

<P>Levin noted that any sanctions that were suspended could be reimposed immediately after a missile test, and that the policy was favored by U.S. allies South Korea and Japan. "It makes sense to me," Levin said. "It's important to stop the missile program." </P>

<P>Former Enemies </P>

<P>Partisan differences are likely to be muted when Congress considers normalizing trade relations with Vietnam. </P>

<P>The effort faces opposition from some Vietnam veterans, such as Rep. Sam Johnson, R-Texas, a member of the Ways and Means Committee. But it enjoys support from other veterans from both parties, such as Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., John Kerry, D-Mass., and Chuck Hagel, R-Neb. </P>

<P>The two countries have agreed in principle to a trade agreement, but have yet to sign a final accord. When they do, Congress probably will have to cast two votes: one on the trade agreement itself, another on granting Vietnam normal trading relations, subject to an annual certification that it is allowing free emigration. (CQ Weekly, p. 1960) </P>

<P>In a Sept. 14 interview, Philip M. Crane, R-Ill., chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, said he believed the accord could be taken up before Congress adjourns for the year. And he was confident of congressional approval, since it has the backing of former Rep. Pete Peterson, D-Fla. (1991-97), a former prisoner of war and now U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. </P>

<P>Calming Timor </P>

<P>Congress also has been surprisingly supportive of Clinton's decision to participate in a U.N. peacekeeping force in East Timor, the Indonesian province wracked by violence since an independence vote Aug. 30. (CQ Weekly, p. 2125) </P>

<P>Indonesian officials agreed Sept. 12 to allow U.N. peacekeepers to restore order, before the Indonesian parliament formally considers the independence vote. The U.N. Security Council on Sept. 14 approved the creation of a peacekeeping force. </P>

<P>Australia will lead the 7,500 member force. The U.S. troops would perform mostly logistical duties, such as communications and transportation, but would be excluded from potential combat. That decision has apparently assuaged congressional critics who worried the United States was about to become bogged down again overseas. </P>

<P>The House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific approved by voice vote Sept. 15 a resolution (HRES292) calling for deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in East Timor. The full committee is scheduled to vote the week of Sept. 20. </P>

<P>The House resolution urges the Indonesian government to "allow unrestricted access to refugees and displaced persons in West Timor," and "strongly urges Indonesia to accept the rapid deployment of this force and to cooperate fully with precedents on the composition and deployment of this force."</P>

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<P>Congressional Quarterly Weekly

Sept. 18, 1999

Pg. 2180 </P>

<P>Despite Albright's Pressure, Congress Reluctant To Fulfill Clinton's Foreign Aid Pledges </P>

<P>By Miles A. Pomper, CQ Staff Writer </P>

<P>Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and the Republican-led Congress are in a tug of war over foreign aid that is likely to grow more determined in the

weeks ahead. </P>

<P>In a series of opinion articles and speeches, Albright has prodded a resistant Congress to fulfill President Clinton's promises to increase overseas spending. But lawmakers, concerned about budget limits and the possible misuse of foreign aid in some countries, refuse to yield. </P>

<P>The first major battleground is the fiscal 2000 foreign operations appropriations bill (HR2606 -- H Rept 106-254; S1234 -- S Rept 106-81), with House and Senate negotiators expected to thrash out a compromise the week of Sept. 20. </P>

<P>In addition to a slew of policy differences, Albright has complained that both versions of the legislation fall about \$2 billion below Clinton's request of \$14.6 billion. She has recommended a veto if the conference report does not come closer to Clinton's proposal. (CQ Weekly, p. 1957) </P>

<P>"Congress faces a critical choice between funding America's overseas leadership and turning its back on the world," Albright wrote in the Sept. 9 Washington Post. "Any legislator who believes the United States should do more to prevent wars, counter terror, fight crime, or preserve a healthy global economy should agree: We cannot make progress toward these goals if we drain the resources we devote to them." </P>

<P>Yet congressional aides say the conference totals are likely to budge little from the House and Senate bills. </P>

<P>If there is an increase, it will likely be limited to \$600 million in "emergency" spending -- not counted against budget caps -- that Clinton has requested for Kosovo and neighboring Balkan states. Additional funds might be included in the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill (HR2670 -- H Rept 106-283; S1217 -- S Rept 106-76) for diplomatic and peacekeeping funds and another \$2 billion for the NATO deployment in Kosovo as part of the fiscal 2000 defense spending bill (HR2561 -- H Rept 106-244; S1122 -- S Rept 106-53). </P>

<P>Senate Appropriations Chairman Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, said in a Sept. 14 interview that he has told administration officials they should hold back on other overseas spending Clinton has proposed. </P>

<P>"I've urged them not to do it," Stevens said. "To send us a supplemental on a bill that's not even out of conference -- that's very confusing." </P>

<P>Catchall Spending </P>

<P>The White House is looking for additional funds to help implement a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, to support anti-drug efforts in South America, boost Balkan countries that aided NATO's air campaign against the Serbs, provide debt relief to the world's poorest countries, and help Turkey and Greece rebuild after recent earthquakes. </P>

<P>Rep. Sonny Callahan, R-Ala., chairman of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, said he expected Congress to approve a significant portion of the more than \$1 billion Clinton has requested for Israel and the Palestinians to carry out the 1998 Wye River peace accord. </P>

<P>But Callahan said those funds would not be included in the fiscal 2000 foreign operations bill. Instead they might be included in an omnibus bill or supplemental legislation later this fall. Such a package, he said, might also include substantial funds for Colombia and other drug-producing nations, although far less than the \$1 billion proposed by Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. (CQ Weekly, p. 2090) </P>

<P>Callahan and other appropriators said Clinton's pledge to help write off poor nations' debt to international institutions is in jeopardy. </P>

<P>Callahan said that he would only support paying off a country's loans to international institutions if they agreed to a moratorium on new loans. Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, said he believed the debt relief endorsed by Clinton earlier this year was "dead." </P>

<P>Bearish on Russia </P>

<P>GOP leaders also took aim at International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans to Russia. With allegations of money laundering and corruption swirling about the Russian government, House Republicans said that further IMF loans should be suspended until a congressionally appointed commission issues a report. </P>

<P>The Banking, International Relations and Joint Economic committees plan hearings in coming weeks on Clinton administration policy toward Russia. "The stated purpose of the Clinton-Gore policy was to help Russia become a peaceful and productive free market democracy," said House Majority Leader Dick Armey, R-Texas. "Instead, Russia has become a looted and bankrupt zone of nuclearized anarchy." </P>

<P>Lawmakers seem inclined to take a punitive approach toward Russia. On Sept. 14, the House passed, 419-0, a bill (HR1883) that aims to punish Russia and other countries for assisting Iran's weapons development. (Vote 409, p. 2182) </P>

<P>The unanimous passage of the bill came despite the threat of a presidential veto. The Office of Management and Budget said in a statement that the bill "would undermine U.S. non-proliferation goals and objectives." </P>

<P>The bill would require the president to inform Congress about the international transfer of items that could benefit Iran's ability to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Countries found to be making transfers would face penalties, such as a cutoff of U.S. military aid or economic sanctions, unless the president exempted them. </P>

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<P>U.S. News & World Report

Sept. 27, 1999

<U><P>Washington Whispers

</U><P>Second Opinion

<P>By Paul Bedard

<P> What could be more intriguing than having the FBI, CIA, or Pentagon defy Congress and the president to keep aging Nazi war-criminal files classified? Little, and it's the job of a little-known National Archives team to make sure

it doesn't happen. David Van Tassel is the staff director of the Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group, a nine-month-old top-level panel charged with declassifying all Nazi war criminal records in government files. His job is a toughie. First, he has to find the documents in the hundreds of millions stored in government files. It's so daunting he's seeking direction from recognized Nazi hunters. Next he has to deal with any agencies that won't play along. To prevent problems, the Archives is hiring outside intelligence experts mainly retired FBI, CIA, and Pentagon spy types who will judge claims of national security by agencies that try to keep the papers secret. His prediction: "Most will be released."


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<P>Washington Post

Sept. 19, 1999

Pg. 1

<P>Costs To Rise 9% In Federal Health Plan

<I><P>Third Year in a Row Of Big Premium Jumps

</I><P>By Stephen Barr, Washington Post Staff Writer

<P> The Clinton administration will announce tomorrow that health insurance

premiums for federal employees and retirees will rise an average of 9.3 percent next year, the third consecutive year of substantial rate increases by the nation's largest employer-sponsored health plan.

<P> The Office of Personnel Management, which administers the health plan, said spending on prescription drugs and expanded use of technology in hospitals and doctors' offices account for the bulk of the rate increases.

<P> The OPM's director called the three-year run of premium increases unacceptable and said she will ask Congress to give her agency the power to tighten program standards and to more effectively control costs. In an interview, director Janice R. Lachance said, "Anyone who looks at the steady increases that this program has experienced has to come to the conclusion that something bold and dramatic must be done."

<P> The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) estimates that, nationwide, the total premium will be about \$18 billion next year. The FEHBP provides coverage to approximately 9 million federal workers, retirees and their families worldwide, including 803,647 people in the Washington area.

<P> About 300 health plans participate in the FEHBP. Seven are fee-for-service plans available worldwide and the remainder are health maintenance organization plans and point-of-service plans that operate on a local basis. In the Washington area, federal employees may choose from 15 plans during an annual "open season," which this year will run from Nov. 8 to Dec. 13.

<P> The government pays 72 percent of the average premium. The average FEHBP enrollee with self-only coverage will pay \$33.04 every two weeks -- \$2.94 more than in 1999. An enrollee with family coverage will pay \$71.76, or \$7.09 more

<P> In recent years, the bulk of federal workers and retirees have enrolled in Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans. The OPM said the biweekly "standard" coverage premium for individuals will rise by \$2.22 to \$30.04 next year. For families, the standard coverage premium will go up \$4.46, to \$66.78.

<P> The biweekly premiums of Kaiser Permanente, a popular HMO in this area, also will rise. Individual coverage will go up \$1.67, to \$23.50 next year. Family coverage will increase \$2.83, to \$58.10.

<P> Not all FEHBP plans will raise their premiums in 2000. The George Washington University Health Plan, for example, will reduce the amount enrollees pay biweekly for individual coverage by \$9.68, to \$24.36. Family coverage will drop \$8.78, to \$62.91.

<P> In the interview, Lachance said she fears that marketplace competition no longer holds down premium increases. FEHBP premiums increased by 9.5 percent in 1999 and by 7.2 percent in 1998. Rate increases slowed earlier in the 1990s, hitting a low of 0.3 percent in 1996.

<P> The announcement of the premium increases comes just days after Congress approved a 4.8 percent pay raise next year for federal workers. That amounts to \$2,856 for the typical white-collar government worker in the Washington area and raises the average annual salary to \$62,365. On average, the health insurance premium for family coverage will rise \$184, to \$1,866.

<P> Federal unions in recent months have pressured the OPM to step up its efforts to contain health care costs, arguing that the premiums have become so expensive that as many as 200,000 federal employees choose to go without insurance.

<P> Bobby Harnage, president of the American Federation of Government Employees, called the premium increases "too high" and "just not acceptable."

<P> "I think we can do better, and we have to do better," Harnage said.

<P> Lachance said she plans to consult with insurance companies, federal unions and members of Congress on legislative proposals that could slow premium growth.

<P> She said the OPM will ask Congress next year to allow it to set higher standards for health care plans in the FEHBP. Under current law, health plans may enter the program if they meet minimum standards based primarily on state licensing and solvency requirements. The OPM wants to set performance standards on how quickly insurance companies resolve disputed claims and pay benefits.

<P> Lachance also said the OPM wants the authority to contract directly with providers of certain benefits, such as dental care and vision care. OPM officials believe that the FEHBP's buying power would enable the program to save money by seeking discounted rates from such providers. Currently, insurance companies in the FEHBP contract separately to provide such benefits through their medical care plans.

<P> At some point, OPM officials said, the FEHBP will study whether to carve out prescription drugs or other "cost drivers" for separate negotiations.

<P> The 1959 law that created the FEHBP lists a broad range of services that should be provided to federal employees and requires the government to enter into contracts with health insurance companies. It does not allow the OPM to contract with providers of specific products or services, officials said.

<P> FEHBP premiums often are harbingers of rate trends facing private-sector employers. Paul Fronstin, a research associate at the Employee Benefit Research Institute here, said he thinks the overall FEHBP increase "is in line" with what other large employers will face in the coming year.

<P> "People are still not going to be happy with 9 percent, but if you think about it, in terms of growth rates, it is not indicating that health care costs are starting to increase faster and faster," Fronstin said.


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<P>San Francisco Chronicle

September 17, 1999

Pg. 8

<P>UC Hires Ex-Military Security Expert To Protect Weapons Labs

<I><P>Report on spying by Chinese prompts move

</I><P>By Tanya Schevitz, Chronicle Staff Writer

<P> Stung by an international spy scandal, the University of California has hired a counterintelligence expert to oversee security at the nuclear weapons laboratories it manages.

<P> Raymond ``Terry" Owens III, an Air Force colonel who directed military counterintelligence during the air campaign over Serbia, retired from the military yesterday and accepted a job with the UC Office of the President, the UC Board of Regents was told.

<P> UC has come under fire in recent months for security breaches at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore weapons laboratories it manages for the federal government. Owens has over 25 years of experience in espionage and counterintelligence, with a specialty in cybersecurity, and will work full time with the U.S. Department of Energy and the labs to strengthen security.

<P> Owens, who will earn \$128,000 annually, had earlier led efforts to prevent terrorism against the United States and its overseas personnel.

<P> Owens' hiring could strengthen the university's position as it increasingly falls under attack by Congress over its management of the labs.

<P> Los Alamos director John Browne said outside the regents' meeting that Owens provides the university with a necessary expertise.

<P> ``I think it is to provide the university with some expertise to deal with lab security people and DOE security people, someone who can speak their language," he said.

<P> The Department of Energy's newly appointed security czar, retired Air Force Gen. Gene Habiger, said through a spokesman yesterday that Owens is the ``perfect selection at the right time for a difficult job."

<P> ``I am confident that Terry Owens will provide a new focus on security at the DOE labs run by the University of California," he said.

<P> The regents also heard yesterday that UC President Richard Atkinson is recruiting new members for his advisory council on the national laboratories. He will add national security experts to the advisory panel, which traditionally has focused on science, technology and environmental, health and safety concerns.

<P> The president's labs advisory council is currently studying how U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson's new security policies are being implemented at

the laboratories, which UC has managed since their inception more than 50 years ago.

<P> The university, which previously relied on the government for security management, is taking a more active role since revelations earlier this year that China had obtained highly sensitive weapons information from spying at the labs. The security breaches have prompted calls in Congress for the university to be held responsible and have raised questions about whether national security and scientific freedom should go hand in hand.

<P> "We take our responsibility very seriously, and we are dedicated to working with the DOE and other appropriate agencies," UC Vice President Wayne Kennedy assured the regents.

<P> Also yesterday, Browne and Livermore lab director Bruce Tarter said they have stepped up security -- from new computer firewalls and the hiring of 50 new guards at Livermore, to the controversial plan to give lie-detector tests to nuclear weapons scientists.

<P> Regent Velma Montoya said she was pleased that UC has taken an aggressive approach to security.

<P> "Let's face it, it is a moving target, and I like the fact that we are trying to hit the moving target," she said.

<P> The regents also heard yesterday that Atkinson has called for his lab advisory council to study cost overruns in construction of the Livermore-based National Ignition Facility, a nuclear-weapons testing system that relies on lasers, not physical testing.

<P> News of Atkinson's call for a financial review of construction came hours after the announcement that a congressional committee had demanded an investigation by the General Accounting Office into why cost overruns at the National Ignition Facility of at least \$160 million -- and possibly up to \$350 million -- were not revealed until this month.

<P> Two months ago, officials at Livermore said the project would be done on time and within budget. This month, they revealed startling problems that will delay completion for at least a year. Richardson has called for his own review and has pledged to hold the university accountable for failing to disclose the problems sooner.

<P> "In hindsight, our reporting might have been more timely," said Susan Houghton, a spokeswoman for the Livermore lab director.

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<P>Baltimore Sun

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>Flight 800 Theorists Stick To Their Guns

<I><P>Crash: Amateur investigators dismiss the government's
conclusion that a vapor explosion brought down a TWA Boeing 747.

</I><P>By Tom Bowman

<P> Sometime early next year will come the last official word on what caused the crash of TWA Flight 800, which set out for Paris on July 17, 1996, and exploded in a fireball over Long Island Sound, sending all 230 passengers and crew members to a watery grave.

<P> The National Transportation Safety Board is expected by March to issue its final report on the crash of the Boeing 747 and will point to an electrical failure, which ignited vapors in a center wing tank, said a top NTSB official, who requested anonymity.

<P> The tank's explosion ripped off the front of the plane, which climbed several thousand feet before it began its perilous descent into the water, said

investigators.

<P> But retired Navy Cmdr. William S. Donaldson III, 55, a combat pilot during the Vietnam War who investigated a dozen Navy crashes during his 25-year career, points to another cause: a shoulder-fired missile from a terrorist aboard a speedboat some three miles away.

<P> Thomas Stalcup, 29, a doctoral candidate in physics at Florida State University, has another explanation, backed by dozens of other amateur TWA 800 sleuths: A military "special operations" exercise supported by a "fleet" of fast-moving ships off Long Island Sound accidentally fired a missile that brought down the plane.

<P> Neither man has concrete evidence to support his theory. They blend portions of evidence, from radar blips to bomb residue. They argue that the government's conclusions of a vapor explosion and a rising, crippled aircraft are impossible. And from eyewitness accounts, they conclude, on their Web sites and in media conferences, that a missile can be the only reason for the crash.

<P> When they ponder the government's explanation, they see incompetence and cover-up. They dismiss an investigation that has cost \$40 million and included the FBI, the NTSB, the CIA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-arms and scientists from government labs and private universities.

<P> "They're both wrong," said former FBI assistant director James Kallstrom, who led the criminal investigation into the TWA 800 crash, referring to Donaldson and Stalcup.

<P> "They have seen none of the evidence," said an exasperated Kallstrom, who has left the agency for private industry. "There's no forensic evidence of anything hitting the plane."

<P> Kallstrom said investigators first thought a bomb or missile destroyed the aircraft, given eyewitness accounts of a streak of light across the sky. "We took the eyewitness accounts very seriously," he said. "I put 500 agents on it as if it were a missile."

<P> But tests of the plane's wreckage, more than 95 percent of which was recovered, pointed not to a bomb or missile but to an internal explosion in the huge center wing fuel tank.

<P> A December 1997 report by the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division in China Lakes, Calif., said there was "no evidence" of a missile strike, noting that the wreckage bore none of the telltale signs, such as high-velocity penetration or soot residue. What the witnesses saw, investigators realized, was n

ot a missile rising to meet the plane but the plane breaking up in the sky.

<P> But Donaldson and Stalcup say many of the more than 100 witnesses, including veterans who had experience with missiles and gunnery fire, clearly saw a rising streak of light that would indicate some type of ordnance.

<P> Donaldson, who left the Navy in 1991 and owns a farm in St. Mary's County, has been obsessed with the crash since April 1997, when he read a Wall Street Journal opinion piece by NTSB Chairman James Hall that discounted the missile theory and pointed to a spontaneous explosion in the center wing tank. "I knew the fuel couldn't do what he said it did," said Donaldson.

<P> Since then, Donaldson has created the Associated Retired Aviation Professionals to look into the crash, peppered government officials with questions, prodded lawmakers to mount a new investigation and crafted his own fuel experiments.

<P> It's impossible for the plane's fuel to create an explosion, Donaldson says, noting that it is difficult to light and would have quickly burned out in the tank because of a lack of oxygen. In millions of takeoffs, he said, the accident described by investigators has never happened.

<P> "He's simply wrong," said a top NTSB official who asked that he not be named. The official said a similar explosion took place aboard a Philippine Airlines Boeing 737 and killed eight people on May 11, 1990, at Manila International Airport.

<P> Despite investigators' findings that a faulty switch and damaged wires probably ignited the fuel-air mixture in the tank, Donaldson sticks to his theory that a terrorist, not a fuel tank mishap, brought down the aircraft.

<P> One of the eyewitnesses saw an arcing light resembling a military "tracer round" at almost precisely the location of a speedboat captured by airport radar at about three miles from the crash scene and traveling at 30 knots. Donaldson says this corresponds with a Cigarette boat that two fishermen saw leaving Long Island's Moriches Inlet about 20 minutes before the plane exploded. The fishermen noticed the boat's operator idle, peer around and then race out into Long Island Sound. They reported what they saw to the FBI, Donaldson says.

<P> The terrorist-attack theorists point out that President Clinton signed into law tough sanctions against Iran months before the TWA 800 explosion. Representatives of nine terrorist organizations were called to Tehran during the first week of June. That month, the U.S. Air Force's Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia were attacked with a truck bomb that killed 19 airmen.

<P> Three weeks later, TWA 800 exploded over Long Island, an act Donaldson calls "one in a long series of murderous attacks on U.S. interests fomented by the Iranian revolution "

<P> Shortly after the accident, The Times of London carried a story that named an Iranian-sponsored terrorist group as responsible, quoting senior Iranian officials who took credit for the crash.

<P> Donaldson goes on to charge that the FBI embarked on a "covert" search for Stinger missile parts, pointing to a Bureau search manual inadvertently left on a boat that contained diagrams of Stinger tubes and batteries. He also claims that the FBI chose to "conceal" from investigators and Congress evidence of shoulder-fired missile components discovered by the scallop boat Alpha Omega.

<P> Kallstrom said he was unaware that the scallop boat crew supposedly found missile parts but acknowledged that the FBI was searching for Stinger components.

<P> Asked why the U.S. government would conceal a terrorist attack, Donaldson has a ready answer: The Clinton administration was caught flat-footed by the terrorist moves and the smuggling of Stinger missiles, and it took no precautions that could have prevented aircraft attacks.

<P> If all this came to light, Donaldson argues, it could have hurt Clinton's chances for re-election in 1996.

<P> But Paul Marcone, chief of staff to Rep. James A. Traficant Jr., an Ohio Democrat who pressed FBI and NTSB officials last year with questions supplied by Donaldson, scoffs at such reasoning. "It's ludicrous. Why would they want to cover that up?" asks Marcone, adding that Clinton could have gained political currency by making the attack public and then bombing terrorist locations.

<P> While Donaldson clings to his terrorist theory for the crash of TWA 800, he dismisses as "baloney" a claim that the U.S. military accidentally shot down the jet.

<P> That's the view of the Flight 800 Independent Research Organization, a collection of some 50 enthusiasts, said Stalcup, who helped form the group earlier this year.

<P> "It was the eyewitnesses that got me into it," he said, recalling an FBI media conference in November 1997 that dismissed the missile theory and said the eyewitnesses saw not a streak rise from the ocean but the breakup of the plane in the sky.

<P> One of those eyewitnesses is Frederick C. Meyer, an Air National Guard Blackhawk helicopter pilot from Long Island, who spotted a streak of light the night of the crash as he was landing about 10 miles away at Gabreski Airport.

<P> "I saw a streak of light crossing the sky from my right to my left. A second or two later, I observed the first explosion," said Meyer, a Vietnam veteran who witnessed missile flights in the service. "I believe what I saw was a long-range missile."

<P> "The best explanation I've heard to date is that it could've been a missile," said Stalcup, who notes that traces of bomb ingredients were found on the plane. Investigators said the traces came from a police exercise in St. Louis several weeks earlier involving bomb-sniffing dogs.

<P> Like others in his group, Stalcup points to radar evidence that shows "a fleet of ships," some 30 boats, heading at high speed toward a military restricted area not far from the crash area that night. "I've been told by someone the speed can only be military," said Stalcup, declining to provide his source but saying it came from a former military radar operator.

<P> A Navy spokesman said no ships were operating within a 40-nautical-mile radius of the crash site.

<P> The Aegis missile cruiser USS Normandy was about 180 miles south of the crash site, though it was not conducting tests. It had no missiles with a range to reach the crash area, said the Navy.

<P> Donaldson holds out hope for a larger congressional probe and additional testing that might point to a missile. In their report, officials at the Navy's China Lake facility said shooting a shoulder-fired missile at a 747's fuel tanks would settle "finally and conclusively" the lingering questions about a supposed missile attack.

<P> But Kallstrom said scientists agreed such tests would not have made "a material difference" in his criminal probe. "There comes a time when you have to end an investigation," he said, noting that he suggested to NTSB officials they pursue any necessary testing. NTSB officials, however, said it was not their role to conduct testing for possible criminal activity.

<I><P> Tom Bowman is a reporter in The Sun's Washington bureau.</I>

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<P>National Journal

Sept. 18, 1999

Pg. 2636

<P>The Spook Spat: Paranoid Suspicions?

<P>By Neil Munro

<P> During the Cold War, hardly anyone would have made a fuss about the National Security Agency's eavesdropping on phone conversations and electronic communications around the world. But how times have changed. Now, a loose network of U.S. legislators, libertarians, and European politicians is protesting the NSA's eavesdropping, questioning whether the privacy rights of U.S. and foreign citizens are being violated and whether some of the information gleaned from e-mails, faxes, and phone calls is winding up in the hands of U.S. businesses.

<P> The dispute threatens to strain relations between the United States and Europe, particularly if Europeans become convinced that the eavesdropping is being used to help U.S. companies win contracts away from European ones. "The whole damn thing goes to pieces if that is ever proven," said Britain's Glyn Ford, who is a member of the European Parliament's committee on civil liberties, and is a member of the Parliament's socialist group.

<P> The critics' most significant success in the United States was the Hous

e passage of an amendment in July sponsored by Rep. Bob Barr, R-Ga., that requires the NSA to explain to Congress its legal guidelines for electronic eavesdropping. The Barr amendment, which was attached to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, still must survive a conference with the Senate.

<P> "Maybe it is time to say the intelligence community has to meet a certain 'probable cause' to establish non-U.S. citizenship before they collect intelligence" on any person, said Barr. "I am a firm believer in intelligence, but it has to be done in the confines of the Constitution."

<P> Barr's amendment followed the release of a European research paper that describes in much detail a vast eavesdropping apparatus, dubbed "Echelon." According to the report, prepared for Parliament at Ford's request by the British-based Omega Foundation, the system is spearheaded by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Echelon intercepts faxes, e-mails, and phone conversations sent via satellites, microwave towers, and even cables, says the report. Because there is no technical way to recognize the voices of known terrorists, criminals, or spies, the system extracts intelligence data from electronic transmissions when key words--perhaps such as "Saddam," "uranium," or "bomb"--can be spotted by sophisticated software, according to a follow-up report.

<P> Intelligence officials don't quibble with the reports' description of the intelligence system, but strongly criticize suggestions that it is used to violate the privacy rights of U.S. citizens or benefit U.S. companies.

<P> "I would be very surprised if something like that was occurring," said R. James Woolsey, who served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1993-95. "Economic intelligence is collected for [informing policy-makers and for] tracking dual-purpose technologies, such as chemicals and supercomputers. Sometimes that covers a range of issues that foreign companies would rather we not collect," said Woolsey, who declined to discuss Echelon. Woolsey, now a partner at the law firm of Shea and Gardner, also said that there is no practical way for intelligence agencies to share information with particular U.S. companies without precipitating charges, in Congress's oversight committees or the media, of lawbreaking and commercial favoritism--even if officials were able to identify a truly U.S. company, given the multinational environment that ensures that many American companies have workers, executives, factories, and owners overseas.

<P> Intelligence agencies are prohibited from eavesdropping within the United States, while police forces can use wiretaps only with a judge's approval. Outside the United States, the agencies are freer to eavesdrop--but data from a U.S. citizen must be immediately discarded, say officials.

<P> A broad range of U.S. advocacy groups--including the left-leaning American Civil Liberties Union; the middle-of-the road Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Center for Democracy and Technology; and the right-leaning Fr

ee Congress Research and Education Foundation--say that Echelon could endanger civil liberties.

<P> ``It is a vacuum-cleaner system that attempts to suck up as much as it can. Certainly, it has potential to be misused for domestic espionage, for economic espionage," especially if the five governments swap information on each other's citizens, said Barry Steinhardt, the New York City-based associate director of the ACLU. He said Congress should ensure that the agencies don't monitor American citizens or supply U.S. police with information gathered on drug runners or money launderers. Despite the weakness of the anti-Echelon network, Steinhardt is optimistic about its progress. ``A year ago, this was X-Files stuff,' he said referring to the popular television show. ``Anyone who talked about Echelon was viewed as a paranoid raver."

<P> But this libertarian network has yet to garner support from the influential high-tech sector, despite their common efforts to promote use of data-scrubbing gear that could stymie the Echelon system.

<P> Woolsey said that opponents of Echelon will have to live with the system, even if it creates friction with Europeans. ``The strain will just have to exist because it is most unwise to pass laws or policies that would prevent . . . keeping track of how sanctions work, or how thugs like [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic move their money around."


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<P>Los Angeles Times

Sept. 18, 1999

<P>Northrop Gets Contract Of Up To \$2.7 Billion

<P>By Bloomberg News

<P> Northrop Grumman Corp. was awarded a six-year contract valued at up to \$2.7 billion for engineering and logistics support on the B-2 Stealth bomber, the Air Force said. Northrop said it already received its first order under the contract, for \$2 million, for flight testing and long-range planning through the end of this year.

<P> The agreement is expected to run through 2005, and includes options for a total of 15 years. Los Angeles-based Northrop, which has made 21 B-2 Stealth bombers, expects to deliver the last of the B-2s next year. Northrop shares were unchanged at \$65.69 on the New York Stock Exchange. News of the contract came after the markets closed.

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**<P>Newsweek
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Sept. 27, 1999

<P>The Hunters And The Hunted

<I><P>East Timor's armed peacekeepers have been told to use 'all necessary measures' to restore security and provide relief

</I><P>By Jeffrey Bartholet and Ron Moreau

<P> Eurico Guterres is not a very imposing enemy. On one level, he's just a two-bit thug, a former gang boss who allegedly controlled prostitution and gambling rackets in East Timor. But he also commands the pro-Indonesian Aitarak or Thorn militia. Ever since East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia on Aug. 30, his militiamen have terrorized civilians, slaughtering some and forcing thousands of others to flee to the mountains. Now he wants to intimidate the international force of at least 7,000 soldiers, led by Australia, that is attempting to take control of the remote territory. "We East Timorese are thirsty for the blood of white people," Guterres boasted last week.

<P> The rescue of East Timor is delicately called a "peacekeeping mission." But make no mistake. This is a peacemaking mission. As mandated last week by the U.N. Security Council, International Force for East Timor (Interfet) can use "all necessary measures" to "restore peace and security" and help get relief supplies to the wounded, sick and starving. President Clinton, who has pledged some 200 American soldiers to help with logistics, communications and perhaps intelligence in both Australia and East Timor, last week warned that international troops will "face some stiff challenges." Australian Prime Minister John Howard was more blunt. "There will be danger. There could be casualties. And the Australian public should understand that."

<P> Could East Timor become a depressing death trap for well-intentioned foreigners? It was only a half-dozen years ago that U.S. forces failed to enforce peace on warring militias in Somalia and withdrew after the corpses of dead GIs were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. But East Timor is considered a very different case. In the August referendum, held under U.N. auspices, 78.5 percent of voters rejected the oppressive rule of Indonesia and its local militia allies. This vast majority will support the Interfet troops. The militiamen, meanwhile, resemble scruffy street gangs. Even the hard-core fighters are more accustomed to murdering civilians than fighting pitched battles. But then, that's what a lot of people said about the Somalis. The main worry now is that militiamen will snipe at foreign troops, or stage hit-and-run raids from Indonesian West Timor.

<P> Teenager João was lucky to escape one of the Thorn militia massacres. In the safety of a refugee camp in Darwin, Australia, he recalled last week what happened in his hometown, Ermera, on the western edge of East Timor. When the paramilitaries began their rampage, Brito hid in a coffee plantation overlooking the town. From there, he watched Thorn militiamen, wearing black T-shirts and red and white headbands (the colors of the Indonesian flag), fire automatic weapons wildly to force people indoors. Brito, who recognized some of the attackers, said they then poured gasoline around the houses of independence activists and set them alight. The militiamen allowed women and children to flee,

Brito says, but forced men back into the flames. As houses burned, the militiamen danced. "They shouted, 'You dogs, you don't have the right to become independent!'"

<P> The priorities of Interfet forces will be to protect civilians and to open routes for relief supplies. Australia began food drops from transport planes last week, but tens of thousands of people were still hiding in the mountains, living on roots, bark and coconuts. In Indonesian West Timor, aid workers reported finding corpses presumed to be pro-independence activists near camps packed with 130,000 refugees. Nobody knows the overall death toll (estimates range from the hundreds to 7,000). But as refugees return and people emerge from hiding, the extent of the atrocities will become more clear. "The real culprits are the Indonesian military," says exiled independence leader Jose Ramos-Horta, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. "The war criminals, wherever they are, will be hunted down. We will find them one by one."

<P> The Security Council resolution adopted last week demands that people responsible for the violence "be brought to justice." Eventually, that could entail a formal investigation into crimes against humanity. Ramos-Horta believes that prospect alone could be a death sentence for militia leaders like Guterres. "He can testify on the role of the Indonesian Army," Ramos-Horta says. "But I doubt Eurico Guterres will be alive for more than two months. He knows too much." It may take more than peacemakers to bring an end to decades of intrigue and bloodshed.

<I><P> With Brook Larmer in Jakarta and Melissa Roberts in Sydney </I>

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<P>New York Times

September 20, 1999

<P>Seoul Drawing Closer To Tokyo As Anger Fades

<P>By Howard W. French

<P> TOKYO -- Moving in ways that are still sometimes scarcely seen by their peoples, the Governments of South Korea and Japan are drawing dramatically closer, bringing a new spirit of respect and reconciliation to one of Asia's most bitter relationships.

<P> "The relations between us have never been better, and we feel that we have laid the basis for even closer relations in the future," said Hyuk Lee, director of Japanese affairs at the South Korean Foreign Ministry. "At every level and in every area, the pace of our contacts has become quite brisk."

<P> Officials in both countries say South Korea and Japan have been driven together by a variety of factors, like a common threat from North Korea, shared economic interests, and the approach of a jointly organized World Cup tournament.

<P> "All this takes place against the backdrop of our shared concern about North Korea," said a senior Japanese diplomat who confirmed that sentiment. "Against that background, all of us have come to realize the importance of solidarity with the Republic of Korea and with the United States, as well."

<P> The first major step in the reconciliation was taken in October, when South Korea's recently elected President, Kim Dae Jung, visited Japan and obtained what no other Korean leader had previously been able to get, a written apology for Japan's brutal 36-year colonization of his country.

<P> In addition to the economic cooperation that both countries pledged to seek during President Kim's visit, the reconciliation has yielded dividends that few optimists would have predicted a year ago, substantial military cooperation for the first time and a rapid increase in cultural exchanges.

<P> The traffic back and forth of officials across a body of water for which the two countries have never agreed on a name -- the Sea of Japan for one and the East Sea for the other -- has increased to an unusual level.

<P> A busy series of visits at the prime-ministerial and presidential level is widely expected to culminate next year with a historic visit to South Korea by Emperor Akihito.

<P> By far the most dramatic illustration of the rapprochement has been the holding of a joint naval drill last month at approximately the midway point between the two countries, in seas 125 miles west of southern Japan.

<P> Yet the understated handling of the naval exercise, which received relatively low-key news coverage in both countries, indicates just how politically sensitive any embrace of Japan remains for Koreans and how little popular regard or attention Korea commonly elicits in the Japanese.

<P> Both countries have faced repeated menacing incursions in their waters by North Korean vessels, some disguised fishing boats and some minisubmarines staffed by frogmen commandos. And both countries are braced for the possible launching of a new generation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

<P> But if they would seem to have every reason to cooperate closely on military matters, many Koreans still hold Japan in contempt for the harsh treatment meted out by the Japanese military in World War II.

<P> Several days before the naval exercises, an editorial writer in The Korea Herald, a daily in Seoul, denounced Japan's defensive preparations for an attack by North Korea as steps taken to "make Japan a military power once again."

<P> In its occupation, Japan sought to ban the use of the Korean language, forced Koreans to adopt Japanese names and coerced Korean women to work in army brothels.

<P> Historians and officials in both countries say much work remains to be carried out before any genuine warmth will be felt between their peoples. Japan has not, for example, reversed its refusal to compensate Korean women who were sex slaves in World War II, and it has not agreed to compensate Korean veterans who fought for Japan in the war.

<P> Nevertheless, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi has made a number of small gestures that represent striking initiatives for a politician of his rank in Tokyo.

<P> In the latest move, last month, Obuchi visited a stone tower in Hiroshima dedicated to Korean victims of the atomic bomb. It was the first such visit by a Japanese Prime Minister since the monument was built in 1970. Obuchi has also promised to seek Parliamentary support for legislation that would allow Kor

ean residents to vote in local elections in Japan.

<P> In the end, Koreans say, the growing exchanges between the two countries after decades of standoffishness may do more than any number of official gestures. Timidly at first, but now with accelerating speed, South Korea has begun to allow the importation of Japanese "cultural items" like comic books, movies and fashion magazines.

<P> Many Koreans acknowledge that there is a keen interest in things Japanese and that greater access to them will gradually reduce the distance between the two peoples.

<P> Conversely, however, popular Japanese views of Koreans remain steeped in disdainful stereotypes. Many Japanese refuse to accept what scientists say is incontrovertible -- that Japan was populated and civilized largely by people who came originally from Korea.

<P> Many of the 600,000 people of recent Korean descent who live in Japan say they encounter stigmatization when hunting for jobs or houses and in dating or marriage.

<P> Japanese prejudices against Koreans include strong cooking odors that they associate with spicy Korean food and the supposed garrulousness and lack of sophistication they see in their neighbors.

<P> Indeed, discrimination faced by Koreans in Japan is one of the unresolved sore points in relations between the two countries.

<P> "The Japanese Prime Minister has done his best to try to reassure Korean people by apologies and various gestures," an adviser to Kim said. "But there are still many problems, like the difficulties of Koreans living in Japan, that do not receive any attention from the Japanese Government."

<P> The director of the Asiatic Research Center at the University of Korea, Choy Sang Yong, detects what he calls "very surprising" changes in Korean attitudes toward Japanese. Following on Kim's decision to open up to Japanese culture, Choy said, "the Korean Government has decided to use the word 'Tenno' for the Japanese Emperor." That is the Japanese title of respect for their imperial leader, one that recalls for older Koreans their wartime subjugation.

<P> Attributing the shift, at least in part, to what he called Kim's drive to make South Korea more democratic, Choy expressed cautious hope that the Emperor's actual visit next year would be a success. Noting strident statements by right-wing politicians in Japan, however, he tempered his optimism by noting that many Koreans were still on guard for any sign of Japanese nationalism.

<P> At a recent debate in Japan over legally adopting the country's flag and anthem as symbols of the nation, some people argued that Japan's neighbors still associated the symbols with wartime atrocities and would be offended. The answer of some ultraconservative politicians was that Japan had done enough apologizing and that Korea, in particular, owed its development to Japan.

<P> Despite the reticence and animosity that has kept them apart, both Japanese and Koreans say being joint hosts of the World Cup soccer tournament in 2002 will bring the countries together as never before. Shuttle flights are expected to link the two capitals, and large numbers of fans will fly back and forth. To lend as much enthusiasm to the exchange as possible, the Korean Government will declare 2002 the Year of Japan, and the Japanese Government will pronounce it the Year of Korea.

<P> "The people are more cautious toward Japan than the Government," said Kwan O Kie, a professor of Japanese affairs at Korea's University of Ulsan and a former newspaper editor. "But we look at them and we admire their way of doing things, and the long-term tendency will be for us to move closer together."


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<P>Washington Post

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>Japan To Give Funds, But No Troops, To E. Timor Peacekeeping Force

<P>By Kathryn Tolbert, Washington Post Foreign Service

<P> TOKYOJapan will not take part in the multinational force being assembled to restore peace in East Timor, but will contribute \$2 million for humanitarian assistance "as a first step," a government spokesman said last week.

<P> Japan, which is Indonesia's largest foreign aid donor and a major trading partner, will make further "substantial contributions" to help nations that are willing to send troops but are in need of funds to assemble and support their forces, officials said.

<P> Japanese law permits soldiers to be sent abroad for limited participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, but not for other multinational forces.

<P> The Australian-led international force includes elements from several of Indonesia's other neighbors, among them Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, and their participation has prompted discussion in Tokyo of Japan's conspicuous absence.

<P> "In a crisis in Southeast Asia, which has close ties to Japan, the fact that Asian and Western countries are coming to help and that Japan's presence cannot be seen is odd," said the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's largest daily newspaper, in an editorial last week.

<P> Japan's postwar constitution renounces war, so when parliament passed a law in 1992 allowing soldiers to go on U.N. missions under certain conditions, the legislation stated that they could not be involved in the use of force. But interpretations of the constitution have gradually broadened, and some politicians are calling for revision of that provision.

<P> Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi said last week that he would take steps to lift a ban on Japanese soldiers participating in peacekeeping tasks that could result in armed skirmishes.

<P> Taku Yamasaki, who is challenging Obuchi for leadership of the ruling party, said in a debate with the prime minister that Japan should be ready to send its forces to East Timor when a U.N. peacekeeping mission takes over from the multinational force.

<P> "Japan should cooperate in that operation," he said. "It would not be enough just to give money."

<P> A former ambassador to Indonesia, Taizo Watanabe, has been calling for Japan to send a sizable amount of personnel for humanitarian work. "It is vitally important for common Indonesian people on the street to see with their own eyes that it is not only Australians or Europeans, but fellow Asians, especially Japanese, who are sharing hopes" for East Timor, he said.

<P> Some reports noted that Japan refused to join U.S. threats of an aid cutoff or other sanctions if Indonesia declined to accept international peacekeepers.

<P> But Watanabe said the Japanese government worked hard to get Indonesia to accept a peacekeeping force and that "it is a matter of great regret that Japanese legal restrictions prevent Japan from actively participating in the multinational force operation."


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<P>Omaha World-Herald

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>Critics: N. Korea Is Extorting U.S.

<P> Washington (AP) - By agreeing not to test long-range missiles in return for an easing of U.S. sanctions, North Korea again has used military threats to bully the United States into making concessions, critics of the deal say.

<P> President Clinton agreed Friday to lift bans on most trade, travel and investment that had been in effect since the end of the Korean War. Clinton took the steps in exchange for Pyongyang's agreement not to test missiles capable of reaching Alaska or Hawaii.

<P> "I'm filled with admiration for their (the North Koreans') negotiating style," said Robert Oakley, a retired diplomat who once headed the State Department's counterterrorism office. "They threaten us, and we keep paying them off."

<P> James Przystup, an analyst at the National Defense University, put it more bluntly: "They're extortionists. That's the way they operate."

<P> Much of Washington breathed easier after the deal was announced, mindful that a missile test - which seemed imminent just weeks ago - could have created another security crisis in northeast Asia.

<P> The most stringent U.S. sanctions remain against Cuba, although Washington has sought since last year to make it easier to provide humanitarian aid to the island and expand people-to-people contacts.

<P> Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said the bargain takes the United States and North Korea down "a new, more hopeful road."

<P> Don Oberdorfer, an East Asia expert at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, sees the agreement as "very positive." The alternative, he said, was a renewed crisis with North Korea similar to one that almost led to war in 1994.

<P> However, Oakley and Przystup see a harmful pattern in North Korean behavior.

<P> They recall the situation a year ago when U.S. officials believed that North Korea was undertaking a nuclear weapons project at a mysterious underground construction site in the side of a mountain. U.S. officials asked for access to the site. North Korea agreed but only after extracting \$100 million in U.S. food aid. The ensuing inspection turned up nothing but a maze of empty tunnels

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<P>Washington Times

Sept. 17, 1999

Pg. 14

<P>Okinawans Are Divided On Clinton's G-8 Visit

<I><P>Japanese see another military base on island

</I><P>By Takehiko Nomura, Special To The Washington Times

<P> NAHA, Japan - President Clinton's visit to Okinawa next year means another U.S. military base on this island, some people say.

<P> Okinawa residents have been divided since the Japanese government chose Nago, a northern Okinawa city with a population of 55,500, as venue for the year 2000 Group of Eight (G-8) summit meeting.

<P> While the decision pleased some Okinawans, especially those in urban areas like Naha, the capital, residents of Nago see it as another carrot-stick combination.

<P> The annual economic summit of the world's main industrial democracies could boost the hobbled economy of northern Okinawa, but many residents fear that Tokyo may press them to accept a U.S. Marine airfield as the price.

<P> Although Nago voters rejected in a 1997 referendum the central government's plan for a sea-based military airport, Okinawa prefectural officials recently suggested that the Henoko district of Nago is a likely site for the proposed replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, which the United States has agreed to return.

<P> "Nobody is pleased with the summit," said Yoshiyuki Nakamura, general secretary of the Nago-based anti-base group, adding that not only the Japanese government but the governor and people in Naha hardly grasp what Nago residents think about hosting the G-8 summit.

<P> Kiyoko Miyagi, an activist in the city's Henoko district, said that while only a handful of local wealthy people will reap the benefits of the summit and the government's economic-development programs, the majority will suffer higher taxes and the intrusiveness of a proposed military base.

<P> "It's money, money, money - all about money," said Mrs. Miyagi, who runs a noodle shop in Henoko. "Everyone used to be against the U.S. military presence, but the government is trying to lure them with money."

<P> During the Vietnam War, the thousands of free-spending American military personnel and strong U.S. dollar helped Henoko's economy boom.

<P> The streets used to be full of Americans, but now the town is "dead," said Katsuo Shimabukuro, a leader of the district's business group.

<P> "Our business has been very slow," said Masako Teruya, who runs a small restaurant in Henoko. "I'm sure our business would be much better if a base comes. That's why I am supporting the government's plan to construct a new military facility."

<P> "We have to remember, relocating Futenma is a national policy," said Mr. Shimabukuro. "But in exchange for our acceptance of a replacement base, we are asking them the central and prefectural governments for reasonable regional-development programs."

<P> Yoshikazu Tamaki, an assemblyman in Okinawa, countered: "If you say the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is important, then other parts of Japan should share the burden."

<P> Okinawa comprises 0.6 percent of Japan's land mass but contains 75 percent of the U.S. military installations in the country and houses 27,000 of the 41,500 American service personnel in Japan.

<P> The 1995 rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. service men stirred strong feelings against the U.S. military presence on the island, bringing tens of thousands of Okinawans into the streets in protests.

<P> To appease their anger, Washington and Tokyo agreed to consolidate U.S. facilities and close MCAS Futenma, located in densely populated central Okinawa. Japan, however, must provide the Marines with an equivalent facility elsewhere.

<P> U.S. and Japanese officials settled on a large sea-based facility off Camp Schwab, on the east side of Nago City. Government officials promised to inject more money if the city accepted the proposal.

<P> Despite much pressure from Tokyo, the people of Nago voted against the plan in the December 1997 referendum. Then-Gov. Masahide Ota came out against the plan in February 1998.

<P> Okinawa's rejection raised questions concerning the credibility of the Japanese government in the U.S.-Japan security relationship. While the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma is deadlocked, Tokyo also froze much-needed economic assistance to the island.

<P> Washington and Tokyo, however, got a boost last November when Keiichi Inamine, a conservative candidate supported by business groups and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, defeated Mr. Ota's re-election bid. During the campaign, Mr. Inamine promised to build an airport in northern Okinawa for both the U.S. military and civilian use.

<P> After his victory, Tokyo promised to pour more money into the island if the new governor keeps a flexible stance on U.S. military base issues.

<P> "Tokyo says 'Unless you accept a base, there is no economic assistance to the island.' That suggests Okinawa seems to be a militarized colony," said Mr. Tamaki.

<P> The assemblyman acknowledged, however, that there are residents "who want to depend heavily on lucrative subsidies from Tokyo. Our key word is independence."

<P> Okinawa needs economic self-sufficiency and to become more politically independent, Mr. Tamaki stressed.

<P> But Yoshikazu Nakasone, general secretary of the Okinawa Peace Action Center, countered: "As long as there are military bases, we are hardly able to picture the future of Okinawa."

<P> Many of the U.S. military installations are concentrated in densely populated central Okinawa. For example, 82.8 percent of the town of Kadena is occupied by the largest U.S. military air base in the Far East, and MCAS Futenma and other facilities take up 51.5 percent of the city of Ginowan.

<P> Mr. Nakasone said such an overwhelming U.S. military presence has stifled Okinawa's economic development.

<P> Okinawa Prefecture is a chain of small subtropical islands about 1,000 miles southwest of Japan's four main islands. It is unusual to have an international conference in such a remote corner of the country, and the first time Japan hosts a summit outside Tokyo.

<P> "What Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi wanted was popularity," said Minoru Morita, a Tokyo-based political analyst. The prime minister thought the decision would please many Japanese in the main islands who feel sympathy for Okinawans.

<P> In fact, Mr. Obuchi's approval rate increased after the announcement.

<P> When President Clinton attends the G-8 summit next July, he will be the second president to visit Okinawa. Dwight D. Eisenhower came in 1960, when the island was still under U.S. occupation.

<P> Okinawa was the only place in Japan that experienced a ground battle during World War II. About 200,000 civilians died there, a third of the island's population. And while the U.S. military occupation of the rest of Japan ended in 1952, it continued two decades more in Okinawa.

<P> "What Mr. Clinton wants and has to do when he comes to Okinawa is to deliver a major speech in front of many American soldiers and tell them, 'Don't worry, you can stay in Okinawa. A relocation site for Futenma has been found. Everything is under control,'" said Mr. Morita.

<P> But once the site is disclosed, that will fuel anti-base movements, so Mr. Clinton is likely to face anti-base protests, analysts say.

<P> Mr. Inamine may announce the site this month, according to local media, but an aide denies it and said there is no plan as such.

<P> The biggest difficulty in dealing with Okinawa, Mr. Morita explains, is that "as always, Okinawans' opposition surges and they say 'no' to a new U.S. military base at the last minute."

<P> "Sure, we will protect our land at the risk of our life," said Mrs. Miyagi, 73, the activist and noodle-shop owner.

<P> "No matter what the governor, Mr. Obuchi or Mr. Clinton says, Okinawans are not going to let them build a new military base so easily," agreed Tokushin Yamauchi, a former mayor of Yomitan, nearly half of which is taken up by an auxiliary U.S. military airfield and parachute training area.

<P> "I think Mr. Obuchi trod on a lion's tail for popularity," Mr. Morita said. "If he stays in office until next July, the summit is likely to toll the bell of his departure."

<P> In June, President Clinton urged Tokyo to make some progress on the stalled issues of the American military presence in Okinawa, especially on relocation of the Marines from Futenma.

<P> "I don't want to go over there and have all these things hanging out. I hope they'll all be resolved," the president was quoted as saying.

<P> Mr. Clinton's comment angered some Okinawans. When about 150 people gathered last week at a meeting of an anti-base group in Nago, they said the U.S. president lacked respect for Okinawans and called him "arrogant."

<P>Site Closings

<P> The choice of a northern Okinawa town for the July 2000 economic summit puts a spotlight on U.S. bases and the deadline for choosing a relocation site for the 1st Marine Air Wing from Futenma. Some agreed returns of U.S. military areas to civilian use and their time frames include:

<P> 1. Senaha and Sobe communications sites plus Yomitan auxiliary airfield, March 2001

<P> 2. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Between 2001 and 2003

<P> 3. About 9,000 acres of the Northern Training Area, March 2003

<P> 4. Most of Camp Kuwae, March 2008

<I><P> Source: General Accounting Office report of March 1998 </I>


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<P>Washington Times

Sept. 17, 1999

Pg. 14

<U><P>Q&A

</U><P>Relocating U.S. Forces Would Be Difficult

<P>By Takehiko Nomura

<P> Sheila A. Smith, an assistant professor of international relations at Boston University, spoke with reporter Takehiko Nomura about issues related to th

e U.S. military presence on Okinawa.

<P> Question: Do you think Washington and Tokyo have ever seriously thought about relocating some of the major bases to Japan's main islands?

<P> Answer: My impression is that there was serious effort - short-lived, serious effort - to explore other options. But I don't think there was political will in Tokyo to sustain the effort.

<P> In other words, relocation is costly politically to the LDP Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and to the government. I don't think there was sustained effort to absorb some of the political cost required.

<P> Q: Is relocation or reduction of the American bases difficult?

<P> A: The relocation and the reduction of numbers of forces, the relocation of bases, whether it's within Okinawa or within the mainland is a very difficult political task. The question, therefore, is whether or not it's feasible either in Okinawa or in the mainland.

<P> My personal opinion is, it's not feasible. I don't think it's a wise policy in the long run.

<P> Q: Why not?

<P> A: Because I think the U.S.-Japan alliance needs sustained support. If the cost of maintaining U.S. forces is high, then we have to address the cost. I'm not really convinced the idea of relocating the Marines Corps in Okinawa has sufficient rationale for the political cost of building that base.

<P> I'm not convinced by the relocation argument - not for strategic reasons, not for economic reasons, not even for the idea that there are some interests in Okinawa who would like to see the base be built - for example, construction interests and perhaps local businesses.

<P> But I think the long-term political costs - if it's trying to relocate and build a new base in Okinawa - are not worth the price. If the United States and Japan want to do something that's good for the alliance, then they should consider seriously the impact on the Okinawan people.

<P> Q: You were in Okinawa for the past seven months. Can you tell us what kind of changes you've seen since Governor Inamine took office?

<P> A: Many people assume that because Governor Ota lost the election in November, the majority of Okinawans want the bases to stay.

<P> I think that is a hasty, unsupported conclusion. I think that now the current governor wants to take a more cooperative approach, less contentious approach, to the relationship with Tokyo. I think that may be more appropriate.

<P> But I think that on Tokyo's side, there also needs to be realization that they didn't win this battle. They need to think through what went wrong in the first place.

<P> The issue for Okinawa at the moment is they spent the last 40-50 years with a massive U.S. presence. Not all of Okinawa's experience with the American military has been bad. But the economy of Okinawa has been structured around the presence of these bases, which means any kind of long-term economic development planning, any kind of local community has to work around the bases.

<P> That's a major public policy problem for most Okinawa communities.

<P> So the problem is not just whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is good or bad, whether the Marines are necessary or not necessary. It's a broader social-political problem than that.

<P> A lot of specific problems faced by mayors and local political leaders in Okinawa, as well as the Okinawa local government, need more attention by bureaucrats and political leaders in Tokyo.

<P> My impression is that the social imprint of the presence of U.S. military bases is extensive. Therefore, a lot of problems need sustained attention to be untangled.


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<P>Newsweek

Sept. 27, 1999

<P>Russia's War Hits Home

<I><P>Bombings rock the urban heartland, and the trail seems to lead to Islamic insurgents in the remote Caucasus region. Suddenly, nobody feels safe.

</I><P>By Bill Powell

<P> Yekaterina Chaborina, a retired 71-year-old widow, had trouble sleeping last Monday night. At around 4 in the morning, she was puttering around her small apartment in a neighborhood south of central Moscow. Then there was a noise unlike any she had ever heard, a deafening thunderclap that blew out the windows in her apartment and knocked her to the floor. Dazed, she gathered herself and raced to see what had happened. Next door, where an eight-story concrete apartment building stood just an instant earlier, there was now just a huge smoldering pile of ash and rubble. "And not even that much rubble," she said later. "I lived through [World War II] and the Nazi invasion," Chaborina recalled as she placed a note of remembrance at a makeshift memorial at the site where 119 of her neighbors were killed, "but I have never seen anything like this."

<P> Russia's latest war has hit home, with a ferocity that has stunned and frightened the citizens of both the capital and its far-flung regions. It is a war most Russians thought had ended three years ago, with a humbling truce in the breakaway Islamic Republic of Chechnya. But the conflict revived last month, when Chechen-led rebels invaded neighboring Dagestan. They quickly withdrew after being pounded by Russian warplanes and artillery, only to invade again early this month. On Sept. 4, a bomb ripped through a Russian apartment building in Dagestan (map). The explosion appeared to be the start of a sophisticated, and ruthlessly executed, terrorist campaign. Three deadly bombings followed two in Moscow, and one in the southern city of Volgograd. In all, nearly 300 people were killed in 16 days of terror. And the security services braced for more.

<P> The authorities blamed Islamic extremists from the Caucasus region for the blasts and rounded up thousands of dark-skinned Chechens, ordering them, in effect, to go back to Chechnya. Police identified two men as ringleaders of the bombing campaign: a Chechen named Achemes Gochiyayev and an Uzbek, Denis Saitakov. Officials said Gochiyayev rented storage space in both of the Moscow apartment buildings that were blown up. But neither man was in custody. Security forces did arrest two other suspects, both Chechens; traces of explosives were said to have been found on their persons or in their homes. One of the suspects said on Russian television: "They haven't found a thing, not a thing. It is a complete fabrication." So far, no one had claimed responsibility for most of the bombings, though a previously unknown group calling itself the Dagestan Liberation Army said it had directed one of the Moscow attacks. Chechen leaders insisted they had no connection to any bombings.

<P> For Boris Yeltsin, ailing, aging and now in the last year of his presidency, the blasts are a disaster. The Russian economy is a mess, and allegations of massive corruption dog him and his government. Now, for Russia's beleaguered citizenry (particularly the 10 million Muscovites), the most basic sense of security that they can go to bed at night reasonably assured of waking up the next morning is all but gone. "We know the name of the enemy," Yeltsin said, "and it is terrorism."

<P> The Russian president is so weak and the political environment so vicious that the bombings triggered wild speculation. Some rumors said the bombs were set on behalf of politicians who want to succeed Yeltsin. Others said the attacks were designed to provoke a state of emergency that would allow Yeltsin to step down in favor of Vladimir Putin, his prime minister and designated successor of the moment. Still other rumors said Yeltsin would fire Putin, replace him with Aleksandr Lebed, the former general who negotiated the Chechen truce, and then cancel scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections.

<P> There was not a shred of evidence for any of the conspiracy theories. That left Moscow confronting a more likely, and equally bleak, reality: a conflict with Islamic rebels has now spawned a terror campaign that has no precedent in modern Russia. By all accounts, the rebellion in Dagestan, a multiethnic region on the Caspian Sea, is led by two key figures. Both are fervent Islamic fundamentalists and were key commanders in the Chechen uprising that started in 1994 (and both have denied any connection to the current bombing campaign). One is Shamil Basayev, a daring commander who fought with the current, elected leader of Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, but has now split with him because of Maskhadov's relative moderation in imposing Islamic law. Maskhadov has disavowed any role in Dagestan, but he is plainly incapable of stopping Basayev's hit-and-run attacks across the Chechen border into Dagestan.

<P> The second leader is a much more shadowy figure who goes by the nom de guerre "Khattab." By some accounts, he is the scion of a wealthy Saudi family and once studied in the United States. But one intelligence report says Khattab is an ethnic Chechen whose family immigrated to Turkey in the 1920s and then to Jordan. He reportedly fought the Russians in Afghanistan, and in February 1995, he joined Basayev's separatists in Chechnya, setting up a camp to train young

Muslims for guerrilla war. By 1996, his exploits had made him famous. Kiosks in Grozny, the Chechen capital, sold a gruesome video showing the long-haired Khattab mowing down a unit of Russian soldiers in a lonely pass.

<P> The Clinton administration is keenly interested in Khattab. There are sketchy reports that he may have links to the notorious Osama bin Laden, the terrorist paymaster Washington believes is behind the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa last year. U.S. intelligence sources say there is evidence of substantial financial support reaching the Chechen and Dagestan rebels from the Arab world, along with a score of volunteers from Egypt, Pakistan and Afghanistan. But one official says U.S. intelligence is "agnostic" on the question of a link between Muslim extremists and the Russian bombings and is even less convinced about any connection to bin Laden.

<P> Still, in part to shore up a deteriorating relationship with Russia, Washington is trying to supply Moscow with useful intelligence on the terror campaign. Two weeks ago FBI Director Louis Freeh discussed Khattab and other topics with Russia's Interior minister. And last week U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stressed, in an otherwise critical speech on Russian corruption, that at Washington and Moscow "stand shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism."

<P> That will be of little comfort to angry and fearful Muscovites, who now leave their offices, saying: "See you tomorrow I hope." Despite Operation Whirlwind, in which authorities said they searched every single one of Moscow's 33,000 apartment buildings, few feel safe. Already, thousands of Muscovites have moved out of their city apartments and are staying in country dachas. Others stand guard at their apartments all night, unconvinced that the police can protect them. Millions more direct their rage against the large Chechen diaspora in Moscow. Identifiable by their dark complexions, many natives of the Caucasus now huddle behind closed doors in Moscow, fearful of retribution. And for good reason. "We have to get these blacka---s out once and for all," says 71-year-old pensioner Lyubov Voznesenskaya a sentiment undoubtedly shared by the vast majority of Muscovites. By late last week the Russian government seemed to be preparing for new military operations against Chechnya. The news media stoked the fire. TV stations in Moscow aired a horrifying video in which Slavic-looking victims of kidnappers in Chechnya and Dagestan are tortured or executed on camera. Boris Yeltsin's Russia is a deeply pained, increasingly volatile place. The backlash to the bombing could be the ugliest chapter yet.

<I><P> With Owen Matthews in Moscow, Steve LeVine in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and John Barry in Washington </I>

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<P>Defense News

Sept. 27, 1999

Pg. 16

<P>Russians Try Out Spy Plane

<I><P>Expect M-55 To Provide Surveillance in a Few Years

</I><P>By Simon Saradzhyan, Defense News Correspondent

<P> MOSCOW -- The Russian Air Force is set to complete tests of a high-altitude reconnaissance plane that it needs for real-time targeting in local conflicts.

<P> The M-55 plane, developed by the Myasishchev Experimental Machine-Building Plant of Zhukovsky, will complete tests in 2000 and be commissioned within the next few years, officials here said.

<P> Valery Shirinyants, Myasishchev's deputy general designer, told Defense News Sept. 14 that his state-owned enterprise is extending the plane's range to meet the Russian Air Force's requirements.

<P> The upgrades include improvement of the plane's flight control systems, installment of fins at the tips of both wings, and reinforcement of the chassis.

<P> Upgrades to the 22.6-meter long plane, which has a wingspan of 37.4 meters, will extend its flight duration from 6.5 hours to at least eight hours. The plane's payload also will be boosted from 2 tons to 3 tons, allowing it to carry more reconnaissance and targeting gear.

<P> Shirinyants said the plane is being fitted with more advanced electronic equipment to enable the M-55 to provide instant targeting for other aircraft and ground weaponry systems. In addition, it could download reconnaissance data, including map information, to command facilities.

<P> He said fighting in Russia's north Caucasian province of Dagestan will prompt the Air Force to speed testing of M-55 if enough funds are allocated. This already seems more likely now that the government has vowed to increase defense research and development spending. Moscow will allocate almost 30 percent of its planned federal budget for defense efforts next year, Sergei Stepashin, the then-prime minister, told industry leaders meeting here June 5.

<P> The increase would allow the Air Force to commission at least one M-55 next year, with leeway for two dozen more, said an official at the Air Force's central command.

<P> "Ideally, we would love to have high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that cannot be shot down, but fighters will remain our priority as long as we are under-financed," the officer said.

<P> The Myasishchev plant began developing the M-55 in the 1980s. The plane, which is powered by two turbofan PS-30V12 engines by Permskiye Motory of Perm, took its maiden flight in 1988. Shirinyants and independent experts said M-55 is more affordable for Russia than satellites.

<P> "Of course you can't use M-55s to spy on the West, but they will be efficient in local conflicts," said Konstantin Makienko, deputy head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. He said the campaign to drive Chechen-led Islamic militants from Dagestan has highlighted Russia's glaring lack of airborne reconnaissance and targeting.

<P> He said the M-55 would be efficient in reconnaissance and targeting missions in northern Caucasus because the rebels might acquire air defense systems to shoot down lower-flying tactical reconnaissance modifications of Russia's MiG-25 and Su-24 fighters.

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<P>London Times

Sept. 20, 1999

<P>Britain Powerless Over Jet Delivery

<P>By Michael Binyon, Diplomatic Editor

<P> BRITAIN said yesterday that it was powerless to stop delivery to Indone
sia of three Hawk trainer jets which are now waiting at Bangkok airport.

<P> John Spellar, the Armed Forces Minister, told Sky News that Indonesia t
ook delivery of the planes before the current crisis in East Timor and before a
n embargo was announced last week. "They are in Thailand, in the ownership of t
he Indonesians," he said. "Obviously, in the spirit of the embargo, we would pr
fer them not to go to Indonesia."

<P> The Ministry of Defence confirmed that the planes were legally the prop
erty of Indonesia under a contract approved by the last Government. The Foreign
Office refused to comment on reports that Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, h
ad intervened to force the planes to remain in Thailand.

<P> The Government seemed deeply embarrassed by the affair. A Ministry of D
efence statement said: "Any future deliveries will be subject to the Government
's export controls, including the recently-introduced EU arms embargo." It coul
d not say how many outstanding orders would be affected or confirm that a furth
er 11 Hawks are due to be delivered under the British Aerospace contract.

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<P>New York Times

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>In Remote Dagestan, Moscow Wages A High-Stakes War

<P>By Michael Wines

<P> MOSCOW -- This week, Russia showed that it can muster enough military clout to shield its southwestern flank, the remote republic of Dagestan, from invading rebels. The next question is whether it can afford to continue.

<P> By Friday, Russian forces had decisively driven thousands of Islamic extremist troops out of the mountains of central Dagestan -- for the second time in six weeks -- and back to bases inside neighboring Chechnya. Overnight, they launched air and artillery strikes against suspected guerrilla bases in the breakaway republic, military officials said, adding that Russian aircraft would fly up to 100 sorties by the day's end.

<P> The cost of the fighting has been fearful: more than 230 Russian soldiers and 280 civilians have died, some 1,000 have been wounded and the nation has been suspended in a state of dread by random bombings that have killed nearly 300 people and are universally ascribed to Chechen terrorists.

<P> Nor is there any real sense that either the terror or the conflict in Dagestan is over. The Russian press reported threats by Chechen rebel leaders to extend the bombing campaign to aircraft and other targets until Russian troops leave Dagestan. While it is not possible to verify these accounts, the fear they engender is palpable.

<P> "The general feeling is relief that fighting on the territory of Dagestan has stopped," said Dalgat Akhmedkhanov, the editor of Novoye Delo, the newspaper in Dagestan's capital of Makhachkala. "However, the possibility remains that just as after the first attack there was a second one, that after the second will be a third."

<P> Were that to occur, Russia would face some difficult choices. If it is mostly unknown outside the Caucasus, Dagestan is a strategic asset, a province whose loss would accelerate the disintegration of Russia's Caspian Sea provinces. And unlike the Chechens, who have battled Russian domination since the 1800s, the Dagestanis are a mixture of ethnic groups that actually look to Russia for protection.

<P> But the extremist warlords who effectively run Chechnya also see Dagestan as a prize worth fighting for. And as they have already shown, they can force Moscow to pay an extremely high price to hold on to it.

<P> Part of Dagestan's attractiveness lies in its location, at Russia's southwestern tip, abutting Azerbaijan and Georgia. A mixture of almost 40 ethnic groups, most of them practicing a traditional form of Islam, Dagestan is a sort of buffer to the more fundamentalist and politically active strain of Islam practiced farther south in Iran.

<P> Dagestan is also a potential moneymaker. The republic claims more than half of Russia's Caspian Sea coastline. It is home to a pipeline and a railroad that ferry oil from the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where it is carried by tankers to the Mediterranean.

<P> The latest war has shut down the railroad. The pipeline also traverses Chechnya, where much of its contents have been siphoned off by thieves. Azerbaijan oil executives and their backers, including the United States, are pushing for a new pipeline that would run outside Russia, directly to Turkey's Mediterranean coast.

<P> Russia is seeking to counter those plans, and Dagestan is virtually its only option. In one measure of the republic's importance, the Russian Government issued an order on Friday to build a new pipeline that would run exclusively through Dagestan, looping around Chechnya on its way to Novorossiysk.

<P> Why the Chechen warlords want Dagestan is a less straightforward question. Nationalism may be one motivation; before the Soviets carved up the area, parts of Dagestan were Chechen territory, and ethnic Chechens still live there.

<P> Money may be another: pipelines and seaports are at least as valuable to landlocked Chechens as to the rest of Russia.

<P> But radical Islam is the explanation most frequently offered in Moscow. Chechnya's military powers, led by the warlord Shamil Basayev and a terrorist who goes by the single name of Khattab, profess to be radicals who hope to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state across the Caucasus. Experts contend that they are supported, at least to some extent, by radicals in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, among other places.

<P> Akhmedkhanov, of Novoye Delo, said the Chechen army expected to find a wellspring of support among Dagestan's Islamic population. "What seems to have happened is the opposite," he said. "Maybe Dagestan is unhappy with the authorities solving certain problems. But more than that, they're unhappy when someone else's will is imposed on them, all the more if that will dictates some beliefs and values which are completely unacceptable."

<P> Some of the ingredients that fueled fundamentalism in Chechnya -- extreme poverty, a corrupt and ineffective government -- exist in Dagestan as well. But except for a puritanical sect known as the Wahabites, which was outlawed in Dagestan last week, radicalism has yet to take hold.

<P> To the contrary, Dagestan, which is run by a national council of ethnic leaders, looks to Russia almost as a unifying force that prevents one or another of the republic's ethnic groups from dominating the rest. And when Russian soldiers appeared in force last month to repel Chechen invaders, the country's young men were mobilized to assist them.

<P> The Kremlin signaled its willingness on Friday to revive its disastrous 1996 civil war against the Chechen rebels, if need be, to stop the incursions into Dagestan. In a closed meeting with the upper house of Parliament, the Federation Council, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was said to have shown a film depicting atrocities by Chechen militants.

<P> He reportedly said the rebels had abrogated the agreement that had halted the civil war and given Chechnya independence in all but name, and called the Dagestan invasion "an aggression against Russia."

<P> Few actually expect an election-year repeat of the war, which disgusted many Russians and nearly cost President Boris N. Yeltsin re-election. What Rus

sia really needs, critics say, is a political policy that can at least match, and preferably outdo, its military one.

<P> So far, that is lacking.

<P> One expert, Shireen Hunter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said the best way to protect Dagestan from a Chechen takeover is to clean up its government and improve its economy, so that the despair that feeds radicalism is wiped out.

<P> "The fact is that the elements they are fighting do have to be cleaned up," she said in an interview. "But after they are cleaned up, they have to do things for the economy and so on in Dagestan, including the social conditions."

<P> The Russians, she added, "also have to come into some kind of terms with the whole issue of Chechnya: Can they work out something that will keep some kind of connection between Russia and Chechnya, or should Chechnya be independent? And what should be the terms of that?"

<P> The influential Moscow daily Sevodnya raised the same questions in an article late this week: "Sooner or later the Russian authorities will have to face the question every 'shrinking empire' encounters, namely: Where does the last line of retreat, to be held at all costs, lie?"

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Sept. 19, 1999

<P>There Will Be More Bombs, Says Chechen Rebel Chief

<I><P> Petra Prochazkova is the first foreign journalist for a year to meet the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev. As bombs bring death to Russian cities, she toured a nerve centre of terror

</I><P> Standing in the courtyard of his Grozny headquarters, Shamil Basayev shrugged his shoulders at the bombs which have claimed nearly 300 Russian lives in a spate of attacks.

<P> Moscow blames this Chechen Islamist warlord for the current wave of terror. When I put this to him last week, he chose his words carefully. He said: "These bombs are Dagestani, not Chechen. Russia is terrorising Dagestan. There will be more bombs."

<P> The Dagestanis were hitting back after Russian raids that have killed women and children, he said, and asked: "Why is a blast in Moscow, wounding 20 children, so much more serious than 20 deaths here after attacks by Russian planes?"

<P> Before we met, Basayev had not spoken to a foreign journalist for more than a year. For a while, the rebel leader tried his hand at politics, but returned to guerrilla warfare after failure in recent Chechen elections. His attempts to suggest that this bombing campaign is part of someone else's war are disingenuous.

<P> For the past year, Basayev has been organising an Islamic front to hound the Russians out of the Caucasus. As we spoke, armed fighters of varying nationalities moved about his base in the capital of the breakaway republic of Chechnya. Lorries were loaded with ammunition and explosives.

<P> Basayev made no attempt to conceal the fact that I had stumbled upon a scene straight from a Russian nightmare: a meeting of the international Islamist fighting force which he calls the United Armed Forces of Dagestani Mujahideen

<P> This is the group of religious warriors whose raids within the neighbouring republic of Dagestan over the past two months have provoked the violent Russian backlash in which scores of Dagestani have died. The rebels are accused of striking back by blowing up apartment blocks in Moscow and Volgograd this month.

nth, killing hundreds of Russians.

<P> The Islamist fighters are now here, in Basayev's base, to plan future operations in the war for Dagestan's "liberation" from Russia. "Chechens, Dagestanis, Turks, Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks" said Basayev of the rebels outside. "An international mujahideen force. Sooner or later, the Russians will be forced to leave the Caucasian region for ever. And the sooner they do, the better for them and us."

<P> Much of his time is spent travelling between training camps on the Chechen border, his native village of Veden and the Dagestan battlefields. When I met him, he was discussing military strategy with Khatab, his most trusted commander. Khatab, a native of Saudi Arabia, has been fighting Russians since the Afghan war, in which he lost part of his arm. His "Young Warriors' Centre" in the Chechen mountains has been called a "terrorist university".

<P> He rose to prominence in the 1994-96 Chechen war, which resulted in the republic's de facto independence. His band of fighters was the scourge of Russian military transport columns. No one has ever proved that Khatab has conducted terrorism against civilians. But he is full of dark hints. He said: "After what the Russians have launched in Dagestan, the responsibility must be borne not only by the soldiers but by the entire Russian nation, including women and children."

<P> "I shall train anybody willing to fight the Russians. Wherever Muslims are forced to fight for their freedom, I shall be there to help. What we see is a great religious conflict. The era of Russia is over." Khatab seemed less than impressed by the Russian military. He said: "They have their air force and all kinds of military hardware, but they do not have real soldiers. They lack spirit. They don't know what they're fighting for."

<P> Russian officials have repeatedly tried to establish a connection between Khatab and Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi accused of orchestrating a series of bombings against the United States. But Basayev and Khatab deny that their religious war has such a prosperous patron.

<P> Basayev said: "If bin Laden gave me \$25 million, as the story goes, would I be running all over the mountains fighting Russian troops? I'd buy up Russia, lock, stock and barrel. Everyone in Russia is corruptible. We're supposed to be in the pay of bin Laden, [the tycoon Boris] Berezovsky, the Yanks, the Hungarians and God knows who else. If we really had that kind of money, we would be fighting a very different kind of war, and victory would come much more easily."

<P> However, he remains convinced that victory and independence from Russia will come eventually. "The time of Russian supremacy over the Caucasus is nearing an end," he said before departing for the Dagestan border. "It is Russia th

at is to be blamed for all of our misfortunes, and the time has come for Russia to pay its dues."

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<P>Wall Street Journal

September 17, 1999

<P>Russia Deploys Troops In Battle To Control Oil-Pipeline Cart
el

<P>By Jeanne Whalen, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

<P> MOSCOW -- The Russian government deployed Interior Ministry troops in a sharp escalation of a struggle for control of the country's oil pipeline monopoly, one of the few prize oil industry assets still in state hands.

<P> Armed guards used chainsaws to break down the doors at Transneft, which controls the world's largest pipeline system and \$3 billion (2.88 billion euros) in consolidated annual revenues, and escort in a newly appointed president, Semyon Vainshtok, a former vice president of AO Lukoil, Russia's largest oil company. His predecessor was fired by the Kremlin Monday but had barricaded himself inside the building.

<P> Russia holds elections for a new Parliament in December and a new president

t next summer. The Kremlin and Russia's other political fractions are battling for control of cash-rich state monopolies that could influence the outcome of the elections.

<P> Oil industry analysts believe President Boris Yeltsin suspected ousted Transneft president, Dmitry Saveliev, of supporting an opposition political party called Pravoye Delo. Mr. Saveliev's dismissal is also seen as part of a complicated truce between rival oil magnates competing over Russia's energy riches. The ousted director says his removal was illegal.

<P> Intrigue and speculation have surrounded the abrupt change of command. Nikolai Aksyenenko, a first deputy prime minister who analysts say is close to tycoon Boris Berezovsky, signed the order to oust Mr. Saveliev while Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was in New Zealand on Monday. Mr. Putin, who returned to Moscow on Tuesday, has not yet publicly confirmed Mr. Vainshtok's appointment, leaving its legitimacy in question.

<P> Both Mr. Saveliev and Mr. Vainshtok said Thursday they were running the monopoly.

<P> "Today I began work as Transneft president," Mr. Vainshtok said at a news conference at the monopoly's headquarters as dozens of police officers stood guard outside. He said Mr. Putin had ordered him to immediately begin plans to construct a pipeline to carry Caspian Sea oil around the breakaway republic of Chechnya.

<P> Across town, Mr. Saveliev said he had been illegally dismissed without the consent of Transneft's board of directors.

<P> Transneft's dealings are notoriously murky. An attempt to sell one-quarter of the monopoly to employees in 1996 ended with former top managers gaining control of the 25% stake. The shares were later arrested, leaving the government the sole owner. But the monopoly has paid the government only one dividend in the past six years and has racked up 15 billion rubles (\$589 million or 566 million euros) in overdue taxes, according to Vladimir Staney, deputy minister of fuel and energy.

<P> The Kremlin's reasons for appointing Mr. Vainshtok are not immediately clear. He hails from Lukoil, a company tied through business dealings to Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a potential presidential candidate and enemy of the Kremlin's

<P> One oil analyst who asked not to be named said the appointment could represent a back-door deal between Lukoil and Mr. Berezovsky, a Kremlin insider who is believed to control the Sibneft oil company.

<P> In exchange for putting a Lukoil executive in charge of Transneft and potentially giving Lukoil more control over new pipeline construction projects, Mr. Berezovsky may have extracted a promise from Lukoil to stay away from coming oil privatizations that Sibneft hopes to win, the analyst said.

<P> A Lukoil spokesman denied that the company will gain any influence through Mr. Vainshtok's appointment, noting that Mr. Saveliev is also a former Lukoil manager.

<P> But Mr. Saveliev is also believed to be an ally of Pravoye Delo, a political party led by Boris Nemtsov, Anatoly Chubais and others who have fallen out with Mr. Yeltsin after helping lead Russia's market reforms. Mr. Saveliev was appointed Transneft president in June 1998 by former prime minister Sergei Kiriyenko, who is associated with Pravoye Delo.

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<P>Armed Forces Journal International

September 1999

Pg. 18

<P>The Accidental General

<I><P>How did a retired US Army ordnance officer and program analyst take command of an entire foreign military force?

</I><P>By Jason Sherman

<P> During his 27-year career, Col. John Kronkaitis held many important positions in the US Army's ordnance branch, but none pointed to the trajectory that his career would take after he retired from the military. Officers that oversee weapon systems' development and run military logistics operations, as he did, often end up working for "beltway bandits," as he did for a decade, analyzing Pentagon programs and formulating business strategies. It's fairly rare for a soldier with his background to then get recruited for a job, as he did, that involves sitting at a negotiating table during high-level State Department meetings and regularly playing host to the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and other senior western military bosses.

<P> But such are the things that fill this retired colonel's calendar these days. Actually, Kronkaitis, who left the Army in 1985, was pressed back into active-duty service this summer at the prompting of a president and promoted to brigadier general. While his new uniform remains green, the left shoulder does not bear the Ranger tab that Kronkaitis earned many years ago in a class with a young officer named Colin Powell; in its place is the Lithuanian flag. That's because the US officer who was once in charge of guided projectiles and cannon artillery weapon systems is now a Lithuanian general, and now commands all of that Baltic nation's military forces.

<P> For the last two years Kronkaitis, as a civilian, has been the Lithuanian vice minister of national defense. In June, the Lithuanian parliament approved Kronkaitis' appointment to the nation's top military post, a position that he did not actively seek, he told AFJ. He took it only after Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus (also an American) rejected the officer originally recommended for the top military job, and turned to Kronkaitis.

<P> "Six months ago I never dreamed that I would be back in uniform; I just never wanted to be in uniform again," he told AFJ. "This was a compromise situation."

<P> A "Credible Force"

<P> If going back on active duty was a compromise, Kronkaitis does not see any middle-of-the-road approach to his tasks in commanding the Lithuanian military. His primary objectives during this tour are to westernize Lithuania's rank-and-file and position the military as a strong candidate for NATO membership in 2001.

<P> "Lithuania is ahead in building a credible military force," he said. W

hile Lithuania plans to increase its spending on defense to two percent of its gross national product by 2001 (it's currently at 1.52 percent), its recent focus has been on personnel--specifically improving training and education. Based on the American model, Lithuania last year established a training and doctrine command, a facility "as modern as you will find anywhere in the US," that will eventually educate 8,000 students a year.

<P> A cadre of British Royal Marines were imported to provide the instruction for the first few waves of young soldiers--none of whom had training under the Soviet system imposed on Lithuania during the Cold War. "We wanted to have a break with the Soviet [system] and go western, completely," Kronkaitis said.

<P> The United Kingdom is likewise providing a handful of officers to revamp education at Lithuania's four-year military academy. Officers from Sandhurst, Britain's military academy, will teach both Lithuanian instructors and students on such subjects as the principles of military leadership. "We are reforming the academy because it was started primarily by Soviet-trained officers and they were teaching what they had been taught. And some of the things that they were teaching are not things that we want to teach," said Kronkaitis.

<P> Lithuania has configured its army as a light, rapid-reaction force. While the army is currently composed of 12,000 troops, the objective is to have a standing force of 23,000. By 2008 the nation will have 50,000 active reserve forces, and Lithuania plans to continue conscription until the reserve force is 250,000 strong. Lithuania's air force includes a half dozen L-39 fighter aircraft, a few helicopters, and transport aircraft. Its navy is made up of 600 sailors who operate two frigates, five patrol boats, a minesweeper, and a minehunter.

<P> "Right now we have a 12,000 member volunteer force that is prepared to lay mines, prepared to fight," said Kronkaitis. "A territorial defense means a mobile defense and all of Lithuania will be a battlefield. We don't expect to fight a linear battlefield because that would be self-destructive. But we will inflict maximum damage if attacked."

<P> Other Expats

<P> Kronkaitis is not the only former American military officer working in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, to revamp the armed forces there. Retired Marine Corps Col. Hal Garsys is overseeing reform of the military academy and retired Air Force Col. Rom Kilikauskas, a former intelligence officer, recently left his position as vice minister of internal affairs for border security and taken Kronkaitis' former post as vice minister of national defense. All of them received special dispensation from the US Senate, the State Department, and the secretaries of their respective military branches to take these Lithuanian jobs. All of them also maintain dual US-Lithuanian citizenship and continue to draw US military pensions (Kronkaitis is paid \$5,000 to lead Lithuania's military, he said).

<P> Born in Lithuania, Kronkaitis fled with his family to Germany in 1944, eventually arriving in the United States in 1949 at age 13. After making a career in the Army during the Cold War, he says it's still hard to believe that he's back in Lithuania, let alone leading its military: "Ten years ago I never dreamed I'd be back in Lithuania."

<P> The soft-spoken general said that putting a uniform back on has felt "very strange because it seems like I'm going backward." However disorienting that might be, he says the job is well worth it. "What is great about this opportunity is that I feel that I can make a contribution to help westernize the Lithuanian military and to help western concepts, ideals, and principles be accepted there. And the Lithuanians are very eager to do that. For the most part, the experience has been fantastic."

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<P>U.S. News & World Report

Sept. 27, 1999

<P>The Next Balkan War?

<I><P>Yugoslav republic of Montenegro confronts Belgrade with rumblings of independence

</I><P>By Philip Smucker

<P> CETINJE, MONTENEGRO Cafe owner, gasoline smuggler, and local hero Bobo Bogdanovic boasts to anyone who listens that he is a leader of a nascent Montenegrin army, whose aim is to oust Yugoslav troops from the republic's territory. "Our experience shows that nations without a strong defense are crushed in the first wave," he explains. So far, his only verifiable qualification is a recent beating at the hands of Serbian troops. State Department officials say they know nothing about him or his claim to have organized thousands of armed volunteers.

<P> Bogdanovic, for now, may be mostly Balkan bluster. But that doesn't mean the emerging face-off over the future of tiny Montenegro, part of the loose Yugoslav federation with Serbia, won't turn deadly. Montenegro's young reformist president, Milo Djukanovic, is openly toying with calling a vote on independence, a brazen challenge to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Up to now, Milosevic has ignored Djukanovic's proposal for a much looser confederation, even as Montenegro's parliament convened last week to consider authorizing a referendum on independence. And while Montenegro mulls over creating its own currency, Serbian troops are enforcing a new trade blockade against Montenegro.

<P> A 37-year-old former Milosevic henchman known popularly as "Milo the Blade," Djukanovic established himself as a democrat, becoming increasingly outspoken against Milosevic as the conflict in Kosovo wore on. He supported his cabinet members who dodged the Yugoslav draft and accused the Serbs of war crimes. "Milosevic's dictatorship is a cancer that has spread to every segment of social life," he told a recent gathering in northern Montenegro.

<P> Better position. Any declaration of independence would be vehemently opposed by Milosevic and could spark yet another Balkan civil war. But compared with the Kosovar Albanians, the Montenegrins are in a better position to mount a defense. Djukanovic controls a 33,000-strong police force armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles. And a significant portion of the 20,000 Yugoslav forces inside Montenegro hail from the republic, putting their loyalty to Milosevic in doubt.

<P> Milosevic has tried to take on Djukanovic, denying his political allies their elected posts in Belgrade. This circumvention of the Yugoslav Constitution has won Djukanovic more support, but Montenegro remains divided over independence. By encouraging militancy, some critics say, Djukanovic is only toying with national aspirations and exaggerating the threat from Belgrade while strengthening his political grip over the republic. Djukanovic clearly hopes to take advantage of the political uncertainty gripping Belgrade. He has carefully courted the West with legal and economic reforms and been rewarded with oblique warnings to Milosevic about a NATO response to any repression. But nervous U.S. officials have been urging caution, fearing another Balkan war that could drag them in.

<I><P> With Kevin Whitelaw in Washington</I>

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<P>Washington Post

September 20, 1999

Pg. 13

<P>FBI's Expertise Gets Emotional Test In Kosovo

<I><P>Relatives Help Bureau Make IDs at Mass Graves

</I><P>By David A. Vise and Lorraine Adams, Washington Post Staff Writers

<P> It wasn't a typical crime site for the FBI: a shallow grave in Kosovo with a single extended family of 23 ethnic Albanians, ranging in age from a 2-year-old boy to a 94-year-old woman, slaughtered and buried together.

<P> Federal Bureau of Investigation forensics experts returned from Kosovo last week after recovering gruesome evidence of the murder of that family as well as 101 other men, women and children.

<P> The information compiled by FBI officials will be submitted to prosecutors investigating war crimes by Serbs against ethnic Albanians for the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Unlike typical homicide probes in the United States, FBI officials said they were surrounded by surviving family members and friends of the dead, who assisted in making positive identification of the disfigured corpses based on clothing, jewelry and other personal items.

<P> The FBI discovered young children who died from blunt force trauma, adults with slit throats, bodies buried beneath dead cattle, and terrified survivors whose lives will never be the same.

<P> "It is very emotional," said Arthur R. Eberhart, section chief of the FBI's laboratory division. "I'll always remember looking into the eyes of a 6-year-old boy. I was giving him a piece of a candy and the fear was still there in his eyes."

<P> The FBI-led group of more than 60 experts--who took photographs and videos and made sketches of the massacre that can be used to support the testimony of witnesses--also included anthropologists and pathologists. They were able to positively identify about 100 of the 124 corpses, according to Donald M. Kerr, head of the FBI's laboratory.

<P> While exhuming bodies in a war-torn region is not the FBI's day-to-day focus, Kerr said the bureau's role in Kosovo illustrates one of the important ways that its specialized skills can be utilized.

<P> "We are kind of proud of our ability to do it," Kerr said. "We have evidence-response teams trained and equipped" that "can work a crime scene quickly and efficiently."

<P> Kerr said he viewed the FBI's work in support of the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic and others as a logical next step following NATO military operations earlier this year aimed at halting genocide in Yugoslavia. "We think it was important for the FBI to be present and do this work," Kerr said.

<P> Some of the deceased, who had feared they would be discovered if they built fires, wore as many as five to eight layers of clothing in an effort to stay warm, according to William C. Rodriguez III, chief deputy medical examiner with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Some bullets passed through the clothing, providing the FBI with valuable evidence it can use to perform ballistics tests. Most of the victims, however, died from gunshot wounds to the head, he said.

<P> The FBI will perform some additional tests on the evidence it gathered

ered before sending it along to The Hague, where agents could be asked to testify in a war crimes trial.

<P> While the FBI discovered bodies at 21 sites, the largest single grave uncovered bore the remains of 23 members of a single extended family buried north of Pristina. The family apparently had been hiding in the woods. In the grave, the FBI discovered the remains of a young boy wearing a red snow suit, a baby bottle and baby shoes.

<P> Elsewhere, another woman was able to identify her husband after telling FBI agents that he had been with a man who was wearing a Chicago Bears jacket, had a watch with a broken face and 50 German marks in his pocket.

<P> "The bodies were beyond recognition," said Dwight E. Adams, assistant director of the FBI's laboratory division. "We identified the individual with the Chicago Bears jacket. A woman about 80 said to me, 'My husband was with that man.' "

<P> Adams said he gave the woman the broken watch to keep.

<P> "She kept saying, 'Yes, yes, yes,' " Adams recalled. " 'You found my husband.' "

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<P>European Stars and Stripes

Sept. 19, 1999

Pg. 3

<P>U.S. Confident Of Peaceful KLA Disarmament

<P>By Sally Roberts, Macedonia bureau

<P> CAMP BONDSTEEL, Kosovo Its business as usual for U.S. forces in Kosovo . Or at least it appears that way. The commander of U.S. forces in Kosovo says U.S. soldiers will meet any disturbances as the Kosovo Liberation Army transforms into a civilian organization in the same manner they have displayed throughout the mission in Kosovo.

<P> "The fair and equal treatment that our soldiers display on a daily basis has earned the respect, understanding and trust of the Kosovars," said Brig. Gen. Craig Peterson, commander of Task Force Falcon, the U.S. arm of the NATO-led peacekeeping force.

<P> U.S. troops have "demonstrated through thought, word, action and deed that they are trustworthy, that they are fair and that we are here to promote and create a safe and secure environment for all Kosovars, regardless of ethnic origin," Peterson said.

<P> No one knows what to expect when the "K+90" deadline arrives at midnight on Sunday. "K plus 90" stands for the 90 days that have passed since the NATO-led force entered the province and began its peacekeeping mission. But KFOR officials say they are confident the KLA leadership has convinced its ranks to accept the deadline for disarming peacefully.

<P> "We're asking a lot of [the KLA] to transition into civilian life and a civilian humanitarian organization. We're asking an awful lot of these people after 90 days to stop the violence," Peterson said. "However, we cannot condone the backlash or the violence that's being conducted here now."

<P> Officials would not discuss details of any changes to their operations in preparation to the K+90 deadline. On Saturday, KFOR patrols appeared to be going on as usual, and Kosovars met in market places as they do every Saturday.

<P> "We're confident that they will be compliant. But we're prepared for noncompliance as well," Peterson said.

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<P>Los Angeles Times

September 18, 1999

<P>Kosovo's Ex-Rebels In No Man's Land

<I><P>Yugoslavia: As demilitarization approaches, thousands
of fighters face lives without civilian jobs they once had.

</I><P>By Scott Martelle, Times Staff Writer

<P> PRISTINA, Yugoslavia--When war ended in his homeland three months ago,
rebel Kosovo Liberation Army fighter Ali Mustafa made a unilateral decision to
disarm.

<P> He went home.

<P> "I decided to come back to my normal life," Mustafa said this week duri
ng a break from his job at the combination sawmill and garage that he and his f
our brothers run here in the provincial capital of Kosovo. "My brothers are car
penters, and they couldn't work without me."

<P> With the bulk of Mustafa's former KLA comrades facing formal demilitari

zation Sunday, international peacekeepers say the reintegration of the rebel soldiers into civilian life will be a key step in the return of stability to the separatist province.

<P> Yet, 90 days after NATO peacekeepers moved into Kosovo, about 10,700 KLA fighters remain in limbo, no longer soldiers but, for the most part, not yet regular civilians, facing lives without the jobs they once had, a clear future or even habitable homes to return to.

<P> As many as 3,000 former KLA fighters may be absorbed into a largely weaponless "Kosovo Corps," a national guard-style force that will begin screening applicants Monday, the day after the scheduled demobilization. The controversial U.N.-organized corps is also supposed to include 2,000 part-time members.

<P> Several hundred more former KLA fighters are expected to become civilian administrators, police officers--65 KLA members are in the first class of 200 of officers being trained by U.N. personnel--firefighters and ambulance workers, all under the direction of the U.N.-run civilian administration.

<P> That leaves half the KLA, and about 40,000 civilian dependents, without any source of income. International aid workers hope that a planned \$15-million jobs program will help ease that crunch.

<P> The guerrillas came from all sections of Kosovo life, according to a recent study--conducted by the International Organization for Migration--of 8,982 ethnic Albanians who registered with the peacekeeping mission as former KLA combatants.

<P> And most want to resume those lives, with only 30% hoping to work as soldiers or police officers. In fact, nearly half those interviewed said they joined the KLA this year, and only one in 10 belonged to the KLA before 1998. More than one-third were unemployed when they joined, and about 24% were self-employed, including farmers, while 12% were students and 6% were teachers.

<P> The KLA was also a young army, with 78% of the guerrillas 29 or younger. Half were single, but in a culture that embraces extended families, each former fighter helps support an average of eight other family members.

<P> Yet in a society that has endured a decade of official oppression, the KLA has assumed a stature far beyond its limited military accomplishments.

<P> Supporters acknowledge that, without the intercession of NATO forces, the KLA probably would have been destroyed by the Yugoslav army. Still, the rebel force is revered as freedom fighters. As such, many Albanians believe, the KLA should continue to exist.

<P> "Kosovo needs the KLA," said Fatmir Dobruna, a truck driver from the rural village of Lozica, between Pristina and the western city of Pec.

<P> Dobruna and his brother Fazli form the core of an extended family of 15 who lived in two adjacent houses until ethnic Serbian paramilitary groups burned one and bulldozed the other. Now the family members live in a single ground-floor room as they try to repair the extensive damage from the fire, which gutted the house.

<P> Dobruna said that, as he and his family fled the fighting during the war, he was stabbed twice by Serbian paramilitary fighters who also robbed him of 5,000 German marks (about \$3,000) before killing six fellow villagers who had no money. Now, he said, ethnic tensions remain a danger in Kosovo, despite the presence of tens of thousands of NATO troops.

<P> "I was driving through [the Serbian enclave of] Gracanica 15 days ago, and the Serbs threw stones and bricks and broke all the windows in my truck," Dobruna said.

<P> But the idea of an ethnic Albanian force in this troubled province, however defanged, angers Serbian authorities. Yugoslav and Russian officials have condemned the plan for the Kosovo Corps on grounds that it doesn't meet the requirements for a fully demobilized KLA.

<P> On Wednesday, officials with the NATO-led force in Kosovo, known as KFOR, insisted again that the group will be limited to working on rebuilding and responding to natural disasters. Only 200 members will be authorized to carry as-yet-unspecified weapons to provide security at corps project sites.

<P> "This will not be a defense force--it will certainly not be an army--and it will not have any role in law enforcement, riot control, counter-terrorism or any other task involved in the maintenance of law and order," said Maj. Ole Ir gens, a KFOR spokesman.

<P> But many ethnic Albanians, including key members of the self-declared, KLA-dominated Kosovo provisional government, see the corps as part of a transition to a military for a future free Kosovo.

<P> "In five years, Kosovo will be independent, and it will have a military like every other country," said Mehmet Hajrizi, deputy prime minister in the provisional government.

<P> Rexhep Selimi, a former KLA fighter and now the provisional government's

s minister of public order, said the only way to ensure Kosovo's future stability is to split it off from Yugoslavia. Kosovo is a province of Serbia, the dominant Yugoslav republic.

<P> "No other solution is possible," he said. "I believe in the future that independent Kosovo will have an army. The Kosovo Corps could be converted into an army if in the future it is decided it is necessary."

<P> KFOR officials, however, insist that Kosovo Albanians will have to be satisfied with living under the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which officially considers Kosovo still to be under Yugoslav sovereignty.

<P> "Any sort of quasi-military force is not acceptable to the international community at this point," said James Kenney, spokesman for the U.S. mission in Kosovo. "What they have to come to terms with is that in the short term and the long term, the security of Kosovo is going to be provided by KFOR."

<P> Irgens said peacekeepers will react "robustly" if KLA soldiers try to continue as a fighting force after Sunday despite their agreement with NATO forces to dissolve.

<P> "Any attempts by [the KLA] in forming any military or paramilitary group in Kosovo will be seen as noncompliance and be treated as such," including with arrests and confiscation of weapons, he said.

<P> But even Pec's sole Roman Catholic priest, a rare figure in a culture dominated by Muslim Albanians and Orthodox Serbs, fears the future without some form of the KLA.

<P> "If the KLA is demilitarized, then the problems will start all over again," Father Albert Krista said. "If Kosovo goes back to the state it was before [as part of Yugoslavia], then the paramilitaries will emerge again."

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<P>Washington Post

September 18, 1999

Pg. 15

<P>For Embattled Serbs, Living With Albanians May Mean Living A
part

<I><P>Kosovo's Bitter Divide

</I><P>By Daniel Williams, Washington Post Foreign Service

<P> PRISTINA, Yugoslavia Three months after the war, the dwindling number of
Serbs who remain in Kosovo are concentrated in tense enclaves that more and mo
re resemble permanent ghettos.

<P> In these places, the Serbs are watchful and suspicious. As they see it,
a flood of hostile ethnic Albanians is set on invading their fragile refuges.
Embittered men, some veterans of the province's ethnic conflict, sit at cafes e
yeing passersby with suspicion. Ethnic Albanians enter at their own risk.

<P> Outside the Serbian enclaves, the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Arm
y (KLA), which fought Yugoslav and Serbian security forces during a 16-month wa
r for independence, virtually runs the province as a separate armed force along
side NATO-led peacekeepers and the United Nations. Although the KLA is slated t
o be demilitarized by Sunday, its leaders plan on pursuing power in Kosovo thro
ugh involvements in politics, the police and a quasi-military civil defense bri
gade.

<P> Across Kosovo, every encounter between Serbs and ethnic Albanians, the

victims of brutal expulsions by Belgrade security forces during the war, is potentially explosive. In eastern Kosovo, Serbian and ethnic Albanian villages are virtually at war with one another. Drive-by shootings, perpetrated by both communities, are common. Kidnapping makes road travel hazardous, especially for the Serbs.

<P> It is a condition that threatens the professed Western goal of establishing a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, and even the viability of the NATO-led peacekeeping mission that entered the Serbian province in June after a 78-day allied bombing campaign. The emerging reality is that peace prevails only in areas where Serbs and ethnic Albanians are fully segregated.

<P> This has led some Serbs to suggest that separation, at least for the foreseeable future, is the only way for the groups to live together within Kosovo. "Why try to apply the concept of tolerance to people who are intolerant?" said Dusan Batakovic, a political activist in Belgrade, the Yugoslav and Serbian capital, who has proposed creating five self-governing Serbian districts based on the existing ethnic patchwork.

<P> The United States and NATO have rejected the idea on the grounds that it would effectively seal the province's partition. Ethnic Albanian and Serbian nationalists also have objected to the proposal because each group wants all the territory--for the ethnic Albanians, as an independent Kosovo; for the Serbs, as part of Serb-dominated Yugoslavia.

<P> Even so, Kosovo is already divided along deep ethnic lines. In town after town, Serbs have fled their homes and been expelled from hospitals, factories, mines, schools and other public facilities in ethnic Albanian-controlled areas. Albanians are barred from such places that exist in Serb enclaves.

<P> In the northern city of Kosovska Mitrovica, fear and hostility have produced a dangerous standoff. Serbs have blocked a bridge over the Ibar River that divides the city in half--one section almost exclusively Serbian, the other ethnic Albanian. Efforts by irate ethnic Albanian youths to storm the Serbian enclave turned violent last week for the third time since NATO peacekeepers occupied Mitrovica in June. Stone throwing and gunfire wounded dozens on both sides, and French troops patrolling the banks were hit by rocks and shrapnel from a grenade.

<P> "Our situation is bad," said Oliver Ivanovic, a former policeman and karate teacher who heads a Belgrade-approved council of Serbs in Mitrovica that acts as a local government. "Our relations with Albanians can't be fixed, even if we had contact. NATO thinks it has the power to fix it, but first, everyone needs protection, and they can't provide that."

<P> International observers estimate the number of Serbs in Kosovo at 97,000, about half the prewar population, when Serbs accounted for approximately 10

percent of the province's 1.8 million inhabitants. Some estimates put the current number as low as 50,000.

<P> Serbs are mainly concentrated in Kosovska Mitrovica; in villages to the north, closer to the border with Serbia proper; in and around Kosovo Polje and Gracanica south of Pristina, the provincial capital; in the east around the town of Gnjilane; and in the town of Strpce near the Macedonian border.

<P> Before the war, Pristina was home to about 30,000 Serbs. That population has shrunk to less than 2,000. Serbian apartment houses there have become tense islands of fear. Scattered Serbian high-rises are under 24-hour a day guard by U.N. police and NATO troops. Empty Serbian apartments are frequently raided and occupied by homeless ethnic Albanians. No one dares leave common entrances open, for fear that someone will lay a bomb on a staircase. Last week, one blew up, killing a Serbian man. Shoppers sometimes travel as far as Gracanica--about 10 miles away--rather than risk venturing onto Pristina's streets.

<P> Mitrovica, a drab, gray mining and industrial town, has become a symbol of Serbian resistance. For fear of clashes, NATO tolerated the division of the city. French troops occasionally escort ethnic Albanians into the district to inspect homes they abandoned when forced into exile during the war.

<P> At the Dolce Vita Cafe on the Serbian side of the bridge, men with time on their hands pass the days sipping beer and looking out the corner of their eyes across the river. They refer to the Albanians as "hordes."

<P> "Do you think we could cross over there?" asked one. "An individual Albanian can come--you see, there goes one--but not the hordes."

<P> Said another: "NATO wants to make us like American Indians in reservations."

<P> Serbian refugees from other parts of Kosovo occupy apartments in Mitrovica abandoned by ethnic Albanians. One such occupant is Jelena Mitrovic, a homemaker who fled Vucitrn, a town 15 miles to the southeast, when ethnic Albanians burned her house down. She said she spends her days visiting acquaintances from her hometown. "What is there to do? We don't even have a movie theater here," she said. "I can't go to Pristina. The Albanians would eat me alive."

<P> Elsewhere in the province, dozens of kidnappings have made Serbs wary of travel. Two weeks ago in Gracanica, Serbs blocked the main road from Pristina to Gnjilane to protest a kidnapping. The man had driven to the countryside to collect firewood. He was the fourth kidnap victim from the town.

<P> NATO troops permitted the blockade, in part because other roads to Gnjilane

lane are still open. The peacekeepers also fear riots and attacks on ethnic Albanians who might use the road.

<P> At an open-air town meeting, the local British commander, Col. Bill Cubitt, tried to defuse tensions over the kidnapping. He announced that NATO was working with the KLA to resolve the case. The crowd howled. "Why not arrest the KLA? They're responsible," shouted one spectator.

<P> Perhaps the most forlorn of Serbian ghettos lies inside Orahovac, a town in southwestern Kosovo dominated by ethnic Albanians who were expelled to Albania during the war. About 3,000 Serbs remain, because their escape routes passed through ethnic Albanian towns and villages, where they feared the rage of returned refugees.

<P> Now they are further cut off from the world by an ethnic Albanian protest against a NATO decision to dispatch Russian peacekeepers to protect the Serbs in Orahovac. The KLA, which accuses the Russians of a pro-Serb bias, organized a blockade of two entrances to the town with trucks, tractors and barbed wire. Outsiders must take a mile detour to get in after passing through KLA document inspection. The KLA has refused repeated NATO requests to lift the blockade.

<P> The Serbs live on a steep hillside, overlooking their shops and homes that have been sacked and burned in retaliation for the torching and smashing of Albanian property during the war. Even if the Russians arrive, most of the Serbs say they will not stay. "Once we leave, we'll never come back. That's the way it is in the Balkans," said Lyubomir Labovic, a farmer who took refuge in Orahovac from an outlying village.

<P> The Serbs produced an exhibit to explain the terror they feel: Milica Gorkovic, a widow who said her husband was scalped and killed in June by vengeful ethnic Albanians. Said Sveta Jovicic, a retiree: "Tell someone to come get us out of here."

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<P>New York Times

September 18, 1999

<P>Popular Kosovar Politician Calls For U.N. Representation

<P>By Barbara Crossette

<P> UNITED NATIONS -- The political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army said Friday that the Kosovo Albanians want to be represented at the United Nations, one more step toward their goal of complete independence from Serbian-led Yugoslavia.

<P> "There can be no democracy if Kosovo is left under Serbia," said Hashim Thaci, the prime minister of a self-proclaimed provisional government of Kosovo and commander in chief of its Kosovo Liberation Army, which is being regrouped into a civilian guard to be called the Kosovo Corps.

<P> Speaking at a news conference, Thaci, who was at the United Nations to meet with Secretary General Kofi Annan, a meeting that was canceled without explanation, and with Richard C. Holbrooke, the American representative, was sharply critical of Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the Secretary General's representative in Kosovo. The United Nations is in charge of administering the territory after the NATO bombing campaign that drove out Serbian forces.

<P> Thaci said that Dr. Kouchner was not doing enough to prevent the partition of Kosovo, under pressure from the remaining Serbs. In general, he said, Albanians were being sidelined.

<P> "We'd better point fingers and say that this has been done by Kouchner," he said, speaking through an interpreter. "We are not allowed to give our contribution, which would be very valuable."

<P> Thaci's Minister of Information, Bajram Kosumi, was more pointed.

<P> "Kouchner and the United Nations mission behave as if the people of Kosovo

sovo were at their service, and not the United Nations and Kouchner trying to help the people of Kosovo," he said.

<P> Kosumi also said that Dr. Kouchner, a former French Health Minister and founder of Doctors Without Borders, was too close to Kosovars who had worked in the past with President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia. Dr. Kouchner also allowed Yugoslav law to remain in force in Kosovo, he said.

<P> An American diplomat said after Thaci's meeting with Holbrooke that the American representative had expressed strong support for Dr. Kouchner, whom he has praised repeatedly in public in recent weeks. Thaci told Holbrooke that his soldiers would comply with the demilitarization soon to be completed, and was committed to establishing democracy.

<P> Thaci, 29, whom a diplomat described as a romantic figure with great appeal in Kosovo, is known to have political ambitions, although he has been slow in forming a political organization despite the urging of his foreign supporters, including Secretary of State Madeleine K.

<P> Albright.

<P> He is also expected to try to use the Kosovo Corps as the base on which to build a national army. Today he described the corps as an essential element of sovereignty "for the people of Kosovo and for Kosovo itself."

<P> Before an international audience at his news conference, Thaci pledged that Kosovo would be a democratic nation, with respect for human rights, a free media and democratic institutions. "As soon as possible, we will have free and democratic elections," he said. He refused to discuss allegations that the Kosovars were increasingly factionalized or that his Kosovo Liberation Army engaged in summary executions of dissidents, except to say that newspaper reports about these issues were not based on evidence.

<P> Pressed to explain whether his plans for an independent Kosovo were in violation of the Security Council resolution setting up the United Nations mission in Kosovo, which recognized the territory as still belonging to Yugoslavia, Thaci said that was the case for the transition period to local civilian rule, not for the indefinite future.

<P> "The Yugoslavs should finally come to the realization that the future of Kosovo will be decided in Kosovo proper," he said.

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<P>Los Angeles Times

September 17, 1999

<P>Enfeebled Currency Could Bring Down Milosevic

<I><P>Yugoslavia: As dinar tumbles, hyperinflation looms. S
uch a blow to an already battered economy would increase chance of widespread d
issent.

</I><P>By Paul Watson, Times Staff Writer

<P> BELGRADE, Yugoslavia--Of all the forces threatening to bring down Yugo
slav President Slobodan Milosevic, the country's weak currency may be the most
powerful.

<P> Over the past several days, the value of the Yugoslav dinar on the bl
ack market has started to drop sharply. If it collapses altogether, Milosevic--
a skilled political survivor--may finally face the kind of widespread and unifi
ed dissent that could threaten his rule.

<P> A similar currency crisis in 1993 set off months of hyperinflation so
severe that prices in dinars soared by more than 1,000,000% a month, according
to the respected London-based Economist Intelligence Unit. But Milosevic was r
escued by a smart central banker named Dragoslav Avramovic.

<P> Avramovic is now firmly entrenched among Milosevic's political enemies, the country's economic ruin is much worse after 78 days of NATO airstrikes last spring, and opposition leaders have called a general strike and daily protests to start Tuesday.

<P> So Milosevic is likely to need more than an economic wizard to save him if the dinar's slide leads to another crash, as several economists are warning it will.

<P> "We are facing a big danger of hyperinflation, which could start by the end of this year or early next," said Mladjan Dinkic, who heads an opposition movement of independent economists called the Group of 17.

<P> 1999 Inflation Will Hit 70%, Expert Says

<P> Dinkic predicted that Yugoslavia's annual inflation rate will hit at least 70% this year, and then worsen as the dinar's value drops and Milosevic's government prints more money in a desperate attempt to quell social unrest.

<P> While prices climb in Yugoslavia, industrial production plummets. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's air campaign, years of international economic sanctions against the country and Milosevic's economic mismanagement have combined to cut factory output, which has been falling for years, by an additional 36% in the first seven months of this year.

<P> After NATO airstrikes destroyed fuel refineries in the Yugoslav republic of Serbia, gas smuggling became a way of life for many Serbs. They fill up cars and trucks from plastic soda bottles at curbside stands.

<P> But over the past few days, police raids have forced many of the black-market gas dealers out of business, driving up fuel prices and making it even harder to find fuel.

<P> A 45-minute search for diesel one day this week in the district of New Belgrade led to a watermelon stand where a Serbian woman, dressed in widow black and sitting in an old car seat, had a few gallons of fuel stashed among her fruit.

<P> Milika Djokovic, who with his four Montenegrin brothers runs central Belgrade's only legal currency exchange booth, has seen the first hints of panic in the faces of his customers, who come to buy German marks as a hedge against hyperinflation.

<P> "People are scared that it might happen again, thus contributing to it," said Djokovic, 26. "In this country, you never really know until it hits you."

<P> When hyperinflation struck six years ago, Yugoslav merchants raised prices by the minute, and most people watched their incomes drop just as quickly. The government tried to keep up by printing more cash.

<P> One bank note, which had a face value of 500 billion dinars in 1993, is worthless today--except maybe as a souvenir of the Milosevic regime's earlier years.

<P> "People were trading dinars [for German marks] minutes after they got them," Djokovic said. "Otherwise, they would be worthless. But the situation was still easier then because people had savings."

<P> "You'd sell 100 German marks for a sack full of money," he added. "By the time you got it home, it was worth only 50 German marks."

<P> The war with NATO, with its destruction of workplaces and loss of jobs, forced so many Serbs to dig into their savings that Milosevic faces a much harder time keeping a lid on social unrest if hyperinflation strikes again.

<P> Far short of enough cash to meet the demands of unpaid teachers, soldiers, pensioners and a growing list of other workers, the government is printing more money again, which forces down the currency's value and drives up inflation.

<P> At the official exchange rate, one German mark buys only six dinars. But the government has pegged the dinar's value so unrealistically high, and the hard currency is in such short supply, that a black market is thriving.

<P> Sidewalk money changers, known as "crickets" because of the sound they make quietly chirping for customers, dropped the dinar's value late last week from 11 to the mark to 14. Dinkic expects the dinar's street value to shrink an additional 30% by year's end.

<P> Money in Circulation Is Up 15% Since War

<P> Since Yugoslavia's war with NATO ended three months ago, the amount of money in circulation has jumped 15% to 14.2 billion dinars, or just more than \$1 billion at today's black-market rate, Dinkic told reporters here Monday

<P> The government has poured 600 million dinars, or about \$43 million, into the market since the beginning of this month alone.

<P> The currency crisis is adding to fears that, after eight years of bloody disintegration, Yugoslavia may break up again.

<P> Montenegro--the smaller republic that, along with Serbia, is all that remains of Yugoslavia--is weighing whether to dump the dinar and create its own currency pegged to the German mark.

<P> The Montenegrins have already threatened to hold a referendum on independence if Milosevic doesn't agree to a radically weaker federal government, which authorities in Belgrade, the Serbian and Yugoslav capital, have declared impossible.

<P> Although Kosovo is still technically a part of Serbia, the German mark is already the currency of choice in the province, and money changers sniff at Yugoslav dinars.

<P> Milosevic's failed war for control of Kosovo and his nation's continuing economic collapse should have already made the Yugoslav leader an easy target for the opposition trying to unseat him.

<P> But Milosevic's political enemies are feuding among themselves over tactics, leaving ordinary Serbs deeply cynical about whether any politician can peacefully lead them out of the mess.

<P> Avramovic, the central bank chief who is credited with saving the country and Milosevic's political skin in January 1994, is now the favorite to replace him among the opposition leaders who support a government of technocrats.

<P> But Milosevic has ignored demands that he hand over power to an interim government and has suggested early elections instead. The opposition is split on whether to take him up on the offer or try to force him out of office.

<P> "We don't believe in street protests as the way to topple Milosevic," Ivan Kovacevi, a deputy leader of Vuk Draskovic's widely popular Serbian Renewal Movement, said Tuesday.

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<P>Dallas Morning News

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>Chemical Threat From Weapons Haunts Panama

<I><P>Testing remnants safe, some say

</I><P>By Tod Robberson / The Dallas Morning News

<P> SAN JOSE ISLAND, Panama - The cascading waterfalls, thick jungle canopies and cawing tropical birds on this Pacific island could represent a gold mine for Otto Probst, if only some pesky metal objects didn't keep getting in his way.

<P> With a whack of his machete, the 69-year-old Panamanian developer demonstrated how easy it is to uncover one of thousands of chemical-bomb remnants that have littered San Jose Island since the U.S. military concluded a testing program here in the late 1940s. Mr. Probst says the remnants are harmless. Others aren't so sure.

<P> According to U.S. military documents, many of the chlorine- and mustard-gas bombs tested in the 1940s did not explode when they were launched but instead plowed into the ground, where they may still lie hidden by the island's thick jungle. Although the United States insists it cleaned up the island before departing in January 1948, it will not guarantee that San Jose is free of lethal agents.

<P> Chemical-weapons specialists say that if chemical gas were still contained in such bombs, it could still be lethal. Whether such concerns are justified, Mr. Probst says, the mere notion is scaring off potential investors and visitors to an otherwise impressive oceanside resort that he plans to open in the next few months.

<P> San Jose is only one of several sites where the Panamanian government and private developers hope to reap millions of dollars from investments on territories now being vacated by the U.S. military. Under the 1979 Panama Canal treaties, all U.S. bases must be handed back to Panama by Dec. 31.

<P> Despite suspicions that serious dangers still lurk in the soil across big swaths of formerly U.S.-occupied land, the Panamanian government is proceeding with plans to sell buildings and develop tracts where chemical and nerve weapons were tested, toxic wastes abandoned and cancer-causing herbicides such as Agent Orange were once used.

<P> U.S. officials insist there is no written record available to show if or where any such materials were left in Panama.

<P> Pros and cons

<P> Without such a record, Panamanian government officials are grappling with difficult choices as they weigh the potential economic benefits of developing the reverted territories vs. the environmental hazards those same sites might hold.

<P> The development income is viewed as crucial to Panama's economic survival now that the United States, a chief source of jobs and income, is pulling out. But officials say Panama has no hope of luring tourists and investors if it gains an international reputation as having been a U.S. toxic-waste dumping ground. They are proceeding with development plans while quietly attempting to work out a solution with the United States to clean up contaminated sites.

<P> Mr. Probst received permission in June to proceed with his development project, though he said the United States repeatedly has refused to give him written assurances that the island is safe. One U.S. official, who asked not to be identified, described Mr. Probst's plans as "really scary."

<P> "These are everywhere here," Mr. Probst said as his machete produced sparks upon striking the iron carcass of one disabled bomb. After spending the last two decades probing the length and breadth of San Jose, he concluded, "I don't think there was any place on this island where the tests did not happen." Even so, he said he has never found a live bomb among the debris nor does he believe any danger remains.

<P> At another commercial site under development, an eco-tourism resort complex at Gamboa, on the banks of the Panama Canal, former U.S. and Panamanian canal workers say Agent Orange was sprayed regularly in the 1970s to control aquatic plants that posed a potential threat to navigation.

<P> Near the canal's Caribbean outlet, where more projects are being planned, the U.S. military repeatedly sprayed one area with Agent Orange during training exercises for soldiers of the Army's 8th Special Forces, say civilian and military witnesses. The widow of one soldier who died after being exposed to Agent Orange at the site is receiving service-related death benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs. At least two other Agent Orange cases from Panama are under review.

<P> Just down the road from the Gamboa resort, which already is being advertised to U.S. and European tourists, the Panama Canal Commission, a U.S. agency until Dec. 31, continues to maintain an explosives depot used for construction projects. It also maintains an unlined, open-pit dump for discarded industrial lubricants barely 100 yards from Gatun Lake, which feeds into the canal.

<P> A canal official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said both sites have been operated by the canal commission for many years and that the explosives depot meets all U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standards. As for the lubricant dump, she said, the commission plans to spend \$500,000 to clean up the site and build a new recycling center.

<P> "They realize it shouldn't be there," the official said. "We're getting rid of it."

<P> Dump sites

<P> Elsewhere in the former Canal Zone, a national park has been established in an area where, according to witnesses and U.S. government records, chemical weapons and other toxic wastes were buried after the San Jose project shut down. One Panamanian witness, who asked not to be identified, said he was present at the site when "soldiers in blue-plastic suits with hoods" placed scores of unmarked containers into a lined pit during the early 1970s.

<P> At another location on the banks of Gatun Lake, Panama plans to develop university research facilities at a jungle site where VX nerve-gas tests occurred during the late 1960s, said Fernando Manfredo, chief of a Panamanian government team assigned to work with the U.S. government on environmental issues.

<P> He said he has been unable to get answers from the U.S. government about the possibility that unexploded canisters of nerve agent remain in the jungle

. In the meantime, the Interoceanic Regional Authority, or ARI, the government agency responsible for selling or renting U.S.-reverted lands, continues to sell or lease such sites.

<P> "ARI is very worried that we're giving the impression that all of these areas under our control are contaminated. For that reason, we have kept these reports secret for a very long time," Mr. Manfredo said, holding a list of sites where U.S. chemical and nerve weaponry was either tested or dumped.

<P> Arnoldo Cano, the ARI director of administration for reverted lands, said the environmental concerns are not justified, though he acknowledged that ARI has conducted only a few tests on isolated sites to determine whether contamination was evident. He said it is up to the United States to disclose whether the sites are contaminated.

<P> At one site where ARI suspects the U.S. military dumped toxic wastes and chemical weaponry, Mr. Cano said, the amount of money the Panamanian government would have to spend just to prove that contamination exists would be prohibitive.

<P> "The problem is, when you do the testing, you have to know what you're looking for so you can test for it," he said. "They don't admit the presence of chemical weapons, so it makes it harder for us to test for it."

<P> Danger analysis

<P> Last week, Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Aleman announced plans for a \$1.6 million study just to determine the level of danger posed by unexploded ordnance being left behind on 8,000 acres of bombing ranges used by the U.S. military near the Panama Canal.

<P> "The Panamanian government has not yet carried out a study, and I think that it is our duty to do so," he told the Reuters news agency. "The U.S. obligation is to return national territory free of these devices. We have to make sure that the treaty is being complied with to the letter."

<P> At least seven Panamanians and one U.S. serviceman have been killed by unexploded ordnance since 1984. What is troubling to some observers is the possibility that similar dangers may exist in places such as San Jose Island, where tourists may soon be exploring the jungles.

<P> "Decades after the fact, chemical weapons have been dredged up and dug up [from World War II battlefields] in Europe, and they are still very, very potent," said Dr. Amy Smithson, senior associate of the chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation project at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington. "

If we are talking about a nerve agent, a drop of the stuff will do you in."

<P> Mr. Probst contends that it is the responsibility of the United States to ensure his island is free of unexploded weapons or to pay for the any cleanup costs required to make it safe. San Jose is not covered under the Panama Canal treaties, but Dr. Smithson said the United States is still obligated under the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention to account for and dispose of any weapons it may have left on the island.

<P> Dr. Smithson added that the convention, to which both Panama and the United States are signatories, requires countries to provide full disclosure of sites where they may have abandoned chemical weapons in another country.

<P> After repeated attempts by Mr. Probst and his business partners to obtain a written "clean bill of health" from the U.S. government for his island, he received a letter last year from then-U.S. Ambassador William Hughes stating only that "every attempt was made to insure destruction and detoxification of all known munitions stored or disposed of on the island."

<P> A Pentagon official, who asked not to be identified, said that weapons used on San Jose "had been expended or were transported off the island when operations ceased."

<P> As for disposal of the weapons and chemicals elsewhere in Panama, the official said: "I don't have a lot of detail on that. I'm assuming they cleaned up as much as they possibly could. . . . In the unlikely event that a chemical munition of U.S. origin were to be found on San Jose or any other portion of Panama - or anywhere else, for that matter - the U.S. government will comply with its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations."

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<P>New York Times

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>Rebel War In Colombia Widening, Pulling In Neighbors

<P>By Larry Rohter

<P> BOGOTA, Colombia -- The kidnapping of a dozen foreign oil workers and tourists in Ecuador a week ago, apparently by Colombian rebels, has stirred new fears that this country's longstanding internal conflict is spilling beyond its borders and increasingly becoming a regional problem.

<P> Colombian guerrillas have used Ecuadorean territory as a rear base and supply area in the past, often smuggling arms and drugs across the border. But the kidnapping on Sept. 11 was nearly 20 miles inside Ecuador, an unusually deep penetration, and would be the largest operation the rebels have carried out there.

<P> After the abduction of the foreigners, among them one American, from a remote jungle zone, Ecuadorean troops clashed with the intruders, described as some 25 men and women in combat fatigues reporting to a leader they called "comandante." An Ecuadorean soldier was killed in the confrontation, which has been followed by aerial and ground search operations by both Colombian and Ecuadorean troops.

<P> Neither of Colombia's main rebel groups has taken responsibility for the bold strike. But both Ecuadorean and Colombian officials have attributed it to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, this country's largest left-wing rebel group, saying that the abductions bore all the hallmarks of its operations.

<P> The mass kidnapping was of the type known as "miraculous fishing," where guerrillas set up a roadblock along a main highway and take away all passengers who appear affluent enough to warrant a ransom. Besides the American, eight Canadians and three Spaniards were kidnapped.

<P> In a statement Friday, the rebel group denied involvement in the kidnapping, calling the assertion a "perverse slander," and accused the United States of seeking to internationalize the conflict.

<P> But the group has issued similar disclaimers before, most recently when three Americans working with Colombian Indian groups were kidnapped in late February and then ordered killed by a rebel commander on suspicion that they were spies.

<P> Fears of the internationalization of Colombia's three-decade conflict have been growing in recent months, and the Ecuador kidnapping is certain to feed them. Colombian refugees fleeing heavy fighting have crossed into both Panama and Venezuela. Peru, following criticism of the Colombian government's efforts to negotiate a peace settlement with rebels, has stepped up the deployment of troops along its porous northern border with Colombia.

<P> Carlos Castano, the leader of Colombia's most feared right-wing paramilitary death squad, also warned of plans to expand the conflict beyond Colombia in a letter this week to the government's chief peace negotiator.

<P> Accusing Panama's national guard of "working in open connivance with the rebel group in the border zone" to smuggle arms and drugs, he said his forces would now regard the Panamanian forces as a "military objective."

<P> Mireya Moscoso, the newly inaugurated president of Panama, which disbanded its army after the U.S. invasion a decade ago, responded by visiting the border area and promising increased support for police there.

<P> The Roman Catholic bishop for the area, Romulo Emiliani, warned that "the only way to prevent insurgents from entering Panama is with arms," adding that "if this is not done, instability will spread throughout the country."

<P> In his letter, Castano, whose forces have made significant advances, especially in the northern half of Colombia, over the last two years, also threatened actions against neighboring Venezuela.

<P> He complained that President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela "supports the terrorist subversion," contending that Venezuelan air force planes attacked his forces during a recent battle "with the objective of protecting the guerrilla retreat" into Venezuelan territory.

<P> Colombian guerrillas often cross that border, sometimes kidnap Venezuelan ranchers and recently hijacked a Venezuelan plane, so the warning was taken seriously in Caracas.

<P> "If either one of them, the guerrillas or the paramilitaries, penetrate our territory, we are going to crush them like the dangerous invaders they are

," said the Venezuelan minister of defense, Gen. Raul Salazar.

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<P>New York Times

September 18, 1999

<P>Plan To Strengthen Colombia Nudges U.S. For \$3.5 Billion

<P>By Larry Rohter

<P> BOGOTÁ, Colombia -- Responding to concern in the United States about surging drug production and guerrilla activity here, the Colombian Government on Friday unveiled a plan for "peace, prosperity and strengthening the state" that calls for \$3.5 billion in assistance from the United States and other allies during the next three years.

<P> Aides to President Andrés Pastrana, who is scheduled to leave on Saturday for a visit to the United States, said he intended to discuss the proposal with President Clinton when the two meet in New York City early next week.

<P> They said that later in Washington he also planned to lobby Congress on behalf of the plan, which includes diplomatic initiatives and trade liberalization measures as well as requests for a dramatic increase in American aid.

<P> In a meeting this afternoon with a group of foreign reporters, Jaime Ruiz, Pastrana's closest aide and an architect of the proposal, said that "a bit more than half" of the money budgeted is intended for "strengthening and restructuring of the army" or combatting drug trafficking. Colombia's two main left-wing guerrilla groups have been fighting the Government for decades, and in recent years have taxed drug traffickers to obtain money to buy weapons.

<P> Speaking to the nation of 40 million people on Friday night in a 15-minute televised address, Pastrana said that "narcotics trafficking is the main enemy of peace" and that his plan would strengthen the democracy by helping to "defeat the pernicious financing of armed groups."

<P> In another reference to the drug trade, always Washington's principal concern here, he added that "only by fortifying the legal economy can we defeat the illegal economy."

<P> Colombia is earmarked to get \$289 million in American aid in the fiscal year about to end. But in July, following a guerrilla offensive that forced Pastrana to impose a limited curfew in one third of Colombia, Minister of Defense Luis Fernando Ramírez visited Washington with a request for an additional \$500 million in military assistance.

<P> Since then, two American delegations, one led by Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Clinton's drug czar, and the other from the State Department, have visited Colombia to assess a situation that Washington believes is deteriorating. American officials were said to have strongly urged Pastrana to be more aggressive in meeting the combined guerrilla and drug trafficking challenge.

<P> "Colombia has paid a price that is truly disproportionate" in the global struggle against narcotics trafficking, he said, and therefore has the right to "demand that the rest of the world recognize that effort" and show solidarity.

<P> While maintaining that "we have always had a strategy," Ruiz said the revamped program that has been drawn up envisions spending \$7.5 billion during the next three years. He said Colombia had about \$4 billion of that amount already budgeted and expected to receive \$750 million soon from international lending agencies for social programs, but will need foreign help if the program is to be fully effective.

<P> "We are not asking for money," Ruiz said, adding that no one in Washington has suggested that he ask for any specific amount. "We are not saying, 'Give us this or this or that.' We are saying, 'Here is our strategy, and this is how much money we are short.' "

<P> Since taking office in August 1998, Pastrana has been accused by some in the United States, especially Republican members of Congress, of having a commitment to peace talks with the guerrillas at any cost, rather than a comprehensive strategy. But Ruiz made an effort to stress that Pastrana is prepared to step up military action against the rebels if talks with the principal group prove unsuccessful, as many here and in Washington have predicted.

<P> "A country cannot bet everything on a peace process," he said. "We're going with the peace process because we believe in it. But that is not the only thing we are doing." The revised plan, he added, "functions with or without a peace process" because "it is a general strategy of strengthening the state."

<P> Ruiz also cautioned that the revised strategy, though ambitious, would not in itself be sufficient to end the longstanding military conflict or wipe out the drug trade. "With this I am not going to resolve the problem," he said. "But it can make a difference at a crucial moment."

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<P>Dallas Morning News

September 18, 1999

U.S. Effort Has Yet To Rescue Haiti

Poverty tests nation's faith in democracy

By Associated Press

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti - Five years ago, President Clinton sent 20,000 troops to Haiti, hoping to end its long, bloody nightmare. The intervention cost \$1.5 billion, and the United States has since poured another half-billion dollars into the economy.

To what avail?

No longer do thousands of Haitian boat people wash up on U.S. shores; Haiti's brutal military regime is history; dead bodies no longer turn up on Port-au-Prince's streets each dawn.

But Haiti is still the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere; 80 percent of Haitians are jobless or underemployed; and across the board, with amazing speed, people have lost faith in democracy as a cure.

Frank assessment

U.S. Ambassador Timothy Carney summed up the situation with bleak frankness.

"We've gotten only modest results for all that money and effort," he said in an interview. But he admitted, "Expectations were grossly out of line with Haitian realities."

Expectations were high on Sept. 19, 1994, when Mr. Clinton, over Republican Party objections, sent the troops in. They found a country in ruins after three years of military-backed rule and international economic sanctions.

Cowed, the military leaders who had ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 stepped aside. The former Catholic priest - Haiti's first freely elected leader - triumphantly returned.

Haiti's army was disbanded, along with militias that had murdered thousands, and replaced by a 6,200-member civilian police force.

<P> But hopes that an end to repression would produce political stability and prosperity never materialized.

<P> Haiti's U.N.-trained police have been unable to cope with rising crime, and its judicial system springs criminals almost as soon as they are jailed.

<P> Ex-army members monopolized the drug trade, which has grown alarmingly. An estimated 15 percent of cocaine sold in the United States now arrives from Colombia via Haiti.

<P> And one botched election after another has disgusted the Haitian voter.

<P>A time of hope

<P> In 1990, a near-total turnout elected Mr. Aristide, viewed as a savior after a series of regimes that featured the spectacularly abusive Duvalier dynasty.

<P> But Haiti's new constitution, designed to prevent similar dynasties, limited Mr. Aristide to one term in office. In 1995 elections, only 30 percent of the electorate turned out to choose Mr. Aristide's hand-picked successor, Rene Preval.

<P> In 1997, only 5 percent of voters cast ballots in legislative elections.

<P> Accusations of fraud in that vote created a political crisis that lasted nearly two years. It ended only when Mr. Preval shut down Parliament and appointed a new prime minister and elections council by decree.

<P> Constitutionally, a new Parliament is to be installed Jan. 10. But an official timetable for local and legislative elections hasn't been published, and there are few signs that a vote can be held in time.

<P> The United States is prepared to foot at least \$10 million of the \$18.5 million election bill if the process is transparent.

<P> "I'm troubled about the prospects of postponing elections," Rep. Tom Campbell, a California Republican, said after a recent fact-finding mission. Congress would oppose more aid for Haiti if elections aren't held swiftly, he warned.

<P>Growing trouble

<P> In recent months there has been growing political violence, most of it of unclear origin. Many politicians attribute it to Mr. Aristide partisans trying to pave the way for his return - again as a savior.

<P> Whoever rules Haiti, no one seems to have a plan for ending its grinding poverty. Deforestation and natural disasters such as hurricanes have hurt agriculture, and there is virtually no manufacturing to speak of.

<P> Since the 1994 intervention, total international aid has been more than \$2 billion. It finances more than half the national budget.

<P> Much of it, however, is in the form of loans, or is used to hire foreign development workers, who end up back in donor nations. There has been little foreign investment.

<P> Mr. Carney offers much sympathy but few guarantees.

<P> "We all see potential for Haiti. We don't see the possibility of realizing that potential now, because of lack of political leadership," Mr. Carney said. "But every people has the right to a better life. We're going to stay next to Haiti until their political culture makes the necessary changes."


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<P>Chicago Tribune

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>Officials Unveil Paramilitary-Built Copter

<P>By Tribune News Services

<P> IRAN -- Iran has unveiled a new helicopter designed and built locally by an elite paramilitary force, Tehran television reported.

<P> The Shahed X5 has a maximum speed of 112.5 m.p.h. and can reach an altitude of 17,000 feet, the television report said Thursday. The report did not say whether the helicopter was built for civilian or military use.

<P> The helicopter took three years to design and was built by experts in the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the report said. It can carry four passengers and has a 372-mile range, said the broadcast, which was monitored by the British Broadcasting Corp.

<P> Iran's former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who witnessed Thursday's launch, said construction of the helicopter was auspicious for Iran and the world of Islam.


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<P>Chicago Tribune

Sept. 19, 1999

<P>Remembering Soldiers In Peacetime

<P>By Jim Turnbull

<P> DETROIT -- My brother, Bruce Turnbull, recently died in Germany. Bruce was a 1st sergeant in the United States Army. Bruce is survived by his wife and his 11-year-old son, our mother, another brother and a gaggle of nephews and their wives.

<P> We flew to Germany for the funeral. The next day the family filled up three station wagons and we were driven to the training base near Nuremberg. Led by a military police vehicle, we slowly moved through the streets of the base. Each time we passed a group of soldiers, they snapped to attention and saluted. Conversation in the vehicles slowed, then it stopped altogether. We moved around a great sweeping curve and the parade ground stretched before us. Six hundred twenty men and women of the United States Army stood, at solemn attention, in immaculate uniforms, as far as the eye could see. This was not our world. This was the holy world of 1st Sgt. Bruce Turnbull, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, United States Army. And the soldiers had come to say farewell to their own.

<P> Bruce looked like a poster for today's Army. He was 6 foot 1, tan and about 180 pounds. We all loved him. He was easy to love. He had a sense of humor that seemed to make him irresistible to young people.

<P> Bruce got the youngest soldiers, he got the hard cases, the lonely kids and the lost souls who, seemingly, didn't have anywhere else to go. They went to Bruce. There wasn't a Christmas or a Thanksgiving we'd call, wherever he was stationed, when there wasn't some new, gawky-as-a-chicken, 2nd lieutenant from West Point or Virginia Military Institute or Texas Christian University or the Big Ten, as part of the gathering around the table.

<P> For one week in Germany, we were honored by seeing the inside workings of the finest and most feared fighting force that this world has seen, the best guarantee of peace the world has.

<P> We are not at war right now and soldiers, unless they are in your family, are not particularly high on the interest level. But they are out there--in

the tens of thousands. We know when they fight in major engagements, but sometimes they fight in nasty little skirmishes that the world doesn't hear about. And sometimes they die.

<P> When soldiers die, the United States Army honors its dead. We didn't know that a few weeks ago. On the parade ground in Germany, the details of 1st Sgt. Turnbull's military life were read out by his commanding officers and his fellow sergeants. Mute testimony to his service was provided by his highly polished combat boots, his down-facing rifle with bayonet mounted, his dog tags on the trigger guard, his black beret on the butt of the rifle. There was the final roll call--four platoons singing out that they were present and accounted for. The 5th platoon was my brother's. His name was shouted three times. There was no answer.

<P> There was a 21-gun salute. Then the awesome finality of taps. First Sgt. Turnbull's decorations were given to his wife and to his mother. There were many. Wife and mother were each given United States flags, which had been draped over Bruce's coffin.

<P> There was more, much more. There was insurance for his widow, education for his child, moving expenses and a list of benefits that only the family and the Army will ever know.

<P> My brother was a soldier. He was a superb soldier, and he had the recognition of his men and his officers and his government to prove it. But even if he had not been a superb soldier, he was a soldier of the United States Army. I suddenly want you to know, with all the passion of a country preacher, that our military forces take care of our country, and our country takes care of its fighting men and women.


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<P>Washington Times

Sept. 19, 1999

Pg. B3

<P>Playing The Guilt-And-Get Game

<P>By Georgie Anne Geyer

<P> It sounds at first like a reasonable deal.

<P> North Korea apparently agrees to forgo its threatening long-range missile testing for the time being, so long as it is involved in negotiations over weapons and status with the United States. Washington, in turn, agrees to lift the trade sanctions that have barred all trade and commerce with the self-isolated "hermit kingdom" of Pyongyang for 50 years.

<P> North Korea gets the kind of constant recognition it loves (and the attendant payoff in oil and food). The United States gets a promise that the missile testing - which started seriously in August 1998 with the aggressive firing of Taepodong 2 missiles that can also reach Alaska and Hawaii - will be halted while everybody tries to work things out. It is an attempt, in the administration's words, to improve relations "at a markedly faster rate."

<P> That, although there are mysterious bits and pieces to the still-tentative agreement arrived at during talks in Berlin, is effectively what President Clinton and his staff confirmed this week. It is also what many specialists believe to be the "best deal" for now, given the strengths and weaknesses on both sides.

<P> A traditional hard-liner on the problems of the Korean Peninsula, the respected William Taylor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has returned from still another trip to Seoul and long talks with South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung. He is convinced that the leader's "sunshine policy" of cautious engagement of the North is the only way. Mr. Taylor has been to the North many times and has no illusions about it.

<P> "I came away from Seoul this time convinced that there is no alternative to this 'constructive engagement,' " he told me. "What is the alternative? Nor

th Korea has us between a rock and a hard place. The Taepodong missiles could destroy all of Japan. We know that North Korea has chemical and biological warheads, and Japan has no missile defense."

<P> That last point is the key. The United States, while beginning work on a missile-defense system that would stop these long-range missiles from hitting U.S. territory, is at least six years away from such a system. A theater missile defense system for Asia is pending, with Japan having agreed to it but South Korea still hesitating. So the deal becomes one of buying time from the threat of the North, which is OK. But it further becomes one of parallel hope that somehow the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang will along the way (favorite words) "moderate, open up, liberalize." And that is where I have problems.

<P> We have no example - not one - where a totalitarian regime, with fascists or Stalinists or tyrants, whatever we want to call these unpleasant people, has opened up with those same people in charge. Russia began its change with Nikita Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" in the '50s - and reached its present level of relative change only 40 years later with Mikhail Gorbachev. In China, the Communist Party continues to hold total power; it has not really liberalized.

<P> What's more, as analysts and journalistic observers are publicly noting, these "buy-out" foreign policies at heart amount to a kind of blackmail by regimes such as North Korea's. At virtually every press conference from Europe to the Pacific where this subject came up, journalists (for the first time, so far as I can see) peppered American diplomats and politicians with questions about "rewarding" Pyongyang with ongoing negotiations, with food and fuel aid, for its theatrically hostile stands against the rest of the world.

<P> At the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in Auckland, New Zealand, National Security Adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger impatiently rejected suggestions that waiving sanctions only rewards North Korea "for not doing something that it should not have been threatening to do in the first place."

<P> Some analysts have even suggested that the Taepodong 2 missile is, for the North, more a negotiating chip than an offensive weapon. And as James Lilley, our erudite former ambassador to Beijing, points out to me, this kind of foreign-policy pandering to the North is flowing over into our relations with China. "As China pushes us more and more in order to get into the World Trade Organization," he noted, "she, too, is maneuvering us into a supplicant position, in this case on membership in the WTO."

<P> In short, the cunning masters of North Korea, who gladly starve their own people while they blame the famine on the West's unwillingness to give them more, are simply upping the ante every time we "negotiate" in their "guilt and get" game. Indeed, opposition presidential candidate Lee Hoi-chang, president of the largest party in the South, the Grand National Party, spoke with a few of

us here this week about the North Korean behavioral syndrome. "This is a typical approach that North Korea takes," he said. "It receives the maximum and gives the minimum. It takes the competitor through stages and involves them in a very tenacious bargaining. The test ban was a bait for the U.S., but not any basic change in behavior. In fact, provocations from the North have increased in recent months."

<P> There has been much speculation and critical talk ever since the United States started playing these games with its highly questionable agreement of 1994 (by which the United States and Asian nations attempted to buy off Pyongyang's aggressive nuclear program with aid) that we were trying to pre-empt the North's aggressive intentions. Now, it seems, we are trying to pre-empt the pre-emption.

<P> The problem is that the Clinton-style liberals (unlike traditional liberals) don't engage tyrants very well. They either want to "save" them, like Jimmy Carter, or they want to buy them off, as the Clinton team has tried with such mixed success to do.

<P> Are we buying time, or are we instead only buying more trouble?

</><P> Georgie Anne Geyer is a nationally syndicated columnist.</I>

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<P>Dallas Morning News

Sept. 19, 1999

F-22 Is About Jobs, Not Military Readiness

By George Palmer

Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon frantically are lobbying Congress to get production funding for the F-22 stealth fighter, part of which is manufactured in Fort Worth. The F-22 hit a bump in July when, after years of development, the House defense appropriations subcommittee voted to delete production money for the fighter.

Press coverage of Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon's intense lobbying campaign rightly has focused on the number of jobs that will be lost if the F-22 is funded at a lower-than-planned production rate or if the program is canceled. Jobs, after all, are what the F-22 program is about.

Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors and suppliers, spread across 46 states and most of the country's congressional districts, are inundating representatives and senators with phone calls, e-mails and letters on behalf of the program.

The Pentagon has offered precious few military reasons to build the F-22. The plane's development began in the waning years of the Cold War. It was conceived as an aircraft that could overcome the Soviet Union's next generation of fighter aircraft and radar. But, as it happened, there was no next generation of Soviet fighters and radar.

So, grasping for a new rationale for the F-22, Air Force generals and Pentagon bureaucrats mutter darkly about the world still being a dangerous place and about our young men and women in uniform deserving the best so they don't come home in body bags in 2010 (as one general put it the other day).

Still, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin seem halfhearted in their claims for the F-22's military necessity. They seem that way because the F-22 is a jobs program. The Dallas Morning News recently reported on the owner of an Azle machine-tool company whom Lockheed recruited to go to Washington to lobby on behalf of the program. The owner said that if Congress fails to restore full funding for the F-22, the jobs of half of his 60 employees are in jeopardy.

That argument is likely to be persuasive to members of Congress who, liberal or conservative, want to be seen as legislators who can bring home the bacon. (On the other hand, it is worth noting that the chairman of the House defense appropriations subcommittee that voted to cut F-22 production funds, Jerry Lewis, R-Calif., represents a congressional district that has no F-22 jobs.)

<P> Fully a decade after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the Pentagon still is in a Cold War mode. In the absence of a rival superpower to compete against, the U.S. military is reduced to competing against itself.

<P> To be sure, the F-22 can do a lot more than the F-15 fighter, which it is supposed to replace. It is more agile, and its "supercruise" capability enables it to fly faster than its predecessor and use less fuel. But the F-15 already is superior to anything else of its kind in the sky. So, it is fair to ask, why are we spending \$70 billion on the F-22?

<P> The answer for Congress and the military contractors is jobs and money. The answer for the Pentagon is ego (and money).

<P> Despite the feverish lobbying campaign on behalf of the F-22, the program is in no danger of cancellation, and both Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon know it. If Congress had intended to cancel the F-22, it would have cut off all of the program's funding. To cut a big project, even one as extravagant and wasteful as the F-22, would take a kind of political courage that congressmen and senators only rarely are able to summon.

<P> Accordingly, Congress has kept development money flowing to the F-22. And, so long as there is even a trickle of funding, as both the B-1 and the V-22 aircraft show, the program lives.

<I><P> George Palmer is a technical writer who lives in Dallas.</I>


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<P>San Diego Union-Tribune

Sept. 17, 1999

<P>U.S. Responsibility In Indonesia

<P>By William D. Hartung

<P> Until the Clinton administration's belated decision last week to suspend arms sales and military support to Indonesia, one would have thought that the United States was an innocent bystander to the events in East Timor, free of responsibility and unable to exert any influence on the forces that have unleashed a wave of murder and terror that have horrified the world.

<P> Nothing could be further from the truth.

<P> Since Indonesia illegally occupied East Timor in 1975, the United States has approved sales of more than \$1 billion in U.S. weaponry to the regime in Jakarta, including everything from F-16 fighter planes to military helicopters to M-16 combat rifles. Although exports of certain items have been curtailed in recent years due to justified concerns regarding Indonesia's human rights record, the United States has remained a significant source of arms and training for the Indonesian military.

<P> A review of official Pentagon and State Department statistics on arms exports indicates that since 1993, the first year of the Clinton administration, the United States has supplied Indonesian forces with more than \$148 million worth of weapons and ammunition, including technical support and spare parts for Indonesia's considerable arsenal of U.S.-supplied aircraft and armored vehicles.

<P> And commercial sales of U.S. military equipment, licensed by the State Department, have increased substantially over the last three years from \$3.3 million in fiscal 1997 to an estimated \$16.3 million during the last fiscal year.

<P> And, notwithstanding recent statements to the contrary by State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin, the United States until last week continued to provide essential support for the operation and sustenance of the Indonesian armed forces.

<P> As recently as 1997 the Pentagon was violating the spirit of a congressional prohibition on U.S. military training to Indonesia by providing assistance to that country's notorious Kopassus counterinsurgency units under the Joint Combined Exercise and Training program. Kopassus has long been implicated in acts of repression within East Timor, and Kopassus members are suspected of involvement in the recent campaign of murder and harassment of pro-independence figures in the territory.

<P> This long-standing pattern of supplying U.S. arms and training to Indonesia has fueled the current round of killing in East Timor. The Indonesian military helped set up the militia forces, and reports from the scene have noted that at the current reign of terror in East Timor is being conducted in part with U.S.-supplied weaponry, such as M-16 rifles, that has been passed on to the anti-independence death squads by representatives of the Indonesian government.

<P> Now that Indonesian President B.J. Habibie has finally agreed to allow a U.N. peacekeeping force to enter East Timor to stop the killing, the Clinton administration must do everything in its power to make sure that mission succeeds. And that means not merely providing financing and personnel but also pressuring our erstwhile allies in the Indonesian military to withdraw their forces from the territory while the militias are being disarmed and viable arrangements for territory's transition to independence are being arranged.

<P> It's the very least we can do.

<I><P> Hartung is director of the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York.</I>

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<P>New Republic

Sept. 27, 1999

Pg. 13

<P>Straits Jacket

<I><P>The "one China" problem

</I><P>By Robert A. Manning and James Przystup

<P> THE CRISIS SIMMERING between China and Taiwan should make President Clinton's upcoming meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in New Zealand more tense than usual. But why is there a crisis in the Taiwan Strait at all? Henry Kissinger blames Taiwan. In a recent op-ed in The Washington Post, Kissinger said Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's July 9 announcement that, in the future, Taipei would deal with the mainland on the basis of "special state-to-state relations" had breached the "one China" policy that Beijing, Taipei, and Washington have adhered to and prospered under since 1972. Henceforth, Kissinger suggested, the United States should "insist on Taiwanese restraint in challenging a framework that, in fact, ensures their autonomy" (and that Richard Nixon and Kissinger developed). Others have pointed to China's outraged response to Lee's "state-to-state" announcement, arguing that the problem is not Taiwan's provocations but China's aggressiveness.

<P> But neither explanation can quite account for why the "one China" formula, which managed to keep relations between Taiwan and China stable for so long, should suddenly be called into question now. The real reason for the breakdown is that Taiwan has become a democracy. And, because of its inability to recognize the full implications of this, the Clinton administration is now pursuing a misguided policy that could be making war more rather than less likely.

<P> Back when Taiwan was still an authoritarian state ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, the "one China" policy had a very different meaning. For years after Mao's 1949 victory on the mainland forced him to flee to Taiwan, Chiang clung to the belief that he would one day retake the mainland and reunify China on his terms. Thus, he was just as determined as Mao was to resist any formal declaration that his island and China were two separate states. Indeed, talk of Taiwanese independence was a crime under Chiang's regime. U.S. governments, seared by the "who lost China" debate and unwilling to give up all hope that the Chinese Communists might one day be toppled, supported Chiang, refusing to recognize mainland China and anointing Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China.

<P> That all changed in the early '70s, when Nixon and Kissinger initiated their strategic opening to mainland China. To do so, they had to placate both Mao, who still claimed Taiwan, and American conservatives, who were wary of selling out free China. The solution was the artful political fiction known as the "one China" policy, which evolved into what China hands refer to as "the three communiques" and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

<P> The first communique enabled Nixon and Kissinger to open ties to China in 1972. It was a joint statement that said: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.... The United States Government does not challenge that position." Not agrees with, not endorses, but simply acknowledges. The Carter administration reaffirmed that position in the 1978 communique fully normalizing diplomatic relations. To ensure that breaking formal ties with Taipei did not mean abandoning the city to Beijing's tender mercies, Congress passed the TRA in 1979, legislating the framework for continued, but unofficial, political, military, and cultural ties.

<P> Contrary to widespread perception, the TRA doesn't require the United States to defend Taiwan. It only says that the United States will help provide the means for Taiwan to defend itself and will view with "grave concern" any use of force. Nonetheless, to assuage Beijing's concerns, in 1982 the Reagan administration issued a third communique pledging to limit the quantity and quality of arms sales to Taiwan, based on the expectation that there would be a peaceful resolution of the issue. At the same time, to assuage Taiwan's concerns, Reagan gave Taiwan a set of quiet, informal promises known as the "Six Assurances," in which the United States agreed not to alter the TRA, not to terminate arms sales, not to consult with China before making decisions on U.S. arms sales, not to mediate between China and Taiwan, not to pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China, and not to formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

<P> In this way, the United States managed to strike a careful balance. The "one China" principle remained sacrosanct, but the rightful leadership of that one China was left ambiguous--as was the time frame within which Taiwan and China would reunify. No less important, the United States established a strategic ambiguity, deterring China by making Beijing feel sufficiently certain that the United States would defend Taiwan if Beijing launched an attack, while leaving Taiwan uncertain about the U.S. commitment to defend the country if Taipei provoked Beijing by a formal, unilateral declaration of independence.

<P> AS POLITICAL PLURALISM developed in Taiwan, however, the conditions that made this formula so successful began to erode. Ironically, Taiwanese democracy is partly the result of U.S. pressure. For decades, U.S. administrations had urged Chiang's sometimes heavy-handed authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) party to liberalize. In 1988, 13 years after Chiang's death, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, initiated a transition to democracy. His successor, Lee Teng-hui, was elected first by the parliament, then in 1996 by the voters themselves, making him the first directly elected Chinese leader in 5,000 years. As the island democratized

, the ruling KMT mainlanders, who had come over in 1949, began to yield to local Taiwanese. (Lee himself is the first native Taiwanese president from the KMT.) At the same time, the Taiwanese began to feel a sense of separate, local identity.

<P> This tendency was heightened in 1989 by Beijing's bloody crackdown on political dissent at Tiananmen Square. Meanwhile, Taiwan's political dynamism, on top of its remarkable capitalist economic success, fueled its citizens' desire for greater international standing and recognition. Taiwan, in short, wants its own international political space. Understandably, the Taiwanese public is no longer content to be a ghost in the international system, as the current "one China" policy requires. But, with both Washington and Beijing still treating the 1970s framework as an *idee fixe*, growing international tension became inevitable.

<P> It began in earnest in 1995. The spark was Lee's request for a visa to travel to the United States in order to speak at a reunion at his alma mater, Cornell University. Beijing protested that granting Lee a visa would be a violation of the "one China" policy. And, initially, the State Department, Pentagon, and National Security Council agreed. Congress, however, did not and voted overwhelmingly in favor of granting Lee a visa. The administration then reversed its course. Furious, China launched amphibious landing exercises across the strait from Taiwan. There was little U.S. reaction, which possibly emboldened China to escalate matters further in March 1996 by conducting large-scale military maneuvers and missile tests within 30 miles of two of Taiwan's major ports. This precipitated an international crisis, with the United States sending two aircraft carrier battle groups into adjacent waters.

<P> While the incident ended peacefully, it led the Clinton administration to rethink its position on China. Officials resolved to seek a rapprochement. During summit meetings in Washington in October 1997 and in Beijing in June and July of 1998, Clinton and Jiang said they were committed to "build toward a constructive strategic partnership." But it soon became clear that the Clintonites were willing to go too far to reassure China. On the way home from Beijing, Clinton stopped in Shanghai, where, in response to a question, he said that the United States "doesn't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan--one China." (The president added that "we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.") These are known as the "three no's", and no American president had ever stated them publicly, let alone on Chinese soil. Indeed, both sides reacted strongly: Beijing was jubilant, Taipei distraught.

<P> Afterwards, in classic Clintonian fashion, the administration dissembled, claiming that the president had broken no new ground with respect to Taiwan. Yet Clinton's words had, in fact, subtly changed policy. With the articulation of his version of the three no's, Clinton was signaling a clear tilt toward Beijing on Taiwan--implicitly accepting Beijing's position that Taiwan is a province of China. For the citizens of Taiwan's democracy, this remains an open question, to put it mildly, and not one for the United States to decide for them.

<P> This chain of events understandably alarmed Taiwan's leadership. If the United States sought a "strategic partnership" with China, where did that leave Taiwan? The three no's seemed to hint at an alarming answer. But it didn't stop there. U.S. officials began speaking publicly of the need for vague "interim agreements" between China and Taiwan. This diplomatic shift appeared to breach the Reagan era assurances, which administration officials say remain U.S. policy.

<P> SHORTLY AFTER THE three no's episode, Lee formed a commission to begin quietly reviewing Taiwan's options. Taipei felt increasing pressure from the Clinton administration to enter into political discussions with Beijing on sensitive issues leading to reunification. From Taipei's perspective, the recent shifts in U.S. policy were premature and constricted Taiwan's room for diplomatic maneuver vis-a-vis Beijing. In the early '90s, Taipei had formulated negotiating positions that declared Taiwan's status as a separate political entity. Taiwan anticipated that some new initiative on its status was likely on China's October 1 celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Mao's revolution. Wang Daohan, Beijing's chief negotiator and a confidant of Jiang's, was due in Taipei that month.

<P> By declaring his new formulation, which was explained as only a nuanced shift from his previous position, Lee would cleverly remove Taiwan from the box he believed it was being put in. And, not surprisingly in a democracy, he would also define the issue for the upcoming March 2000 presidential elections in Taiwan, seeking to improve the prospects of his designated successor.

<P> So, where does this leave the United States? If there is a lesson, it is that no matter how hard the Clintonites try to force events into it, the old policy framework under which all three sides of the triangle have prospered for a generation is no longer adequate. It requires adjustment to account for the views of Taiwan's 22 million citizens, most of whom support Lee. Otherwise, the Clinton administration--which claims that the enlargement of democracy is a pillar of its national security strategy--will be in the odd position of attempting to contain the results of democracy out of excessive deference to the decidedly undemocratic government in Beijing.

<I><P>ROBERT A. MANNING, a former State Department policy adviser, is a senior fellow and director of Asian studies at the Council of Foreign Relations. JAMES PRZYSTUP, a former member of the State and Defense Departments policy planning staffs, is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.</I>

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<P>Washington Post

Sept. 19, 1999

Pg. B1

<P>Mission Implausible

<I><P>Are We Asking Too Much of the U.N.?

</I><P>By Robert P. DeVecchi and Arthur C. Helton

<P> As efforts go forward to secure independence for East Timor, autonomy in Kosovo and sustainable peace in Bosnia, many have expressed frustration at the slow deployment of United Nations staff and peacekeepers, and at the quibbling over the limits of institutional power and mandates. But the real question is whether the U.N. is up to the new challenge of these post-Cold War conflicts--the challenge of building new nations.

<P> The U.N. is no stranger to tough problems. For more than 20 years, the two of us--one as president of the International Rescue Committee and the other an international lawyer--have watched, and often admired, the U.N.'s response to wars and humanitarian catastrophes spanning the world from the killing fields of Cambodia to the burning buildings of Dili.

<P> If the world is to combat such horrors and pursue the 50-year-old goal of universal human rights--a goal in which the two of us strongly believe--then individual states must put faith and financial support in an organization that

will supersede their strategic self-interest. U.N. opponents, who have long argued that the body should not act as a world government, will object. But, while less than perfect, the U.N. is the only global mechanism for effective collaboration in circumstances where states are reluctant or ill-placed to act alone.

<P> Much more is expected of the U.N. today than simply providing a buffer between former combatants. The new mission is more often than not to promote the responsibilities of statehood. If the future of the U.N. is to be a builder of new states or a repairer of failed ones, then it must be given better tools for the job. So far, bureaucratic shortcomings within the U.N. system and the lack of political and financial commitments by member states have been serious obstacles. The United States should delay no longer in paying the \$1.3 billion it owes in dues.

<P> Before the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations responded primarily to conflicts between states. In recent years, peacekeeping operations have had to address conflicts within states. These new forms of internal conflict bring to light the inadequacy of traditional peacekeeping methods and challenge the international community to devise new and more effective methods of establishing lasting stability.

<P> In response to these new political realities, peacekeeping has grown rapidly in size and scope. Before 1988, there were 13 U.N. peacekeeping operations; since 1988, there have been 36; counting the new U.N. mission to East Timor (UNAMET), there are now 17. In January 1988, there were approximately 11,000 peacekeepers deployed. During the early 1990s, deployment peaked at almost 80,000 with annual expenditures of more than \$3 billion.

<P> The model for traditional peacekeeping was provided by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which was established in 1956 to manage the aftermath of the Suez crisis. It required the consent of the parties in conflict and was intended to deal with disputes between states. Subsequent peacekeeping operations have generally been modest in size and have involved the deployment of lightly armed forces to monitor cease-fires and oversee troop withdrawals, usually for a transitional period of months. (There are some striking exceptions, including UNTSO, the force that was sent to the Middle East in 1948, that have become intractable problems lasting for decades.)

<P> Since the late 1980s, however, peacekeeping operations have taken on political, social and economic elements that require relief specialists and civilian experts. They are designed not only to oversee the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements but to introduce lasting democratic political systems. While disarmament, demobilization and monitoring of cease-fires remain important components, operations must now include promoting political reconciliation, reconstruction and building civil society. Recent peacekeeping efforts such as UNMIK in Kosovo or UNMIBH in Bosnia involve providing massive humanitarian assistance, monitoring human rights, training police, establishing a judicial system, regulating elections and overseeing the repatriation of refugees.

<P> These new responsibilities have prompted debate about U.N. reform, but produced only modest bureaucratic changes. Since 1992, following the crisis of Kurdish refugees from Iraq, the U.N. has tried to improve its ability to respond to humanitarian emergencies. Its first move was to create a Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) within the U.N. secretariat aimed at coordinating the allocation of responsibilities among the various U.N. agencies.

<P> This effort was abandoned just five years later when DHA's role was reduced essentially to an advisory one. Now known as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), it is headed by one of the U.N.'s most respected senior officials. But OCHA has been unable to meet the new operational responsibilities associated with nation building.

<P> Today, our expectation for international action in response to humanitarian catastrophes is heightened. Kosovo and East Timor are simply the most recent in a series of emergencies this decade--in northern Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia--that suggest that gross human rights violations, genocide and repression justify some form of international intervention. The next decade will in all likelihood bring further upheavals and emergencies.

<P> Whether or not it is equipped to shoulder the responsibility, the U.N. is now in the business of nation building. Of course, traditional peacekeeping will remain an important element in these efforts. But it's time to do some more radical rethinking. The need for a permanent standby U.N. force that can be rapidly deployed is graphically illustrated by the crisis in East Timor. The delay in assembling an international police force in Kosovo is a sobering reminder of the need to ensure continued security after a conflict.

<P> And while the expertise exists to establish the judicial systems and civil administrations that are the basic building blocks of democratic nations, it is not well coordinated within the U.N. system. A comprehensive institutional framework is needed to marshal and apply this expertise. The structural and bureaucratic impediments that stand in the way must be overcome quickly.

<P> At present, 35 million individuals are caught up in 22 humanitarian emergencies around the world. These situations involve ethnic warring, human rights violations, forced migration, political instability and unmet humanitarian needs. The magnitude, duration and pace of these emergencies, as well as the complications associated with responding to them, will continue to challenge and disrupt the international community. For the U.N. to continue to play the indispensable role we expect of it, it must undergo basic reforms and receive a more vigorous commitment from its member states.

<I><P> Robert DeVecchi and Arthur Helton are senior fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.</I>

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<P>Washington Post

Sept. 19, 1999

Pg. B2

<P>Why It's Wrong To Right Off Russia Now

<P>By David Hoffman

<P> MOSCOWIn the colossal Soviet military machine, Viktor Vyshinsky worked in fluid dynamics at a secret aviation institute, testing missiles and warplane s. But when the Soviet Union came to an end, he felt trapped, he recalled, "like a miner deep in the shaft." He climbed to the surface to try to make sense of capitalism and the new Russia. Vyshinsky, a scientist, set up a pollution control system for a local government. He didn't get paid. Then he tried a commercial project for timber drying. No luck. After that came his attempt to predict floods. "Nothing actually worked out from that period," he told me. But Vyshinsky did not give up--not long ago, he was working on a mathematical model to predict turbulence created by airplanes at commercial airports.

<P> Vyshinsky's doggedness holds a lesson for those who are suddenly worried that the great Russian transition to market capitalism and democracy has somehow failed. It hasn't. Russians are picking themselves up off the floor every d

ay, plunging back again and again into the unknown, despite the wrenching disappointments that they and the world have witnessed here in the last few years.

<P> The experiment--and it is just that, a grand and unprecedented experiment--is in trouble, that's clear. From the outset, it has been burdened by the legacy of Russian authoritarianism, by greed and avarice, by utter incompetence in national leadership, and by the unimaginable problems of changing the mindset of a whole people, breaking free of generations of passivity and paternalism, and doing it quickly.

<P> Now comes a spate of headlines in the United States and Europe about allegations of money laundering, alleged bribery involving high-level Kremlin officials and the flight of Russia's precious capital. But it is strange to hear the alarmist tone in the West about the Russian "kleptocracy" and "gangster state," and to listen to the debate about who "lost" Russia. It is strange because Russia's woes have been staring us in the face for nearly a decade. In fact, the deeper these woes become, the greater the need for the world's most successful experiment in market capitalism and democracy to show the way. What really baffles me is the notion that the United States should disengage from Russia because things have not, in a few short years, turned out to be our idea of Main Street.

<P> Russia is not going to be Main Street for a long time. But the United States has a huge obligation--and national interest--to see that the Russian experiment advances and to find ways to repair the damage it has already suffered. It may surprise prospering Americans, but the truth is that the Cold War is not yet really won. Our longed-for dividend of a less dangerous world will not be secure if Russia goes off the tracks.

<P> Russia today is a failing state--its military is a wreck, its recent wave of terrorism has created panic and uncertainty, its tax collection is a disaster, and it is not turning itself into a market democracy very well. Moreover, Russia is suffering a debilitating and degenerative disease. What little capital it has to become a capitalist country is being spirited abroad. For a decade, capital has been fleeing at an alarming rate. The suspicions of money laundering and possible huge money flows through the Bank of New York are not the first, or the last, of this river of riches that has left Russia.

<P> However, the past 15 years--since the dawn of perestroika--have taught an important lesson: Transition takes time and patience, far more than anyone thought when the Berlin Wall fell. The late economist Ed Hewett noted wisely that sometimes a misstep is part of a larger movement forward. For example, last year's devaluation of the ruble and default on Russia's domestic debt were not disasters. Policymakers made big mistakes, but, in retrospect, the crash itself was more of a correction than a cataclysm.

<P> It's just plain wrong to write off Russia as a hopeless failure. Have w

e run out of energy and patience for the job of a lifetime, making sure the values that we fought for in the Cold War are truly and firmly planted here? It's time to wake up and think about getting Russia right. In fact, it's easy to forget how far Russia has already come. Not too long ago, a foreign visitor--even a package from a foreigner--aroused fear and suspicion, and people spoke openly only in their kitchens. Today Russia is a cacophony of political voices, and both literature and art are relatively free. And despite the stress of recent years, the Russian transition never degenerated into mass violence.

<P> The criticism that Russia has become a "gangster state" is terribly one-dimensional. The transition has many fronts, and it has been an inchoate mess on all of them. The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, greatly advanced political freedom but stumbled repeatedly in lame attempts to tinker with the socialist economy. Russian President Boris Yeltsin at first bravely broke the grip of the old state, but then checked out of the business of building something new in its place. The fundamental problems of constructing a civil society and rule-of-law state have been carelessly ignored and may well have to wait for another generation.

<P> What is amazing to me every day is not the lack of capitalism in Russia but the utter madness and zealousness of it. Russians are rushing headlong into a new world for which they have few rules. Instead of a sodden mass longing to go back to socialism, the country is a bewildering, scary and warped buy-sell kind of place. The "market" creates perverse incentives--scrap metal thieves, for example, raid warplanes and power stations in search of electronic boards with precious metals they can steal, melt down and sell. The Russians call it *di kiy* or wild capitalism--wild as in the untamed jungle.

<P> Americans should hardly be throwing up their hands in shock and surprise at the ascent of robber-baron capitalism in Russia. We know it well. We had it once, too. In the industrial expansion that followed the Civil War, there was a hunger for new capital, and that gave rise to tycoons such as J. Pierpont Morgan. He became a powerful turn-of-the-century middleman between capital, both foreign and domestic, and America's expanding industry. Eventually, the magnates' immense power dissipated as our markets grew more mature. The wild capitalism gave rise to a more civilized kind. But this fundamental shift took decades.

<P> Russia has been trying to build market capitalism for only eight years. In one sense, Russia faces the same problem that once confronted the United States--a hunger for capital. There is no way the rotting factories of the Soviet Union can be retooled and restructured without new capital. But there are differences: The American robber barons, for all their greed, built something and left enormous amounts of philanthropy. Russia lacks the rule of law that has been one of America's enduring national strengths. And, when the new Russian state was born, the lion's share of property--the massive stock of factories, mines and refineries--was not the result of individual initiative, but rather came from the old state. The immensely important job of finding owners for that property who will rebuild it, manage it and reinvest profits is still at the core of Russia's troubles.

<P> In the latest controversy, much of the harshest criticism has been directed at Russia's robber barons, known here as the oligarchs, a group of financiers and magnates who dominate the weakening state. These men did not just parachute into Russia. They were a product of their turbulent times. Unfortunately, the incentive of those times was to make "easy money," to reap fantastic profits quickly because of the imbalances created during the transition. There is a temptation to see these early businessmen as pioneering capitalists blazing trails out of the Soviet system, but the oligarchs played an important role: They elbowed out the Communist Party elite and factory managers who resisted change. The oligarchs were also addicted to easy money. Economist Anders Aslund has pointed out that in early 1990 the Moscow free-market price of a package of Marlboro cigarettes was 30 rubles--the same price as a ton of crude oil. Those who could hustle the crude and sell it overseas at world prices reaped a windfall.

<P> I have counted seven phases of accessing "easy money" since 1991, and it is the final phase that ought to get special attention. In 1997 and 1998, Western banks lent hundreds of millions of dollars to Russia's oligarchs and their empires, often without carefully checking the borrowers. One Russian banker told me recently that he really didn't need the \$250 million he borrowed on global markets two years ago.

<P> From the time they were young men, the new tycoons learned that their money was only safe abroad. They feared their own crazy, unreformed tax system, political instability, extortion and theft by their rivals. Over the years, capital was pumped out the door at a rate of \$1 billion a month. For a country already lacking capital, the leaks were debilitating. The only real way to stop them was to create conditions inside Russia to attract capital, but its leaders had absolutely no willpower to make that happen. What's more, the Central Bank itself took part in capital flight, sending Russia's foreign currency reserves to an offshore tax haven.

<P> The window of opportunity is closing in Russia: Millions of people have lost faith in the Western goals of market democracy, even as they struggle frantically to survive in it. There are three important ways for the United States to remain engaged. First is the business of democracy. Russians have stayed the course on elections. Now they need to build civil society, the glue that connects the rulers to the ruled. We know something about civil society--and we've done far too little to share that knowledge. Second, there's still an enormous amount of work on arms control and nonproliferation. The last, and most difficult, is the Russian economy, which is not yet completely out of control. Whether the problem is bandit capitalism or just chaos capitalism, much remains to be done to fix the system of corporate governance, to clean up a disastrous tax code, to help Russia break out of stagnation in agriculture and to deal with defense conversion. Most of it will have to be done by Russians themselves.

<P> But we need to remind ourselves just how much Russia has changed. As a teenager in the early 1970s, I demonstrated for Soviet Jews' freedom in Washington's Farragut Square. In the '80s, I reported on President Reagan and his demands for systemic change in the Soviet Union. Now I sit in Moscow, thinking that

in many ways Russians have accomplished much of what we asked. Have we run out of the imagination and energy to help them finish the job?

<I><P> David Hoffman is Moscow bureau chief of The Washington Post.</I>

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<P>Washington Post

Sept. 19, 1999

Pg. B4

<P>Putting A Doctrine To The Test

<P>By Charles Trueheart

<P> PARISIn the days following the end of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, President Clinton flew to the war zone and proclaimed, in the heady spirit of the moment, that the allied victory had set a new standard for armed humanitarian interventions.

<P> "Never forget," the president told NATO troops in Macedonia, that "if we can do this here . . . we can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe or any other place: If somebody comes after

innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it." Yet only 11 weeks later, as a new crisis erupted over a possible intervention in East Timor, the president's senior advisers were all but disowning the president's words.

<P> "I don't think anybody ever articulated a doctrine which said we ought to intervene wherever there's a humanitarian problem," national security adviser Sandy Berger told reporters at a news conference on Sept. 8. And Secretary of Defense William Cohen insisted, like American leaders before him, that the United States cannot be the world's policeman.

<P> The crisis in Indonesia has become a sobering reminder of the chasm between thought and deed, between lofty principles and nuanced realities. If a Clinton humanitarian doctrine was born in Kosovo, it seems to be a creature of its times and of its namesake: case-by-case, unhobbled by consistency, strictly dependent on circumstances.

<P> "It's almost always dangerous to articulate a general doctrine, particularly when vital interests aren't at stake," said Richard Haass, a national security official in the Bush administration who is now at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "You'll want to discriminate."

<P> What the Clinton administration ended up supporting, after Indonesia acceded to an international force in East Timor, is not the military engagement and superpower leadership it demonstrated in Kosovo. It is a material and political helping hand--a couple of hundred troops, mostly pilots to transport soldiers from donor nations and assist with logistics, communications and intelligence. In its personnel contributions, the United States ranks behind Australia, Portugal, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Canada, France and South Korea--all of which together will muster a force of fewer than 10,000 troops.

<P> Does that number, and the U.S. piece of it, reflect the severity of the crisis it is meant to stifle?

<P> Ethnic terror and mass displacement are among the Balkans-sized horrors going on in the Indonesian territory. In the past 25 years, an estimated 200,000 people have been killed in East Timor--a quarter of the population. The killing in the former Yugoslavia was on an equivalent scale, but over a shorter period of time; in Rwanda, the bloodletting was two to four times worse, depending on estimates, over a matter of just a few months.

<P> But policy, let alone doctrine, cannot be built on a hierarchy of outrage. Under the emerging standards for intervention, the scale of the inhumanity does not appear to be the decisive factor. Just as important are the legitimacy of the political claims of the suffering population, the means that can be brought to bear to end the suffering--"if it is in our power to stop it," as the p

resident himself cautioned--and the consequences of intervention or inaction to political and economic order in the broader region.

<P> "Each of these situations is different," said Berger at the same news conference. "In Kosovo you had a situation in the middle of Europe, on the doorstep of NATO, which clearly posed not only a compelling humanitarian imperative, but also had strong security and strategic consequences. I think the situation in Indonesia is a serious one and one that we cannot ignore. But there's not one prescription that fits. Because we bombed in Kosovo doesn't mean we should bomb Dili [the East Timorese capital]."

<P> Bombing strategy aside, the East Timorese have a stronger claim to outright independence than the Kosovo Albanians, who have always lived under Serbian domination. A former Portuguese colony, East Timor was annexed forcibly by Indonesia in 1976, and the annexation has never been recognized by the U.N. (Australia, notably, has recognized Indonesian legitimacy.) The killing, atrocities and displacement in East Timor lack something else that underlay all of the international decision making on Kosovo: the immediate historical antecedent of four years of bitter war in Croatia and Bosnia. The Yugoslav government of President Slobodan Milosevic has been a pariah in Europe for much of the 1990s, while Indonesia--the fourth-largest country in the world, and the largest Muslim one--has been a staunchly anticommunist U.S. ally in Southeast Asia for decades.

<P> The U.S. national interest in East Timor's independence is not huge. But the Clinton administration, like its predecessors and successors, has an interest in preserving the territorial integrity of Indonesia, which could come under threat if similar independence movements break out elsewhere in the vast archipelago. In this instance there is a regional player, Australia, whose military capabilities and political will to lead the intervention force appear to match its own key interests in peace and security in neighboring Indonesia.

<P> Such tests of U.S. consistency and resolve are bound to recur. Only a few days before the crisis in East Timor dissolved in panic and bloodshed, the Clinton administration was drawn into questions about its commitment to protecting civilians victimized by war in Congo (formerly Zaire). An Aug. 31 interim peace settlement among the various warring parties there raised the prospect of a U.N. force to monitor the accord.

<P> But the United States carefully remained noncommittal. Philip Reeker, a State Department spokesman, recently said it would be "premature to speculate" about U.S. participation in a 25,000-member Congo force without final U.N. Security Council approval.

<P> "A good doctrine," said Haass, "ought to leave very little doubt in any one's mind about our intentions. It shouldn't promise more than we're prepared to deliver." The Clinton doctrine, as amended by East Timor, has qualified its promises accordingly.

<I><P> Charles Trueheart reports from Paris for The Washington Post.</I>

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<P>Minneapolis Star Tribune

Sept. 18, 1999

<P>Try Standby Force To Get U.N. Peacekeeping Act In High Gear

<P>By Andrew J. Glass / Cox News Service

<P> WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Before the White House belatedly signed off on the creation of a multinational force of up to 8,000 troops to quash the violence in East Timor, national security adviser Sandy Berger made the case for doing nothing.

<P> "You know," he told reporters, "my daughter has a very messy apartment up in college. Maybe I should intervene to have that cleaned up."

<P> Whatever her flaws, Berger's daughter hardly competes with the mess created by Indonesian soldiers and militias on that forlorn island. Beyond a fearful loss of life, the vandals looted some \$10 million in equipment and vehicles. U.S. taxpayers no doubt will be asked to pay up in making good the losses.

<P> Valuable time was lost because U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan needed to start from scratch in setting up an interim military mission. Earlier this year, similar haggling within the Security Council over who would do what prolonged the fighting in Kosovo.

<P> Perhaps the time has come to set up a permanent peacekeeping force under the United Nations flag -- one that could be rapidly deployed in such places as East Timor.

<P> This isn't a novel notion. In 1993, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Annan's predecessor in the secretary-general's post, sought to sell Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. envoy to the United Nations, on the merits of a standing quick-response force. But Boutros-Ghali's plan made several senators livid and gave Albright yet another reason to have him dumped.

<P> Now Annan has quietly circulated a draft that spells out "the need for a system of standby arrangements." It ought to be considered. In its absence, we're left with an alphabet soup of units, each operating under its own rules of engagement and each more or less charged with keeping a distance between people who hate one another.

<P> Before East Timor (UNAMET) and Kosovo (UNMIK), deployments were brokered to serve in such diverse places as Bosnia (SFOR), Haiti (UNMIH), Rwanda and Zaire (UNAMIR and UNMGLR), Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Golan Heights (UNDOF), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Kuwait and Iraq (UNIKOM and UNIMOG), Cambodia (UNTAC), India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and Tajikistan (UNMOT) and Georgia (UNOMIG).

<P> Without any fanfare, the Pentagon already runs a seven-week "Democratic Sustainment Course" at Fort Benning, Ga., that covers human rights and that could act as a training nucleus for a permanent force. The syllabus calls for teaching the "theory and practice of military and civilian leadership in a constitutional nation-state."

<P> When the antagonists have felt queasy about the labyrinthine U.N. process, a substitute has been found, such as the MFO team in the Sinai, which was created in the aftermath of the 1978 Camp David Accords. The 11 currently participating MFO states are as good a model as any for a permanent force: Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, the United States, Uruguay and Norway. (Germany and Japan help out with the bills.)

<P> Overall these forces have climbed from 30 soldiers in 1947 to a high of 78,500 in 1993, before receding to 18,800 last year. In the current world climate, a standing force of, say, 10,000 peacemakers is apt to find suitable work.

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<P>Detroit Free Press

September 17, 1999

<P>U.S.'s Role In Other Backyards

<P>By Joe H. Stroud

<P> DESPITE THE BEST efforts of the New York Times and Foreign Affairs Quarterly, I've never been able to make East Timor rank as high as perhaps it should be on my priority list. I confess this with some embarrassment.

<P> Indonesia, after all, is the planet's fourth most populous country and the working out of the post-colonial order in that part of the world has significant implications for global trade, peace and for a lot of suffering humanity. Indonesia's treatment of the people of East Timor has provided the world with a horrible example of how hard it is sometimes to achieve stability, freedom and democracy once colonialism is ended.

<P> But most of us, including me, have only so much capacity to fuss over distant places and to think about what, if any, responsibility we as Americans have toward them. I probably have more passion than most Americans about seemingly obscure places; the Free Press enabled me to go visit a lot of them. One night on a long flight back across the ocean, I counted up the countries I had visited as editor of the Free Press. I lost count and fell asleep around 50.

<P> In general, I think we in the news biz do not tell you nearly enough in intelligible form about what is coming down the road in foreign affairs. The United States is not an island. We live in a world where trade is important, and human rights issues are important, and instability can threaten American interests in a lot of seemingly distant places. That's why I believe the United States was right to try to stop the killing in Bosnia and again in Kosovo. I have no apologies for thinking trouble in Europe has the potential to be trouble for us in this country.

<P> At some point as you work your way down the list of world trouble spots, you do have to say, "Whoa, Nellie," and think about whether this country is trying to be police officers to the world. It isn't racism or Eurocentrism to suggest that there are evils in the world that the United States cannot hope to cure.

<P> At some point, in some situations, it is going to be true that we have quit preaching and gone to meddling.

<P> American forces and attention are spread pretty thin. I do not accept the "hollow army" argument sometimes made by conservative commentators, but all the commitments do add up. You have to worry about the cumulative total.

<P> That's why you have to approach the plans to intervene to safeguard the pro-independence forces in East Timor with some caution. The Australians and New Zealanders can surely take the lead in putting this peacekeeping force together. The United States should not apologize for having to insist that its forces not become the lead pony in the exercise.

<P> What makes it especially hard to hit the right balance is that there is so much that only the United States seems able to do.

<P> It was not until President Bill Clinton took a personal hand and threatened to cut off all contact with Indonesia's military that the Indonesian government invited the United Nations to come in.

<P> I expect our president to use American power advisedly in such instances. But there are reasons for us to tread lightly in this and to take whatever criticism comes for not being willing to say yes to every problem in the world.

<P> The challenge is to be a world leader in the most cost-effective way possible. Yes, East Timor matters. Yes, U.S. transport and intelligence are probably indispensable to the success of an intervention there. Yes, this crisis belongs on our radar screen.

<P> But yes, too, we need to press the president to limit our exposure and to worry about other possible claimants on his time and our resources. It's a big , wide, wonderful but sometimes dangerous world out there, and there are a lot of East Timorese ready to demand our attention.

<I><P>JOE H. STROUD is the retired editor of the Free Press. </I>

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<P>Armed Forces Journal International

September 1999

Pg. 62

<P>The Kosovo Result

<I><P>The facts speak for themselves

</I><P>By General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (ret.)

<P> Among the casualties of the recent Balkan air campaign was the hypothes is that air power, employed alone, cannot win in combat. This proposition will continue to be heard, of course. It has become an article of faith, immune to t

he ravages of evidence. There is an old argument about air power's effectiveness, motivated in part by service partisans who sense budget consequences. Then too, there are some--Army General Colin Powell is a good example--who are genuinely reluctant to intervene militarily, except under the most propitious circumstances. When air intervention is the only practical option, the conviction that, by itself, it cannot be effective, removes us safely from any obligation to act.

<P> Dreadful consequences were forecast in advance of the Kosovo air campaign. This was not the open desert of the Gulf War; whole regiments could disappear into these narrow mountain valleys. Bad weather would be a show stopper. This was a populated landscape; even a few stray bombs would blow up in ugly headlines. Serbian air defenses were some of the toughest in the world. And so forth. In the main, these predictions were made by people with, at best, a limited grasp of air operations. Some were civilians--former Pentagon officials, academics, politicians--free of any blemish of combat experience. But many were former military men, mostly retired soldiers or sailors with, presumably, a good understanding of their own martial specialties, but little or no involvement in organizing, training, equipping, or using air forces.

<P> From about Day 3 on, the air campaign was solemnly pronounced a failure, a theme that continued until nearly the end. In particular, the broadcast media, with its insatiable appetite for critical commentary, discovered regularly and often that we were playing a losing hand.

<P> This must have seemed quite bizarre to Milosevic. Sitting in Belgrade, the lights out, the phone dead, our experts assured him he had "achieved his strategic objectives," as though he had aimed for a 50-year setback of the Serbian economy, hoped to cut old-age pensions in half, sought to ration gasoline at two gallons a month, wished to see unemployment skyrocket, and wanted to get an army trapped in Kosovo, dispersed in small units, hiding, impossible to reinforce--unable, perhaps, even to retreat.

<P> Seventy-eight days of bombing finally persuaded Milosevic that the "experts" were wrong. Few of them have since admitted it. (John Keegan, distinguished historian and defense editor of The Daily Telegraph, is an honorable exception.) Most have taken the line that, since we all know air power cannot win by itself, this Kosovo thing must have been a defeat. For example, the bombing did not save 800,000 ethnic Albanians from expulsion and the destruction of their homes.

<P> The fact that bad things happen in a war does not ordinarily interfere with our judgment about outcomes. Six million Jews were murdered in World War II, and the killing accelerated as Allied ground troops approached the death camps. This unhappy fact does not prevent us from concluding, rightly, that we won the Second World War.

<P> Moreover, the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo began in February of 1998, mo

re than a year before the bombing started. Fully 35,000 people, maybe more, had already fled the province in the months leading up to the air campaign. In March, when Milosevic concentrated 40,000 troops at the Kosovo border with the obvious intent of finishing the job, we kicked off the air campaign. In short, ethnic cleansing caused the bombing, not vice versa.

<P> Besides, a charge that the air campaign did not stop ethnic cleansing fails the "instead-of-what?" test. We painstakingly exhausted the diplomatic avenues that would have put a peacekeeping force on the ground. In fact, the aim of the air campaign was to get Milosevic to reconsider his rejection of a NATO presence in Kosovo, not to stop him from completing the ethnic cleansing, which we all recognized would require troops on the ground.

<P> Ready For The Job

<P> Another accusation is that the air campaign was really a moral and ethical defeat. Little risk was taken by the aircrews, as witness the astonishing fact that no pilots were lost. The centerpiece of this criticism is the order that pilots remain above 15,000 feet, described by one defense "expert" as an "ultra-safe" altitude for flying over Kosovo.

<P> The Air Force has always taken the air battle into enemy territory, an approach popular with our ground troops, who have not been attacked by hostile aircraft in half a century. In doing so, we have absorbed some painful lessons about handling active air defenses. We have developed the equipment and tactics, established demanding training programs, and organized ourselves for the job. The results can be plotted as a classic learning curve showing increased aircrew survivability over the years. As these things go, we did rather well in the Gulf War, where we lost only 21 people in 43 days of air fighting--about 1 killed every 2 days. Still, that's 21 too many, and we should be delighted with the remarkable result in this latest round. It means we know our business.

<P> The altitude restriction is a phony issue. We did lose an F-117 Stealth fighter, which was shot down early in the conflict while operating above 15,000 feet. Those World War II bombers, shot down in such great numbers that there was a sortie limit of only 35 missions, crossed the target at 30,000 feet. Francis Gary Powers was bagged 40 years ago while flying a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft at or near 70,000 feet. So altitude is only part of the answer for dealing with air defenses, and not the most important part.

<P> Nonetheless, the same "experts" who had predicted Serbian air defenses would be deadly pounced on the altitude limit, as if to say, "Yeah, but who would have guessed these guys would stooge around at 15,000 feet, where they can't see anything and from where they were always bombing Chinese Embassies, and the like, just so they could save their own skins." In other words, it was somehow unethical to conduct an air action with the aim of sustaining few or no friendly casualties, if, at the same time, there was any risk of injury to innocent civilians on the ground. A writer in The Guardian described the NATO approach

as "cowardly."

<P> No Easy Choices

<P> No thoughtful military man pretends that war involves easy ethical choices. Certainly a lot of civilian damage was done, including the killing of , perhaps, 2,000 Serbian noncombatants. But inadvertent

<P> damage caused by errant munitions or poor intelligence remains an unwelcome by-product of any campaign, air or ground. And this was a war epitomized by restraint. Many records were set. One of them was for most bomb tonnage returned to home base. Our pilots did not drop without reasonable certainty about their targets, and so a lot of ordnance was brought back, or dumped into the Adriatic, which became, by the way, an issue with the Italian government. Something like 23,000 bombs and missiles were actually expended, and we know of 20 instances of unintended collateral damage. Never before in the 85-year history of aerial warfare have fewer bombs strayed off course. On balance, we made the war as safe as we could for Serbian civilians and have no apologies to make.

<P> Finally, it is being argued that the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA, reappeared on-scene near the end and flushed Serbian ground forces from hiding, making them vulnerable to air attack. This ground action is claimed ultimately to have made the bombing effective, providing yet another "proof" that air power, used alone, does not work.

<P> A more faithful account is that the KLA had been routed, physically expelled by Serbian regular army and police, and written off as worthless. Two months later, this makeshift outfit was back in Kosovo, now with friendly air support, and they were suddenly effective. This may prove to some that air power must be used in tandem with other military capabilities, or it may prove that, nowadays, it is air forces that determine the fate of armies.

<P> Victory and defeat are rarely undiluted, binary outcomes. On balance, this air victory was about as pure as they come. In a major blunder, the use of ground troops was ruled out from the beginning. I know of no airman--not a single one--who welcomed this development. Nobody said, "Hey, finally, our own private war. Just what we've always wanted!" It certainly would have been smarter to retain all the options, but our NATO allies made it clear they had no stomach for a ground war and that was that. Signaling to Belgrade our extreme reluctance to fight on the ground made it much less likely the bombing would succeed, fully exploring the limits of air power as a military and diplomatic instrument

<P> Few airmen today believe that the Air Force suffices to secure the nation's interests. Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and much other experience has accustomed us to combat formations in which land, sea, and air arms unite under joint command. We stake no claim to win all wars, all the time, all by ourselves

, and neither does the Army or Navy. At any rate, it is a ridiculous, unreasonable test, that any service should have to win by itself. But somehow our modesty in this regard has metastasized into something else--the theory that air power can never win alone, that under no conditions should we rely on air power to achieve victory. The integrity of this proposition has been damaged as badly as Serbian ambitions.

<P> Opportunities to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states will come easily to us, the world's preeminent power. The case for steering clear of such prospects is likely to be strong enough without recourse to the fable that air power alone can never win in combat.

<I><P>General Merrill A. McPeak was Air Force Chief of Staff, 1990-94. Among his other current activities, he is a member of AFJIs Editorial Advisory Board.</I>

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<P>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

September/October 1999

Pg. 6

<U><P>Guest Opinion

</U><P>Billions For Bombs; Pennies For Peacekeeping

<P>By William D. Hartung

<P>IF THE UNITED STATES WANTS CREDIBILITY AS A world leader, it needs to become known as more than the country that drops bombs and sells weapons. Offering real economic assistance to help rebuild Kosovo and its Balkan neighbors would be a good start--as would reinvigorating U.S. support for peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

<P>But the ink was barely dry on the June 10th peace accord that brought an end to NATO's air war in Kosovo before the world's major economic powers started passing the buck about who should pay for post-war reconstruction.

<P>In his first major statement after the war, President Bill Clinton argued that since the United States picked up the bulk of the costs of the NATO bombing campaign, European nations should shoulder most of the cost of rebuilding the Balkans.

<P>But--surprise!--no one stepped forward to take the lead. By early July, nearly a month after the formal end of hostilities, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had received less than half of the roughly \$400 million it was seeking to help return Kosovar refugees to their homes.

<P>"I find it unacceptable that the international community is not in the position to give us the necessary funds," said UNHCR Deputy Commissioner Soren Jespersen. "After the international community spent billions, billions of dollars on a military campaign which was intended to pave the way for the return of refugees it is a pity they are not prepared to spend what we have asked for."

<P>A few days later, World Bank President James Wolfensohn sounded a similar note at the inaugural meeting of the High-Level Steering Group--a coordinating body for post-war aid to the Balkans, which includes representatives from the United Nations, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the finance ministries of the world's seven largest industrial nations. He urged potential donors not to let their contributions to a rebuilding fund for the region come at the expense of urgently needed aid for victims of less publicized conflicts in places like Sierra Leone, Azerbaijan, and Central Africa.

<P>In late July, the United States pledged \$500 million toward a \$2.1 billion international fund for Kosovar refugees--still a far cry from the estimated \$20 to \$30 billion needed to rebuild the Balkans.

<P>The perceived shortage of funds to rebuild the Balkans and other war-torn areas needs to be put in perspective. A grudging \$2 billion rebuilding fund stands in flinty contrast to the \$4 billion the United States and its NATO allies spent bombing parts of Serbia and Kosovo into rubble.

<P>The problem isn't a lack of resources; it is misguided spending priorities. If the United States had invested a modest amount in diplomacy and conflict prevention before the war, the killing in Kosovo might have been stopped without launching a multi-billion dollar bombing campaign.

<P>The Clinton administration should shore up U.N. peacekeeping capabilities by paying its back dues to the international body, which would cost less than the price of just one of the \$2 billion B-2 bombers used in Kosovo. And the conflict prevention budget of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could be doubled for the price of just one of the hundreds of the \$2 million Tomahawk cruise missiles that rained down on Serbia.

<P>THESE INVESTMENTS PALE IN COMPARISON WITH THE Pentagon's Tiffanyesque \$290 billion budget, and they provide a cheaper, more effective way to build the foundations for international peace and stability than spending more money on high-tech weaponry.

<P>A more balanced approach to U.S. security also would put more funds aside for foreign economic aid. According to a recent United Nations Human Development Report, at one-tenth of one percent, the United States ranks dead last among major industrialized nations in the share of its gross national product devoted to official development assistance.

<P>But shifting U.S. budget priorities from preparing for war to preventing or containing potential conflicts will require principled political leadership. Otherwise, the Pentagon and its allies in industry will soak up most of the available funds to promote their version of the lessons of Kosovo: the need to restock the U.S. arsenal with cruise missiles and smart bombs, and to reinvest in a new generation of intelligence gathering, communications, and transport equipment needed to fight the "next" Kosovo.

<I><P>William D. Hartung is director of the Arms Trade Resource Center of the World Policy Institute at the New School for Social Research in New York.</I>

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<P>Defense News

Sept. 27, 1999

Pg. 22

<P>Comanche On Budget

<P> I take great exception to your Sept. 13 editorial, "On Target With Cost," especially with your example of Comanche as a program that is exceeding schedule and budget.

<P> It is true that, since the contract award to the Boeing and Sikorsky team in 1991, the program has been restructured three times. The first two times a great deal of money was taken from the program (for example, \$1.8 billion in 1994).

<P> Each time, the Army decided that the Comanche was absolutely vital to Army modernization and, reluctantly, had to stretch out the development of the helicopter with the funding available to buy it back.

<P> But, let me make it perfectly clear: When the program was restructured, it was never because it had fallen behind schedule or was over budget. We use the Earned Value Management System (EVMS) on Comanche, and it measures cost and schedule variances over all aspects of the program. We keep a running EVMS metric of the program, both since its inception and also for the current Pre-Production Prototype (PPP) program.

<P> The PPP program, approved last July by Jacques Gansler, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, represents the latest restructure and was proposed by the Army

my to make the Comanche program more efficient. More importantly, this restructure was achieved within the current resources of cost and schedule.

<P> I am quite proud of the PPP program as it is relevant, uses best commercial practices throughout, addresses the entire life cycle management cost, and is on track on both cost and schedule with variances less than 1 percent.

<P> The statement that the Army's current estimate has the first six helicopters costing \$8 billion is totally misleading. I assume you have taken our total development budget, which is roughly \$8 billion, and then assumed that we are only buying six helicopters for that amount.

<P> First of all, we are buying a total of 15 helicopters during the development program. Second, there is a huge amount of technology development on-going with associated equipment, such as electronics and sensors, as well as the integration and testing required during the development process. None of these things should be portrayed as the direct aircraft unit cost.

<P> Lastly, I strongly object to your inference of so-called book-cooking associated with the Comanche. I have been with the program for two years and know of no instance where we have misled anyone about the program's cost or schedule.

<P> And as I indicated before, none of the program restructures were used to hide cost or schedule overruns. The data is available and open for anyone to review.

<P>U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Joseph Bergantz, Comanche Program Manager

<P>Editor's Note: The editorial referred to appeared in the <I>Current News Supplement,</I> September 10, 1999.


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<P>Washington Times

Sept. 18, 1999

Pg. 11

<P>Military Medical Staffs Thanked For Service

<P> As a retired Army officer with 40 years active duty under his belt, I always enjoy Col. Harry G. Summers Jr.'s erudite and well-informed commentaries. I almost always agree with his views. I read with keen interest his Aug. 26 column, "Taking care of their own," a well-warranted tribute to the staff and services at Walter Reed Army Hospital. Thousands of us are indebted, indeed some of us owe our lives, to the skills and dedication of that splendid staff.

<P> But Col. Summers speaks of services rendered to retired people and ends on a note of optimism that could be misleading: "My month at Walter Reed convinced me that regardless of the shortages and hardships they face," they can continue to ensure the good health of the Army."

<P> If Col. Summers takes Walter Reed Army Hospital in the broader sense of the Army Medical Corps, and the Army in the sense of including its dependents and retired personnel, I have to disagree. I think Col. Summers' closing should be modified to "... they will continue to do the best they can to ensure the good health of the Army."

<P> Services rendered at military medical facilities necessarily are constrained by the means at hand - funds, equipment and personnel - as well as by mandated priorities. The first priority (and properly so) are the uniformed active-duty personnel and their dependents. The last priority (and then only to the extent remaining means are available) are retired personnel and their dependents.

<P> The drawdown of the defense budget following the end of the Cold War, and notably under the Clinton administration, has adversely impacted all elements of national defense, not excluding medical. Hospitals and clinics have been cl

osed, personnel have been cut back and services have been curtailed. Inevitably , the ax has fallen most heavily upon retired military - thousands of people on ce promised lifetime care. This was a promise I both received and passed on to my subordinates. Many retired military are seeking redress, and military-relate d organizations and a few political leaders are working to help them. There is some feeling of betrayal.

<P> So the happy experiences that Col. Summers and I and many in the Washing ton area and elsewhere still enjoy, are no longer assured for the vast majority who, when they were in uniform, counted on lifetime military medical support.

<P>Maj. Gen. Herbert G. Sparrow , U.S. Army (Retired), McLean

<P> This is in response to Col. Harry Summers' commentary wherein he rec ounts how the Army medics took care of him at Walter Reed Army Hospital and wha t outstanding treatment he received.

<P> For more than 55 years I, along with my bride of 63 years, have been car ed for as needed by military medics (Army, Navy, Air Force), and we have not on e complaint, not one gripe, not one quarrel with our military medics.

<P> Aid men, nurses, physicians, administrators, food service personnel and l ab technicians all team up to be the best they can be. And don't overlook the l egions of volunteers who do administrative tasks to help the hard-working medic al personnel.

<P> My latest experiences have been with the wonderful medical personnel and services at Malcolm Grow U.S. Air Force Medical Center at Andrews Air Force Ba se. It is no mystery to me how our military can win wars and battles when we ha ve the very best medical attention to keep the airman, sailor and soldier in gr eat physical condition, make him well when he is sick, repair him when he is wo unded or otherwise hurt. This is done sometimes under impossible conditions. Ma y the good Lord bless them and keep them all.

<P>Maj. Marvin J. Hout, U.S. Air Force (Retired), Bowie

<P>Editor's Note: The editorial referred to appeared in the <I>Current News Supplement</I>, August 27, 1999.

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<P>New York Times

September 20, 1999

<P>Russian Terrors, New And Old

<P> The fear and anger in Russia are understandable. Terrorism has struck people in their homes, with bombs exploding in Moscow and in the south, killing about 300 people at night when they should have been dreaming, at worst, their everyday nightmares. Government officials, including President Boris Yeltsin, have spoken admirably about the need to find these terrorists without turning a crucial search into a racist crusade. As Mr. Yeltsin said after the first bombings, terrorism has "no faith, no nationality, no religion."

<P> Yet, among the alarming reports coming out of Moscow in the past few days are stories of police officers conducting the wholesale roundup of those who look as if they come from the Caucasus region of the country. In their "Operation Whirlwind," Russian police have moved too much like a tornado, arresting and detaining the innocent along with those legitimately suspected of these cowardly acts. The number of those detained, often for being dark-haired natives of Chechnya, Dagestan or other regions of the Caucasus Mountains, has reached alarming proportions, with estimates ranging from 11,000 to 20,000. Only a few dozen suspects have been arrested.

<P> Moscow's Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, who has retained the old Soviet system of requiring residency passes for his city, has also chosen to demand that all legal visitors re-register. His forces are among those storming through the city in search of dark-skinned suspects, and although many spot checks of documents have been carried out in public, police have also been bursting into homes searching for evidence of the explosions by nationality.

<P> Some residents without proper documents are merely asked for money, a relief in comparison to treatment others have reported to human rights groups and journalists. One Chechen family, in Moscow legally even by the Mayor's standards, opened the door to a squad of masked police officers who hit the mother, terrified the children and battered the father despite a search that uncovered no evidence, according to Human Rights Watch. The Moscow Times reported Friday that the head of a Chechen and Ingush social organization had logged dozens of horror stories, including one of a girl from the Caucasus being beaten up by Russian classmates.

<P> Such hysteria revives old horrors for many Russians. The search for a common scapegoat was a favored tactic in the worst days of the Soviet era, when enemies of the state were swept away in the night, their families left behind for or daily humiliations inflicted by a programmed society. Stalin's doctors' plot encouraged local citizens to terrorize Jews, a pogrom in 1953 that mercifully was cut short by Stalin's death. Still, these Soviet reflexes in Russia may remain altogether too close to the surface.

<P> The tremors from old conflicts and recent battles in Chechnya and Dagestan also stir fears in Moscow that the Government, in its weakened state, might unwisely change the schedule for upcoming elections. At this point, the same American Government that is wary of giving more aid to the Russians is now offering more help in fighting terrorism. But any erosion of constitutional process could also erode that support. President Clinton last week appealed to Russians not to "allow terrorists to achieve their underlying objective, which is to undermine democratic institutions and individual freedoms." The bombing deaths of so many innocent Russians are a terrible tragedy that can only be made worse by any overreaction that tampers with Russia's democratic progress.

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<P>Washington Post

Sept. 19, 1999

Pg. B6

<P>The Russian 'Menace'

<P> Republicans in Congress have announced several inquiries into Clinton administration policy toward Russia. These could be useful, for many legitimate questions arise from the vexed state of U.S.-Russian relations and the disappointing performance of Russia's post-Soviet economy. Among these are whether too much aid was given, or too little; whether stricter conditions could have been set on such grants, and whether they would have mattered; whether U.S. policy put too much faith in Boris Yeltsin, and whether U.S. policy makers naively underestimated the difficulty of Russia's transition.

<P> Unfortunately, last week's launching of the inquiries did not inspire much confidence. House Majority Leader Dick Armey, for example, had already drawn his conclusion: "The Clinton administration's Russian policy is the greatest foreign policy failure since Vietnam." This is a sweeping view, and not just when you consider some of the other possible nominees: the failure to deter Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of nuclear arms to India and Pakistan, the standing aside while a million Rwandans were slaughtered, and so on.

<P> Mr. Armey's judgment seems to assume that Russia is doomed, and that the United States is primarily responsible; the former is premature at least, and the latter too respectful of U.S. influence. A sense of historical proportion seemed similarly absent when Rep. James Leach, chairman of the Banking Committee, wrote in a New York Times article on "The New Russian Menace" that constraining corruption "may well prove more difficult" than defeating Communism.

<P> "We're likely to continue to face a Russian security threat for another generation," says Mr. Armey. But what kind of threat? Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is not militarily threatening U.S. allies or seriously challenging U.S. power anywhere in the world. Unlike China, which all summer has been brazenly menacing democratic Taiwan, Russia poses no danger to any neighbor. On the contrary, it is having great difficulty keeping its own country together.

<P> To the extent Russia is a threat today, in other words, the source is the nation's weakness, not its strength. There is no longer much fear that Russia will send hundreds of nuclear-tipped ICBMs hurtling toward North America in a deliberate first-strike attack; but there is real concern about an accidental launch due to computer malfunction, or of a nuclear warhead smuggled out due to

poverty and lax controls. Russian corruption is a threat like Mexican corruption or Indonesian corruption, all of which work against the democracy and prosperity that the United States hopes will spread. But given the minuscule size of the Russian economy, its corruption can hardly threaten the American way of life. The corruption of the Chinese economy, which is far more intertwined with America's, would seem to pose a greater danger. But it is receiving considerably less attention right now.

<P> Russia's most recent calamity is a series of apartment-building bombings that have claimed nearly 300 lives. Remembering Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center, Americans know that every society is vulnerable to terrorism. But such heartland bombings may be even more terrifying for Russians, because they have -- with good reason -- such little faith in their law enforcement agencies. Moreover, the inevitable push for Draconian response threatens civil liberties that have shallower roots in Russian soil.

<P> The natural response to all these dangers would be to help alleviate Russia's weakness. That no one, including certainly the Clinton administration, has as a foolproof strategy for doing so is painfully clear, and congressional advice would be welcome on how from the outside to promote stability and prosperity. But imposing sanctions and cutting off ties will produce the opposite result, and inflating the menace beyond reality will impede clear-headed decision making.


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<P>New York Times

September 18, 1999

A Step Forward With North Korea

After months of threatening behavior by North Korea and tough warnings by the United States, the two countries have stepped back from a potentially dangerous confrontation. Yesterday President Clinton ordered an easing of economic sanctions against North Korea in response to the Pyongyang Government's decision to freeze its testing of long-range missiles. The Administration's move is not without risk, and much needs to be done to monitor the North's behavior and to reach even broader accords to reduce tensions. But this was a welcome development that could lead to further progress toward stability in the region.

North Korea is one of the most isolated, secretive and distrustful countries in the world. Since 1994, however, when American negotiators won an agreement to let international inspectors into its main nuclear plant, the Clinton Administration has put its faith in diplomacy rather than confrontation. Then, last year, under pressure from some in Congress, Mr. Clinton recruited former Defense Secretary William Perry to review Korean policy. He and several negotiators met with North Korean delegates, most recently in Berlin, and devised the accord announced this week. The agreement will allow North Korea to purchase some consumer goods from the United States and let individuals in America transfer funds to North Koreans. These measures come on top of food aid that is already being provided by the United States, China and other countries.

The most important part of the deal is North Korea's willingness to forgo missile tests, which seemed imminent a few months ago. Such tests would have spread fear and outrage in the Korean Peninsula, Japan, China and throughout the world. Even a temporary agreement not to test is thus a step forward. Though missile development is not affected, and would not be verifiable under current restrictions, missile tests would almost certainly be detected. In a separate positive development, foreign inspectors were also allowed to visit a second suspected North Korean nuclear site, and Mr. Perry says they were satisfied that it is not capable of producing weapons-grade material.

The Administration might be criticized by some hard-liners in Congress for having a trusting attitude toward North Korea, a country not worthy of much trust. But the course the Administration is on can always be reversed if conditions warrant a change.

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<P>Dallas Morning News

Sept. 18, 1999

<P>Panama Canal

<I><P>U.S. must carry out treaty, but ensure security

</I><P> A controversy is brewing in Washington over whether Panama will actually control the Panama Canal after the United States departs.

<P> The issue is one part hype and several parts politics from a cadre of conservatives in the Congress. Nonetheless, it highlights a regional security dilemma.

<P> Two years ago, Panama gave Hutchison Whampoa Group, a Hong Kong firm suspected of ties to China's People's Liberation Army, the long-term rights to operate two major access ports along the ends of the canal.

<P> The implication in Congress is that China will hold a beachhead, if not the keys, to the strategic economic and military shortcut between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

<P> The White House, Panama and Hutchison insist the company has no proven ties to the Chinese military. Hutchison, they say, is a commercial venture that poses no national or regional security risk.

<P> There are reasons to suspect China's motives. China is believed to have stolen U.S. defense secrets over two decades and was involved in illegal campaign contributions to the Clinton re-election campaign in 1996. Last year, a shi

pping company allegedly run by the People's Liberation Army tried to acquire a former U.S. Navy shipyard in California. And in Panama, China's gangs have smuggled illegal Chinese immigrants, sometimes with the support of corrupt Panamanian officials.

<P> At the risk of giving too much credence to vast China conspiracy theories, Panama and the United States must carefully monitor Hutchison Whampoa's activities in Panama and be prepared to challenge if it engages in illicit or destabilizing activities.

<P> At the same time, the United States should aggressively press newly elected President Mireya Moscoso to explore ways to jointly enhance regional security.

<P> For example, the U.S. withdrawal leaves Panama with no organized military and more vulnerable to the threat of Colombia's drug guerrillas spilling across the border.

<P> As a first step, the U.S. should renew efforts to establish a nonmilitary, counter-narcotics unit in Panama, since drugs and arms are the region's most destabilizing forces. Former President Ernesto Perez Balladares opposed such a unit, but President Moscoso's advisers say she might consider it.

<P> The U.S. cannot and should not attempt to back out of its promise to relinquish the canal. Nonetheless, Panama's vulnerability is becoming more evident, a fact both the United States and Panama need to confront.


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<P>Chicago Tribune

September 17, 1999

<P>A Morally Unsustainable Iraq Policy

<P> Would the average American support killing innocent civilians to punish a despicable dictator?

<P> Hardly. Yet that, in starkest terms, has been probably the most notable result of nine years of economic sanctions against Iraq for its deadly invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

<P> The Bush and Clinton administrations supported United Nations-imposed sanctions as a way to punish and undermine Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein, to cut off his resources and keep him from reconstituting his armed forces or building weapons of mass destruction with which to threaten neighbors.

<P> However, by UN estimates, more than 1 million Iraqi civilians, most of them children, have died since the Persian Gulf War as the direct or indirect result of the sanctions. This while Saddam remains entrenched. It's time for a change.

<P> The Clinton administration insists the sanctions can be lifted only when Iraq complies with UN disarmament resolutions. It blames Saddam for Iraq's misery, arguing he has obstructed full implementation of the UN oil-for-food deal designed to relieve his people's suffering. Indeed, only this week the State Department released a report accusing Iraq of exporting food, even though its people are malnourished.

<P> In effect, the administration says, Saddam is cynically starving Iraqis in order to fuel international opposition to the sanctions and get them lifted without having to comply with UN arms mandates.

<P> None of which, unfortunately, is surprising. Saddam's inhumanity towards his own people is well documented. But the fact remains that the sanctions are not working as they were intended and are producing enormous, unconscionable suffering among people who are powerless to throw off their leader.

<P> Apart from the morality, the sanctions have become diplomatically costly. Arab nations see them as anti-Muslim at best, genocidal at worst. France, China and Russia oppose them, leaving the U.S. and Britain alone on the UN Security

y Council pushing the policy.

<P> There have been indications in recent days that the U.S. and Britain may be open to change. Along with France, China and Russia, they are working on a deal to ease sanctions if Iraq agrees to new UN weapons inspections. It's not clear, however, why anyone supposes that Saddam would go along with such a deal.

<P> The administration fears, not unreasonably, that lifting sanctions would give Saddam access to new resources he could use to rearm. Maybe so, but nobody supposes he ever fully disarmed anyway.

<P> A better approach would be to lift the economic sanctions against Iraq and tighten instead the arms embargo. Additionally, the U.S. should make clear that if he ever attacks a neighbor--or makes a serious threat to do so--this country will retaliate massively.

<P> It may not be possible for outsiders to ease his people's suffering by ousting Saddam, but we ought not be adding to it either. The interest of the U.S. and the international community is to contain Saddam, to keep him from attacking or threatening his neighbors. Our policy ought to be crafted to achieve those ends, not to inflict suffering indiscriminately.


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<P>Minneapolis Star Tribune

Sept. 17, 1999

<P>East Timor -- The U.N. Peacekeepers' Daunting Task

<P> Perhaps East Timor is not lost after all. The rampage leveling that land may soon be brought to a halt by the entry of U.N. peacekeeping troops. Secretary-General Kofi Annan favors such a venture. The Security Council has approved it. Australia has offered to lead the force. Indonesian President B.J. Habibie says the peacekeepers are welcome. So surely all will soon be well

<P> But how can all be made well, after what has happened? The peacekeepers can remove the Timorese heads now planted on stakes and extinguish the fires still raging. But they can't put heads back on shoulders or bring burned villages back to life. They can't undo the herding and looting that have turned Dili into a ghost town. Nor can they welcome back home the tens of thousands of East Timorese forced to flee their country. Many of these people have no home to return to. And they are anything but welcome. Indonesia's savage militia men have seen to that.

<P> Even if President Habibie stands on the tarmac and shakes each arriving peacekeeper by the hand, these lamentable facts will still govern. The ominous truth seems to be that Habibie has little control over the Indonesian Army -- the proud sponsor of the atrocities that have ravaged this occupied territory.

<P> If this were not so, the results of August's U.N.-supervised referendum in East Timor would have been honored. After all, that is what Habibie promised would happen. But the pledge was not kept, because Habibie had no way to enforce it. Once the people of East Timor declared their overwhelming wish for independence, the local militias made it plain they'd rather see East Timor destroyed than democratic.

<P> What has transpired since is shocking, and the West bears considerable blame for the carnage. The world stood by when Jakarta invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975, and it looked on placidly as thousands of East Timorese people suffered torture and death at the hands of the Indonesian military.

<P> The decision to rush U.N. troops to East Timor may signal an overdue change of the global heart. But the hope the peacekeepers represent will be hard to fulfill. A river of blood is flowing in East Timor, and the blood-spillers couldn't be less interested in drying it up. Whatever their president says, they are likely to do all they can to subvert the U.N. force's efforts.

<P> It's up to the peacekeepers to find a way to stop the murderous campaign. And that's the easy part. What will prove most daunting is making good on the cruelly broken promise of freedom for the East Timorese. Fulfilling it will be

e all the harder if Indonesia's leaders, and its audacious soldiers, do not go along.

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