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<P>Colorado Springs Gazette

October 19, 1999

<P>Two Airmen In Springs Refuse Anthrax Vaccine

<I><P>Some troops worry about effects

</I><P>By Mary Boyle, The Gazette

<P> WASHINGTON - A running controversy about the safety of the military's mandatory anthrax vaccine is reaching into Colorado Springs.

<P> So far, two airmen stationed in the Springs have refused the vaccine and were discharged from the military as a result.

<P> The unidentified men were stationed at Peterson Air Force Base and the Air Force Academy, officials say. That's a small percentage of the estimated 200 to 300 active-duty troops nationwide who have refused the vaccine, most citing health concerns.

<P> The Pentagon maintains the vaccine is safe and says refusals are few compared to the 340,000 troops vaccinated since March 1998 to protect against a growing threat of biological warfare.

<P> However, a much higher number of National Guard and reserve members - mostly airmen - now appear to be refusing the vaccine.

<P> In Colorado, reserves are beginning to receive the vaccine, and so far there have been no refusals, officials say. The Pentagon, however, has acknowledged failing to adequately educate reservists about the six-shot regimen.

<P> "We didn't focus on our reserves," Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre said at a recent hearing on Capitol Hill.

<P> At least two lawmakers have responded by sponsoring separate bills that would essentially make the vaccine voluntary until more is learned about it.

<P> However, the proposals aren't expected to advance far, as top defense officials offer dire warning to unvaccinated troops who come in contact with anthrax: "You will die," Hamre said.

<P> At least 10 nations are believed to have made weapons of anthrax - the reason the Pentagon plans to vaccinate all 2.4 million of its troops within seven years as part of its force protection strategy.

<P> Troops who refuse the shot are discharged, but the type of discharge varies depending on reasons for not taking the shot. Some refuse the shot for religious reasons, for example.

<P> Concerns about the vaccine range from long-term health effects, which the government has acknowledged have not been studied, to side effects some compare to symptoms of Gulf War syndrome.

<P> The Pentagon says 72 troops out of 340,000 vaccinated have had reactions to the shots severe enough to require hospitalization or to miss a day of work.

<P> A July report by an investigative arm of Congress, the General Accounting Office, concluded the military's system of tracking adverse reactions was flawed because it depended on the doctor or vaccine recipient to report a problem, rather than monitor all who received the shot.

<P> Colorado National Guard members and reservists have yet to express concern about the vaccine in the numbers and volume heard in other states.

<P> It could be because only a few hundred Colorado guardsmen and reservists have begun receiving the vaccine.

<P> Fifteen of 1,200 Air Force reservists at the 302nd AirLift Wing at Pete

rson have started getting the injections, spokeswoman Maj. Deb Gill said.

<P> About 300 of 1,400 members of the 104th Air National Guard Wing at Buckley Air Force Base in Denver have started to receive the shots, said Brig. Gen. Wayne Schultz, wing commander.

<P> Schultz credits an education program, including a visit by an immunization specialist to answer guardsmen's questions, with heading off early opposition to the vaccine.

<P> "We realize there was a benefit to getting an independent, credible source out here to talk about it," Schultz said.

<P> Like other commanders, Schultz doesn't know when his remaining 1,100 troops will start the immunization.

<P> Priority now goes to those deploying to high-risk areas, such as Korea, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

<P> "When (the vaccine) gets closer, will we have a problem? I don't know," Schultz said.

<P> About 27,000 guardsmen and reservists have started receiving their shots nationally, but no statistics are kept on those who refuse. Congressional testimony, however, indicates the numbers may be significant.

<P> More than half the 301st Airlift Squadron at Travers Air Force Base in California have resigned or plan to resign because of the vaccine, according to U.S. Rep. Walter B. Jones, R-N.C.

<P> One-third of F-16 pilots in the Wisconsin National Guard's 115th Fighter Wing are also expected to refuse the shot, along with the same number in an Air Guard unit in Connecticut, Jones said.

<P> Their departures will cost the military millions of dollars in lost training and flight experience at a time when the Pentagon routinely depends on part-timers' help, Jones said.

<P> Schultz, for one, attributes some of the fears to the massive amounts of information available on the Internet.

<P> "You can back up any position you choose," Schultz said.

<P> Bruce Pennington of Colorado Springs, a commercial pilot who served four years with the 302nd AirLift Wing, contends the concerns are justified. Pennington left the reserves about a year ago and didn't have to take the vaccine, but he understands why some former colleagues may be hesitant.

<P> "The government has done tests on troops that were disastrous health-wise and they kept it quiet," Pennington said. "That lack of trust in the government and the fact that there are side effects out there" make questioning necessary, he said.


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<P>San Antonio Express-News

October 19, 1999

<P>Late Night Grounds 200 Airmen

<P>By Sig Christenson, Express-News Staff Writer

<P> Nearly 200 fledgling airmen at Lackland AFB got their wings clipped after commanders caught them breaking the rules.

<P> Their crime? Staying up past their bedtime.

<P> "They were up after lights out," Lackland spokeswoman Irene Witt said Monday.

<P> "Everybody has to be in bed at lights out, and the dorm was not in inspection order."

<P> The airmen were grounded after the recruits, all men, were discovered out of their beds during an after-duty-hours dorm inspection one night last week.

<P> A military training instructor also found the dorm wasn't ready for an inspection that can be performed any time after lights-out, which comes at 9 p.m. each day.

<P> Witt didn't know how long the 180 recruits had been out of bed or what they were doing when they were caught.

<P> The recruits were allowed to graduate and join hundreds of others for Lackland's weekly graduation parade Friday morning.

<P> But they were denied a pass to leave the base Saturday, a traditional privilege new airmen typically use to enjoy a leisurely lunch at restaurants across the Alamo City.

<P> Throughout the six weeks of basic training Air Force boots are rushed through dorm cafeterias, often having 15 minutes or less to eat.

<P> One irate man phoned a reporter to complain he and other parents couldn't "see our kids" Friday after converging on San Antonio from locales around the nation.

<P> While Witt admitted parents may have been upset, she warned base liberty and town passes are privileges that can be denied.

<P> "This is the military," she said. "Rules are made to be followed."

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<P>Philadelphia Inquirer

October 19, 1999

Pg. 1

<P>Battleship On Last Panama Transit

<P>By Thomas Ginsberg, Inquirer Staff Writer

<P> MIRAFLORES LOCKS, Panama - Silently, gracefully, the mammoth gray battleship USS New Jersey floated between two high walls of scarred, blackened concrete in the Panama Canal with just six inches of space on either side, moving slower than a stroller on a Sunday afternoon.

<P> After a few minutes, the quick, low-pitched grind of iron scraping concrete came from its left side. Then a puff of white smoke, as the covers over the holes in the ship's hull burned. Canal workers tightened the steel cables tied between the ship and small locomotives ("mules") that move alongside on land to guide the ship. A few minutes later, there was another grind and puff.

<P> And then it was over. For the day.

<P> The New Jersey yesterday began its 10th and final journey through the Panama Canal on a tropical day, moved gingerly by tug boats like a piece of thread into the eye of a needle. Two more sets of locks lie ahead today and tomorrow for the country's most-decorated battleship, which was built 56 years ago at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to be just narrow enough to squeeze through the c

anal.

<P> The Big J, as the ship is called, will be the last U.S. battleship to make the crossing before the United States turns control of the canal over to Panama at the end of the year.

<P> While a battle awaits the ship in New Jersey over where it will be docked permanently as a museum - north near Bayonne or south off Camden - a mass of people, including Gov. Whitman, U.S. Sen. Frank Lautenberg, U.S. Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, Panama Canal administrators, and scores of American veterans, flocked to the isthmus to witness the final passage with other things on their minds.

<P> U.S. and Panamanian officials hope that a smooth transit by the warship will show the world that Panama is ready and able to run the canal efficiently and safely.

<P> The transit gives Whitman a good opportunity to promote the battleship museum, her spokesman, Peter McDonough, said. Her trip has been pelted by talk-radio shows back home as an unnecessary junket because the vessel will be back at the Philadelphia yard in just three weeks. McDonough said expenses were minimal or being paid by private donors.

<P> Finally, it was a dream come true for many aging veterans who came to Panama from across the country on their own dime to see a wake again behind the New Jersey, whose iron rails they had clung to while facing death through part of its four decades of service, including several wars.

<P> "It was excellent. It was very emotional," Walter E. Olkowski, 74, of Bridgewater, N.J., a trustee of the battleship historical museum, said after stepping off the ship.

<P> "This is the first time I've ridden her in 55 years," said Olkowski, who was a fireman first class in the ship's boiler room in 1944 on its maiden canal transit to the Pacific.

<P> He then turned to a group of Panamanian canal workers to thank them profusely in excited English, only part of which they understood. "It was amazing. They really had their act together," Olkowski said.

<P> The battleship was not the first to move through the canal, nor may it be the last, but its transits are legendary. Olkowski recalled how, on the first trip through, sailors dropped cylindrical rubber bumpers between the ship's hull and canal wall at the front, letting them roll as the ship passed. A sailor grabbed them at the back and dashed the length of three football fields to the f

ront to start over again.

<P> On another transit - nobody could quite remember which one - a protrusion from the canal began burning from the friction, and had to be hosed down from the deck. It became standard procedure for the crew to lay down hoses and let water dribble over the rail to keep the hull cool.

<P> Then there was the infamous incident in the 1970s, while on a passage for service in the Vietnam War, when the grand battleship got wedged against a wall after being steered at a wrong angle. The only way out was backing up, according to John Horan, a crewman at the time who now lives in Cherry Hill.

<P> "We had to turn the screws backward," he recalled.

<P> Yesterday's transit came off with a few rubs, but without a hitch, through Miraflores Locks, the first of three sets of locks on the 50-mile canal that raise ships 85 feet above sea level for the passage across the continental divide.

<P> Each lock is 110 feet wide. The New Jersey is 108 feet wide, two feet wider than the usual limit of 106 feet, canal operators said. For yesterday's transit, like all the previous ones, canal workers removed wood-and-rubber bumpers from the inner wall of the canal to create the needed margin of six to eight inches.

<P> Each lock is 1,000 feet long, and swallows up to 206 million gallons of water in order to raise and lower ships. Yesterday, the New Jersey was pulled gently into the first chamber of the East Lane at 10:50 a.m. In just eight minutes, submerged vents let in enough water to raise the 45,000-ton ship the height of a two-story building.

<P> "This transit is fitting because it brings together two great symbols of American power and ingenuity," Caldera, the U.S. secretary of the Army, said at a reception. "As the Panama Canal approaches its transfer to the people of Panama, this passage serves as a milestone in U.S. stewardship of the canal."

<P> New Jersey Assemblyman Joe Azzolina, a crew member on the ship when it fired its Volkswagen-sized shells over Lebanon in 1982, and a prime force behind the transfer, said he had warned Congress last year that the ship should be transferred before the handover to avoid any possible hitches. He conceded he made the warning in part to "get the [ship] moved sooner rather than later," but the warning became an undercurrent in the transit.

<P> "Now that I'm down here, I don't have any worries," Azzolina said, echoing comments by Caldera and the canal administrator, Alberto Aleman Zubieta, that

Panama was making its mark with the transit.

<P> "It shows that we are committed to doing a good job," Aleman said. "This would be happening whether [the transit] is now or five years from now."

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<P>Columbia (SC) State

October 17, 1999

Pg. D1

<P>'We Don't Take Lunch Breaks'

<I><P>For Hard-Pressed Marine Recruiters, The 'Work Week' I
s Often 80 Hours

</I><P>By Dave Moniz, Staff Writer

<P> It's 9 on a weekday morning and Marine Gunnery Sgt. Marvin Trammel is busy talking on the telephone. That's not at all unusual. Trammel is probably on the phone each week for as long as most people are at their jobs. This musclebound Marine recruiter has been up since 4 a.m., when his day began with an hour of weightlifting that got him ready to go to work.

<P> Monday through Friday, Gunny Trammel typically arrives at the office at 7:30 a.m. and quits calling "prospects" at 9 p.m. Sandwiched in between are visits to high schools, malls and "cold calls" on young adults at home. Trammel, who just began a 36-month tour of duty as a Marine recruiter, has time for little else in his life. When you add up the typical work week, the toll comes to a barely believable 75 to 80 hours. That's not unusual.

<P> In a military that pushes all of its recruiters to the edge to meet increasingly difficult-to-fill enlistee quotas, the Marines are the Iditarod sled dogs of working stiffs. A recent Department of Defense survey found that, on average, Marine Corps recruiters work 80 hours a week, or twice as long as most American workers. According to the survey, the average number of hours worked each week by all military recruiters rose from 56 hours in 1995 to 66 hours today.

<P> The reason is simple: Most young people today have no interest in military jobs. A big part of the services' solution seems to be work harder. Typically, Trammel and his colleagues spend more than two-thirds of their waking hours each week at work.

<P> "I've done a lot of jobs in the Marine Corps, and this is by far the hardest," says Trammel, who's been divorced for three years. Asked if he worked on Saturdays and Sundays, Trammel laughs.

<P> "Work Saturday? Last Sunday was my first day off in two months."

<P> In the past two years, the Marine Corps won praise for its ability to meet its annual recruiting goals while the other services have floundered. Now it's becoming clear how the Marines do it - on the broad shoulders of leathernecks like Trammel who feel compelled to complete this most taxing of missions.

<P> For a proud force renowned for its fighting exploits at Iwo Jima and Khe Sanh, the most difficult job today might be storming the aisles of Wal-Mart, looking for recruits. For the next three years, Trammel will be required to recruit three people a month into the Marine Corps. His self-esteem, and future in the Corps, will hinge on how he does.

<P> Gunnery Sgt. David Ridgely, who commands Trammel's Columbia recruiting station, finds it difficult to imagine civilian jobs that might compare to being a Marine recruiter. "None I can think of," he says.

<P> Ridgely, too, is once divorced though he is now happily remarried. Because of the demands his job makes on recruiters, he has a few simple rules: Knock off early on anniversaries, Halloween and kids' birthdays. There is an inherent

nt problem, and advantage, in being a Marine recruiter, he says. Because Marines are known for doing whatever it takes to get the job done, they will work themselves to the bone, ligament and tendon to find new Marines.

<P> "We don't take lunch breaks or dinner breaks - you eat at the mall," Ridgely says. "We take a lot of pride in making the mission."

<P>'Organizational irresponsibility'?

<P> People who study workplace habits are divided on whether 80-hour work weeks are such a good thing. Joyce Gioia, a strategic business futurist in Greensboro, N.C., said it's not necessarily the number of hours people work that stresses them out.

<P> "It depends on your attitude toward work. If for you, work is play, or enjoyable, then it will not take that same toll as if the work is drudge," Gioia said.

<P> Samuel Bacharach, director of the Institute of Workplace Studies at Cornell University, doesn't necessarily agree. When first told of the Marines' typical work regimen, Bacharach didn't believe it.

<P> "Eighty hours a week?" he said. "Say that again. Are you sure that number is correct?"

<P> Told the statistic came from the Pentagon's own personnel surveys, Bacharach's tone changed. "I would be very, very worried about that," he said. "Eighty hours a week is total organizational irresponsibility."

<P> The monstrous hours being worked by all military recruiters these days "runs against the grain of the military's commitment to families," Bacharach said.

<P> Marine Corps officials in Washington say they have not studied the effects the long hours have on recruiters or their families. But Bacharach, who just completed a five-year study on work stress, says they should start.

<P> Gunny Trammel acknowledges that his job is unusual. Being a Marine, he says, means thinking "there's no mission we can't accomplish."

<P> But there's reality, too, he says. Part is personal. For this kind of work, he's convinced there's a high divorce rate. Part is professional. Convincing young people to join the military today - even elite Marines - is "very, ve

ry, very hard," he says.

<P> Trammel says he doesn't feel stress or pressure. As long as he's convinced he's giving 120 percent, he can't worry about whether young Americans want to bite on his sales pitch. Trammel's boss says the Marines will keep going no matter what.

<P> "When a kid gets back from recruit training, that's my biggest reward," Ridgely says, lifting his left arm to show raised hair and goosebumps.

<I><P>Dave Moniz covers the military in South Carolina and reports on military trends in the Southeast.</I>

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<P>Defense News

October 25, 1999

Pg. 30

<U><P>One On One

</U><P>Mac Thornberry

<I><P>U.S. Representative from Texas

</I><P> The fight to radically reshape the U.S. military has a new champion on Capitol Hill, Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas. For much of the last five years, Sens. Dan Coats and Joseph Lieberman, a Republican from Indiana and a Democrat from Connecticut, respectively, led the fight in Congress to radically change how the military fights and what weapons it uses, to prod their colleagues and the Pentagon out of the Cold War and beyond Desert Storm.

<P> Coats left the Senate last year, seemingly leaving the fight for transformation in the hands of Lieberman.

<P> But Thornberry, 41, and friend of presidential-hopeful, Texas Gov. George Bush--slowly has gained the respect of his colleagues in the House of Representatives and become identified as the lead Republican on changing the military

<P> Thornberry, who looks to the redoubtable Winston Churchill for inspiration, says the British bulldog's career was "inspiring, not just for his speeches and leadership in World War II, but for all the ups and downs he went through before reaching his finest hour."

<P> As he and his allies push, prod and cajole the U.S. military to change, Thornberry may need to draw on that inspiration.

<P> He spoke recently with Defense News Staff Writer Colin Clark, in his Capitol Hill office, about transformation and the coming Quadrennial Defense Review.

<P> Q. The Quadrennial Defense Review is coming soon. How big will the fight be over resources and who will be the protagonists?

<P> A. There will be a big battle over resources, particularly if there is an effort to reduce the buys for some systems, or cancel them altogether. It's going to be a very challenging time over the next two years.

<P> Q. Will the main conflict be centered on the Army and its force structure, as occurred last time?

<P> A. I would say not necessarily so. In the last few weeks we've seen the Air Force come under questioning for the F-22. If the new attack submarine and maybe carriers need to be reexamined, we could well have it with the Navy. I don't think any of the services are going to be immune. I think the tougher

battle is going to be over strategy and organization. If you look at some of the past revolutions in military affairs, what a lot of the scholars find is that the technology was the easy part. The new ideas, the changing of structures, the changing of culture was much more difficult.

<P> Q. What would be a more reasonable strategy, a more realistic one?

<P> A. We need to take a fresh look at the threat environment we face, and try to sort out what the role of the United States is and how to defend our interests. The picture is much, much more complicated now than it has been for a long, long time.

<P> Q. Are you confident of the Pentagon's ability to address this issue?

<P> A. No. I'm fairly confident that the Pentagon alone cannot make the changes that have to be made. Just as congressional involvement was required for [the] Goldwater-Nichols [Defense Reorganization Act of 1986], some pushing from Congress and some mandates are essential. We are expecting them to change in ways that are against their bureaucratic interests, and that is very difficult for any organization to ever do.

<P> Q. The Pentagon says they are loath to change their force structure right now because its troops are already stretched so thin. Is this a valid argument?

<P> A. It is a valid concern, as is the concern [from the services] that, if we bite the bullet and reduce our force structure someone else will suck the money away. But you can't use those arguments as an excuse for not changing.

<P>Vital Statistics

<P>Position: First elected to the House in 1994

<P>Political Heroes: Winston Churchill, Abraham Lincoln and Ronald Reagan.

<P>Favorite Quote: By Theodore Roosevelt: "The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by the dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly. . . who at best knows the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly. . . ."

<P>Where he goes to recharge: His family's ranch in Clarendon, Texas. "Gaze out the window long enough," reads a Texas Tech University alumni magazine profile of Thornberry a few years back, "and you begin to think you can actually see the curvature of the Earth."

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<P>Washington Post

October 20, 1999

Pg. 7

<P>Nuclear Agency To Get Chief

<P> Energy Secretary Bill Richardson brought a conciliatory message to Capitol Hill yesterday, telling a Senate hearing that the White House will nominate someone to head the new National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) by March.

<P> Both Republican and Democratic senators warned Richardson against attempting to undermine the new agency, which will run the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories. Congress last month set up the NNSA despite Richardson's objections that it would reduce his authority.

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<P>Grand Forks (ND) Herald

October 19, 1999

<P>GF Launches Lobbying Mission

<I><P>Mayor, Chamber of Commerce part trip to Washington to
keep system in N.D.

</I><P>By Rona K. Johnson, Herald Staff Writer

<P> Plans to change the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty could have impli
cations for North Dakota. To make sure the implications are positive, Grand For
ks Mayor Pat Owens, Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce of Commerce President Bob G
ustafson, several people from the chamber's Council on Military Affairs and oth
er city officials are going to Washington on Sunday to lobby for the region.

<P> The ABM treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union establish
ed North Dakota as the single designated site in the United States for a missil
e defense system.

<P> Sen. Kent Conrad, D-N.D., and Gov Ed Schafer are concerned that an atte
mpt to alter the treaty could include a shift in North Dakota's designation as

a missile defense system site to Alaska. And a Duke University expert on Russia says that country has its own concerns.

<P> In defense of the nation

<P> Conrad said a North Dakota site could better defend the Eastern seaboard from a missile attack than a site in Alaska. In attempt to secure North Dakota's site designation, Conrad added an amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill that requires the secretary of defense to study the advantages of deploying national missile defense at two sites -- rather than just one -- to protect the against a missile attack. Congress expects to see a copy of that report March 15.

<P> That Clinton administration has said it supports the plan for a single site in Alaska, and deferred any consideration of a second site until a later date.

<P> A potential threat to the United States and Russia from radical nations that are developing missile technology and nuclear weapons prompted the proposal to change the treaty. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright mentioned Iran and North Korea as two of the radical nations. Proponents of altering the treaty want to develop systems to defend against ballistic missile attacks, which the ABM treaty has banned.

<P> Russian opposition

<P> The Russians are opposed to changes in the treaty.

<P> Ellen Mickiewicz, professor of public policy at Duke University and author of "Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle of Power in Russia," said the Russians are opposed to any change in the treaty because they believe it will weaken the framework of arms control and lead to a more uncertain -- and in their eyes, a more threatening world.

<P> Mickiewicz has been studying Russia for many years and has learned the Russian language so that she can interview Russian policy makers.

<P> "They don't appear to be convinced that what we are doing is not aimed at them but potential rogue states," she said. Also, "They are threatened by their own instabilities in the Caucasus, they are threatened by the erosion of their own infrastructure. In fact, the threats to their domestic well-being are so profound that it is their first priority."

<P> She added that no major decisions can really be predicted now until the

end of the presidential campaign in June. Right now, the Russians are dealing with a divided parliament and a lame-duck president, she said.

<P> "It's very hard to predict how the legislature will respond what action s it will take, it's hard to predict what the makeup of that legislature will be," Mickiewicz said.

<P> Mickiewicz said the United States could unilaterally make changes to the treaty and that we may justify that by stretching the language, "but it would in my view be close to gutting the agreement. I really don't think it should be changed unless one can get the agreement of the other side and if the technology, expense and technical expectations are such that can make us think that the cost is worth the benefit," she said. "I have real concerns about both of those."

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<P>Washington Post

October 20, 1999

Pg. 24

<P>Tribunal Rules On Bosnian Serb

<P> THE HAGUE--A U.N. war crimes tribunal acquitted a Bosnian Serb

rb of genocide, but convicted him on 31 other counts of torture and murder to which he confessed. Goran Jelusic, 31, called himself "Adolf" and confessed to killing at least 12 Croat and Muslim prisoners during the Bosnian war from 1992-95. But a three-judge international panel concluded there was insufficient proof that Jelusic carried out a genocidal campaign at the Luka prison camp in northern Bosnia in 1992. The former mechanic faces multiple life sentences.


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<P>European Stars and Stripes

October 18, 1999

Pg. 3

<P>Setting Foot On New Paths

<I><P>Two former Yugoslav POWs recall captivity, aftermath as they prepare to leave the Army

</I><P>By Richelle Turner-Collins, Würzburg bureau

<P> SCHWEINFURT, Germany When three U.S. soldiers were captured by Yugoslav armed forces seven months ago, Americans became captives of sorts, too helplessly hoping the POWs were still alive. The battered and bruised soldiers appeared on Serbian television shortly following their capture. Americans sat glued to

o television screens. The three needed a miracle.

<P> It happened 32 days later. Spc. Steven M. Gonzales, 22, Staff Sgt. Andrew A. Ramirez, 24, and Staff Sgt. Christopher J. Stone, 26, were released. The cavalry scouts, assigned to B Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry, were finally free.

<P> "You can't help but think it was a miracle," Stone said Friday at his duty station in Schweinfurt, Germany. "That doesn't happen every day."

<P> Two of the three soldiers agreed for the first time to an in-depth interview with Stars and Stripes to talk about their ordeal, and how they've settled back into their lives. Two of the three are facing another challenge they leave the Army this week to begin new lives.

<P> The soldiers' lives have been full of joy and some chaos since their release. They've been heralded as heroes in the press and criticized by some veterans for surrendering to the Yugoslav ambush that captured them and others who didn't think they were injured enough to receive their purple hearts.

<P> The three have been on the "A list" of interviewees for newspapers and television talk shows. They've been offered a few movie/book deals, visited their families for a month and then tried to quietly settle back into their units. Things are just starting to calm down.

<P> Gonzales, whose friends nicknamed "Paco," leaves the Army on Friday and will return to Palestine, Texas. In January, he will attend Texas A&M University, where he plans to study mechanical engineering. Gonzales, described by friends as sensitive, easy-going and an outstanding athlete, already completed one year of college before joining the Army.

<P> Stone, who is from Smith Creek, Mich., returns home on Friday to be a full-time recruiter/marketer for the Michigan National Guard.

<P> "It's kind of a unique program," explained Stone, whose hobbies are reading and playing with his 5-year-old son Ryan. "A little bit of recruiting and selling of the Guard."

<P> Stone hasn't been back to Michigan since joining the Army eight years ago. Ramirez, from Los Angeles, left Germany on Oct. 3 for his new duty station at Fort Irwin, Calif., where he's expected to serve out the last year of his Army contract. Ramirez's plans are unknown. He was not available for an interview.

<P> The decision to leave the Army wasn't easy for Gonzales or Stone, who are members of the 1st Infantry Division's elite reconnaissance unit.

<P> "It's something I will miss becoming a family with your unit and platoon," Gonzales said.

<P>The capture

<P> The cavalry unit is close-knit. Perhaps because they've shared so much together. The group took over the United Nations Preventative Deployment mission in Macedonia. Soldiers were housed in strategically located observation posts along the Macedonian border to observe and report on Yugoslavia. That mission was abruptly ended on March 1, when China vetoed extending the mission. China was angry that Macedonia had formally recognized Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a breakaway province.

<P> "All of us were disappointed that the mission ended," Stone said. "It was successful. It prevented Macedonia from breaking out in the same wars."

<P> With the U.N. mission scrapped, the 350 soldiers began a similar NATO mission. During this time, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's campaign against ethnic Albanians in neighboring Kosovo increased. Later that month, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began its bombing campaign against Yugoslav targets to stop the Yugoslav army's attacks on ethnic Albanians.

<P> About one week later, the soldiers were on a routine patrol along the Macedonian-Yugoslav border when they were ambushed by 15 to 20 men wearing Yugoslav uniforms. It was 2:30 p.m. on March 31. Where the soldiers were located has been a matter of contention. Some say they accidentally wandered into Yugoslavia.

<P> Former 1st Infantry Division Commander Maj. Gen. David L. Grange said he was convinced the soldiers were in Macedonia. When asked Friday about where they were during the capture, Stone said it has not yet been determined.

<P> During the first week they were interrogated no less than four times. They were periodically beaten. Stone received a fractured nasal bone and Ramirez suffered two broken ribs. All the men had abrasions on their wrists from shackles. The next week they were moved to a prison, where their days became more routine.

<P> They didn't know if they would be killed or set free. But during all this turmoil and uncertainty, one thing remained constant: their faith in God. Stone

ne and Gonzales say it was that faith that got them through the dark times, until they were released.

<P> "It was probably my strongest crutch," said Gonzales. "It was always a place to turn for what feelings of safety I could enjoy."

<P> Gonzales, a Baptist, said he passed countless hours saying praise songs and remembering fun times at church camps and youth groups. He had plenty of time to think to help him re-evaluate his life and put his priorities in order. Stone said his faith was the only place he had to turn. He was in a solitary cell.

<P> "When you are sitting out dark times and dark circumstances you have to turn somewhere," Stone said, explaining his faith.

<P>On the homefront

<P> The two men knew nothing of what was happening back home. They were being fed lots of Yugoslav propaganda. They were told the U.S. government hadn't asked for their release.

<P> "Why do you think that is?" one captor asked the men.

<P> "We were pretty much in the dark about what was going on," Gonzales said.

<P> It wasn't until the men got a visit from a representative from the International Committee of the Red Cross that they learned what was happening back home.

<P> "It's just a great feeling to know there are so many supporters of the Armed Forces," said Gonzales, who spent his 22nd birthday in captivity.

<P> "It's inspiring that people would come together," Stone said.

<P> Back at the 1st Infantry Division's headquarters in Germany and in the United States, yellow ribbons were hung on fences, trees and lapels in honor of the soldiers. Students in Gonzales' hometown, put yellow ribbons all over. You couldn't buy a yellow ribbon in that town, a resident told Stars and Stripes in April. The same thing was happening in the other men's hometowns.

<P> "My sister likes to tell me it took me being captured to get the whole state of Michigan talking to God again," Stone joked.

<P> Youngsters raised money for Kosovar refugees in the soldiers honor and many wrote the men letters of encouragement and support. Journalists were doing live television remotes from the three soldiers hometowns.

<P> This was tough for the soldiers families. They didnt know if their sons were alive or dead or when they could come home. Stone said he learned later a media helicopter was constantly hovering outside his fathers home. The local television station would always report when the father left the house and speculated he could be flying to Germany to meet his son.

<P> "It was a pretty rough ordeal for our families," said Gonzales.

<P> Things were especially rough for his mother, Rosie. The Gonzales family was geographically split but she kept every-one together during the ordeal.

<P> "But now she has been able to go on," Gonzales said. "Shes waiting for me to come along with one of my aunts. Theyre really anticipating my return."

<P> The Friday before the soldiers were released, they were visited by the Rev. Jesse Jackson, who had been negotiating for their release. That meeting stuck in Stones mind and gave him hope. Jackson told Stone about Nelson Mandela, who was imprisoned for decades for opposing South Africas apartheid system.

<P> Jackson said while Mandela was in prison he envisioned the idea of a new South Africa. Then Jackson told Stone something that he says forever touched him: "Through our scars come our stars."

<P> "That stuck with me," Stone said. He went back to his solitary cell and he focused on that quote. Two days later, Stone, Gonzales and Ramirez were released.

<P> Unlike some media reports, the men dont see themselves as heroes. And they dont think they played any role in the U.S. peaceful deployment to Kosovo.

<P> "We were doing our job. We were serving our country. Thats all that can really be expected by anyone," Stone said.

<P> "We were put in a situation and thankfully we lived through it,"
ot; Gonzales added.

<P> The three men now get to live a new life away from the horrors of their
captivity and the military they dutifully served.

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

October 20, 1999

<U><P>Interview

</U><P>General Agim Çeku

<I><P>Commander Of Kosovo Protection Corps (Kpc)

</I><P> Gen Agim Çeku became chief of staff of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) during the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia.

<P> On 20 September, following the disbandment of the KLA, Bernard Kouchne
r, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Kosovo, named Gen &Cce
dil;eku Commander of the newly-formed Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), an unarmed
emergency service.

<P> "Our co-operation with [the NATO-led Kosovo Force] KFOR and the UN Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK] is good," asserts Gen Çeku. "Our strategic goal has always been to lead Kosovo towards democracy and European integration. That can only be achieved by co-operating with the international community."

<P> On 21 June, 10 days after KFOR entered Kosovo, the KLA agreed to demilitarise and transform within 90 days. According to Gen Çeku, "the departure of the Serb bodies left an institutional void. When KFOR started deploying, the KLA was the only organisation with its own structure within Kosovo. "We tried to fill that void and, together with the international forces, organise everyday life. We are still not satisfied there are lots of problems in the field, but improvements are visible."

<P> He admits that the KLA was worried about allegations concerning its possible lack of co-operation with KFOR. "We accepted [UN Security Council] Resolution 1244 to prove that we are a part of the international community not against it. There were a lot of misconceptions about the KLA, it was portrayed in a darker light than it deserved. We were eager to prove that we were an organised and structured army, with military hierarchy and discipline."

<P> "The main concern of the international community was how to demilitarise the KLA, while our main goal was to transform it. We played our part and demilitarised, but we asked the international community to accept our argument that Kosovo needs a defensive structure, which in the end they did. The transformation is proof that the international community realised the KLA was not a problem but an organisation they could co-operate with."

<P> On 20 September, then KFOR commander Gen Sir Mike Jackson approved Gen Çeku's statement that the KLA had ceased to exist. The KLA handed over some 10,000 weapons to KFOR and has no hidden arms, says Gen Çeku. "At the end of the bombing campaign, we had 20,000 soldiers, but many of those, maybe even 50%, were drafted and had no arms. They had to share one weapon. We were never short of fighters, but had the problem of weapons both in quantity and in quality."

<P> "I do not exclude the possibility that the population has weapons. The borders were open and anyone could bring them in from Albania, but former KLA units have handed in all their arms. The demilitarisation was controlled and verified by KFOR," says the general.

<P> "We see the KPC as a bridge towards the future, from the KLA as a wartime organisation towards a regular, modern army of Kosovo which will be achieved with the independence of Kosovo. Our task is to fulfil the mission of a protection corps that will help the people but also to develop a system of education and training and be ready to transform once again if that becomes necessary."

<P> KLA members will have to be re-trained for the KPC's new civilian tasks. Gen Çeku said the KPC will train many more than its 3,000 regular members. He says those who complete their training would resign, opening the possibility for new members to be trained.

<P> "We will have several levels of education: a non-commissioned officers school, basic and advanced officer training, and in future, when the conditions are right, possibly two levels of advanced training," he says. "We will try to take [officer candidates] with civilian degrees and give them specialised training to be leaders. We want to train as many men as possible, so that if the need arises we have capable leaders."

<P> At least 10% of KPC members are to stem from Kosovo's minority groups. "We will be ready to accept [Serbs]. I believe that at this moment it will be difficult to find someone [among the Serbs] who would accept the reality. Our aim is to build a democratic Kosovo and it has to be multinational. Every citizen of Kosovo has the right to participate in all of its institutions. We will remain open and leave the 10% of positions for the Serbs. It is up to them to decide."

<P> The Military-Technical Agreement on Yugoslav withdrawal and UN Resolution 1244 provides for a small number of Yugoslav personnel returning to Kosovo to guard Serb cultural monuments and maintain a presence at the border. "The Albanians did not take part in formulating those fundamental documents. If they asked us, we would have never accepted. The return of Serbian personnel would create problems. If we are given a chance to have a say, we will not agree with it."

<P> The KPC is a compromise between the Albanians' desire to maintain a uniformed force and the international community's reluctance to allow for any military force other than KFOR. "All of us, the people and the soldiers, see this project as the only realistic possibility at the moment. The structure is such that it can re-transform very rapidly if necessary."

<P> He believes the wave of killings in recent months is the result of bitter memories. "There were many victims during the war, and I would attribute most of the murders to revenge. I say with full responsibility that KLA structures have never taken part in war crimes, during the war or after it. Our strategic decision was to wage a 'clean' war, in accordance with Albanian moral values. We fully accept the authority of the International War Crimes Tribunal but I am certain that my soldiers have not performed war crimes."

<I><P>- Zoran Kusovac, JDW Correspondent </I>

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<P>London Times

October 19, 1999

<P>Serbs Shiver In Struggle For Power

<P>By James Pringle in Belgrade

<P> Radiators and hot water pipes remain uncomfortably cold in the Yugoslav capital, even though temperatures are dropping below freezing.

<P> Meanwhile, Government and opposition vie to see who will supply the most power to a population dreading the oncoming winter. Western sources estimate that Nato bombing raids this year knocked out a third of the national grid.

<P> State television, controlled by the Government of President Milosevic, boasted on Sunday that the state Serbian oil industry had reached agreement with the Hungarian state oil company for the trans-shipment of Russian gas, which had been blocked for non-payment of debts. Heating will start tomorrow, only five days after the normal date on which it is provided to the city's public flats, according to the president of the state company.

<P> In the southern cities of Nis and Pirot, controlled by opposition parties, the European Union has agreed to provide heating oil. Under the proposed Energy for Democracy programme, the EU initially will supply the two cities with about 3 million of heating oil. Other opposition-controlled cities will receive

aid later.

<P> Zoran Zivkovic, Mayor of Nis and vice-president of the Democratic Party, which with other opposition parties hopes to force Mr Milosevic from power, spoke against any state attempt to stop the oil deliveries.

<P> America has expressed fears that the EU aid, while reducing the winter hardship facing ten million Serbs, will help Mr Milosevic to stay in power by reducing public discontent with his regime. Mr Zivkovic has blamed Mr Milosevic for Serbia's economic hardships and increasing international isolation.

<P> Foreign diplomats say that both Government and opposition are using the heating situation to gain popular support. They are concerned about the morality of using humanitarian aid as a political weapon, supplying fuel only to opposition cities.

<P> The people of Serbia are merely concerned that they will have no heat this winter. In Belgrade's Kneza Mihajlova shopping street yesterday, Bojana Vujasinovic, a former physician who quit her hospital job to sell small religious wood carvings when her official salary dropped to 2 a month in 1991, said: "People fear the winter. They are not just worried, but desperate."

<P> Dusica Radovic, 28, an economist, said: "If we don't have electricity or heating oil we cannot warm ourselves. Everyone is trying to buy a wood stove, but a lot of people cannot afford even that. Anyway, most city flats have no chimneys. I don't know what is going to happen."

<P> Most Serbs agree that the issue is unlikely to bring down Mr Milosevic. "In 1993 our salaries fell to DM3 a month and it did not drive him out of power," one said.

<P> The UNHCR has begun delivering coal and heating oil to help thousands of internal refugees from Serbia's conflicts. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, said last week: "There are some 700,000 refugees from previous wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo who are now in dire need of assistance in Serbia."

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<P>Pacific Stars and Stripes

October 21, 1999

Pg. 3

<P>South Korea, Vietnam To Consider Boosting Military Ties

<P>By Jim Lea, Stripes Osan Bureau Chief

<P> Three South Korean warships will visit Vietnam next month in an effort to strengthen military ties between the two former enemies.

<P> Two South Korean frigates and a combat support ship will make a goodwill visit to Ho Chi Minh City from Nov. 5 to 8, a Defense Ministry spokesman said. It will be the first time South Korean military personnel have been in Vietnam since the war ended in 1975.

<P> The agreement for the port visit came Tuesday during a meeting between South Korean Vice Defense Minister Park Yongok and his Vietnamese counterpart, Tran Hanh.

<P> Tran, who arrived in Seoul on Monday, is the highest-ranking official of the Vietnamese military to visit South Korea since Seoul and Hanoi established diplomatic relations in 1992.

<P> Tran reportedly told Park that Hanoi will assign a military attache to its embassy in Seoul next year in an effort to strengthen military exchanges between the two countries.

<P> More than 300,000 South Korean troops fought with U.S. and South Vietnam

mese troops against North Vietnam and the Viet Cong during the Indochina War. More than 5,000 South Korean soldiers were killed or listed as missing during the war.

<P> Seoul severed relations with Vietnam after North Vietnam absorbed the South at the end of the war. Diplomatic ties were established with Hanoi in 1992

<P> South Korea now is Vietnams third-largest trade partner.

<P> Park also explained South Koreas policy of engaging its communist rival, North Korea, and asked Vietnam to help open North Korea, the officials said. The Vietnamese official expressed full support, they said.

<P> Hanh later met South Korean Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae. He is scheduled to end his South Korea visit Friday after inspecting a military unit and a weapons plant.


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<P>Christian Science Monitor

October 20, 1999

<U><P>USA

</U><P>Why US Is Wary Of Pakistan's New Rule

<I><P>In wake of last week's takeover, officials are concerned about regional instability.

</I><P>By Justin Brown, Special to The Christian Science Monitor

<P> WASHINGTON -- Despite pledges by Pakistan's new leader to improve relations with the West, US officials are hesitant to throw their support behind his country's first military government in control of a nuclear arsenal.

<P> Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who last week overthrew Pakistan's democratically elected government, has said all the right things in public: that he will ease tension with India, that he will limit nuclear proliferation, and that he will restore democracy to the country of 135 million.

<P> Nevertheless, officials here remain concerned about the threat of nuclear confrontation under General Musharraf - and the possibility that Pakistan could fall in step with anti-American neighbors Iran and Afghanistan.

<P> Musharraf, to the dismay of some observers, is a career soldier and by his own admission, "not a political or constitutional expert."

<P> "There are signs that military leaders are more likely to use nuclear weapons than [are] civilian leaders," says Steven David, a professor at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. "In a crisis situation, they may strike if they feel they will be preempted."

<P> While the military has always controlled Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, Musharraf will now have the final say in crucial matters of state that could lead to nuclear confrontation. He will rule through a six-member National Security Council and be advised by experts.

<P> Musharraf's time line

<P> Another US concern is that Musharraf didn't specify when he would install democracy, despite the urgings of US officials who recently met with him

<P> "A lot of what he said was quite good," President Clinton said this week about an Oct. 18 speech by Musharraf. "But I was disappointed there was no commitment to a timetable to move toward democracy, and I hope that will be forthcoming."

<P> Having already imposed sanctions in 1990 and last year for Pakistan's testing of nuclear weapons, the US has limited economic leverage. Nevertheless, the White House said it will block some remaining aid.

<P> While US officials have not supported Musharraf, they also have not publicly condemned him - because it is too early to know what kind of leader he will be, because he is for the moment popular in Pakistan, and because he has acted with moderation during his first week of rule, analysts say.

<P> "We certainly don't approve of the move he's made," says an administration official. "But he's what we got now, and he's making the right noises."

<P> Musharraf, however, is best known as the general who earlier this year led Pakistan's conflict against India in the disputed territory of Kashmir. The US and other world powers strongly condemned the action. Pakistan did not withdraw from Kashmir until, at the urging of the US, ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered a halt to the operation. Musharraf was said to have been humiliated by the episode - and inspired to move against Mr. Sharif. The defeat in Kashmir was just one in a string of losses for Pakistan, a country that has been left out of the global economy and has fallen far behind its rival, India.

<P> With or without Musharraf, the US considers Pakistan a threat to global security. "Pakistan is a loser," says Leon Hadar, a south Asia expert at the Cato Institute here. "And when a loser has nuclear weapons, it's dangerous."

<P> Although US relations with Pakistan have been strained recently, the country remains a vital foothold in south Asia. It is seen as a front line in the fight to prevent the spread of the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban movement, which rules Afghanistan and is among America's top enemies.

<P> Another US enemy, Iran, has been courting Pakistan, which has the same predominant Sunni Muslim religion. Iran has said it would support Pakistan if it were engaged in an armed conflict.

<P> Pakistan a 'swing' country

<P> Finally, the US considers Pakistan a swing country that could end up on America's side or on China's. "If Pakistan sees that the US is becoming a less reliable ally, they could get closer with China," says Mr. Hadar.

<P> According to Hadar, the strategic importance of Pakistan is one reason the US has been relatively reserved - at least publicly in its judgment of Musharraf.

<P> Also, US officials have never been particularly fond of his predecessor, Mr. Sharif, who some accuse of mismanaging Pakistan.

<P> Shireen Hunter, director of Islamic Studies at the Center of Strategic and International Studies here, says one positive outcome of the coup may be an initial period of calm - due to the installation of military rule.

<P> So far Pakistanis have supported Musharraf, who has already taken aggressive steps to root out corruption.

<P> But, says Ms. Hunter, "this is not a positive development because it shows that parliamentary democracy failed in Pakistan." Almost all of the US's diplomatic conflicts this century have been with nondemocratic countries.

<P> Deepa Ollapally, an analyst at the Washington-based Institute for Peace, says the biggest problem with Musharraf is that he is a soldier and may be likely to settle confrontations through military force, not diplomacy.

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct1999/s19991020kashmiri.htm
RETURN TO TOP

<P>Washington Post

October 20, 1999

Pg. 23

<P>Kashmiri Rebels Press Pakistan For Help

<P>By Pamela Constable, Washington Post Foreign Service

<P> ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Oct. 19Islamic guerrilla groups fighting in Indian Kashmir have welcomed the "moral, political and diplomatic support" offered by Pakistan's new military ruler for the Kashmiri pro-independence movement, but some are demanding a commitment of weapons and money as they intensify their rebellion.

<P> "Every leader in Pakistan says they will support us diplomatically. We need one that will support us militarily. This is not real support," said Abdullah Muntazir, spokesman for the Lashkar-e-Taiba group, one of about a dozen armed organizations fighting against Indian forces in the disputed Himalayan border region.

<P> Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a bloodless coup last week, on Sunday pledged his unflinching support for the Kashmiri independence movement.

<P> But in a nationally televised address, Musharraf volunteered to withdraw some troops from the India-Pakistan border away from Kashmir and said he hoped to resume stalled negotiations with India about the future of the region. He made no mention of the Islamic guerrilla groups.

<P> Musharraf's handling of the explosive Kashmir issue will be closely watched abroad as India's and Pakistan's friends in the West, especially the United States, judge whether the general is sincere in his pledge to try to reduce tensions.

<P> As armed forces chief under now-deposed prime minister Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf sent Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces into Indian Kashmir last spring, triggering a 10-week conflict with India in the remote Kargil mountains that ended in July when Sharif withdrew the troops.

<P> The military leadership considered the withdrawal a humiliation, and it was one of the factors that apparently led to Musharraf's decision to topple Sharif on Oct. 12.

<P> Musharraf's more conciliatory tone since assuming power has disappointed the guerrillas, who since the withdrawal from the Kargil region have increased their campaign of violent sabotage in India's Kashmir Valley.

<P> The leaders of a guerrilla coalition here, the United Jihad Council, warned the new military government against being swayed by "internal or foreign intrigues." Muntazir said his organization strongly opposes any negotiations with India, unless the armed Kashmiri groups are allowed to participate.

<P> "If Musharraf thinks dialogue is the solution, he is welcome to try," he said. "But we believe the only solution to Kashmir is jihad," or holy war.

<P> Kashmir is divided between India and Pakistan, and both countries claim the region as their own. In 1990, Kashmiri guerrillas began battling security forces in Indian Kashmir, but by 1997 the insurgency had been largely crushed. Following Sharif's decision in July to pull both Pakistani military forces and guerrilla groups back from the conflict, the Pakistan-based guerrillas shifted their campaign to the Kashmir Valley and began recruiting local Kashmiris again.

<P> "This has been a very good year for us. The entire Kashmir Valley has become a battlefield now," Syed Salahuddin, leader of both the Hizbul Mujaheddin guerrilla group and the United Jihad Council, said in a recent interview. "We believe the solution to our problems is the gun, and we will continue to take the last drop of Kashmiri blood."

<P> More than 350 people have died in guerrilla attacks in Indian Kashmir since early September, when parliamentary elections were held there over several weekends. One candidate was shot to death, others had their cars blown up by mines and numerous police stations and army patrols were assaulted with grenades or automatic weapons.

<P> Both Muntazir's and Salahuddin's offices keep careful records of each attack--Muntazir's in a leather bound diary, Salahuddin's in a computer. They regard each incident as another step in their strategy to destabilize India, spread conservative Islam, undermine Indian democracy and ultimately free Kashmir and unite it with Pakistan.

<P> "Our rate of actions is 100 times what it was a year ago," said Muntazir, 24, a slender and soft-spoken man, ticking off the number of police stations attacked, Indians wounded and "mujaheddin martyred," or guerrilla fighters killed. "We have no problems with weapons or manpower now, and we have met our infiltration targets. The people are as helpful to us as they were in the early 1990s. It is all due to the help of Allah," the God of Islam.

<P> Despite their lethal agenda, both groups claim that they are sure to avoid attacking civilians. In recent weeks, there have been a series of attacks in Kashmir on movie theaters, video parlors and cable TV offices, which Islamic extremists view as indecent entertainment. But both Muntazir and Salahuddin denied their organizations were responsible.

<P> "This is entirely against our code of conduct," said Salahuddin, 50, a bearded Muslim cleric who once ran for political office in Kashmir but became embittered by allegedly rigged elections in 1987 and founded Hizbul. "We are a legitimate freedom movement, and we do not want to be stigmatized with the terrorist label."

<P> Yet according to their chilling logic, anyone who participated in India's electoral process, which they view as a fraud, is susceptible to attack. During the campaign in Kashmir, posters were seen warning people against voting or they would face "dire consequences."

<P> Muntazir said last week's military takeover in Pakistan is proof that "Western-imposed democracy is not the answer" for either Pakistan or India. But he added that military rule is "not the answer either. The only solution is the full implementation of Islam."

<P> Muntazir said he did not know anything about attacks on political candidates in Kashmir, but he issued a warning for the future. "We have our own hit list," he said, listing the heads of all security forces in Indian Kashmir and adding the name of its civilian chief minister, Farooq Abdullah. "We will try our best to kill him, and with the help of Allah, we will succeed."


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<P>USA Today

October 19, 1999

Pg. 11

<P>Indonesian Military Is Down, But Nowhere Near Being Out

<P>By Julie Schmit and Joe Leahy, USA Today

<P> JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Student leader Ali Yusuf, 22, has strong words for Indonesia's powerful military.

<P> "We totally reject it," the reform-minded activist says. "The Indonesia we want in the future is an Indonesia that is free of violence and of military rule."

<P> Today, the Indonesia that Yusuf seeks is closer to reality than it has been in decades. But it is still far away.

<P> Indonesia will elect a president Wednesday in its most democratic process in 44 years, a process that started last year with the forced resignation of President Suharto, who ruled for 32 years.

<P> But no matter who has the top job in Indonesia, he or she will have to deal with a military that is firmly entrenched in the nation's political and economic landscape and which remains an obstacle to Indonesia's full transition from totalitarian rule to democracy.

<P> "They don't want to be seen as being in power, but they still want to hold power," says Blair King, Indonesia expert for the Washington, D.C.-based National Democratic Institute.

<P> The military is omnipresent in Indonesia. Its leaders own business assets -- from timber to hotels -- worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

<P> The military has 38 seats in the 700-member People's Consultative Assembly, which will choose the president. It has positions throughout government, down to the village level.

<P> Its chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, 52, is considered one of Indonesia's most powerful people.

<P> On Monday, Wiranto weakened the candidacy of incumbent President B.J. Habibie by refusing to commit to be his vice president. Wiranto said he prefers to concentrate on security matters. Indonesia's military has been accused of kidnapping government critics, killing political activists and aiding pro-Indonesia militias in a reign of violence in the territory of East Timor, which voted Aug. 30 for independence from Indonesia.

<P> President Clinton cut ties with the military to protest its conduct in East Timor.

<P> Still, it is often held up as the only force capable of holding Indonesia together. The economy is weak, and numerous provinces are agitating for independence.

<P> Facing potentially explosive times, no president can afford to isolate the military, says Andi Mallarangeng, one of the drafters of Indonesia's new election laws. "We don't want the same situation as Pakistan," he says.

<P> Pakistan's military overthrew the government last week in a bloodless coup.

<P> The Indonesian military's power has waned since Suharto's downfall. When Habibie went before parliament on Thursday to defend his presidency, he was met with accusations that human rights abuses by the military were going unpunished. Such a challenge to the military would have been unheard of a couple of years ago.

<P> The military has suffered in other ways:

<P> -- Fewer political positions. Indonesia's new election rules give the military 38 of the 700 seats in the assembly. In the past, the military had 75 seats. Proposals may take away all the military seats by the next presidential election, in 2004.

<P> -- Setting the agenda. Last month, in a rare move, a new law giving the military sweeping powers to curtail civil protests was apparently pulled back in response to student-led protests.

<P> -- A tarnished image. In East Timor, the military was virtually forced

to withdraw under a cloud of suspicion as an international peacekeeping force moved in to quell violence. "It was a massive humiliation," says Harold Crouch of Australia National University.

<P> A first step for improving the military's image would be to curb corruption by raising salaries, Australian defense expert Bob Lowry says.

<P> "(Reform) is going to be a long and difficult process," Lowry says. "It's not just a matter of giving an order."


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<P>South China Morning Post

October 19, 1999

<P>Japan Vows To Bail Out Landmine Agency

<P>By Agencies in Phnom Penh

<P> Japan has pledged to bail out Cambodia's scandal-plagued mine-clearance agency with a US\$900,000 donation, a Japanese Embassy official said yesterday.

<P> The funding promise comes after the Cambodian Mine Action Centre warned

it would temporarily shut down if foreign donors did not release funds that were suspended after a corruption scandal rocked the government-run agency.

<P> "I hope the funds will be available very soon," Japanese Embassy First Secretary Toshihiko Horiuchi said.

<P> The donation should be enough to pull the organisation out of financial crisis, centre officials told yesterday's Cambodia Daily edition.

<P> Cambodia ranks among the world's most mine-infested countries, with an estimated four million to six million mines buried within its borders from three decades of civil war and strife, claiming about 100 casualties a month.

<P> The centre - charged with clearing former battlefields for the benefit of the landless poor - relies on foreign aid for 92 per cent of its US\$12 million annual budget.

<P> Leading donors - including the United States, Australia and Denmark - froze funding to the centre this year after reports of widespread corruption.

<P> Internal reports written by disgruntled foreign advisers accused the centre of turning over a significant amount of land to wealthy businessmen and the military. In one reported case, US\$500,000 was spent on a plantation owned by a former Khmer Rouge guerilla wanted for the 1994 murders of three Western backpackers.

<P> Donors demanded widespread reform before releasing more funds, but the centre was slow to react and many donor nations' financial years expired before the bulk of conditions were met.

<P> An independent financial audit completed last month found no evidence that donor funds were stolen, but discovered serious financial management problems.

<P> Mr Horiuchi said the audit's results were "good enough" for the Japanese to make the new donation.

<P> Meanwhile, Jordan's Queen Noor called yesterday for nationwide rehabilitation and training for Cambodian landmine victims, saying a private pilot programme had brought "hope and great faith" to casualties.

<P> Queen Noor toured a rehabilitation centre in Kien Khleung, just outside

Phnom Penh, and later met Prime Minister Hun Sen on the second day of a visit promoting humanitarian relief for mine victims.

<P> "We are very impressed by the collaboration of so many non-governmental organisations and the Government [of Cambodia] in making a model project that I hope one day will be in every province in this country," the queen said.

<P> She is visiting the region as patron of the Landmine Survivors Network. During their meeting Mr Hun Sen announced plans to re-train thousands of soon-to-be demobilised military personnel to work for the mine centre, said Ieng Sopha, Mr Hun Sen's personal assistant.

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<P>Dallas Morning News

October 19, 1999

<P>U.S. Optimistic About Pakistani Coup Leader

<I><P>Officials believe military uprising was provoked; general's first comments bear moderate markings

</I><P>By Nomi Morris, Knight Ridder Newspapers

<P> ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - Army Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf may wear camouflage fatigues and have seized power in a military coup, but U.S. officials say they believe Pakistan's new ruler is someone Washington can work with.

<P> "We are confident General Musharraf is a moderate man who is acting out of patriotic motivation and was provoked into doing what he is doing," U.S. Ambassador William B. Milam said Monday. "I don't believe he is an extremist. I think he is the opposite."

<P> Gen. Musharraf seemed to be trying to cultivate just that image Monday when he spoke to the news media for the first time since seizing power in a bloodless coup Oct. 12.

<P> The general appeared relaxed at his whitewashed bungalow in Islamabad's twin city, Rawalpindi. He wore civilian clothes - a short-sleeve shirt and slacks - and gathered his whole family, including two Pekingese dogs named Buddy and Dot, for a 15-minute session with a small group of photographers.

<P> While pledging to fight for the independence of disputed Kashmir, he has offered an olive branch to India - a fellow nuclear power - by asking for dialogue, and he began a partial withdrawal of troops Monday from their common border.

<P> Gen. Musharraf, 56, seemed buoyed by the tolerance toward the coup in Washington and other capitals.

<P> "I have been encouraged by the reaction of the international community," he said. "They seem to understand that we are facing huge problems here and had to act."

<P> However, the foreign ministers of the Commonwealth nations, led by Britain and Canada - suspended Pakistan's membership Monday in that organization of one-time British possessions.

<P> Gen. Musharraf put elected but unpopular Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif under house arrest a week ago, after Mr. Sharif tried to sack him while the general was in Sri Lanka. Gen. Musharraf subsequently declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, dismissed Parliament and named himself "chief executive" subject to no higher authority.

<P> Gen. Musharraf said Monday that he would announce his interim Cabinet "in a few days."

<P> "The delay has not been due to indecision," he said. "The delay has been

n due to getting the right people."

<P> Envoy's unease

<P> Mr. Milam, the U.S. envoy, acknowledged his discomfort at the way Gen. Musharraf came to office and said he would closely monitor his progress on promised reforms in coming months.

<P> He said that Gen. Musharraf must advance a program of political and economic reform, respect human rights in his crackdown on corrupt politicians, and give a time line for Pakistan's return to democratic rule if he wants Washington to use its influence with international financial institutions.

<P> He also suggested that Gen. Musharraf's performance will help determine whether President Clinton stops in Pakistan when he visits South Asia next year.

<P> Gen. Musharraf said that restoring accountability in what had become a corrupt political system is the key to Pakistan's future.

<P> "We will start at the top and work down," he said, referring to investigations of the nation's elite. "Nobody is out of the ring. A thorough cleansing of the nation is what is required."

<P> Mr. Milam said he believes the general is sincere in his desire to get Pakistan's economy and political life back on track.

<P> "I've known him since he became chief of staff," said Mr. Milam, calling Gen. Musharraf a man of "rectitude and patriotism."

<P> In particular, Gen. Musharraf's comments on Afghanistan during his speech to the nation Sunday encouraged those in the U.S. administration who hope Pakistan will use its influence with the fundamentalist Taliban regime.

<P> Promising sign?

<P> Washington sees the Pakistani-Afghan relationship as important in the fight against terrorism and drugs - and in winning the extradition from Afghanistan of Osama bin Laden, the expatriate Saudi Arabian multimillionaire accused of masterminding last year's U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

<P> In his speech, Gen. Musharraf called for "representative government" in

Afghanistan.

<P> "This is new. This is good and welcome," Mr. Milam said. "You can infer that if there were a representative government in Afghanistan, it wouldn't be harboring terrorists."

<P> Those who know Gen. Musharraf say that he is a modern, liberal, straightforward soldier who has been well-liked by both superiors and subordinates in the army. He is said to have a good sense of humor, to like golf, dancing and Western music, and to have recently taken up playing squash.

<P> His former commander, Lt. Gen. Farrakh Khan, said Gen. Musharraf has no political ambitions and is neither nationalist nor Islamist in his orientation

<P> "As for the finger on the nuclear trigger," Lt. Gen. Khan said, "I'd leave it more easily in his hands than anyone else we've seen in the last 10 years."

<P> That does not mean Gen. Musharraf is pro-Western, nor that he will do Washington's bidding, Lt. Gen. Khan and others said.


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<P>Long Island Newsday

October 18, 1999

Pg. 14

<P>Showing Mubarak's Muscle

<I><P>Will Egypt's campaign against Islamic terrorists back fire?

</I><P>By Matthew McAllester, Middle East Correspondent

<P> Cairo-Ghada Abdel Aziz and her family woke the morning after an assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak to the sound of the Egyptian government showing who was in charge.

<P> Car engines revved and men's voices blared on the usually quiet Abdel Wudood Street. Aziz looked outside and saw about 40 armed police officers.

<P> "Everyone stay inside and close your blinds," shouted the police in the dusty, narrow street in the poor Omraniya district of Giza, just south of the Pyramids. Aziz closed her blinds but continued to peek at the officers who concentrated their attention on a house four doors away.

<P> Then the shooting started.

<P> Minutes later it was over, and the police led several young men with their shirts pulled over their heads out of the student boarding house. Later, the police carried out the bodies of four men, along with the weapons the young men had kept in the house.

<P> The shootout with suspected members of the terrorist group known as the Islamic Group, or the Gama'a al-Islamiya, was only the second reported incident of conflict between the group and the Egyptian security forces since the Gama'a leadership announced a unilateral ceasefire a year ago. While the Egyptian government insisted there was no connection between the man who attacked Mubarak on Sept. 6 and the Gama'a, some Egyptian analysts suggest that foiled attack prompted the government's dramatic show of force to demonstrate Mubarak was still very much in control.

<P> As an unintended consequence, however, the government's action has resurrected the reputation of the Gama'a after a year in which the terrorist movement -militarily defeated, internally split and politically marginalized -was almost completely absent from Egyptian politics. The extremist splinter groups of the

deflated organization that only a few years ago was waging a violent war to replace Egypt's secular government with an Islamic state, have come back into view.

<P> "There are circles of units without leadership, without orders, without a network," said Baher Shaihy Abed al-Moniem, a researcher at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. "Therefore they have to care about their own needs and survival, stealing to feed themselves and avoiding the crackdown. That's led them to become more extremist. They do not recognize the ceasefire. Even after the military wing of the Gama'a accepted the ceasefire, some cells did not, and they acted against it and there are now some small fanatical cells acting on their own." Al-Moniem estimated there are perhaps only three or four active terrorist cells left, each with between three and six members.

<P> Neither Al-Moniem or any other observer of the Gama'a believes that the cells pose anything near to the threat represented by the thousands of organized members of the group during the early and mid-1990s. Many of those members are in prison or overseas, and most have accepted the ceasefire.

<P> "They are themselves calling it a crisis," said Mohamed Salah, a journalist with the London-based Al Hayat newspaper, who closely covers the Islamist groups Gama'a, Islamic Jihad and the banned political party the Muslim Brotherhood. "If they rely on themselves to rebuild they will need a long time, not less than 10 years. At the same time, an individual operation is always possible." Two major factors are responsible for the nearly broken state of the Gama'a, analysts say. Through enormous intelligence and security efforts, Egypt and Western governments have almost completely defeated the group, imprisoning thousands, disrupting sources of funding and pressuring previously supportive governments in countries like Sudan to sever ties with the Islamists.

<P> The second reason for the demise of the Islamists' activity in Egypt is their internal divisions and splits, caused in part by the military defeat. "The real danger to their survival is that they have become divided," Salah said.

<P> One sign of these internal ruptures was the staggered way in which the different elements of the movement—the prisoners, the overseas leaders and those still at large in Egypt—agreed to the ceasefire.

<P> Last week, those divisions surfaced again when the leader of the military wing of the Gama'a, Rifai Ahmed Taha, who is believed to be in Afghanistan, sent an e-mail to the Arabic language newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, which the paper published. While not explicitly encouraging new attacks, Taha wrote that Muslims should "tighten and concentrate the strategy of hostility toward the United States." He also wrote: "The Islamic movement does not claim to be superior to the United States in terms of material potential, but it is stronger in terms of its solid will and clarity of targets." If the Gama'a had one thing going in i

ts bid to establish an Islamic state, it was significant support among the millions of the country's poor. Even that seems to have vanished, especially in the wake of the massacre of 58 tourists and four Egyptians at Luxor in 1997. That attack led to a hemorrhage in the tourist trade, which is a vital part of Egypt's economy.

<P> "Any attack on tourists affects all Egyptians, and it affects me personally," said Said Kemel, 33, who owns a cafe in Omraniya. "These people don't understand Islam. They are criminals. To be Islamic is just to be concerned with the word of God and the Prophet. These people, all they know is to disrupt the politics of the nation." Some of the Islamists want to be politically legal, but so far, the government has refused to allow factions of the Gama'a or the smaller Islamic Jihad group to set up political parties.

<P> Al-Moniem considers this a tactical error.

<P> "It would give the government an unprecedented opportunity to contain the Islamist movement," he said. "The Islamists might gain a substantial amount in parliament if there were free elections, but would they have a majority? No.

<P> "But it won't happen. The state feels it has the upper hand now, so why give concessions?" The main danger of not bringing the Islamists into the political fold is that the small and increasingly extremist cells, like the one eradicated last month, will only become more aggrieved at their disenfranchisement, analysts say. At times, violence becomes the only way to gain attention.

<P> "I wouldn't say they are finished," said Abdel Monem Said, director of the Al Ahram Center. "I would say they are curtailed. They are destroyed structurally and organizationally but they still have the capacity for violence. There's a sense that we should be alert because they can cause a lot of damage with minimum cost. Luxor happened after two years in which they were extremely in the decline. That one event cost us a whole year of tourism."


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<P>Defense News

October 25, 1999

Pg. 6

<P>Russia To Emphasize Replenishing Spy Satellite Fleet

<P>By Simon Saradzhyan, Defense News Correspondent

<P> MOSCOW -- The Russian government will make spy satellites a priority in its next annual procurement plan to boost the flow of information to Russian armed forces involved in local conflicts like the one in Chechnya, officials said.

<P> Zinovii Pak, director of the Russian federal government's ammunition agency, told reporters Oct. 6 that the government will procure more high-precision weaponry, as well as spy satellites to provide data for ground troops. He did not elaborate.

<P> Reached by telephone, an officer at the office of the Defense Ministry's armament chief confirmed that his agency hopes to get more funds in the 2000 procurement budget to order spy satellites.

<P> The officer, who asked not to be identified, said there is a need to replenish Russia's aging fleet of military satellites with new intelligence spacecraft. "There is a substantial need for such satellites in some conflicts," such as the one that Russian troops are fighting in the country's separatist province of Chechnya, he said.

<P> The officer noted, however, that it remains unclear exactly how much will be allocated for procurement of such spacecraft and how many of them could be procured.

<P> The federal government already has revised the draft of the 2000 defense

e budget to boost it from 110 billion to 140 billion rubles (\$4.26 billion to \$5.42 billion), Alexander Zhukov, chairman of the State Duma's budget and finance committee told reporters in early October.

<P> The 2000 federal budget draft, which already has been rejected by the lower chamber once and is to be resubmitted, does not specify what funds will be allocated for procurement of what weaponry. The State Duma's defense committee chief, Roman Popkovich, already has demanded that the federal government specify exactly what will be procured.

<P> An officer at the Moscow area headquarters of Russia's Strategic Missile Force, which operates Russia's military satellites, said in a telephone interview that his force would welcome allocation of funds for procurement of intelligence satellites.

<P> Of the 130 Russian spacecraft orbiting Earth, 60 percent are used for defense and security, according to Lt. Gen. Valery Grin, deputy commander of the Strategic Missile Force, who responded in writing to a Defense News inquiry. More than 70 percent of spacecraft and ground technical facilities already have passed their guaranteed life spans, Grin said.

<P> The exact number and designation of Russia's military satellites is classified, but experts say only one of them is capable of flying over Chechnya to provide visual information to ground troops.

<P> This satellite is not capable of maintaining a data link with the federal forces in Chechnya and, thus, cannot provide the operations of Russian warplanes and artillery with up-to-the-minute information about the highly mobile and compact units of Chechen rebels, according to Pavel Podvig, military space expert with the Moscow-based Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies.

<P> Podvig said the Russian armed forces should not only procure new spy satellites, but also order development of an entire integrated system that will allow ground troops and aviation to maintain constant data links with those satellites.

<P> "Without such a system, visual intelligence satellites will produce pretty pictures, which would be of no use," he said in a telephone interview.

<P> Podvig also noted, however, that Russian armed forces do not really need satellites to carry out intelligence missions over Chechnya. "Chechens do not have any substantial air defense capabilities, so aircraft can do this [reconnaissance] job even better over this province," he said.

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<P>London Daily Telegraph

October 20, 1999

<P>PR Setback For Moscow's Media Tour Of Chechen War

<P>By Marcus Warren in Gerzel on the Chechen-Dagestan border

<P> RUSSIA'S media minister yesterday brushed aside military qualms by taking a group of foreign correspondents to the front line in Chechnya in the hope of getting good press for the Russian invasion that began in August.

<P> Mikhail Lesin was worried that the world was misinformed about the war in Chechnya, and put himself at our complete disposal. Only a Kremlin insider such as Mr Lesin could have prevailed over the military and laid on an unprecedented front-line trip for a group of Western journalists. Only he could have arranged half a dozen helicopters to ferry us into the hills bordering Chechnya.

<P> Not only did he want to be our genial host in Russian-held territory, he was urging us to travel into Chechen-controlled Chechnya as well. The plan went something like this: we would be met by representatives of Salim Yamadayev, a "friendly" warlord, escorted to the town of Gudermes 15 miles away, and be returned safe and sound within three hours.

<P> Mr Lesin, a man skilled at PR, said: "If I were a journalist, I would go. But my position means I can't." This was supposed to be our chance to see phase two of Russia's operation to destroy what it calls Islamic "terrorists" in Chechnya.

<P> Moscow claims to have completed building a "security zone" in and around Chechnya. A new tactic is to encourage Chechens to take up the struggle against "bandits" themselves. Little is known about Mr Yamadayev, except that he is based in Gudermes, hostile to Islamic fundamentalists, and, therefore, a potential Russian ally.

<P> But our journey to see him in his lair had to be put off. This was because of the alleged sighting nearby of men from Arbi Barayev, king of the Chechen kidnappers. He is accused of ordering the execution of four hostages - three Britons and New Zealander - whose heads were found on a roadside in Chechnya last December. The trip was now off.

<P> "Well, that takes care of that," said Mr Lesin, as we waited at Gerzel on the Chechnya-Dagestan border. There was little left to do but admire the view and listen to the rumble of guns. Russia has shut all Chechen border crossings, except a few to the west, forcing more than 150,000 refugees from the fighting to stream into neighbouring Ingushetia.

<P> If we could not travel to see Russia's allies inside Chechnya, they were to come to see us. They drove up for a brief encounter in the form of the Mufti of Chechnya, plus bodyguards.

<P> He was now an ex-Mufti, after being dismissed for being too close to Moscow. "I would like our republic to be free of all war and bandits," said Ahmed Kadirov, when asked what Chechnya's status in Russia should be. "That is what I call real freedom."

<P> Mr Lesin said: "Our information is that the Chechens are trying to clear their territory of bandits themselves. There are real signs that there are Chechens who want to deal with this problem."

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Baltimore Sun

October 19, 1999

Soviet Emigre Says He Spied For KGB In Latvia And Israel

JERUSALEM -- An immigrant from the former Soviet Union who worked as a technician at an Israeli air force base pleaded guilty yesterday to passing military secrets to the KGB for 18 years.

Valery Kaminsky, 54, admitted spying on the Jewish community in Riga, Latvia, before he emigrated in 1977 and afterward, until 1993.

Kaminsky's lawyer, Sassi Gez, told the court her client had been pressured into working for the KGB in return for permission to emigrate.

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

October 20, 1999

<P>Non-Proliferation On The Way Out?

<I><P>Andrew Koch examines the perilous process of trying to shape the future of strategic arms control for Russia and the USA

</I><P> The USA's body politic is in the midst of addressing three fundamental arms control treaties that could well shape the near-term future of US-Russian relations and the direction of international nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

<P> While the Clinton Administration continues discussions with Russia over possible amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the content of a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), the US Senate briefly considered, then postponed, a vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

<P> One driving factor behind the increased focus on arms control issues is the looming US decision on whether, and in what configuration, to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. American officials have repeatedly said they need an NMD system to guard against a limited strategic ballistic missile attack, which could be precipitated by an accidental launch or action by an undetected enemy state.

<P> A decision to deploy an NMD system is scheduled to be made in the June 2000 Deployment Readiness Review (DRR), although actual deployment would take several more years.

<P> The Clinton administration favours a phased approach to NMD deployment, believing that initially fielding a limited system is less expensive, technically more feasible, and has a greater possibility of gaining Russian approval than a decision to deploy a larger system.

<P> Under the current Capability-1 [C1] plan, the USA would initially deploy about 20 interceptor missiles at a single site in Alaska that could defend against five ballistic missiles fired without countermeasures or penetration aids. The plan allows for the USA to increase the system's capability to address more incoming missiles or systems using simple countermeasures if necessary. Th

e upgraded system would include basing more interceptors in Alaska or at a second site, as well as building additional ground-based radar, X-band radar, early warning radar, improved Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications, and space-based sensors.

<P> A decision to deploy NMD, however, requires either modifying or abrogating the ABM treaty, which has long been considered the linchpin of strategic nuclear stability. While US Congressional Republican leaders argue that the ABM treaty is an anachronism left over from the Cold War and should be scrapped, the Clinton administration is attempting to retain the treaty by securing Russia's agreement to necessary modifications.

<P> In order for both the ABM treaty to be saved and a limited NMD system deployed, Moscow would have to agree to amend the treaty and allow for country-wide defence [versus a single site or capital] against a limited ballistic missile attack. Russia would also have to permit the USA to switch its designated interceptor site from Grand Forks, North Dakota, to Alaska. Though Washington has not announced a decision, it is leaning toward shifting its designated NMD site from Grand Forks to Alaska due to the latter's increased ability to defend against a North Korea ballistic missile threat.

<P> Securing Moscow's consent for these changes, however, will be no easy task. Russian leaders have taken a hard-line negotiating strategy, refusing even to discuss potential modifications. The Russian military in particular is believed to be opposed to the negotiations at all costs.

<P> In a recent statement, Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev, the head of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces, threatened that Russia could withdraw from other arms control pacts and increase its nuclear stockpile if the USA abrogates the ABM treaty.

<P> "All agreements that have been signed or prepared will come under threat namely START I, START II, and consultations for START III," Yakovlev warned.

<P> A recent Russian Foreign Ministry statement went even further, calling the first test of NMD-related technology, conducted on 2 October 1999, a violation of the treaty. Though these statements may be posturing for domestic political consumption, the underlying forces they represent cannot be ignored out of hand.

<P> Moscow's concerns centre not on the initial C1 NMD deployment, but rather on Washington's future intentions. Russia fears that once the USA begins building a missile defence system, it will inevitably want to incorporate upgrades and increased capability as the technology matures. If those upgrades include space-based sensors, a network of early warning radar, and a number of other sensors as currently envisioned, it could give the USA the infrastructure to qu

ically build a robust NMD system capable of negating Russia's second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability. Were the USA to decide that it wished to withdraw from the ABM treaty in this "breakout" scenario, Moscow's strategic forces, like its conventional forces, could be put at a significant disadvantage vis-a-vis the USA.

<P> The Clinton Administration is investigating a number of enticements and options to mitigate these Russian concerns. The USA has assumed that Russia desperately needs to reduce its nuclear arsenal for financial reasons and could be willing to make a deal. Gen Antoly Sitnov, the Russian military's head of procurement, seemed to support this view in a recent announcement when he said that Russia had eight years to replace its entire nuclear arsenal before it became obsolete.

<P> "The resources of Russia's nuclear weapons are strictly limited and run out in 2007," Sitnov said, adding "by then, we will need a full replacement of ground and naval components of the strategic nuclear forces".

<P> Therefore, the administration believes, Moscow could be willing to negotiate changes to the ABM treaty in exchange for locking-in US nuclear forces at lower but equivalent levels to Russia under START III. Without such an agreement, Moscow could be facing overwhelming US nuclear superiority as early as the next decade.

<P> The issue of a straight START III for ABM modification deal is further complicated, however, by the continued US insistence that no formal negotiations on a new treaty can be held until the Russian parliament, the Duma ratifies START II. Washington has noted that an agreement could be reached shortly thereafter.

<P> The Duma has not ratified the START II accord for a number of domestic and international political reasons, and insists instead on moving directly to lower numbers of nuclear weapons under a new START III agreement. START II calls for Russia and the USA to cut their nuclear warheads from about 6,000 to 3,500 each by 2007, while US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed in 1997 that START III's overall ceiling would be 2,000-2,500 warheads. Even those lower numbers do not represent a large enough reduction in nuclear forces for Moscow, whose arsenal could shrink to no more than 1,500 warheads (and more likely 1,000) within the next decade.

<P> In order for the START III agreement to be made appealing to Moscow, it must address the question of an 'up-load' potential gap. Due to the structure of START II, Washington has the ability to break out of the treaty and reload its nuclear forces back to pre-treaty levels much more quickly than Russia could, thereby placing Russia in a potentially inferior strategic position, at least temporarily. One approach being discussed to meet this challenge is for START III to subject warheads, and not just launchers, to verifiable dismantling and destruction, which would concurrently provide greater transparency than earlier

r pacts.

<P> The USA may also offer Russia relief from one of the most contentious provisions of START II, namely that its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) must carry a single warhead.

<P> With Russia's ICBM fleet quickly approaching retirement, Moscow will be forced either to break that provision or spend larger amounts of scarce capital building more new missiles. To overcome the problem, US Defense Secretary William Cohen told Jane's Defence Weekly that the USA would consider allowing Russian road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27) ICBMs to carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), but noted that Russia had not yet made such a proposal. Russia has been developing the Topol-M to replace its ageing land-based deterrent force, but to date has deployed only 10. According to Stanford University's Dean Wilkening, re-MIRVing road-mobile land-based ICBMs could be a stabilising factor if it increases Russia's survivable second-strike arsenal. MIRVing the Topol-M would also provide Russia with the ability to overcome even a robust NMD system, giving Moscow greater confidence that the USA cannot gain the capability to mitigate its nuclear deterrent.

<P> The Clinton Administration has further proposed offering increased transparency and creative confidence-building measures with regard to NMD, including sharing of early warning data. Some Russian leaders, including Roman Popkovich, head of the Russian Duma's Defense Committee, have said that although they oppose changes to the ABM treaty, modifications could be discussed if the USA makes its NMD plans more transparent.

<P> Simply sharing early warning data, however, will probably not be sufficient to entice Moscow, which may desire greater levels of military co-operation. According to several US-based defense analysts, the Clinton Administration is considering offering Russia missile defence co-operation as a key enticement for agreeing to modify the ABM treaty. If Russia accepted 'buying into' US missile defence technology, it would be included in the NMD efforts and could be allowed to produce components for the system. Though numerous sources said this proposal was being discussed, a US State Department spokesman recently said that sharing the entire missile defence system is not, nor ever was, on the table.

<P> Although sharing missile defence technology may be sufficient to secure Moscow's co-operation, it would face several difficult political challenges. First, the continued levels of mistrust in Moscow and Washington could lead to political and technical barriers being raised to the open sharing of sensitive technologies such an arrangement would require. Moreover, approval for changes to the ABM treaty would require the consent of the Republican-controlled US Senate. That consent would be highly unlikely if the deal involved sharing sensitive technology with Moscow. A similar reaction could be expected from the Russian Duma.

<P> Though realising that the negotiation processes will be fraught with p

olitical difficulties, the Clinton Administration has remained optimistic about its chances. Cohen told JDW that while he "didn't expect any major breakthroughs," on an ABM agreement soon, "I'm more optimistic than pessimistic. I think we can persuade them."

<P> The administration believes that, though a bitter pill to swallow, Moscow will soon realise the USA is going to build an NMD system with or without its blessing and it would, therefore, be better off negotiating some constraints on that system than none at all. The strong support shown for an NMD system by Republican Congressional leaders and candidates for the 2000 presidential elections underscores the dilemma Moscow is facing, administration officials said.

<P> Despite Washington's optimism, however, it appears unlikely that an agreement on ABM or START III will be finalised soon and a number of political factors threaten the negotiations. First, many Russian politicians believe the USA has repeatedly lied about its future intentions and deeply mistrust Washington's ultimate goal. This view is upheld by the perception that Washington reneged on numerous past commitments, including a firm pledge that NATO would not expand following German re-unification and a promise, prior to the Kosovo conflict, that NATO was exclusively a defensive alliance.

<P> Moreover, the prevailing Russian view notes that even if the Clinton Administration is serious about abiding by its commitments and saving the ABM, that government has only one more year in office and there is no guarantee the next president would follow a similar policy. As noted above, several Republican presidential candidates have said they would scrap the ABM if they were elected and Congressional Republican leaders have repeatedly argued that the USA should build as robust an NMD system as technically achievable, irrespective of its cost and effects on relations with Russia and China.

<P> Any amendments to the ABM treaty would have to be approved by the US Senate, and the chances the Republican-controlled body would agree to anything but full NMD deployment are unlikely. According to Republican Congressional sources, a two-site NMD system with space-based warning sensors and increased radar, would have to be deployed, at a minimum; precisely the infrastructure for the later "breakout" Russia fears.

<P> Some independent experts are not convinced that a Russian government will ever agree to modify the ABM. Nikolai Sokov of the Monterey Institute said "I don't see a deal that is feasible [on the ABM] no matter what the US says."

<P> Others believe that while a deal is possible it would have to wait until after Russia's presidential elections next summer. That would be too late for the June 2000 DRR and would delay serious negotiations until the final months of the Clinton presidency.

<P> Even if a deal were reached, it would face stiff opposition in both co

untries' more hawkish legislatures. As the Carnegie Endowment's Joe Cirincione noted, one remaining option would be for Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton to sign some form of executive agreement on the topic that did not require legislative approval. Such a deal, Cirincione said, would follow "Clinton's typical muddling-through approach " to foreign policy by "kicking the can down the road," in effect delaying a showdown until a future date.

<P> Though not an ideal solution, administration officials said they would prefer that outcome to outright abrogation of the ABM treaty. Noting the potentially disastrous repercussions for US-Russian relations, they pointed to statements by Russian military officers such as Gen Yakovlev who said Russia could retaliate by re-MIRVing its Topol ICBMs and withdrawing most forms of international security co-operation.

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

October 20, 1999

<P>Russia To Base Su-24 Fencer Bombers In Ukraine

<P> Russia will base 20 Su-24 (NATO codename Fencer) tactical bombers at Gvardeyskoye air base near Simferopol on the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine, following the conclusion of two years of negotiations between the two countries.

<P> Ukraine feared the aircraft would carry nuclear weapons but negotiations agreed that all the aircraft stationed in the Crimea will pass inspection by Ukrainian experts to make sure that nuclear weapon-carrying equipment has been removed.

<P> The aircraft are expected to arrive later this month, having spent more than a year at Anapa airfield in Russia, 250km from Simferopol. Russia, which leased Gvardeyskoye from Ukraine following the division of the Black Sea Fleet between the two countries, has the right to station 22 combat aircraft at the base. The 43rd Independent Naval Attack Aviation Squadron of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is currently stationed there. The unit formerly operated 22 Su-17M3 fighter aircraft but, following the end of their service life, pilots and technical staff were then trained for service with the new Su-24.

<I><P>- Piotr Butowski, JDW Correspondent </I>

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

October 20, 1999

<P>Russian Funds For Procurement Reallocated

<P> Russia is to redistribute defence procurement funds as a result of the continuing military operations against Chechnya.

<P> Although the development of its Strategic Nuclear Force (SNF) will remain Russia's top defence priority, more funds will be allocated to develop conventional forces.

<P> The procurement budget for conventional weapons will be more than doubled in the year 2000, according to Deputy Prime Minister Iliya Klebanov. By the end of this year the Russian Defence Ministry will receive an additional Rb4 billion (\$160 million) for conventional arms procurement and modernisation.

<P> Conventional arms due to be procured and supplied to the Federal force in the Northern Caucasus include advanced communications and night vision systems. These can be used by land forces and combat helicopters. Before year-end, the Federal force in the Northern Caucasus will receive 10 helicopters capable of operating day and night. These will include six Mil Mi-24 attack helicopters and four Mi-8 transport helicopters that will operate as part of an experimental combat group (ECG), which will provide direct support for the land forces and special anti-terrorist missions (Jane's Defence Weekly 8 September).

<P> To enforce tactical aerial reconnaissance, 23 Pchela-1T remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs) will be supplied before the end of the year. These will operate as part of the Stroy-P complex, airlifted to Chechnya. The RPVs may be also fitted with onboard night vision equipment.

<P> More financing will be provided for components of the Russian Strategic Missile Force (SMF) also destined for combat operations in Chechnya. According to Commander-in-Chief of the SMF, Gen Vladimir Yakovlev, steps will be taken to redistribute the funds among the three components of SMF: strike; space; and rocket-space defensive units. Russia is currently facing serious problems with its orbital satellite constellation. Some 72% of the Russian orbital constellation spacecraft have reached the end of their guaranteed service lives.

<I><P>-- Nikolai Novichkov, JDW Correspondent </I>

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<P>New York Times

October 20, 1999

<P>Penny Pinchers

<P>By Thomas L. Friedman

<P> You can think about the tug of war between the Republicans and President Clinton over the State Department's budget in a lot of ways. I prefer to think about it like this: Out of every dollar spent by the U.S. government each year, about one penny goes to pay for our embassies and diplomats abroad, democracy support programs, denuclearizing Russia, foreign loans and foreign aid. One penny. The Republicans now want to take that penny and cut it back more.

<P> One might have understood this if the U.S. economy were doing poorly or if the U.S. were not the keystone of the whole international system. And one might have understood this if the Republicans were acting out of some coherent global strategy. But they aren't. Rather, the Republicans' drive to cut the foreign operations budget by 15 percent, or \$2 billion, below what Mr. Clinton is seeking (He vetoed their budget Monday) is all part of a cheap gimmick led by the House majority whip, Tom DeLay, and his merry band of right-wing nuts, whose only guiding principle in world affairs is: "Dumb as we wanna be."

<P> Think about it for a second. What possible foreign policy strategy would prompt a Republican lawmaker to want to reduce by some \$300 million the amount of money the U.S. spends on its Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, which pays for taking apart Russian nukes and chemical weapons and employing Russian nuclear scientists in commercial fields so they won't go to work for Iran or Iraq?

<P> What possible foreign policy strategy would prompt him to want to reduce by 37 percent the funds the U.S. deposits in the global development banks, which are promoting capitalism in Africa and Latin America by lending to small businesses so they become America's customers?

<P> What possible foreign policy strategy would say, "Let's help Israelis a

nd Palestinians reach an agreement at Wye, but then not give them the money we promised to help them institute it -- even though we know, as Mr. Clinton said, that the cheapest Mideast war would cost us far more than the most expensive peace"?

<P> It's no wonder that pro-Israel lobbies on Capitol Hill are deeply distraught about where the Republican Party is heading today, since the G.O.P. seems determined to shrink the foreign operations budget. The Republican strategy is to silence the Jews by giving Israel its full foreign aid allotment (but not the Wye supplement), and cutting everyone else. But Jewish groups understand that this will only isolate Israel and eventually imperil its aid too.

<P> The fact is, DeLay & Co. have no adult supervision anymore. Republican internationalists like Bob Dole and Newt Gingrich are gone; Trent Lott and Dennis Hastert together don't add up to zero; George W. is still learning basic geography; and Ronald Reagan, who built up our foreign affairs budget because he knew how critical it was, is now a fading memory. The G.O.P. is now led by people with no sense of how important America is to the world, both as an example and as a stabilizer. Bill Clinton has made the Republicans crazy.

<P> So to embarrass Mr. Clinton, the Republicans have decided to pit the State Department budget against Social Security and to say that if you are for giving money to Ghana you are for taking it away from Grandma. The foreign operations budget, says Mr. DeLay, "will come straight out of the pockets of American seniors." Hogwash. There is no more direct connection between Social Security and foreign aid than there is between Social Security and the Marine Band.

<P> But who cares? As Representative Sonny Callahan said during the House debate, back home in Alabama "when I say, 'Folks, I voted against increasing foreign aid,' they seem to like that."

<P> Yes sir, I bet they do. But when the next Alabama exporter shows up in some country and needs help from the embassy commercial officer but the job has been cut; when the next U.S. embassy gets blown up because the world despises an America that tells everyone what to do but won't pay its U.N. dues; when a Russian-designed nuke shows up in Iran; when an environmental disaster in Mexico washes up on Alabama's shores, we'll see how much the people of Alabama like that.

<P> They might just say: "You mean we could have prevented this with just one penny out of every budget dollar, and we cut the penny? Who was the idiot who did that?"

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<P>Boston Globe

October 19, 1999

Pg. 19

<P>America Has Become A Danger To The World

<P>By James Carroll

<P> We hear a lot of talk about the heroic achievements of America's World War II generation. It takes nothing from the courage of those who threw themselves against the iron wall of Omaha Beach to praise that generation's equally courageous assault against the age-old logic of war nearly 30 years later. By then the youthful heroes of World War II were at the peak of power during the Cold War. Building on the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, they negotiated with the Soviet Union the myth-shattering Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and saved the future.

<P> The United States has recently taken unilateral steps away from that treaty, embracing the idea of a national missile defense system, which the treaty forbids. Americans are well into testing prototype weapons designed to shoot down incoming missiles. Russia has declared that the United States is already in violation of the treaty, "with all the negative consequences which that entails," as a Kremlin spokesman put it earlier this fall. Now comes news of the Clinton administration's pressure on Russia to accept a change in the treaty that would permit the United States to do what it is already doing.

<P> As last week's shocking Senate vote rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty indicates, the United States has turned away from a long-established bipartisan effort to reduce the threat of a nuclear war in favor of a strategy of preparing to win it. The treaties of the Cold War era that limited nuclear weapons are widely dismissed as obsolete, and even liberal Democrats accept the idea of a national missile defense system designed to protect against rogue nations and accidental launches. This shift undoes the unprecedented insight around which our parents' generation had boldly built the approach now derided as obsolete. But is it?

<P> What the ABM Treaty of 1972 enshrines is the still radical notion that in the nuclear age, every act of defense inevitably provokes an act of offense by the enemy. National security becomes defined as paradoxical, not dialectic. It runs counter to human history and human intuition to reject defensive measures because of their inevitably provocative character, yet eight American administrations - four Democratic and four Republican - have done just that. But under the second Clinton administration, that approach is being discredited.

<P> Now the rejection of defensive measures - whether by outlawing ABMs or forbidding nuclear tests - is seen as naively unrealistic in a dangerous world. But the men and women who beat back Hitler and outlasted Stalin were hardly naive idealists. They learned the hard way what their glib progeny are prepared to ignore - that the unilateral pursuit of national security through new rounds of weapons development leads to less security, not more.

<P> For example, now that the Senate has rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, claiming to protect our security by protecting our ability to test new generations of nuclear weapons, other nations will do exactly the same. Widespread weapons testing, probably beginning on the subcontinent, will likely resume. And so with the ABM. The threats that an American national missile defense would counter are indeed real, especially the risk of accidental nuclear launches by Russia or China, the only two nuclear powers capable of targeting the United States.

<P> But when we deploy a missile defense shield, Russia and China will inevitably worry that deterrence has been diluted. That will require Russia and China to respond with some kind of heightened offensive threat, since neither can soon deploy a matching defensive system. That heightening could take the form of increased levels of nuclear alert, like a policy of launch on first warning. Such adding hair to the hair trigger, in the argot, would increase the likelihood of an accidental launch. The new defenses could bring about the very catastrophe they are intended to deflect.

<P> It took the World War II generation several decades to do it, but they developed a simple standard when it came to decisions about nuclear weapons: Does this policy move us toward nuclear doomsday or away from it? That standard led to the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, the ABM Treaty of 1972, the original SALT agreements of the 1970s, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987, and the START agreements of the late

'80s and early '90s.

<P> To their great credit, the heroes of D-Day thus institutionalized an approach to foreign policy and national security that aimed not at nuclear weapons status quo but at nuclear weapons reduction; not at winning nuclear war but at preventing it; not at dominating our rivals but of engaging them in a joint project of nuclear disarmament.

<P> It is sentimental in the extreme to honor the World War II generation while dismantling the hard-won structure of peace that they left to us as their legacy. With a weapons industry hellbent on a new arms race; with a Congress that squanders the future to settle a score; with a callow president who fights only for himself; with presidential candidates defined by what they avoid; and with an American citizenry that cooperates in its own irrelevance, America has become a danger to the world. Even our allies say so.

<P> With the Senate destruction of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Clinton administration's undermining of the ABM Treaty, we, the children of heroes, have ourselves become the rogue nation.

<I><P> James Carroll's column appears regularly in the Globe. </I>


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<P>Cleveland Plain Dealer

October 18, 1999

<P>For Stability's Sake, Save Nuclear Treaty

<P>By Elizabeth Sullivan

<P> Might as well dust off those bomb shelters and the gory drills in which fourth-grade teachers carted off imaginary corpses while the rest of us crouched against dim hallway walls.

<P> The Senate's resounding defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty wasn't just partisan one-upmanship, even if a lot of senators played that game. Nor was it driven by concerns about verification - a 10-kiloton blast isn't something you can hide, at least not in this dimension - or misplaced fear of meddling in U.S. affairs.

<P> The vote was a stark and epochal rejection of decades of belief the world was better off with fewer nuclear bombs and fewer nuclear states.

<P> From now on, it's open season on atomic weapons. The world's newest nuclear nation, military-coup-plagued Pakistan, is laughing into its automatic weapons.

<P> So haul out the fall-out gear and hold on to your wallets. It is back to the drawing board for a coherent arms-control strategy. And it's time to start salting away \$100 billion here and there to pay for the next generation of atomic blasters, missiles and missile shields.

<P> It also is time to start thinking seriously about the United States' place in the world - and about voting in office-holders more interested in long-term national security than cheap political stunts.

<P> It didn't start out so momentously. The rhubarb over the treaty began just two weeks ago as one of those many dissing contests between the Democratic White House and a Republican Congress deeply suspicious of the administration's wandering foreign policy.

<P> But the Republican hard right was also peeved and fractious, with a new bone to gnaw on - the upcoming U.S. handover of the Panama Canal to Panama, set for year's end under a 1977 treaty. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott demanded, and got, hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on whether China was moving into Panama as thousands of GIs left.

<P> The media weren't much interested.

<P> Lott quickly realized that the long-ignored test-ban treaty - the object of little debate in the two years it has been awaiting Senate action - was a much juicier target. An opportunity to humble hated Bill Clinton just before his last year in office.

<P> Especially since Clinton-backers had lost little time trying to humiliate Lott for blocking consideration of a treaty the president really didn't want brought to the floor.

<P> So the Panama hearings were off. A test-ban vote was on.

<P> Reason would still have prevailed, in the form of an indefinite delay, had there not been one additional factor: the tiny fragment of influential Republicans who believe that arms control and multilateralism are outdated concepts.

<P> In their view, we should just build, buy and buttress until we're the strongest, most unassailable nation in the world. As if, in the history of humankind, such a status had ever been achieved. As if 50 years of living with the Bomb offered no lessons for the future. As if the nuclear deterrent could somehow be strengthened if more, rather than fewer, nations had the Bomb.

<P> That, ultimately, is why this vote is so dangerous.

<P> If the Senate had been motivated only by ignorance or partisanship, the rest of the world would say "ho-hum," roll over and go back to sleep. They'd see that the United States - which hasn't exploded a nuclear device in seven years - remained serious about arms control, nuclear nonproliferation and world security.

<P> But instead, they see a nation cratering into isolationism, without an understandable foreign policy.

<P> It can't have failed to register with the 51 Republicans who voted "No" that not a single nation - friend, foe or neutral - has applauded their action.

<P> Unpredictability in foreign affairs, as so often practiced by the Clinton administration and abetted by a micromanaging Congress, can be dangerous. The fears it precipitates are what lead to wars.

<P> A world in which Israel and Taiwan carry out nuclear tests, perhaps igniting reprisals by hostile neighbors, will not be stable. Nor can a shield of missile defenses prevent a terrorist from sailing a bomb into New York Harbor.

<P> It is not too late to rededicate our national will to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It is not too late to resurrect the test-ban treaty and restore good will and purpose to advancing mutual strategic-weapons cutbacks with Russia. It is not too late to engage China in arms control instead of merely pointing fingers at its probable nuclear espionage.

<P> Perhaps we will even look back on this rejection as a defining moment, when the American people awoke to the peril of their increasingly narrow politics.

<P> Perhaps, but don't hold your breath.

<P> The Democrats already are drafting attack ads, instead of a constructive strategy to recoup the arms-control momentum. Partisanship has become a bad habit as hard to kick, and as ultimately destructive, as nicotine. But this time, our children may be the ones to feel its lethality.


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<P>Houston Chronicle

October 17, 1999

Nuclear Testing

Five actions we can take to counter global arms danger

By Bill White

LAST week's debate on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty reminded me of meetings I attended in 1993, when we gathered the nation's top nuclear-weapons scientists, experts and policy-makers inside a thick-walled "secure room" below the headquarters of the Department of Energy.

Scientists described in highly classified detail what they might learn from more detonations of nuclear weapons, which had already been tested a thousand times. (At that time, the very number of tests was classified and had not been made public.)

Everyone understood the international harm of further testing; our tests would invite tests by other nations and erode our moral authority on the issue. But some argued we still needed 10 more tests. I asked the group, "How can the deterrent effect of our massive, well-tested nuclear arsenal possibly be weakened by a suspension of tests?" At first there was a long silence, then former Defense and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, long a proponent of testing, conceded: "Of course testing is not needed to preserve the nuclear deterrent."

I asked repeatedly of those advocating testing whether they believed that nations such as China or North Korea would begin a nuclear war on the assumption that 7,000 American warheads would not work. Even the strongest advocates of testing did not believe this was plausible.

In 1993, President Clinton followed our recommendation to suspend nuclear testing of existing weapons. After last Wednesday's unfortunate vote by the Senate defeating ratification of the treaty, nations worldwide condemned the U.S. action. Those protesting included our allies, who our warheads are supposed to protect.

Controlling the spread of nuclear weapons should be our highest national-security priority. Let's face it, military intervention in Kuwait served important international economic and humanitarian interests, but the aggressors did not threaten the lives of Americans. In contrast, Americans would be threatened if Saddam Hussein or the next renegade despot could send a nuclear device

into New York City on a fishing boat. That kind of attack could do more damage to Americans in one hour than the Chinese and Russian conventional armies together could do in one year.

<P> Wednesday's vote and the debate over whether to stop testing earlier in the decade show we have a way to go in updating our thinking. Five actions can help restore American leadership in countering the new nuclear danger:

<P> The United States should continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The sole function of our nuclear weapons is simply to deter or discourage other nations from using them first. Nobody wins if deterrence fails and there is an outright nuclear war. So each nuclear device does not need to work perfectly to fulfill its function of deterrence.

<P> We should accelerate cooperation with other nuclear states, especially Russia, to have stronger controls over nuclear materials. Western intelligence has observed signs of potential nuclear smuggling from the Soviet Union. In the last six years we helped transfer warheads from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan into Russia through direct financial aid. We should redouble efforts to assist Russia in securing its nuclear materials through aid for its scientists to work on civilian projects and the outright purchase of plutonium-laden materials. We should use aid and treaties and persuasion to initiate international inspection and control of the nuclear-weapons programs in China, India and Pakistan, even if it means that the United States is also subject to some reciprocal inspections.

<P> We should strengthen our development of cruiser-based, theater-missile defense. Most folks now recognize that the "Star Wars" vision of space-based defense against a Soviet first-strike produced little while costing almost \$40 billion. However, recent tests have demonstrated that sea-based theater missile defense is far less costly and far more technically effective. Moreover, it responds to the new nuclear danger - a small number of missiles from a small renegade nation such as North Korea.

<P> We should strengthen our national nuclear weapons labs. Morale and the human resource within our national weapons labs has been harmed by sensationalist and largely unsubstantiated charges of Chinese espionage.

<P> These labs have struggled to attract a new generation of physicists who discourage any other nation from thinking that it can ever get ahead of us in the design of more advanced weapons, and who can help us design new systems for dealing with nuclear terrorism. Labs should accelerate their work on technologies to both detect and disarm nuclear weapons which may be smuggled by terrorists. We are struggling to recruit top scientists to these labs today, and we ought to be paying signing bonuses to the best scientists, and equipping them well.

<P> Finally, we should continue to press for multinational reductions in warheads. The United States and Russia are still the dominant nuclear powers. They have agreed to reduce their warheads to less than 4,000 on each side. But that is still too many. A reduction in nuclear arsenals today would actually increase U.S. military strength, since our nation now enjoys a massive and unprecedented superiority in conventional military capabilities over any other nation.

<P> As pointed out by the mayor of Hiroshima, Japan, on Wednesday, the United States has a special role in providing leadership on this issue. We can provide this leadership with these five actions.

<P> <I>White, a Houston businessman, served as deputy secretary of energy from 1993-1995.</I>

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<P>Austin American-Statesman

October 17, 1999

Pg. G3

<P>Locked And Loaded, Deep In A Mountain

<P>By Rich Oppel

<P> COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. -- The night of Sept. 30 was not restful for Gen. Richard Myers, an F-4 fighter pilot who now commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

<P> Calls from the operation center kept coming in. By the fifth call, the general's dogs were so confused they pawed the door, ready for their pre-dawn walk.

<P> Coming from deep inside the gray granite of Cheyenne Mountain, the calls were placed by a colonel sitting at a U-shaped desk constructed of yellow mountain ash. To his left was an intelligence officer; to his right a missile systems expert.

<P> Above them three large screens loomed on the forward wall. The image on one was of an electronic map showing quarter-sized red dots, inching through south central Russia to the northern Caucasus.

<P> They were SCUD missiles. The Russians were pounding the daylight out of the breakaway republic of Chechnya.

<P> Which is deeply interesting to NORAD, sufficient to rouse Myers.

<P> "In the last two months, we've called (Myers) only one night -- last night. That was not an ordinary night," said Army Col. Steve Bowman, who was directing the operations center the next day when I stopped in with 16 visiting editors.

<P> "We had to make his confirmation." Which means the operations center had to give Myers details sufficient so that he could be assured that the United States was not under Russian missile attack.

<P> Had the United States been threatened, "here's where the war would be prosecuted," Bowman said of his semi-dark room of 400 square feet, furnished with big, soft, cocoa-colored leather chairs. Chairs for watching.

<P> There are no red buttons on the ash desk to let fly the missiles. NORAD is an intelligence center, collecting data from across the world, via satellite, AWACS and secret means.

<P> Had there been an attack, the colonel would have seen this:

<P> The red spots entering a long corridor, gradually widening, with its

neck on the Alaskan coast. Missiles from both Russia (estimated flight time, 25 minutes) and the People's Republic of China (32-36 minutes) are likely to come that way.

<P> Then, a computer-drawn "threat fan" would appear. Within two minutes of a missile's liftoff, NORAD radar and computers would know its type, size, range, speed, direction and arc. Soon after, the likely target would be known.

<P> NORAD analysts would then characterize the attack:

<P> No threat.

<P> Concern.

<P> Yes.

<P> There has never been a "yes." Not even a "concern" in many, many years, according to Bowman. If there was a yes, NORAD would notify the president well before the end of the 25-minute Russian missile flight.

<P> The president would need time to decide whether to retaliate before a missile struck and, of course, one very likely target would be 1600 Pennsylvania Ave.

<P> Retaliation, or no retaliation are the choices.

<P> Right now, there is no defense against an ICBM attack.

<P> Cheyenne Mountain, hovering over the beauty of Colorado Springs, houses 1,450 military personnel. Built to withstand bomber attack, it was modified to take a direct hit from a nuclear bomb.

<P> A long, arcing corridor would absorb the blast, blowing out giant doors but saving the NORAD and U.S. Space Command facilities inside.

<P> The place is brass-heavy, because its task is not to be taken lightly. You can't be wrong when you tell the White House that we're about to be wiped out. There are only 34 four-star officers in all of the military, and one is here: Myers. Also, there are two three-star (out of 116) and two one-star (out of 445) officers.

<P> Many in Congress and elsewhere think Russia's economic and military d
isarray prevents an attack, but NORAD people would rather stay watchful.

<P> Not long ago, said Myers, "the Russians sent Bears off the coast of A
laska. We did send fighters out to intercept them." The Russian equivalent of U
.S. B-52s, the Bears turned away before entering U.S. territory. It was a probe
, to check U.S. defenses.

<P> In the United States, we have the privilege, exercised regularly by A
ustin peace groups, to protest U.S. military actions in Kosovo and elsewhere, s
ometimes calling them illegal.

<P> The protesters ignore illegal actions of Serbs who rape and murder Alb
anians.

<P> They ignore statements like those of Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wh
o, seeking to repress dissidents, reminded them with a threat two weeks ago, "I
n an Islamic system, punishment is the authorities' prerogative."

<P> We hope for peace with the Russians and the Chinese, but we should ke
ep our guns loaded. The Russian-Chechnya war of 1994-96 killed 80,000 people. F
ifty years of Communist rule have resulted in the deaths of 35 million Chinese.

<P> We have to learn to live with great powers who are neither our friend
nor our enemy, but are frequently dangerous. The best way to do that is to be
ready.

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<P>Washington Times

October 19, 1999

<P>Politics Of Arms Control

<P>By Tod Lindberg

<P> American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been characterized by substantial bipartisan agreement on the basics overlaid with sharp partisan quarreling at the margins. The fate of the test ban treaty defeated in the Senate last week is illuminating not because it is typical of partisan foreign policy tangles in recent years but because it is highly unusual. It brought into sharp relief a major area on which fundamental differences between the parties remain.

<P> First, a few words about the bipartisanship, since this phenomenon can easily get lost in Washington's hothouse environment. It is necessary, first, to draw a distinction between outside policy advocates seeking to influence the direction of the policy-makers of their party, on one hand, and the policy-makers themselves, in the executive branch and on Capitol Hill, on the other. The outside advocates play an important role; they are a resource for those inside to draw on and, in addition, offer cues to the policy-makers about the partisan political concerns, or the principle concerns, of their natural allies. Yet it is not the fate of the usually sharp disagreements between the advocacy communities to be adopted willy-nilly by the policy-makers, and it would be a mistake to take the decibel level of the outside debate as a true indication of what is going on inside.

<P> Notwithstanding the surrounding discord, here are some noteworthy points on which the parties do not differ: The United States must remain engaged in Europe; NATO is the principle instrument of U.S. engagement; and NATO expansion was an appropriate affirmation of transatlantic engagement. The United States should seek to encourage Russia as a responsible international actor. The United States should remain committed to a freer, more open environment for international trade. The United States should keep trade ties with China open and try to draw China into the international community; and China must understand that a resolution of the Taiwan issue by force is unacceptable. The United States remains committed to the defense of South Korea. The United States believes rogue states such as Iraq must be contained. The United States remains committed to a process of negotiated settlement of disputes, preeminently in the Middle East. Finally, there is this lesson brought home from the breakup of Yugoslavia: The United States should act in concert with other nations whenever possible but should not count on the ability of others to organize an effective international

response to a crisis without U.S. leadership.

<P> To be sure, there is ample disagreement on subsidiary questions among the policy-makers, and the competence of the execution of foreign policy remains an issue, but the amount of bipartisan agreement on principles is, in a word, a lot -- enough for the United States to conduct foreign policy without substantial danger of paralysis due to failure to agree at home.

<P> Except in one major area, and that is arms control. Here, the difference remains fundamental, and it accounts both for the Senate's determined repudiation of the test-ban treaty and for the extreme vitriol of the administration's response, a rhetorical level so overheated you would have to go back to the Cold War policy disputes during the Reagan administration to find its equal.

<P> Which is, of course, the point. Republicans in general have a deep and abiding skepticism about the ability of arms control agreements to improve the security of the United States. Their first question is: What is the United States giving up? The second: How will we know that others are doing what they have promised?

<P> Democrats, by contrast, in general stress the importance of nations coming together to address serious concerns collectively. They believe that the creation of an international environment of cooperation will encourage responsible behavior and will add moral weight to the condemnation of bad behavior. They believe that negotiations can be conducted so as to accommodate the particular concerns of the United States and that what the United States must, in the end, give up will be of less utility than the benefits to the United States of the agreement itself.

<P> This partisan gap over principle is deep -- and currently bridgeable only in extraordinary circumstances. (Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott went along with the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 because it was the price of the Clinton administration's signature on the balanced budget agreement.) The question is to what extent international agreements of this kind are central to U.S. foreign policy? If they are central, we have a basic division at the center.

<P> Clearly, the administration, and the president in particular, is now insisting on the centrality of such agreements. He proposes to define Republicans as isolationist for their opposition to this treaty. Given the bipartisanship catalogued above, the charge is ridiculous. Congressional Republicans as the opposition to a Democratic administration are no more isolationist (i.e., obstructionist) than congressional Democrats in opposition to Republican administrations.

<P> But Mr. Clinton's angry charge is not merely politics. It is sincerely the product of the most prominent genuine difference over principle between Dem

ocrats and Republicans on foreign policy.

<I><P> Tod Lindberg is editor of Policy Review.</I>

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<P>Policy Review

October/November 1999

Pg. 19

<P>Military Supremacy And How We Keep It

<P>By Loren B. Thompson

<P> IN FEBRUARY 1776, only months before the American Declaration of Independence, British historian Edward Gibbon published the first volume of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. It was almost immediately recognized as an important achievement. Gibbon, like no one before, discerned the sources of Rome's early success and later failures over the course of a history spanning a full millennium. The sixth and final volume appeared in 1788, the year before the U.S. Constitution. Not surprisingly, several of the framers of the Constitution thought they saw lessons in Gibbons' work for the new republic. George Washington was particularly impressed with an insight about Roman military power that Gibbon offered in the first chapter of the first volume:

<I><P> The terror of the Roman arms added weight and dignity to the moderation of the emperors. They preserved peace by a constant preparation for war; and while justice regulated their conduct, they announced to the nations on their confines that they were as little disposed to endure as to offer injury.

</I><P> When he became president, Washington paraphrased Gibbons lesson in his first annual message to Congress, observing that "to be prepared for war, is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

<P> It was not a lesson that his fellow countrymen or their descendants would learn easily. Over the following two centuries, the nations vital interests would be endangered repeatedly by lack of military preparedness. But in the second half of the twentieth century the "American Century," as Henry Luce called it in 1941 the United States emerged as a global military power without peer. As that century ends, America commands more power and influence than perhaps any nation since the halcyon days of Gibbons Rome.

<P> The sources of American success are not primarily military in nature. But after a century in which democracy was endangered first by imperialism, then by fascism, and finally by communism a century in which over a hundred million lives were lost to war and civil strife most Americans can readily grasp the value of possessing global military supremacy. The United States certainly has that today. Its defense budget is bigger than the combined total for the six next-biggest military powers (most of whom are U.S. allies). It is the only nation that can project military power rapidly and decisively anywhere on earth; the only nation with a major military presence in both hemispheres; the only nation exploiting the full military potential of the information revolution; and the only nation that anyone seriously expects to deserve the title "superpower" in the early decades of the next century.

<P> If the United States can sustain the economic and cultural sources of its success, America has the potential to preserve its global influence for a long time to come perhaps for as long as Rome did. But that also depends upon sustaining its current military supremacy. History is strewn with the remains of great civilizations that lost the capacity to protect themselves from external challenges. The hard part for America, as for Rome, seems to be maintaining a sense of purpose when threats recede. Given enough time, Americans are masters of military mobilization and execution. Where they have proved wanting is in preserving their might during periods of peace.

<P> Despite an imposing defense budget, there are signs that the U.S. military posture is losing the coherence of its Cold War years. In an international environment posing few direct threats, it is quite possible to imagine a gradual deterioration, born of inattention, continuing past the point at which real damage to the U.S. global position occurs. Now, in short, is the time to think about where and why erosion is occurring and what investments the United States must make in order to preserve global military supremacy during the first half

of the next century.

<P> Current national strategy

<P> BEHIND U.S. MILITARY FORCES in the field is a complex analytical process. Planners specify vital national interests and the threats to them; they formulate a strategy for coping with those threats; they identify the military requirements of implementing the strategy and translate the result into a range of programs to provide necessary personnel, equipment, and support services. In order to understand the investment programs the equipment and technology expenditures that must be made over the next generation, one must first spend a little time on the earlier stages of the process.

<P> The Clinton administration has seen fit to rethink each step in the national security planning process, arguing that the demise of the Soviet Union required reflection on how future security needs might differ from those of the Cold War. The administration called its new approach a "strategy of engagement." Proponents characterized it as a middle ground between the extremes of isolationism and assuming the role of global policeman. The military component of this strategy was explained in the report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, a comprehensive assessment of U.S. military needs completed in 1997. The review specified five "vital national interests" that are the starting point in defining national military requirements:

<P> *Protecting the American homeland, especially against attacks employing nuclear, chemical, or biological "weapons of mass destruction."

<P> *Preventing the reemergence overseas of hostile regional powers or coalitions.

<P> *Guarding the security of global lines of communication at sea, in the air, and in space.

<P> *Ensuring unfettered access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources.

<P> *Deterring and/or defeating aggression against allies and friends.

<P> The defense secretary's 1999 Annual Report identified major near-term "security challenges" (i.e., threats) to U.S. interests:

<P> *"Large-scale, cross-border aggression" by hostile regional powers such as Iraq and North Korea.

<P> *"Flow of potentially dangerous technologies" to overseas adversaries, particularly technologies relevant to weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, or space access.

<P> *"Transnational dangers" such as terrorists and drug cartels that operate with little regard for national borders.

<P> *"Threats to the U.S. homeland," including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, information warfare, infrastructure attacks, organized crime, and uncontrolled immigration flows.

<P> *"Failed states" such as Somalia and Zaire, where the collapse of effective government has allowed the spread of lawlessness and disorder.

<P> *"Adversary use of asymmetric means," in other words, enemies exploitation of novel tools and tactics to circumvent superior U.S. conventional forces.

<P> The administration does not anticipate the emergence of a "global peer competitor" comparable to the old Soviet Union prior to 2015. Its strategy of countering the emergence of regional aggressors is clearly designed to discourage such a development. However, Defense Secretary William Cohen acknowledged in his 1999 Annual Report that China could one day become a superpower rival of America, and also noted the possibility of "wild card scenarios," meaning completely unexpected threats for which the U.S. is poorly prepared.

<P> The defense strategy formulated to deal with these interests and threats has three basic goals. The first is to shape the global environment by promoting regional stability, mitigating tensions, and deterring aggression, so as to diminish the frequency with which U.S. military forces must be employed. Efforts to reduce the Russian nuclear arsenal, halt the spread of ballistic-missile technology, and deprive international terrorists of safe havens are key features.

<P> The second is to be prepared to respond militarily to a full range of possible crises. U.S. military forces must be able to deter aggression or coercion; engage in a variety of smaller-scale, possibly protracted contingencies in widely scattered locations; and successfully prosecute two "nearly simultaneous major theater wars," such as Operation Desert Storm. The latter requirement is the main driver of current force structure. Smaller-scale contingencies require less capability, and the standard for determining whether forces can effectively deter is inherently subjective. Virtually all of the key features of current U.S. conventional forces—number of armored divisions, number of long-range bombers, number of naval surface combatants—are in some way linked to the two-wars metric. The administration envisions that most major theater wars will be conducted in concert with allies, but acknowledges that the U.S. must be prepared

d to act alone.

<P> The third basic strategic goal requires the military to think beyond 2015 the planning horizon for the force posture proposed in the Quadrennial Defense Review in an exercise called "preparing now for an uncertain future." Neither the administration nor the military claims to know what the global security environment will look like after 2015. The services describe the forces they will need then as "capabilities-based" rather than threat-based, acknowledging that they can only guess at who the enemy might be. The focused modernization effort called for in this part of the defense strategy is driven by the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs," the anticipated transformation in military capabilities made possible by new information technologies. It is also in this futuristic context that the Quadrennial Defense Review discusses national missile defense, describing it as an "insurance policy" against unanticipated threats

<P> Three fundamental flaws

<P> THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S defense strategy is more coherent than many critics acknowledge. It identifies the full range of plausible future threats to national security and has shown a capacity to evolve over time in response to changing circumstances. Nonetheless, the strategy has three fundamental flaws that make it an incomplete basis for any road map of future defense investments. First of all, it provides no real solution to the most serious and persistent security threat the nation faces, the danger of nuclear attack against the American homeland. Second, it makes assumptions about the circumstances under which future conflicts might arise that are too optimistic to assure military supremacy over the long run. And third, even within the context of neglected threats and convenient assumptions, the strategy does not yield a force structure or capabilities adequate to satisfy its own requirements.

<P> The first flaw is clearly the most important, reflecting the peculiar blindness of Democratic administrations throughout the Cold War to the likely permanence of nuclear deterrence. U.S. nuclear strategy today, as in the past, depends upon the presumed validity of an unprovable theory of human behavior. The strategy assumes, inter alia, that nuclear adversaries will be rational; that they will not be accident-prone; that they will prevent rogue elements from seizing control of strategic forces; that they will perceive U.S. actions as intended; and that they will respond to U.S. actions in the manner American policy makers consider appropriate. There was little historical basis for such heroic assumptions during the Cold War, and there is even less in its aftermath, especially given the volatile character of Russian domestic politics and the emergence of new nuclear players.

<P> The only valid excuse for allowing national survival to rest on such a fragile base is the absence of alternatives. That was the main argument of those opposing national missile defense during the Cold War that protection against nuclear attack was not practicable, and that efforts to provide it would make attacks more likely by "destabilizing" the superpower security relationship. I

n the years after the end of the Cold War, defense became both more feasible and more necessary. The number of strategic warheads in the Russian nuclear arsenal declined by a third during the 1990s, to around 7,000; some U.S. intelligence analysts believe that the arsenal will deteriorate to less than 1,000 usable warheads by 2010 (far below levels permitted under pending arms control agreements). Defense may accordingly be easier, especially if attack comes in the form of a limited accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch. But the same internal decay driving down warhead numbers also makes nuclear accidents, security breakdowns, and proliferation more likely. With the assumed stability of the Cold War era gone, active defense becomes more necessary.

<P> Fortunately, significant technological progress has been made in developing systems that can counter nuclear missile attacks, particularly the smaller-scale attacks that might be mounted by emerging nuclear powers or rogue commanders in Russia. After cutting back on national missile defense research during its first term in office, the Clinton administration began to warm to the idea of relaxing the severe constraints on missile defenses imposed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But its defense strategy reflected little sense of urgency about developing defenses, and the administration's public pronouncements were often fraught with misplaced emphasis, leaving the impression, for example, that the primitive ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea was more ominous than Russia's 7,000 intercontinental warheads. An adequate strategy for defending the nation must begin by addressing this challenge more seriously.

<P> The second fundamental flaw in current strategy is the tendency to make convenient assumptions about how future warfighting contingencies might arise. Current strategy assumes that two major conflicts will not occur at exactly the same time; that well-armed allies will probably participate in major theater wars; that extensive infrastructure will be available in or near conflict areas to support U.S. forces; that early suppression of enemy air defenses will be feasible; and that adequate supplies of precision munitions ("smart bombs") will be available to quickly disable critical enemy assets.

<P> For all the military success of the Western alliances' air offensive over former Yugoslavia, several of these assumptions proved wrong. The Air Force began running out of key munitions only a week after the air war began. Uncertainty about whether enemy air defenses had been disabled hobbled the use of U.S. aircraft. And European allies proved ill-equipped to participate effectively with U.S. forces in a precision air campaign. (One senior U.S. military officer was quoted in the press commenting acidly, "We slipped some training wheels on the Europeans and put them in the middle of the freeway; after a few days, we said, we better get these kids out of the road.")

<P> Even the assumptions that proved valid in Kosovo raised troubling questions about how U.S. forces would fare in future conflicts. For example, the absence of major conflicts in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf region enabled the Pentagon to remove the only U.S. aircraft carrier in the Northern Pacific as well as electronic-warfare aircraft enforcing the Iraqi no-fly zones to support the Kosovo operation. But since the current U.S. force posture was constructed

d around scenarios envisioning "nearly simultaneous" conflicts in both Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, how likely is it that U.S. strategy will be adequate to deal with contingencies in other areas such as the Balkans in the future?

What would have happened if U.S. forces were under pressure in both Iraq and Korea a real possibility when the Kosovo operation began? And while U.S. forces operating over the former Yugoslavia did indeed have access to nearby infrastructure in allied countries (they used two dozen bases), Europe is the only major theater of military operations where base access is not declining over time.

In the Persian Gulf region, even key allies such as the Saudis have expressed ambivalence about U.S. use of bases there. Obviously, a defense strategy grounded in excessively optimistic assumptions has the potential to go seriously awry in the years ahead.

<P> This leads to a third fundamental flaw. Even within the context of neglected threats and optimistic assumptions, the Clinton administration's strategy never properly translated into support for the programs necessary to implement it. Indeed, the administration made a number of foolish program choices. For example:

<P> *The Clinton administration limited production of the stealthy, next-generation B-2 bomber to 21 aircraft, a fraction of the originally-planned 132 planes. The Air Force does not plan to produce another new bomber until 2037, leaving it with a force of barely 200 intercontinental bombers for the next 40 years 90 percent of which are not stealthy, and over a third of which (the B-52s) are already nearly 40 years old.

<P> *Although the U.S. Army today leads the world in heavy-armor technology for the first time in history, it plans to cease upgrades to its M-1A2 Abrams tank early in the next decade and forgo any further tank production for a generation. The service has no firm plans as to when it will resume production of heavy-armor vehicles, and no funding allocated to provide the majority of existing tanks with the latest digital upgrades.

<P> *Despite the growing versatility of submarines as stealthy platforms for sea control, land attack with cruise missiles, intelligence gathering, and other missions, the Navy's sub inventory was set to decline from 100 in 1990 to half that number. Internal Navy studies indicate that 70 attack subs are needed to meet current commitments, but with many older subs approaching retirement, it is not clear the service can afford to keep even 50 operational.

<P> There's no way of knowing precisely where such program trends will leave the U.S. military in, say, 20 years. But "global military supremacy" certainly isn't the first phrase that comes to mind. It's not clear the existing force posture can meet even the near-term demands of national strategy. Shortly after the end of the Kosovo campaign, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Ryan told an audience that, faced with two simultaneous major-theater conflicts, his service would experience shortfalls in intelligence collection, surveillance, defense suppression, airlift, fighters, and bombers. Ryan said the service could cope with the two "nearly simultaneous" conflicts envisioned in current strategy a

s long as an accommodating adversary allowed him to begin shifting assets to the second conflict 90 days after the first one began.

<P> If that is the state of U.S. military preparedness today, imagine where the U.S. will stand after the full effects of no bomber production, no tank production, and minimal submarine production have asserted themselves for a generation not to mention dozens of other key military investments delayed, deferred, or diminished by recent administrations. Barring some miraculous change in human nature, it is clear that a much more ambitious investment program will be needed to assure U.S. military supremacy in the early decades of the next century.

<P> Critical investments ahead

<P> A REALISTIC INVESTMENT STRATEGY for future military supremacy must begin by recognizing some basic realities: Americas geographical remoteness from likely theaters of military involvement; the undependability of key allies, who may lack the resources or resolve to participate in coalition warfare; the ongoing proliferation of advanced military technologies, including those related to weapons of mass destruction; the uncertainty of future access to overseas bases; and the traditional reluctance of Americans to sacrifice their fellow citizens lives in wars with limited or unclear objectives. Current U.S. defense strategy acknowledges many of these constraints but does not respond adequately to them.

<P> An effective military investment plan must leverage the nations extraordinary economic and technological power to compensate for other strategic disadvantages the United States faces. The Clinton strategy is correct in asserting that well-trained, well-led personnel are the U.S. militarys most important asset, but other nations also have competent warriors. Where they cannot match America is in the scale and sophistication of military technology. The U.S. thus requires a technology-intensive defense strategy to assure future military supremacy, one which is more heavily weighted toward investment than driven by readiness, as during the Clinton years. Almost all of the critical investments can be organized to support five overarching goals:

<P> *Developing homeland defenses against nuclear attack.

<P> *Preserving global air superiority.

<P> *Asserting unrivaled dominance in space.

<P> *Securing and leveraging the benefits of global maritime supremacy.

<P> *Exploiting the full military potential of the information revolution.

<P> Homeland defense

<P> THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION BEGAN stressing the importance of preparing the nation for future attacks involving chemical or biological weapons. Planning for the protection of critical infrastructure against information warfare has begun. The administration has even acknowledged that the emergence of nuclear-capable rogue states such as North Korea may soon require deployment of national missile defenses.

<P> These efforts are all worthwhile, and probably should be accelerated. However, the administration's approach to defense against nuclear attack, while an improvement over its earlier positions, cannot begin to cope with the full range of nuclear threats to the American homeland. The current concept is to construct a very limited system of sensors and interceptors that at least initially would be compatible with the 1972 ABM Treaty and its 1974 protocol. This would limit the system to 100 interceptors at a single, fixed domestic site, which the administration believes could be adequate to counter the small, relatively simple attacks mounted by a North Korea. The system architecture is being designed so it can evolve into a more capable defensive network able to cope with somewhat larger or more capable threats, such as those that might be posed by an accidental or unauthorized launch of Russian missiles.

<P> But the envisioned system will not be able to deal with a large-scale nuclear attack such as Russia could launch today, or China perhaps 10 years in the future. In fact, because four interceptors would be needed to provide 95 per cent probability of destroying one incoming warhead, a fully treaty-compliant version of the system could be overwhelmed by only half a dozen multiple-warhead missiles. If the U.S. homeland is truly to be defended, a completely different approach is needed, one involving some form of boost-phase interception in other words, destruction of missiles early in their launch sequence, before multiple warheads and penetration aids have been released. The only real candidate at present to accomplish this task is the Air Force's Space-Based Laser program.

<P> Unfortunately, the Clinton administration allowed the laser program to languish. Plans for a space-based test of key technologies were delayed from 2005 to 2008, then to 2010, and now to 2012. Nuclear deterrence may fail long before the leisurely pace of the program produces anything useful. To make matters worse, congressional proponents of space-based lasers have contrived a series of excuses for delaying the Air Force's Airborne Laser program, a theater-missile defense system that will facilitate early demonstration of key enabling technologies. In short, the boost-phase interception component of the national missile defense program is in a state of disarray. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's entire budget for directed-energy technologies in the fiscal 2000-2005 defense spending plan is a mere \$450 million.

<P> The United States cannot reasonably claim global military supremacy so

long as it is at the mercy of any nation with more than a handful of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Its present defenselessness is an incentive to adversaries to acquire nuclear weapons as a relatively inexpensive way of matching U.S. military power. The administration's plans for a treaty-compliant system are a good first step and a potentially valuable backup. But real security depends on infusing the Space-Based Laser program with a much greater sense of urgency, a conclusion congressional authorizing committees underscored in their conference report on the fiscal 2000 defense budget.

<P> Air superiority

<P> NO AMERICAN SOLDIER HAS BEEN KILLED by enemy aircraft since the Korean War. No American military plane has been shot down by enemy aircraft since the Vietnam War. And throughout the American Century a period of history essentially coterminous with the age of air power the American homeland has never been subject to a bombing campaign by foreign adversaries. These achievements have been made possible in large measure by what air power theorist Giulio Douhet at the beginning of the century called "command of the air."

<P> Americans have enjoyed air superiority for so long that they have come to take it for granted. Few citizens fully grasp what an accomplishment it was to pound Serbia into submission without losing a single allied pilot or having to commit ground forces. But precisely because U.S. air superiority has come to seem so inevitable, there is a real danger that it could be lost sometime early in the next century. The Air Force's plans for a stealthy heavy bomber not dependent on forward bases were scaled back to a mere 21 planes, the only survivable long-range strike aircraft it now plans to operate for decades to come. The Clinton administration reduced scheduled production of the only new air-superiority fighter the Air Force has developed in the last quarter century, the stealthy F-22, from 750 planes to 648, then to 438, then to 339 and finally, congressional appropriators in fiscal 2000 budget deliberations threatened the plane with extinction altogether. And because it had expected to have large numbers of stealthy next-generation bombers and fighters, the service abandoned its fleet of electronic-warfare aircraft, leaving the joint tactical jamming mission to the Navy.

<P> Planners also cut the production goal for the service's next-generation strategic airlifter, the versatile C-17, by 40 percent and threatened the program with termination in the early 1990s. That program eventually got back on track, and the Air Force will probably buy close to the 210 planes originally planned. But in virtually every other category of aircraft fighters, bombers, tankers, surveillance planes, tactical airlifters the service operates an increasingly aged and decrepit fleet. High rates of utilization and low rates of production during the Clinton years accelerated the decay. If U.S. air superiority is to be assured during the early decades of the next century, three efforts in particular must receive increased funding:

<P> *Plans to upgrade the Air Force's 21 B-2 bombers should be organized to facilitate further production of long-range strike aircraft in the near future.

Careful sequencing and management of programmed improvements would allow the service to develop a "virtual prototype" of a cheaper, more capable B-2 variant that could be produced in the next decade.

<P> *Production of the F-22 must be kept on schedule to avoid huge costs and delays in fielding a next-generation air-superiority fighter. The F-15 fighter that the F-22 will replace is a Vietnam-era airframe that cannot assure air superiority against more modern foreign fighters, and the other tactical aircraft the U.S. is developing are not suitable for the air superiority role.

<P> *The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), a radar plane that does for ground surveillance what the AWACS does for air surveillance, must be upgraded and procured in sufficient numbers. The Clinton administration wrongly assumed allies would buy six for coalition operations, but since they haven't, the U.S. production goal should be restored to at least the original 19 aircraft (some senior Air Force officers think twice that number would be optimal).

<P> The Air Force also needs to revitalize its electronic-warfare community and determine how it will replace hundreds of aging KC-135 tankers and C-130 tactical transports. These missions are not as well understood in Congress as the more visible combat missions, but they are critical to the Air Force's success in future conflicts. With access to foreign bases increasingly doubtful, the importance of range-extending aerial refueling tankers and rugged intratheater airlifters that can land almost anywhere will become increasingly apparent in the years ahead. But the average KC-135 tanker is 38 years old, and many C-130s are operating well beyond their intended design lives. They need to be replaced soon.

<P> Space superiority

<P> IN THE 40 YEARS SINCE the United States launched its first photographic reconnaissance spy satellite (the KH-2 in 1959), the U.S. military has become increasingly dependent on and proficient in the use of orbital space platforms. The most important military satellites are five constellations of early-warning, communications, navigation, and meteorological spacecraft operated by the U.S. Space Command; and a series of highly classified intelligence satellites such as the Orion electronic-eavesdropping system operated by the National Reconnaissance Office. The Air Force has traditionally been the lead military service for acquiring and operating space systems, often acting in concert with the intelligence community. However, all of the military services have become heavy users of these systems, even though the Air Force bears most of the budgetary burden.

<P> The Soviet Union tried hard throughout the Cold War to keep up with America in the military utilization of space, but after losing an early lead during the Kennedy administration, it never again came close to matching the sophistication of U.S. orbital assets. The Russian military space program today is a p

ale shadow of its Soviet-era scale, unable even to provide national leaders with continuous early warning against nuclear attack. A handful of other countries such as France and Israel have established niche competencies in particular satellite types, but the U.S. remains by far the dominant producer and user of military spacecraft. This not only provides a critical advantage in global defense operations, but also is a key reason America leads the world in commercial satellite sales and technology. The U.S. will continue to dominate satellite innovation for the foreseeable future, unless overly restrictive export controls hobble the competitiveness of an increasingly commercial business.

<P> The same cannot be said of the launcher segment of the space business, where the U.S. faltered badly after the Challenger disaster in 1986. Because the Space Shuttle was expected to replace traditional launchers in many roles, the U.S. spent relatively little on upgrading its expendable launchers once the shuttle program began. But the shuttle never lived up to the expectation that it would greatly reduce the cost of orbiting satellites, and after the Challenger exploded, most military payloads were returned to expendable launchers. A series of false starts on new launchers such as the "Advanced Launch System" and "National Launch System" then ensued, as the U.S. tried to improve a fleet that consisted of little more than modified variants of Eisenhower-era ballistic missiles.

<P> This effort led eventually to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program in the Clinton administration, a family of launchers that may finally solve the near-term need for cheaper, more reliable access to space. The EELV program is essential to effective U.S. space operations in the early decades of the next century. But by the time that program began to bear fruit, much of the domestic demand for commercial space launches had already moved offshore to France, Russia, and China. This process was accelerated by neglect in modernizing and expanding the U.S. launch infrastructure. If the United States is to maintain its present dominance in military, civil, and commercial space operations over the long run, it will need something more revolutionary than an evolved expendable launcher.

<P> The leading candidate to serve as this "leap-ahead" space transportation system is VentureStar, a "single-stage-to-orbit" launch vehicle being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and several of the nation's largest aerospace companies. In conceptual terms, VentureStar will be a cross between the Space Shuttle and an aircraft, with reusable systems, aerodynamic landings, and quick turnaround on the ground. It will have a payload comparable to the shuttle, but much lower costs and higher reliability. The first commercial operations are forecast for 2005. Before two full-scale vehicles can be built, though, NASA needs to demonstrate key technologies on a smaller test vehicle designated the X-33 probably beginning next year. Because reliable access to space at reasonable cost is the greatest single weakness in the current U.S. military space program, the X-33/VentureStar effort should arguably be the highest funding priority in any campaign aimed at bolstering space capabilities for the future.

<P> Maritime supremacy

<P> DIPLOMATIC HISTORIAN JOHN SPANIER once explained Americas purport ed insularity from world affairs by observing that it was "a nation with nonthr eatening neighbors to the north and south, and fish to the east and west." He m ight more accurately have said, "and the U.S. Navy to the east and west." Durin g the nineteenth century, the Navy was the main bulwark against European interv ention in the Western Hemisphere; in the twentieth century, it became the most frequently used instrument of American influence in the Eastern Hemisphere. The American Century, which began so portentously in 1907 when President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched the Great White Fleet on a cruise around the world, ended with the 97,000-ton, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier named for Roosevelt sittin g in the Adriatic Sea, launching dozens of precision air strikes daily against the warmaking capacity of Serbia.

<P> By the time the latter development unfolded in spring 1999, the U.S. Na vy no longer had a real rival for global maritime supremacy. One by one, all of the other great naval powers of the twentieth century Britain, Japan, Russia had receded to the status of regional players. But the U.S. Navy no longer thi nks solely in terms of such traditional missions as sea control. Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy and its sister service, the Marine Corps, have set fo rth an increasingly bold vision for using naval strike forces to intervene asho re. The new doctrine, first explored in a 1993 conceptual document called "From the Sea," seeks to exploit the fact that most of the worlds population and com merce are found within a few hundred miles of the sea well within the range of sea-based aircraft and missiles. It fashions a post-Cold War role for the sea services that leverages their mobility, versatility, and independence to make t hem potent military forces far from the sea.

<P> This is a potentially revolutionary development, one that may have grea t military significance in the next century if the U.S. continues to withdraw f rom land bases in the Eurasian littoral. With diminished access to foreign base s and a dwindling number of long-range strike aircraft in the U.S. inventory, t here undoubtedly will be many overseas contingencies in the years ahead in whic h only the Navy and Marine Corps can respond with the requisite combination of speed and sustained firepower. But as the number of warships in the fleet shrink s to barely half its Reagan-era peak, the Navy has to make hard choices about what mix of vessels is best suited to implement its new doctrine of littoral wa rfare.

<P> Aside from Marine Corps amphibious assets, the service seems to be evol ving toward a mix of three next-generation warships: advanced large-deck aircra ft carriers, multimission surface combatants, and versatile attack subs. In eac h case, the next-generation vessel will be expected to accomplish a broader spe ctrum of missions than the ship classes it replaces, while being much less manp ower- and maintenance-intensive. New technologies such as electric drive and di gital networks will enhance the efficiency of each vessel and will link ships, aircraft, and space assets together in an integrated warfighting system greater than the sum of its parts. Navy insiders call this a transition from "platform -centric" to "network-centric" warfare.

<P> In doctrinal terms the revolution is already well advanced. The Navy knows what capabilities it is seeking in next-generation warships, and has begun development of all three classes. But there are challenges with each class caused by inadequate funding:

<P> Development of the New Attack Submarine ("NSSN" in naval nomenclature) has progressed to a point where initial production can begin. However, even though the versatile sub will be the only undersea warship produced for the foreseeable future and may even be modified to serve as a successor to Trident strategic-missile subs there is uncertainty as to whether the Navy can afford the annual build rate of two to three boats necessary to sustain an adequate fleet.

<P> Development of a new destroyer, designated DD-21, is still in its infancy, but the vessels diverse mission requirements ranging from land attack to theater missile defense to antisubmarine warfare are raising doubts about whether it can operate as planned with a much reduced crew of perhaps 100 sailors. This program may need increased funding to assure that all required capabilities are suitably integrated in time to commence production in the next decade.

<P> Development of an advanced replacement for large-deck Nimitz-class aircraft carriers has been slowed by budgetary constraints, forcing the Navy to gradually introduce new design innovations over a period of many years. The consequences of this delay will be compounded by the Clinton administrations unwillingness to fund the necessary force structure of 15 carriers, which would require production of one new carrier every four years rather than five.

<P> In addition to these long-term challenges, there are two more pressing issues that the Navy must address soon. First, the aging EA-6B Prowler carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft, which provides tactical jamming for all U.S. military aircraft, must be replaced in the near future. With only a hundred such aircraft available worldwide on any given day and their average age approaching 18 years (production ceased 10 years ago), it is just a matter of time before lack of coverage leads to combat losses. Providing adequate coverage of U.S. strike aircraft during the Kosovo operation required shifting a third of available assets to the Balkan theater, leaving other regions thinly protected. Since it is too late to begin the lengthy development of a "clean-sheet" replacement aircraft, the only practical solution is to take advanced jamming equipment already in development for the Prowler and integrate it into a variant of the Navys new strike aircraft, the F/A-18 Super Hornet. The Super Hornet will be the dominant fighter-bomber in the Navy inventory for the foreseeable future, so making it the host for electronic-warfare missions will minimize logistics costs and maximize air-wing flexibility.

<P> The other pressing near-term issue is disposition of four Trident ballistic-missile submarines due to depart strategic service early in the next decade. These boats are in need of nuclear refueling and probably are no longer required for the deterrence mission. But their large size makes them well-suited for use as stealthy land-attack warships carrying cruise missiles. Modifying the

subs for that mission would be an innovative and low-cost approach to bolstering the firepower for littoral warfare, but because it cuts across traditional mission lines, the service has not fully embraced the concept. Conversion needs to be funded while the option still exists.

<P> The Marine Corps has made huge progress in recent years modernizing its aging collection of amphibious combat vessels. A class of eight very capable LHD amphibious assault vessels they look like small aircraft carriers and cost over \$1 billion each will be complemented by a dozen new San Antonio-class vessels incorporating advanced design concepts and technology, leaving the service well positioned in terms of combat vessels for the next century. However, the corps faces major problems with an obsolescent aircraft fleet that have been exacerbated by Clinton Administration cutbacks in the planned production run and rate of the V-22 tiltrotor aircraft. The V-22 features the range and speed of a fixed-wing aircraft, combined with the vertical ascent/descent of a helicopter. It is the most important new aircraft the corps has purchased in two generations. The program needs to be restored to higher production goals at accelerated rates, before more Marines fall victim to their aging aircraft. The corps also needs to ensure that its next-generation Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle is adequately funded, because existing vehicles for transiting from ship to shore lack the range, speed, flexibility, and protection for littoral warfare in the next century.

<P> Information revolution

<P> THE FINAL OVERARCHING GOAL of an investment strategy for future military supremacy can be covered quickly, because it is not so much a mission area as a mindset. Virtually all of the advanced military systems and capabilities discussed above draw on new information technologies. From the pinpoint accuracy of smart bombs to the battle management of missile defenses to the superior connectivity of network-centric warfare, it is apparent that every facet of America's military posture is now permeated with digital processors and software. This is arguably the greatest military achievement of the Clinton years, a broadly based breakthrough in capabilities grounded in awareness that Cold War systems can be made much more effective through the insertion of new technology.

<P> Over the next several decades, the armed forces must make a costly transition from the insertion of digital components to exploiting the full potential of the information revolution. But it is important to recognize that most of the major weapon systems that will be found in the force posture of 2020 have already been built today. The nation cannot afford to simply walk away from this vast investment in military hardware, and it doesn't need to. Innovative upgrades of older systems can keep many of them relevant to combat even as the full potential of the information revolution is being realized in a new generation of weapons.

<P> Rather than permitting sharp discontinuities in capability as the result of a fitful transition to something fundamentally new, it is more prudent and affordable to gradually introduce next-generation weapons into a force structure

re where proven systems still have a place. That means systematically applying digital technologies across the force structure and to its underlying logistics base rather than reserving them for the "gee-whiz" weapons of tomorrow. The Clinton administration made a good start on this process, one on which future administrations should try to build.

<P> The price of supremacy

<P> DISCUSSIONS OF FUTURE MILITARY requirements lead inevitably to questions about affordability particularly in periods of diminished danger, when the consequences of failing to modernize forces are less apparent. While the cost of the investment program set forth above would be considerable, some perspective on the scale and composition of current U.S. military spending is in order. Viewed in the light of post-Cold War threats, the scale of U.S. defense expenditures in the late 1990s was already quite imposing; at about one-third of the global total, it is many times the military budget of any existing adversary. But while dangers to democracy are at their lowest ebb in three generations, that situation cannot prudently be expected to last indefinitely. Moreover, much of America's current quarter-trillion-dollar annual defense budget is spent inefficiently on redundant bases, the high overhead costs of an all-volunteer force, and support functions that should long since have been contracted to the private sector.

<P> If the Defense Department were operated according to the management standards prevailing at the nation's most competitive private companies, it would probably be feasible to accommodate the proposed investment agenda within planned budgets. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration's efforts to reform Pentagon management practices were mainly rebuffed by Congress. Furthermore, it is doubtful that government could ever come close to matching the efficiency of the marketplace, and even trying to do so might undercut popular support for defense spending. In any event, fundamental reform takes time, and after the depressed investment spending of the last decade, that is one thing the armed forces do not have. A program to preserve global military supremacy needs to be funded now.

<P> That means political leaders must abandon the belief that they can enjoy sustained military supremacy for only 3 percent of gross domestic product, the level of defense spending prevailing in 1999. Some say, reform first. But insisting on "fixing" the Pentagon before major increases in military expenditure are approved would be like refusing to increase Medicare and Medicaid expenditures until those programs are reformed: Many people may die before the system is noticeably improved.

<P> The good news is that U.S. economic activity is so robust compared with that of current or prospective enemies that global military supremacy can be sustained for only a modest additional increment of national wealth: on the order of 0.5 percent of GDP. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in July 1999 that U.S. gross domestic product in fiscal 2002 will for the first time surpass \$10 trillion. Following Clinton administration guidelines, defense spending t

he same year is likely to total about \$300 billion, matching its current 3 percent claim on national output.

<P> Fiscal 2002 (beginning October 1, 2001) is also the first full budget year for President Clinton's successor. It thus will be the critical year for establishing the tenor and priorities of a new administration. A commitment to increase defense spending by an average of half a percent of GDP over the subsequent eight years would ensure that all of the investment goals for future military supremacy described above could be met (so long as the new president's defense managers maintained a clear sense of their goals). It would enable the United States to begin rapid development of real homeland defenses, to bolster its global air and space superiority, to leverage the benefits of maritime supremacy, and to realize the full military potential of the information revolution.

<P> Critics would undoubtedly complain that a defense budget increase ranging from \$50 billion in 2002 to \$70 billion in 2010 (assuming a \$14 trillion GDP in the latter year) is excessive. In a limited sense, they might be right: Quickly increasing defense spending in the first year of a new administration could lead to waste. In the larger sense, however, they would be wrong. The share of national output allocated to defense would still be less than half the 7.5 percent average of the Cold War years. And because per capita GDP is so much bigger now than it was then, the sacrifice of average taxpayers would be smaller still.

<P> It is important to keep in mind that the real (after-inflation) buying power of the U.S. defense budget has declined continuously since fiscal 1986. Increasing the defense budget by the equivalent of half a percent of GDP would barely restore its buying power to the level at which it stood at the beginning of the 1990s, long after the decline from the peak spending of the Reagan years had commenced.

<P> But this still would be sufficient to meet the investment requirements of global military supremacy. One reason is that the Clinton administration programmed a 42 percent nominal increase in procurement spending into its fiscal 2000-2005 defense budget plan (from \$53 billion to \$75 billion in "then-year" dollars). Skeptics who remember the administrations' repeated deferral of promised procurement increases in the mid-1990s were right to question whether this commitment would mean anything years after Clinton left office. But the plan is there, and a new administration has the option of building on it, not only by purchasing the sinews of long-term military superiority, but also by bolstering the readiness accounts that robbed procurement spending during the Clinton years.

<P> So global military supremacy is affordable at a level of sacrifice that many citizens might hardly notice. In a nation that now spends 6 percent to 7 percent of national wealth on various forms of gambling, it hardly seems unrealistic to expect that half that amount might be spent on defense. After all, the alternative might be to suffer military defeat at the hands of an emerging competitor sometime in the first half of the next century. That may seem improbable

e today, but who foresaw the full extent of the danger that would be posed by fascism or communism in the early years after the Great War? Human nature has not changed. If no other lesson can be learned from the deaths of 100 million human beings in conflicts during the American Century, there is at least the one that lingers from the experience of Rome two millennia ago as well: Over the long run it costs far more to be unprepared for war than it does to be well-armed and ready.

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<P>Weekly Standard

October 25, 1999

Pg. 11

<P>The Senate Republicans Finest Hour

<P>By William Kristol and Robert Kagan

<P> Last weeks rejection by the Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was the most responsible and courageous action by that body since the 1991 vote authorizing the Gulf War. In the face of a hostile media, a well-organized an

d well-funded international "arms control" industry, polls showing majority support for the treaty, and explicit threats by Democrats and the White House to use the vote against Republicans in the 2000 elections, Republican senators cast a decisive vote in favor of serious American global leadership. With this one vote, Republicans proved that they are the only party that can be trusted with the stewardship of the nations security.

<P> The fact that they are being pilloried by the elite media should not give Republicans a moments pause about whether they did the right thing. On the contrary: They should be proud. The Test Ban Treaty is to the late 1990s what the "nuclear freeze" movement was to the early 1980s and the SALT II agreement was to the late 1970s. All were bad and dangerous proposals that appealed both to the utopian fantasists of the arms control theocracy and to those who have always believed that the most dangerous nuclear weapons in the world are the ones in Americas arsenal. Forget all the pious declarations by advocates that the treaty would somehow have magically restrained the likes of North Korea, China, and Pakistan from building up their own nuclear capabilities, or prevented Iraq and Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. That claim, which was manifestly absurd, was only cover for what really animated the push for the treaty. As Thomas Graham, president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, told the Washington Post, the Test Ban Treaty was part of a larger project: for the United States "to pursue disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons."

<P> That was the real game here. The same people who two decades ago wanted to disarm the United States in our confrontation with the Soviet Union today want the United States to disarm in our confrontation with the disparate forces of evil in the post-Cold War world. Republicans were right to reject such misguided and dangerous fantasizing then. They are right to reject it now.

<P> The accounts of last weeks vote in the New York Times and Washington Post were comical. According to the journalists who "covered" the story, Republican "hard-liners" killed the most important treaty of the twentieth century in pursuit of narrow, partisan advantage. The Times in its hyperventilating front-page headline actually claimed that the defeat of the Test Ban Treaty "Evokes Versailles Pact Defeat." That papers R.W. Apple, in what surely must rank as the most embarrassing "news analysis" of the past decade, pulled out all the stops: The Senates rejection of the treaty "not only further weakened the already shaky standing of the United States as a global moral leader." Indeed, the rejection "went to the very heart of the efforts by the victorious allies to build a safer world in the wake of World War II." Why, Apple informs us breathlessly, "on Tuesday of this week, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged American ratification, arguing that it would serve as an example and promote the ratification of the treaty by other countries." Talk about self-parodic.

<P> What accounts for such hysteria? One might compare the lefts faith in arms control to old-fashioned religious fervor, except that to do so is unfair to so much religious belief, which at least tries to account for inconvenient evidence and arguments. The fact is, even supporters, like the Washington Post, admit

tted that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was flawed, that its monitoring and verification mechanisms were suspect, and that U.S. ratification would in no way have guaranteed that other nuclear and would-be nuclear powers would have ratified it, much less that they would have abided by it. The fact is, no international agreement can possibly be relied upon, by itself, to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. And the fact is, U.S. ratification would most likely have ended up placing dangerous restrictions on the reliability of the American nuclear arsenal without similarly restricting the capabilities of other nuclear powers, present and future.

<P> This is to say nothing of the core objection to the treaty, brilliantly summarized by Richard Perle:

<P> <I>In domestic affairs, no one would seriously propose that the police and criminals come together and sign agreements according to which they accept the same set of constraints on their freedom of action. Yet that is the underlying logic of the CTBT: a compact among nation states, some of which are current or likely criminals, othersthe majorityrespectful of international law and their treaty obligations. Because there can be no realistic hope of verifying compliance with the CTBT, this fundamental flaw, which is characteristic of global agreements, is greatly magnified. The net result of ratification of the CTBT would be a) American compliance, which could leave the U.S. uncertain about the safety and reliability of its nuclear deterrent; and b) almost certain cheating by one or more rogue states determined to acquire nuclear weapons.

</I><P> But leave all this aside: If ratification of this treaty was of such transcendent interest to the United States and the worldif it was, as the Times insists, the most important treaty of the twentieth centuryhow is it that President Clinton barely lifted a finger to press for its passage? How is it that Clinton did not expend a micron of his political capital, did not risk a single digit in his approval rating, to try to push this treaty through the Senate? After all, the president signed the Test Ban Treaty over three years ago, in September 1996. We don't recall his making it a major campaign issue that year. Nor did he make ratification of the treaty an issue in the 1998 congressional elections.

<P> In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan gave a speech after a televised speech on foreign policy issues of importance. Clinton, by contrast, has never once appeared before the American people to try to explain or sell what were now being told is the cornerstone of peace and the international order. And as long as we were making comparisons to 1919, how about this: Although in desperately poor health, Woodrow Wilson toured the nation stumping for his treaty, and the exertion killed him. Clinton last week met with a few senators and made a few phone calls. According to the Times, the administration's approach to the treaty was one of "benign neglect."

<P> In short, the treaty was so vitally important that the president could hardly bring himself to talk about it. The strongest statement Clinton made in its defense came a day after its rejection, in which he preposterously accused

the Republican opponents of the treaty who include the likes of Richard Lugar and John McCain, Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick of "a new isolationism."

<P> Which leads us to the question of partisanship. Who was really playing politics with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? Not the Republicans. Anyone who thinks Republicans were playing to their constituents on this vote is living on another planet. The polls were against them last week and probably will still be against them come next November. Instead, it's the Democrats who all along were sharpening their knives for the coming election season. The day after the vote, Al Gore already had his ads ready to go. The Democrats can't wait to blame the Republicans the next time India or Pakistan or some other nation carries out a nuclear test.

<P> The bad faith of the Clinton administration and Senate Democrats in the ratification debate was breathtaking. The Republicans did not go looking for this fight. It was Senate Democrats who taunted Senate majority leader Trent Lott and threatened to bring Senate business to a halt unless they got a vote on the treaty. The Democrats did this knowing that they didn't have the votes to ratify. They wanted the Republicans either to refuse to let the treaty come up for a vote or to vote the treaty down. Either way, the Democrats figured, they would have the issue for the next elections. This may well have been smart politics. But let's not pretend it was about anything other than politics. Neither the Senate Democrats nor the White House were thinking seriously about the treaty. They were not thinking about the damage that might allegedly be done to U.S. credibility were the treaty to fail in the Senate. If they had been thinking seriously about these matters, they wouldn't have tried this gambit.

<P> Republicans called the Democrats bluff, and in doing so, went to the trouble of taking the treaty seriously. Led by senator Jon Kyl, they brought experts and prominent former officials like James Schlesinger and Brent Scowcroft to the Hill to discuss the merits of the treaty. Convinced that the treaty was deeply harmful to U.S. interests, Kyl organized briefings for senators and methodically set about the business of collecting votes against it. One of the New York Times reporters last week characterized Kyl's efforts as "political intrigue" as if a senator's reviewing a treaty's merits and marshalling opposition to it were somehow shady and illegitimate activities. Kyl's efforts apparently took the Democrats and the White House by surprise. Why? Because, unlike Kyl, they couldn't be bothered to build their case.

<P> Fortunately, at the end of the day, seriousness prevailed. Republicans have struck a blow at arms control fantasies, thereby showing an admirable willingness unlike their critics across the aisle, at the White House, and in the newsroom to confront the real world, with all its multiplying dangers, without illusion. The Clinton administration would have us believe that the problems of nuclear proliferation can be addressed by gaining ever more signatories to an ever growing plethora of weak international conventions. This while the administration manifestly fails to do anything about the proliferation of weapons in Iraq and Iran, tries to bribe North Korea into halting its programs, and consistently coddles the ever-proliferating Chinese. And this while the administration d

rag's heels on building a missile defense system that can protect the United States and its allies from real threats today and in coming years.

<P> Senate Republicans have blown the whistle on this charade, and they are to be congratulated and encouraged. This year it's the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Maybe next year they can press the administration to submit its amended ABM Treaty to the Senate, so they can vote that down too. After that, a Republican president can take over, rebuild our defenses, make the case to the American people for serious global leadership, and work realistically for a more secure world.

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<P>Weekly Standard

October 25, 1999

Pg. 24

<P>"The Right Thing For Our Country"

<I><P>How Jon Kyl and a handful of his Republican colleagues in the Senate engineered the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

</I><P>By Matthew Rees

<P> After all the fireworks, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty took a drubbing. Fifty-one senators voted against it, 17 more than were needed to block ratification. Yet up until the very eve of the vote, a high-stakes struggle for the heart of Trent Lott was going on behind the scenes.

<P> The majority leader had to choose between holding a vote on ratification and delaying it. His intentions were unclear as late as Wednesday afternoon, when the president called to plead for postponement. That Lott told the president, in so many words, to buzz off was due primarily to the persistence of a small band of conservative Republicans, but also to the arrogance of Senate Democrats and the Clinton administration and the last-minute legal advice of a Washington lawyer.

<P> The backdrop to last week's drama is as follows: President Clinton signed the CTBT, which obliges signatories to permanently forsake all nuclear testing, in September 1996 and submitted the treaty to the Senate a year later. It was immediately referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, where it languished with no hope of going anywhere. Committee chairman Jesse Helms promised not to move on it until the president also submitted the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Kyoto environmental protocol for ratification--something Clinton showed no intention of doing.

<P> A prolonged stalemate ensued, but it drew little notice outside foreign-policy circles. Indeed, the stalemate might persist to this day but for the spadework of a few Republican senators--Jon Kyl in particular--who were committed either to ensuring the treaty remained bottled up in committee or to killing it outright.

<P> The impetus for action came in April, when Kyl learned the Clinton administration had arranged for an international conference on the future of the treaty, scheduled for September, to be held in New York. This suggested to Kyl the administration would use the conference to mount a massive campaign in favor of ratifying the CTBT. More important, it suggested that for such a campaign to be defeated, he needed to start organizing senators who might oppose the treaty.

<P> Soon thereafter, Kyl drafted Paul Coverdell, an energetic Republican senator and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, to join his crusade. Their first meeting, in May, was with Lott and Helms, both of whom indicated their support for finding a way to kill the treaty or keep it buried in committee. Kyl and Coverdell promptly began meeting with other Republican senators to gauge their opinions on the treaty; a month later they were pleasantly surprised to discover as many as 30 were already opposed. Equally important, all but one of the 17 GOP senators up for reelection next year indicated they'd be happy to see the treaty defeated in 1999 (Jim Jeffords, a Vermont liberal, was the lone holdout), in hopes of preventing it from becoming a political hot potato during their campaigns. When Kyl and Coverdell shared their intelligence with Lott, he indicated for the first time that he might be willing to bring the treaty up for

a vote later in the year.

<P> This encouraged the dynamic duo to intensify their efforts during the August recess. They compiled briefing books for Republican senators containing countless articles and memos making the case against the treaty and began recruiting former government officials who could speak to the treaty's many shortcomings. They also brought in two of their conservative colleagues--senators Tim Hutchinson and Jeff Sessions--to expand their advocacy efforts.

<P> Shortly after the senators returned to Washington in September, Kyl, Coverdell, Lott, and Helms met to plot strategy. Lott had just been informed there were now 34 "no" votes, enough to block ratification of the CTBT. But he and Helms opposed bringing the treaty up for debate until there were 40 hard votes against it. Helms in particular pointed out that some opponents were sure to weaken under pressure from the White House, just as they did during the 1997 debate over a chemical-weapons treaty.

<P> Two developments around this time proved crucial in the effort to defeat the treaty. First, Senate Democrats escalated their criticism of Republicans for refusing to release the CTBT for a vote. On July 20 every Democratic senator had signed a letter urging a vote by September. Then on September 8, in a now infamous statement, Byron Dorgan vowed "to plant myself on the floor like a potted plant" and disrupt Senate business if the Republicans refused to schedule debate and a vote on the treaty. Republicans could barely contain their glee over attacks like these, as they suggested Democrats still hadn't realized the extent of the GOP's mobilization against the treaty.

<P> The second development was the success of the Kyl/Coverdell education campaign. Throughout September the two complemented their own canvassing of Senate Republicans with a series of briefings by outside experts. Two former senior officials of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, now retired, flew in from Hawaii, for example, to speak with senators about the treaty and answer their questions.

<P> Even more valuable was James Schlesinger, whose previous posts include director of the CIA, secretary of defense, secretary of energy, and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In a low-key presentation at a September 21 luncheon for Republican senators, Schlesinger spelled out the flaws in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Some cite this as the turning point in bringing wavering Republicans around to opposing the treaty.

<P> Schlesinger later conducted briefings for small groups of senators, and when Susan Collins, a Maine moderate, wavered, he initiated a private meeting with her. Their 30-minute session helped cement her opposition. Even Lott later acknowledged, "James Schlesinger was the one that had the greatest impact on me."

<P> Its no coincidence that by the end of September, when Kyl, Coverdell, Helms, and Lott met again to evaluate their strategy, 44 Senate Republicans had made solid commitments to vote against the treaty. This prompted Helms to say he would let the treaty out of the Foreign Relations Committee, confident it could be defeated in the full Senate. The lingering question was whether Democrats remained sufficiently clueless about the GOP strategy to keep agitating for a vote.

<P> The answer came quickly. On September 29, senator Joseph Biden told Helms of his plan to offer an amendment to the Labor-HHS appropriations bill with a resolution pledging the Foreign Relations Committee to hearings on the treaty, and pledging the majority leader to schedule debate and a vote on the Senate floor. Lott mischievously called Bidens bluff, saying there was no need for an amendment; he'd be happy to schedule 10 hours of debate on the treaty, then a vote. Kyl and other Republicans thought Democrats would get suspicious at this point, but the only substantive change requested by minority leader Tom Daschle was more time for consideration of the treaty. Lott promptly offered 22 hours, and by October 1 a unanimous consent agreement had passed the Senate, committing the treaty to a vote once the 22 hours had elapsed.

<P> Just why the Democrats fell into the GOP trap of agreeing to a vote is debated in Republican circles. Some believe it was because Daschle, Biden, and the administration still didn't know Republicans had ginned up enough opposition to the treaty to kill it. (If true, this would rank as one of the more extraordinary boners in recent Senate history.) Another theory, advanced by GOP senator Slade Gorton, is that Democrats had concluded they could persuade enough Republicans to vote for the treaty or force a delay if it were headed for defeat. Daschle confirmed that this was part of the Democratic strategy: "We made the assessment that there would be open-minded Republicans willing to work with us to come up with the necessary revisions." Given the flexibility of Lott and others during debate on the chemical-weapons treaty, this was not an unreasonable expectation, though Daschle also conceded that "there are a lot of people who hold responsibility [for the defeat] and I take my share."

<P> Yet it quickly became obvious the Democrats had been outmaneuvered. The administration initially tried schmoozing a few undecided Republican senators by inviting them to dinner with Clinton at the White House, but the president was brooding, and the evening was a disaster (Clinton slammed the table at one point, complaining, "Trent Lott has me by the short hairs"). Next was a brief war-room offensive, but Republicans were ready with responses. The White House, for example, began trumpeting that 32 Nobel laureates had endorsed ratifying the treaty. Kyl responded with a letter signed by six former defense secretaries opposing ratification. When William Cohen, secretary of defense, held a press conference on the importance of supporting the treaty, Helms went to the Senate floor and quoted from Cohens statements as a senator opposing a ban on nuclear testing. The ultimate blow came on October 7, when Richard Lugar, the administrations most consistent Republican ally on foreign policy, announced his opposition to the treaty. This, according to Gorton, was "fatal."

<P> Lugars announcement convinced the administration and Senate Democrats t

here was no hope of securing enough votes to ratify the treaty, at which point they wisely modified their message. From that point forward, they stressed the danger to the "international community" in rejecting the treaty and the need to postpone the vote. Before long, 62 senators, many of them Republican opponents of the treaty, had signed a letter endorsing this general idea. Lott was clearly intrigued, and did nothing to discourage Republicans like John Warner from calling for delay.

<P> So what prevented Lott from making a last-minute deal? Democrats objected to the central GOP demand in exchange for postponing the vote, i.e. that the Senate not reconsider the treaty before 2001 (Republicans fear Democrats will push for a vote on the eve of next years elections). Daschle made a last-ditch effort on October 12, writing to Lott that there would be no attempt to schedule a vote this year or next "absent unforeseen changes in the international situation." But even moderate Republican senators ridiculed this exception--"absurd," Gorton told me--and it went nowhere.

<P> Another obstacle to agreement also emerged on October 12, when Kyl began circulating information he'd been given by Doug Feith, a Washington lawyer and senior Reagan Pentagon official. The gist of the matter was that signatories of the CTBT are obligated not to conduct nuclear tests undercutting the object of the treaty even if they have not ratified it (Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). This suggested that postponing the vote was a backdoor way of implementing the treaty. Kyl also circulated a brief written in 1996 by John Holum, a senior arms-control official in the Clinton administration, affirming the point.

<P> The final obstacle to a deal was the conservatives' resolve. They signaled to Lott their opposition to postponing the vote, but the key episode came late on the evening of October 12. Lott met with Kyl, Coverdell, and Helms to discuss some conversations he'd been having with Daschle, but the senators made it clear they wouldn't support a deal along the lines Daschle was proposing. Later, Jim Inhofe, a Republican critic of the treaty, arrived at the meeting and upped the ante, telling Lott he would use his power to block any effort to postpone the vote. Lott came away from the meeting resigned to holding a vote. It didn't hurt that Dick Cheney, secretary of defense in the Bush administration, called Lott the next day from Canada and urged him to kill the treaty.

<P> Yet even after the vote, Republican senators and their staffs emphasized to me how amazed they were at the ham-handedness of Clinton officials throughout the entire process. Coverdell, among others, noted that had the president called Lott a week before the vote, instead of two hours before, it might have been possible to cut a deal. Yet rather than extend an olive branch, Clinton devoted much of his October 8 press conference in Ottawa to repeatedly charging the Republicans with politicizing the treaty vote (moments after Clinton made these comments, they were distributed to Lott and other wavering Republicans). Symbolic of the administration's poor handling of its lobbying effort was that on October 13, the day of the Senate vote, Cohen and secretary of state Madeleine Albright were not even in Washington, choosing instead to make a joint appearance at the University of Maine.

<P> These mistakes notwithstanding, Kyl, Coverdell, Helms, and Lott achieved something no one would have predicted a few months ago. It's all the more remarkable in that Republicans have had few such triumphs since winning their congressional majorities in 1994. Defeating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may, of course, prove to be an isolated victory. A day after the vote there were already signs of GOP queasiness. Still, a beaming Lott seemed to speak for many of his fellow Republicans when he said, "We did the right thing for our country, and I'm very proud of it."


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<P>Washington Times

October 19, 1999

Pg. 19

<P>Fusillade Of Fabrications

<P>By Frank J. Gaffney Jr., The Washington Times

<P> The great masses of the people . . . will more easily fall victims to a big lie than to a small one.

<P> - Adolf Hitler, 'Mein Kampf'

<P> In the wake of Bill Clinton's stinging repudiation by the Senate over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) last week, the president, his subordinates and their allies outside the administration have responded by repeatedly smearing Republican opponents of this accord with what can only be called "big lies."

<P> This practice was much in evidence in the course of Mr. Clinton's press conference last week where he declared the GOP was engaging in "a reckless partisanship - it threatens America's economic well-being and, now, our national security."

<P> Early in what amounted to the better part of an hourlong rant on that occasion, the president declared without a hint of irony: "It's been my experience that very often in politics when a person is taking a position that he simply cannot defend, the only defense is to attack the opponent."

<P> The truth is, however, that it is the Clinton administration whose position on the CTBT is indefensible and whose only "defense" is now to attack those senators who courageously voted to reject a treaty that an actual majority of senators found to be insupportable.

<P> Consider some of the more outrageous of the big lies being used to defame the 51 Republicans who voted against the CTBT:

<P> * Big Lie: Partisan Republicans didn't allow enough time for hearings or debate or afford the needed opportunity for amendment of the Treaty.

<P> The Truth: Every senator, Democrat as well as Republican, explicitly assented to the unanimous consent agreement that set out the arrangements under which the CTBT was considered. Evidently, so long as Senate Democrats and the Clinton administration thought their side had the votes - or would get them in the end - the duration and particulars of the debate were deemed sufficient. If the task is simply to rubber-stamp a treaty, the job doesn't take that long. In fact, with the notable recent exception of the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention, no arms control treaty since the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been subjected to protracted and rigorous Senate debate.

<P> The Democrat complaints about a rush to judgment and their demand for an 11th-hour stay of execution only started when it became apparent that Republican senators - unlike most of their colleagues across the aisle - had actually backed up on the Comprehensive Test Ban (thanks to the leadership of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, the personal efforts of Sens. Jon Kyl of Arizona and Paul Coverdell of Georgia, and most especially the briefings of experts like former Carter Energy Secretary James Schlesinger) - and that the CTBT was headed for

defeat.

<P> In the end, the widely shared conviction that this accord was irremediably flawed and that delay would not improve it caused all 55 Republican senators to vote to keep to the original schedule, dooming President Clinton's efforts to try to cut the sorts of deals on unrelated matters that allowed the CWC to squeak through eight months after it was nearly killed by the Senate in September 1996.

<P> * Big Lie: The treaty was killed by hard-line Republicans who oppose bipartisan approaches to foreign policy in general and arms control in particular.

<P> The Truth: The 34 votes needed to kill the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - to say nothing of the absolute majority the opponents ultimately mustered - would not have been possible without the support of senators like Richard Lugar of Indiana, Thad Cochran of Mississippi, Ted Stevens of Alaska, Pete Domenici of New Mexico and Olympia Snowe of Maine. These are legislators with unbroken records of bipartisanship in support for arms control agreements and foreign policy initiatives they deem to be in the national interest.

<P> It is contemptible and irresponsible to suggest these members in particular would act as they did out of any motivation other than what they believed to be best for the national security and the international effort to achieve real constraints upon the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. Indeed, those who insist the Senate put partisanship before the national interest merely display their ignorance of the substantive nature of the debate and vote - and their biases with respect to both the CTBT itself and the proposition that the Senate is supposed to be more than a rubber-stamp in the treaty-making process.

<P> * Big Lie: As White House press spokesman Joe Lockhart put it Friday, in the wake of the CTBT's defeat: "The titanic debate that has gone on over the last several years within the Republican Party has finally been settled in favor of Fortress America - isolationism."

<P> The Truth: Far from seeking an isolated United States, the Republican majority voted to assure the military capability that most underpins America's international engagement - the United States' nuclear deterrent - remains safe, reliable and effective. The difference between the CTBT's Senate opponents and proponents is not over the formers' support for Fortress America or "going it alone" and the latter's conviction that allies and forward defense arrangements are critical to the nation's security. Rather, the difference that emerged from the Senate vote is between divergent views about how best the United States can "engage" and, in particular, the role nuclear weapons should play in American security policy.

<P> Those who believe, as most senators evidently do, that America's global leadership, international interests and security are better served by a credible deterrent than by an unverifiable, unenforceable treaty that would undermine that deterrent, should welcome the debate being promised - or, more accurately, threatened - by CTBT proponents. Senatorial, to say nothing of popular, opposition to this treaty can only be strengthened by intensified exposure of the public to the woolly-headed, radical anti-nuclear agenda of which the zero-yield, permanent Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has long been a cornerstone. And that's no lie.

<P> <I>Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is the President of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times. </I>

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<P>San Diego Union-Tribune

October 18, 1999

<P>Moving The World Back From Nuclear Brink

<P>By Ira Helfand

<P> Last week's vote in the Senate to kill the nuclear test ban treaty was a tragic example of Cold War-era thinking on nuclear weapons. Perhaps the only good to come from this arms-control defeat is the reminder that the nuclear threat is still with us.

<P> As the repercussions of this vote play out across the globe, it is critical that President Clinton take action to reassure the international community. He should immediately act with the Russian leadership to get our nuclear weapons off high-alert status.

<P> The stakes could not be higher. Some 10 years after the end of the Cold War, there are still at least 4,500 nuclear warheads sitting on top of Russian and American missiles on hair-trigger alert. They can be launched in 15 minutes and reach their target cities in 30 minutes, destroying the world as we know it.

<P> A study published in the April 30, 1998, issue of the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that the missiles aboard just one Russian Delta 4 submarine would kill 6.7 million people in the first 30 minutes with an additional 6 million to 12 million people dying of radiation illness in the following weeks.

<P> Concern about accidental nuclear war is particularly acute as we approach Jan. 1 and the expected failure of many computer systems.

<P> For more than a year Pentagon officials have been reassuring the American public that Y2K-related computer glitches will not increase the danger of accidental nuclear war between the United States and Russia. But recently, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner conceded that the most important safeguard against such a war, the "Hotline" that links U.S. and Russian nuclear command centers, is not Y2K compliant.

<P> The Pentagon now assures us that these fixes are "in the mail" and will be completed in time.

<P> Let us hope so.

<P> But we do not have to have a Y2K-related computer problem to trigger an accidental nuclear war; there are many other possible scenarios.

<P> On Jan. 25, 1995, Russian military radar misinterpreted a weather rocket launched from Norway as a possible attack on Russia. For the first time in the history of the nuclear era, the "Suitcase" carried by the Russian president was activated, and Boris Yeltsin, a man with serious health and substance-abuse problems, was given five minutes to decide how to respond to this "attack." His options included an all-out nuclear attack on the United States, which at that time would have involved 4,000 nuclear warheads destroying every major population center in the United States.

<P> We don't know exactly what happened in the Kremlin that morning, but by great good luck we did not have an all-out nuclear war.

<P> Jan. 25 was an ordinary day. There was no great international crisis, not even a minor bump in relations between the United States and Russia. Yet our policy of maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert brought us to the brink of global destruction.

<P> Shall the keystone of our nuclear policy continue to be the hope that we will have good luck in the future?

<P> For more than two years now a group of eminent military leaders led by Gen. George Lee Butler, former commander of all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has been calling on the president to get all U.S. and Russian nuclear missiles off high-alert status. The president has not acted.

<P> On Sept. 7, the American Medical Association joined this call in a letter to the president. Citing the decisive action of President George Bush in eliminating tactical nuclear weapons at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the AMA declared that "the present danger demands similar visionary leadership today" and called on the president to get nuclear missiles off hair-trigger alert.

<P> In 1995 the nuclear powers won extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by promising to live up to their obligations under Article VI to work for an end to nuclear testing and the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

<P> Senate rejection of the test ban is a refutation of that promise. But President Clinton can help us step back from the brink. De-alerting -- increasing the time needed to prepare nuclear missiles for launching -- does not require a treaty. It can be done by the presidents of the United States and Russia. Clinton should take the initiative -- now.

<P> <I>Helfand is a co-founder and past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility and former North American vice president of PSR's international federation, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. For its work in alerting the public to the dangers of nuclear war, IPPNW was awarded the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize. </I>

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<P>New Republic

October 18, 1999

Pg. 4

<P>Nuclear Presence

<P> To The Editors: Patrick Clawson's conclusion in "Stealth Bombing" (September 6)--that the United States needs to support the Iraqi opposition in overthrowing Saddam Hussein--is most welcome. America's Middle East experts have lagged behind certain national security figures in advocating such a course. But, as someone consulted by a TNR fact-checker for this article, I would like to point out a major error.

<P> Clawson claimed that the end of the presence of U.N. weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) in Iraq was "no great loss," while "Saddam's nuclear and missile programs are somewhat more vulnerable to detection and destruction now, because they require such large facilities that spy satellites will be able to detect them." That is not necessarily so. During the Gulf war, the United States did not know about Iraq's main nuclear weapons manufacturing center and did not target it. Moreover, Iraq's nuclear program is, in significant respects, more advanced now than it was at that point. After the August 1995 defection of Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamil, who had overseen Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, it was discovered that Iraq's nuclear program had continued after the war and that Iraqi scientists had solved the problem of designing a bomb small enough to fit on a missile. Thus, all Iraq needed to make a nuclear bomb was the fissile material. And, if Iraq managed to get such material, the weapons-fabrication facility to turn it into a bomb would be small--undetectable by satellite.

<P> Clawson wrote only about inspections, failing to mention UNSCOM's monitoring of Iraq's large industrial base. Dual-use equipment was tagged and regularly checked to insure that it had not been diverted for proscribed purposes. The equipment for shaping the core of nuclear bombs was monitored while UNSCOM was there but is not any longer. The same is true about Iraq's missile program. Iraq is allowed to have limited-range "defensive" missiles. While UNSCOM was in Iraq, it could ensure that the country's declared facilities were not being used to build longer-range missiles. But who can tell now?

<P> Saddam's determination to retain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs even in the face of punitive economic sanctions should be a matter of concern, particularly with UNSCOM's presence ended. Had Clawson accurately described the danger, his argument for supporting the Iraqi opposition would have been more compelling and the bankruptcy of present U.S. policy would have been dearer.

<P>Laurie Mylroie, Publisher, Iraq News, Washington, D.C.

<P>Editor's Note: The article referred to appeared in the <I>Current News Supplement,</I> August 23, 1999.

<I><P> Patrick Clawson Replies: Laurie Mylroie is correct that, if Iraq got hold of fissile material, it could produce a nuclear bomb in a small facility not detectable by satellite. Inspections would do little to solve this problem, because the facility needed would be so small that it could be hidden from any conceivable inspections regime. (Also, the necessary equipment is compact enough to be readily smuggled in.) This is one of the reasons the U.S. government puts such a high priority on its program with the former Soviet states to prevent diversion of fissile material.</I>


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<P>New York Times

October 20, 1999

<P>Deadly Politics In Eastern Europe

<P> Although politics has not been a profession for the fainthearted in Belarus and Serbia, until now opposition figures could generally count on staying alive. But in both places activists have recently disappeared or suffered potentially fatal attacks in murky circumstances.

<P> The most widely known incident was the car crash on Oct. 3 that killed the brother-in-law and three bodyguards of Vuk Draskovic in Serbia. Mr. Draskovic is an opportunistic nationalist who has served in Slobodan Milosevic's government and still controls the city of Belgrade and its television station. At the moment he is nominally part of the opposition. He was only slightly injured in the crash, in which a truck swerved directly into his car.

<P> If the government did try to rid itself of Mr. Draskovic, as he has charged, the goal may have been to prevent the formation of a unified opposition. Serbs are fed up with not only Mr. Milosevic but also with the petty divisions among his critics. But those divisions may be lessening. A genuine opposition group called the Alliance for Change has recently staged nightly street rallies, though the police have beaten demonstrators several times.

<P> The protests are small, but they are a positive step that has made the alliance more popular. It and Mr. Draskovic now also agree to press for early elections if certain conditions of fairness are met. Mr. Draskovic is rightly distrustful by Serbia's democrats -- the last time Mr. Milosevic assaulted him and his family, he reacted by embracing the regime. But other members of his party are less authoritarian and belong in a genuine opposition.

<P> In Belarus, ruled by the Stalinist dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko, four prominent opposition leaders have mysteriously disappeared since April. In each case the government says it has no information, even though one of the missing, the former national bank chief Tamara Vinnikova, was under house arrest when she disappeared, and the others were constantly tailed by security police.

<P> If Mr. Lukashenko is now kidnapping opposition leaders, he may be trying to push the opposition into withdrawing from European-sponsored talks about the possibility of free elections next year. Or, as his ties have warmed slightly with Europe and Washington, he may simply be thinking he can get away with it

. The Western group with the most influence in Belarus is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has been inexplicably muted in its defense of Belarus's opposition. It, and foreign governments, must prove Mr. Lukashenko wrong by strengthening their support for Belarus's dissidents.

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<P>Washington Post

October 20, 1999

Pg. 28

<P>Fission At The DOE

<P> THE NOBLE concept of the separation of powers yields plenty of ignoble fights, but few seem quite so base as the one underway at the Department of Energy. Following reports of espionage at the department's nuclear labs, Congress imposed a reorganization of its institutions that will supposedly improve accountability. President Clinton disliked this reform, but this month he signed it into law because it came to him bundled together with popular military pay increases. Having accepted the reorganization, however, the president announced that he would obey its letter but not its spirit. In response, Congress fumes that it may cut salaries or travel expenses for DOE officials.

<P> Neither party comes off well in this fight. By signing a law and simultaneously threatening to ignore its intent, Mr. Clinton has in effect awarded

ed himself a line-item veto more far-reaching even than the one that the Supreme Court recently deemed unconstitutional. This only adds to the strains between executive and legislature. At the same time, however, Congress does not look great. Its effort to promote accountability at the DOE is more likely to dilute it.

<P> In recent years Congress repeatedly has expressed its frustration with the executive branch by tinkering with its institutions. It has pushed the State Department to swallow up the Agency for International Development. It has pushed the Internal Revenue Service and the Census Bureau to accept oversight boards. Now it wants the Department of Energy to set up a semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration to run its nuclear weapons programs.

<P> None of these reforms gets to the main problem at many federal agencies, which is that the multiplication of politically appointed slots has created cumbersome hierarchies. Moreover, the imposition of oversight boards can actually make things worse: They create a new layer of paper shufflers to share responsibility for an agency's performance, thereby diluting the responsibility of the manager who was originally supposed to be running it. Real accountability lies in giving responsibility to one person, who then answers to president and Congress.

<P> Congress's DOE reform repeats this oversight mistake. It gives responsibility for nuclear programs partly to the energy secretary and partly to a new agency chief: In the event of another espionage scandal, each could blame the other. It also creates new bureaucratic complication: Instead of one counterespionage effort, for the Energy Department and for the labs, there will henceforth be two separate ones, and the same goes for all sorts of other functions. Mr. Clinton is right to dislike administrative fission at the DOE. But he is wrong to think that he can sign a law and then get away with flouting it.


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<P>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

October 19, 1999

<P>Plan To Get Oil To Serbs Deserves U.S. Support

<P> Serb politicians who want to liberate their country from the gangster who runs it are working with the European Union on a plan that would achieve several worthwhile political and humanitarian objectives. The Clinton administration, unfortunately, is opposed to the plan, for reasons that border on wishful thinking.

<P> Under the plan, the European Union would provide some \$5 million worth of heating oil to two Serb cities governed by opponents of dictator Slobodan Milosevic, the man whose campaign in Kosovo involved the murder and displacement of thousands of innocent people. The heating oil is necessary because the NATO air war against Milosevic destroyed many of the country's oil refineries and storage facilities.

<P> The plan, called Energy for Democracy, would do at least three good things. First, it would supply help to people who need it. Serbia has been under an economic blockade for several years. The United Nations warns that it faces severe shortages of electricity, oil and coal this winter and that the impact of these shortages will fall most heavily on the aged, the very young, the sick and the urban poor.

<P> Second, it would demonstrate that Serbia's opposition politicians, unlike Milosevic, can deliver the goods. That could increase their political strength and the possibility of Milosevic's eventual ouster.

<P> Third, it would blunt a political weapon that Milosevic has used to defend himself against complaints that he has driven Serbia into bankruptcy and misery. Milosevic claims that these torments result from the embargo, not his own blunders and greed.

<P> The Clinton administration opposes the Energy for Democracy plan because it fears the aid would ease public discontent with Milosevic and thus perpetuate his reign. This is a very chancy proposition; people occupied with keeping their homes warm and their stomachs full generally don't have the time, the inclination or even the energy to engage in political protests, especially against well-entrenched dictators.

<P> Moreover, the heating oil goes to cities ruled by Milosevic's opponents partly to make sure it is not siphoned off by the government and used to heat Milosevic's own house and those of his goons.

<P> It's a timely, humane and smart plan. It ought to be implemented.

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<P>Boston Herald

October 17, 1999

Pg. 26

<P>New North Korea Policy Is Needed

<P> House Republicans are forming a task force to come up with recommendations on a new policy toward North Korea. It's badly needed because President Clinton's policy of bribery and appeasement is going nowhere.

<P> The Republicans will just have to run the risk that Clinton will throw another calculated tantrum and denounce their effort as "partisan politics of the worst kind," as he did with the Senate Republicans' rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty.

<P> North Korea is a good example of an insane government that no treaty can stop from getting nuclear weapons. It signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but that didn't stop it from trying to build bombs.

<P> What did - as far as anyone can tell - was the Clinton administration's formation of a bribery coalition with South Korea, China and Japan to provide oil and food and two nuclear power reactors ill-adapted for making bomb material. In exchange, North Korea was to close an older reactor of a design better suited to making bomb material and the associated plant that could recover that material.

<P> What the coalition failed to appreciate was that the only way North Korea's rulers can think of to survive is to extract aid from others by explicit or implicit threats, such as their test launch of a missile over Japan last year.

<P> This extortion has been going on for five years, and shows no sign of ending. Last month Clinton took the process another step, agreeing to lift certain trade sanctions in exchange for a commitment not to conduct another missile test. Since then the Communist Party newspaper has claimed for the government the sovereign right to "launch a missile any time it feels necessary." In other words, the government won't even reaffirm a test ban agreement it reached a month ago.

<P> If the Clinton administration really cares about nuclear proliferation, it will make sure North Korea cannot make nuclear weapons - or at least any more - and not rely on promises from madmen. This means ending the program to provide new nuclear reactors and substituting other power plants. The North Korean regime has gone back on enough promises - it is still launching guerrilla attacks on South Korea - to justify dropping the reactors even if it doesn't agree.

<P> This should not be done without a great effort to persuade North Korea to comply, an effort which should be targeted at all reasonably competent elements of society, including the armed forces. Anyone contemplating a coup will be able to see the prospect of a better life, and should understand that an end to the government's bitter isolation from the world would be welcomed by the country's neighbors.

<P> House Republicans likely would approve of a renewed effort to deny bombs to North Korea. But this could provoke North Korea to renewed missile threats. Those can be countered with an all-out effort to create anti-missile defenses to protect Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South Korea - which will be highly useful against China too. Sound policy ought not to be rejected just because the other political party would approve.

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<P>Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville)

October 19, 1999

<P>Korea: Another Dud

<P> The Clinton administration's latest deal with North Korea has failed. Last month, with the Pyongyang regime developing a rocket capable of bombing Alaska or Hawaii, an agreement was reached.

<P> The two governments would enter into another round of negotiations, during which Pyongyang would not test fire any more missiles. The United States, in return, would partially lift restrictions on trade, travel and banking.

<P> North Korea got something of value to itself without any obligation whatsoever to reciprocate - except for the duration of talks that it could unilaterally break off at any time.

<P> Sure enough, North Korea has launched a new round of rhetoric aimed at justifying continuation of its missile program. Missile development, said the official newspaper Sunday, is a needed for protection from the "continued menace of the United States."

<P> U.S., South Korean and Japanese forces are assembling an invasion force

south of the DMZ, it added, and an all-out war is "merely a matter of time."

<P> About 500,000 South Korean troops and 30,000 Americans will begin an 11-day joint military exercise next week.

<P> But that is nothing new. The exercise has taken place annually since John Kennedy entered the White House. For 37 straight years, it hasn't been a prelude to invasion. There is no reason to think the 38th year will be different.

<P> Besides, the reference to Japan was pure demagoguery. Japan has done nothing to threaten Pyongyang. But many Koreans still despise the Japanese because of abuses during World War II, and naming them as potential invaders was a rather clumsy attempt to inflame emotions.

<P> Time after time, the United States has attempted to pay North Korea to be less troublesome. Each time, the North has emerged even more bellicose.

<P> The administration's mistake was trying to link an easing of the sanctions to concessions on missiles. The sanctions should be lifted unconditionally.

<P> Just as Richard Nixon realized that ending China's isolation would make it less of a threat to world peace, President Clinton needs to understand that unduly adversarial policies toward Pyongyang will not make it less adversarial.

<P> The administration also needs to look in the mirror. The United States bombed Yugoslavia into ruin and seized sovereign Yugoslav territory. Then it allowed Kosovo to commit widespread ethnic cleansing against Serbs, who are the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia.

<P> It's no wonder the United States is both feared and distrusted.

<P> One good way to avoid missile buildups in the future would be to stop giving small, sovereign adversaries a reason to fear the United States.

<P> That is a long-term solution. A good short-term strategy would be to tell Pyongyang that if it persists, the United States will send South Korea a set number of short-range missiles - capable of hitting targets anywhere in the north - for every long- or short-range missile that North Korea develops.

<P> The old Soviet Union couldn't win an expensive arms race against the Un

ited States. Neither can starving North Korea.

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<P>Minneapolis Star Tribune

October 17, 1999

<P>Test Ban Defeat: Repudiating 50 Years Of Arms Control

<P> Almost from the first atomic test near Alamogordo, N.M., more than half a century ago, the world has been caught up in a continuing struggle to minimize the global threat from nuclear arms and similar weapons of mass destruction. Leadership in that struggle has fallen heavily to the United States. That U.S. leadership has always been strongly bipartisan, drawing strength from such Republicans as Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan and such Democrats as Harry Truman and Bill Clinton.

<P> With the U.S. Senate's rejection Wednesday of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the destruction of that bipartisan arms control movement seems complete. The Senate today can be divided into those who believe in traditional multilateral arms control and those who don't. Those who don't now seem firmly in control, manipulating their colleagues with appeals to the basest partisanship. While these anti-arms control activists express specific misgivings about the CTBT, the fact is that few have ever seen a weapons reduction program they liked. They are foreign-policy lone rangers, inherently reluctant to embrace the collective security of arms control.

<P> A member in good standing of that group is Minnesota's Republican Sen. Rod Grams. Two major arms-control treaties have come before the Senate during his term, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Grams has opposed both.

<P> In the process, he has joined with Sen. Jesse Helms and other charter members of the anti-arms control crowd to do enormous damage to U.S. leadership in the global nonproliferation movement. It will now be infinitely more difficult to keep India, Pakistan, China, Russia and other nations of the world -- all of whom looked, however grudgingly, to the United States for nonproliferation leadership -- from seeking new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons as a hedge against the uncertainty introduced by the Senate vote.

<P> Helms, Grams and their small coterie of anti-arms control Republicans thus have made the world a more dangerous place. They have failed in their most fundamental obligation as public servants -- safeguarding the health and welfare of their constituents. For that they deserve the world's strongest possible condemnation -- which they are now getting. Friends and potential foes alike have good reason to worry over the fundamental U.S. repudiation of the arms-control regime reflected by the Senate vote.

<P> That vote was overlaid heavily with the most petty partisan payback -- a chance for the Republican majority to get even for seven years of defeat, including impeachment defeat, at the hand of a president they hate.

<P> In service to such pettiness, the Republicans in the Senate willfully forfeited their role as responsible partners in American foreign policy. Their vote against the comprehensive test ban treaty was a vote many -- including Grams -- will come dearly to regret.


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<P>Richmond Times Dispatch

October 19, 1999

<P>The Test Ban

<P> When Ronald Reagan left the 1985 Reykjavik summit without reaching an agreement -- any agreement -- with Mikhail Gorbachev, critics rent their garments and broke out in lamentations. Reagan, they charged, had set back the cause of peace. Several years later the Iron Curtain fell. The United States and the Soviet Union no longer threatened each other with mutual assured destruction. As Ken Adelman -- director of the U.S. Arms Control Agency during the Reagan administration -- notes, when Gorbachev was asked how it happened that "he came into office ruling the Communist Soviet Union and left office with no Soviet Union and no Communism" the former General Secretary answered, "Oh, it was Reykjavik."

<P> The Senate's rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty does not spell doom.

<P> The pact did not receive the debate it deserved. The Clinton administration misplayed the issue. Although it cited polls suggesting the citizenry supports a test ban (when asked point-blank if they favored a ban on testing weapons of mass destruction, how many individuals would volunteer to strangers a no?), the White House did not subject the treaty to the necessary scrutiny. It relied on knee-jerk emotion instead. The tactics played into the hands of realists who suspected the treaty flunked the two crucial tests. It could be neither verified nor enforced.

<P> Ancient man believed the Earth was flat; children fear the monster hiding under the bed. Naive moderns put their faith in arms control. If a treaty includes words such as "nuclear" or "testing" or "ban" or "control," they want the U.S. to sign on the bottom line, and never mind the fine print.

<P> Treaties will not restrain miscreants and rogues. Sanctions do not deter the likes of North Korea and Iraq. India and Pakistan almost certainly would have conducted nuclear tests even if the Senate had approved the test-ban treaty a year ago.

<P> The administration portrays the Senate as supremely partisan. No Democrat voted nay; four Republicans voted aye. (West Virginia Democrat Robert Byrd and

swered the roll with a present, and subsequently criticized both sides.) The ay
es and the nays included Senators who were unhappy with the treaty's supporters
and its foes. Indiana Republican Richard Lugar ranks as the Senate's most thou
ghtful thinker on foreign policy. He is not a fire-eating partisan; no one woul
d nickname him "Senator No." He voted against the pact. Any criticism of the Se
nate's stand must take Lugar's reluctance into account. The list of nays also i
ncluded Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Susan Collins, Pete Domenici, Charles Grassley
, Chuck Hagel, John McCain, Olympia Snowe, Ted Stevens, and John Warner -- i.e.
, Republicans often celebrated as independents and moderates. Blind partisanship
seldom follows politically difficult routes. Approving the pact would have be
en the easy thing to do.

<P> (By the way, in 1997 the GOP Senate ratified the administration's beloved
chemical weapons treaty. A majority of the chamber's Republicans said yes.)

<P> The future yet may see a treaty purporting to ban tests of nuclear arms.
This treaty was not the right one. The dilemma regarding arms control is that
the success of a treaty depends on precisely the retaliatory capacity (and will
) arms control enthusiasts long to restrict. And if those blindly trusting in p
archment and paper to secure peace had prevailed in the Seventies and Eighties,
the Evil Empire would not be a memory.

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