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<P>Defense Daily
October 14, 1999
Pg. 4

<P>Big Hurdles For NMD Are Time And Integration, Officials Say

<P>By Hunter Keeter

<P>The biggest challenges facing the National Missile Defense (NMD) system development team are sticking to the programs tight schedule and achieving the

level of interoperability required, according to industry executives and military officials.

<P>"I have never failed to integrate a systemI have [however] failed to integrate a few things on time. Thats my biggest concern. This program does not have any schedule margin," said John Peller, the NMD program manager for prime contractor Boeing [BA], told a briefing audience on Tuesday at the Association

of the United States Army symposium in Washington, D.C.

<P>Peller said an additional challenge is "functionality--making all of the various systems that comprise NMD work together as one."

<P>Army Maj. Gen. William Nance, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDO) NMD joint program manager, praised the success of all elements, especially the Raytheon [RTNA/RTNB] Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), used during last weeks first successful hit-to-kill intercept (Defense Daily, Oct. 5).

<P>But Nance said that the prototype for the NMD Ground Based Radar system--a

part of NMD that was not participating in the test but acting only in "shadow mode"--experienced "some intermittence in target tracking." He added that BMDO

knows what caused the problem and is taking steps to fix it.

<P>Peller said that during the last test--Integrated Flight Test 3 (IFT-3)--the

"target complex" was not as robust as could have been used because the program

wanted "metal-on-metal" contact. But he said that the EKV's seeker has been tested against much more complicated target arrays in the past and performed well.

<P>The next series of tests, beginning with IFT-4 in mid-January, will use

progressively more complex targets. Army Col. Robert Billings, the Training and

Doctrine Command System Manager (TSM) for NMD, noted that he plans to submit a

revised operational requirements document (ORD) to the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council in April "in time to have an updated ORD for the deployment readiness review" next summer.

<P>Following the June 2000 deployment readiness review, BMDO plans to prepare

for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting in FY 01 to gain approval to

begin site construction--something that must happen in FY 01 to reach the

target deployment date of fourth quarter FY 05. In FY 03, the DAB is to meet

again to decide whether to give BMDO permission to begin procurement and installation of the NMD weapon system.

<P>The appointment of a TSM is one indication of how the Army has already begun

to prepare for the role the service expects to have in the management of NMDs

ground-based systems. Approval from the Pentagon giving the Army authority over

the ground-based portion of NMDs network has yet to be granted.

<P>But Lt. Gen. John Costello, commanding general of Army Space and Missile Defense Command--the Army agency that would be charged with NMD management--said

that he expects approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to come

soon.

<P>Costello believes the Army is a logical choice for leadership in NMD given

the services long history of "homeland defense" that dates back before the

Nike-Zeus project in the 1960s.

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<P>San Francisco Chronicle
October 13, 1999
Pg. 1

<P>Historic Battleship May Berth On Bay <I>

<P>Iowa might join floating museums under plan considered in Congress

</I>

<P>By Carl Nolte, Chronicle Staff Writer

<P>The Iowa, a 56-year-old battleship with a troubled past, may soon be permanently docked on the San Francisco waterfront as a reminder of the days

when the city was a Navy town.

<P>Even though the Iowa's arrival is looking like a done deal, what happens

after that is still up in the air -- it is not even certain that the vessel would be open to the public.

<P>One thing is certain, however: The mammoth ship will be the biggest change to

the city's waterfront since the demolition of the Embarcadero Freeway. If stood on its end, the 887-foot-long Iowa would be 30 feet taller than the Transamerica Building.

<P>The House Appropriations Committee voted late last week to spend \$3 million to bring the ship to San Francisco, and a House-Senate conference committee is expected to approve the money as soon as today.

<P>Reps. Nancy Pelosi, D-San Francisco, and Lynn Woolsey, D-Petaluma, said yesterday that passage seems

<P>assured, barring what Woolsey called "unforeseen circumstances."

<P>It is not clear, however, what the ship's status would be once it arrives on

San Francisco Bay. Both Pelosi and Woolsey were under the impression that the Iowa would serve some civilian purpose. Woolsey said she thought it would be a museum ship "dedicated to those who served in our Navy."

<P>Pelosi said she thought the ship could also serve as "a command and control vehicle," to be used in the event of a natural disaster. "Its presence could save many lives," she said.

<P>However, Navy representatives said yesterday that the Iowa would still be in the Navy's inactive reserve as "a mobilization asset," which could be sent to

sea in time of war.

<P>The ship, now docked in Newport, R.I., can currently be viewed only twice a year, and only from the pier, according to Rita Wilkes, of the congressional

liaison office of the Navy's Sea Service Command. She said no visitors are allowed aboard.

<P>It would apparently take an act of Congress to change this status.

<P>''It is in the inactive fleet, not yet a memorial," said Marilyn Wong, co-founder of the Historic Ships Memorial at Pacific Square, a nonprofit group that lobbied to bring the ship to San Francisco.

<P>Wong's group of Navy veterans and ship admirers clearly hopes that the Navy will give it the Iowa so that the ship can be turned into a museum and memorial on the Embarcadero. Wong said the group obtained market surveys that showed the vessel could draw at least 500,000 visitors a year.

<P>It would be ''a constant symbol of a proud Navy legacy in a city visited by millions annually," she said.

<P>San Francisco Bay is already the home for the world's largest collection of museum ships, which range from the 1886 sailing vessel Balclutha to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's yacht Potomac.

<P>World War II memorial ships include the submarine Pampanito, the large aircraft carrier Hornet, docked in Alameda, and two civilian wartime ships, the Liberty ship Jeremiah O'Brien and the Victory ship Red Oak Victory.

<P>In addition, a separate group announced plans last summer to acquire the old

Matson liner Lurline and turn it into a floating hotel.

<P>How the addition of the Iowa to this fleet would affect the finances of the

other vessels is not clear. The Balclutha and five other ships berthed at the Hyde Street Pier are part of the San Francisco Maritime National Historical Park. The others are owned by nonprofit groups.

<P>Except for the submarine Pampanito, which draws about 220,000 visitors in its

berth at Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco, attendance at the other museum

ships has been far below projections. The Hornet, for example, had hoped to draw

up to 800,000 visitors a year in its Alameda berth. The actual attendance has been only a fraction of that.

<P>Like many inactive ships, the Iowa is not in operating condition and would have to be towed from Rhode Island to San Francisco.

<P>The Iowa, the first of a series of four 48,000-ton battleships, served with distinction in World War II and the Korean War. The ship was mothballed after Korea but was sent back to sea during the Reagan administration.

<P>In 1989, the ship's reputation was tarnished when an explosion in one of its gun turrets killed 47 sailors.

<P>After an investigation, the Navy claimed the explosion was not caused by equipment failure, but by sabotage. High-ranking naval officers said the explosion was caused by a gay sailor who was attempting suicide.

<P>That was later discredited, and the incident became the centerpiece of a book

called "A Glimpse of Hell" that argued that the case was what a Chronicle review called "a textbook example of how the military uses homophobia to cover its mistakes."

<P>One of the Iowa's sister ships, the New Jersey, is being towed from the West Coast to Philadelphia, where it will become a memorial.

<P>The Missouri, the most famous of the Iowa class battleships, is now a memorial ship in Pearl Harbor. The fourth Iowa-class battleship, the Wisconsin, is laid up on the East Coast.

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<P>Christian Science Monitor
October 13, 1999
Pg. 1 </P>

<P>Could Treaty Hurt US Superiority? </P><I>

<P>Senate debate over the nuclear-test pact centers on divergent views of what

the US needs to maintain its edge. </P></I>

<P>By Ann Scott Tyson, Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor </P>

<P>WASHINGTON--At the heart of the high-stakes duel in Washington over the nuclear test-ban treaty is this unanswered question: How much nuclear-weapons superiority does the United States need? </P>

<P>Both sides in the debate agree that a credible US nuclear deterrent is a good

thing, but they differ strongly over how the treaty would affect that

capability. </P>

<P>Currently, the United States has about 7,000 strategic nuclear warheads, compared with 6,000 for Russia and fewer than 800 divided among France, Britain, and China, according to the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers here. Both US and world stocks of nuclear bombs have declined sharply in the 10 years since the end of the cold war. </P>

<P>Senate Republicans and other treaty opponents have argued that US superiority would be eroded if the Senate were to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans nuclear-arms test explosions. </P>

<P>The Clinton administration and Senate Democrats, backed by European allies, argue that the pact would not threaten American nuclear might. </P>

<P>At press time, negotiations between Senate Republicans and the White House were continuing over whether to delay the contentious Senate vote - scheduled for Oct. 12 or 13 - until 2001, a move supported by Democrats and some Republicans. </P>

<P>Republicans have the votes to block ratification, which requires a two-thirds majority, or 67 votes. </P>

<P>Keeping nations in check </P>

<P>Opponents to the treaty argue on two grounds. </P>

<P>First, they say difficulties verifying the ban could allow nations such as Iraq and North Korea to cheat, conducting low-level tests to build crude nuclear arms. Meanwhile, the US, by permanently halting testing, could suffer a deterioration of its nuclear stockpile and deterrent. </P>

<P>"The CTBT jeopardizes our ability to ... maintain the reliability of our

nuclear arsenal," Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R) of Virginia said on the Senate floor Oct. 12. "To forgo testing is to live with uncertainty." </P>

<P>He, Sen. Jesse Helms (R) of North Carolina, and other Republicans, including the Senate GOP leadership, oppose the treaty. </P>

<P>"We did not design our weapons to last forever," warned Sen. John Kyl (R) of Arizona, stressing that testing would be required to "field new designs to replace older weapons." </P>

<P>Yet supporters of the pact contend that US nuclear power would remain overwhelming. They concede that cheating by so-called "rogue" nations such as Iraq could occur, but argue it would not produce weapons that could threaten US security. </P>

<P>"Tests of the size that could go undetected are of no relevance to our security," says Spurgeon Keeney, president of the Arms Control Association and a former member of the US delegation to early CTBT negotiations. </P>

<P>In addition, the treaty would set up a new international monitoring system that would "far exceed current capabilities," says Sen. Max Baucus (D) of Montana. </P>

<P>Moreover, treaty supporters say the US could maintain the reliability of its nuclear arsenal without conducting test explosions. Instead, it would rely on sophisticated computer models and nonnuclear explosive tests, costing \$4.5 billion a year, that have been used since the US suspended nuclear testing in 1992. </P>

<P>If such nonnuclear testing failed to certify the stockpile's safety and

reliability, the US would have the right to withdraw from the treaty after six

months "if it decides that extraordinary events ... have jeopardized its supreme

interests," the treaty states. </P>

<P>Strong deterrent </P>

<P>Finally, backers of the treaty say that even if some of the thousands of US

nuclear weapons were to become outmoded as a result of the treaty, enough would

remain to constitute a potent deterrent. </P>

<P>"Maybe one of those bombs won't go off, maybe 10 ... maybe 3,000," says Sen.

Joseph Biden (D) of Delaware. "We still have 3,000 left. Back when [I was a kid], we used to see bumper stickers: One atom bomb can ruin your day." </P>

<P>Pressure on the Senate to ratify the treaty has mounted as US allies urge it

support. The CTBT has been signed by 154 countries, including the US, but can only take effect if it is ratified by 44 nuclear-capable countries. So far, only

26 of that group have ratified the treaty. </P>

<P>The CTBT, 40 years in the making, aims to curb the proliferation of nuclear

weapons by prohibiting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, space, or underground - building on more limited nuclear-test bans in the 1960s and '70s.

</P>

<P>It would buttress the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits the five

nuclear powers - the US, France, Britain, China, and Russia - to cut their arsenals, and requires other members not to develop or acquire nuclear arms.

</P>

<P>Supporters, including US allies overseas, see the treaty as an important tool

in curbing a potential nuclear-arms race between nations such as India and

Pakistan. The American public also strongly backs the treaty, with a June 1999

poll showing 82 percent want it approved. </P>

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<P>Signal
October 1999
Pg. 23

<P>Security Agency Transitions From Backer To Participant <I><FONT

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<P>An organization designed to support military campaigns now finds itself in

the thick of information operations. </I>

<P>By Robert K. Ackerman

<P>The National Security Agency is reorganizing its structure and activities to

serve as a full-fledged participant in military operations. This break from its

traditional role of providing support to decision makers and warfighters

reflects the growing magnitude of information in military operations.

<P>The security organization is already positioned at the heart of the

information revolution. Its longtime collection expertise involves data

detection, acquisition, processing and dissemination. Its global reach also enables it to access a number of diverse sources and deliver information to customers in widely disparate locations.

<P>The agency, however, also faces potential changes in personnel recruitment and retention policies. This could involve greater reliance on external expertise and more pragmatic security standards as well as greater flexibility

in staffing and consulting. Exponentially increasing data from diverse sources

increasingly must be processed and disseminated in real time. And, new technologies erupting in the international commercial marketplace are taxing the

government organization's ability to stay ahead of potential adversaries.

<P>These developments are occurring against the backdrop of an emerging global

information grid. Traditional lines of information demarcation are giving way as

knowledge becomes ubiquitous. Accordingly, the National Security Agency (NSA) is

working to change its collection philosophy as well as its techniques.

<P>"This agency has an offensive and defensive mission generally described as providing vital information and protecting vital information," Lt. Gen. Michael

V. Hayden, USAF, NSA director, maintains. "In the past, we provided vital information by working on someone else's network. We protected vital information

by working on our own network. Now, more and more, we are discovering that they

are the same networks."

<P>The general continues that, just as the advent of air power created a new

combat arena in the air, the information age has created a new battlespace. This

information domain is proving to be a vital realm for land, sea and air combatants. Now, he offers, this information space may be where the decisive battle takes place, with the other arenas serving supporting roles. And, as with airspace, the information domain is shared.

<P>"We have spent most of our time saying 'we support the decision maker, we support the policy maker, and we support the warfighter,'" Gen. Hayden observes

"Now, 'support' as a verb no longer works. We have to view ourselves as participants in the fight.

<P>"This implies a far greater degree of responsibility for the final outcome than simply producing a good intelligence product and throwing it over the transom," he states. "We need to take more ownership of the final outcome than our older model would have us do."

<P>The general describes the new information domain in terms of a technological opportunity that opens up a whole new arena where the United States "is particularly well suited to go out and dominate" for the security of the Free World. Just as the U.S. Air Force is "the military expression" of the U.S. aerospace industry, the NSA is the security expression of the U.S. information technologies industry.

<P>Having taken the reins of the NSA in March, Gen. Hayden describes the agency's biggest challenge as transferring 50 years of expertise to a new security world. The bipolar world of the Cold War is over, and the bipolar security focus has gone along with it. Threats can come from virtually any direction, and this unpredictability is compounded by the ongoing revolution in

information technologies.

<P>The fundamental core issue is the agency's ability to adjust to this new era

the general states. And, the key to that success is agility. "We have come from

an era in which target focus and continuity were the greatest of virtues," he

explains. "We are now in an era where, although those are still important, the

ability to be agile and to move from one area of focus to another quickly, full
y

and competently has a greater premium."

<P>Achieving this agility will require changing the NSA's internal way of

thinking, its technologies and its processes, the director declares. Related

issues include cryptography, export controls, training, work force retention an
d

new skill sets. Gen. Hayden emphasizes that he is not shifting the NSA away fro
m

the direction established by his predecessor, Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF

(SIGNAL, October 1998, page 23).

<P>The NSA already has taken steps in its new direction with the Kosovo

operation. The agency was part of the operational team with the forces waging

the air campaign. Gen. Hayden states that the NSA's activities comprised

military operations as much as the combat forces engaged during the conflict.

<P>"In Kosovo, we saw a glimpse of the future," he says. The information battle

frequently turned "inside the loop" of the munitions battle in ways previously

unattainable. U.S. forces were able to move operational information at great

speeds. For example, the two downed U.S. aircraft were geolocated in real time

by national systems far away from the theater of battle.

<P>While both technology and mindset play significant roles enabling these advances, the mindset of U.S. military forces is more important, the general

offers. "The thought that you could be so involved in the fight was unimaginable

15 years ago. We [then] viewed intelligence in a linear fashion. Now, we have become less hierarchical and more networked, with information shared. We moved

information in a networked nodal fashion in this war, and that gave us the agility to move the standards," he observes.

<P>The transition from support element to provider may be further along in combat operations than in other areas. A noteworthy change is that the old dividing line between red data and blue data-friendly force information and intelligence on the enemy has been eroded to virtual nonexistence. This type of battlefield information now comes under the umbrella of situational awareness.

As a result, the NSA is more involved in compiling friendly force data to serve its role as an operational contributor.

<P>Most of the agency's technology needs are driven by information access, the general states. However, being able to manipulate and move the accessed data is

of vital importance. This mandates an information technology backbone that the

agency does not yet have, he says. For example, during the Kosovo operation, the

agency had to minimize all routine data traffic to ensure that vital

mission-essential information reached Kosovo forces, even though it was not a

major theater war.

<P>This backbone could take a number of different forms or consist of a variety

of media, the general predicts. The agency is studying its own

nonmission-essential backbone to define requirements and potential architecture
s

for the future. This study is scheduled to be completed next year.

<P>For the NSA, staying on top of communications technology extends beyond

internal use. The security agency continues to seek new methods of collecting

information from among the new telecommunications technologies and systems

proliferating around the globe. The world's telecommunications system is moving

toward networks, and this shift must be reflected in the agency's collection

methods.

<P>Overall, the key to meeting information delivery needs is processing. Gen.

Hayden allows that the NSA currently collects far more data than it processes,

and it processes more data than it reports. Adding more collection capabilities

and assets only exacerbates the problem if processing limitations cannot handle

the increased data flow.

<P>For sorting data, the agency seeks to exploit "anything that allows us to

automate this overwhelming mass of data coming at us and to filter it into item
s

in which we are interested," Gen. Hayden says. This would include moving this

information to the first human interface after it is filtered.

<P>The general also emphasizes the need for a "living SIGINT [signals

intelligence] system." This would be an intelligent system capable of absorbing

almost any data but also capable of focusing on timely items of interest through

SIGINT mission management. It would have a "brain-like function" enabling it to

respond to the environment in a human manner-"to take this massive data, to ratchet it up through the taxonomy from data to information, from knowledge to wisdom, and to act wisely," Gen. Hayden declares.

<P>Technology alone is not the solution to the data processing problem, however

The agency needs to add more analysts and linguists to its staff, Gen. Hayden states, and obtaining quality people in booming economic times is of prime concern to agency planners.

<P>"It would not be unfair to describe our work force as simultaneously graying

and greening," the general says. The agency's hiring bulge from the early 1980s

is aging, while a subsequent downsizing eliminated many positions and reduced the amount of fresh blood entering the organization. Meanwhile, most of the newer staffers "are green in experience and are green in what they wear to work

every day-they are a military work force," Gen. Hayden states. He adds that the

agency comprises "a relatively inexperienced junior military work force and a very experienced civilian work force approaching retirement age."

<P>Meeting expert personnel needs could require revamping longtime staffing practices. Traditionally, the goal was to hire people who would remain in the work force potentially for 30 years. However, conventional hiring and promotion

approaches might not be realistic in the future. Gen. Hayden suggests that alternative ideas, such as different definitions of a career in the agency as well as new kinds of partnerships with industry and academia, may be necessary.

<P>He cites linguists as an example. During the Cold War, promising personnel would be taught Russian and assimilated into the agency for a career of translation. Now, no one can predict the expertise in which of the world's many languages will be needed at the first sign of crisis. The agency no longer can afford the two-year lead time needed to generate a trained linguist.

<P>One possible solution might be a linguistic version of the Defense Department's civil reserve air fleet, known as CRAF. This program taps civilian pilots and hardware to serve military needs in times of crisis without maintaining a surge capacity in the active duty roster. A linguistic equivalent might tap specific language expertise only when needed.

<P>Gen. Hayden relates that the NSA already has its own equivalents in alternative staffing. "We have a rich and deep relationship with the Utah National Guard-Mormon missionaries," he notes. One solution to the language problem would be to recruit more extensively among ethnic communities in the United States. However, this also would require rewriting security clearance standards that currently preclude most ethnic foreign language speakers from serving in sensitive NSA positions.

<P>The general admits that this is "lowering the bar" to an extent. However, the agency as a whole must adapt to its new mission by adopting more realistic security measures. "We are departing the old model, which was to avoid risk, and we are embracing the new model, which is to manage risk," he warrants. By opting

for managing instead of merely avoiding risk, the NSA hopes to open new vistas in capabilities and operations.

A related challenge involves curbing an agency capability. Gen. Hayden observes that the NSA long has maintained a "can do" attitude when faced with new requests. However, this has led to a SIGINT system that is "badly stretched" while accruing new missions and challenges without allowing older ones to fade into the background. "If we fail to make the tough decisions to stop doing some things and just keep accruing new duties, we will be stretched so thin that we will not have graceful degradation-we will have a catastrophic failure," he warns. "We need to learn to say no sometimes."

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USA Today
October 13, 1999
Pg. 3

Pilotless Planes May Take Flight To New Heights

By Paul Hoversten

On the dry lakebed at Edwards Air Force Base in California, an odd-looking assortment of remotely controlled planes sits poised to take flight today in a

demonstration of cutting-edge technology.

<P>Billed as "poor man's satellites," these aircraft need no pilots. Their makers say the planes represent the future in collecting aerial data and photos for unlimited commercial research and development.

<P>Others see a vision of privacy invasion, available to anyone with enough money and the right kind of cameras to snoop from above.

<P>"We're starting a revolution," says Ray Morgan, vice president of AeroVironment, which is building a solar-powered "flying wing" designed to reach an altitude of 100,000 feet, or 19 miles, and stay there for days. That's three times higher than a commercial jet and higher even than the U-2 spy plane of the Cold War.

<P>The AeroVironment plane and another aircraft are to take off today from Edwards in their public debuts. Two other drones, or pilotless craft, are on display. NASA and four small aerospace companies are building the planes for use as airborne scientific laboratories. Each company hopes to produce up to 100 planes a year.

<P>The market for the planes includes companies that survey croplands, universities that study the upper atmosphere and local governments that fight forest fires. The aircraft, which cruise at about 20 mph, also could serve as telecommunication relay stations, replacing cellular towers.

<P>The planes' low cost, projected at \$3 million to \$5 million each, makes them affordable enough to be used for almost anything. With the right cameras aboard

the planes can zoom in closer than a typical camera satellite in orbit around Earth, at a fraction of that \$60 million cost.

<P>The aircraft also can "loiter" silently for hours above a town. By contrast, a satellite covers an area for only a few minutes before it moves on.

<P>"From 10 miles up, you can get down to the centimeter" in photo clarity, says

John Sharkey, project manager for the Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor

Technology program at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center.

<P>And therein lies a promise, or a problem, depending on the perspective.

<P>"It starts getting into intimate detail, which potentially raises both privacy and security concerns," says Steven Aftergood, a specialist on government secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists.

<P>But close-ups from the clouds also can bring certain benefits, Aftergood says.

<P>"Greater transparency can lead to greater security and greater stability," he

says. "It can mean that all kinds of violent or criminal activity that depend on

secrecy will suddenly have a bright light shining on it. As in everything, the

costs and benefits have to be weighed."

<P>Despite the Hollywood version of "spies in the sky" in movies such as Enemy

of the State, a presidential order bars U.S. spy satellites from conducting domestic surveillance.

<P>NASA launched the drone program in 1994 with \$7.4 million. The project now receives \$20 million a year. Funding is planned through 2003.

<P>"Nobody in this project wants to intrude in anybody's privacy," says Larry Roeder, a senior policy and planning analyst at the State Department, which is

promoting the aircraft to U.S.-friendly nations.

<P>Roeder wants developing countries to consider buying or leasing the planes as

part of a proposed global information-sharing network to monitor drought, floods

or other natural disasters. So far, Mexico, Uruguay and Kenya are interested.

<P>"This is not a military tool," Roeder says. "It's a civilian tool." The idea

that anyone would outfit any of these aircraft with spy equipment is ludicrous

to some. There are, after all, much easier ways to get pictures from above.

<P>"Anybody today can go up with a hand-held camera in a Piper Cub and take a picture of anybody," says Phil Walker, a chief technology officer at Eastman

Kodak in Rochester, N.Y., which makes cameras for spacecraft and airplanes.

<P>Other gray areas have yet to be resolved. One is developing safe routes for

them to fly. The Federal Aviation Administration, which regulates commercial

aviation, has no flight corridors at 100,000 feet.

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<P>Wall Street Journal
October 13, 1999
Pg. B6

<P>Companies Eye Pilotless Aircraft For Possible Commercial Uses

<P>By Anne Marie Squeo, Staff Reporter of the Wall Street Journal

<P>Pilotless aircraft have been used by the military for years to run some of the most dangerous spying missions. Now, telecommunications, insurance and other

companies are for the first time being offered similar aircraft to do everything

from hurricane-damage assessments to beaming high-speed Internet service to people in crowded cities.

<P>Closely held Risk Management Solutions, which does risk assessments for about

three-fourths of the world's insurance companies, is considering the use of these airplanes, like satellites, to get fast and accurate data when a natural

disaster hits.

<P>And Hughes Electronics Corp. and Lucent Technologies Inc. are among the telecommunications companies talking with the makers of these vehicles about

possible commercial uses for the technology. Shue-Yu Kwan, technical manager in

Lucent's wireless design center, says the company is interested in using the

imagery from these planes to help design tower sites for customers who provide wireless telephone service.

<P>The aircraft are getting their first public viewing at Edwards Air Force Base

in California Wednesday. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which funded the planes' development, is pushing commercial applications of these vehicles as part of a broader effort to make money by "bringing space-age

stuff" to a broader audience, said John Sharkey of NASA's Environmental Research

Aircraft and Sensors Technology project.

<P>U.S. State Department officials are expected at the event to announce a new

initiative called "Peacewing" that would use the vehicles to provide

international aid when a disaster strikes such as the recent earthquake in

Taiwan or the floods in Mexico. Agency officials are talking to disaster relief

groups and international development agencies to craft a system for paying for

this project and possibly acquiring a fleet of vehicles that can be deployed

around the world, said Larry Roeder, a State Department senior policy adviser

spearheading the project.

<P>To be sure, the technology has only recently been seen as commercially

viable, and it is still early to gauge how useful or widespread it will become,

industry and company officials say. Use of the aircraft would require approval

from the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Communications

Commission.

<P>Proponents of the aircraft say they have some big advantages over

geo-synchronous satellites, which can perform similar spy-in-the-sky functions.

The planes are a lot cheaper and can provide stronger signals to a more

concentrated regional area. They can also be fixed and sent back up if problems

arise.

<P>"All the things that take a lot of bandwidth could be done with this type of

system," said Ray Morgan, vice president of AeroVironment Inc., which makes the

Helios unmanned aerial vehicle.

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<P>New York Times
October 13, 1999

<P>Giant Leap For Private Industry: Spies In Space

<P>By William J. Broad

<P>People passing through 14th and Constitution in Washington on Sept. 30 had no

idea that the world's first private spy camera was orbiting 400 miles overhead.

But the spacecraft snapped a picture of the intersection in resolution sharp

enough to show their cars, as well as surrounding buildings, monuments and city

bustle.

<P>Inaugurating a new commercial era, Space Imaging Inc., the private company in

Thornton, Colo., that built the spacecraft, made the photograph public on

Tuesday. It is the world's first commercial image from space whose sharpness

rivals those of military spies in the sky.

<P>The release caps many years of planning, delay and debate. The emerging spy

satellite industry holds promise for geographers, urban planners and others, but

also poses knotty security and privacy questions.

<P>Among other uses, the industry is expected to aid detection of countries trying to set off underground nuclear explosions in secret, augmenting global sensors that can detect rumbles from clandestine blasts.

<P>"It's one of the most significant developments in the history of the space age," said John E. Pike, head of space policy at the Federation of American Scientists, a private group in Washington. "It was revolutionary when it was available to the nuclear powers, and one expects it to have similar potential now that it is commercial."

<P>The Clinton Administration gave the go-ahead in 1994 for such private space cameras. Space Imaging launched the first successful satellite of the class on Sept. 24, after a similar effort failed in April. Three other companies have announced plans to put similar craft in orbit by the end of next year, and experts say that perhaps a dozen or so may fly in the next decade.

<P>The new wave of commercial space cameras can see objects as small as a few feet wide -- down to one meter -- and thus show cars, homes, roads, boats, trees, buildings, pipelines, bridges, tanks, jets and missiles -- but not individual people. The image released yesterday shows the Washington Monument, part of the White House ellipse and buildings like the Department of Commerce and the American History Museum of the Smithsonian Institution.

<P>The company said that it was taking orders, but that no images would be sold until late this year. The Pentagon is expected to be a main customer.

<P>Mark E. Brender, a Space Imaging spokesman, said prices would range from \$30 to \$600 per square mile.

<P>He added that the minimum order, at least for now, would be \$1,000.

<P>Mr. Brender said the satellite was being run through calibration tests, including photographing painted lines on a runway in Texas that are exactly one meter wide "so we can see precisely how accurate the sensors are."

<P>Eastman Kodak, a top contractor for military spy satellites, built the camera and telescope system, whose main mirror is 27 inches wide.

<P>Space Imaging is a private company owned by the Lockheed Martin Corporation,

which makes many of the military's spy satellites, and E-Systems Inc., a unit of

Raytheon that provides many of their communication links. International investors include Mitsubishi and Hyundai.

<P>An illustration of how spy satellites can expose plans for secret explosions

came in 1977 when South Africa was preparing to detonate a nuclear device beneath the Kalahari desert. As Seymour M. Hersh recounted the episode in "The

Samson Option" (Random House, 1991), an American spy satellite found signs of preparation for an underground test.

<P>Alerted to the activity, President Jimmy Carter helped lead a quiet campaign

of international protest. And South Africa, facing the loss of diplomatic

relations, scrapped the planned detonation.

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<P>Long Island Newsday
October 10, 1999
Pg. 6

<P>A Generation Lost To War <I>

<P>Rebels, nations fashion children into killing machines </I>

<P>By Tina Susman and Geoffrey Mahon

<P>Kenema, Sierra Leone - Soldiers who were themselves children drove
fourth-grader Abu Jusu to go to war.

<P>Hunched in the bushes, he watched as rebels dragged his mother and father
from their home and forced them to lie on their backs in the dirt road, their
eyes staring up into the starry night.

<P>As other villagers were ordered to crowd around like spectators at a cock
fight, the rebels hoisted axes high and slammed them down onto the necks of the
chosen couple, sending their heads tumbling toward the terrified onlookers.

"Nothing was explained. They killed them just because they wanted to kill them,
" says Abu. "They were child soldiers, very young boys who beheaded them." Now,
Abu himself is a child soldier, a trained member of the Kamajor civil-defense
unit who joined to avenge his parents' murder. That was three years ago, and
although the math doesn't match the physique, this would-be seventh-grader -
standing about 4-foot-8 with tiny hands, undeveloped body, cherubic, hairless

face and high, prepubescent voice tells visitors in all seriousness that he is 28 years old.

<P>Age is a touchy topic in the rebel zone where Abu lives, in a violent nation where the international spotlight on the use of child soldiers has been cast with particular intensity. Worldwide, that spotlight has grown brighter. And with good reason. There are an estimated 300,000 minors engaged in combat worldwide, and the 20th Century is ending with the dubious distinction of having more children in the field of battle than any other period of history.

<P>Children "become in a very cynical way the best raw material to fashion into efficient, ruthless, unquestioning tools of war," Olara Otunnu, the UN special representative for children and armed conflict, said in an interview.

<P>"Because they are impressionable, they're like a vessel. Whatever you want to shape them into, they'll be shaped. So you indoctrinate them, you shape them, and then as we see, from Sierra Leone to Congo to Sri Lanka, they are the most ruthless." With an intensity similar to the campaign against land mines, international attention is beginning to turn toward people like Abu. The aim is to raise in international law the minimum acceptable age for combat to 18. The current standard is 15, a benchmark the majority of signatory nations found too low when they agreed to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 under pressure from the United States, which recruits 17-year-olds.

<P>In visits to six countries on four continents, Newsday has found that even the 15-year-old limit is widely and openly flouted. Children as young as 9 have been fighting in battle zones as diverse as Kosovo, Colombia, the Philippines, Liberia, Uganda and Sierra Leone. They are snatched or seduced into committing unspeakable acts. They think like children, but fall like adults.

<P>These are the children at war: A 13-year-old girl in Mindanao, the Philippines, joins communist rebels to avoid a forced marriage. Three years later, she is cut down by a bullet, and in her childish mind, wonders why she doesn't die like the heroes and heroines of Hollywood. "I was thinking all the while that if you are hit by a bullet, like you see in movies, you would just fall down and that's the end," Lilay, a former communist cadre, says.

<P>"But the experience of being hit in an encounter, it's different and very, very painful." At an age when an American girl has just gotten interested in boys, a 12-year-old Ugandan girl becomes both a soldier and a sex slave because one day she forgets to lock her door, and the minions of a crazed warlord come in. "I hated both," Grace, now 15 and the mother of an infant, said of her dual bondage. "Each seemed worse than the other." Her fellow child soldiers are dispatched to cut off the lips or ears of those who disobey a violent and ranting leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, leaving villages with scores of mutilated victims. A teenage girl joins the communist rebels of Colombia in the cocaine jungles, eager to be trained as a nurse. But her last gruesome anatomy lesson comes when she is told to cut open the body of her 14-year-old friend,

executed after being judged a traitor in a revolutionary show trial. She swears

the girl was still moving when the blade pierced her adolescent belly.

<P>A Liberian boy who resists forced recruitment is told rebels will begin killing a lineup of captured civilians, one by one, until he agrees to join.

After the fourth killing, he relents. Many children in Liberia and other countries are fed drugs to make them fight more ferociously, like Mohammed Sisay, a preteen soldier who became dependent upon "Bubbles," as his comrades called the amphetamines fed to them by their grown-up Liberian commanders. "I began to fight the war. I didn't feel discouraged or afraid.

<P>They made me invisible," he said. At night, they were given more drugs to make them sleep. A 10-year-old Sierra Leonean boy abducted by Revolutionary United Front rebels tries to escape but is caught and punished by being confined

six days in a dungeon-like hole dug into the ground and covered with metal sheets that turn it into an oven. Each day brings lashings with a rubber truncheon. Some of his fellow combatants, like the ones who attacked Abu's parents, tear through the countryside lopping off hands and arms and collecting them in sacks to impress their commanders.

<P>Child rebels in April used axes to chop off the hands of 13-year-old Mariatu

Kamara after they kidnaped her and her 15-year-old sister, Adama, as the girls

walked through the forest. First they hacked off Adama's hands and left her for

dead. Then they carried Mariatu away, promising she would not be harmed. As soon

as some adult rebels left the girl alone with kid soldiers, though, they decided

to chop off her hands, too.

<P>The sisters survived and today live in a camp for amputees in Sierra Leone's

capital, Freetown, along with hundreds of victims of similar atrocities. Many tell similar nightmarish tales of children who laughed as they chopped off limbs

and claimed to be collecting hands to impress a commander dubbed "Capt. Blood.

<P>"They were laughing. They were enjoying it," said 25-year-old Muctarr Braima

, whose left arm was chopped off in January by young rebels carrying a bloody sack

filled with other amputated hands.

<P>Child soldiers are the lost generation of protracted civil wars, in nations

where the three things that are most plentiful are children, poverty and violence. Shell-shocked human-rights workers in Colombia joke that in their Amazonian backwaters, kids leave three prints behind: their two feet, and the rifle barrel dragging behind them. The kids tread a career path offering a post

in the right-wing paramilitaries, the left-wing guerrillas, prostitution or cutting coca to process cocaine.

<P>The use of children who are still developing their values and personalities

to shoot, often to murder, their fellow human beings violates all the moral taboos of society and, at least for the younger ones, constitutes a massive violation of human rights.

<P>As Newsday reporters talked to child soldiers around the globe and those who

worry about them, it became clear that war itself has become more brutal, unpredictable and violent because of their more widespread use, because children

are so maleable and easily misled.

<P>"They have no notion of what they're doing," said the UN's Otunnu. "They're indoctrinated. They are told do this, and they will do it with ferocity."While some of these children join armies or guerrilla groups willingly, their decision often is founded in such desperation that it represents no choice at all. Many, many others are systematically kidnaped into war, while the world stands by watching.

<P>How does a child recover from such horrific experiences? Experts say most never do, because there are precious few resources set aside to help them. Not only do these countries lose an entire generation, but families wind up torn apart while society at large fears its own children."There's a value crisis in the society. Sitting by the fireside is no longer there," said George Omona, director of a trauma center for child soldiers in Uganda. "It has brought about a lack of trust in the family."The United Nations, UNICEF and a slew of international human-rights groups believe one simple first step toward improving the situation would be to raise the minimum age for combat to 18 in the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. In that treaty and others, the age of adulthood is defined as 18.

<P>That is, for everything but war.

<P>"With the 18-year limit, hopefully we'll see fewer 13- and 14-year-olds pulled in," said Jo Becker, head of the Children's Rights section of Human

Rights Watch, a Manhattan-based group spearheading the effort against child soldiers. "Especially in countries without a lot of documentation, where a commander can pull in a healthy-looking 13-year-old and pass him off as 15." The

last effort to raise the minimum combat age failed when the treaty was finalized

in 1989, due to protest from an unexpected source.

<P>The United States maintains it must protect its right to recruit from a pool

of high-school graduates or dropouts, even though they amount to less than 6

percent of any year's batch of recruits, and less than 1 percent of the active

force. Britain, which allows 16-year-olds into its ranks, also opposes raising

the age limit, but has said it will stand aside to let the treaty pass, then

decide whether to sign it.

<P>The United States won't let the treaty go forward at all.

<P>"We have trouble with the notion of allowing an international standard to

form that we would have trouble adhering to," said James Schear, an aide to

Defense Secretary William Cohen who is following the issue for the United

States. "Standing aside, as some countries may be willing to do, would not cut

it with us." That posture angers the developing world, where most wars are being

fought.

<P>"It depresses me when I see countries like the United States opposing this,"

said Omona. "These other countries already have mechanisms in place to protect

their children, but in Africa we have a problem.

<P>There is this will among African leaders to shoot their way into power and to

give guns to children, and there currently is nothing stopping them from doing

that. It would not cost these countries a lot to raise the age to 18, and I

think African children would greatly benefit from it." Not only in Africa, but

also in Asia, South America and Europe, it is becoming increasingly hard to separate civilians from combatants.

<P>In the mindless carnage of World War I, civilians accounted for 10 percent of

total casualties. In the era of aerial bombardment of cities in World War II, they rose to 45 percent. Today, in the wars of the developing world, civilians

can comprise as much as 90 percent of wars' casualties, according to the UN.

<P>"That is prosecuting war for the purpose of killing civilians, where the very

purpose of war is to annihilate the enemy community," said the UN's Otunnu, a native of Uganda. "That's what we're witnessing today. If this was something

isolated - it happens in Rwanda, it happens in Kosovo and maybe in Afghanistan

- fine.

<P>But this is across the globe. In that context, we're seeing, with barely an

exception, the massive use of children."Internal wars last longer and gut

societies of any taboos they once may have held, explained Otunnu, who this past

year visited most of the civil-war hot spots, from Sri Lanka to Colombia to

Sierra Leone.

<P>"War is not new to them, but they always had rules of war," Otunnu said. "The

elders will tell you very clearly, 'This you do, this you don't do.' That has gone. It's a kind of ethical vacuum, a free-for-all.

<P>It's total war, in which everything goes." With adults dying or dropping out

children fill the vacuum for leaders who increasingly seek total control, Otunn

said. Forty-two percent of the population in the developing world, on average,

is under 18. It is about a quarter of the population in the developed world.

<P>So children become the most available and willing recruits, he said.

<P>To be sure, children and war have intermingled in the past. During the Middle

Ages, thousands were sent off from Europe to martyr themselves in the Children's

Crusade. British soldiers as young as 16 died in the Falklands and Persian Gulf

Wars, according to Human Rights Watch. But never were children so widely exposed

as they are now, human-rights officials warn.

<P>"Certainly, youths have been involved \[in war\], but not at the same level

or in the same extreme measures," said Becker, of Human Rights Watch. "We are seeing kids today being used on suicide missions, being pushed to the front or

even being used as human mine detectors." Jean-Claude LeGrand, the head of child-protection programs for UNICEF in New York, says history is no excuse. "I

am always a bit concerned about comparing too much the fact that there have always been children used as soldiers in history, because this would miss the point," he said. "The point is that there is a systematic use of children for the last 10 years, not for the last 20,000 years. For the last 10 years what has

occurred is the systematic use of children on a very large scale. And it's

developing very, very fast."Technology has helped make child soldiering feasible. Children are fighting with arms that are increasingly easy to carry and toy-like in their simplicity. The M-16, the AK-47, the AR-15 and the ArmaLite rifle, weapons of choice for rebel groups and regular armies alike, weigh about 8 pounds. With a light squeeze of the trigger, they fire a burst of bullets that travel at more than 900 yards per second and can punch a fist-sized hole in human flesh. For many of these children, their elders say, that squeeze of the trigger is their first sensation of power, identity and belonging.

<P>In Sierra Leone, where, until a recent peace agreement, children were ordered to lop off the heads and limbs of civilians, child soldiering dates to colonial times. As the British army began withdrawing in preparation for the country's independence in 1961, it began searching for suitable recruits to build a new, post-independence army for Sierra Leone. "They started with men, but they were not educated enough," recalls Momodu B. Jawara, the commander of the Kamajor camp in Kenema and a former child soldier himself.

<P>"Then they started looking at new secondary school graduates, but that took too long. So they started looking for kids in school."Jawara, recruited at age 14, was one of those kids. Unlike in his day, though, when children were molded by military officers into disciplined soldiers, the child soldiers of today are primarily members of rebel groups whose main skills are killing and looting, not

defending their countries against foreign invaders.

<P>The UN's Otunnu said the Kamajors, a civil-defense unit that evolved from an

elite band of hunter-warriors, fall into that category, though they support the

current government of Sierra Leone.

<P>"The Kamajors, they had a traditional system for training adults, to learn how to hunt, to assume responsibility," Otunnu said. "It was twisted in the context of this war to become a channel through which you get young fighters.

It's no longer to go through an elaborate training program. Just round them up,

indoctrinate them and give them a gun. That was an offshoot of something traditional, which had a positive purpose.

<P>It was orderly, it was very systematic, and then it was distorted into this."Jawara's trainees undergo a secret initiation and immunization - which

neither he nor his followers would describe but which is rumored to include the

eating of human flesh - that they claim makes them bulletproof.

<P>Their trademark is a lion's tooth hanging from a black cord around the neck.

Children Associated With War, which tries to rehabilitate former child soldiers

in Sierra Leone, estimates about 10,000 kids under 18 - many under 15 - are involved in combat in the country, where a civil war has raged since 1991.

Though a truce was signed in July, peace is far from guaranteed, and the young

combatants remain armed to the teeth and on a war footing. There is a land of

teenyboppers with guns who listen to rap music and wear Tupac Shakur muscle shirts, imitation Ray-Bans, counterfeit Nikes, and AK-47s slung across their

bony chests.

<P>Here, at least, the campaign against child soldiering is being heard, though

not necessarily heeded. Jawara insists no one younger than 18 is accepted into

Kamajor training. Having been a 14-year-old recruit himself and having made a career of the military, however, he says child soldiering is good if discipline

and training go with it. Why, then, doesn't he drop his age limit? "Because you

people don't allow it!" he says with a laugh, referring to the international

condemnation of child soldiering. "I've been scared of you guys. One day you

might just bump into us and say, 'Let me see your Kamajors.' So I have to make

sure they're all old enough."Still, it's clear they're not. It's hard to keep a

straight face as one Kamajor after another steps forward, shyly extends a skinny

arm in greeting, and states in an unbroken voice an age that appears to be

exaggerated by at least a decade. Musa Kallon, about 5 feet tall and no more

than 80 pounds, insists he is 25 but looks 15 at most. "I've come to fight and

train for my country," he says, holding up a rifle as his fishnet camouflage

tank top hangs on him like a potato sack.

<P>A boy in fuzzy pink pajamas who looks about 15 bounds forward and offers his

age as 22. A tiny boy claims to be 19. Jawara jumps in and says the boy is only

9 and not a Kamajor but a kitchen helper. When Jawara is not listening, though,

the boy insists he has undergone Kamajor training.

<P>Later, as more and more self-proclaimed 20-somethings begin running forward and clowning childishly for the visitors, the camp's adult commanders get edgy.

One grabs a stick and chases the group - including the boy in the bunny-like pink pajamas and another toting a rifle and wearing a goofy Cat-in-the-Hat style top hat - into the kitchen and orders them to stay there.

<P>Later, under Jawara's watchful eye, three lines of about 200 trainees march back and forth under the barking orders of a commander. Little Abu, who has graduated from military training, uses a stick taller than himself to lash at those who don't keep up with the drill, which is performed under a broiling sun.

Like Abu, these trainees will be taught how to use and care for a variety of weapons, how to dig trenches, how to swing across a rope suspended between two trees, how to find their way through the dense forest and how to sustain themselves for days in the wilderness. It's like an African version of the Outward Bound survival course, except that most of these boys have seen combat and are doing this to hone their survival skills and obtain the laminated card

that identifies them as full-fledged Kamajors. These boys at least are volunteers, basking in the glory of being part of a group that still has an elite reputation for its fighting skills and willingness to confront the notorious rebels. But many Sierra Leonean rebels are children abducted by the fighters and literally branded by having their skin sliced with razor blades.

<P>"They're the worst," militia commander Jawara said of his adversaries in the

Revolutionary United Front.

<P>"They have no consciences. They kill; they don't feel anything. They're the

most wicked of the lot. This cutting of hands is done by children. The burning

of houses - they use the children to do that."James Thorpe was 10 when he was

abducted by the rebels and forced to pick up a gun and fight with them.

<P>His captivity lasted six years and included being drugged with gunpowder to

make him hyper and agitated - more willing to kill and fight on the front lines

"We were almost always hungry. When there was food, we would be called to stand

in line and hold our hands out," he says, explaining that there were no bowls o
r

eating utensils. The gunpowder was mixed into the food to ensure it was ingeste
d

by the famished boys.

<P>Like most former child soldiers, who are fearful of retribution and tortured

by the things they have seen and done, James denies ever intentionally killing

anyone during his fighting days, though he admits the bullets he fired might

have hit someone. It is only after months of in-depth counseling - a luxury

unheard of in most developing countries - that youngsters start to admit to wha
t

they have done, say adults who work with such children. But getting them to

confess is crucial to relieving their guilt, say counselors, whose job is to

make the children see that their horrible deeds were forced upon them by adults

and that they should not be burdened by guilt.

<P>For both former abductees and willing recruits whose hands are accustomed to little more than guns, the end of the wars leaves their prospects truncated.

With its war over for two years, Liberia's estimated 4,300 child soldiers have exchanged their weapons for sacks of rice, a change of clothes and the equivalent of \$5. But few have gone back to the few schools that remain open. Most ex-soldiers, wherever they are, are too embarrassed to sit in classrooms surrounded by children years their junior. What's left to most of them is an itinerant life on the street, where begging and stealing offer more immediate rewards than lean years spent in a classroom or vocational school. And many have been horribly maimed or disfigured by their battles, left by their rebel heroes to languish or die.

<P>Perhaps worse is the change in attitudes toward children in countries that have been brutalized by them.

<P>No longer can a hungry, homeless child wander into a village and expect help, said Theo Momoh of Children Associated With War. "Now, people are a bit skeptical," he said. "How can they be so open? They think maybe this child could be a spy. In the beginning of the war we saw children as innocents, but during the war we came to see how they were being used, and that's when the doubts came." Meanwhile, besieged governments around the world choose defense spending over more social programs that could help ex-soldiers. "With this will in Africa, with leaders shooting their way into power and putting children at war, I don't know what kind of Africa we'll have in the future," said Omona, at the

trauma center in Uganda.

<P>"I think for the sake of children in Africa, the world should do more." And more for all the children of the world whose tender years were brutalized by performing the arts of war.

<P>"These guys are loose cannons in a way. They're so used to being on their own, that they're basically just little, early adults," said Elke Wisch, a child-development expert with UNICEF. "If they don't want to go home at night, they don't go home. You basically have a lost generation out there now."

<P>Cover Photos by Viorel Florescu. STAFF PHOTOGRAPHER - 1-4) (Children with guns in different countries.) Photos by Viorel Florescu. STAFF PHOTOGRAPHER - 5)

Abu Jusu uses a stick to lash new Kamajor recruits who do not keep up with the drill at the civil-defense training camp in Kenema, Sierra Leone. 6) New Kamajor

recruits are primed for armed conflict in the training camp in Kenema, Sierra Leone, in the dark shirt is Abu Jusu, who says he is 28. 7) Bockarie Foday is in

training as a Kamajor in the civil-defense unit in Kenema, Sierra Leone, He will

undergo a secret initiation and immunization that the group says makes members

bulletproof. Bockarie is wearing the Kamajors' trademark lion's tooth on a black

cord. 8) A training officer inspects a line of recruits in Kamajors, the

civil-defense unit in Kenema. Child soldiers are plentiful in countries such as

Sierra Leone that are engaged in civil war. 9) Kamajor commander Momodu B.

Jawara, right, shows the fate of a young man taken captive and mutilated by rebels in Sierra Leone. James Thorpe was 10 when he was abducted by rebels. While he was captive, he said, he was fed gunpowder to make him agitated. 10) Kamajor trainees in Sierra Leone are taught how to use weapons, how to find their way through a dense forest and how to sustain themselves for days in the wilderness. The boy in pink pajamas says he is 22, though he looks more like 15

11) A soldier, at right, wears around his neck an American flag and a lion's tooth necklace, which, Kamajors say, makes soldiers bulletproof. 12) Civil-defense unit member Isaac Banistar, far right, accompanies his sister, Mamin, through a street that he patrols in Kenema, Sierra Leone. 13) Mohamed

Vandi, right, takes a break from training for the civil-defense unit in Kenema to listen to the radio, one of the few activities he has in common with children in other parts of the world whose youth has not been aborted by the demands of

civil war. 14) A Training officer, top prepares to punish a recruit for making a mistake during a training drill in the Kamajors, the civil-defense unit in Kenema, Sierra Leone. 15) Above, a 15-year-old soldier patrols a checkpoint on the road from Kenema to Freetown, the capital.

<P><I>This series was reported by Tina Susman from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, Geoffrey Mohon from Colombia and the Philippines, Liam Plevin from New York and Matthew McAllester from Kosovo.</I>

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<P>Long Island Newsday
October 10, 1999
Pg. 61 <U>

<P>CHILDREN AT WAR </U>

<P>Setting A Standard For War <I>

<P>Push for higher age limit meets U.S. resistance </I>

<P>By Liam Pleven, Albany Bureau Chief

<P>Peekskill-Raymond Diaz has doe-soft eyes and the ungainly gait of a lanky

17-year-old, but there is no adolescence in his voice when he talks about

enlisting in the U.S. Army.

<P>"I was born ready," said Raymond, an Astoria native who dropped out of high

school and enrolled in a National Guard program at a military base here to get

the equivalency degree he will need to become a soldier. "I'm mature, I guess

you could say." Raymond might as well be speaking for the military he hopes to

join, which for decades has signed up 17-year-olds to fight for the U.S. armed

forces.

<P>Especially now, when either college or the strong economy lures teenagers

toward better-paying or less dangerous work, the American government believes

that being able to recruit people Raymond's age is crucial to maintaining the

fighting force the nation needs.

<P>But the U.S. military's resolute view is being challenged by a campaign against what most experts acknowledge is an increasingly prevalent form of abuse: the use of children as soldiers in armed conflicts around the world, in many cases against their will. And the campaign, which is led by human-rights groups and is unfolding in negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, is implicitly questioning the U.S. role as a leader in the international community.

<P>The campaign's backers hope to reduce the number of child soldiers worldwide by raising the minimum age for military service from 15, which was set in a 1989

international children's rights treaty, to 18. Their argument is that the higher standard will create an added stigma against the practice, and that Third-World countries in which documentation is poor will find it much harder to pass off a underage soldier as 18 than as 15.

<P>Yet the United States, which has signed the 1989 treaty but not brought it to a ratification vote, is among a handful of countries that have refused to agree to any amendment that would impose the higher age. The United States argues that conditions in countries where children are abused bear no resemblance to its own highly structured military, and it contends that raising the minimum age to 18 would only make it more difficult to recruit future soldiers just as they graduate from high school.

<P>And beyond objecting to a mandatory change to 18, the United States is also

refusing to allow a voluntary treaty amendment to be drawn up, one that countries could either sign on to or ignore. Because the negotiations on changing the 1989 treaty operate under consensus, the U.S. position has prevented any agreement on an amendment, known as a protocol. Moreover, the last round of negotiations on the issue is scheduled for early next year, after which, officials said, the current talks will likely be abandoned.

<P>"The United States has been able to effectively block this protocol from being adopted," said Jo Becker of Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit watchdog group pressing for the 18-year-old standard. "Our priority right now is to just get the U.S. out of the way." The Clinton administration's explanation for balking at 18 is that it would cripple recruiting efforts. The United States is instead calling for the age to be raised only to 17, which for the United States would be no change at all.

<P>The United States is one of 49 countries that recruit soldiers younger than 18.

<P>But groups pushing for the 18-year-old minimum have refused to accept the proposed U.S. alternative of 17, arguing that it runs counter to the age of adulthood that is commonly accepted for other rights and responsibilities, and also contending that the international community should not be forced to change a widely held position primarily because of the United States.

<P>Last year, 10,607 17-year-olds enlisted in the U.S. military-less than 6 percent of new enlistees and less than 1 percent of those on active duty-and

most turned 18 before finishing basic training. But thousands of others under 18

are in military-funded programs like the one Raymond is enrolled in, or have

agreed to enlist under delayed entry-pipelines the Department of Defense believes could be threatened by raising the age to 18.

<P>"The main reason we oppose this is that we believe this would hurt our recruiting," said Kenneth Bacon, the spokesman for the Pentagon.

<P>But the U.S. government's reasons may have more to do with the wounds it has suffered in other recent human-rights struggles.

<P>In recent years, for instance, the United States has been embarrassed because

it refused to join an international treaty banning land mines, and to a lesser

extent stung by a UN-negotiated stance against the death penalty. U.S. officials

admit they are now wary of allowing a new treaty to go forward, even one the

U.S. doesn't sign.

<P>"We have trouble with the notion of allowing an international standard to form that we would have trouble adhering to," said James Schear of the Defense

Department. "Standing aside, as some countries may be willing to do, would not

cut it with us." When the United States did stand aside on the land mine treaty

, it suffered a public relations nightmare. The United States said it needed land

mines to stabilize the border between North and South Korea. But when the

organization pushing for a global ban was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997

the U.S.

<P>refusal to embrace terms most of the world had agreed to was stark.

<P>The United States has had a similar experience with the 1989 treaty on

children's rights, the one the current campaign is trying to amend. Virtually

the entire world has joined the treaty, while the United States and

Somalia-which has no functioning government-are holdouts. President Bill Clinton

signed the treaty in his first term, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

has refused to bring it to a vote, apparently part of a general resistance to

subjecting the United States to international treaties. The United States is not

bound by the treaty until it is ratified.

<P>Whether the U.S. concerns are justified is a subject of debate. Defense

Department officials say they need to guard against the possibility that an

international criminal court, currently being considered but far from a reality

could one day have the jurisdiction to force the United States to defend its

practices.

<P>"We have seen in international law that anything whose definition is a little

squishy ... can change over the years," said Lt. Col. Bill Darley, a spokesman

for the Defense Department. "And that concerns us." But officials involved in

pressing for the higher age limit believe the United States is overreacting, and

they note that other countries such as Britain have said they will continue

their own practices and ignore any new treaty.

<P>"What does the United States think it is, a 90-pound weakling? What is the U.S.

<P>afraid of?" asked Carol Bellamy, the head of UNICEF. "There is an unwarranted

fear of intervention and intrusion." The U.S. military's fear about hampering domestic recruitment, on the other hand, is supported by more direct evidence.

Several branches of the military, particularly the Army, have had difficulty reaching their targets in recent years.

<P>"It's a genuine problem that's easy to scoff at because it's only a couple thousand people," said Ruth Wedgwood, a professor of international law at Yale

University. "With current pay levels ... it's just not easy to fill slots."

Though there are relatively few 17-year-olds in uniform at any given time-there

were 2,880 in September, 1997, according to the most recent U.S. figures

available-thousands more are enrolled in the Junior Reserve Officers Training

Corps or the smaller Challenge program for troubled teens, which is what Raymond

belongs to.

<P>A treaty that forbade recruiting 17-year-olds could also call into question

the delayed-entry program, which allows teenagers to commit to the military when

they finish high school, U.S. officials said. About 22 percent of the nearly

200,000 enlistees in an average year-more than 40,000 people overall-are either

17 when they enlist or 17 when they commit to delayed entry.

<P>And for many 17-year-olds, the military is sometimes the most attractive option, not only in less developed countries but also in the United States.

<P>If the age limit were raised to 18, said Angela Petersen of Wolcott, Iowa, who joined the U.S. Navy at age 17 after graduating from high school in May,

"That would probably mess up a lot of people who graduate young. For some people

the military's the best option."

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<P>Long Island Newsday
October 10, 1999
Pg. 62 <U>

<P>CHILDREN AT WAR </U>

<P>Just 15, But A Seasoned Veteran For The KLA

<P>By Matthew McAllester, Middle East Correspondent

<P>Krume, Albania-It's not just the blond down covering Kastriot Gashi's upper

lip that makes him look young. He's small both in height and build. He has the

wavy hair and big eyes of a boy hero from a children's book.

<P>But this 15-year-old boy, who wouldn't stand a chance of making it onto any

high-school football team, has an adult's job. One afternoon in early June,

Kastriot was walking down a road in the northern Albanian town of Krume carrying

a small Thompson machine gun, as was his duty as a soldier in the Kosovo

Liberation Army, the ethnic Albanian guerrillas then fighting Serbian forces in

Kosovo.

<P>"I joined because of the massacres," said Kastriot, referring to Serb killings of Albanian civilians during the struggle between the KLA and the Serbs. "And now I want revenge. I want to send them to the [War Crimes Tribunal at The] Hague. I consider them criminals. If they were real soldiers, they would fight against soldiers, not civilians." During the war, several KLA commanders interviewed by Newsday insisted that there was a strictly enforced policy within the army of not allowing people under the age of 18 to join. Some exceptions were made for impatient 17-year-olds, said Selman Lajqi, a commander in the KLA's 136th Brigade who was killed during the fighting, but he claimed the rule was rarely broken.

<P>Kastriot may be the exception, but he's a startling one.

<P>He joined the KLA when he was 14, he said, making him something of a veteran among the inexperienced students, farmers and professionals who joined the army in droves just before and during the 11-week NATO bombardment and the campaign of ethnic cleansing that the Serbs unleashed on the civilians of Kosovo. In respect for his seniority, he was promoted to military policeman. As he walked around the dusty streets of Krume on patrol, he wore the all-black uniform of a KLA MP.

<P>Despite his age, Kastriot was involved in some of the heaviest fighting in the war, a major KLA ground victory against the Yugoslav army. Several large groups of KLA soldiers pushed through the mountains and overran the Serbian

outpost at Kosare. The fighting was very intense in the trenches even after the outpost was overrun.

"We took Kosare by entering in several groups from different sides of the mountain," Kastriot said. "We were in close radio contact. When we overran the Serbian army barracks that evening around 7:30 p.m. we pushed the Serbs 300 yards down the mountain. We found ammunition and food in the barracks, and we took these supplies. We also found photographs that the Serbs had taken of Albanians they had massacred.

"After that I took up a position on the front line and fought in the trenches that were 200 yards from Serbian positions. We were fighting with bazookas and automatic weapons. I had my Kalashnikov. It was a difficult fight, and many of my friends were killed or wounded. It seemed like forever waiting for reinforcements. We were so happy when they finally came." When NATO forces mistakenly bombed the barracks that the KLA had captured, seven of his friends were killed while Kastriot was just 500 yards away. "The ones who were killed were still eating dinner," he said.

Despite having witnessed and taken part in so much death and destruction, Kastriot insists he was not too young.

"No. I do not think I was too young. I joined when I was 14. But even when I was 13 I was helping with intelligence matters. I joined because I believed in the ideals of liberation." He said that there were four others his age in his unit.

<P>How do his parents feel about him fighting in the war? "They are happy and pleased that I want to fight for our freedom," the boy said. "My parents are in

Tirana , and my brothers are also in the KLA." Kastriot said he had come to the

bleak border town of Krume, one of the strongholds of the KLA in northern

Albania during the war, for a break from the fighting. "I came for a rest and t
o

collect ammunition and guns to bring them back to" the front lines, he said.

"It's our place." The war in Kosovo ended just over a week later. Last week, a

reporter found him in his village in Kosovo, working with his brother to rebuild
d

their family's home, destroyed at the beginning of the war.

<P>He is going back to school this week, and is planning a career in a KLA army

that officially does not exist. <I>

<P>Special correspondent Philip Smucker contributed to this story. </I>

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<P>Long Island Newsday
October 12, 1999
Pg. 7 <U>

<P>CHILDREN AT WAR </U>

<P>A Child's Choice <I>

<P>Children allowed three fates: war, drugs, prostitution </I>

<P>By Geoffrey Mohan, Latin America Correspondent

<P>San Vicente del Caguan, Colombia - The reasons to pick up a gun were laid

out, seven in a row, for 10- year-old Luz Dari to see.

<P>The daughter of a dirt farmer in a land ruled by guns and cocaine did not

have to be told who had killed the seven villagers whose bodies bloodied the

soil at her feet. Word had been passed. It was a warning from the right-wing

paramilitaries challenging the guerrillas for dominance of Colombia's southern

reaches.

<P>For Luz Dari, the massacre struck the last blow to a childhood that consiste
d

of little more than dodging the back and forth violence of Colombia's civil war

while tending her family's tiny plot of yucca, corn, bananas and their only

really profitable crop - coca. From the time she could stoop to pick, Luz Dari

had been a raspachin, a coca picker, her tiny hands yellowed from tearing coca

leaves, crushing them and then pouring the noxious mix of lime and kerosene tha
t

leaches out the addictive alkaloids that are turned into cocaine.

<P>By the age of 11, Luz Dari had abandoned that life and joined the communist

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist guerrilla movement tha
t

has waged war on the Colombian government for 35 years. Better at least to have

a gun when the paramilitaries return, she reasoned. Better to side with the ones

who seemed to care about the peasants and their crops, legal or otherwise.

<P>"The paramilitaries stomp on civilians. They don't fight for the people," Luz

Dari said. "They fight for wealth, for money. On the other hand, we fight for the Colombian people, for the civilians, to make a new Colombia."

<P>Jose Raul Garcia, head of the Colombian Red Cross' youth programs, shrugs

knowingly when he hears of people like Luz Dari. "In these areas, children have

three alternatives," he explained. "You can join the guerrilla, join the paramilitaries or become raspachines."

<P>"They're forgetting prostitution," added Lina Gutierrez, a top assistant with

the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, which is scrambling to devise a program

to deal with child soldiers.

<P>As many as 6,000 Colombian children like Luz Dari have made the same choice

among evils at a tender age, according to UN estimates. They constitute a burgeoning and largely unaddressed human-rights crisis in a nation with no shortage of atrocities.

<P>In Uganda and Sierra Leone, ruthless warlords kidnap youths into their personal war machines. In Kosovo, children took up arms as a strategy against annihilation. In the Philippines, Islamic children fight a Jihad, a holy war, while others join communist groups for little more than food, shelter and respect.

<P>In Colombia, total war and misery are the dual mechanisms driving the child-soldiering machine. Abuse, abandonment and dismal educational prospects are enough to drive the innocent into the arms of any one of the three factions

bloodying the countryside - leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and the regular armed forces.

<P>"Someone told me down here you find three footprints," said Camilo Lopez, a

social worker in the guerrillas' coca-growing strongholds. "I said, 'What do you

mean?' He said, 'Two footprints and the gun barrel dragging behind.' They play

war games early, and for real."

<P>It is not so much that these armies rob Colombia's youth of their childhood;

most simply never have one.

<P>Colombia has been at war with itself for almost the entire second half of the

century. In the past decade alone, civil strife has killed 35,000 people and

displaced nearly a million others. Half of the displaced are children.

<P>This is the world these children inhabit: Marxist guerrillas kidnap and

murder politicians and the rich, tax and protect the cocaine trade, sabotage oi

l
rigs, and ambush the army in the name of a utopian communist state. Private

militias, or paramilitaries, raise money from the rich, including some cocaine

druglords, and pursue a scorched-earth campaign against the guerrillas and

perceived sympathizers, often with tacit or direct support of the Colombian

military, which says it is fighting both factions.

<P>There is no middle ground in Colombia, and if there is, it is soon stained

with the blood of each side's atrocities.

<P>"You see, children in Colombia don't play anymore," Gutierrez said. "There is

no childhood. Because when you're 3 years old, all you see are massacres in you

r

town and people dead."

<P>Luz Dari sees subsistence in her new surroundings. At 14, she is a hardened

guerrilla. Among the skills she has added to processing coca are launching an artillery shell fashioned from a propane tank, throwing fragmentation grenades

and the finer points of handling a Galil assault rifle. By her reckoning, she's

got it made.

<P>"It's good, the way they treat you," she said, her Galil across her lap and a

9-mm Ruger tucked in her waistband as she guarded a roadblock in a

FARC-controlled area of southern Colombia. "Here, they don't pay you, but they

give you everything: the clothes, the boots."

<P>Some parents, exhausted by their poverty, hand over their children to the

guerrillas. Given up for adoption as an infant, Patricia (a pseudonym to protect

her real identity) was passed off again at the age of 12, when her adoptive

mother convinced her she'd be better off with the guerrillas.

<P>"I didn't have any idea of what the revolution was or what it was to fight

for the people," Patricia said from a safe house, where she has lived since

running away from the guerrillas in February. "To die from a gunshot, to go out

and fight for the people? I couldn't think that way."

<P>A gunshot wound to the shoulder in fact got Patricia thinking about leaving

two years ago. But it wasn't until February that she acted, escaping with a

soldier she had fallen in love with while he was held prisoner by her squad. She

does not know her own birth date, and only knows she is 18 because that's what the doctors who examined her told her.

<P>Even in the most stable families, parents in Colombia fear they will lose

their children to the simple attraction of a uniform, steady meals and power. I
n

San Vicente, war has chased away even the cattle, and jobs are scarce. Idle teens mill in the two open-sided pool halls, while others buzz through the muddy streets on dirt bikes. Their other choices for entertainment outlets include

three bordellos and a cockfight ring by the steep banks of the Caguan River, a

swift and muddy cocaine highway leading south through a vein of tributaries to

the Amazon.

<P>It is easy for Colombian youth to see the relative lure of the revolutionary

life. Its consequences often don't make themselves apparent until later. Marta

(a fictional name used to protect her identity) opted to become a guerrilla at

14 because she didn't get along with her mother's new boyfriend, and because the
e

guerrillas promised to train her as a nurse. Her career ended when she was forced to wield her skills with a knife against a 14-year-old comrade.

<P>Last year, Marta's best friend and fellow guerrilla was accused of being a traitor, tried in a jungle tribunal and sentenced to death. Commanders

suspicious of Marta's loyalty forced her to come along for the execution. It was
s

to be a lesson on what happens to talkative children.

<P>"I had to go. A commandant, another guy and I," she said. "The hole was dug,

with the dirt beside it. I heard two shots, and she fell. And later they threw

her in the hole. They wanted me to get in the hole, too.

<P>"They passed me a knife and told me to cut her open so she wouldn't swell up

and push the ground up. It was something terrible. I felt strange. I had never

seen anyone dying that way, at my own feet, agonizing and moving, moaning. It

horrified me. And to touch her, to touch a dying person, it horrified me. She

was one of my best friends. She was 14 years old."

<P>This spring, Marta used the cover of battle to make her escape. Child welfare

authorities placed her in a guarded group home for female juvenile offenders to

protect her until her case could work its way through the courts and she could

be relocated to resume her life.

<P>Even from the guarded confines of a group home, and with a year's time

between her and that execution, it is a hard story for Marta to recount. She

forces it out in mumbles and stammers, wringing the hands that held the knife.

<P>"It was after that that I left," she said. "I thought that what they did to

her, they can do to me tomorrow.

<P>" Nearly half of Colombia's minors in combat, about 3,000, are in the FARC o

r the smaller, rival left-wing group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). And as

many as half the members of some paramilitary units are minors, often forcibly

taken by these right-wing militias as they sweep through villages in guerrilla

hotspots, according to human-rights workers.

<P>In the 1980s, when civil war erupted throughout Central America, child soldiers were common in rebel groups in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.

With those wars over, Colombia stands out as Latin America's worst practitioner

of child soldiering, followed by Peru, where the Shining Path guerrillas still

forcibly recruit children. Minors, however, still join government forces in nine

countries in Latin America, including Brazil, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador,

Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Colombia, which annually has allowed about

1, 200 secondary school graduates under 18 to start their compulsory service in

the army or other services upon graduation. They follow a long tradition. A

mural in the army's recruitment brigade headquarters in the capital, Bogota,

depicts Simona Duque handing over one of eight sons to serve in South America's

independence wars in the early 19th Century. The youngest was 12. The words of

the recruits' hymn, printed on another wall, urge: "Colombians with dreams of

glory, for the fatherland take up a gun, that tomorrow, shining history will

speak of the honor of youth."

<P>With international pressure mounting, the Colombian army this year announced

it no longer will accept conscripts under 18, though they can join the National

Police, a common target of leftist guerrillas. "We don't see the necessity to

have minors," Brig. Gen. Manuel Guillermo Franco Paez, commander of the army's

recruitment brigade, said. "We have the capability to fill all the positions

with adults. A minor is a problem for us. We want mature soldiers."

<P>Franco's announcement of the policy shift, during an interview with *Newsday*

in early June, coincided with a high-profile visit to Colombia by Olara Otunnu,

the UN special representative for children and armed conflict, who had been

lobbying for the change.

<P>The FARC, meanwhile, follows its own revolutionary logic, which does not

necessarily coincide with international humanitarian law. Thus far, the group

has only promised Otunnu it will stop recruiting teens below 15.

<P>But on the same June day when Otunnu visited with top FARC leaders,

Commandant Jairo Martinez, the FARC's security chief for San Vicente, sat in a
n

abandoned cattle pen that served as an overnight camp and scoffed at the

international campaign to remove all minors from combat.

<P>"People who propose those things speak very pretty," Martinez said. "You see

them on television or \[hear them\] on the radio or in a conference, but that

doesn't hide the fact that it only creates false expectations. The youth don't

have a future. They can barely survive. For that reason, there are three paths

that await a young person in Colombia: prostitution, drugs or, for the one who

saves himself from drugs or prostitution, well, he finds the path of the

guerrilla."

<P>Martinez, 46, joined the guerrilla movement at age 16, after a youth spent

running from the violence that had broken out in 1948 between Conservatives and

Liberals. The era, lasting until the 1960s, is known as "La Violencia." When

Martinez was an infant, his house was destroyed by an aerial bombardment that killed his father, three brothers, two uncles and three workers, and badly damaged Martinez's hearing. He spent much of his childhood in the military's program for displaced youth, called the Milk and Bananas Program, for the food it gave him twice a day. It was not long before he joined a communist youth group, and from there, the guerrilla campaign.

<P>Acting as bodyguard for Martinez was a sinewy young guerrilla whose nom de guerre is Jair, a tribute to his mentor, Jairo Martinez. He says he is 15, and a natural-born killer.

<P>"It's just that some are born to join the guerrillas, so you join the war, and no one can stop you from becoming a guerrilla," he said, shrugging. For him that was four years ago, at age 11. Jair was fresh off the farm, scared to be away from home and only vaguely familiar with the Marxist ideology of the FARC.

<P>But he is learning quickly.

<P>"You see how the people are exploited," he said. "The peasant doesn't have good housing. In school, you have to pay from the chalkboard on. The government doesn't help you for anything. So . . . " he shrugged, hands still fixed on an AK-47 assault rifle, a weapon nearly as plentiful as the plow in Latin America.

<P>"In the first few days you feel bad, being so far from the family," Jair said. "But after about a month, you feel fine. You start to understand the war; seeing your companions, you start to learn, you start to delve into ideas and understand why you have to fight for the people to get ahead. You become

conscious.

<P>" Though he walks with an athletic and buttoned-down pride of a soldier eager

to prove his mettle, Jair says getting a gun did not change his sense of himself. "There's no reason to think you're big just because you carry a gun,"

he said.

<P>Jair has yet to level that gun in battle. "If it comes down to it, I will,"

he said.

<P>There have been younger recruits in these camps, tucked in what is left of the jungle that has been cut away by cattle ranchers. In February, Martinez turned over three boys, ages 9 through 11, to child welfare authorities, saying

they had been trained by the military or paramilitaries to infiltrate the FARC,

and once there, engage in sabotage and murder.

<P>The story is not implausible. Paramilitaries often employ minors in their

dirty war - as spies, messengers and even combatants, according to human-rights

workers. Nearly three years ago, the militias paid a handful of child informers

\$50 to \$100 to pinpoint guerrilla sympathizers, and used the information to

massacre 30 villagers. Guerrillas struck back by kidnaping four of the

informers, all of them under 18, and holding them for 15 months before releasing

them last year.

<P>Two of Martinez' alleged infiltrators, meanwhile, have run off again, and

were reportedly headed back to guerrilla territory. With no program to track

them, and precious little to protect them, the fate of disarmed child combatants

is bleak in Colombia. A 1996 study found that in one war zone, 13 percent of the

child soldiers repatriated over a two-year period - a total of 30 teens - were killed after going through the relocation process.

<P>IL At the halfway house where Marta hid, guerrilla-linked attorneys looking for cadres who have defected have gained access without proper authorization, and army officials have come looking for photographs of internees. All were turned away, but the house director acknowledged that the presence of ex-combatants amounts to an open secret.

<P>In the fourth decade of the conflict, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute is just beginning to cobble together a program to rehabilitate and protect children

soldiers, who are treated virtually the same as juvenile offenders. Marta's therapy, for example, consisted mostly of arts and crafts, Christian-themed movies and group sessions on values shared with housemates who are prostitutes and drug addicts.

<P>"They put them in institutions, guarantee them food and a bed and a little recreation, and that's where it ends for them," said Beatriz Linares, Colombia's

Public Defender for Children, Women and the Elderly.

<P>"We can't criminalize these kids. We have to treat them as victims of armed conflict."

<P>Stung by the criticism, child-welfare authorities are scrambling for funds to

design a better system. But Colombia faces its worst economic crisis in decades

while violence is escalating apace.

<P>"Now that we're entering 2000, the war is getting into the dehumanizing phase," Gutierrez, of the family welfare institute, said. "This is getting pretty bad. And each year, more and more kids are getting involved in the war.

This is a big snowball. We don't know exactly where it started, and we're starting late. The country has never worked on this."

<P>While Colombian officials slowly begin that work, children like Luz Dari fight on. When asked how long she would stay with the guerrillas, she shrugged

and laughed. "Until they kill me," she said.

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<P>Long Island Newsday
October 12, 1999
Pg. 29 <U>

<P>CHILDREN AT WAR </U>

<P>Bullet Pierces Warrior Image <I>

<P>Comrade: Real war unlike TV </I>

<P>By Geoffrey Mohan, Latin America Correspondent

<P>Mindanao, Philippines -- Lilay was a warrior at 13.

<P>It had seemed such a simple decision. Refusing to marry the boy her parents

had chosen for her, she ran away to the communist guerrillas.

<P>But three years later, it was not the romantic life she imagined in her child's television world. She was in a heap on a jungle road, a red-hot wire of pain poking through her groin, where a bullet from an army ambush had glanced off her pelvic bone and torn through her abdomen like a whip through paper.

<P>She wondered why she was not dead, like the young guerrilla beside her, whose body lay arched back in a heap, a bullet hole through his throat, the blood tracing a delicate line down his neck. His death, at least, seemed like what she pictured.

<P>"I was so scared," she said, her words probing tenuously at the memory of what she describes only as "the encounter" in February. "I thought it was like a Beta or a movie. But it was real. It was very real. I was thinking all the while that if you are hit by a bullet, like you see in movies, you would just fall down, and that's the end. But the experience of being hit in an encounter, it's different and very, very painful." Children like Lilay (a pseudonym used to protect her identity) are fighting and dying all over the Philippines, from the communist revolutionaries active throughout the archipelago to the Islamic separatists fighting for an independent homeland here on Mindanao, the remote tip of the Philippines.

<P>They are not alone in this part of the world. Children in Sri Lanka have been used as human bombs by the Tamil Tiger separatist movement. Children also fight in Myanmar, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.

<P>But the child soldiers of Mindanao are virtually forgotten. Fighting an

obscure war in an obscure corner of the globe, they have escaped the sights of international human-rights groups, and until this year, hardly drew the notice of fellow Filipinos.

<P>"We have seen a trend in the recruitment of minors," Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado said. "And this trend has been bothersome for us, because we are beginning to encounter these minors even in the field, at 14, 15 years old." There are an estimated 2,000 minors fighting in the communist New People's Army and Moro Islamic Liberation Front, according to the armed forces, which have captured 84 child soldiers in the past two years, about equally divided between the two bands.

<P>Until she was shot, Lilay was an ardent warrior for the poor. In many ways, she says, she still is. Her grip is firm, her forearms still cabled with muscle from three years of humping in the jungle with a 35-pound pack and an M-16 rifle. Her eyes, set in a chubby, almost cherubic face, flash suspicion and a circumspection that belie her age. She says she is not afraid of anyone.

<P>But she admits now that she harbored a reservation, a kid's secret she kept from her elders.

<P>"Even when I was with the movement, carrying a gun, my intention was not to kill anybody else," she confessed. "But I cannot disobey the orders of superior
s
who say to carry guns." At 8 pounds loaded, the M-16 was light. But what Lilay carried in her mind weighed much more.

<P>"I had a thought in me that I should have been in another place than with

them there at my age," she said through an interpreter. "I thought at that time

I should have been in school ... I was thinking, all the while. I thought that

we are all Filipinos, why should we be fighting?" Lilay hid her misgivings until

the bullet made the decision for her in February, when an army patrol

intercepted her squad as it came down to a village for a propaganda visit. Nine

of her comrades died in the exchange.

<P>"At the time, I was proud of my actions," she said. "But when I was hit, it

was so painful, I had to ask for the help of God." Dory, a 26-year-old former

communist insurgent, asks for forgiveness instead. A guerrilla since she was 9,

she became a recruiter and lured children into the cause by the score. This

year, she switched sides, and now hides on a military base, helping guide the

fight against her former comrades, and taking to the air waves from time to time

to implore her former comrades to surrender their child recruits.

<P>"They are the ones who are still strong," she said, when asked why she

recruited children. "They are idealistic. They are easy to convince." She keeps

a mental ledger of the child soldiers she recruited, as if saving a few children

can balance that score. In the four battles she fought, 56 guerrillas died. Some

were minors, though she can't say how many.

<P>She touched her fingertips toward her heart. "I was hurt," she said through

an interpreter. "I was the one responsible for their recruitment. I began to

think this is not good. It's not supposed to be." She remembers Rubie Tijero, a smart and well-behaved boy she signed up when he was 10. He died March 8, at 16 in a fight with the army after Dory betrayed his squad's location. She came across his body among the casualties sprawled on the jungle floor. "I cried," she said. "I didn't expect him to be there.

"I'm bothered in my conscience by his death," she said. "But I know I am doing right helping the government. I don't want the communists to take over. Even now, I'm trying to convince the rebels to come down" from their mountain hideaways.

Dory remains in hiding, sought by her angered former comrades, including her own husband. Lilay has restarted her life far from her home village and those who might recognize her. She celebrated her 17th birthday in March, and she is by far the oldest girl in the sixth grade-the level where she left off before going to war. No one in her class knows her real name or the true story. If she ever told it, she said, she would end it this way: "Continue studying and always

follow the advice of your parents, so you won't be swayed away to an organization that will ruin your life." But it's a story, Lilay said, that can't be told in a movie. Now, at least, she knows the difference.

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<P>Christian Science Monitor
October 14, 1999
Pg. 6 <U>

<P>World </U>

<P>Sticks Vs. Carrots For Serbia <I>

<P>EU ministers this week approved aid to opposition cities. The US worries it

may still help Milosevic. </I>

<P>By Peter Grier and James N. Thurman, Staff Writers of The Christian Science

Monitor

<P>WASHINGTON -- With winter coming on, US officials are counting on cold and isolation to accomplish something that bombs couldn't: The ouster of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.

<P>Western economic sanctions against Serbia are more targeted than the restrictions long in place against such rogue regimes as Iraq and Libya. Fuel aid will flow to cities controlled by Mr. Milosevic's opponents. A ban on travel

aimed at Milosevic supporters is meant to make the elite feel quarantined in a

nation increasingly defined by the word "drab."

<P>But whether the foreign-policy tool of squeezing the people to make the despot squeal will work any better in Serbia than it has in Cuba remains an open

question. Compelling in theory, a sanctions effort often has unintended consequences, ranging from increased nationalism to the delegitimization of political opposition.

<P>"As a regime-changing mechanism, it is not effective. It is a device of

punishment," says Ilana Kass, a professor of military strategy at the US National War College in Washington.

<P>The problems and promise of sanctions against Serbia were on full display this week in the aftermath of a meeting by European Union foreign ministers in Luxembourg. EU ministers approved \$5 million in fuel-oil aid for two Serbian cities: Nis and Pirot. Both had petroleum refineries destroyed during NATO's 78-day bombing campaign last spring. Both are controlled by politicians opposed to Milosevic.

<P>The US grudgingly went along with the move, but the administration remains concerned that the fuel could be mysteriously diverted and end up warming, say, the Serbian police.

<P>"We support the principle of giving aid to the opposition.... We remain concerned about doing anything that would weaken the overall sanctions regime," said State Department spokesman James Rubin.

<P>The US blocked a move by the EU to restore airline service to Belgrade. Administration officials consider the isolation of the nation's top officials and business people to be perhaps the most promising part of the West's sanctions package.

<P>Unintended consequences of the Luxembourg meeting quickly cropped up in the Balkans. Opposition politicians did not greet the trickle of fuel aid with open arms - far from it. They boycotted the meeting over concerns that they would be associated with the call for Milosevic to be extradited to the West for trial a

s

a war criminal.

<P>In general, Serbia's fractured opposition fears being portrayed as President Clinton's lackeys. On Monday, Milosevic blasted his opponents as "cowards" and Western stooges.

<P>Whether this criticism sticks will depend on whom shivering Serbs blame for their misery in December. Past sanctions experience shows that such public opinion can be unpredictable.

<P>"Grandmothers in Belgrade and freezing temperatures ... it's not going to play well," warns Ruth Wedgwood, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

<P>Used as a blunt hammer, sanctions seldom are effective, experts say. They point to the example of Iraq, where a broad economic blockade appears to have only impoverished the nation while leaving Saddam Hussein in power.

<P>"You have to take the human rights of the people under the sanctions into account," says Hurst Hannum, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Mass.

<P>In sanctions, as in war, proportionality may need to be kept in mind - whether the intended end is worth the cost of the means. The travel ban, which is a direct rapier thrust at people who know Milosevic, wins Professor Hannum's approval.

<P>"What remains to be seen is whether the impact will be great enough to effect the sought-after change," he says.

<P>South Africa is one nation where sanctions may have hastened the desired destruction of a political leadership, experts say. While international strictures against dealing with South Africa were broad, they also had the support of anti-apartheid leaders within the country. Most important, there was a true international consensus against apartheid, and the sanctions largely held.

<P>If this week's Luxembourg meeting is any guide, the effort to oust Milosevic may have trouble on this point. A split could open between a hard-line US and European nations that remain convinced that an opening by the West would do more to undermine the Serb leader than lack of heat ever could.

<P>"You have to broaden the base, so it's not just one country doing [sanctions]," says Chester Crocker, a former US Assistant Secretary of State and a professor at Georgetown University.

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<P>American Journalism Review
October 1999
Pg. 37

<P>Close Call <I>

<P>During the first week of the bombing of Yugoslavia, two NATO F117 Nighthawks

headed for Belgrade to take out Serb TV headquarters, where Western journalists filed daily. The mission was aborted only minutes before the planes would have reached their target. </I>

<P>By Patrick J. Sloyan

<P>DURING THE FIRST week of Operation Allied Force, two F117 Nighthawks took off

from Aviano, Italy, headed for a new priority target of modern warfare. No, not

enemy headquarters, or the secret laboratory of James Bond epics. These odd-looking stealth bombers carried four tons of explosives for a laser-guided

attack on the Serb Radio and Television headquarters in downtown Belgrade.

<P>President Clinton and most other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had sanctioned the destruction of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's propaganda outlet--hanging their hat on Article 52 of the Geneva

Convention, which makes national broadcast stations legitimate military targets

Ostensibly, stopping the spin and outright lies from the Serb president's anchor

henchmen had moved the broadcast headquarters to the top of the target list. It

also raised the very real possibility that the Western world's eyes would have

been blinded to events in Yugoslavia as the country came under NATO bombardment

<P>CNN's Brent Sadler and his staff had an office in the Serb broadcast

headquarters; NBC, Britain's BBC and other Westerners were daily visitors. The

Serb government required journalists to use facilities in the building when

relaying their broadcasts back home via satellite. As the bombers roared out of

Aviano in late March, these journalists had no inkling of the Nighthawks' target.

<P>According to White House and Pentagon officials, the possibility that network

correspondents from NATO countries could be blasted at the broadcast

headquarters was understood by Clinton; Defense Secretary William Cohen; Army

Gen. Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the American

commander of NATO, Army Gen. Wesley Clark.

<P>"The president was briefed" about the headquarters, says a National Security

Council staff member, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "He knew the Western

reporters were there."

<P>Kenneth H. Bacon, the Pentagon's assistant secretary for public affairs, says

NATO wasn't "hot to attack Western media." The issue, he says, "was shutting

down a propaganda vehicle," which Milosevic hoped to use to fracture NATO unity

and chip away at popular support for the bombing campaign--his only chance of

hanging on to Kosovo in the face of the world's mightiest military alliance.

<P>"We are not against the free press," Bacon says.

<P>Fortunately, when the Nighthawks were only minutes from the Serb broadcast

headquarters, Clark aborted the mission. That was no simple task. During the

three-hour flight, the F117 had withdrawn its communications antennae to enhance

its radar-evading profile. "It's kind of like communicating with a submerged

submarine," Bacon says. "It's difficult to contact them."

<P>In the aftermath of that aborted bombing plan, Bacon would launch an extensive campaign to warn the Western press away from the radio and television

headquarters and Belgrade itself. A month later, on April 22, when NATO did strike and destroy the headquarters, no Western journalists were killed. The

Serbs weren't so fortunate; 10 technicians and engineers died in the blast.

Reporters at the scene say they saw a decapitated body. Another man had his legs

amputated to free him from the rubble. "For the first time in world history, the

media war is fought with bombs," said Belgrade Mayor Vojislav Mihajlovic, deploring the attack.

<P>But despite repeated attacks on transmitters throughout the country, Serb

radio and television remained on the air throughout the 79-day conflict. "It was

fuzzy but still broadcasting on the last day," says Steven Erlanger, the New

York Times reporter in Belgrade.

<P>There are conflicting accounts about why NATO commander Clark halted the planned strike in March. The general blamed unidentified "lawyers" when he

complained bitterly about interference at a Pentagon news conference. He did not

respond to repeated calls by this reporter.

<P>An explanation from Air Force officials is that CNN President Tom Johnson

learned of the plan and vigorously confronted Cohen and Shelton--while the planes were in flight.

<P>Another view--from Shelton's staff--was that French President Jacques Chirac vetoed the strike.

<P>But the White House explanation, offered by a National Security Council official, was that the mission to destroy the broadcast headquarters was aborted

because of a breach of security--a leak to CNN's Johnson. It was presumed Johnson alerted his staff in Belgrade that an attack was imminent.

<P>Sorting out the facts is difficult. Most of the players are reluctant to talk about secrets of diplomacy, warfare and journalism. Even Johnson begged off.

"Everything was off the record, as far as I am concerned," the CNN chief said recently.

<P>What is certain is that the Western journalists' presence in Yugoslavia was a risky proposition: Many senior U.S. military commanders viewed those working in Belgrade as Milosevic's handmaidens. "When you tell us you are willing to take the risk of going into areas we are bombing, we are willing to take you at your word," says a senior aide to Shelton, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified.

<P>TOM JOHNSON CAN charm, wheedle and whine if necessary to bend Washington to CNN's viewpoint. But, by all accounts, Johnson became a lion when the Nighthawks took off for the Serb broadcast headquarters and the offices of CNN correspondent Sadler and his staff.

<P>"Tom Johnson called and raised hell after the bombers were launched," says a senior Air Force officer who viewed the looming broadcast headquarters attack as a disaster. "It would have made the Chinese Embassy bombing look like a positiv

e

development. They would have killed TV reporters from every NATO country."

<P>As it turned out, someone, either in Washington or at NATO headquarters in Brussels, tipped Johnson that the strike was under way, according to Air Force

sources. While the Nighthawks followed their three-hour course to Belgrade, key

participants screamed at each other over the phone lines. "There was a

suggestion' [by Johnson's tipster] that the CNN crew leave the building and

head for their hotel in Belgrade," says one participant involved in the

controversy that night. The suggestion was meant as intimidation. The tip-off t
o

Johnson included some heavy-handed warnings that CNN staffers clear out of the

headquarters and take other Western journalists with them--perhaps by throwing
a

party at a Hyatt hotel in Belgrade where they were staying. "You better have

that goddamn party right now!" was the edict to Johnson overheard by a Pentagon

staffer.

<P>During the exchanges while the planes were in flight, Johnson warned Bacon

and Shelton that the imminent attack would be killing men and women who were

household faces in London, Paris, Berlin and Rome, as well as the United States

one military officer says. Johnson, the officer adds, "was really hot."

<P>But Shelton's aides say it wasn't Johnson but the president of France who

halted the Nighthawks. Chirac told the French media in June that "not a

single[airstrike] was carried out without France's agreement." Leaders of the

other NATO countries could have exercised the same control, but "for their own

reasons, they waived their powers," Chirac said.

<P>Chirac's role was endorsed by Clinton. According to Clinton aides, the president embraced Chirac's advice to temper the pace and scope of the air war.

"They were on the same wavelength," a Clinton official says.

<P>According to Shelton's aides, Clark had launched the bombers with the thought

that his action would trigger formal approval from Chirac. But when Clark called

Shelton to inquire about the French president's endorsement, Shelton calmly told

the NATO commander that there had been no approval. "Then [Shelton] put down the

phone before Clark let out a shriek," says the military officer.

<P>What effect did the Western media reports have on the war? Some say their

reports of continued Serb atrocities in Kosovo served to bolster support in the

United States and other countries for NATO airstrikes.

<P>But in the ensuing weeks, Western journalists also would relay the mistakes

and mishaps of aerial NATO attacks where civilians were incinerated. Wayward

"precision" munitions struck a passenger train, apartment buildings, a hospital

a tractor convoy and, most famously, the Chinese Embassy. NATO estimated 200

civilians were killed during the conflict, but some Western journalists put the

death toll at 1,000.

<P>Public opinion surveys showed, however, that popular support of the alliance

remained high in the United States and Western Europe throughout the conflict.

Accounts of Milosevic's continued genocide in Kosovo seemed to outweigh reports of NATO mistakes.

<P>AS THE MEMORY of Operation Allied Force fades, it is important to focus on official American planning for the next foreign conflict.

<P>While many journalists had expressed strong frustrations over the limitations of coverage imposed during the Persian Gulf War, newspaper editors, network news chiefs and wire service executives made little effort to bring about revised

ground rules for the military and media before the conflict in Yugoslavia started. And although Clinton officials and NATO trampled previous agreements with the media at the outset of the campaign in Yugoslavia, the press establishment didn't get to the Pentagon to protest until April 29--a month after the airstrikes began. Their complaints were brushed off by Bacon.

<P>Now is the time for the media establishment to bypass the Pentagon and go directly to the commander in chief for ground rules on future Kosovos, to prevent American military planners from painting bull's-eyes on Western network cameras in potential hot spots.

<P>And if they do, one thing media leaders should consider is making Johnson their point man.

<P>Bush administration officials are still complaining about Johnson's "interference" with war planning during Operation Desert Storm, when his efforts halted attacks on a media center used by CNN in Baghdad. And while he won't go into specifics about the aborted bombing of the Serb Radio and Television

headquarters, Johnson is clearly dismayed by the current climate at the

Pentagon.

<P>Johnson first waded into the fray over war coverage as a young deputy press

secretary for President Johnson as he was being besieged by nightly news reports

from Vietnam. The media-military relationship "has changed a lot," he says.

<P>"In those days, we used to provide [military] helicopters to get reporters to

the war," Johnson says. </I>

<P>Patrick J. Sloyan, who wrote about NATO's Kosovo spin campaign in AJR's June

issue, is senior correspondent for Newsday's Washington bureau. Sloyan has

covered military conflicts for more than 30 years and won a Pulitzer Prize for

his reporting on the Persian Gulf War. Elements of this article appeared

previously in Newsday.</I>

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<P>New York Times
October 14, 1999

<P>Serbian District To Investigate Albanians

<P>By The Associated Press

<P>BELGRADE, Serbia -- The government of New Belgrade, the largest district in

the Yugoslav capital, has instructed its police to investigate ethnic Albanians

living in its territory, the independent Beta news agency reported Wednesday.

<P>Quoting a district official, the agency said the municipality was advised "t
o

check in detail all Albanian residents and tenants in apartment blocks there."

<P>Instructions handed down by the local government said that males of Albanian

families absent from the city during the NATO bombing campaign this spring

"should be checked out in detail."

<P>The official reportedly behind the idea, Aleksandar Bozovic, said action "wa
s

to prevent bombing attacks such as the recent ones in Moscow where explosive

devices were planted in apartment buildings. We thought that, maybe, our

Albanian neighbors, under orders from the Kosovo Liberation Army, could begin

such attacks."

<P>Before Yugoslavia's crackdown last year against pro-independence Kosovo

Albanians and the NATO bombardment, thousands of Albanians lived in Belgrade. I
t

is unclear how many remain.

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<P>New York Times
October 14, 1999

<P>Annan In Kosovo

<P>Secretary General Kofi Annan made his first trip to Kosovo just two days after a grim reminder of ethnic hatred in the region -- the killing of a United

Nations worker who angered ethnic Albanians by speaking to them in

Serbo-Croatian. Mr. Annan met with ethnic Albanian and Serbian leaders. <I>

<P>(AP)</I>

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<P>St. Louis Post-Dispatch
October 10, 1999

<P>Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes Is A Simple, Fast-Paced Job For Many Kosovars

<P>By Harry Levins

<P>GNJILANE, KOSOVO - Homes in the Balkans have almost no wood, and the extensive use of concrete results in sturdy dwellings that can be patched up.

<P>Television news made burned-out homes in Kosovo a depressingly familiar image. Less publicized, almost four months after the war's end, is the rapid

rebuilding of those houses.

<P>Around Gnjilane -- it's pronounced "ja-LAW-nee," -- the destruction seems

scattered and almost random, maybe one house in 30 or 40.

<P>Ethnic cleansing no doubt hit with a harsher hand in other parts of Kosovo.

But around this city of 65,000 in Kosovo's southeastern corner, the dominant image is reconstruction, not destruction.

<P>Making the chore easier is the simple yet solid nature of buildings in the Balkans.

<P>In Kosovo -- as in Bosnia and almost everywhere else in the region -- houses rise around a framework of concrete.

<P>The floors are concrete slabs; the weight of the structure rests on concrete pillars. Between the pillars, the walls take shape from masonry blocks, made of concrete or, more commonly, reddish terra-cotta.

<P>Unlike an American ranch house, a Balkans house has almost no wood. Even the stairs are concrete.

<P>The exception is the roof. Crude two-by-four wooden rafters rise at a steep, snow-shedding angle. Nailed to the rafters is furring -- thin slats of cheap wood. The furring provides a base for the roof's exterior red-clay tiles, ubiquitous in the Balkans.

<P>Most people in the Balkans build their own houses, with the help of friends and neighbors. (For the final touch, many slap on a coat of white mortar as a permanent paint job.)

<P>So when violence comes calling, people like the Albanian Kosovars have the know-how they need to patch up the damage.

<P>Mostly, the damage in Kosovo seemed limited to burned-out roofs. Other than furniture, the rafters and furring are about the only part of a house that will burn. A roof aflame makes for dramatic television footage. But it also makes for relatively simple repairs.

<P>In Bosnia, by contrast, many houses took direct hits from artillery and mortar shells. But even that damage can be fixed, as long as the concrete framework remains intact. The homeowners simply chip away the damaged masonry blocks and replace them.

<P>Given that the walls and floors are so solid, a damaged house can sit open to the weather for two or three winters without buckling, warping or rotting. A similarly afflicted American subdivision would be in ruins.

<P>Ensign Mark Williams of San Diego has put his Annapolis engineering degree to work with the Seabees, the Navy's experts on building. He's in Kosovo to help build a base camp for the Army.

<P>Although the Seabees are building barracks from two-by-fours and plywood, Williams saw some advantages to the Balkan building materials.

<P>"Those houses won't rot," he said. "They're warmer than bare wood, and anyway, the wood around here isn't very good for construction."

<P>Williams also saw some drawbacks. "Running plumbing and electricity has to be a nightmare," he said, "although I doubt that a lot of the houses have indoor plumbing."

<P>And in a region that's geologically shaky, he said, the homemade houses are structurally shaky. "American houses are definitely more sound," Williams said.

<P>Even so, he mused, given conditions in the Balkans, its houses have one key edge:

<P>"They're bulletproof."

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly
October 13, 1999

<P>US-Israeli New Defence Policy Group

<P>Israel and the USA have inaugurated a new defence policy advisory group to plan strategy on missile defence.

<P>The first meeting of the US-Israeli Defence Policy Advisory Group (DPAG) took

place on 30 September in Tel Aviv. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter

Slocombe led the US delegation; the Israeli team was headed by Ministry of Defence (MoD) director-general Ilan Biran.

<P>The new group will co-ordinate the activities of the US Department of Defense

and the Israeli MoD. It was established during a visit by Israeli Prime Minister

Ehud Barak to Washington in July, where he held several meetings with US

President Bill Clinton. The two countries have other joint panels designed to

explore strategic issues.

Slocombe also travelled to northern Israel to examine Israeli plans to install the Theater High-Energy Laser system to destroy short-range rockets employed in the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

From Tel Aviv, Slocombe went to Amman where he held talks with Jordan's King Abdullah on the kingdom's defence. King Abdullah was due to meet with President

Clinton on 12 October in Washington. Defence sources told Jane's Defence Weekly that the USA seeks to include Jordan in a regional defence system against ballistic missiles.

-- Steve Rodan, JDW Correspondent

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Pacific Stars and Stripes
October 14, 1999
Pg. 3

Activists Request U.S., S. Korea Ban Land Mines

The United States and South Korea have refused to join a treaty that calls for a total ban of land mines.

By The Associated Press

SEOUL Leaders of anti-land mine organizations

appealed Tuesday to the United States and South Korea to ban all land mines.

<P>"I would like to appeal to the U.S. and South Korean governments to join our

move and ban land mines," said Tun Channareth, a spokesman for the International

Campaign to Ban Landmines, Tun. The Cambodian lost both legs to a land mine.

<P>His organization, along with co-founder Jody Williams, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997.

<P>Tun spoke at a workshop during an international conference of nongovernmental

organizations in Seoul's Olympic Stadium. Thousands of activists from more than

100 nations are taking part in the five-day event that began Monday.

<P>The United States and South Korea have refused to join a treaty that calls

for a total ban on all kinds of antipersonnel land mines, saying land mines

serve as a deterrent to a possible invasion from communist North Korea. More

than 100 nations signed the Ottawa Convention in late 1997.

<P>The agreement prohibits the use, storage, production and transfer of

anti-personnel mines and requires their destruction. It also obliges its

signatories to assist, rehabilitate and reintegrate mine victims socially and

economically.

<P>The 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice, not a permanent peace treaty

<P>An estimated 1 million land mines are planted along the 155-mile-long border

between the two Koreas.

<P>About 37,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed in South Korea under a mutual

defense treaty.

<P>According to the Korean Campaign to Ban Land Mines, a local NGO, land mines have killed or injured more than 100 soldiers and civilians in South Korea in the last five years. Most civilian victims died after stepping on mines dislodged by floods.

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<P>New York Times
October 14, 1999

<P>Indonesian President Asks Top General To Be His Running Mate

<P>By Seth Mydans

<P>JAKARTA, Indonesia -- In an attempt to strengthen his hand with the politically powerful military, President B. J. Habibie Wednesday selected Indonesia's military chief, Gen. Wiranto, as his vice presidential running mate

in an electoral assembly that is due to vote in a week.

<P>General Wiranto made no comment. Under his command, the military, with its potentially crucial bloc of votes, remained publicly uncommitted on its presidential choice.

<P>But the selection of a fellow member of the inner circle of former President

Suharto sharpened the divide between Habibie's old-guard candidacy and that of

his chief rival, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who has become a symbol for change.

<P>A possible Habibie-Wiranto leadership, in direct defiance of those calling for a break with the past, could energize the opposition into a new eruption of unrest.

<P>"The people and the students will not accept Habibie and Wiranto," said Ridwan, an English teacher, as he marched in central Jakarta Wednesday with students who support Mrs. Megawati. "Both Habibie and Wiranto are followers of Suharto. If they win, nothing will change."

<P>A 700-member electoral assembly is to vote Oct. 20 to choose Indonesia's next President and the following day to choose the vice president. Candidates for the

posts do not run on party slates; electors who vote for Habibie will not be bound to choose his vice presidential selection.

<P>But Habibie's choice, with its overture to the influential military, is part of a vigorous lobbying effort in what has become a tight presidential race.

Abdurrahman Wahid, who heads the leading Islamic movement here in the world's largest Moslem nation, has emerged as a third presidential possibility.

<P>Habibie's announcement came just hours after the hotly debated decision by his party, Golkar, to retain him as its candidate despite his slipping popularity.

<P>He said, in part: "We need good cooperation with the military; that is why I want to have a military man as my running mate. A vice president has to help the president handle threats faced by the nation."

<P>The two appear to have worked well together during a transition that has seen

continuing instability both on the streets and within the corridors of leadership.

<P>Habibie was vice president 17 months ago when he moved into the vacancy left

by his mentor, President Suharto, who was forced to resign. Habibie reappointed

General Wiranto and gave him free rein to reorganize the military.

<P>General Wiranto, 52, also owes his career to Suharto, who made him his personal adjutant and then head of the armed forces. Together with Habibie, he

has pledged to protect Suharto.

<P>A four-star general, he holds the two top military posts in Indonesia: chief

of the armed forces and Defense Minister. Both posts were conferred by Habibie.

The general is a career soldier who is seen as professional, moderate and supportive of reforms in which the military would withdraw from its pervasive political role in Indonesia.

<P>But whether he was engineering events or, as he asserts, lost control of his

ground forces, General Wiranto holds command responsibility for the violence and

chaos that has consumed the territory of East Timor since it voted for

independence from Indonesia on Aug. 30.

<P>Under him, the military also has engaged in brutal tactics in the province of

Aceh and the island of Ambon, and has cracked down violently on some, but not all, protests in Jakarta.

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<P>South China Morning Post
October 13, 1999

<P>Hutchison Hits Back At US Canal Claims

<P>By Greg Torode in Washington

<P>Hutchison Whampoa is taking urgent steps to protect itself from intensifying

political attack in Washington over its Panama Canal operations.

<P>The company is negotiating with several lobby firms in the capital to quell

claims it is at the heart of a mainland bid to eventually control the strategic

shipping route.

<P>"We are increasingly worried about the situation and we are taking steps to

ensure our side of the story is firmly and effectively put across to stop all

this," one official said.

<P>"It is not good for us or Hong Kong in the long term. It is all quite

ridiculous and we are talking to people who know Washington a lot better than we

do."

<P>A senior Hutchison official is expected to visit the capital soon.

<P>Senior Republican figures, such as Senate Majority leader Trent Lott and

former defence secretary Caspar Weinberger, have named Hutchison as a major

People's Liberation Army secu-

<P> rity threat once American forces pull out of the canal in December. Open hearings of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives are expected to start by the end of the month.

<P> Committee members are understood to have met intelligence officials last week to discuss the situation.

<P> Further attention is expected this week with the arrival in Washington of new Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso, who has refused to allow any future stationing of United States troops.

<P> "This one is not going to go away . . . things could get a lot more painful for Hutchison in the weeks and months ahead," one diplomat said.

<P> "Conservative Republican fears over Bill Clinton, China and Panama are fast converging and Hutchison is finding itself at the centre."

<P> Hong Kong officials in Washington are monitoring developments. Trouble flared for Hutchison six weeks ago when Senator Lott described the firm as an arm of the PLA and personally linked tycoon Li Ka-shing to mainland efforts to control the canal. Hutchison signed contracts in 1997 allowing a subsidiary to run port operations at Balboa and Christobal on the Pacific and Atlantic entrances.

<P> The fears come amid open Republican anger at the Clinton administration over its compliance with a pact signed under president Jimmy Carter to hand the canal back to Panama by the end of this year.

<P> The 1977 treaty gives the US a stated right to continue to defend and protect the canal to ensure its openness, but is still not enough for several prominent

conservatives.

<P>Mr Weinberger, still a figure of influence on Capitol Hill, warned against "political efforts to make everyone feel good".

<P>He described the Hutchison deal as the "biggest threat" to the canal's continued security and raised the prospect of the firm using a "trumped-up reason" to shut it to US traffic. Hutchison has fiercely denied the reports,

insisting it has no links to the PLA, no ability to control the canal and no

interest in doing so.

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<P>New York Times
October 14, 1999

<P>Pledges Of Extradition Accompany Colombian Drug Arrests

<P>By Barry Meier

<P>WASHINGTON -- The Justice Department announced Wednesday that Colombian officials had arrested the head of that nation's largest cocaine trafficking

ring and other drug traffickers and had pledged to move quickly to extradite

them to the United States.

<P>Colombia has not extradited drug traffickers to this country since 1990,

after a wave of terror by drug cartels that involved the assassination of government officials and bombings. In 1997, it changed its constitution to permit extradition, and the Justice Department is currently seeking to bring 10

Colombians to stand trial in the United States on drug charges.

<P>Among 31 people arrested in early morning raids Wednesday in Colombia and Mexico were Alejandro Bernal Madrigal, whom a federal official described as the head of the biggest cocaine ring in Colombia, and Fabio Ochoa, a member of the Medellin cartel.

<P>The latest arrests come as Colombia is seeking \$3.5 billion in international aid, mostly from the United States, to combat drug trafficking and leftist insurgents and to prop up its faltering economy.

<P>At a news conference here Wednesday, Luis Alberto Moreno, Colombia's ambassador to the United States, said that the Colombian government and its judicial system will review extradition requests for the suspects and fulfill those deemed legally warranted.

<P>"They will be certainly extradited to the United States," said Moreno.

<P>Both U.S. and Colombian officials said in interviews that they believed that the extradition of Colombians for trial in this country could have a significant impact on drug trafficking. Colombian courts have often handed out light sentences and drug lords have continued to operate from jails.

<P>But Michael Shifter, a senior fellow with the Inter-American Dialogue, a policy institute here, said he doubted such moves would have much impact.

<P>"It is a mistake to look at this as something that marks a major step in the

drug war," said Shifter, who has studied drug issue. "It is not going to make a difference in American cities that a few Colombians are going to be extradited to the U.S."

<P>Federal officials estimated that those arrested were part of an operation that may have been responsible for shipping between 20 tons to 30 tons of cocaine monthly from Columbia through Mexico to the United States and Europe. That would represent as much as one-third of the cocaine consumed in this country.

<P>Federal officials said that the drug ring used four different routes to send cocaine to the United States, including shipping the drug by shrimp boats and in deliveries of frozen fruit pulp produced by plants controlled by the drug gang.

<P>"In our estimation, this was the most significant cocaine trafficking operation in Colombia today," William Ledwith, chief of the Drug Enforcement Administration's office of international operations, said in an interview.

<P>The Colombia ring also operated closely with drug traffickers in Mexico, including an operation once run by Amado Carillo Fuentes, who was at one time that country's top drug smuggler.

<P>A senior DEA official who asked not to be identified said that the investigation was particularly significant because, although the inquiry was conducted by officials in Colombia, the United States and other countries, those charged with crimes had been indicted only in the United States.

<P>Previously, most Colombians facing drug charges, including the leaders of the

Cali and Medellin cartels, were charged both in the United States and Columbia.

That allowed them to be tried in Colombia and receive more lenient sentences

than they were likely to have received in the United States.

<P>Those arrested Wednesday on drug trafficking and money laundering charges

were indicted on Sept. 30 by a federal jury in Miami. The charges were unsealed

Wednesday.

<P>Ledwith, of the DEA, said that the drug trafficking headed by Bernal had

emerged a few years ago to fill the void left by the deaths or arrests of the

heads of the Medellin and Cali cartels.

<P>For much of the 1990s, the issue of extradition was a source of tension and

friction between U.S. and Colombian officials. American authorities argued that

Colombia's refusal to extradite its citizens reflected its ambivalence toward

the drug trade. But Colombians also had to confront a wave of terrorist acts by

drug traffickers opposed to facing trial in the United States.

<P>Moreno said in an interview that Colombians' attitudes toward extradition

began to shift about four years ago.

<P>"I think people came to recognize that extradition is a very useful tool in

fighting the war on drugs," he said.

<P>The change in the country's law, in December 1997, only applies to those

charged with crimes after that date.

<P>One DEA official said the agency was pleased with how Columbia officials wer
e

handling the pending requests, which he estimated could take anywhere from one

to two years to resolve.

<P>Extradition requests for those arrested Wednesday will be made in coming weeks, the official said.

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<P>New York Times
October 14, 1999

<P>5 U.N. Workers Seized In Georgia

<P>A day after two United Nations relief officials were killed in Burundi by an

armed gang that raided a refugee camp, five United Nations military observers

and two other employees accompanying them were taken hostage in Abkhazia, a

province trying to secede from Georgia. <I>

<P>Barbara Crossette (NYT) </I>

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<P>USA Today
October 13, 1999
Pg. 6

<P>Poland Missiles Stolen

<P>Police searching for six anti-aircraft missiles reported missing from an arms

factory in southern Poland found five of them nearby, police said. It was not

known who took the weapons, what happened to the sixth one, or whether any of

the 5-foot-long, 44-pound missiles were armed.

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<P>Flight International
October 6-12, 1999
Pg. 26

<P>Russians Perform Better In Chechnya

<P>By Alexander Velovich, Moscow

<P>THE PERFORMANCE of the Russian air force during operations against separatist

rebels in Chechnya is better than its previous campaigns in Afghanistan during

the 1980s and over the disputed enclave in 1994-6, says air force

commander-in-chief Col Gen Anatoly Kornukov.

<P>While satisfied with the air force's operations, Kornukov acknowledges

"friendly fire" incidents following attacks on Russian ground forces.

<P>He also admits that the air force mistakenly dropped mines on Georgian

territory in an aerial minelaying operation designed to close an 81km (50 miles)

section of the land border with Chechnya.

<P>Russian air force raids are normally performed by pairs of Frontal Aviation

Sukhoi Su-24M Fencer or Sukhoi Su-25TM Frogfoot attack aircraft using

television- and laser-guided bombs supported by Su-24MRs providing strike

reconnaissance. About 2,000 missions were flown between 3 August and 27

September.

<P>Targets have included an Antonov An-2 Colt biplane, which the Russian air

force claims Chechen rebels bought from Azerbaijan, and which was used to

smuggle weapons from neighbouring Azerbaijan and Georgia and for reconnaissance

flights over Russian positions in Daghestan.

<P>Also hit has been the Grozny airport surveillance radar, more than 30

bridges, rebel training camps and ammunition stores, as well as oil refineries,

an electricity distribution station, a television transmitter and a

cellular-telephone station in Grozny and its suburbs.

<P>Chechen airspace has been declared "under special regulations" says Kornukov

with no flights allowed from the disputed enclave.

<P>Kornukov says the air force is meeting growing resistance from anti-aircraft

artillery, small arms fire and "several launches" of man-portable surface-to-air

missiles. Intelligence reports say Chechen rebels have received Stinger

shoulder-launched SAMs from Afghanistan.

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<P>New Republic
October 25, 1999
Pg. 6 <U>

<P>TRB from Washington </U>

<P>Wounded

<P>By Charles Lane

<P>It was only last year that Americans marked the thirtieth anniversary of the

My Lai massacre, that horrible incident on the morning of March 16, 1968, during

which U.S. Army soldiers deliberately gunned down hundreds of defenseless men,

women, and children in a South Vietnamese village. That war crime was

incompletely prosecuted; its meaning is still bitterly debated among an American

public divided to this day over the war in Vietnam.

<P>And now another Asian village, the Korean hamlet of No Gun Ri, has emerged

from the shadows of military history to claim a place next to My Lai in the

catalog of the Army's shame. According to a superbly documented Associated Press

story that drew on declassified American materials as well as on eyewitness

accounts from both Korean survivors and veterans of the Army's Seventh Cavalry

Regiment, U.S. troops were ordered to machine-gun hundreds of refugees from No

Gun Ri during the frantic early days of the Korean War. The most agonizing part

of the story is that the survivors and the victims' relatives have been pressing their claims for justice for decades, only to be silenced by the South Korean government or brushed aside by the Pentagon. As recently as 1997, the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service told the Koreans, inaccurately, that there was "no evidence" that the Seventh Cavalry had even been in the vicinity on the day in question.

<P>Justifiably concerned about the implications for U.S.-South Korean relations, the Clinton administration has ordered a thorough investigation that, with luck, will produce a full and accurate account of what happened. What's perhaps even more important, though, is that the United States comes clean about the half-century-long cover-up of this awful event.

<P>But let's also hope that this won't turn into an occasion to besmirch the entire Korean War effort or otherwise tilt the discussion of the U.S. role in the cold war. Horrible as it appears to have been, the No Gun Ri massacre does not invalidate the U.N.-sanctioned American effort to roll back a North Korean invasion, which, if successful, would have subjected the entire Korean peninsula to a long dark night of official murder and economic deprivation.

<P>Rather, the No Gun Ri investigation should be an occasion to reflect seriously on the causes of war crimes; the mitigating factors, if any, that should be taken into account when evaluating them; and the appropriate means for ensuring accountability, even long after the fact.

<P>Clearly one mitigating factor at No Gun Ri was the sheer chaos of the situation surrounding the ill-trained and hastily deployed American troops. They found themselves desperately trying to maneuver along roads clogged with refugees--refugees their commanders told them might well be North Korean soldiers in disguise. James Webb, the secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan who served as a Marine officer in Vietnam, has already decreed in The Wall Street Journal that these factors should be enough to absolve the Seventh Cavalry. He even comes close to implying that deliberately killing the refugees might have been acceptable, if morally gut-wrenching, if the alternative was losing American soldiers, especially since "the only true protection [the United States] can give the [South Koreans] is to defeat the invading enemy."

<P>Webb is right to weigh the American action against the possible alternatives but, even so, he goes too far. The order to shoot the refugees, who, contrary to what Webb implies, were already basically confined by the U.S. forces under a bridge, was clearly illegal. "No refugees to cross the front line," the order read. "Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." Soldiers are bound to follow only lawful orders; indeed, they are duty-bound to disobey unlawful ones. The accounts published by the A.P. and others make clear that several American soldiers did, indeed, refuse to shoot at the women and children, just as Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, a helicopter pilot, intervened to stop the slaughter at My Lai. Fear is a powerful factor in

every soldier's mind; it can even mitigate culpability in some circumstances; but in a civilized Army it cannot be permitted to trump individual conscience.

<P>Webb has a stronger point when he notes the hypocrisy of focusing on the up-close killing at No Gun Ri instead of on the basically intentional aerial slaughter of civilians at Dresden and Tokyo. All I can say is, Two wrongs don't make a right. But Webb's provocative comparison does have implications for such recent events as our intervention in Kosovo. Many fault the United States for having attacked Serb forces, government offices, and factories only from 15,000 feet and above, a policy that surely contributed to the deaths of dozens of Kosovar refugees who were mistaken for Serb troops on the ground, as well as many Serb civilians. But, given the extraordinary accuracy of the weaponry the United States employed whenever possible and the lengths to which pilots went to avoid inflicting civilian casualties, damage due to the 15,000-feet-and-above policy cannot fairly be called a war crime. The air war in Yugoslavia was anything but another Dresden. Also, one lesson of No Gun Ri is that, if the United States had gone in on the ground in Kosovo, heavy civilian casualties might also have taken place, especially given the foreseeable difficulty of sorting Serb paramilitaries from the civilian Serb population.

<P>But, if Webb errs on the side of post hoc absolution, there is little point in taking an overly prosecutorial attitude toward the men of No Gun Ri. North Korea started the whole thing. And those who are principally responsible on the

U.S. side--the senior planners who put American troops into such an untenable position in the first place, along with the field commanders who gave the hasty, unconscionable order to shoot refugees--are mostly dead. The applicable U.S. law provides that Korean War vets who are now civilians could not be prosecuted for their actions during wartime (though the rule was recently changed to permit such prosecution of former soldiers in the future). But even if it were possible, what purpose would it serve to haul the soldiers who followed the terrible order into court now? It would certainly be unfair to those who have finally broken their silence to tell what happened.

<P>The government's approach to this issue must be premised on the healing power of truth, full disclosure, and, where appropriate, official remorse. The investigation should be a thorough, no-holds-barred affair; it should name names. If, as seems likely, the story is confirmed, the result should be generous compensation, as well as official written apologies, for the families of the victims. But there should also be medals for the Americans who refused to fire on the refugees, just as Thompson was finally decorated last year for his heroic effort to stop My Lai.

<P>For its role in saving South Korea from North Korean Stalinism, this nation need never apologize. But our strength can also be demonstrated through our willingness, however belated, to acknowledge that that effort, along with other battles of the cold war, was not an unblemished one. Indeed, without a full accounting for No Gun Ri, we risk undermining the legitimacy of American effort

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to bring today's real war criminals to book.

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<P>The Nation
October 25, 1999

<P>Korean My Lai

<P>By Bruce Cumings

<P>Repressed memory is the ammunition of history, returning when one least

expects it to puncture the complacency of the present. Americans reacted with

palpable shock at learning the fate of several hundred Korean civilians,

machine-gunned to death by US soldiers in late July 1950 under a bridge near

Nogun village. The deeply researched Associated Press account of this massacre

made the front pages of major newspapers, leading some of them to run for

cover--like the Washington Post, which dismissed the massacre as the unfortunate

result of untrained soldiers facing an unknown enemy in the early, chaotic

stages of the Korean War. But this was not an isolated incident. The Nogun

massacre can help Americans understand what this "forgotten war" was really

about. It was a civil and unconventional war that had its origins long before

June 1950, and the official repositories of historical truth in Washington and

Seoul have been lying about its basic nature for half a century.

<P>Nogun village is located a couple of miles down the road from the county seat

of Yongdong in a remote and mountainous region where a strong, indigenous left

wing emerged just after Japanese imperialism collapsed in Korea in August 1945.

A county people's committee (a ubiquitous political form at the time) took power

from the Japanese and then watched as US civil affairs teams grabbed the reins

of government from it that fall. The teams quickly re-employed Koreans who had

served in the hated colonial police, as part of the establishment of the US

military government that ruled south of the 38th Parallel for the next three

years. After two years of political turmoil, guerrilla war emerged in and around

Yongdong county, long before the "Korean War" began. According to a US doctor,

Clesson Richards, who ran a Salvation Army hospital in Yongdong from 1947 to

1950, "Guerrilla warfare was around us all the time. We had many Commies as

patients." The police would "keep an eye on them," he blithely told a reporter,

"grill them and when they had all possible information, take them out and stand

them before a firing squad. This wall was near the hospital. We could hear the

men being shot."

<P>Shortly after US troops joined the battle in 1950, the 24th Infantry Division

suffered a "ghastly" defeat at Taejon, "one of the greatest ordeals in Army

history," according to military historian Clay Blair. As backpedaling US forces

tumbled southward from Taejon, they soon arrived in Yongdong. North Korean sources said it had been "liberated" by local guerrillas, something corroborated by the New York Times's Walter Sullivan, who reported that some 300 guerrillas in and around Yongdong harassed the retreating Americans. "The American G.I. is now beginning to eye with suspicion any Korean civilian in the cities or countryside," Sullivan wrote. On July 26 a Communist soldier wrote in his diary that US bombers had swooped over Yongdong and "turned it into a sea of fire."

<P>The popular and guerrilla element of the Korean War has been lost from the collective memory, as if Vietnam were the only intervention where My Lai occurred. But in 1950 what the people in "white pajamas" provoked in Americans was as accessible as your barbershop reading table. What the Pentagon could not find was reported, for example, by John Osborne in Life. He told readers of the August 21, 1950, issue that US officers had ordered GIs to fire on clusters of civilians; a soldier told him, "It's gone too far when we are shooting children." It was a new kind of war, Osborne wrote, with the "blotting out of villages where the enemy may be hiding; the shelling of refugees who may include North Koreans." The commander of the 24th Infantry Division, Gen. John Church, said that Korea was not like the European battles of World War II: "It's an entirely different kind of warfare, this is really guerrilla warfare...essentially a guerrilla war over rugged territory."

<P>Official US sources have always denied that any massacres of civilians

occurred at any point in this three-year war. Routine denials by officers on the scene in Yongdong were followed by official military histories that blamed the North Koreans for all atrocities and by years of stonewalling by two governments--right up to the Pentagon's claim for the past two years that it found "no information that substantiates the claim." The offending First Cavalry Division wasn't even in the area, it said. But it took me exactly five minutes to find Clay Blair's statement in *The Forgotten War*, based on declassified unit records, that "the 1st Cav would relieve the shattered 24th Division at Yongdong" on July 22.

<P>If, under President Clinton's prodding, the Pentagon proposes finally to open up the real history of the Korean War, I can point out a couple of places to begin. One week before the Nogun village incident, according to ten witnesses who spoke to a North Korean Army detachment that arrived there on July 20, US troops herded some 2,000 civilians into the mountains near Yongdong and then slaughtered them, apparently mostly from the air, although the account also said several women were raped before being shot. An internal intelligence memorandum two months later, sent to Maj. Gen. Clark Ruffner, suggested that the ubiquitous guerrillas could be dealt with by organizing "assassination squads to carry out death sentences passed by ROK Government in 'absentia' trials of guerrilla leaders."

<P>The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa defined that vexing

term "truth" in four ways: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social or "dialogue" truth, and healing or restorative truth. The revelations of the Nogun village massacre establish all those meanings of truth for the courageous survivors who have pressed their case against all odds for years--those like Chun Choon Ja, a 12-year-old girl at the time, who witnessed US soldiers "play[ing] with our lives like boys playing with flies." For Americans, the forensic truths establish lies at all levels, perpetrated for half a century, but they also (in the commission's words) "reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse." It is now up to others to take the personal truths of the survivors and turn them into a restorative truth, a requiem for the "forgotten war" that might finally achieve the reconciliation that the two Koreas have been denied since Dean Rusk first etched a line at the 38th Parallel in August 1945. <I>

<P>Bruce Cumings teaches at the University of Chicago. His newest book is Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century (Duke). </I>

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<P>San Diego Union-Tribune
October 13, 1999

<P>Renewing The Red Scare On The Canal Zone

<P>By Lionel Van Deerlin

<P>In mid-August, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott addressed a letter to a fellow Republican -- Defense Secretary William S. Cohen. It contained this grim

warning: When America relinquishes control over the Panama Canal at year's end,

Communist China may seize the strategic waterway.

<P>"It appears that we have given away the farm without a shot being fired," the

senator mused in a mild mix of metaphors.

<P>If he hoped this would prompt new demands to rescind the 1977 treaty ending

U.S. sovereignty in the Canal Zone, Lott misfired.

<P>More than two decades have elapsed since President Carter signed and the

Senate ratified this treaty. There have been stormy moments. Die-hard

conservatives and Republican platforms since 1980 have viewed the agreement with

misgivings. They foresee a loss of world leadership.

<P>But a Chinese takeover, possibly shutting down the canal? Please. That suggestion was a bit much even for folk who scare easily about such things.

<P>Mississippi's Trent Lott was serving his third term in Congress when the canal treaty became law -- but to make sure he understands it, the Pentagon has

now taken care to explain an important detail.

<P>To wit, Washington retains the unilateral right to use military force against

anyone trying to blockade the canal. Our Navy stands ready, if needed, to

maintain an international waterway open to all. "We are satisfied that our interests will be protected, both in terms of national security and commercial use," Lott was advised.

<P>Two more months have passed without renewed sniping at the treaty from any quarter. Fearmongers should feel free to devote their full attention to the Y2K computer threat, and let the canal treaty ride.

<P>Panama, a nation carved out of Venezuela a century ago so that we might build

the canal, seems ready to assume responsibility for managing it. The 1977 treaty

(on which negotiations began during the Eisenhower years) recognized that the United States in modern times could not forever retain a colonial outpost many hundreds of miles from our shores.

<P>During the brief but conservative years of Gerald Ford treaty negotiations moved to the conference table and toward an agreement. But they were upset by a

political development at home -- Ronald Reagan's first campaign for the White House. In 1976, it will be recalled, the freshly retired California governor

attempted a coup against his party's incumbent president, Ford -- and almost pulled it off.

<P>Reagan focused his attack against Ford on the pending treaty with Panama. He

articulated a viewpoint shared by many Americans -- that our sovereignty over the Canal Zone was justified on grounds that "We bought it. We paid for it. And we aren't going to give it up!"

<P>In a flight of wishful thinking, Reagan termed the Canal Zone "every bit as

much American soil as is the land in states that were carved out of the Gadsden

and Louisiana purchases, as is the state of Alaska." He branded Panama's president, Gen. Omar Torrijos, "a tinhorn dictator" standing in our way.

<P>Many responsible conservatives felt otherwise. Barry Goldwater accused Reagan

of deception and of "telling the American people things that are not true." The

respected editor and TV host, William F. Buckley, visited Panama, met with Torrijos and came away in support of the treaty.

<P>Even Reagan's longtime ally, actor John Wayne, broke with him on this issue.

"I am sure it is quite embarrassing to General Torrijos to be called a tinhorn

dictator," Wayne wrote to his old friend. "I hope they weren't your words. This

is more the style of a liberal punk . . . "

<P>Wayne got angrier as Reagan kept up the attack. In a second letter he wrote,

"I'll show you point by g----- point in the treaty where you are misinforming

the people. This is not my point of view against your point of view. These are

the facts."

<P>Carter signed the treaty to which Ford had agreed. In the face of spirited charges that it was a "giveaway," the Senate went along. And although occupying

the White House for eight subsequent years, Reagan made no move to reverse our commitment.

<P>Trent Lott should feel relieved. Although U.S. hegemony there has only about

10 weeks left, the 280 canal pilots are not studying Chinese. <I>

<P>Van Deerlin represented a San Diego County district in Congress for 18 years

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<P>Toronto Star
October 13, 1999

<P>Panama Canal Transfer Shows U.S. Pettiness

<P>By R.M. Koster

<P>On Dec. 31 the United States will transfer the Panama Canal and the remainder

of its isthmian bases to Panama.

<P>The transfer, which began in 1978, is one of the most significant events of

the century, one that makes the hoopla and fanfare of the return of Hong Kong to

China two years ago seem commonplace. There, the weaker party relinquished to

the stronger, something done every day, though not always so gracefully. Here,

the world's most powerful state cedes to one of the tiniest, a singular

occurrence.

<P>In addition, the transfer concludes a unique bilateral relationship, one not

always blissful but, on balance, beneficial to both parties and to the world in

general.

<P>Its first consequence, often forgotten these days, was cleansing the isthmus of malaria and yellow fever, the century's greatest public-health effort.

<P>Its more illustrious offspring, the canal, contributed signally to our country's defence, until the advent of nuclear weapons made dependence on it a liability, and it continues to contribute to world commerce.

<P>In bringing this relationship to a close, the canal transfer culminates an era of boundless energy but insufficient restraint.

<P>The predatory exuberance of President Theodore Roosevelt's "I took the isthmus!" - if just barely, in 1903 - gives way to fairness and moral leadership.

<P>Finally, the transfer is an act of national self-definition through which the

United States distinguishes itself from other nations past and present. It completes an act of national self-assertion with one of unprecedented generosity. In this, it resembles our postwar treatment of Japan.

<P>There, having waged war as implacably as any other nation, the United States made a concerted effort to leave an enemy better off for having been defeated.

<P>To invoke Hong Kong again, British rule there allowed trade to flourish, but the British neither built nor left behind anything like the Panama Canal.

<P>It is lamentable that the Clinton administration, so far, intends no special ceremony to mark the transfer, nothing commensurate with the event's transcendence.

<P>Some mid-level politicians apparently fear the transfer may harm Democratic

candidates in next year's election. Other mid-level officials have allowed themselves to become resentful toward Panama over slights dispensed by the country's former president.

<P>These groups' approach to the transfer is for someone like a deputy assistant undersecretary of transportation to drop the key to the canal into some Panamanian official's mailbox in the dead of night.

<P>This will not do.

<P>A great nation's policy shouldn't be influenced by petty matters. The canal transfer will be noticed no matter who represents the United States. Some people will decry it. We are a large country with many different strains of opinion on how we should behave toward our neighbours. But the point here is that transferring the canal to Panama is something we agreed to as a nation, openly, formally, constitutionally, after thorough debate.

<P>How we mark it is not something a candidate's convenience should determine.

<P>Nor need we take into account the actions of the last president of Panama, Ernesto Perez Balladares, who left office after being overwhelmingly repudiated by his own countrymen when he attempted to change the constitution last year to allow himself to run for reelection. To cite Cervantes, "The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on."

<P>The Panama Canal is a national monument, arguably mankind's greatest engineering achievement, our counterpart to the pyramids and China's Great Wall. The Clinton administration has an obligation to the American people to mark its

transfer in due fashion.

<P>This is an obligation that extends to past generations, who built it, operated it and defended it, and to future generations, who will take greater pride in it because of the transfer. From a different standpoint, no responsible

administration would pass up so excellent a public-relations opportunity.

<P>Washington has plenty of enemies adept at exploiting its errors and distorting facts to portray the United States as a sump of evil. The transfer demonstrates an example of the nation's decency.

<P>On Sept. 1, a new president took office in Panama: Mireya Moscoso, chosen last May in the fairest and friendliest election ever held here. She will represent Panama at the canal transfer.

<P>President Clinton should be on the podium with her to honor the past and usher in the future - the land divided to bring nations together, the imperialist era laid to rest with the millennium. <I>

<P>R.M. Koster is the co-author of In the Time of Tyrants: Panama 1968-1990.

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<P>Long Island Newsday
October 13, 1999
Pg. 43

<P>Are We Condemned To Repeat History?

<P>By Charles Ingrao

<P>Over the last decade, perhaps the most powerful argument for intervention in

the former Yugoslavia has been the vivid memory of the horrible atrocities committed during World War II.

<P>Its advocates repeatedly shamed western leaders by reminding them of the promise that the civilized world would "never again" permit genocide. And, after

four years of neglect, their arguments finally prevailed: Behind the reluctant

statesmanship of President Bill Clinton, NATO air power ended the killing in

Bosnia and, most recently, in Kosovo.

<P>So now we can say that we've learned from the horrors of World War II and

acted decisively against ethnic cleansing. Or can we? Today very few of us are

aware of a second wave of ethnic cleansing that took place with the defeat of the Third Reich, when 14 million German civilians were driven from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe.

<P>The largest expulsion in human history was so brutal that 2 million refugees

died in the process of fleeing to Germany-from exposure, starvation, or outright

violence.

<P>To this day the survivors' descendants represent 20 percent of Germany's 80

million people. Yet, very few people outside Germany know or care about their fate, certainly not their former homelands, which have carefully expunged all evidence of their presence there.

<P>Such was the punishment for their "collective guilt" that, even today, many European and American "liberal" intellectuals cannot bring themselves to sympathize with the plight of these forgotten victims, even though most of them had taken no part in the Nazi crimes perpetrated in their name.

<P>Admittedly, Serbian war crimes pale by comparison with those committed by the

Nazis: Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's goal was to terrorize and expel, not to annihilate a whole race, and his surrogates may have killed perhaps 50,000 civilians, not 11 million. Nonetheless, the forgotten aftermath of World

War II is uncomfortably similar to the recent experience of the Serbs.

<P>The monstrous acts committed in the name of "Greater Serbia" have transformed

the Serbs into the Nazis of the '90s and ready candidates for expulsion from

Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. This summer alone, at least 100,000 Serbs have fled

Kosovo in the wake of a brutal regimen of murder, rape, assault, arson and

robbery meted out by their former victims. Most have left for Serbia, where they

have shared the fate of over a half-million Croatian and Bosnian Serb refugees,

most of whom have been denied access to schools, jobs, housing and other scarce resources.

<P>The majority of these refugees committed no crime; some actually risked their

lives by shielding their Albanian neighbors from Serb paramilitaries and providing them with food and shelter.

<P>In stark contrast to the experience in Croatia and Bosnia, indigenous Serb

leaders like Momcilo Trajkovic and Orthodox Bishop Artemije fought long and hard

against Milosevic's demagogic message of hate and fear, warning their people

that he was simply using them to tighten his grip on power. Yet, today Artemije

lives in internal exile behind a cordon of NATO troops, while Trajkovic

frantically shuttles between his home and Belgrade, making tearful appeals for

the protection and return of Kosovo's Serbs.

<P>To their credit, allied political and military leaders have tried to spare

the Serbs from the earlier fate of the German expellees. During the last four

years the U.S. government has both cajoled and threatened Croatian President

Franjo Tudjman in an attempt to effect the repatriation of his country's 300,000

Serbian refugees, much as the allied force in Kosovo has recently accepted the

daunting task of protecting Kosovo's Serbs from the wrath of 2 million Kosovars

<P>Yet the allies have failed, largely because of the remorselessness of the

Serbs' former victims but, perhaps, also because western leaders are less

outraged by what they see as an understandable thirst for retribution.

<P>But surely we can do more to prevent a repetition of this second cycle of

ethnic cleansing. At the very least, the United States and its NATO allies could

make clear their determination to repatriate all Serb expellees by warning

Kosovo's Albanians that resistance will dash any hope of self-rule, whether it

be independence, union with Albania or autonomy within Yugoslavia.

<P>International donors could announce that monies currently earmarked for the reconstruction of Albanian communities will be diverted to Serbian ones on a sliding scale in proportion to the destruction that they sustain.

<P>Nor should we stop in Kosovo. We could exploit Croatia's need for international acceptance and financial aid by securing its Serb refugees the right to cast absentee ballots in this December's general elections. And, finally, we could advise all of the Serbs' former victims that, with Milosevic's inevitable fall from power, the West will actively promote democracy in Yugoslavia by addressing the legitimate grievances of its Serb refugees.

<P>It is hoped that this will be done through their repatriation, but, if necessary, by partitioning or fully reintegrating Kosovo into a newly democratic Serbia.

<P>Or we could do nothing, and let the Serbs share the fate of the 14 million Germans whom the civilized world forgot.

<P><I>Charles Ingrao, a professor of history at Purdue University, is the author of "The Hapsburg Monarchy: 1618-1815."</I>

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<P>Wall Street Journal
October 13, 1999
Pg. 30

<P>America Must Say No To Pakistani Coup

<P>By Tunku Varadarajan, a New York writer.

<P>Yet another man in uniform has huffed and puffed and blown down that fragile

Pakistani house called "democracy." A general, not for the first time, has

overthrown an elected government in Islamabad. Many in America will not have

heard of Pervaiz Musharraf until this morning's newspapers, but there is

pressing reason now not just to pay very close attention to him, but also to

condemn him in the most trenchant terms.

<P>Yesterday Gen. Musharraf's coup d'tat ousted the government of Nawaz Sharif.

It was an unlovely government, to be sure, riddled with corruption and graft,

but it had come to power in an acceptably clean election and enjoyed an emphatic

majority in Parliament. To say that Mr. Sharif's dismissal is an act of violence

against Pakistan's constitution is to state the obvious. But it is also an act

of violence against Pakistan's civitas, whose rickety democracy has once more

been treated with derision by the saboteurs in khaki.

<P>But what are we, in America, to make of the coup? James Rubin, spokesman for

the State Department, has rightly given warning that the general must not assume

that there can be "business as usual" with the U.S. It will take a while before

a clear picture of Gen. Musharraf's program emerges from the political rubble in

Pakistan. At a fundamental level, nothing the general says or does or offers to do can be allowed to dilute Washington's opposition to his power. No program that he puts forward, or offers to put forward, can allow the West to be distracted from a one-point demand: the restoration, without delay, of the Sharif government and return of Pakistan to democratic, constitutional rule.

<P>America hasn't always reacted in this way to Pakistani coups. There was a time when Washington didn't really care who ran things in Islamabad or how, as long as Pakistan's foreign policy dovetailed with Western interests. As long as Pakistan was a bulwark against Soviet communism and expansionism in the region, Washington might even have preferred an army man in charge in Islamabad. This approach reached its apogee in the years the Soviets occupied neighboring Afghanistan, when the Pakistani armed forces played an indispensable role in the arming, training and organization of the Afghan mujahideen. The last general to stage a coup in the country--Zia-ul-Haq--was, in this regard, a great friend of America.

<P>The Afghan war had a profound impact on the Pakistani army, leading to the intense Islamization of important sections of an officer corps that was gradually shuffling off the Sandhurst ways inherited from the British. Gen. Zia himself was an example of the "new" Islamic soldier. And Gen. Musharraf was one of the men in the force who caught Zia's eye. In 1987, then-Brig. Gen. Musharraf

was chosen to command the newly formed Special Services Group, which was used to

quell revolts by recalcitrant Shiites in northern Pakistan.

<P>Gen. Musharraf has had less interaction with the U.S. military establishment

than virtually any other senior Pakistani army officer. He has, for example,

never attended a course in the U.S. In this, he shares much with a generation of

junior officers who have, for about a decade now, been barred from attending

training courses in the U.S. as a result of the 1985 Pressler Amendment, which

forbids Washington from giving economic, military or technical assistance to

Pakistan because of Islamabad's nuclear-weapons program.

<P>Consequently, American influence in the Pakistani army--once enormously high--is now at an all-time low, and this cultural gap is widened still further

by the Pakistani army's increasingly Islamic proclivities. Yesterday's coup

should give America cause for reflection. Does a broad punitive approach, such

as that of the Pressler Amendment, really serve America's purposes?

<P>There are other points to ponder. Gen. Musharraf has very close links with

the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, two militant Islamic outfits

that are a part of Osama bin Laden's Islamic international front for jihad

against the U.S. and Israel. It is no secret that the general planned and

executed the daring land grab on the Indian side of Kashmir earlier this year,

which led to a military confrontation between the two countries. Nor is it a

secret that he conceived of that operation without so much as consulting the

elected government of Mr. Sharif, who was as surprised as the Indian government was.

<P>Gen. Musharraf's bellicose track record does not augur well for regional stability. And his coup could spark widespread civil unrest in Pakistan itself.

America must engage the general in dialogue without a moment's hesitation and say, in a tone loud and firm: Go back to your barracks. He does not belong in power in Islamabad.

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<P>London Times
October 13 1999

<P>Robin Cook's Wasteland <I>

<P>Only the lifting of sanctions can save the Balkans from Nato's folly
</I>

<P>By Simon Jenkins

<P>This week the Nato commander in Kosovo, Sir Mike Jackson, ended his tour of

duty and went on holiday. He handed over to a German, but the reality is that Nato's newest colony is now ruled by Agim Ceku, the KLA army commander. An Albanian and former Croatian brigadier, Mr Ceku is being investigated for war crimes against Serbs in Krajina in 1993-95. Britain supports Mr Ceku's rule on

the flimsy grounds that his subordinates are "even worse". There is no reason to doubt this judgment.

<P>The Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, once promised to disarm the KLA. The idea of Mr Cook disarming Mr Ceku of so much as the time of day is laughable. Nato's war aim of policing a multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo is also laughable. All Nato has achieved is to return the Albanian refugees to their homes and help Mr Ceku to power. The KLA, formerly a terrorist minority faction in Kosovo, runs every town and village hall. As for the third of the population who were Serbs and Gypsies before the bombing started, Mr Ceku has "cleansed" three quarters of them, some 200,000 people beaten and bombed from their homes into neighbouring Serbia. When General Wesley Clark last week told CNN that Nato policy was "Serbs out, Albanians in", he meant it.

<P>Serb villages have been burnt under the eyes of Nato troops. According to the Serb patriarchate, 52 Serb Orthodox churches have been classified as destroyed since Nato's arrival. When Serb forces left Kosovo in June, Tony Blair and Bill Clinton promised that Serb civilians and culture would be protected. They have not kept that promise. Of course, stopping revenge killings was going to be hard. That is what the Serbs said in confronting

<P>KLA terrorism last year. The difference is that Nato thought it could do better, bombing its way to "multi-ethnicity".

<P>A week in Yugoslavia has subjected me to constant propaganda, almost all of it from enemies of Mr Milosevic. They make a pathetic and disparate group, their nightly demonstrations in central Belgrade no more impressive than a half-hearted student rally. Only one thing unites them, that Nato's bombing of civilian targets this spring was an outrage as cruel as any ethnic cleansing, and that continued sanctions are counter-productive. "You won, we lost, we were punished: why continue the war?" they cry with one voice.

<P>Belgrade and the second city of Novi Sad are today desperate sights. Nato's bombing of bridges has left the Danube eerily empty of traffic. Giant contorted mounds of concrete and steel form incongruous dams and rapids, aimed in Nato's words to "close for 20 years" what was Europe's greatest waterway. Refineries, office blocks, factories, skyscrapers, stand gaunt, blackened and twisted at the turning of every street. The bombing of Belgrade's executive offices, hospitals, radio stations, factories, trains and buses was patently anti-civilian.

<P>I am all for hard-headedness in foreign policy and have seen many an act of war. But to find British forces attacking hospitals because they might contain soldiers, or dejected factories because their owners might be Milosevic supporters, or the old Victorian bridge at Novi Sad because a fuel truck might cross it, challenges even my realpolitik. I kept wondering what Robin Cook or Clare Short or even Tony Blair would have made of such operations were they in

opposition. The Defence Secretary, George Robertson, wrote in The Times last month that they were justified to rid Kosovo of Serbs without loss of British lives. Does that end justify the IRA-style cluster bombing of Nis marketplace?

<P>Yet the bed is made. Yugoslavia may be politically "off message", but Britain is party to installing a regime in Kosovo whose hands are as dirty as Mr Milosevic's. Mr Cook may not be about to ship Mr Ceku off to The Hague, or even make him protect the few remaining Serbs in Kosovo. He has chosen Mr Ceku as his ally and is party to the results. But in doing so he has given a green light to the next bunch of separatists, in Yugoslav's last remaining republic of Montenegro. They are about to stage an independence referendum. They argue that any British Foreign Secretary who can back Mr Ceku of all people can hardly refuse military support to the outcome of a democratic vote. Has not Mr Cook done just that in East Timor? Montenegro awaits his bombers over Belgrade.

<P>Mr Cook would, of course, prefer to see Mr Milosevic go. Indeed, he believes that sanctions must remain in place until that great event occurs. As with the bombing, the legal basis for Mr Cook's economic aggression is unclear. Mr Milosevic has abided by the terms of the Kosovo withdrawal (as Mr Cook has not)

He is regularly called a dictator, but he is twice elected and has not indicated any wish to suspend the constitution, under which he stands down in 2001. Serb politics may be chaotic, but they are not moribund. Freedom of speech is extreme

and the press is free. Mr Milosevic and his colleagues may be indicted for war crimes, but only a fool could see this as a helpful step towards early elections and exile.

<P>Sanctions have left the roads of Serbia empty of traffic, its airports desolate, its fuel stations closed and its formal economy in ruins. The mayors of Serbia's 36 cities met in Budapest last week to plead with Europe for relief on the reasonable ground that every one of them is anti-Milosevic. Sanctions hurt them, but put added power in the hands of the regime. Foreign exchange and black market petrol are controlled by Mr Milosevic's mafia. As in Iraq, sanctions make the rulers rich and everyone else, the professionals, the merchants and the workers, poor. They pollute the political economy and degrade public order. The Marxist in Mr Cook seems to think sanctions encourage the workers to rise up in revolt. They do the opposite. They increasingly offer Mr Milosevic an excuse for extra-constitutional action. I could not find a single person in Yugoslavia who regarded sanctions as anything but counter-productive.

<P>I would lift sanctions on Yugoslavia at once, all of them. I would wreck Mr Milosevic's black market with trade, not with bombs. I would cheat his buddies of their fuel franchises and illicit currency rackets, and rebuild the bridges and privatised factories with outside cash. I would reopen links to universities and schools. Nato's blocking of the Danube must be ended. Europe's biggest army

of refugees - a third of them fleeing Nato-controlled territory - are now in freezing barracks, hostels, schools and sports stadiums. They need humanitarian work, not just humanitarian aid. Work is what Mr Cook is denying them.

<P>Ask any opposition politician what lifting sanctions would mean and they reply: "Milosevic would declare a victory, and be gone inside a year."

Yugoslavia may be a nation in ruins, but it is not immune to the democratic nourishment of trade and outside contact. It is a sort of democracy and can deal with Mr Milosevic without Mr Cook's cackhanded help, as it almost did in 1995.

<P>Needless to say, there are many conspiracy theorists in Belgrade to doubt if Nato really wants any change. They think that Nato leaders like a few monsters about the globe. While Mr Milosevic is in power, Nato need not pay for bomb damage or risk inquiries into civilian deaths. It can continue to "Balkanise" the Balkans. Besieged nations need paranoia to boost their morale. If they cannot be loved, they need to be hated in a bigger cause.

<P>But Yugoslavia is not victim of any Great Game. It is a victim of two mistakes, one by its own rulers, the other by Nato. It is just another poor country lifted from obscurity by Western meddlers, given a public thrashing and dropped back in the bin. When the bombing stopped, Nato merely shrugged and turned elsewhere. The Danube "blocked for 20 years"? Who cares?

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<P>Columbus (OH) Dispatch
October 12, 1999
Pg. 9

<P>Navy In Decline As Its Need Rises

<P>By Joe Testa

<P>The nation's role in the world has changed dramatically in recent years. U.S

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military power is being called upon frequently. We civilians may question some

of the deployments, but our men and women in uniform go where the president

orders them to go.

<P>In the celebrations the followed the end of the Cold War, there was a belief

that military spending could be cut drastically. Some of our fellow Americans

have been slow to recognize that military preparedness comes at a high price.

<P>The defense budget just signed by President Clinton addresses some of the

military shortfalls, but a critical problem, erosion of the naval fleet,

remains. Navy ships are being built at half the rate needed to maintain an

adequate force. In spite of the efforts of some members of Congress, awareness

of the Navy's needs is lacking.

<P>The fleet has shrunk to 325 ships from 600 just 10 years ago, and will fall

to 200 if future budgets continue to ignore the problem. In fact, deployments o
f

the Navy and Marines are three times higher than before the fall of the Soviet

Union.

<P>A Navy with too few ships should concern every American. The world is becoming more fragmented politically at a time when U.S. economic prosperity and physical safety are tied more tightly than even to global stability.

<P>After the Berlin Wall came down, much of the Soviet bloc and many Third World nations that had been held in check by Cold War fears began disintegrating into violent conflicts.

<P>The United States remains in position to help ensure that such conflicts don't evolve into major military, terrorist, economic or humanitarian disasters

But because many U.S. bases overseas have been closed, we are less able to provide rapid responses to such conflicts and, therefore, have to rely on the Navy to transport large numbers of troops, their equipment and supplies, sometimes half way around the world. The Navy, Marines, Army and Air Force can't fulfill their missions without sufficient support from the federal government.

<P>At a bare minimum, we need to maintain three aircraft-carrier battle groups, one each at all times in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean and western Pacific. To maintain this constant patrolling, we need 12 carrier groups -- again, a bare minimum. We have 11 such groups plus one in reserve for training.

That adds up to 325 ships and dropping. As the fleet erodes to 250 and then 200 ships, we will have no choice but to curtail missions monitoring and containing conflicts.

<P>Adm. Jay L. Johnson, chief of Naval Operations, said recently, "We run unacceptable risks by going below 300 ships," and pointed out that "the current shipbuilding level is insufficient to preserve even that level of fleet in coming decades." In fact, the United States needs to build at least 10 to 12 Navy ships per year for the coming decade to maintain the nation's security. But the current defense budget provides money for only six ships, the same as last year.

<P>All government offices constantly should look for ways to improve efficiency. But the military branches are having trouble recruiting and retaining personnel as they continue to tighten their economic belts. The economy is strong and unemployment is low, which means that salary and benefits in the private sector are more attractive than those in the military.

<P>Navy families make sacrifices in terms of compensation and separation during duty at sea. The men and women in the Navy and all the services love their country, but they love their families, too. They must be given sufficient support to assure that they continue to serve.

<P><I>Franklin County Auditor Joe Testa is president of the Greater Columbus

Council of the Navy League. </I>

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<P>Fayetteville (NC) Observer-Times
October 13, 1999

<P>Broken Image <I>

<P>School of the Americas needs to find a new face </I>

<P>Given that the Army's School of the Americas will be around in the future despite the perennial winds of criticism about its record, Secretary of the Army

Louis Caldera makes good sense in ordering a review of how it might improve at least its present-day image.

<P>In its earliest days, the grandly named officers training school for Latin American military men, located at Fort Benning in Georgia, produced many graduates who went back home to serve brutal dictatorships.

<P>While the training may have been standard GI, the school acquired a lasting reputation for adding to the woes of the Latin American people. And it is undoubtedly true that, in many cases, its graduates did make war on their own countrymen.

<P>The flowering of democracy in much of the region served by the School of the Americas raises legitimate questions of whether its mission is even necessary, if it ever was.

<P>But such institutions generally take on a life of their own, and that is certainly the case with the School of the Americas.

<P>Despite years of fierce opposition from human rights and religious

organizations who turned up evidence of abuses by hundreds of its graduates,

Congress continues to back the school with yearly appropriations, although with decreasing enthusiasm.

<P>Secretary Caldera insists that today's institution actually promotes democracy in Latin America through a curriculum that, along with the martial training, preaches human values and respect for human rights.

<P>Nonetheless, the image lingers, and the protests do not abate. As many as 10,000 demonstrators are expected to gather at the gate of the school next month in the annual show of solidarity with the remembrance of six Jesuit priests and two women murdered in El Salvador in 1989.

<P>Ultimately, we can hope that democracy will take root so deep in Latin America that soldiers won't be needed there. Until that happens, the School of the Americas certainly should try very hard to develop an image worthy of the mission propounded by Secretary Caldera.

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<P>Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel
October 13, 1999. </P>

<P>Deadbeat U.S. Should Pay U.N. Debt </P>

<P>The United Nations is in a poor position to organize a government and manage the affairs of East Timor, which erupted in war after its people voted for independence from Indonesia in August. Unfortunately, the U.N. has no choice but to take on this assignment. </P>

<P>A U.N.-sanctioned force of peacekeepers, mostly Australians, is trying to suppress the fighting. When the region is pacified, East Timor will have to be governed - by someone - until the new country can get on its feet. </P>

<P>Indonesia has already been rejected as a governing power. The people of East Timor themselves are too dispersed and too traumatized to build a government. Australia can't do the job without becoming a foreign occupier. </P>

<P>Thus, it pretty much falls to the U.N. to become East Timor's government. The

U.N. volunteered to guide East Timor to independence last summer, before the region erupted in warfare. The problem now is that the U.N. will have to build government institutions, which could be costly. </P>

<P>Unfortunately, the U.N. is cash-strapped, partly because the United States refuses to pay \$1 billion in overdue bills to the world body. If Congress would vote the money the U.N. needs, the effort in East Timor would be easier and the prospects for success would brighten. </P>

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<P>Chicago Tribune
October 13, 1999

<P>A Fork In The Road On Kosovo?

<P>With winter approaching, European Union foreign ministers approved plans this

week to provide \$5 million worth of heating oil to two Serbian cities led by

opponents of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.

<P>The Clinton administration has objected to this so-called "Energy for Democracy" program, fearing that improved conditions in Serbia will shore up

support for Milosevic. The U.S. wants the Yugoslavian dictator ousted and tried

for war crimes committed in Kosovo before and during the 78-day NATO bombing

campaign last spring. Easing international sanctions, the administration contends, can only bolster him.

<P>The U.S. and NATO have adamantly, and appropriately, refused to help rebuild

and repair bomb damage in Serbia outside of Kosovo, in order to keep Belgrade isolated and put pressure on Milosevic to resign.

<P>The EU's offer of heating oil is not a repudiation of that policy, but does

represent at least a subtle shift. The Europeans hope this humanitarian gesture

to the two cities will signal that the opposition can deliver relief and a

return to normalcy better than Milosevic.

<P>There may be merit in that approach. But whatever the EU may do, the U.S.

should continue to focus its efforts on rebuilding Kosovo and getting humanitarian aid to victims of the ethnic cleansing there.

<P>The ultimate goal of American and EU policy ought to be to push Serbia--and

Kosovo--toward genuine democracy, stability and integration into a peaceful,

democratic Europe. Such closer ties will make them less likely to return to war
s

that could drag in neighbors, or NATO forces, yet again.

<P>But Yugoslavian democracy and rule by Milosevic are incompatible, and for

now, isolation is the best weapon available for pressuring him to step down.

<P>Serbian opposition leaders have demonstrated signs of unprecedented unity in

recent days, but their position is tenuous. Milosevic still controls the

security forces and state media in Serbia. He has countered weeks of

pro-democracy rallies aimed at his ouster by unleashing riot police. He has als
o

accused his opponents of seeking "civil war through violence" to install a

pro-Western "colony" run by a "local traitor."

<P>The intimidation is working. Most opposition leaders boycotted a meeting

Monday with EU ministers because the EU foolishly sought a promise that they

would extradite Milosevic to stand trial for war crimes if they came to power.

As important as it is to pressure Milosevic at this moment, it is equally

important not to weaken his opponents by making them vulnerable to charges of

treason or of being pawns of the West.

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<P>Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
October 12, 1999

<P>More Ships: Bring 'Em On. <I>

<P>We have plenty for sailors </I>

<P>Because more people have been departing Hampton Roads than moving in, the

region's population has increased little in the 1990s. More births than deaths

here account for the slight population growth.

<P>For sluggish growth, however, one can't simply blame military downsizing.

Many factors are involved. And the U.S. Navy of late has been boosting the regional population and economy.

<P>The recent stationing of more jet warplanes at Oceana Naval Air Station is having an impact beyond controversial noise levels in Virginia Beach. Now the possibility that the Navy will station in Norfolk four fast combat-support ships

currently based at Earle, N.J., dangles the prospect of further gains.

<P>Hampton Roads has fared comparatively well during the downsizing of U.S. armed forces since the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Defense spending contributes a smaller chunk to the economy today than during the Reagan presidency. But Norfolk is still the world's largest naval base, where several

of the globe's mightiest warships cluster.

<P>Some who were alive when Japanese warplanes attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet

at Pearl Harbor fear concentrating so much naval hardware in a handful of ports

here and abroad.

<P>In popular memory, the attack on Dec. 7, 1941, came out of the blue -- not when tensions between the U.S. and Japan were of a magnitude that today would

scatter the fleet to sea.

<P>Concentration of ships being among its lesser problems, the Navy is studying

pros and cons of shifting the supply ships from Earle to Norfolk. A Pennsylvani
a

congressman whose district benefits from their presence in Earle has concluded

that, on the merits of the issue, moving the ships would be wrong.

<P>But Vice Adm. Henry C. Giffin III, commander of the Atlantic Fleet's surface

force, notes that the Earle Naval Weapons Station, unlike Norfolk, is ``an

isolated homeport without a lot of things for single sailors to do." That

reality is important: The sea service struggles to retain trained personnel in
a

full-employment economy. If the Navy has a capital, Hampton Roads is it. Bring

on the ships.

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<P>Orlando Sentinel
October 13, 1999

<P>Use Asia Policy As Model

<P>Flaky. Patchwork. Reactive. Foreign policy under President Bill Clinton has earned many names -- mostly unflattering.

<P>He has only himself to blame for that. The president has stuck his nose into virtually every global issue that has popped up, without much sense of direction.

<P>Mr. Clinton has paid closer attention, though, to events in Asia, continuing and expanding sound policies that have shaped U.S. relations with the Asia-Pacific region for decades.

<P>And for good reason. After a recent tumble, Asia has begun to regain its economic footing. The East once again appears ready to play a central role in the next century's economic and political affairs. That will affect U.S. interests in many ways, from jobs to security matters.

<P>Mr. Clinton has worked to reduce barriers to trade, both with individual Asian countries and with the entire region. Fewer barriers would lead to more opportunities for U.S. companies to sell their goods and services in Asia, creating jobs in this country along the way.

<P>Local companies have a particularly important stake because Central Florida's economic planners have targeted Asia to boost this region's international trade

<P>In addition to focusing on trade, the president has worked to uphold U.S.

military interests in Asia, maintaining a strong troop presence in South Korea and Japan.

<P>In addition, he has shown the wisdom to keep Japan -- the Asian nation most similar to the United States -- the U.S. policy cornerstone in that region.

<P>Meanwhile, Mr. Clinton has had to work his way through a strained relationship with China. China still complains about the United States' bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict. And allegations that Chinese spies stole U.S. nuclear secrets set off alarms throughout the U.S. government.

<P>For the most part, though, the two nations have worked together effectively.

<P>Then there's North Korea. Mr. Clinton probably has drawn more complaints from

his decisions about that country than from any other in his Asia policy. Why?

<P>Because he has acted boldly to ease war fever on the Korean peninsula. First, the president worked with U.S. allies to help North Korea through an energy crisis in return for a commitment from the North to end its nuclear-weapons research.

<P>More recently, Mr. Clinton got North Korea to halt its missile-testing program in exchange for loosening U.S. trade sanctions. Though he eased up on those sanctions too quickly, he had the right idea -- sending North Korea signals that a cooperative relationship can bear more fruit than a contentious one.

<P>No one would argue that the Clinton administration has come up with a perfect

t

Asia policy. But if the president dealt with other regions in a similar fashion

,
U.S. foreign policy would look a lot more consistent.

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<P>Christian Science Monitor
October 13, 1999
Pg. 8 </P>

<P>Helping The Serbs </P>

<P>The Western allies who united a few months ago to force a Serbian withdrawal

from Kosovo are today split over what to do about a humanitarian emergency

caused largely by their own military actions. Specifically, how can hundreds of

thousands of Serbs, including refugees from Kosovo, be helped to survive the

coming winter? </P>

<P>The answer would be pretty straightforward - launch a relief operation -

except for one factor: Aid might be manipulated by the government of Slobodan

Milosevic. At the least, it could ease public discontent in Serbia, thus

weakening political pressures on the regime. This is a reasonable concern,

shared by both Washington and Europe. But it shouldn't be a governing concern.

</P>

<P>People's need for food and warmth shouldn't be held hostage to the removal of

an unsavory leadership. The parallels to Iraq and Saddam Hussein are obvious, if

imperfect. Serbs, however, may have an opportunity in the next few months to

vote Mr. Milosevic out - an option not available to Iraqis. </P>

<P>Meanwhile, the European Union's aid plan, called "Energy for Democracy,"

should go forward - despite US opposition. It calls for shipping heating oil to

towns run by politicians that oppose Milosevic. The Europeans are convinced that

aid applied in this fashion will strengthen opposition forces - as well as keep

more people warm during the cold months. </P>

<P>But the hoped-for opposition backing for the EU plan failed to materialize.

The anti-Milosevic ranks divided over the EU's desire to link further aid to

cooperation with the war-crimes tribunal at The Hague. Their argument was that

humanitarian aid shouldn't be tied to such a politically explosive issue within

Serbia. </P>

<P>Clearly, priorities need to be reestablished. First, move ahead with basic

aid that can help the economically devastated Serbs get through this winter.

Second, don't relent on pointing out Milosevic's terrible disservices to his own

country's well-being and to the cause of human decency. Third, make it clear that the

tribunal's indictments won't go away. </P>

<P>Short-term humanitarian relief will not jeopardize longer-term political change and justice. It should do just the opposite by lessening the despair and resentment that the Milosevics of the world feed on. </P>

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<P>London Times
October 13 1999

<P>Distortions Of Democracy <I>

<P>The military may be a less bad option for Pakistan today </I>

<P>Pakistan is no stranger to rule by the military. Its generals have controlled

the country for nearly half its brief half-century of independence, intervening

frequently to topple civilian governments whose activities displease them.

Pakistani television viewers, watching an announcement that their Prime

Minister, Nawaz Sharif, had abruptly dismissed the second army chief in a year,

may therefore have been more shocked than surprised when the screen suddenly

went blank. Outside, soldiers were vaulting into the television centre, and

seizing key buildings around the country, before announcing that the Government

was fired. Pakistan's most powerful institution has, once again, made its presence felt.

<P>Military coups are no substitute for democracy. Mr Sharif is Pakistan's democratically elected executive leader. Just last month, Pakistan's most powerful friend, the United States, gave warning that it would deal very seriously with any "extra-constitutional" changes of power. And yet, in almost every way, the fault for Pakistan's latest crisis can be laid squarely with the

Prime Minister himself. Seldom has a politician so frivolously squandered the goodwill that originally brought him victory against the tainted Government of

Benazir Bhutto. The opportunity before the businessman Premier then was to scrub

clean the reputation of a country blackened by corruption. He has wasted that chance, displaying no real vision of a better future for Pakistan, nor much interest in finding one.

<P>In domestic tussles with the presidency, the judiciary, a growing number of

political enemies, the press, religious factions and the military, Mr Sharif has

done little but try to extend his own powers. Internationally, too, Mr Sharif has done Pakistan little good. By testing nuclear weapons last year, in an attempt to keep up with his country's nuclear neighbour, India, he exposed Pakistan's flagging economy to international sanctions which it could ill afford. The United States has been held up in attempts to get the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed; yesterday's turn of events, putting government of the newest nuclear powers in military hands and adding heat to an already volatile region, can be expected to add to American exasperation.

<P>Mr Sharif sowed the seeds of his own downfall by maladroitness handling of Pakistan's ill-considered incursion into Indian territory in disputed Kashmir.

India's tough military response and a frosty reaction from the West forced Mr Sharif into a humiliating climbdown in July. Military chiefs, led by General

Pervaiz Musharraf, were embarrassed; rumours of a rift circulated until, a fortnight ago, Mr Sharif went to considerable trouble to scotch them by declaring that General Musharraf would not leave his job early. His word was not

to be trusted, but his next about-turn - announcing the general's dismissal as

soon as he had gone abroad - backfired; the army ousted him instead.

<P>Mr Sharif's sorry record may be why Washington, despite its earlier strong warnings, is taking an unusually softly-softly tack, calling only for the swift

restoration of democracy "if a coup has taken place". The outside world, like Pakistan's frustrated voters, may feel that a new government, even one brought

in by the army, might be less bad for Pakistan than the distorted democracy it

has endured until today.

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<P>Los Angeles Times
October 13, 1999

<P>Pakistan Coup A Risk For Region

<P>For nearly half of its 52-year history Pakistan has been ruled by the army.

It now appears the army intends to rule again.

<P>Moving swiftly, the military has ousted the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, just hours after Sharif announced he was dismissing the powerful

army chief of staff. Animosity between the military and the civilian government

has grown since last summer when Sharif, at President Clinton's urging, moved t
o

defuse the latest crisis over Kashmir by ordering army-supported Islamic militants to end their intrusion into Indian- controlled territory.

<P>What many Pakistanis saw as a national humiliation further diminished Sharif's popularity, already sagging because of a troubled economy and the prim
e

minister's voracious appetite for power.

<P>Sharif's firing of army chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf triggered the coup, whic
h

for the moment appears to command considerable public support. It is an all too

familiar story. But this time the military takeover has implications that exten
d

beyond Pakistan's borders.

<P>Pakistan, like its rival India, has now tested nuclear devices. That adds

exponentially to the risks involved in the confrontation between the two countries--mainly over the disputed province of Kashmir--that dates from their

independence from British rule in 1947. It was because last summer's fighting i
n

Kashmir raised fears of a much larger war, conceivably involving nuclear weapons, that the United States intervened diplomatically to tamp down the crisis. How much leverage Washington has now to put behind the State Department's call for a rapid restoration of civilian democratic rule is uncertain. The last thing Southwest Asia needs is the threat of further instability. But that's exactly what Tuesday's coup has created.

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<P>Columbus (OH) Dispatch
October 11, 1999
Pg. 10

<P>On Target Tests Put Anti-Missile Shield A Step Closer

<P>As missile technology spreads around the globe, the chances of an accidental

or deliberate attack on the United States grow every day.

<P>Efforts by the United States to counter that threat scored an encouraging

success on Oct. 3, when an unarmed Minuteman rocket fired from California was intercepted and destroyed by another missile launched 1,400 miles away in the Marshall Islands.

<P>The interceptor destroyed the California rocket about 140 miles above the Pacific.

<P>Scoffers have said that effective anti- missile defenses are unlikely because

the task of shooting down one missile with another is akin to hitting a bullet

with a bullet.

<P>Yes, this is a tall technological order, but three times in the past five

months American scientists and engineers have shown that it can be done.

<P>On June 10, after six previous failures, the Army successfully intercepted and destroyed a missile with its experimental Theater High-Altitude Area Defense

system. On Aug. 3, THAAD succeeded again.

<P>With these successes, the effort to develop an anti-missile defense has leaped a formidable hurdle: doubt.

<P>In the early 1940s, the American nuclear scientists rushing to create the world's first atomic bomb had no idea whether such a thing could be done. Their uncertainty persisted right up to the moment on July 16, 1945, when their prototype exploded over the New Mexico desert.

<P>But when the Soviet Union launched a crash catch-up program to build its own nuclear bomb, its scientists had a tremendous advantage: They already knew it could be done.

<P>Thanks to the three successful tests, missile-defense advocates now know it is possible to hit a bullet with a bullet.

<P>The critics will continue to complain. One area of attack is the cost. The Army's THAAD system has a \$14 billion price tag. The Oct. 3 test, conducted for the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, alone cost \$100 million.

The Navy also has spent billions developing the Aegis anti-missile system that protects its ships and that some believe could be adapted to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles.

<P>Such sums do induce sticker shock, but it is important to remember what is at stake.

<P>A single missile armed with a nuclear or biological warhead could wipe out a major American city, killing hundreds of thousands of people and causing not billions, but trillions of dollars in damage. In that light, \$14 billion of prevention looks like a bargain.

<P>The threat of such an attack is very real.

<P>One concern is an accidental launch from China or Russia. The latter is of particular concern because its nuclear arsenal and early-warning system are aging and error-prone.

<P>The other threat is from rogue states. Missiles and missile know-how are widely available worldwide. Nations hostile to the United States, such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, rapidly are building missile arsenals.

<P>North Korea already has a missile that may be able to hit Hawaii and Alaska and most certainly could devastate U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan. The North Koreans are believed to be perfecting a weapon capable of reaching the West Coast of the United States.

<P>Even without deploying that weapon, Pyongyang has wrung important concessions from the Clinton administration, which last month lifted trade and travel

sanctions against North Korea in return for the communist nation's pledge to

stop testing the new missile.

<P>The possibilities for missile blackmail against the United States are obvious

to enemies around the world.

<P>Without a missile-defense system, the United States will remain vulnerable to

such threats. The recent missile-interception successes suggest that such a

shield can be built. For the security of the nation, it should be built.

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<P>Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel
October 11, 1999

<P>Military Spending Well-Larded

<P>To protect itself against foreign tyrants and other threats, the United

States needs (and possesses) a first-rate military force. Such a force, however

is not built of pork.

<P>Unfortunately, the Defense Department has become a huge repository of

excessive and wasteful government spending. Anyone who doubts that ought to look

at the \$268 billion military spending bill for fiscal 2000 that House and Senate

negotiators agreed upon last week.

<P>For \$268 billion, you can buy a lot of fighter jets, aircraft carriers and tanks and pay the salaries of a lot of fighting men and women. You can also buy a lot of things you don't need. Contained in that spending bill, The New York Times reported this week, is language authorizing the Pentagon to lease or buy seven luxury aircraft for military commanders, at a cost of some \$1 billion over 20 years, or about \$50 million a year.

<P>Six of the planes are Gulfstream V jets to transport military commanders from base to base, and the seventh is a Boeing 737-300 designated for the top general at the Central Command, headquartered in Tampa, Fla., which is responsible for the Middle East.

<P>The spending for these aircraft is not only immense and dubious, but also mysterious, since the Pentagon never formally requested the money. So what is it doing in the budget? Who asked for it, and why? Does the leader of the Central Command have a sufficiently large staff to justify the need for the kind of a plane, used by airlines, that can carry up to 126 passengers? Do the other military leaders need new Gulfstream jets?

<P>At least one item in that spending bill is a mammoth slab of pork: \$375 million to build an aircraft carrier at a shipyard in Mississippi, which happens to be the home state of Trent Lott, the Senate majority leader.

<P>Any doubt that this item was inserted as a personal and political courtesy was demolished by Rep. John Murtha (D-Penn.), a leading member of the

House-Senate conference committee, who noted, "We try to take care of leadership
whenever we can."

Voters do not elect members of Congress so they can spend millions to "take
care of" their friends and colleagues. Every dollar that is squandered on a
needless or wasteful project - whether it's an office building, a stretch of
highway or an aircraft carrier - is a dollar that cannot be used to protect our
country, its people and its way of life. That's not building a national defense
; that's a scandal. [s19991014cia.htm](#)

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Colorado Springs Gazette
October 12, 1999

Our Changing CIA

Is aging intelligence keeping up with the times, or just kidding itself?

One hardly knows whether to view the news that the Central Intelligence

Agency is trying to adjust to Internet speed and catch up with new technology by

forming a venture capital company as mildly hopeful, potentially catastrophic or

just plain bizarre. Even if the move demonstrates an awareness that the bureaucratic ways of government simply won't do in today's high-tech environment, however, it ignores the more fundamental problem that the CIA is still, 10 years after the Cold War ended, an agency in search of a mission.

<P>The new nonprofit "firm" financed with \$28 million of the taxpayers' money does come with a welcome sense of humor. It is to be named In-Q-It, a tip of the

hat to the fictional gadget-master "Q" in the James Bond novels. It is headed by

Gilman Louie, 39, a well-known figure in the software world since creating his

first computer-gaming company while a student at San Francisco State in the early 1980s. He developed the Falcon air-combat simulator video game and just sold his most recent venture, Microprose, to Hasbro.

<P>CIA spokesman Bill Harlow says the project "grew out of the recognition here

of a need to find new ways to harness the capabilities of the private sector to

deal with some of the more difficult problems of information technology." Or, as

Louie put it, "The technology world has totally changed, and one day the CIA

woke up and realized they needed to go through the same change."

<P>The recognition that government will have to change in the information age is

welcome. But is a venture capital firm to "be an umbilical cord plugged in to the brightest minds in the (Silicon) valley" as former CIA deputy director and

In-Q-It board member John McMahon put it, the way to go?

<P>Erick Gustafson, technology project director at the free-market Citizens for

a Sound Economy thinks it's "pretty outrageous when we have healthy capital

markets and one of the most innovative technology sectors in the world." The CIA

would do better to be a smart customer than a development partner, Gustafson believes.

<P>Or, as Andrew Anker, a partner with the Silicon Valley venture capital firm

August Capital, put it, "Say the CIA said that wrist phones are critical for our

agents and we will buy 10,000 of them. As long as there is a consumer market for

it, a bunch of entrepreneurs will go down to Sand Hill Road (where the most active high-tech venture capital firms tend to be located) and seek financing to

get it." That would probably cost the taxpayers less money.

<P>Other issues are troubling. If a nonprofit quasi-government agency does become a significant player in the high-tech market, how seriously will that

distort the market? Will the CIA be able to break the habit of secrecy that is

so counterproductive in research and development? Will it assert proprietary

interest in products it had only a minor role in developing and want to have

them classified as national secrets - as the National Security Agency tried to

do with early encryption programs it didn't even develop?

<P>Will a CIA venture capital firm be the first step toward turning the

high-tech business toward what government wants rather than toward what ordinary

people, through their investment and purchasing decisions in the marketplace, want?

<P>All in all, this idea doesn't look like a winner - unless it's the first step

p

in privatizing significant parts of the CIA, which we doubt.

<P>Instead of this agency - which hasn't had a coherent mission in 10 years -
looking for investments, it's time taxpayers re-examined their investment in

this agency..

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