintain the same tough-on-crime stance in the face of results imposing on the majority the burden we now impose on the minority, we cannot claim to have a fair criminal justice system. The fact that the majority does not share equally in criminal justice burdens is very likely why our system has become one of the most severe in the world.n

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LOAD-DATE: February 1, 2000



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LEVEL 2 - 8 OF 345 STORIES

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The Vancouver Sun

January 19, 2000, Wednesday, FINAL

SECTION: Editorial; A13

LENGTH: 1808 words

HEADLINE: Beijing, Clinton and a killer with a gun: The Chinese government launched a massive, ruthless manhunt for a shady underworld character. The mission: Protect the president of the U.S. at all costs.

BYLINE: John Pomfret

DATELINE: XIAN, China

BODY:

On March 22, 1998, top police officials in this historic Chinese metropolis held an emergency meeting. At stake, said police chief Liu Ping, was the life of the president of the United States.

A killer was on the loose in Xian, known once as the "city of heavenly peace" but now as the "city of thieves." In three months, with no apparent motive, he had murdered four people and left a woman in a coma with a bullet to the face.

President Bill Clinton would be visiting the city in June on his first trip to China and was to mingle with people in the streets. The ministry of public security in Beijing had sent Liu an order: Catch the killer by the end of the month, before a Clinton advance team arrived.

The manhunt lasted 100 days and involved more than 10,000 police officers. As they probed an underworld of killers, prostitutes, drug addicts and pickpockets normally unseen by foreigners, the case provided a rare look behind the facade of a surging economic juggernaut and would-be superpower that China presents to the world. It revealed a country with a rising crime rate, a society unsettled by 20 years of economic reform and a yawning disparity between rich and poor.

The "12-1 Armed Homicide Major Case" -- so named because the first killing occurred on Dec. 1, 1997 -- is populated by characters worthy of Dickens. There is Huang Xin, a larcenous lover who used women to set up robberies, then left them waiting for him to marry them or support their babies.

There is Wang Jiang, a jack of all trades who would rather jury-rig a pistol than fix bicycles for a buck. And there is a gang leader named Dong Lei, a martial arts expert whose first alleged murder was a double homicide. He is said to have pushed two men into the Yellow River after they fired him from a construction job.

The case also involves a pack of teenage runaways from the highlands of China's dirt-poor northwest -- where people live in caves and running water is a



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luxury. China's bigger cities attract hordes of such young scavengers, who flee the dead end of China's countryside for a life of petty crime and cheap thrills amid the smokestacks and sleazy karaoke bars of the new, urban China.

Case 12-1 also spotlights the daunting task facing Chinese police, who kept uncovering other crimes and capturing other suspects as they pursued their main quarry. The nation's crime rate is soaring. In 1998, 530,000 criminal defendants were sentenced to prison terms, a 30-per- cent rise over the previous year. Illegal drugs are flooding the streets of many cities, and police last year seized about seven tonnes of heroin, six times the amount confiscated in the United States.

Multiple murders, while often unpublicized, have become more frequent. A Chinese reporter who followed Case 12-1 previously covered the pursuit of a mass killer who was suspected of 21 homicides and 90 rapes.

In an effort to break Case 12-1, police interrogated more than 200,000 people. As with other crimes, the investigation depended less on warrants or rule of law than on "human wave" tactics in which large numbers of citizens are detained, searched, threatened and sometimes violently interrogated -- even tortured.

The case has been a sensation in Xian since a television docudrama based on it was aired here last summer -- a film that will soon be shown nationwide. This report, however, is based on interviews with sources with direct knowledge of the investigation.

The story begins on the wintry night of Dec. 1, 1997, in the Qin Ling Mountains outside Xian. A plainclothes policeman was heading home on a bus; it was snowing, the road was slick and the driver was drowsy.

The bus went out of control on a curve and flipped, killing 10 people. The policeman was seriously injured, but he went to the rescue of other passengers, helping to save lives and escorting an ambulance to Xian's Changan Hospital, where he fainted from loss of blood.

The officer was carrying his standard-issue sidearm, a Model 64, 7.62 mm automatic pistol. Chinese plainclothesmen do not wear holsters; they carry their weapons in small tote bags. Hospital doctors placed the bag at the side of the officer's bed, and within seconds, it was gone, stolen by one of the homeless waifs from China's northwest.

The officer discovered the theft, and police soon surrounded and searched the hospital, finding the empty tote bag in a sterilization room. The thief was poor, investigators surmised; he had pinched the gun, a few dollars worth of cash, some medicine and the officer's dirty socks.

Dec. 16, a little over two weeks later, was another snowy night. Near a lumber yard on the outskirts of Xian, police discovered the body of a taxi driver who had been killed by two bullets to the head. Tests confirmed that the bullets came from the stolen gun.

Police soon obtained the name of a woman who might have wanted the driver killed -- a prostitute known as Little Orchid who had once tried to trade sex with the driver for a free ride home. He slapped her; she threatened to have



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friends in Xian's underworld kill him.

Hundreds of detectives fanned out across Xian, rummaging around hundreds of karaoke bars and other nightspots. They finally found Little Orchid in jail, arrested in an anti-vice campaign. She told investigators she had given the driver's name to two gangster friends but did not know if they had killed him.

Police found the men and followed them; they were confronted while trying to break into the home of a retired general, apparently with the intention of robbing and killing him. Police arrested one of the men; the second jumped from a four-storey building in an attempt to escape and died. They turned out to be the wrong suspects.

A few weeks later, and about 100 kilometres away from the site where the cab driver was shot, traffic police found an overturned truck on a desolate highway leading north out of Xian. Two men inside were dead, each killed with two bullets in the back of the head.

Again, tests revealed that the bullets came from the missing police automatic. The killer had now used six bullets; the stolen gun had only five in the magazine. Not only did the killer have a gun, but he also had access to ammunition, a rare commodity in China.

'At this point the police began to get very nervous,' said a source with direct knowledge of the investigation. 'There was no motive. They thought he was a psychopath; so perhaps if he got close to Clinton, bad things would happen.'

By mid- February, the case was still unsolved, so police launched a citywide crackdown in which every person with a felony record was interrogated. The source said this amounted to questioning more than 200,000 people in a city of three million.

'All of Xian's police officers at one time or another were working on the case,' the source said. 'All over the city, if you were a big suspect or a small suspect you were called in. They went to homes of non-suspects, to homes of people who were completely innocent, interrogating, writing everything down. The hands of the police officers ached from writing. Their throats were dry from talking.'

Sometimes they seemed close. One day, a landlord who was spreading rat poison around his building entered a room rented by a young couple -- and found the man cleaning a pistol. 'I'm a killing god,' the man told the landlord with a smile. 'I've killed many people.'

Police raided the apartment but discovered that the man was a lieutenant in the People's Armed Police from Qinghai province. He had eloped to Xian with his fiancée because their parents opposed their wedding, and the gun was a legitimate tool of his occupation. He was a police executioner; China kills condemned criminals with a bullet to the back of the head.

On Feb. 23, 1998, the killer struck again, killing the manager of a furniture company in his apartment and stealing \$3,000. His wife was shot in the face and remains in a coma. By then, police had launched three massive operations to find



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the killer, but had nothing solid to go on.

Finally, they got a break. They had heard rumors the stolen gun had been sold by a teenager who worked in a Xian restaurant district. During a sweep of the area, the source said, police were drawn to a commotion at a restaurant where they were told that a man had just fled after beating a pickpocket who had tried to steal his wallet. The pickpocket admitted to police he had tried to lift the man's wallet, then added: "I also saw a gun."

It turned out that the man who beat the pickpocket, and who was ultimately charged with the murders, was gang leader Dong Lei. He had bought the gun from a 15-year-old illiterate named Ma Xiaobao, and as police tightened their noose around Xian, Dong had gone to the restaurant in search of Ma, intending to kill him to prevent him from talking to police.

Xiaobao, police later discovered, had stolen the gun from the hospital on Dec. 1 and buried it. But he broke his leg a short time later, and, needing money for medical expenses, he sold the pistol to Dong for \$40.

Still searching for Ma in mid-February, police found his elder brother, a teenage heroin addict and petty thief. Before the interrogation began, Wu Jinbiao, Xian's deputy chief of police, gave his detectives some simple advice, a source said: "Tell him: If he talks about the gun and the killings, he can live. If not, we'll take his life."

The brother gave the police an address. That night, officers with submachine guns flooded the neighbourhood under orders to take Dong gang members dead or alive. Thirty policemen broke into a small apartment, nabbing two men. One suspect, who a source said was "subjected to police terror tactics," told investigators that Huang Xin and another gangster were hiding out with one of Huang's girlfriends in Beijing.

The interrogation continued and, under threat of death, the suspect also volunteered that Dong and Wang Jiang, who worked on guns for the gang, had fled to Wuhan, a major city in central China. They were found there on March 27 and arrested. That day, Dong's lover of 12 years, who had followed him to Wuhan, jumped into the Yangtze River and drowned.

Five gang members -- including Dong, Wang and Huang -- have been convicted of capital offences, but thus far none has been executed. Nearly two years since Case 12-1 was launched, police are still investigating murders that might have been committed by Dong, the sources said.

Chinese officials said the U.S. government was never told about the case or about China's concerns for Clinton's life. "The main thing," Liu Ping told the officers at that March 1998 meeting, "is to not hurt the reputation of the Xian police, and the police of Shaanxi province, and the nation as well."

GRAPHIC: P Photo: Rick Wilking, Reuters / INSPECTING THE TROOPS: Bill Clinton in June 1998 walks among terra cotta soldiers in Xian, China.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH



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LEVEL 2 - 14 OF 345 STORIES

Copyright 2000 The Detroit News, Inc.
The Detroit News

January 10, 2000, Monday

SECTION: LetterstotheEditor; Pg. Pg. A8

LENGTH: 1253 words

HEADLINE: Letters: City's gun buyback plan wouldn't work

BODY:

I think that the proposed gun buy-back program in Detroit is the biggest waste of taxpayer money I have ever heard of.

The reasons are as follows:

* The reason that criminals are called criminals is that they don't obey the law. So do you honestly think they are going to turn in their guns?

* How is the honest homeowner going to protect himself and his family against the bad guys?

* You hear all about the 40,000-plus people who are killed with gunfire in this country every year, but we don't hear how the presence of a firearm has protected more than 2.5 million from harm or worse every year.

* If you would check the records of the 31 states that have changed their concealed carry weapon requirements so honest people, with training, can carry their protection with them, you would find the major crime rates in these states have dropped drastically.

* In this country, there is one police officer for each 3,000 people. How do you expect them to protect us? All they can do is react after something happens, and by then, it is too late!

Horace G. Francis

Portage, Mich.

Steven Jaffe's Dec. 13 commentary "Reducing number of handguns prevents injuries and even deaths" plays fast and loose with facts and statistics. In an effort to boost his case, Jaffe flings numbers and asserts that those numbers are factual simply because they came from Handgun Control Inc. I, for one, prefer to get my "facts" from a more reputable source.

I want to see some corroborating evidence that one in every eight households with children contains a loaded, unlocked gun.

Michael Olin

Ludington



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Stephen Jaffe makes some interesting points in his Dec. 13 op-ed piece that don't tell the entire story.

What he says about "Great Britain's homicide rate being a small fraction of that of the U.S." is true. However, his conclusion that the difference is due to differences in ownership of guns is not valid. How does he explain the similar large difference between the U.S. homicide rate and that of Switzerland, where loaded firearms are kept in nearly every home? The only valid conclusion is that something other than the mere gun ownership rate is responsible.

His quote of Handgun Control's statistic that "a firearm kept in the home is more likely to kill a family member than it is to kill a stranger in self-defense" is also misleading. One would (wrongly) conclude that an intruder must be killed for the homeowner's use of a firearm to have been effective. Nothing could be further from the truth; the mere brandishing of a firearm is usually enough to send the bad guy packing, post haste. Killing him is seldom necessary.

John Lott, formerly of the University of Chicago, did an in-depth study and published a book on the subject, titled *More Guns, Less Crime*, which shows that lawful firearms ownership actually reduces crime and violence.

Due to Britain's low rate of firearm ownership, a very high percentage of burglaries are "hot," that is, someone is at home during the commission of the crime. This is much more unusual in the United States, where a miscreant knows all too well that someone in the home might be armed and dangerous to his health.

The gun buy-back program is a joke and a total waste of the taxpayers' money. Putting the criminals in jail by enforcing existing laws is the most effective way to reduce crime.

Jim Dunmyer

Temperance, Mich.

Stephen Jaffe's recommendation supporting the proposed buyback program for handguns from Detroit public housing residents (Dec. 13) is typical of the liberal anti-gun proposals.

Getting rid of all the guns is an ideal and noble thought, if it could be done. But it can't and never will. Does Jaffe really think criminals and drug pushers would turn their guns in under this program? They are not going to.

Consequently what this program would do is disarm the law-abiding citizens in these high crime areas and thus make it even easier for the criminal element to commit their crimes.

An armed law-abiding citizenry actually reduces crimes and saves lives. Keenesaw, Ga. is a perfect example. In 1982, this Atlanta suburb passed a law requiring heads of households to keep at least one firearm in the house. The residential burglary rate subsequently dropped 89 percent in Keenesaw the first year, compared with the modest 10.4 percent in Georgia. Ten years later the rate was still 72 percent lower than it had been in 1981 before the law was passed.



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I resent my tax dollars being piddled away on a program that is only going to make matters worse than they already are.

Wayne Stienbarger

Mendon, Mich.

Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer is effectively a public housing resident. His bodyguards have guns. Is the good mayor going to set an example and have his protection sold to the feds at 50 bucks a weapon? Probably not.

Mark Hodgins

Sterling Heights

In his column regarding firearms buybacks for public housing, attorney Stephen R. Jaffe asserts that the fewer guns that are available, the less violence there will be. This must come as a surprise to Jamaicans, where firearms are illegal and their murder rate dwarfs ours. It must also surprise Mexicans and the Taiwanese, whose murder rates meet or exceed ours, with guns being completely illegal as well.

Jaffe states that gun control in Great Britain is responsible for its low murder rate. England's sharp instrument murder rate is also far lower. Its murder rate from blunt instruments is also lower, as is the murder rate for hands-and-feet beatings. Do the British license steel pipe? Do the Britons have fewer appendages per capita? Their murder rate by poisoning exceeds ours, however. I must presume that poison is legal in England.

Jaffe's assertion that "a gun kept in the home is more likely to kill a family member than it is to kill a stranger in self-defense" is wrong on several counts.

The study that makes this claim uses a flawed strategy for coming to the conclusion that he states, as less than 5 percent of the deaths in the study can be attributed to the firearm in the house.

David Hunt

Sandusky, Ohio

Stephen R. Jaffe's Dec. 13 commentary "Reducing number of handguns prevents injuries and even deaths" supporting gun-buy-back programs was terribly wrong.

His first assertion is, "this country is overly violent." While any violence is too much, the United States is very close to the top of the list of the least violent countries of the world. Also, according to FBI statistics, violence and crime have been slowly falling for more than 20 years.

He next proclaims that "Great Britain, where handguns are virtually banned, has a homicide rate a small fraction of that of the United States." A 1998 study done by Cambridge University has found that all serious offenses, including homicide, are now higher in Great Britain than in the United States. People in England are twice as likely to be the victims of burglary and 1.5 times as



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The Detroit News, January 10, 2000

likely to be robbed as Americans. Incidentally, "hot" burglaries, (where the home is occupied during the burglary), happens about 47 percent of the time in England, and only about 7 percent of the time in the United States. Violent crime has continued to go up in England in spite of the fact it is beginning its third year of a nearly total firearms ban.

On the direct subject of gun buy back programs, there is virtually no known proof they accomplish reducing violent firearms use, injuries or deaths as suggested by Jaffe.

Steve Frazier

Battle Creek

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LEVEL 2 - 26 OF 345 STORIES

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The Canberra Times

November 29, 1999, Monday Edition

SECTION: Part A; Page 9

LENGTH: 1489 words

HEADLINE: A FAIR AND JUST LEGAL SYSTEM;
JOHN PURNELL DISPUTES THE NOTION THAT DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING INEVITABLY LEADS
TO DIVERGENT SENTENCES, AND ARGUES THAT THE COURTS USUALLY GET IT RIGHT.

BODY:

TOUGH sentences curry favour with the electorate. That is why law and order issues continuously surface during state elections in NSW and Victoria. We have witnessed at recent elections, parties competing with each other playing the machismo hard-ball game" in relation to sentencing. The target of tougher" sentences is indeed a soft one.

Studies show the electorate sees more jail for more people" as a simple solution. Perhaps that is why we have seen politicians engaging in a sentencing auction". Cutting down the options and the discretion exercised by the judiciary is another chestnut. More people for jail for longer jail sentences is believed to provide deterrence to criminals and protection for society. But does it? If that is passionately advocated, we should know if there is a proper basis for these submissions.

Rapists, murderers, robbers and molesters of our youth do not engender sympathy. By their behaviour people who commit serious crimes often forfeit, in the eyes of many, their right to continue to live freely in our community.

Well, one might ask, what's wrong with that approach? When one is the victim of such a crime, either personally, or the parent or partner of a victim, a response that bespeaks of retribution is not only understandable but consistent with our experience of human nature. A relevant question for judges, criminologists and the public to ask and rationally assess is whether imprisonment does deter people from committing crimes. Do tougher sentences with less discretion exercised by judges achieve objectives that ideally would be held in a modern human progressive society? Subjectively the answer to that question appears to be an unmistakeable and resounding "No!" This fact may surprise many readers.

In an article entitled "To Treat or Punish", Justice McClellens of the Supreme Court of NSW, said, As each year passes, I think I am more convinced of the sterile and criminogenic qualities of imprisonment." Simply put it costs about \$50,000 a year to keep someone incarcerated. A prisoner is often subjected to sexual and other assaults. On release an offender is often worse off.

Justice McClellens reports with approval the work of Sheldon Glueck, an American criminologist, who said, Published prior statistics generally, and



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The Canberra Times, November 29, 1999

intensive follow-up studies, have demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that the product of routine criminal administration is much more likely to be recidivism rather than reform." There have been over the years various theories put forward to justify sentencing practices employed by the courts. One of Australia's greatest criminologists, David Biles, in an article, "Imprisonment and its Alternatives", said: A study of crime rates and imprisonment rates in Australia, the United States and Canada st. . . has refuted the argument that communities which imprison high proportions of their society thereby gain higher levels of public safety. With the evidence from Holland, America and Canada as well as Australia all suggesting that high or low rates of imprisonment had no influence on crime rates, the reason why we in Australia have moved in the direction of more widespread use of imprisonment is open to speculation." The NSW Director of Public Prosecutions, Nicholas Cowdery, QC, in his paper entitled, "The Drug Problem in South West Sydney What to do?" (May 19, 1999), says, "In any area of professional practice such as the criminal law, it is often suggested that Parliament and the courts get tough. There are two things to be said about that: first, they are tough and, secondly, being tough is no answer . . .

Research shows emphatically that increasing penalties particularly for drug-related crime has no demonstrable effect on its commission. Drug users do not stop to consider the possible criminal justice consequences." Further, before a court sentences an offender, there are the statutory imperatives to consider. Courts do not sentence in a vacuum.

The Crimes Acts provide discretionary and mandatory matters for courts to consider, for example, a court shall not pass a sentence of imprisonment on any person . . . unless the court after having considered all other available sentences is satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case." Both the Federal Government and the ACT Government have passed legislation instructing the courts that in contemplating a sentence, the court must look at imprisonment as the last resort and to consider a large list of relevant matters. The task properly discharged is a difficult one indeed.

Sentences in the territory come under regular criticism in the media. The Canberra Times, for example, reviewed a sentence handed down by Justice Terry Higgins (October 28, 1999). The sentencing was of William Gordon Brady. There was criticism of the sentence as demonstrated by the views of letter-writers.

The comments made in relation to this sentence demonstrate how important it is to have possession of all of the facts and the relevant law concerning the offender. What was not made clear in the report and letters in this case was that the offender had sole custody of his two-year-old daughter, and that the offender and his daughter, through no fault of the offender, had contracted HIV. Consequently, the offender's life expectancy is apparently only five years.

A report on the offender expressed the view that his long history of sexual abuse and his being forced to engage in homosexual prostitution when very young, could have contributed to his behaviour in relation to this crime. A consulting psychiatrist found that the offender was suffering from a delusional disorder which signified a psychiatric impairment of judgment generally.

Sexual molestation is a serious crime and naturally causes a feeling of



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The Canberra Times, November 29, 1999

revulsion. Thankfully for the victim, there was no violence or penetration. It was, however, an unprompted isolated incident.

It did, of course, cause enormous distress to the victim and her family, who, not surprisingly, believed the sentence was not tough enough. But punishment for the offender does not mean that a sentencing judge is without compassion for the victim.

In the Brady case, the DPP was represented by a competent and experienced prosecutor. She urged a custodial sentence, and put forward three cases to assist the court in setting a correct tariff sentence", that is, a term of imprisonment consistent with sentences in cases that have some similarity. The prosecutor conceded that the three cases she put forward objectively involved more serious criminality. The imprisonment given in those three cases ranged from two years and three months with a non-parole period of 12 to 18 months with a non-parole period of six months.

In Brady's case, the sentence was 18 months with a non-parole period of six months. The offence in this case was sexual molestation on one occasion of a six-year-old girl.

The citizens of Canberra can rest assured that they are served by an independent experienced and competent DPP in Richard Refshauge. His duty in assessing sentences given to offenders is to consider an appeal to three judges if he believes the sentence is manifestly inadequate. The Appeal Court would accordingly increase a sentence if it accepted the sentencing judge imposed a manifestly inadequate sentence.

Likewise, offenders and their family can be comforted by the fact that in the ACT there is an experienced and viable independent body of barristers who will likewise recommend and prosecute an appeal if the sentence is manifestly excessive. Those checks and balances usually result in a fair and just system being maintained.

Sentencing by its very nature calls for an assessment that is of necessity subjective". Whether a sentence is correct and appropriate depends very much on how you are viewing it from the victim's point of view or the offender's.

What is necessary to keep in mind is that the sentencing process often takes a considerable time. There are usually pre-sentence reports and often medical, psychological or psychiatric reports tendered. Victim-impact statements are before the court, and oral evidence from the offender, together with character evidence, forms part of the judge's consideration.

Restrictions on time and space in the media often mean that viewers and readers receive a very truncated version of the sentence.

Commentators on the short version of the sentence are often giving opinions without knowledge of the full facts. At the end of the day it should be remembered that the task of sentencing is a very difficult one carried out by fallible mortals. The system, however, does have checks and balances within it so that the right decision is achieved on appeal if not at first instance. John Purnell, SC, is president of the ACT Bar Association.

LANGUAGE: English



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Capital Times (Madison, WI.)

November 9, 1999, Tuesday, ALL EDITIONS

SECTION: Editorial, Pg. 9A, GUEST COLUMN

LENGTH: 688 words

HEADLINE: PRISON BUILDING BOOM IS NOT THE RIGHT ANSWER TO CRIME

BYLINE: David Erway

BODY:

Wisconsin taxpayers, wake up!

What does it say about Wisconsin when all we have to offer an economically dying town to stay alive is a prison?

The "Incarceration Inc." article in The Capital Times (Oct. 28) should be a final warning call to Wisconsin taxpayers, who are continuing to foot the bill for increasingly punitive and costly, but not more effective, anti-crime legislation.

As our lawmakers contemplate the badly needed revision of Wisconsin's criminal code, Rep. Scott Walker has visions of a Wisconsin landscape whose dying communities are economically augmented with "shiny new corrections facilities, built and operated by private prison companies," whose questionable reputations (and profits), alas, often come from cutting security and treatment corners.

Experts have persistently demonstrated that crime rates fluctuate rather independently of incarceration rates, that punishment has never been an effective deterrent to crime, and that U.S. crime rates for many types of crimes, as well as illicit drug use, started declining a number of years before our politically hailed wars on crimes and drugs in the late 1980s were initiated.

Further, when compared with other Western industrialized countries, many U.S. property and personal crime rates are only about average. Nonetheless, the United States now has an incarceration rate 6-12 times that of other countries with comparable crime rates, incarcerating approximately one out of every 65 adult males, and placing one in three young black males under some kind of criminal justice control.

The statistically demonstrable impact on national crime rates? Little to none.

Clearly, Wisconsin legislators have not wondered about this, politically lock-stepping with national trends. Their expanded judicial policies have resulted in an almost 400 percent increase of (mostly male) incarceration rates since 1981. Wisconsin's incarceration rate is now approximately six times that



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Capital Times (Madison, WI.), November 9, 1999

of Finland, Germany or Japan; five times that of Norway; four times that of the Netherlands, Italy and France; and three times that of Switzerland. This persistently upward trend has resulted in a 335 percent increase in our incarcerated population.

The Wisconsin taxpayer bill? More than \$ 385 million in fiscal year 1998 and more than \$ 418 million in fiscal year 1999 -- an increase of 8.5 percent (3.5 percent above the national average). This averages to about \$ 25,000 a year per inmate, and rising, in part because of the increasing percentages of seriously mentally and physically ill inmates.

Despite these costs to the taxpayer, our Department of Corrections continues to be plagued by budget, physical plant, staffing and program shortfalls. Under these conditions, offender rehabilitation and community reintegration have become little more than archaic concepts for which there is little political or functional accountability, let alone any demonstrable impact on crime rates.

To politically defend our incarceration rates as an effective deterrence to Wisconsin crime is at best disingenuous, at worst scamming the taxpayers to help stay in office.

Crime is the symptom, not the problem. Unless Wisconsin taxpayers want to pay steadily increasing bills for more punitive, but ineffective, responses to crime, we should collaborate with our legislators to explore more cost-effective approaches to "crime management" rather than supporting crime punishment.

These would include social and economic programs that address root causes of crime, shorter sentences for nonviolent crimes, restorative rather than punitive justice, rehabilitation accountability, and post-release processes that functionally facilitate reintegrating, rather than disenfranchising, offenders in our communities.

If Wisconsin can be a national leader in helping people get off welfare, surely we can do likewise with more thoughtful, cost-effective and proactive crime management solutions. Simply building more front-end alignment shops will not fix the potholes in our road. It's the wrong model, and "Incarceration Inc." is not the right answer.

NOTES:

David Erway is a Madison resident.

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LEVEL 2 - 30 OF 345 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Toronto Star Newspapers, Ltd.
The Toronto Star

November 4, 1999, Thursday, Edition 1

SECTION: NEWS

LENGTH: 560 words

HEADLINE: SEX CRIME FIGURES STIR CONTROVERSY IN S. AFRICA

BODY:

newspaper says

JOHANNESBURG, South Africa (Reuters) - New reports of brutal rapes shocked South Africans yesterday, a day after police admitted inflating sex crime figures that activists say are among the highest in the world.

The Johannesburg Star reported on its front page that a gang of boys aged 7 to 9 had taken turns raping a 2-year-old girl in Soweto at the weekend.

The newspaper also reported the arrest of a senior police officer accused of abducting and raping five girls aged 12 to 14 from the poor rural villages he patrolled.

"What it shows is that South Africa is grappling with the problem of rape regardless of any debate over the numbers," said Marion Stevens, a policy analyst for the independent Women's Health Project.

South Africa has one of the highest crime rates in the world, but sex-related offences have ranked low on the agenda of law enforcement authorities until now.

In recent weeks, however, the media has given extensive coverage to a judge's controversial ruling that a man's rape of his own 14-year-old daughter was less serious than if the same crime was committed by someone outside the family.

The acquittal of a national cricketer on rape charges and a government study into the possibility of chemically castrating repeat rapists also have attained prominence.

South Africa

has one of the

highest crime rates

in the world The latest furor followed President Thabo Mbeki's comment last week that police statistics on rape were "purely speculative"



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The Toronto Star, November 4, 1999

because they included the assumption that only one in 36 rapes was reported.

On Tuesday, Safety and Security Minister Steve Tshwete admitted that "there is no element of authenticity in the statistic attributed to the police."

The latest South African police figures show 74.1 reported rapes per 100,000 people in the first eight months of this year. By comparison, the United States reported 34.4 rapes per 100,000 for all of 1998.

"I don't think we should be expending energy on debating the numbers," said Palesa Makhetha, spokesperson for People Opposing Women Abuse.

"I think the number of reported cases is overwhelming and shocking enough that we need to do something in this country," Makhetha said.

The opposition Democratic party has accused the ruling African National Congress of insensitivity toward victims of sex-related crimes.

"No where in the world would a government dare tell its crime-weary citizens that because a woman is not raped every 17 seconds, but rather every four minutes . . . that the crisis is not as bad as allegedly thought," said Democratic party spokesperson Raenette Taljaard.

The readiness of South Africa's health-care system in dealing with rape victims has also come under scrutiny after Mbeki questioned the effectiveness of the anti-AIDS drug AZT.

The government is under pressure to provide AZT free and automatically to rape victims in a country where one in eight of the adult population is infected with AIDS.

Mbeki said in parliament last week that AZT is toxic and was being challenged by court cases in the United States, Britain and South Africa - a claim the manufacturer, Glaxo Wellcome PLC, has hotly denied.

Many studies have shown that AZT cuts in half the risk that women will infect their babies during delivery.

LANGUAGE: English

LOAD-DATE: November 4, 1999



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Wisconsin State Journal

October 30, 1999, Saturday, ALL EDITIONS

SECTION: Opinion, Pg. 9A

LENGTH: 344 words

HEADLINE: MORE MAIL; DOES LACK OF EMOTION SIGNIFY MOTHER'S GUILT?

BODY:

Regarding the JonBenet Ramsey murder, when the mother, Patsy, was asked if she murdered the young beauty queen, she very calmly replied, without any emotion, "I didn't kill her." I find this reaction very strange.

People can and do tell pure lies on a hairline of truth. This can be called "mind/thought" control.

Alfred Barman, Waunakee Tighter gun laws don't help elsewhere

It is interesting, although not surprising, that in a recent front page story, "Gun control credited for crime drop," there is no mention of the fact that in countries that have implemented much more restrictive gun control laws than the United States (e.g., Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom), crime rates have been rising.

A report published by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics indicated that during the period of 1981-96 the crime rates for robbery, assault, burglary, rape and motor vehicle theft in England and Wales rose above the rate for the same crimes in the United States. The murder rate remained higher in the United States during the period; however, the murder rate decreased in the United States while rising in England and Wales.

To satisfy my curiosity, I made a comparison of the unemployment rates in the United States and the United Kingdom since 1959. During 1981-96, unemployment rates are at their highest point in the United Kingdom, while they are lower and generally stable or falling in the United States. It would seem reasonable to conclude that crime rates are affected more by the state of the economy than by restrictive gun laws; or perhaps that the rate of crime actually rises as gun laws become draconian.

Auric Gold, Madison No tears for Turner; victim deserves that

So, the Halloween Killer (Gerald Turner) has been discriminated against in his efforts to get a job. Oh, how awful! What about Lisa French, the little, innocent 9-year-old who this killer did away with in 1973? The real shame of this whole scenario is that this killer has been allowed to live and Lisa French was not.

K. Slack, Columbus



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Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

September 5, 1999, Sunday, TWO STAR EDITION

SECTION: LIFESTYLE, Pg. A-1

LENGTH: 2183 words

HEADLINE: TURNING AROUND YOUTHS IN TROUBLE

BYLINE: JACK KELLY, POST-GAZETTE NATIONAL BUREAU

BODY:

The slaughter at Columbine High School last spring, the worst in a string of school slayings, took 15 lives and tied the country in knots as it tried to figure out why - and what to do about youth violence.

Congress has reflected the national confusion. Over the summer, pre-existing juvenile-justice legislation was layered with proposals to control guns, the Internet and violence in movies. Other measures, such as posting the Ten Commandments in schools, attempted to promote virtue and right thinking.

As the pile of proposals got heavier, the effort collapsed. So as schools reopen across the country, Congress must take up the issue again.

Hard to find in the clutter of emotion and solution-seeking has been some relatively good news: While sudden acts of homicide by previously uncriminal children seem to have risen slightly in frequency - from almost never to once in a while - juvenile violence overall is in decline.

After soaring in the early 1990s, the rate of teen violence has dropped like a rock since 1993. It is now below the rate for 1989.

It is still high. A teen-ager in the United States is twice as likely as a teen-ager in Canada to commit a violent crime. Homicide remains the second-leading cause of death among Americans 15 to 24 years old. And young men in that age range - especially the 19-, 18-, and 17-year-olds - account for most criminal violence.

Nevertheless, the trend is promising, and a great deal has been learned about how to reach juveniles in trouble before they become hard-core criminals.

Boys 15 with 11 arrests

More than half of all juvenile crimes are committed by 6 percent of the juveniles who commit crimes. Sociologist James Q. Wilson, now with the University of California, Los Angeles, summed up the attributes of the hard core this way:

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"They tend to have criminal parents, to live in cold or discordant families, to have a low verbal intelligence quotient and to do poorly in school, to be emotionally cold and temperamentally impulsive, to abuse alcohol and drugs at the earliest opportunity and to reside in poor, disorderly communities."

The Justice Department did a profile of "serious habitual offenders" among juveniles. The averages produced a 15-year-old male who had been arrested 11 to 14 times, five times for felonies. In 46 percent of the cases, one or both parents had an arrest record, as did 53 percent of siblings. There was no father figure in 59 percent of cases.

The relationship between single-parent households and crime is strong, and researchers have found that 14 percent to 26 percent of habitual offenders were abused or neglected as children, a figure that rises as high as 70 percent when relying solely on claims by the offenders themselves.

Treatment programs that work provide troubled young people with the structure, guidance, attention and love they often do not get at home.

A family environment

The average age of students at the world famous Boys Town outside of Omaha, Neb., is 14, nearly half of them girls. Some are as young as 10 and some as old as 18. About four in five have problems with substance abuse.

Boys and girls live in groups of eight in family homes, each run by a couple whose full-time job is to parent the kids.

Pat Garcia, 32, from Albuquerque, N.M., has been a family counselor for six years. He was a student at Boys Town from 1975 to 1985.

"I wanted to deal with kids who were having problems," he said. "I knew where the work I wanted to do was being done."

Boys and girls live in separate homes, two to a room. Each has assigned chores, which rotate weekly. Students are given latitude in how they may decorate their rooms but must keep them neat.

There is a television set in each home, even though students are kept so busy with school, homework, athletics and chores that they don't have much chance to watch it. Music that glorifies violence or degrades women is not allowed.

The scene is similar at George Junior Republic in Grove City, Mercer County, where 450 boys 9 through 18 years old also live in groups of eight in family homes run by married couples, most of whom have children of their own. Rules and the daily routine are pretty much the same as at Boys Town.

"The thing that most of the boys seem to be missing is an intact family," said Richard Losasso, vice president. "We provide a family environment as much as we can."

At Royal Haven, a horse farm in Sisters, Ore., Steve Gage, a former Marine, and his wife, Karen, do what Boys Town and George Junior Republic do, but on a

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smaller scale.

Royal Haven is a working farm, but the Gages spend most of their time parenting troubled teen-age girls. The 15 currently in residence range in age from 12 to 17 and come from all over the country. Almost all have abused drugs.

The girls do chores and attend the local high school. Either of the Gages drives the girls to school and picks them up afterward. Meals are eaten together, homework is monitored, music and television are censored.

In operation since 1992, Royal Haven had its first "postgraduate" last year. Laine, 18, a slim, athletic blonde from New York City, asked to stay on after she completed high school. A mediocre student before coming to Royal Haven, she was student of the year at Sisters High School last year. She attends the local community college, where she is earning straight A's.

"I like the structure," she said. "You are not allowed to slack off here."

Structure, consequences

If there is a one-word answer to the problem of juvenile crime, experts say, it is "parenting."

"The best programs do what responsible parents should be doing all along," said Judge James Ray of the Lucas County juvenile court in Toledo, Ohio.

Gary Emmons, headmaster of the Brush Ranch School, a private boarding school in the mountains northeast of Santa Fe, N.M., agrees. He said: "Every juvenile treatment program that works has five elements:

"First, strong positive role models, especially male role models for boys.

"Second, a highly structured environment - no rap music or gang clothes, little or no television, very little free time.

"Third, lots and lots of attention.

"Fourth, immediate, predictable consequences for inappropriate behavior.

"And fifth, opportunities to develop self-respect through genuine accomplishment."

His sentiments were echoed by youth professionals ranging from the Rev. Val Peter, executive director of Boys Town, to Maj. Scott Bowman, headmaster at the Robert Land Academy, a military boarding school for unruly adolescents in Wellandsport, Ontario.

There are differences of opinion, of course.

Robert Land Academy is like a Marine Corps boot camp. The school year begins with the boys going on a 50-mile hike, at the end of which they drag a cannon up a steep hill.

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Peter disapproves of boot camps.

"The idea behind boot camps is ' Beat people up and they will shape up for the long haul.' We get better results by appealing to what's best in young people."

But both the Land Academy and Boys Town contain the five elements, and both get results superior to most government corrections programs at lower cost.

Recidivism 60 percent

Robert Land Academy considers itself successful when a boy has progressed to a higher level of education and remained there at least a year, while staying clear of drugs and alcohol. By this measure, the school claims an 84 percent success rate. Tuition, room and board amount to \$ 17,300 per boy for a 10-month school year.

At Boys Town, Peter sets a similar standard, with the additional requirement of attendance at church services. Boys Town claims a success rate of 80 percent at an average annual cost of \$ 32,485.

George Junior Republic uses methods comparable to Boys Town, and gets comparable results. Founded in 1909 by philanthropist William Ruben George to care for orphans, it switched emphasis in the 1950s to treating troubled adolescents. Roughly 75 percent of graduates stay out of trouble for at least a year, according to Executive Director Pat Farrone. Costs range from \$ 34,675 to \$ 59,860 per year, depending on the level of care required.

Such results compare favorably with virtually every government run youth corrections program in America.

In Ohio, it costs \$ 63,440 a year to house a juvenile in a state facility. The recidivism rate after six months is nearly 35 percent.

In Pennsylvania, the average annual cost per juvenile at nine facilities run by the state Department of Public Welfare is \$ 66,087. The department doesn't keep statistics on recidivism, but James Anderson, executive director of the Juvenile Court Judges Commission, said: "Historically, we have had a recidivism rate of 60 to 70 percent after 18 months. That's about the same as everywhere." He is working with the Pittsburgh-based National Center for Juvenile Justice to develop a system for tracking recidivism and other relevant measures, such as post-incarceration education and employment.

Youths need an activity There wouldn't be so much need for residential treatment programs if parents, school officials and community leaders kept young people busier in the first place, according to Pueblo, Colo., District Attorney Gus Sandstrom, a former Green Beret who in 1980 co-founded the committee on juvenile justice for the National District Attorneys Association.

A friend of Sandstrom's runs a band camp. In 1992, 206 teen-agers attended. Sandstrom checked their history of police contacts. Six had contact in the previous year - four as victims. A random check of 206 other Pueblo teen-agers who had no summer activity revealed 197 police contacts.

"It clearly tells you kids need an activity," he said.

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A Boy Scout leader in his spare time, Sandstrom once challenged some troubled youths to climb with his troop up a "14er" - one of Colorado's 54 mountains more than 14,000 feet tall.

"I told them if they made it to the top with my boys, I'd pay them \$ 500," Sandstrom said. "Eleven tried. None collected. The point is to show boys you don't have to be bad to be tough, and being bad doesn't make you tough. It's worked."

Sandstrom believes that the juvenile crime rate could be cut nearly in half if the school day were extended by two hours and the school year by two weeks. "Most juvenile crime occurs between the hours of 3 p.m. and 6 p.m. - after school gets out, but before the parents get home," he said.

Because most children who commit crimes also get poor grades, reducing opportunities to get in trouble by lengthening the school day could help on both counts at relatively low cost, Sandstrom argues: "Have a mandatory study hall with tutoring from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. for kids getting C's and below. Being excused from school early would be an incentive for kids to get good marks. And you could hire kids who are getting good grades as tutors. That would give them some pride, some pocket money, and keep them off the streets until their parents got home."

Sentenced as adults

One reason for the recent decline in the rate of violent crimes committed by young people may be the increasingly common practice of sentencing juvenile offenders as adults.

"There are a handful of kids who commit most violent juvenile crimes. If you take more of them off the street, and put them away for a longer period of time, the crime rate goes down," said Peter Reinharz, chief of the family court division of the New York City law department.

Another reason is the maturation of crack cocaine markets, according to Alfred Blumstein of Carnegie Mellon University. In 1985, when the rate of violent crime began to soar, crack was just being introduced into America's cities, and gangs were battling for turf. With longer-term relationships now established between buyers and sellers, gangs no longer need to use firearms to gain or hold market share, he said.

The practice of sentencing juveniles as adults is highly controversial. But most within and without the juvenile court system, which celebrates its 100th anniversary this year, agree it was not designed to handle the number or violence of juvenile criminals today.

"Juvenile courts have yet to figure out whether they are a social service agency or a part of the criminal justice system," Reinharz said. Toledo's Judge Ray also complained that, "Juvenile courts are at the bottom of the food chain in terms of prestige and resources."

Most experts believe that to teach children it is wrong to break the law, they must be held accountable the first time they are caught, even if punishment is slight.

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Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 5, 1999

"The system lies to kids all the time," Sandstrom said. "We tell them they're going to get in trouble if they break the law. Then the cops pick them up and give them a lecture and release them. Then the first time they're taken before a judge, they get probation. They have maybe five major offenses before a judge finally slaps them. And then they ask: 'Why me?' "

FIRST OF FOUR PARTS Tomorrow: Wilderness programs that take youths into the wild to cope and talk.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO 2, INFORMATIONAL GRAPHIC, PHOTO: NOELLE TOROK, A COUNSELOR/PARENT AT ONE OF THE RESIDENTIAL HOMES AT GEORGE JUNIOR REPUBLIC, HELPS THREE OF THE BOYS MAKE THEIR LUNCH.; PART OF THE STUDENTS' DAILY CHORES INCLUDES HELPING PREPARE MEALS, CLEARING UP, MAKING THEIR BEDS AND CLEANING THEIR ROOMS.; PHOTO: ROBIN ROMBACH/POST-GAZETTE PHOTOS: A STUDENT HEADS UP THE CLIMBING WALL; AT GEORGE JUNIOR REPUBLIC WITH HELP FROM JEN CHESTNUT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE ADVENTURE-BASED COUNSELING PROGRAM. THE OBSTACLES STUDENTS FACE IN THE PROGRAM HELP THEM BUILD TRUST AND DEVELOP PROBLEM-SOLVING SKILLS.; INFORMATIONAL GRAPHIC: Steve Thomas/Post-Gazette; Urban Institute analysis of; data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention: Snapshots of juvenile violence

LOAD-DATE: September 8, 1999

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As a result of different crime trends in the two countries —

- the police-recorded U.S. *murder* rate was 8.7 times England's in 1981 but 5.7 times in 1996 (figure 5)
- the police-recorded U.S. *rape* rate was 17 times England's in 1981 but 3 times in 1996 (figure 6)

- the police-recorded U.S. *robbery* rate was 6 times England's in 1981 but 1.4 times in 1996 (figure 7)

- the police-recorded U.S. *assault* rate was 1.5 times England's in 1981, but in 1996 the English assault rate was slightly higher than America's (figure 8)

- the police-recorded U.S. *burglary* rate was slightly higher than England's in 1981, but in 1996 the English burglary rate was more than double America's (figure 9)

- the police-recorded English *motor vehicle theft* rate went from 1.4 times America's in 1981 to nearly 2 times in 1996 (figure 10).

Reporting of crime to police

Robbery: Percent reported to police




Figure 11

Assault: Percent reported to police




Figure 12

Burglary: Percent reported to police




Figure 13

Motor vehicle theft: Percent reported to police




Figure 14

For additional information on these graphs, see the section labeled *Notes on figures 1-82*.

Reporting of crime to police

The level of crime recorded in police statistics depends partly on how often victims report crime to police. Comparisons of police statistics between countries can be misleading if victims in one country call police more often than victims in another country.

Information on how often victims (and others) report crime to police is available from victim surveys. In these surveys, victims are asked whether the police were notified or otherwise became aware of the crime.

Is serious crime reported to police more often in the United States or England (including Wales)?

According to crime victims in 1995, the *percentage reported to the police* was —

- for *robbery* not significantly different between England (57% reported to the police) and the United States (55%) (figure 11)

- for *assault* significantly greater in the United States (54%) than in England (40%) (figure 12)

- for *burglary* significantly greater in England (66%) than in the United States (50%) (figure 13)

- for *motor vehicle theft* not significantly different between England (98%) and the United States (88%) (figure 14).

Historically (after 1981) —

- *robbery* is more often reported to the U.S. police than the English police (figure 11)

- *assault* is more often reported to the U.S. police than the English police, but the historical pattern for assault is less consistent than for other crimes (figure 12)

- *burglary* is more often reported to the English police than to the U.S. police (figure 13)

- *motor vehicle theft* is more often reported to the English police than to the U.S. police, although the difference is typically small (figure 14).

Are crimes being reported to police more often today than in the past?

- Reporting of crime to police is showing no clear trend in either England or the United States. A possible exception is English robbery, for which reporting to police has generally risen since 1983. In 1983, 39% of robberies were reported to police in England; in 1995, 57% were reported (figure 11).

Police recording of crime

Robbery: Percent recorded by police




Figure 15

Assault: Percent recorded by police




Figure 16

Burglary: Percent recorded by police




Figure 17

Motor vehicle theft: Percent recorded by police




Figure 18

For additional information on these graphs, see the section labeled *Notes on figures 1-32*.

The level of crime recorded in police statistics depends not only on how often victims report crimes to police, but also on how often police record as crimes the incidents that are reported to them. Police do not always record as a crime every allegation that comes to them. Sometimes police find insufficient evidence that a crime has occurred. Alleged crimes go unrecorded because of poor record keeping. Police also weed out crimes they do not consider to be serious.

Comparison of the volume of crime that victims said they reported to police during the year with the volume that police actually recorded that year reveals how often police record as crimes those incidents that come to their attention.

Are police more likely to record crimes in the United States or England (including Wales)?

- Compared to police in England, police in the United States more often record as crimes those alleged offenses that are reported to them.

According to 1995 statistics, of all —

- *robberies* reported to police, 78% of U.S. robberies were recorded as robberies in police statistics, compared to 35% of English robberies (figure 15)
- *assaults* reported to police, virtually all U.S. assaults were recorded as assaults in police statistics, compared to 53% of English assaults (figure 16)
- *burglaries* reported to police, 72% of U.S. burglaries were officially recorded by police, compared to 55% of English burglaries (figure 17)
- *motor vehicle thefts* reported to police, virtually all U.S. vehicle thefts were officially recorded in police statistics, compared to 83% of English vehicle thefts (figure 18).

Are police today recording more of the violent crime that comes to their attention?

- A growing fraction of the violent crime reported to police is being officially recorded in both the United States and England.

From 1981 to 1995, the percentage of reported crimes that were officially recorded in police statistics —

- rose from 65% to 78% for U.S. *robberies*, and from 24% to 35% for English robberies (figure 15)
- rose from 61% to virtually 100% for U.S. *assaults*, and from 41% to 53% for English assaults (figure 16).

Are police today recording more of the property crime that comes to their attention?

- A growing fraction of the burglaries reported to police are being officially recorded in the United States. In England, the trend is in the opposite direction, with a progressively smaller percentage of property crimes being officially recorded since 1981.

From 1981 to 1995, the percentage of reported crimes that were officially counted in police statistics —

- rose from 58% to 72% for U.S. *burglaries*, but fell from 70% to 55% for English burglaries (figure 17)
- remained at around 95% for U.S. *motor vehicle thefts*, but fell from virtually 100% to 83% for English motor vehicle thefts (figure 18).

In both England and the United States, police are recording a growing fraction of the violent crimes (robberies and assaults) reported to them. U.S. police recorded 63% in 1981 and 93% in 1995. English police recorded 37%

in 1981 and 46% in 1995, bringing England in 1995 to about the level the United States was in 1973 (44%). What changes in policing might explain the trend in both countries toward more complete recording and more formal handling of violent crimes that come to police attention?

1. Police have become more professional.
2. Police operations have become more computerized.
3. Calls to police are increasingly being electronically recorded, creating an audit trail. Consequently, police are keeping closer track of responses to calls.
4. Police have become increasingly responsive to demands that domestic violence be handled more formally and be treated more seriously. In the United States, for example, a growing number of States now mandate arrests in all domestic assaults — misdemeanor as well as felony. In States where arrest is not mandatory, new laws now permit police to make probable cause arrests even when the police themselves have not witnessed the violence. Previous laws had required that the victim file a formal complaint when no police had witnessed the crime.
5. Society has perhaps become more litigious. In response to the growing threat of civil suit, police have adopted what might be called “defensive policing.” In defensive policing, the actions police take toward victims, witnesses, suspects, and the general public are closely managed by formal procedural rules established by police departments in part to protect police from suits. Among other things, the rules define situations in which police have a duty to act. Fewer decisions are left to police discretion.

Victim surveys versus police records

Is the violent crime rate higher in the United States or England?

- Crime rates are available from two different sources — from victim surveys and from police statistics — and sometimes the answer depends on which source is compared.

According to the latest comparable figures on violent crime (1995), victim surveys indicated higher violent crime rates in England (including Wales) than in the United States, while police statistics indicated the opposite:

- According to victim surveys, the 1995 *robbery* rate was higher in England than in the United States (7.6 versus 5.3) (figure 1), but according to police statistics the robbery rate was higher in the United States than in England (2.2 versus 1.3) (figure 7).

- According to victim surveys, the 1995 *assault* rate was much higher in England than in the United States (20.0 versus 8.8) (figure 2), but police statistics showed a slightly higher assault rate in the United States than in England (4.2 versus 3.9) (figure 8).

Why did 1995 police statistics indicate higher violent crime rates in the United States than in England, while 1995 victim surveys indicated higher violent crime rates in England than in the United States?

- If *robbery* were more often reported to police in the United States than in England, that might help to explain why the U.S. rate of robberies from police statistics is higher than England's. But robberies were *not* more often reported to the U.S. (55% reported) than to the English (57% reported) police (figure 11). However, U.S. police *did* more

often than the English police *record* robberies that came to their attention. Of all robberies reported to police in the United States in 1995, an estimated 78% were ultimately recorded as robberies in police statistics (figure 15). Of those reported to English police, a much smaller proportion — 35% — was officially recorded as robberies.

- The *assault* rate from police statistics is higher in the United States than in England for two reasons. One is that assaults in 1995 were more often *reported* to police in the United States (54%) than in England (40%) (figure 12). The other is that, compared to police in England, police in the United States *recorded* a higher proportion of assaults that came to their attention in 1995 (virtually all in the United States versus 53% in England) (figure 16).

In 1996 the rate of robbery recorded by police was higher in the United States (2.0 per 1,000 population) than in England (1.4 per 1,000 population) (figure 7). Is that because American police recorded a greater fraction of the robberies that were reported to them than English police?

As noted above, in 1995 American police recorded 78% of all robberies reported to them, while English police recorded 35% (figure 15). In other words, American police were about twice as likely as English police to record a robbery coming to their

attention in 1995. Assuming the same was true for rates of robbery recorded by police in 1996, the English rate is not directly comparable to the American rate because American police recorded a greater fraction than English police of the robberies reported to them. Had English police recorded the same fraction of robberies that were reported to them as had American police, the English robbery rate would have been 2.8 per 1,000 population, exceeding the American rate of 2.0 robberies per 1,000.

Is the property crime rate higher in the United States or England?

Both victim surveys and police statistics for 1995 indicated higher property crime rates in England than in the United States.

- For the property offense of *burglary*, the rate from victim surveys was higher in England than in the United States (82.9 per 1,000 households versus 47.5) (figure 3), and the rate from police statistics was also higher in England than in the United States (23.9 per 1,000 population versus 9.9) (figure 9).

- For the property offense of *motor vehicle theft*, the rate from victim surveys was higher in England than in the United States (23.6 per 1,000 households versus 10.8) (figure 4), and the rate from police statistics was also higher in England than in the United States (9.8 per 1,000 population versus 5.6) (figure 10).

Are trends in crime rates derived from victim surveys similar to trends in police-recorded crime rates in both countries?

• In England (including Wales), 1981-1995 crime trends calculated from police statistics corresponded closely to 1981-1995 crime trends obtained from victim surveys. By contrast, in the United States for the period 1981 to 1996, the correspondence was less close.

Trends in police-recorded crime rates can be compared to trends in survey rates for robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.

In England from 1981 to 1995 —

• the rise in the police-recorded *robbery* rate corresponded closely to the

rise in the robbery rate as estimated from victim surveys ($r = +.91$) (table 1)

• the rise in the police-recorded *assault* rate corresponded closely to the rise in the survey assault rate ($r = +.88$) (table 1)

• the rise in the police-recorded *burglary* rate corresponded closely to the rise in the survey-estimated burglary rate ($r = +.95$) (table 1)

• the rise in the police-recorded *vehicle theft* rate corresponded closely to the rise in the vehicle theft rate as documented in victim surveys ($r = +.98$) (table 1).

In the United States from 1981 to 1996 —

• the rise in the police-recorded *robbery* rate corresponded fairly well to the rise

documented in victim surveys ($r = +.56$) (table 1)

• changes in the police-recorded *assault* rate did not correspond at all to changes in the assault rate as estimated from victim surveys ($r = -.15$) (table 1)

• a striking correspondence existed between the drop in the police-recorded *burglary* rate and the drop in the survey-estimated burglary rate ($r = +.97$) (table 1)

• changes in the police-recorded *vehicle theft* rate corresponded closely to vehicle theft rate changes documented in victim surveys ($r = +.86$) (table 1).

Table 1. Correlation between trends in crime rates as measured by data from police records and victim surveys in the United States and England, from 1981 to 1995/96

	Police recorded rate of —						Victim survey estimated rate of —			
	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Motor vehicle theft	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Motor vehicle theft
Police-recorded rate of —										
Murder	X									
Rape	.565*	X								
Robbery	.968**	.698**	X							
Assault	.337	.849**	.488	X						
Burglary	.352	-.354	.185	-.692**	X					
Motor vehicle theft	.493	.874**	.619*	.916**	-.419	X				
Victim survey estimated rate of —										
Robbery	.653**	-.134	.558*	-.255	.540*	-.183	X			
Assault	.539*	.083	.414	-.145	.418	-.078	.700**	X		
Burglary	.246	-.511*	.064	-.807**	.969**	-.588*	.601*	.474	X	
Motor vehicle theft	.770**	.771**	.825**	.705**	-.081	.861**	.207	.249	-.227	X

Unshaded = correlations between U.S. crime rate trends

Shaded = correlations between English crime rate trends

Note: For rape, rates are per 1,000 female population; for all other crimes, rates are per 1,000 population or per 1,000 households. The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients. U.S. correlations are all based on 16 years of data spanning the period 1981 to 1996. English correlations between two police-recorded crime rates are based on 16 years of data spanning the period 1981 to 1996; correlations between two victim-survey crime rates, 6 years of data spanning the period 1981 to 1995; correlations between a victim-survey crime rate and a police-recorded crime rate, 6 years of data spanning the period 1981 to 1995.

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Convictions per 1,000 population

Murder conviction rate per 1,000 population




Figure 19

Rape conviction rate per 1,000 male population




Figure 20

Robbery conviction rate per 1,000 population




Figure 21

Assault conviction rate per 1,000 population




Figure 22

Burglary conviction rate per 1,000 population




Figure 23

Motor vehicle theft conviction rate per 1,000 population




Figure 24

For additional information on these graphs, see the section labeled *Notes on figures 1-52*.

Depending on the circumstances, a person charged in the United States with a serious crime can be prosecuted in a State court, a Federal court, or a juvenile court. Likewise in England (including Wales), depending on the circumstances, the case can go to the Crown Court, a magistrate court, or a juvenile court (a specialized magistrate court).

U.S. Federal courts treat persons 18 years of age and older as adults. In the vast majority of States, a defendant is considered an adult once he or she reaches the age of 18; in a small number of States, age 17 is the beginning of adulthood; in a few States it is age 16. In England, adulthood in the eyes of the law begins at age 18. Before 1992, it was age 17.

In both countries, a juvenile charged with or previously found delinquent of a serious crime can be prosecuted in the adult court rather than the juvenile court. In America, State and Federal laws define special circumstances in which adult prosecution of a juvenile is automatic (for example, a juvenile charged with murder, rape, or armed robbery), and circumstances in which such prosecution is at the discretion of either the juvenile court or the prosecutor. English law requires that all juveniles charged with homicide be prosecuted in the Crown Court (the adult court) rather than the juvenile court (called the youth court in England). If the crime is not a homicide but is one that is punishable by at least 14 years confinement for an adult (for example, household burglary), or the crime is carried out with an adult accomplice, the English juvenile court, at its discretion, can commit the juvenile for trial in the Crown Court. Commitment for trial in the Crown Court is distinguished from commitment for sentencing in the Crown Court. When a juvenile is convicted in the English juvenile court but the magistrate

believes the juvenile deserves a longer sentence than the maximum that the juvenile court can impose (12 months), the juvenile can be committed to the Crown Court for sentencing. In such a case the maximum sentence the Crown Court can impose is 2 years.

The total number of convictions (juvenile and adult combined) in the United States is not directly comparable to the English total because the U.S. population is far larger than the English population. Naturally the United States has more convictions: it has roughly five times more people than England. A more meaningful comparison is between conviction *rates* per 1,000 population, a measure that takes into account the difference in population size.

The U.S. conviction rate per 1,000 population is higher than England's for murder, rape, and robbery. Is that because the United States has higher rates of victimization from murder, rape, and robbery? Or because the criminal justice system in the United States is more likely than the English system to catch and convict murderers, rapists, and robbers?

- The higher U.S. conviction rate for *murder* is explained entirely by the higher U.S. murder rate. According to the most recent statistics on crime (1996) and the justice system (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the U.S. murder rate is nearly six times the English murder rate (figure 5). Correspondingly, the U.S. murder conviction rate per 1,000 population is nearly six times England's (.059 versus .010) (figure 19).

- The higher U.S. conviction rate for *rape* is attributable both to the higher U.S. police-recorded rape rate and to a United States criminal justice system that catches and convicts rapists at a higher rate than England's system.

According to the most recent statistics on crime (1996) and the justice system (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the U.S. police-recorded rape rate is three times England's (figure 5), but the U.S. rape conviction rate is over eight times England's (.212 versus .025) (figure 20), indicating that a rape in the United States is more likely to lead to conviction than one in England.

- The higher U.S. conviction rate for *robbery* cannot be attributed to a higher U.S. robbery victimization rate since, according to the latest figures, the U.S. robbery victimization rate is lower than England's. Instead the reason for the higher U.S. robbery conviction rate is that the English criminal justice system is less likely than America's to catch and convict robbers. According to the most recent statistics on robbery victimization (1995) and the criminal justice system (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the English robbery victimization rate is 1.4 times the U.S. rate (figure 1), but the U.S. robbery conviction rate is nearly 3 times England's (.30 versus .11) (figure 21), indicating that a robbery in the United States is more likely to lead to conviction than one in England.

The English conviction rate per 1,000 population is higher than the U.S. conviction rate for assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. Is that because England has higher rates of victimization from assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft? Or because the criminal justice system in England is more likely than the U.S. system to catch and convict assaulters, burglars, and motor vehicle thieves?

- The higher English conviction rate for *assault* is attributable to a higher English assault victimization rate, not

to different performance by the English justice system. According to the most recent statistics on assault victimization (1995), the English assault victimization rate is 2.3 times the U.S. rate (figure 2). However, according to the most recent conviction statistics (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the English assault conviction rate is 1.4 times the U.S. assault conviction rate (.61 versus .44) (figure 22), indicating that an assault in England is *less* likely to lead to conviction than one in the United States.

- The higher English conviction rate for *burglary* is attributable to a higher English crime rate for burglary, not to different performance by the English justice system. According to the most recent statistics on burglary victimization (1995), the English burglary victimization rate is 1.8 times the U.S. rate (figure 3). However, according to the most recent conviction statistics (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the English burglary conviction rate is 1.1 times the U.S. burglary conviction rate (.78 versus .73) (figure 23), indicating that a burglary in England is *less* likely to lead to conviction than one in the United States.

- The higher English conviction rate for *motor vehicle theft* is attributable to a higher English crime rate for motor vehicle theft, not to different performance by the English justice system. According to the most recent statistics on motor vehicle theft victimization (1995), the English motor vehicle theft victimization rate is 2.2 times the U.S. rate (figure 4). However, according to the most recent conviction statistics (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the English motor vehicle theft conviction rate is 1.6 times the U.S. conviction rate (.34 versus .21)

(figure 24), indicating that a motor vehicle theft in England is *less* likely to lead to conviction than one in the United States.

Have conviction rates per 1,000 population been rising or falling in each country?

From 1981 to the latest year of conviction data (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England) —

- The U.S. *murder* conviction rate rose steeply (.045 in 1981 rising to .059 in 1994), while the English rate rose modestly (.009 in 1981 rising to .010 in 1995) (figure 19). Unlike the rise in the U.S. conviction rate, the rise in the English conviction rate is linked to an increase in the country's murder rate.

- The U.S. *rape* conviction rate rose sharply (.099 in 1981 rising to .212 in 1995), while the English rate rose comparatively modestly (.015 in 1981 rising to .025 in 1995) (figure 20). Unlike the rise in the U.S. conviction rate, the rise in the English conviction rate could partly be explained by an increase in the country's rape rate, although the increase in the English rape rate (more than 5 times) was far higher than the modest increase in the rape conviction rate.

- Both the U.S. (.28 in 1981 rising to .30 in 1994) and the English (.10 in 1981 rising to .11 in 1995) *robbery* conviction rates increased slightly (figure 21). The U.S. conviction rate modestly rose while the robbery victimization rate fell. In England, by contrast, the conviction rate rose modestly while the robbery victimization rate soared.

- The U.S. *assault* conviction rate rose sharply (.16 in 1981 rising to .44 in 1994), while the English rate fell sharply (1.12 in 1981 falling to .61 in 1995) (figure 22). The rise in the U.S. conviction rate was accompanied by a decline in the assault victimization rate. By contrast, the decline in the English conviction rate was accompanied by a steep rise in the assault victimization rate.

- Both the U.S. (.97 in 1981 falling to .73 in 1994) and the English (1.69 in 1981 falling to .78 in 1995) *burglary* conviction rates fell, and the English rate fell more than the U.S. rate (figure 23). The falling English rate was accompanied by a steep rise in the burglary victimization rate. The falling U.S. conviction rate was accompanied by a steep decline in the burglary victimization rate. However, the conviction rate decline was less steep than the victimization rate decline, indicating that the risk of burglary conviction was actually rising in the United States during the period.

- The U.S. *motor vehicle theft* conviction rate rose sharply (.07 in 1981 rising to .21 in 1994), while the English rate fell sharply (.83 in 1981 falling to .34 in 1995) (figure 24). The rising U.S. conviction rate was accompanied by a stable victimization rate for vehicle theft. By contrast, the falling English conviction rate was accompanied by a rising victimization rate for vehicle theft.

Convictions per 1,000 offenders

Murder convictions per 1,000 alleged murderers




Figure 25

Rape convictions per 1,000 alleged rapists




Figure 26

Robbery convictions per 1,000 alleged robbers




Figure 27

Assault convictions per 1,000 alleged assaulters




Figure 28

Burglary convictions per 1,000 alleged burglars




Figure 29

Motor vehicle theft convictions per 1,000 alleged vehicle thieves




Figure 30

For additional information on these graphs, see the section labeled *Notes on figures 1-82*.

Convictions per 1,000 offenders

Is a person committing a crime in the United States more likely or less likely to be caught and convicted than one committing a crime in England?

According to latest conviction figures (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England) —

- with the exception of murder, a person committing a crime in the United States is more likely to be caught and convicted than one committing crime in England (including Wales).

The number of persons convicted in 1994 of —

- *murder* for every 1,000 alleged murderers was 487 in the United States and 555 in England, indicating that a murderer's risk of conviction is slightly greater in England than in the United States (figure 25)

- *rape* for every 1,000 alleged rapists was 188 in the United States and 100 in England, indicating that a rapist's risk of conviction in the United States is nearly double that in England (figure 26)

- *robbery* for every 1,000 alleged robbers was 22 in the United States and 6 in England, indicating that a robber's risk of conviction in the United States is nearly four times that in England (figure 27)

- *assault* for every 1,000 alleged assaulters was 25 in the United States and 14 in England, indicating that an assaulter's risk of conviction in the United States is nearly double that in England (figure 28)

- *burglary* for every 1,000 alleged burglars was 14 in the United States and 6 in England, indicating that a burglar's risk of conviction in the United States is more than double that in England (figure 29)

- *motor vehicle theft* for every 1,000 alleged vehicle thieves was 18 in the United States and 12 in England, indicating that a vehicle thief's risk of conviction is 50% greater in the United States than in England (figure 30).

Is an offender's risk of being caught and convicted rising or falling in each country?

- An offender's risk of being caught and convicted is rising in the United States but falling in England.

From 1981 to the latest year of conviction data (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the number of persons convicted of —

- *murder* per 1,000 alleged murderers has risen 43% in the United States (340 in 1981 rising to 487 in 1994) but fallen 12% in England (631 in 1981 falling to 555 in 1995) (figure 25)

- *rape* per 1,000 alleged rapists has risen 94% in the United States (97 in 1981 rising to 188 in 1994) but fallen 63% in England (272 in 1981 falling to 100 in 1995) (figure 26)

- *robbery* per 1,000 alleged robbers has risen 29% in the United States (17 in 1981 rising to 22 in 1994) but fallen 40% in England (10 in 1981 falling to 6 in 1995) (figure 27)

- *assault* per 1,000 alleged assaulters has nearly tripled in the United States (9 in 1981 rising to 25 in 1994) but fallen 66% in England (41 in 1981 falling to 14 in 1995) (figure 28)

- *burglary* per 1,000 alleged burglars has risen 40% in the United States (10 in 1981 rising to 14 in 1994) but fallen 78% in England (27 in 1981 falling to 6 in 1995) (figure 29)

- *motor vehicle theft* per 1,000 alleged vehicle thieves has more than doubled in the United States (7 in 1981 rising to

18 in 1994) but fallen 77% in England (53 in 1981 falling to 12 in 1995) (figure 30).

Are persons committing a crime unlikely to be caught and convicted in both countries?

In both countries, persons committing a crime are unlikely to be caught and convicted. The major exception is murder.

According to latest statistics (derived from figures 25-30 covering 1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the likelihood of conviction was about —

- 50% for *murder* in both countries

- 20% for *rape* in the United States and 10% in England

- 2% for *robbery* in the United States and less than 1% in England

- 2% for *assault* in the United States and 1% in England

- 1% for *burglary* in the United States and less than 1% in England

- 2% for *motor vehicle theft* in the United States and 1% in England.

However, these estimates must be interpreted cautiously. For example, the rape conviction likelihood is inflated because it is based on the number of convictions divided *not* by the total number of rapes but by just the number recorded by police.

In other respects, all of these estimates (including rape) are conservative because, to be precise, the data used to calculate them estimate the likelihood of an *offense* leading to conviction, not the likelihood of an *offender* being convicted sooner or later. To estimate the likelihood of an *offender* being convicted, the number of *different* persons convicted is divided by the

number of *different persons* committing the crime. But in available data, persons who are convicted more than once or who commit crime more than once during the year are counted over and over again.

Such overcounting is particularly prevalent in the data on the number of persons committing crime because the typical offender commits more than one crime over the course of a year (the typical violent offender commits from 2 to 4 violent crimes per year and the typical property offender commits from 5 to 10 per year according to Blumstein and others, 1986, page 4).

Some adjustment can be made for their overcounting. For example, if the typical robber in the United States commits 4 robberies per year, the likelihood that a person committing robbery will be convicted of robbery during the year is nearly 8%, not 2%.

At first glance that might seem like a small difference but a 1 in 12 chance of conviction (the equivalent of 8%) is considerably greater than a 1 in 50 chance (the equivalent of 2%). Furthermore it should be stressed that, despite the adjustment, the 8% is still conservative because it is the probability that a robber will be convicted *just* of robbery during the year. Obviously the likelihood that a robber will be convicted of robbery *or* some other offense during the year is greater than just the probability that he will be convicted of robbery. How much greater is not known but for two reasons it is probably substantial.

One reason has to do with the practice, common both in England and the United States, of downgrading offenses. Because of downgrading, when persons are convicted of a crime, the crime they are convicted of is often less serious than the one for which they were originally arrested and charged (in the United States, downgrading occurs

in 40% of violent crime convictions and 25% of nonviolent convictions according to Reaves, 1998, tables 26 and 27).

The other reason is related to the fact that persons who commit a crime typically commit more than one a year. Importantly the crimes they commit typically differ from one another. For example, a man committing a robbery one day may commit a burglary the next. While he might not be caught for the robbery, he might be caught and convicted for the burglary. Consequently his chance of conviction is greater than just the chance he takes of being convicted of the robbery.

Over periods longer than a year, the probability of an offender being convicted can be quite high. For example, Farrington (1989, pages 339-423) found that 58% of English males who admitted to committing burglary were eventually caught and convicted of burglary at least once before reaching age 33.

Percent sentenced to incarceration

Percent of convicted murderers sentenced to incarceration




Figure 31

Percent of convicted rapists sentenced to incarceration




Figure 32

Percent of convicted robbers sentenced to incarceration




Figure 33

Percent of convicted assaulters sentenced to incarceration




Figure 34

Percent of convicted burglars sentenced to incarceration




Figure 35

Percent of convicted motor vehicle thieves sentenced to incarceration




Figure 36

For additional information on these graphs, see the section labeled *Notes on figures 1-82*.

In the United States, various types of institutions are used to incarcerate persons convicted of crime. There are State prisons and local jails for adults convicted in State courts; Federal prisons for persons convicted in Federal courts; and various types of residential institutions (for example, training schools) for juveniles found delinquent in juvenile courts.

In England (including Wales), adults are incarcerated in either prisons (for persons ages 21 and over) or young offender institutions (for persons ages 15-20). Juveniles in England are incarcerated in two types of facilities: those that are exclusively for juveniles (secure accommodation for juveniles), and those for persons under age 21 (young offender institutions). Unlike the United States, where juveniles and adults are kept in separate institutions, English young offender institutions confine juveniles and adults together.

This report focuses only on incarceration, but there are many other sentences that offenders receive in both countries, such as probation, community service, and fines.

Are courts in the two countries equally likely to sentence a convicted offender to incarceration?

- Courts in the United States are more likely to sentence an offender to incarceration than courts in England. Two exceptions are offenders convicted of murder or rape.

According to the latest court figures (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England) —

- 96% of convicted U.S. *murderers* and a nearly identical percentage of English murderers (94%) were sentenced to incarceration (figure 31)

- 82% of convicted U.S. *rapists* were sentenced to incarceration, which is less than the 95% of English rapists (figure 32)

- 79% of convicted U.S. *robbers* and 67% of English robbers were sentenced to incarceration (figure 33)

- 62% of convicted U.S. *assaulters* and 27% of English assaulters were sentenced to incarceration (figure 34)

- 60% convicted U.S. *burglars* and 38% of English burglars were sentenced to incarceration (figure 35)

- 55% of convicted U.S. *motor vehicle thieves* and 30% of English motor vehicle thieves were sentenced to incarceration (figure 36).

Are courts in both countries sentencing relatively more convicted offenders to incarceration today than in the past?

- In the United States, the percentage of convicted offenders receiving an incarceration sentence has been fairly stable since 1981. In England, the percentage has been less stable but has shown no long-term trend.

However, since 1991 the percentage receiving an incarceration sentence has been rising in England for murder, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.

From 1981 to the latest year of sentencing data (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the percentage of convicted offenders receiving an incarceration sentence has been —

- staying at about 95% for U.S. *murder* while increasing to 94% for English murders (up from 85% in 1981 and up from 89% in 1991) (figure 31)

- staying at about 82% for U.S. *rape* and staying at about 95% for English rape (figure 32)

- staying at about 80% for U.S. *robbery* while falling somewhat to 67% for English robbery (down from 74% in 1981 and 79% in 1987) (figure 33)

- staying at about 60% for U.S. *assault* while rising to 27% for English assault (up from 13% in 1981 and up from 15% in 1991) (figure 34)

- rising slightly to 60% for U.S. *burglary* (up from 54% in 1981) and rising to 38% for English burglary (up from 29% in 1981 and up from 28% in 1991) (figure 35)

- staying at about 50% for U.S. *motor vehicle theft* and rising to 30% for English vehicle theft (up from 25% in 1981 and up from 14% in 1991) (figure 36).

Incarcerations per 1,000 population

Murder incarceration rate per 1,000 population




Figure 37

Rape incarceration rate per 1,000 male population




Figure 38

Robbery incarceration rate per 1,000 population




Figure 39

Assault incarceration rate per 1,000 population




Figure 40

Burglary incarceration rate per 1,000 population




Figure 41

Motor vehicle theft incarceration rate per 1,000 population




Figure 42

The total number of convicted offenders (juvenile and adult combined) sentenced to incarceration in the United States is not directly comparable to the English total because of the vast difference in the number of people that live in the two countries. Naturally the United States incarcerates more people than England (including Wales): far more people live in the United States. A more meaningful comparison is between incarceration *rates* per 1,000 population, a measure that takes into account the difference in population size.

The U.S. incarceration rate per 1,000 population is higher than England's incarceration rate. Is that because the United States has higher crime rates? Or because the criminal justice system in the United States is more likely than the English system to catch and convict criminals? Or because convicted criminals in the United States are more likely to be incarcerated?

The higher U.S. incarceration rate for *murder* is explained entirely by the higher U.S. murder rate. According to the most recent statistics on the murder rate (1996) and the justice system response (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the U.S. murder rate is nearly six times the English murder rate (figure 5). Correspondingly, the U.S. murder incarceration rate per 1,000 population is nearly six times England's (.056 versus .010) (figure 37).

The higher U.S. incarceration rate for *rape* is attributable both to the higher U.S. police-recorded rape rate and to a United States criminal justice system that is more likely than England's to catch and convict rapists. According to the most recent statistics on crime (1996) and the justice system (1994 in the United States, 1995 in England), the U.S. police-recorded rape rate is three times England's (figure 6), but the U.S.

rape incarceration rate is seven times England's (.175 versus .024) (figure 38), indicating that a rape in the United States is more likely to lead to incarceration than one in England. However, the higher U.S. incarceration rate for rape is not a function of a higher probability of an incarceration sentence being imposed following a conviction.

The higher U.S. incarceration rate for *robbery* cannot be attributed to a higher U.S. robbery victimization rate since, according to the latest figures, the U.S. robbery victimization rate is lo

LEVEL 3 - 1 OF 15 STORIES

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The Toronto Star

July 22, 1999, Thursday, Edition 1

SECTION: NEWS

LENGTH: 947 words

HEADLINE: CANADA'S CRIME RATE LOWEST IN 20 YEARS

BYLINE: William Walker

BODY:

cities with drop

of 11 per cent

in the last year

still major concern

OTTAWA - Canada has achieved its lowest crime rate in 20 years, thanks to an aging population and reduced unemployment, Statistics Canada reported yesterday.

The latest figures available for 1998 show the country's crime rate dropped 4.1 per cent, the seventh consecutive year it has fallen. Since 1991, the national crime rate has dropped 21.7 per cent, the agency reported.

Crime in Ontario fell even faster - by 5.8 per cent - the third largest drop of any province.

And Toronto had the biggest drop of any major metropolitan area in Canada, with its crime rate down 11 per cent. Violent crimes were down 2.2 per cent in Toronto and the city's property crimes fell 14.8 per cent.

The megacity may have re-established its reputation as "Toronto the Good," with a crime rate of 5,839 per 100,000 people that was beaten only by Quebec city.

There were 23 other metropolitan areas with higher crime rates than Toronto. Ontario cities with higher crime rates per 100,000 included Thunder Bay (10,379), London (8,284), Windsor (7,892), Ottawa (7,672), St. Catharines (7,465), Sudbury (7,102), Hamilton (7,074) and Kitchener (6,849).

"The tragic shooting of a police officer in Toronto last week conveys the message to people that they live in a pretty lawless society," said University



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The Toronto Star, July 22, 1999

of Ottawa professor Julian Roberts, who specializes in crime trends and public attitudes toward crime.

"But Toronto has, historically, for its size been an incredibly safe city, particularly in terms of homicides. There are incidents that have projected an image of big-city violence, but Toronto is not a big city in terms of crime, thankfully," he said.

Roberts said the "'cohesive communities'" within distinct Toronto neighbourhoods have helped reduce crime and lately crime has fallen because the city is going through an economic boom.

Reduced across Canada were homicides, attempted murders, sexual assaults, robberies, break-and-enters, motor vehicle thefts and impaired driving, but crimes such as fraud, prostitution and drug dealing - which are linked to organized crime - remain stubbornly high. For example, drug offences increased 6 per cent in 1998 and prostitution-related offences edged up 1.7 per cent.

"For that reason, the federal government is focusing our efforts now on organized crime," said Yvette Alouisi, director-general for law enforcement policy with the Solicitor General's department.

The department launched an organized-crime strategy earlier this year and "the key aspect of that is to try to take the profit out of organized crime," Alouisi said in an interview yesterday.

She agreed lower unemployment rates and an aging population have helped reduce the crime rate in Canada, as they have in the United States and Britain. Crimes tend to be committed by persons aged 15 to 24, a demographic that's shrinking in Canada.

The number of Canadians who are 55 and over has been increasing steadily in recent years. Statistics show they are the least likely to be involved in crime.

What that leaves is a problem with organized crime, which is not just drug dealing but also affects communities through everything from credit card fraud to prostitution to high-tech crimes, Alouisi said.

"We know that organized crime is still a problem and that it has an impact at all levels of society," she said.

Of the 2.5 million crimes reported in 1998, more than half - 56 per cent - were property crimes, 12 per cent were violent crimes and the remaining 32 per cent were various other Criminal Code offences.

Violent crime fell 1.5 per cent, and of the 300,000 cases reported, 62 per cent were of the less serious common-assault variety.

Homicides, of which 555 were reported in 1998, dropped 6.2 per cent to the lowest level since 1968. The rate of attempted murders fell 15.5 per cent.

The 25,000 cases of sexual assault represented a drop of 6.6 per cent from the previous year, and 97 per cent of those involved the lowest level of measurable physical injury.



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The Toronto Star, July 22, 1999

Home break-ins dropped 6.4 per cent, business break-ins fell 9.2 per cent and car thefts were down 7.3 per cent.

Western provinces and the territories continue to have the highest crime rates. Newfoundland, where police officers do not carry guns, has the lowest.

Over-all, the crime rates represent a "drift" down from a peak in the early 1980s, University of Ottawa's Roberts said. But today's lower rates are still double what they were 30 years ago.

"We're not talking about huge declines but the comforting thing is that seven years in a row (of reduced crime) is not just a blip - there's something going on," he said.

The improved economy has helped, but Roberts said the number one reason is the reduced number of 15- to 24-year-olds and the fact more of those young people are now in school than ever before.

"The less free time for 15- to 24-year-olds, the less crime there will be because there will be less drug and alcohol consumption."

He also credited police practices, including community policing, and the greater street presence of police officers and police vehicles for reducing the crime rate.

Oddly, most Canadians still think crime is on the rise. A recent university study indicated more than 50 per cent of Canadians believe crime is increasing and only 10 per cent believe it's on the decline.

That's caused by the fact that crimes widely reported in the media influence the public more than studies issued by the government, Roberts said.

Public fear on the increase, B5

LANGUAGE: English

LOAD-DATE: July 23, 1999



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LEVEL 3 - 12 OF 15 STORIES

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The Economist

October 3, 1998, U.S. Edition

SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs; AMERICAN SURVEY; Pg. 35

LENGTH: 3104 words

HEADLINE: Defeating the bad guys. Crime in America

BODY:

America's plunging crime rates have attracted attention across the world, not least in Britain. What's the secret?

FOR the past six years, crime rates have been falling all over America. In some big cities, the fall has been extraordinary. Between 1993 and 1997 in New York city violent crime fell by 39% in central Harlem and by 45% in the once-terrifying South Bronx. The latest figures released by the FBI, for 1997, show that serious crime continued to fall in all the largest cities, though a little more slowly than in 1996.

Violent crime fell by 5% in all, and by slightly more in cities with over 250,000 people. Property crimes have fallen, too, by more than 20% since 1980, so that the rates for burglary and car-theft are lower in America than they are in supposedly more law-abiding Britain and Scandinavia. And people have noticed. In 1994, 31% of Americans told pollsters that crime was the most important challenge facing the country. In 1997, only 14% thought so. Some cities' police departments are so impressed by these figures, it is said, that they have lately taken to exaggerating the plunge in crime.

Why this has happened is anyone's guess. Many factors--social, demographic, economic, political--affect crime rates, so it is difficult to put a finger on the vital clue. In March this year, the FBI itself admitted it had "no idea" why rates were falling so fast.

Politicians think they know, of course. Ask Rudy Giuliani, the mayor of New York, why his city has made such strides in beating crime that it accounts for fully a quarter of the national decline. He will cite his policy of "zero tolerance". This concept, which sprang from a famous article by two criminologists in Atlantic Monthly in March 1982, maintains that by refusing to tolerate tiny infractions of the law--dropping litter, spray-painting walls--the authorities can create a climate in which crime of more dangerous kinds finds it impossible to flourish. The Atlantic article was called "Broken Windows"; if one window in a building was left broken, it argued, all the others would soon be gone. The answer: mend the window, fast.

The metro system in Washington, DC, was the first place where zero tolerance drew public attention, especially when one passenger was arrested for eating a



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The Economist, October 3, 1998

banana. The policy seemed absurdly pernicky, yet it worked: in a better environment, people's behaviour improved, and crime dropped. Mr Giuliani, taking this theme to heart, has gone further. He has cracked down on windscreen-cleaners, public urinals, graffiti, even jaywalkers. He has excoriated New York's famously sullen cab-drivers, and wants all New Yorkers to be nicer to each other. Tony Blair, visiting from London, has been hugely impressed.

But is this cleanliness and civility the main reason why crime has fallen? It seems unlikely. "Zero tolerance" can also be a distraction, making too many policemen spend too much time handing out littering tickets and parking fines while, some streets away, young men are being murdered for their trainers. It is localised, too: though lower Manhattan or the Washington Metro can show the uncanny orderliness of a communist regime, other parts of the city--the areas of highest crime--may be left largely untreated.

William Bratton, New York's police commissioner until Mr Giuliani fired him for stealing his thunder, has a different explanation for the fall in crime. It came about mostly, he believes, because he reorganised the police department and restored its morale: giving his officers better guns, letting them take more decisions for themselves, and moving them away from desk jobs and out into the streets. Mr Bratton made his precinct commanders personally responsible for reducing crimes on their own beats. There was no passing the buck, and those who failed were fired. Within a year, he had replaced half of them.

On the street

In most cities, reorganisation of the police force has been accompanied by an increase in the number of policemen, which had dwindled in the 1970s and 1980s. The extra numbers have usually been accompanied by a collection of policies known as "community policing". This means encouraging officers to get out from behind their desks and on to the beat, where their visibility will reassure the public. In some cities it has also meant officers becoming more actively involved with residents, youth organisations, schools and other local groups. Community policing has two clear advantages. A strong police presence can deter crime, or get officers speedily to a crime scene; and the police themselves get to know their patch thoroughly enough to prevent crimes, not just pursue the criminals.

Community policing has become so popular that it was the pillar of the 1994 crime bill, in which President Clinton promised 100,000 more policemen on the streets (and eventually provided money for about 70,000). This played heavily to Mr Clinton's advantage in the 1996 presidential election; and many mayors will bear witness that a heightened police presence has plainly produced lower crime rates.

In Los Angeles, the addition of more than 2,000 policemen since 1993 seems precisely to track the fall in the murder rate. In other parts of the country, the connection can be harder to make. Because the money was spread widely and thinly, in many places the extra police were hardly enough to account for drops in crime. The proof will come when the money runs out; the crime bill provided money for these extra cops on the understanding that, within three years, local governments would meet the cost themselves. Many of them may not.

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The Economist, October 3, 1998

In some cities, community policing is taken so seriously that it has turned into something not far from social work. The Boston Police Department is widely credited with the most successful campaign in the country against juvenile crime. This includes co-operation between officers and civilians to scrub off graffiti, run youth clubs, provide tutoring and counselling services and keep an eye open for truants. As a direct result (so the police believe), only two juveniles have been killed with a gun in Boston since July 1995, compared with ten in 1990 alone (juveniles are the most common victims of other juveniles).

As long ago as 1985, a study by Michigan State University into the future of community policing predicted that a force much like Boston's would become the national model: the officer on the beat would also become "the sponsor of the youth team, the community advocate, the block club organiser, the community problem solver . . . " And occasionally make an arrest, too.

Community policing of this intensity seems hard to fault. But some civil-rights campaigners complain that it is too intrusive; in New Orleans, after more intensive policing methods were introduced last year, citizen complaints of verbal or physical abuse by officers went up by 11%. And the policy has occasionally increased crime, rather than reduced it. Officers who become involved in their "patch" sometimes grow so intimate with criminals that they cross over to the other side; it happened a few years ago in Philadelphia. Because human beings, even in blue, are so corruptible, some crime-fighters argue that the most dependable new ingredient in the police armoury is not human leg-power, but computerised intelligence.

On the screen

The man behind this notion, Jack Maple, is a dandy who affects dark glasses, homburgs and two-tone shoes; yet he has become something of a legend in America's police departments. For some years, starting in New York and moving on to high-crime spots such as New Orleans and Philadelphia, he and his business partner, John Linder, have marketed a two-tier system for cutting crime.

First, police departments have to sort themselves out: root out corruption, streamline their bureaucracy, and make more contact with the public. Second, they have to adopt a computer system called Comstat which helps them to analyse statistics on all major crimes. These are constantly keyed into the computer, which then displays where and when they have occurred on a colour-coded map, enabling the police to monitor crime trends as they happen and to spot high-crime areas. In New York, Comstat's statistical maps are analysed each week at a meeting of the city's police chief and precinct captains.

Messrs Maple and Linder ("specialists in crime-reduction services") have no doubt that their system is a main contributor to the drop in crime. When they introduced it in New Orleans in January 1997, violent crime dropped by 22% in a year; when they merely started working informally with the police department in Newark, New Jersey, violent crime fell by 13%. Police departments are now lining up to pay as much as \$ 50,000 a month for these two men to put them straight.

It is probable that all these new policies and bits of technical wizardry, added together, have made a big difference to crime. But there remain anomalies that cannot be explained, such as the fact that crime in Washington, DC, has



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fallen as fast as anywhere, although the police department has been corrupt and hopeless and, in large stretches of the city, neither police nor residents seem disposed to fight the criminals in their midst.

The larger reason for the fall in crime rates, many say, is a much less sophisticated one. It is a fact that crime rates have dropped as the imprisonment rate has soared. In 1997 the national incarceration rate, at 645 per 100,000 people, was more than double the rate in 1985, and the number of inmates in city and county jails rose by 9.4%, almost double its annual average increase since 1990. Surely, some criminologists argue figures is the cause of the other. It is precisely because more people are being sent to prison, they claim, that crime rates are falling. A 1993 study by the National Academy of Sciences actually concluded that the prison population between 1975 and 1989 had reduced violent crime by 10-15%.

Yet cause and effect may not be so obviously linked. To begin with, the sale and possession of drugs are not counted by the FBI in its crime index, which is limited to violent crimes and crimes against property. Yet drug offences account for more than a third of the recent increase in the number of those jailed; since 1980, the incarceration rate for drug arrests has increased by 1,000%. And although about three-quarters of those going to prison for drug offences have committed other crimes as well, there is not yet a crystal-clear connection between filling the jails with drug-pushers and a decline in the rate of violent crime. Again, though national figures are suggestive, local ones diverge: the places where crime has dropped most sharply (such as New York city) are not always the places where incarceration has risen fastest.

The larger picture

Statistically, each of these new changes in law-enforcement has made some difference to the picture. Yet it seems probable that the factors that have really brought the crime rates down have little to do with policemen or politicians, and more to do with cycles that are beyond their control.

The first of these is demographic. The fall in the crime rate has coincided with a fall in the number of young men between the ages of 15 and 21, the peak age for criminal activity in any society, including America. In the same way, the rise in the crime rate that started in the early 1960s coincided with the teenage years of the baby-boomers. As the boomer generation matured, married, found jobs and shouldered mortgages, so the crime rate fell.

This encouraging trend was quickly overshadowed, starting in the mid-1980s, by a new swarm of teenagers caught up in a new sort of depravity: the craze for crack cocaine. Crack brought with it much higher levels of violence and, in particular, soaring rates of handgun murders by people less than 25 years old. Yet the terror became too much, and the young began to leave crack alone. Within a few years, at least in most big cities, the drug market had stabilised and settled, even moving indoors; the turf-wars were over, and crack itself had become pass(acute)e. Studies of Brooklyn by Richard Curtis, of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, show the clear connection: around 1992, many young bloods decided to drop the dangerous life of the street in favour of steady jobs. In direct consequence, the local crime rate fell.

Murder rates among Americans older than 25 had al declining since 1980. Here, according to Alfred Blumstein, a professor of criminology at Carnegie-Mellon

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University, there may be even longer-term social factors involved. In an age of easy divorce and more casual relationships, men and women are less likely to murder their partners: between 1976 and 1996, such murders fell by 40%. The decline in alcohol consumption, too, means that fewer bar-room brawls leave a litter of corpse on a Friday night.

It seems that changing social trends also sometimes lie behind the fall in property crime. Burglars tend not to steal television sets now because almost everyone has one; their value on the street has p At the same time, the fact that people stay in watching their sets, rather than going out, deters would-be burglars. Extra garages are standard in the suburbs, to safeguard extra cars; credit cards mean that shoppers c cash in their pockets; people working from home, by means of computers, can keep a closer watch over their streets.

Lastly, people are going to greater lengths to protect themselves and their property than they did in the past. This is partly because of the huge fear of crime that preceded the present decline, and partly because--even with recent increases in the number of policemen--the ratio of police to violent crimes reported is still way below what it was in the 1960s.

One American home in five now has a burglar alarm, up from around 1% in 1970; sales of car alarms have risen 40 times over; spending on private security, including private guards, has risen ten times (to \$ 80 billion) since 1975. There are indications that all this may do more for citizens' confidence than it does for crime: that property criminals, being mostly opportunists, will merely move to a place where potential victims less diligent. Yet the police are happy to attribute a 53% decline in the burglary rate in Washington's inner suburbs, between 1977 and 1997, to Neighbourhood Watch and car alarms.

Some people suppose that increasing prosperity may affect crime in more fundamental ways. When people are better off and unemployment is low (it is 4.5% at present), there is simply less incentive to rob others, and perhaps less incentive even to hurt them. Historically, to fall in boom years; the lowest recorded point for murder occurred in the mid-1950s. Yet research has also shown that local economic booms (especially when caused by the introduction of gambling casinos into a depressed region) can actually cause certain sorts of crime to rise.

The inevitable upturn

The "social-trend" explanations are bothersome not only because they are ambiguous. Each of them is also reversible. This is why the news crime rates has been greeted with only muted joy. The economy may sometimes seem to be breaking free of old cycles, but sooner or later there will probably be a downturn. And demography is fairly predictable. So is the tendency of drug dealers to find some new kick to sell to the young once their current wares go out of fashion. The police are well aware of this. As Boston's police commissioner said, immediately after noting how juv murders had fallen to zero in his city, "There is only one way the statistics can go."

Within a few years, the numbers of 15-21-year-olds in the country will be rising again. Yet the point is not the sheer number it is the number living messy lives. More ominously, by 1999 the first generation of babies born when their mothers were addicted to crack will start to reach puberty. By 2000,



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three-fifths of black youths turning 15 have been born to single mothers. Police departments are expecting a wave of "super-criminals"--at worst drug-addicted, at the least deprived of paternal discipline, and probably heavily armed--to hit the streets then. The scourge will be compounded if by then the economy is looking worse.

Police departments also know that some sorts of crime--especially juvenile crime and property crime--have not fallen back to anywhere near the levels of the post-1945 years; and they know, besides, that crime has not fallen everywhere. There are signs that it may merely have moved to new terrain. Because the big cities, wired and well-policed, have become difficult for criminals to work in, or because the drug saturated, they have moved to more modest-sized cities in areas that were once relatively crime-free. Drug gangs are now found in small towns throughout the mid-west and the Rockies; crack, once a plague of the ghettos, is now devastating the poorer parts of the rural South.

The numbers tell the story. Whereas the biggest cities--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles--congratulate themselves on plummeting rates of crime, crime rates have risen since 1993 in places like Nashville, Phoenix, Milwaukee and Charlotte, North Carolina: pleasant cities, which no one would call deeply troubled, but whose population has been growing rapidly.

In fact, crime rates are rising in most medium-sized towns across the country. And, though crime in central Washington, DC, has fallen, in some parts of that city's suburbs crime rates have doubled since the 1970s, growing much faster than the population. The irony is that t that refugees from city centres, driven out to the suburbs by fear of crime, have drawn the criminals after them.

In short, crime seems to behave much as a flu virus does. It adapts itself to new factors and new forces, and inoculation against one strain does not guarantee any immunity from the next one. It moves around as people do and, like most social activities, follows fashions. For at its base, of course, is flawed human nature: which is, unfortunately, a statistical constant.

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British and Canadian Crime Rates: Not Evidence For Gun Prohibition

by Clayton Cramer

Gun prohibition advocates frequently point to British and Canadian crime rates as proof that gun prohibition makes a dramatic reduction in crime rates. Does the evidence support this claim?

Equivalent Societies?

First of all, for such a comparison to be meaningful, there needs to be similar cultural values and legal systems. While most people can immediately see that Japan and the United States are dramatically different, the assumption of equivalence between Canada, Britain, and the United States is never questioned. Since the principal language of all three countries is English, and our legal systems are usually grouped together as "Anglo-Saxon law", this assumption is understandable. But scratch the surface similarities, and the differences start to appear.

If you ask the average white American where our culture comes from, as likely as not, the answer will be "England". The more careful may answer "Britain". A few will say "Western Europe". But if you ask much of the population of the Southwest the answer is likely to be "Por Favor Senor". American is a brew of imported cultures, of which British cultural norms are at most the predominant strain. Canada has experienced significant immigration, just like the United States, but the mix is different: less Hispanic, less African, more French, more English.

Another area of cultural difference may be the people that immigrated to America. Before the American Revolution, it was common for minor criminals to be transported to the United States. After the Revolution, they were sent to Australia. Keep in mind that many of the criminals who came to America were "criminals" because they refused to conform to the religious establishment of their home countries. Is non-conformity necessarily criminal in nature? Not necessarily -- but criminals are by definition those who refuse to conform to the majority's values.

Culture is transmitted from one generation to the next -- does American culture's long noted love affair with non-conformists and outlaws reflect the criminal past of our ancestors? A good question -- and one that needs to be addressed by those who claim equivalence for these three societies. In the case of Canada, there may be another selection process -- many Canadians are descendants of those Americans who remained loyal to the King in 1776, and chose not to live under a government of "traitors".

What about our supposedly shared legal system? Again, beneath the similarities are many differences. American law diverged from British law at the time of the Revolution. The continuance of the grand jury system is one obvious difference between our systems. In this century, our Bill of Rights has dramatically extended the rights guaranteed to defendants in criminal actions. (Before you become too critical of these procedural guarantees, remember that the more certain we are of a convict's guilt, the more comfortable we can be imposing a severe punishment.)

British Crime Rates: Those Brits Sure Are Peaceful

I have spent some time locating British crime figures, and the numbers are quite interesting -- though they do strongly support my position that British crime rates are not the result of British gun control

laws.

British and Canadian crime figures are remarkably difficult to locate, even in a university research library. It's not surprising that the claims of the gun control advocates have seldom been directly challenged. I found articles about British crime rates in both New Statesman (14 November 1986, "The absence of acceptable authority") and The Economist (21-27 March 1987, "Still unsafe on the streets").

How the numbers were used says a lot about the impact of partisan politics on journalism. New Statesman's article printed a chart showing total crimes reported to police (raw numbers) during this century. Not surprisingly, total crimes has risen dramatically, most of that increase since the late 1950s. Of course, the population has also dramatically risen, but New Statesman, while acknowledging that the population is much larger, didn't provide enough information to determine crime rates -- that is, crimes per people. Perhaps if the Labor Party were in power currently, they would have been more careful.

The Economist did take efforts to mitigate the unpleasant details of the numbers (and doubtless for the same reason New Statesman made no effort to do so) by pointing out the dramatic rise in population during that time, as well as improvements in how crimes are reported (rape in particular, being more likely to be reported now than it used to). The Economist's article also pointed out that:

one in three Londoners though crime and the threat of violence were the worst things about living in the capital. Women were most frightened: an astonishing one in four of 16- to 24-year-olds said they did not go out at all on their own -- day or night -- for fear of being attacked. The 1984 British Crime Survey also found a high proportion of women living in fear: 41% of all women aged 30 or under, and 64% of women on the poorest council estates [public housing projects], said that they were "very worried" about being raped.

Now we get to the numbers. There were 662 homicides and 2,288 rapes in England and Wales. Note that there were approximately 49 million people living in England and Wales at that time (a total derived from 1983 World Almanac). That gives a murder rate of 1.35/100,000 population. By comparison, the 1985 Uniform Crime Reports show North Dakota with a murder rate 1.0/100,000, and South Dakota with a murder rate 1.8/100,000. England & Wales would be between the lowest and the second lowest murder rate states in the U.S. The U.S. murder rate for 1985 was 8.2/100,000 (down significantly from its peak in 1980 at 11/100,000). But is this necessarily an indication of gun control at work? (Keep in mind that the Dakotas are among the least restrictive states in the U.S. on gun ownership).

The rape rate computes to 4.67/100,000 population. By comparison, the U.S. as a whole had a rape rate of 36.39/100,000 population, and even the lowest rate rape in the U.S. (again, South Dakota) was 7.30/100,000. "Big deal," you say, "It must be gun control at work." Except that firearms are used in rape only 7% of the time (Source: Report To The Nation On Crime, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1983). The very low British rape rate can't be because of gun control laws -- adding 7% to British rape rates they would STILL be lower than the safest part of the U.S. -- and by a large margin, and still be one-eighth of U.S. rape rates as a whole.

That rape is associated with warm weather seems quite clear.

Monthly totals showed the greatest number of forcible rapes were reported during the summer, with August recording the highest frequency. The lowest total was registered in February. [Uniform Crime Reports, 1987, p. 14]

There is a chart associated with this paragraph that shows a clear temperature association, and a table of forcible rapes for 1983-1987 that show this wasn't a fluke of 1987. That rape is very rare in Britain is not surprising -- it's a cold climate. Are there similar relationships involving murder? I've read that high temperatures and murder are associated. Considering how tempers and temperatures seem to rise in even well-adjusted people, I don't find this surprising.

As I said at the beginning, the numbers are not persuasive that gun control in Britain is responsible for their low crime rate. In the U.S., homicides are 63% committed with firearms. Let's engage in a thought

experiment and see if firearms laws explain Britain's murder rate:

+ Assume that firearms were as freely available in Britain as they are in the U.S.

+ Assume that none of the murders committed currently in Britain would be done with firearms in preference to other methods. (This is an unlikely assumption for premeditated murders).

+ Assume that no one successfully defended themselves with a firearm. (Another demonstrably bogus assumption).

The murder rate in England & Wales would STILL only be 2.1/100,000 people -- lower than almost every American state.

Are British people intrinsically less likely to commit rape and murder? Perhaps. After all, much of the population of the U.S. is descended from criminals transported from England, "troublemakers" who refused to subscribe to the preferred religion in much of England and continental Europe, and criminals sold into slavery by their own tribes in West Africa.

Canadian Crime Rates -- What Do They Tell Us?

First of all, the following caveat about Canadian crime statistics comes from an article titled "Crime" in The Canadian Encyclopedia (more accurately, a Canadian supplement to a real encyclopedia):

Crime statistics have to be viewed with reservation. While the national figure for offences reported to the police was about 2.5 million in 1980, charges laid in Ontario alone during the same period were reported to be almost 4 million. Statistics based on offences, offenders or charges yield very different counts. [The Canadian Encyclopedia, 1:441]

A little earlier in the article:

Serious problems have plagued national data collection and processing. As a result, the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (Juristat) was established in 1981, and is beginning to yield more reliable and useful data, although a consistent national reporting system will still take years to develop. [The Canadian Encyclopedia, 1: 441]

Note that this is the reason why the FBI developed the Uniform Crime Reports -- to deal with inconsistencies in crime reporting.

The following raw numbers are quoted from the same article and page:

1977 1981 Homicide 707 647 Attempted murder 684 900 Kidnapping 536 782 Sexual offences 10 932
13 313

Unfortunately, no rates are shown. From the 1983 World Almanac I get a population (1981 est.) of 24,100,000. This gives crime rates for 1981 of:

Crime raw rate/100,000 population Homicide 647 2.68 Attempted murder 900 3.73 Kidnapping 782
3.24 Sexual offences 13 313 55.24

I don't have 1981 crime rates for the entire U.S. available, but I was able to derive 1980 crime rates for the entire U.S. from 1980 census population and total crime reports (both in the same, now very dog-eared 1983 World Almanac).

Crime raw rate/100,000 population Homicide 23 044 10.17 Forcible Rape 82 088 36.24

Unfortunately, the FBI doesn't put figures for attempted murder or kidnapping in the Uniform Crime Reports, so a direct comparison is difficult. "Sexual offences" seems from the header to mean "rape",

but there is no explicit statement of it. (To make it even more confusing, Canadian law was changed in the 1980s, according to another article in the same encyclopedia, so that "rape" was redefined as "sexual assault", with three degrees, corresponding roughly to "molestation", "rape", and "rape by savages in need of slow torture before execution". This will make it even more difficult to compare 1970s and 1980s Canadian crime figures).

As you can see, the evidence suggests that Canadians do a lot of rape, and relatively little murder -- and also that they are darn successful at it -- 41.8% of the attempts are successful. (Amazing what you can do, even with guns restricted). Do they have more crime than the U.S.? I'm not prepared to go that far -- and the following paragraphs will point out why.

On comparing different countries' crime rates, the article "Homicide" in The Canadian Encyclopedia, vol. 2, p. 828, has something to say which bears repeating when these sort of apples and oranges discussions come up:

Canada is the only nation in the western hemisphere whose homicide rate is as low as that of Europe. International homicide statistics are generally unreliable and always outdated, but Canada's rate is roughly 5% that of Mexico or Columbia; 25% that of the US; equal to that of France or New Zealand, and triple the rate of Norway and the Netherlands.

It might be tempting to note the two data points above (1977 and 1981) and conclude that the murder rate declined because of the stricter Canadian gun control laws passed in 1977.

From the same article:

After increasing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Canadian homicide rate began to decline in 1975 and dropped an average of 5% annually until 1981, when it again began to rise.

I've seen some Canadian gun prohibitionists claim that Canada's murder rate is as high as it because too close proximity to the U.S. causes gun diffusion. Again, the same article and page:

The Maritimes have the lowest homicide rates in Canada, and Newfoundland (0.68 in 1981) has the lowest of all. Quebec's rate (2.93) was lower than Alberta's (3.43) and BC has the highest provincial rate (4.02), but the NWT and the Yukon have the highest rates of all (11.57 and 4.57 respectively). These sparsely populated territories also have Canada's highest rate of increase, while in the US the increase is highest in the major metropolitan areas, but this discrepancy may reflect the location of the 2 countries' socially alienated populations, America's blacks in urban slums, Canada's native people in the North (*see* Native People Law). Less than 2% of the Canadian population, the Inuit, Indians, and Metis comprised 16% of the homicide victims between 1961 and 1974.

If U.S. gun diffusion is a cause of murder in Canada, the effect must be utterly overwhelmed by other factors, since the Northwest Territories have absolutely no contact with the U.S., while the Yukon directly borders Alaska, and has a much lower rate.


Notice that Alberta, directly bordering Montana, has a murder rate only 17% lower than Montana (1980 Uniform Crime Report murder rate for Montana: 4.0), and 11% higher than Idaho (1980 Uniform Crime Report murder rate: 3.1). Compare Alaska's murder rate (9.7 in 1980) with the Northwest Territories (11.57) and the Yukon (4.57). Compare Washington's murder rate (5.5 in 1981) with British Columbia's murder rate (4.02 in 1980). There are differences, but they aren't always in Canada's favor, as you would expect if gun laws were the dramatic factor that is sometimes claimed.

Remember also that we are comparing U.S. 1980 (the peak year for the U.S. murder rate since 1903), and Canada 1981 (the lowest recent year for the Canadian murder rate). I wish I had more Canadian crime data available -- but if Canada is going to be presented as an example of the success of gun control laws, the facts readily available aren't persuasive.

Crime rates are very multifactorial. If you want to argue that gun availability is a factor, I will agree it could be a factor -- though the evidence available suggests that it isn't a major factor, and something more persuasive than a few random crime rates needs to be presented.

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JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SEEKS \$23.4 BILLION TO CONTINUE REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE, ENHANCING COMMUNITY LAW ENFORCEMENT, CURBING DRUG USE, BATTLING CYBERCRIME, AND BUILDING MORE PRISONS

Reno: "Our investment in anti-crime initiatives has achieved unprecedented success, but there is more we can accomplish"

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Department of Justice announced today that it is requesting a total of \$23.4 billion for Fiscal Year 2001 -- a \$1.83 billion increase over FY 2000 levels -- to continue combating gun violence, enhancing community law enforcement efforts, curbing the cycle of drugs and crime, battling cybercrime and funding new prisons to incarcerate felons.

"Since the Administration's first budget request in 1993, the Justice Department has been investing in anti-crime initiatives that have emphasized building partnerships between federal, state and local governments," Attorney General Reno said. "It has been money well spent."

"Crime rates have fallen for seven years in a row -- for every type of crime, and in every region of the nation. There are more than 55,000 additional community police officers on the beat across the country. And, we have prevented more than 470,000 criminals and other prohibited persons from purchasing guns," added Reno. "We have achieved so much in the last seven years, but we can accomplish so much more."

Highlights of the increases in funding requested, include:

Combating Gun Violence -- \$215.9 million in increased funding to hire more federal, state and local prosecutors to further increase gun prosecutions, to bolster efforts to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and other prohibited persons, and to reduce youth violence.

- 2 -

Expanding Community Law Enforcement – \$616.4 million in increased funding to support community policing initiatives and community crime prevention programs, to improve policing methods, and to help state and local law enforcement acquire the latest crime-fighting technology.

Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse – \$171.4 million in increased funding for OJP's Zero Tolerance Drug Supervision Program, enhancing the Offender Reentry Program, and supporting Residential Substance Abuse Treatment program.

Battling Cybercrime – \$37 million in increased funding to continue to wage the war against cybercrime and create a permanent network of experts dedicated to prevent and prosecute computer crime.

Building More Prisons – \$2.4 billion in increased funding to construct, expand, activate, modernize and repair federal prisons to keep pace with our burgeoning inmate population.

COMBATING GUN VIOLENCE

"Over the past seven years, our aggressive actions to control gun violence have paid off,"

Reno said. "We have witnessed a 22 percent increase in the combined number of state and federal prosecutions since 1992, and a 36 percent reduction in gun-related homicides between 1993 and 1998. Today's budget request seeks an increased \$215.9 million to continue vigorously pursuing those who violate our nation's gun laws and to provide state and local law enforcement with the technological assistance to solve gun crimes."

Highlights include:

Hiring Community Prosecutors – \$150 million to hire or redeploy up to 1,000 community prosecutors in regions designated by the Justice Department as High Gun Violence Areas.

Prosecuting Firearms Offenders -- \$14.5 million and 113 attorneys to investigate and prosecute firearms offenders, violent felons who possess guns, and armed drug traffickers. The funds will also be used to develop comprehensive strategic plans to prosecute, prevent and disrupt gun violence through the cooperative efforts of state and federal law enforcement, local government and community based groups.

- 3 -

Investing in Communications Infrastructure – \$11.36 million to help state and local law enforcement ballistics systems integrate into the National Integrated Ballistics Identification Network (NIBIN), and to eliminate the backlog in imaging ballistics data.

Supporting Communities – \$40 million targeted at reducing juvenile gun violence, getting guns off the streets, and developing “smart gun” technology.

IMPROVING COMMUNITY LAW ENFORCEMENT

“Since 1993, we have increased assistance to state and local governments by 300 percent,”

Reno said. “In FY 2001, we plan to continue our commitment to providing resources to fight crime at the grass roots level.”

The FY 2001 budget seeks \$616.4 million in increased funding to improve community law enforcement efforts. Highlights include:

Supporting Community Policing – \$230.68 million is requested for the Public Safety and Community Policing Grants Program, bringing the total funding for this program to \$650 million in 2001. The program includes funds to hire additional community police officers, and to support other innovative programs. The hiring funds will keep the COPS Program on course to pay for up to 150,000 officers by the end of 2005.

Advancing Community Crime Prevention Programs -- \$70 million, of which \$35 million is new funding under a new community crime prevention program. The funds will promote youth and school safety by establishing a value-base program between youth and police, and by supporting school-based problem-solving partnerships.

Promoting Policing Programs – \$30 million to enhance police recruitment, promote police integrity training, and create citizen problem solving academies.

Enhancing High-Tech Crime-Fighting Strategies – \$220 million to promote the interoperability of computer and communications systems within the law enforcement community; upgrade criminal history, criminal justice and identification record systems; improve forensic labs; provide communities access to sophisticated crime mapping tools, and, continue funding Technology Centers to help identify appropriate technological solutions for specific community problems.

- 4 -

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUGS AND CRIME

"Supporting a drug habit is a common denominator for many who end up in prisons. In order to break the cycle of drug use and its consequences, inmates in our nation's prisons need access to drug treatment and a program that ensures their successful reentry into the community," said Reno.

This year, nearly 570,000 individuals will be released from state and federal prison and returned to communities across the nation. Today's budget request seeks more than \$171 million in additional funding to help break the cycle of crime.

In addition to these funds, the Justice Department seeks a total of \$1.7 billion for drug enforcement efforts.

Highlights include:

Funding OJP's Zero Tolerance Drug Supervision Program -- \$75 million to support an initiative which will provide discretionary grants to states, units of local government, Indian tribes, and state and local courts to plan and implement comprehensive drug testing and treatment programs, as well as graduated sanctions for individuals within the criminal justice system.

Enhancing the Offender Reentry Program -- \$60 million (\$35 million new from COPS; \$25 million new from OJP) to fund partnerships between law enforcement entities and community leaders to better prepare communities to handle inmates reentering society. OJP will administer this program jointly with the Department of Labor, which will apply \$75 million to develop and operate jobs-related programs in the same communities.

Supporting Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program -- a total of \$65 million for the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program, which provides formula grants to states so state and local governments can develop and implement residential substance abuse programs within state and local correctional and detention facilities.

- 5 -

COMBATING CYBERCRIME

"The technology age has significantly changed the way everyone does business -- including criminals," Reno said. "For our society to be cyber-safe, law enforcement must keep pace with the criminals of the new millennium. Our budget seeks \$37 million in additional funding to fight cybercrime and protect our nation's technological infrastructure from cyber-terrorism."

Highlights include:

Expanding the National White Collar Crime Center (NWCCC) -- \$8.75 million to train even more state and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies to meet the increasing incidence of computer crime. The funds will enable the Center to expand its curriculum, invest in distance learning technologies, act as a clearinghouse for all federal computer crime training, and offer a "yellow pages" of resources available in forensic computer science.

Developing 10 Regional Computer Forensic Labs -- \$6 million to encourage and support the creation of regional computer forensic laboratories through partnerships among various federal, state and local capabilities.

Supporting Computer Analysis and Response Teams (CART) -- \$11.4 million to hire 100 additional computer response team members who are dispatched to support investigations into computer-related crimes. The fund will also help develop the Automated Computer Examination System, which is a data forensics tool that scans thousands of files for identification of known format and executable program files.

Prosecuting Child Porn and Other Cybercrime -- \$8 million for U.S. Attorneys to vigorously prosecute cases referred by law enforcement task forces regarding individuals who produce child pornography; travel across state lines to engage in sex with children, and trade images of child pornography via the print media or over the Internet. The funding will also be used to prosecute those who use computers to steal trade secrets, hackers, intrude into private computer networks, embezzle funds, or misappropriate copyrighted works.

- 6 -

ENHANCING DETENTION AND INCARCERATION

"Tougher sentencing laws as well as an increase in prosecutions has resulted in a tremendous growth in our nation's inmate population," said Reno. "Our budget request seeks \$2.4 billion in additional funding to build new prisons, expand existing facilities, and to contract with more state and local jails so criminals stay behind bars."

Total funding for prison-related costs is \$4.4 billion. Highlights include:

Constructing New Prisons -- \$2 billion in increased funding, of which nearly \$800 million is advance appropriations, to construct 17 prisons.

Activating Prison Facilities -- \$80.18 million to activate 4 facilities providing more than 3,800 additional beds scheduled to open in 2001, 3 high security facilities with 2 minimum security camps, and 1 Federal Detention Center.

Housing Detainees -- \$84.47 million in increased funding primarily to augment the number of contract beds for short and long term non-U.S. citizen inmates and detainees.

EXPANDING COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

"We have witnessed a dramatic increase in terrorist activity over the past seven years -- both domestic and international," Reno said. "We are requesting an increase of \$119.6 million to expand our efforts as well as those at the state and local level to fight terrorism and address hostile intelligence activities."

Highlights include:

\$15 million for the Attorney General's Counterterrorism Fund to reimburse any Justice Department organization for costs incurred in support of countering, investigating, or prosecuting domestic and/or international terrorism and to finance reward payments in connection with such activities.

\$19.1 million to fill 138 positions (63 agents) to enhance the FBI's ability to conduct national security investigations.

- 7 -

ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS

"The rigorous enforcement of our nation's civil rights laws remains one of our top priorities," Reno said. "We are seeking \$16 million in new funding for the Civil Rights Division -- a 19 percent increase above the 2000 enacted level."

Highlights of the total \$107.8 million civil rights budget include:

Enforcing Civil Rights Laws -- 38 attorneys to expand the investigation and prosecution of criminal civil rights cases, increase fair housing and fair lending enforcement efforts, and encourage compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Increase Funding for Community Relations Service -- \$2.3 million in increased funding to support additional conflict resolution teams, which would be dispatched to local communities to resolve racial or ethnic tensions.

PREVENTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND PROMOTING LEGAL ENTRY

"Since 1993, this Administration invested heavily in preventing illegal immigration, while promoting legal entry into the U.S.," Reno said." For the sixth straight year, the INS removed a record number of criminal and other illegal aliens. And, there are now more than 8,000 agents protecting our borders."

Today the Justice Department is requesting an increase of \$523.2 million -- for a total \$4.8 billion -- to provide the necessary resources to continue to strengthen INS's enforcement and service activities.

Highlights include:

Supporting the INS National Border Control Strategy -- \$164 million for INS border management initiatives, which include resources to add 430 new Border Patrol agents, to deploy more Integrated Surveillance Intelligence Systems (ISIS), and to reform the pay structure for Border Patrol agents and Immigration Inspectors.

- 8 -

Funding New Facilities -- \$76.1 million to plan and construct a new Border Patrol Station and Sector Headquarters space, as well as new detention facilities.

ENHANCING OTHER JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INITIATIVES

Fighting Crime Through Technology -- \$358 million to purchase new management software and hardware, upgrade wiretapping systems, enhance cryptology equipment, bolster DNA collection efforts and on-going research and development projects, devise data driven crime control strategies and improve the information sharing abilities of the Justice Department. **\$225 million** will be used to reimburse the telecommunications industry for certain eligible costs associated with modifying their networks under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).

Protecting Indian Country -- \$82 million in increased funding to implement public safety initiatives on Indian Lands, including funding to increase the number of fully trained and equipped police officers in Indian country; improve the quality of the criminal justice system, including courts and detention facilities; enhance substance abuse programs; and, combat tribal youth crime.

Representing and Enforcing Federal Laws -- \$27.2 million to provide litigation resources to prosecute unlawful activities and protect the interests of the American people in court.

"I am proud of all we have accomplished since 1993. Today's budget request provides us with the opportunity to continue to build on these accomplishments and meet the law enforcement challenges of the 21st Century," Reno added.

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Draft 02/10/00 12:45pm
Heather Hurlburt

**PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON
DEDICATION OF PRESS BRIEFING ROOM
TO JAMES BRADY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, DC
February 11, 2000**

6-277

Acknowledgments:

It is a great pleasure for me to come to the Briefing Room not to talk about my own agenda but to honor a man who is living proof that you can't assassinate courage; that it takes more than a cheap handgun to destroy a man's spirit and sense of purpose; and, as he himself has said, that no one can shoot your sense of humor away.

Jim Brady's courage, purpose and humor made him a standout press secretary here and throughout his career. Remember, Jim Brady was the man who convinced the White House press corps to abandon decades of tradition – and raise their hands when they wanted to ask a question. Jim Brady was the man who changed press conferences forever one day in the 1970s, when he invited journalists to see a bipartisan group of Senators cutting the budget – with hedge trimmers. And Jim Brady was the man who, when Members of Congress proposed to give themselves a \$50-a-day tax deduction, responded with a press release that was one word long. The word was "Stupid."

Nothing less fearful than a bullet could have driven Jim from this job and this place he loved so much. He battled pain greater than any of us can know, and despair that none of us can truly understand. He could have chosen to live out his life in private. He could have been remembered as a good press secretary, a committed campaigner, and a world-class chili cook.

But Jim Brady has all the toughness of the Irish. And he had a profound desire to contribute to the life of our nation – and to give others the opportunity to contribute as well.

Even in the hospital, when he had doubts about his own future, he reached out to his fellow patients – and gave them reasons to keep going. For more than fifteen years, he has traveled the country on behalf of the National Head Injury Foundation and other groups, bringing a message of hope and wholeness to thousands whose lives have been shattered. "Persevere," he tells them. "Never give up."

Jim and his brave wife Sarah have shown a lifetime of perseverance in their years of struggle to strengthen our nation's gun laws.

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They fought for seven years to pass the Brady Bill. It was my very great honor to sign it into law in 1993. And it has kept guns out of the hands of more than 500,000 felons, fugitives

man

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brady
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and stalkers.

an untold #

X Thanks to your courage, Jim and Sarah, ~~thousands of~~ Americans have been spared the nightmare of losing a loved one.

And with your perseverance, we will do more.

Jim and Sarah Brady have urged that we adopt common sense measures like requiring background checks for sales at gun shows. Mandating that child safety locks be sold with every new handgun. Banning the most violent juvenile offenders from ever possessing firearms. Ending the importation of large-capacity ammunition clips. And requiring all handgun owners to apply for a license and show that they know how to use and store guns safely. *TH* *brady* *brady*

Today we give a name to a room. But Jim and Sarah Brady have already given their name to an idea – the simple, common sense idea of making it harder for criminals, disturbed people and children to get their hands on guns that are only good for killing and maiming.

can later be used in senate and in
A few years ago, Helen Thomas told Jim Brady's biographer that "he's like a great tree standing by the river. He's a role model and that's what life is all about. He realizes life is to be lived – that we should give our all – that we're lucky to be alive."

Jim and Sarah, may we all draw inspiration from your strength and spirit, here in the James Brady Briefing Room and around our great nation.