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<P>Federal Computer Week

June 7, 1999

Pg. 45</P>

<P>Now Playing: 'Revolution In Business Affairs'</P>

<I><P>Stan Soloway, a former TV/film producer, directs cultural change as the undersecretary of Defense for acquisition reform</P>

</I><P>By Daniel Verton</P>

<P> As the driving force behind the Defense Department's major acquisition reform initiative -- known as the "Revolution in Business Affairs" -- Stan Soloway is among the most influential officials in DOD.</P>

<P> As deputy undersecretary of Defense for acquisition reform and the newly appointed leader of the department's overall business process reform effort, Soloway, perhaps more than any other DOD official, is in a position to change the culture of the department for years to come.</P>

<P> However, when Soloway first arrived in Washington, D.C., in 1975 as a consultant for a small start-up public affairs consulting firm, the last thing on his mind was working in the Pentagon or, for that matter, leading a revolution.</P>

<P> "I have honestly never plotted out my career and have no idea what I will be doing five or 10 years from now," Soloway said. "In fact, if you had suggested to me five years ago that I would be doing this, I would have thought you were nuts."</P>

<P> The consulting job, which he left after six years, gave Soloway his first exposure to DOD issues. And one of the firm's clients, a little-known congressman named William Cohen, would play a more influential role in Soloway's future than anyone could have known at the time.</P>

<P> Soloway, a native of Boston, graduated from Denison University in Ohio in 1975 with a bachelor's degree in political science. While attending Denison, Soloway excelled in journalism, particularly college radio, and harbored a burning desire to become involved in film and TV.</P>

<P> By the early 1980s Soloway began dividing his time between his public affairs consulting practice and producing local film and TV. Working with a Boston-based company, Soloway helped produce a series of Public Broadcasting Service specials, including a live debate between then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the head of the European Nuclear Freeze Movement, E.P. Thompson. A subsequent special featured the Rev. Jerry Falwell and New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange debating the morality of nuclear weapons, and another had Steve Allen and Alan King debating two British comedians on the notion that Englishmen are funnier than Americans.</P>

<P> Soloway also helped develop several TV movies and a TV series for Warner Bros., but none were picked up. "In short, I always say I never got involved in television and film production to get rich or famous, and from that perspective it worked out very well," Soloway said.</P>

<P> Having missed his shot at becoming the next Steven Spielberg, Soloway entered the 1990s working on public policy issues once again, this time for an industry consortium concerned with contracting with the government. It was about this time that the Clinton administration came along and turned its attention to reforming government, and industry formed the Acquisition Reform Working Group. Soloway became involved with the ARWG right from the start and also was an active member of other industry groups. </P>

<P> "On a substantive level, I think my involvement with industry...enabled me to bring to this position a slightly different perspective and, I believe, a strong degree of objectivity as to what the real issues are that need to be tackled," Soloway said. "In some areas, my views were not always in consonance with those of some of my colleagues in industry, and the same is true within DOD. But I had the opportunity to work with individual companies and gained extremely valuable insights into the challenges they face and the ways in which our current system exacerbates those challenges."</P>

<P> Once at DOD, Soloway was able to use his industry experience to the department's benefit in the area of public/private competition. "While I understand the philosophical opposition to the very idea of the government essentially competing with its citizens, I am also well aware that in most cases where competitive sourcing has worked well, some form of managed, public/private competition has been a key element," Soloway said. "The issue, therefore, that I am most concerned about is how we conduct the competitions and that we ensure [that] both our work force and the private sector walk away feeling they got a fair shake."</P>

<P> Central to Soloway's success has been his ability to communicate with the public and private sectors. He also has a keen understanding of the techniques available to get his message out. Examples include his use of electronic town hall meetings, a focus on distance learning for the acquisition community and monthly briefings with the press, where Soloway invites reporters into his office to talk about the ever-changing Defense reform and acquisition road map.</P>

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<P> "In my town hall meetings, I often refer back to congressional hearings on [the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act] in 1993," he said. "One small-business man told the committee that in the commercial world, the degree to which one communicates with one's customers is a mark of excellence, but in dealing with government business, that very communication can get you thrown in jail. I think acquisition reform has really changed that paradigm."</P>

<P> Despite many positive changes, Soloway believes DOD is not where it needs to be. "Not only do we have additional policy challenges to take on, but we have quite a ways to go to truly inculcate reform into our acquisition culture," he said. "And that means we must do a better job of providing our work force with the tools, through various kinds of training and education, they need to implement the tasks we have given them." </P>

<P> With all that is on his plate, Soloway insisted that his 12-hour days are not any different than those experienced by most working people. "My family is most important, and I do my very best to balance work and home life," he said.</P>

<P> "I have learned an enormous amount," he continued. "And of course, I am also getting a rare opportunity to do what I really love to do at a level that holds out at least the possibility of having a real impact. When I was thinking about this position and wondering if it was something I could or should do, my wife looked at me one night and asked, 'How can you not do it?' She was right."</P>

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<P>Strategic Review

Spring 1999

Pg. 41</P>

<P>The Army After Next: Revolutionary Transformation</P>

<P>By General Dennis J. Reimer, U.S. Army</P>

<P>In Brief</P>

<I><P>The U.S. Army is undergoing a revolutionary transformation to meet the strategic and technological challenges of the 21st Century. The Army's strategy for change is founded upon a process of Spiral Development - a partnership of soldiers, scientists, members of industry, and academia working together in an iterative experimentation effort. This process will enable the Army to adapt to unexpected trends while continuing to execute the national military strategy. The end-state of the Army's transformation - the Army After Next - is best characterized by the principles Knowledge, Speed, and Power, capabilities that will amount to a revolution in strategic ways.</P>

</I><P>We launched the Army After Next (AAN) project in the spring of 1996 to assist us in the development of a vision of future requirements. AAN was to occupy a "hilltop" 30 years into the future and report what it saw. Looking forward is difficult for any organization. Looking forward 30 years is virtually unprecedented, particularly for an army. To ensure that it maintained a comprehensive perspective, the AAN project focused on four critical areas: the geo-strategic environment; technology; military art; and human and organizational behavior. AAN's two annual reports thus far, Knowledge & Speed and Knowledge & Speed: Battle Force and the U.S. Army of 2025, have yielded a vision for changing the Army from an industrial-age to an information-age organization. That vision amounts to a revolutionary transformation for the Army - a transformation founded upon three principles: Knowledge, Speed, and Power.</P>

<P>Why Change?</P>

<P>Our investigations into the future thus far have given us two compelling reasons for transforming the Army. First, the geo-strategic environment is becoming more complex and dynamic. Ethnic rivalries, national and religious tensions, international crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and the rise of one or more major military competitors capable of challenging the U.S. regionally will probably increase the likelihood of conflict over the next several decades. To provide leadership and to promote democratic principles, human rights, and free-market economies in such a world, the United States will need an Army that is more strategically responsive.</P>

<P>Second, advances in precision weaponry and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will make the future battlefield a much more lethal place. Tomorrow's tactical engagement areas will likely extend as far as today's operational and strategic distances. To survive and accomplish its objectives in such an environment, the Army must become more mentally and physically agile. It must also fight as part of a joint team, contributing its unique capabilities toward the realization of the operational concepts laid out in Joint Vision 2010: Dominant Maneuver; Precision Engagement; Full-dimensional Protection; and Focused Logistics. While advances in precision weapons will make the battlefield more lethal, recent events have shown that if we want to protect a people's cultural and ethnic existence, we have to do it the old fashioned way - by putting troops on the ground.</P>

<P>Our Strategy for Change</P>

<P>Preparing for the future is a challenge. As General Electric's recent annual report reveals, trends predicted 20 years ago - record highs for oil, Japanese dominance in the world economy, and double-digit inflation - "did not play out." Today, oil is at record lows, the Japanese economy is struggling, and inflation remains low. Jack Welch and GE's other leaders have thus concluded that an organization's ability to meet the future depends a great deal upon its "ability to cope with any trend." Like GE, the Army had to adopt a flexible approach to preparing for the future. Failure to adapt could mean letting down the nation in a moment of crisis.</P>

<P>Time is not necessarily on our side. We can't afford to stand down the Army in order to modernize it. The Army can't take a time out from readiness. We must change while executing the national military strategy, a strategy for which the Army does much of the "heavy lifting." Hence, our change process had to afford us enough flexibility to alter our vision as the need arises.</P>

<P>To guarantee flexibility, we adopted a process of experimentation and development in 1994 called Force XXI, which consists of three overarching efforts: redesign of the tactical Army; redesign of the institutional Army; and the integration of information-age technologies into the force. The key to Force XXI is Spiral Development - a partnership of soldiers, scientists, testing agencies, and leading members of industry, academia, and the research and development community working together in an iterative experimentation effort. Spiral Development allows us to anticipate, leverage, and monitor change in the Army's Core Competencies: Quality People, Leader Development, Training, Modern Equipment, Doctrine, and Force Mix. Transforming the Army successfully requires synchronizing our progress across all of these areas, ensuring that the effects of change in one area are addressed in the others over time. We want them to co-evolve, to change with respect to each other in ways that contribute to the effectiveness of each. The FXXI process focuses on capabilities instead of weapons.</P>

<P>The Army's selection of a standard machine gun in 1904, during a period of unparalleled reorganization, is a good example of Spiral Development. Rather than choosing a machine gun solely on its own merits, we elected to synchronize its selection with that of the new service rifle (M-1903 Springfield) so that the two weapons would have matching ammunition calibers, thus easing the logistical burden on the battlefield. We subsequently chose the water-cooled Maxim and synchronized its adoption with other initiatives on structural reorganization and new doctrine and training methods. Keeping our core competencies synchronized thus allows us to maintain a comprehensive perspective with regard to change and to reduce the potential friction among the Army's many moving parts before those parts are tested in battle.</P>

<P>The Army of 2025</P>

<P>The Army of 2025 will consist of a mixture of forces ranging from special operations, light, mechanized, and strike and battle forces. Every element of the Army of 2025 will both contribute to and benefit from Knowledge, Speed, and Power in some form.</P>

<P>Knowledge means the ability to answer three questions: Where am I? - Where are my buddies? - Where is the enemy? Ideally, we want to be able to answer those questions successfully, all the time. We cannot do that unless we are able to

leverage fully the tremendous capabilities associated with information technology. Speed refers to tactical agility as well as rapid strategic responsiveness - getting there "first with the most." Speed also means agility - making decisions quickly, developing leaders who are comfortable with a degree of uncertainty and capable of harnessing the power of the information age. By 2025, the Army will put decisive combat power in theater in a matter of hours. Power means providing not only an overmatch of the right forces to do the job, but also having enough flexibility and adaptability within those forces to respond to unforeseen situations. It also means having the right force at the right place at the right time to accomplish the mission quickly and with minimum casualties.

When combined, Knowledge, Speed, and Power will amount to a revolution in strategic ways because they will give us more freedom to decide how and where we will engage.

Throughout history the Army's major strategic challenge has been getting to the fight. Deployment times and logistics requirements forced us to arrive in stages, which in turn put tremendous constraints on how we fought. Tomorrow, knowing where the enemy is, moving faster than he can, and with more of the right mix of force than he has will enable us to checkmate him. In other words, we will remove his options so that he will have only two choices: to fight against overwhelming odds or to concede the conflict on our terms.

Knowledge, Speed, and Power will also help us conduct stability and support operations more effectively by enabling us to put "boots on the ground" in the right locations, quickly, and with the right capabilities to control people and places. Knowledge of the capabilities and locations of friendly and hostile forces, the ability to move quickly anywhere on the globe with the right kinds of forces to do the job, will greatly facilitate peacekeeping, arms control verification, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, and counter-terrorist missions. To do so effectively we must reach back and tap into the vast arsenal available in the whole of America's Army.

Knowledge, Speed, and Power will thus make the Army of 2025 the nation's most versatile expression of military power.

<P>Thus Far</P>

<P>We have made a great deal of progress within a few short years. The Army's Battle Command System, which uses emerging information technologies to combine real-time situation awareness with near-instantaneous transmission of the commander's intent, has brought us one step closer to revolutionizing our tactical command and control procedures. Other steps toward that revolution include fielding the first digitized division in the year 2000 and the first digitized corps before the end of 2004. This will allow our heavy force to leverage the significant capabilities associated with situational awareness and ultimately information dominance. Our light forces will complement the heavy force so that the Army maintains a balance of capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict. The battlefield awareness or knowledge that our digitized systems will impart to every unit in the Army remains a prerequisite for achieving the proper balance between dominant maneuver and precision strike over all types of terrain from urban and restricted to open.

<P>We are using the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to create a Strike Force that will provide an adaptive, near-term, early entry force capable of rapid strategic deployment. The Strike Force will possess the characteristics of speed, agility, and decisiveness required to conduct operations in a rapidly changing strategic environment. Once fielded, it will also serve as a prototype for testing organizational structures, operational concepts, and critical leader and soldier skills for the Army of 2025. Initially, the key to the adaptive capacity of the Strike Force will be the command and control capabilities we embed in headquarters elements of the 2nd ACR. These capabilities will provide the core around which we can task organize the full spectrum of Army assets (basically Cold War units) and link them to the right set of joint capabilities in response to a crisis today involving any combination of conventional and asymmetrical threats. This is the most cost effective way of adapting the Cold War structure to post-Cold War requirements while pulling forward the technology needed for the future. Such a force might include land maneuver elements, heavy fire support, and Army aviation and joint or combined assets to address conventional threats, as well as Special Operations Forces, and Army Reserve and Army National Guard units to provide civil support and to respond to terrorist, chemical and biological threats. As the name implies, the Strike Force will be a fast moving, hard hitting, multi-mission force that we can tailor to meet specific requirements.</P>

<P>Efforts are also underway to achieve a revolution in military logistics to reduce the Army's cumbersome logistical tail, an essential step toward achieving greater strategic speed while sustaining the force's logistical needs. By 2010, the Army will have new technologies and procedures in place to transition to a logistics system capable of pin-point distribution. Among other things, this system will feature the capability to track an item from the moment it is requested by the user to the instant it arrives and is put to use. In addition, new logistics management systems will enable us to anticipate supply requirements based upon equipment with self-diagnostic capabilities. All of these steps, when complete, will amount to a total transformation of the way we supply, repair, and transport the operational Army.</P>

<P>The institutional Army is also changing. We are currently evaluating ways to reorganize the Department of the Army and major Army commands to capitalize on the ongoing Revolution in Business Affairs. We are reengineering to achieve better performance, consolidating to remove redundancy and maximize synergy, competing to improve quality and reduce costs, and eliminating excess support structures to free up resources. Current initiatives include partnering with the private sector to "outsource" selected functions and efforts to build efficient and effective installations through better management practices and doctrine. The days of the "Iron Mountains" associated with the Cold War are long gone. The emphasis on total asset visibility and velocity management will not only decrease cost but increase deployability.</P>

<P>As the noted historian and scholar Sir Michael Howard has observed, it is less important for armies to predict the future than it is for them to adapt quickly when it arrives. We have built flexibility into our change process so that we can adjust our transformation as our vision of the future changes. The most critical ingredient for success, however, is the human element - the open-mindedness of our soldiers and leaders. As the leaders of GE discovered, the future that unfolds twenty-five years from now will be different from what we expect it to be. Our success as a pillar of national defense will depend a great deal on

pon how well the young people entering the Army today adapt to the world of tomorrow. If their current performance in Central and South America, Korea, Bosnia, and in a hundred other locations across the globe is any indication - and it is - the Army's future is in good hands. </P>

<I><P>General Dennis J. Reimer became the 33rd Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on June 20, 1995. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1962 and was commissioned in the field artillery. He commanded an infantry company, an artillery battalion, division artillery, corps artillery, and the 4th Infantry Division. He served two combat tours in Vietnam and as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans during Desert Storm, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, and Commanding General of Forces Command. He holds a BS from USMA and a MS degree from Shippensburg State University.</P></I>

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<P>Defense News

June 14, 1999

Pg. 52</P>

<P>U.S. Army Study: Keep Ground Troops In Asia</P>

<P>By Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News Staff Writer</P>

<P>WASHINGTON -- A sizable U.S. ground combat and support force must remain permanently deployed in Northeast Asia, regardless of whether or not the force will be needed to defend South Korea against North Korean attack, according to a new U.S. Army study.</P>

<P>Without U.S. ground troops, China can deny U.S. and other forces access to critical sea lanes throughout the southern and western Pacific Ocean, wrote U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales Jr., commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and Col. Larry Wortzel, director of the college's Strategic Studies Institute.</P>

<P>Not only would China dominate the region, but the absence of U.S. troops in Northeast Asia could compel Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to deploy their own nuclear weapons, the authors warn in "The Future U.S. Military Presence in Asia," the newest monograph on the subject published by the college.</P>

<P>"Visualize what the strategic landscape might look like, without a U.S. presence in Northeast Asia: U.S. forces would probably be anchored along a line stretched from Alaska, through Hawaii, to Guam.... Deployment times by sea to the main shipping lines in the region would be longer, and the ground presence, which really demonstrates the depth of the American commitment to the region, much thinner," according to the report.</P>

<P>According to the authors, Washington may not need to maintain the 100,000 troops currently deployed in the region, a longstanding U.S. policy most recently codified in the Pentagon's 1998 National Security Review. Instead, the study's writers insist that Washington and its key allies in the region should focus on militarily meaningful capabilities and the deployment of a balanced future force.</P>

<P>"A virtual presence or powerful fly-by just won't do the job. It must be capable of some form of traditional maneuver war and forced entry," the authors wrote.</P>

<P>According to the U.S. Army officers, a minimum U.S. force would require permanent deployment in the region of a U.S. Army combat brigade and part of a Marine Expeditionary Force. Attached to such forces must be sufficient sealift and airlift, as well as air defense against hostile aircraft and missiles.</P>

<P> Other remaining deployments in the region will involve the means to maintain air superiority and "a robust naval force to patrol the sea lines of communication."</P>

<P>Moreover, the authors noted that all forces will require major logistical facilities along with a medical brigade, an Army engineer brigade and possibly a police brigade and an information warfare operation in order to carry out humanitarian and disaster relief operations.</P>

<P>Finally, the authors noted that U.S. forces "must get adequate intelligence support, requiring an array of intelligence collection platforms, a analytical organization, and a military intelligence brigade."</P>

<P>As for command headquarters, the authors said a new three-nation, combined military headquarters operation could replace the existing structure now used by combined U.S. and South Korean forces on the Korean peninsula.</P>

<P>The authors concluded that a shift in the focus from numbers to capabilities would serve the long-term interests of Washington, Tokyo, Seoul and other countries in the region.</P>

<P>They noted that U.S. forces should maintain their three-part strategic framework in the region, which includes peacetime engagement based on a forward presence; crisis response, built on forward-stationed forces; and the ability to augment forces, fight and win any conflict that could develop in the region.</P>

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<P>Defense News

June 14, 1999

Pg. 1</P>

<P>U.S. Army To Equip Kosovo Force For City Combat</P>

<P>By George I. Seffers, Defense News Staff Writer</P>

<P>WASHINGTON -- Despite misgivings many U.S. Army leaders have about urban conflict, the service is arming itself for potentially bloody and brutal city fighting -- buying new weaponry that could equip either U.S. combat troops or peacekeeping forces in Kosovo.</P>

<P>Army leaders have issued an emergency procurement order, known as an urgent material release, for the Rifle Launched Entry Munition. It is designed specifically to knock down doors or blow holes in walls during a fight in city streets.</P>

<P>Under the emergency order, expected to be approved by January, the service plans to buy 486 munitions for approximately \$600,000 to be used for possible conflict in Kosovo. Even though troops could enter Kosovo within weeks, Army experts said they expect any peacekeeping force to remain there for many months.</P>
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<P>The emergency order was set in motion long before NATO began bombing Yugoslav military positions in Kosovo, however. The Yugoslav government accepted a NATO peace plan June 3, more than two months after the air attacks began. Even if that peace deal's details are finalized -- something that remains unclear -- the possibility exists that U.S. Army troops could get caught up in a bloody city brawl, and the emergency purchase will proceed, said Army officials.</P>

<P>What if all the [Yugoslav forces] don't get out? What if the [Kosovo Liberation

ion Army] resurfaces? What if a peacekeeping force is caught in the middle, as peacekeeping forces have been, historically? It's better to have [the Rifle Launched Entry Munition] and not need it, than it is to need it and not have it," said Lt. Col. William Wheelehan, Army spokesman.</P>

<P>Russell Glenn, senior defense and policy analyst with think tank Rand's office here, said the munition offers tremendous benefits regardless of the mission.</P>

<P>"It's a pretty good little system that provides a capability [the U.S. Army has] been looking for, for a long time," Glenn said.</P>

<P>The munition has several advantages, he said. It allows soldiers to breach a door or wall without exposing themselves. Moreover, it is short range, causing little collateral damage, and can clear a room of booby traps. The Rifle Launched Entry Munition fits over a rifle barrel and is launched by the bullet fired. The munition lands near the targeted door or wall and is triggered by a time-delayed fuze. It has a range of about 30 meters and can knock down wood or steel doors. It is made by Rafael Armament Development Authority, Haifa, Israel.</P>

<P>Rafael calls the munition the Simon Door Breaching Rifle Grenade, and it was developed specifically for Israeli special forces who have used it for the past five years, a Rafael source said. "As you know, Israel and the United States have a very special relationship, so it is only the United States we wanted to expose this to. No one else buys it," the Rafael source said.</P>

<P>Although U.S. Army leaders describe the acquisition merely as preparation for any possible contingency in the Kosovo conflict, analysts said the purchase indicates the Army could find itself embroiled in other future urban conflicts. This is despite the fact that Army leaders traditionally have tried very hard to avoid such combat missions.</P>

<P>"We have not had a lot of experience as a nation fighting in complex urban terrain. We have sought alternative strategies because of the challenges," Gen. John Abrams, commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, told reporters here. "Nothing in my upbringing makes me want to get into a brawl in the city."</P>

<P>Other Army officials have been warning that the service is not yet ready for urban warfare. For example, two articles by different Army officials have recently appeared on Army Internet home pages questioning whether the service is ready to fight street-by-street and door-by-door.</P>

<P>In one article, "It's A Dirty Business, But Somebody Has To Do It (Urban Combat)," George Mordica, an analyst with the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., wrote that U.S. doctrine on combat operations is outdated; severe Army downsizing in recent years has left the service without the manpower needed for urban conflicts; that for political and humanitarian reasons the service does not have the flamethrowers and other weapons highly effective in city fighting; and that the service lacks training for urban warfare.</P>

<P>The purchase of the Rifle Launched Entry Munition is designed to address suc

h concerns, one Army official said.</P>

<P>"The primary advantage is that it can break down much bigger doors than any other munition I know of, and it allows the soldier to remain concealed because he doesn't have any debris or shrapnel coming off to pinpoint his position," said Peter Errante, ammunitions team leader for the Army's small arms office.</P>

<P>The purchase does not, however, signify an impending urban battle, other Army sources stressed.</P>

<P>"There is nothing unusual about the Army stockpiling weapons in preparation for any contingency," said Nancy Ray, Army spokeswoman in the Pentagon.</P>

<P>Despite the emergency buy, Army officials said the purchase will take some time, acknowledging the current conflict in Kosovo could be over before the munitions even reach their destination.</P>

<P>"Just because it's an emergency release, doesn't mean we're going to put just anything out there," said Walter Gadowski, the Army's deputy program manager for small arms. He explained that the service still has to meet safety requirements.</P>


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<P>Federal Computer Week

May 31, 1999

Pg. 1</P>

<P>Army Saves On Laptops</P>

<P>By Bob Brewin</P>

<P> At a time when most other federal organizations have bypassed traditional contracts in favor of streamlined procurements, the Army last week awarded t

wo conventional contracts that will reduce its cost of buying laptop computers by more than 50 percent.</P>

<P> The winning bids submitted by GTSI and Intelligent Decisions Inc. for the indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity Portable-3 program -- which covers the purchase of 15,000 Pentium II computers -- came in well below the \$90 million value the Army had estimated for each bid.</P>

<P> Intelligent Decisions won with a bid of \$43.5 million, FCW has learned, while GTSI won with a \$52.8 million bid. Intelligent Decisions plans to offer portable computers from Compaq Computer Corp., and GTSI plans to offer portables from Panasonic.</P>

<P> Both bidders are required to open up their contracts for ordering within 60 days, which could be good timing, given the substantial force of ground troops the Army plans to deploy to the Balkans as part of a Kosovo peacekeeping force.</P>

<P> GTSI, which holds the Portable-2 contract -- extended by the Army until the end of fiscal 1999 -- already has started taking a "substantial" inventory position in portable computers in anticipation of heavy demand by forces deployed in the Balkans, according to Joel Lipkin, the company's vice president for business development. </P>

<P> GTSI plans to offer a full line of Panasonic semirugged and rugged notebooks on the Portable-3 contract, as well as a 3-pound subnotebook from Hewlett-Packard Co., Lipkin said. GTSI offers notebooks from Everex Systems Inc. and Compaq, but Lipkin said the tough Panasonics better fit the needs of Army users in the field. Lipkin declined to provide pricing until all competitors are debriefed this week.</P>

<P> Inacom Government Systems Inc., which holds the other Portable-2 contract, also submitted a bid of \$52.8 million for Portable-3, offering portables from Gateway Inc., industry sources said. Mark O'Donnell, Inacom's sales vice president, said the company does not plan to protest the award, even though its bid was identical to GTSI's.</P>

<P> GTSI and Intelligent Decisions priced their offerings substantially lower than other bidders in the field of seven, according to industry sources. Intelligent Decisions executives did not return calls from FCW asking for further details on the company's Portable-3 offerings.</P>

<P> According to industry sources, ITC (formerly IntelliSys Technology Corp.), which this February won an Army PC-3 contract, came in "way high" on Portable-3, with an offer of about \$65 million, as did Comark Federal Systems Inc. FCW could not determine the price of Telstar's offer or identify the seventh bidder in the field.</P>

<P> Eben Townes, senior vice president of Acquisition Solutions Inc., said the Army has proven that IDIQs still have a place in the streamlined procurement era. "The Army has shown it can run a fast IDIQ compared to the old days, when it took four years to do one, and you still ended up with a protest."</P>

<P> The Army also proved it can get a good price on an IDIQ because those c

ontracts involve buying in bulk, Townes said.</P>

<P> IDIQs also have great utility in providing a wide range of users with s
tandardized systems and configurations, Townes said. </P>

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<P>San Antonio Express-News

June 5, 1999</P>

<P>Despite Massive Ad Campaign, AF Struggling To Win Recruits <
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<P>By Sig Christenson, Express-News Staff Writer </P>

<P> The Air Force has pummeled Yugoslavia without losing a single pilot, bu
t it hasn't turned the tide in its war to win recruits, even as an 18-month, \$5
4 million television ad campaign has taken wing. </P>

<P> The service at the end of May lagged 2,578 recruits behind its year-end
goal of 33,800 airmen, the San Antonio-based Air Force Recruiting Service repo
rted. </P>

<P> The Army, too, was struggling. But both the Navy and Marines exceeded t
heir goals, the Defense Department said Friday. </P>

<P> "Obviously, any time there is a shortfall in recruiting, there is cause
for concern," said Lt. Col. Tom Begines, a Defense Department spokesman. "More
importantly, all of the services have renewed and re-energized their recruitin
g efforts." </P>

<P> Facing the possibility of not meeting its recruiting goal for the first
time since 1979, the Air Force has spent \$12 million to run public service ann
ouncements in 10 major television markets. </P>

<P> It spent \$1.3 million to produce up to three 30-second spots in which a

irmen give testimonials about Air Force life. </P>

<P> The service has bought \$17 million worth of air time from February through September, and it has earmarked \$54 million to broadcast its recruiting spots through September 2000, said Tim Talbert, Air Force's chief of advertising. </P>

<P> The new spots, created by a Dallas advertising firm, will air next month in the nation's top 10 markets. They'll be seen in San Antonio as the fall television season kicks off, he said. </P>

<P> "We knew the initial ad campaign using the public service advertising would not be as effective, ultimately, as new advertising created specifically for the recruiting purpose," acting Air Force Secretary F. Whitten Peters said. </P>

<P> Master Sgt. Tom Clements of the recruiting service attributed the Air Force's lackluster number of recruits to a slow period that's now ending. He hoped the Air Force would get back on track as the new TV spots air. </P>

<P> Peters shared that sentiment, but cautioned the spots aren't a magic bullet. </P>

<P> "All advertising can do for you, really, is to get somebody to call you," he said. "Whether you can actually get the recruit in depends on a lot of other factors." </P>

<P> Grappling with a shortage of pilots and enlistees in a variety of critical career fields, Peters and other top Air Force leaders last week issued a "stop-loss" order that will keep 6,000 airmen from leaving the service as planned. </P>

<P> The Air Force, meanwhile, has seen its recruiting shortfall rise from 696 airmen in February to 2,039 in April. </P>

<P> The Army fell short by 6,791 recruits in April, while the Navy and Marines exceeded their quota by 288 and 299, respectively. </P>

<P> Figures for May were not available for the other three services. </P>

<P> "I can't remember the last time that happened," Sara Lister, former assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve affairs, said of the Air Force's shortfall. </P>

<P> "They have very little trouble, usually, getting recruits because airplanes are still viewed as the most interesting, and they also teach good, useful skills," Lister said. </P>

<P> The nation's robust economy often is seen as a chief culprit behind recruiting shortfalls that last year rocked the Army and Navy. </P>

<P> To make the armed services more competitive, the Senate overwhelmingly approved a measure that gives all military personnel a 4.8 percent pay raise. It also boosts retirement benefits and grants eligibility to a highly regarded

hrift plan that had long been open to other federal workers. </P>

<P> Kathy Dempsey, a spokeswoman for U.S. Sen. Phil Gramm, R-Texas, said the measure would "aid the Air Force in their recruiting attempts." </P>

<P> But Lister and recruiting expert Charles Moskos, echoing comments made by many airmen at four San Antonio bases, said money alone likely won't win the Air Force's recruiting wars. </P>

<P> Moskos, a Northwestern University sociologist and author of "All We Can Be: Racial Integration the Army Way," said recruiters have told him the war in Kosovo has caused some parents in the Chicago area to discourage their children from enlisting. </P>

<P> Begines said the war may have been an issue for potential recruits in isolated instances. But Begines, the recruiting service's Clements and a Chicago-based Air Force recruiter agreed the 2 1/2-month-old conflict hasn't been a factor. </P>

<P> "I have a dropout kid who can't pass my (military aptitude) test, and he's telling me he wants to be a pilot," said recruiter Sgt. Lorenzo Mendoza, who recently told Peters one of his biggest problems is finding qualified applicants. </P>

<P> Mistaken beliefs and the booming economy moreover are delivering a one-two punch to recruiters. </P>

<P> "We're battling the misconception that the military is still drawing down, that it's not a place of opportunity," Begines said. </P>

<P> U.S. Rep. Henry Bonilla, R-San Antonio, said the country may someday have to scrap its 25-year-old all-volunteer force and reinstitute the draft. </P>

<P> That wasn't seen as necessary by Lister but was welcomed by Moskos, who noted fewer and fewer children have parents who have worn a military uniform. </P>

<P> "You have to talk about how you attract middle class youth to the military," Moskos said. "We have to reinvigorate the concept of the citizen-soldier, instead of the career soldier." </P>


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<P>Federal Computer Week

May 31, 1999

Pg. 24</P>

<P>JSTARS Flies High Over Yugoslavia</P>

<P>By Daniel Verton</P>

<P> RHEIN-MAIN AIR BASE, Germany -- Finding Serb tanks and supply convoys in the mountains and wooded valleys of Kosovo, where poor weather often conceals the battlefield, is a daunting task for any pilot, regardless of skill level.</P>

<P> However, the Air Force's 60th Air Expeditionary Wing, stationed here at an airstrip adjacent to Frankfurt International Airport, has deployed a squadron of Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft, known as JSTARS, to help pilots flying in support of NATO's Operation Allied Force locate, track and attack Serb army units.</P>

<P> Using its sophisticated radar sensors and data communications systems, JSTARS function as mobile surveillance, reconnaissance and control centers, detecting enemy tanks, trucks and other targets on the ground and directing fighter/attack aircraft to them.</P>

<P> Flying far enough from what could be considered the front line in this air war but close enough to the action to require protection from fighter aircraft, JSTARS aircraft have contributed significantly to the success of Allied Force, and by most accounts they have proven their worth, Air Force officials said.</P>

<P> An Air Force technical sergeant, who goes by the call sign "Fairlane" and whose name is being withheld for security reasons, is a communications systems technician on one of the many JSTARS flight crews here. He said JSTARS represents what everybody in the Defense Department and the United States wants -- information superiority that requires fewer people be sent into harm's way.</P>

<P> "This is what everybody was hoping for, and it is saving lives," Fairlane said. "There's no limit to how far the JSTARS program can go," he said. "It takes a lot to task a satellite to do the job. However, we're a really cheap version of a satellite."</P>

<P> "At this point, it looks like Serbian forces in Kosovo are hunkered down in no small measure because as soon as they move, </P>

<P> JSTARS spots them and they get blown up," said John Pike, a defense and intelligence analyst with the Federation of American Scientists. "While there are other sensors that can support targeting, JSTARS is pretty much the only one that provides continuous coverage...over all Kosovo," Pike said.</P>

<P> Depending on the mission, the modified Boeing Co. 707 airframe can hold a crew of 22 and links 17 Compaq Computer Corp. Digital Alpha-based operator workstations that control on-board sensors, communications, intelligence and radar to Army mobile ground stations. The workstations also control mobile command and control networks, such as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, a secure voice and data network used by fighter aircraft, missile defense units and others.</P>

<P> The aircraft also holds a navigation workstation and carries a complement of Army specialists who communicate with forces on the ground that use special mobile JSTARS workstations.</P>

<P> According to Air Force Lt. Shawn Bishop, a communications and computer officer for JSTARS, "the plane has the capability to send images of moving targets and pictures and can tell the difference between wheeled and tracked vehicles." For example, regardless of weather conditions, the plane is able to identify whether a potential target moving down a road is a tank or a jeep -- a capability that proved critical during the Persian Gulf War. "JSTARS was just a prototype during Desert Storm, and its performance there is what really sold it to Congress," Bishop said.</P>

<P> Each airplane is equipped with five Digital Alpha servers, which run the VAX operating system. However the JSTARS Computer Replacement Program, a contract between the JSTARS program office and Northrop Grumman Corp., will replace and upgrade the current servers, operator workstations, selected portions of the radar signal processor, the local-area network and other peripheral equipment. According to Bishop, the upgrades will consolidate the five servers into two rack-mount systems and also will transition the workstations over to Microsoft Corp.'s Windows NT operating system.</P>

<P> Using a keyboard and trackball, the technical sergeant can hook into various intelligence networks to receive real-time threat updates and data from intelligence collection agencies. He also can use two satellite communications radios that are capable of transmitting and receiving voice and data. From his workstation, Fairlane can run all necessary diagnostic tests and even tune the radar. Likewise, sensor workstation operators can overlay radar images on maps, or link live video feeds from unmanned aerial vehicles flying over a target.</P>

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<P> "Everything is commercial off-the-shelf," Fairlane said. "We can upgrade all we want. In fact, software change requests can be completed within a matter of months," he said.</P>

<P> JSTARS aircraft fly missions that can last up to 24 hours. A single aircraft has enough surveillance capabilities on board, including a 26-foot-long phased-array radar antenna under the fuselage, to allow the senior surveillance director to "see" the entire area of Kosovo and more, according to Fairlane.</P>

>

<P> However, some analysts say mountainous areas such as Kosovo may be problematic at times for JSTARS, enabling forces to easily mask their presence behind hills and rugged terrain. JSTARS "is one of many capabilities we need, but obviously when you get into the kind of rugged terrain or a threat environment where it won't work, you'd better hope you didn't put all of your eggs into that basket," said a senior DOD official, who requested anonymity.</P>

<P> Although he has not done a complete analysis yet of JSTARS' performance in Kosovo, Pike said he agrees that terrain could be a limiting factor. "The big unknown at this point is the extent to which terrain masking is a problem, since that was a big factor in the somewhat disappointing performance of JSTARS in Bosnia," Pike said.</P>

<P> Despite the challenges and the fact that JSTARS aircraft take off in full view of the public at Frankfurt International Airport, "the Serbs might know we're coming, but they can't hide," Fairlane said. </P>

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

June 9, 1999</P>

<P>USN To Use GPS To Make Its Guns Smart</P>

<P> The US Navy (USN) will soon receive the first Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver designed to make deck-mounted projectile guns 'smarter' through the use of satellite guidance signals.</P>

<P> As the first such receiver to hit the market, the navy is expected to invest considerable funds to outfit up to 300,000 of its short-range fire-support guns, across the range of calibers, with the hand-sized receiver.</P>

<P> The GPS receiver, developed by Interstate Electronics Corporation (IEC) of Anaheim, California, and shipped to Raytheon, fits in the front end of the service's 5in (127mm) deck-mounted guns, such as the upgraded Mk 45, and can withstand 12,500g of force according to the company. It is designed to acquire t

he GPS signal less than six seconds after the projectile leaves the barrel.</P>

<P> "This type of receiver-performance is key to providing the USN with a cost-effective method for making their most basic sea-to-land attack weapon 'smart'," IEC said.</P>

<P> The receiver has been enhanced with IEC's Fast Acquisition/Direct Y code-processing technology to compensate for the shorter flights of projectiles fired from mobile, portable or fixed guns, company officials said. This is deemed critical because such shells cannot be powered in an operational state prior to launch.</P>

<P> The fast acquisition feature also supports the Pentagon's standoff doctrine "by allowing acquisition of the GPS satellite signals faster and further from harm's way," according to IEC, "which also allows a longer projectile control period and lower (up-range) jammer level for [inertial measurement unit] calibration, leading to higher precision".</P>

<P> IEC envisions a large market for the new receiver, for naval guns as well as 155mm guns. "This has the potential for nearly every projectile," said Fred Golightly, a company spokesman.</P>

<P> He added that IEC plans to unveil a spin-off technology from the GPS programme, called a "translator", that will allow military commanders to receive data along the projectile's flight path to make any necessary calibrations within seconds for follow-on munitions and possibly provide battle damage assessment.</P>

<I><P>- Bryan Bender, JDW Bureau Chief </P></I>

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

June 9, 1999</P>

<P>US Navy To Move Towards Commonality In Radars</P>

<P>By Bryan Bender, JDW Bureau Chief</P>

<P> Washington DC -- The US Navy is planning to consolidate all shipboard radars in operation and identify a small family of radars to meet the requirements of both current and future ship classes, following its first in-depth study of future radar needs since 1996.</P>

<P> Rear Adm Paul Schultz, director of theatre air warfare, said of the 1999 Navy Radar Roadmap Study, set for public release in July: "This is the first of several studies the navy will do over the next few years.</P>

<P> "The navy currently supports over two dozen different radars," said Adm Schultz in a statement outlining some of the study's results. "We realize that we cannot afford to continue paying for this kind of infrastructure in the next century."</P>

<P> The study focused on the need for common radar requirements in four areas: ship defence for current ship classes in the fleet after 2015; ship defence on new ship classes; theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD) requirements on existing cruisers; and TBMD requirements for the future CG-21 theatre air dominance cruiser.</P>

<P> "The study's objective was to ensure a co-ordinated radar plan with a large degree of commonality across ship classes in an effort to minimise the navy's overall radar cost," according to a summary of the report. "The roadmap will be used as a reference point from which to decide on future technology investments in radar development."</P>

<P> The study signals the navy's wish to move away from the AN/SPY Aegis system, its primary self defence and air control system, and focus investment in new radar advances in the areas such as X-band and S-band radars.</P>

<P> Officials stressed, however, that the Lockheed Martin-built Aegis system would remain of paramount importance in the interim. The study recommends that at the initial batch of cruisers equipped to intercept theatre ballistic missiles retain the Aegis radar.</P>

<P> For current ship classes, including the CVN-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; LHD and LSD-class amphibious ships; CG-class cruisers; and DDG-class destroyers, the roadmap recommends various upgrades in self-defence radars.</P>

<P> The US Navy last week awarded Raytheon a \$140 million contract for engineering and manufacturing development of the next generation Multi-Function Radar (MFR), to equip future aircraft carriers and destroyers. Total production is expected to exceed 45 radars.</P>

<P> A navy official said the theatre air warfare office has to decide which upgrades it will recommend in the final draft and various candidate radar technologies are still under consideration. To realise the benefits of such upgrades, however, the study asserts that weapons improvements to these ship classes will be required.</P>

<P> Future ship classes, such as the DD-21 land attack destroyers, CVN-77 aircraft carrier, LPD-17 amphibious ships and the replacement for the LHA class, may be fitted with a "forward fit radar configuration for self-defence and air control consisting of X-band multi-function radar (MFR) and L-band volume search radar (VSR)", which have the lowest procurement and operation and support costs.</P>

<P> The final study will outline six radar options for these future combatants, ranging between \$100 million and \$190 million, officials said.</P>

<P> Those ships that will be outfitted with the Block I Navy Theater Wide (NTW) ballistic missile defence system primarily current cruisers will retain the existing AN/SPY Aegis radar and receive signal processor and computer upgrades. For the NTW Block II, the study found that the high-powered discriminator used by the army's Ground Based Radar (GBR) system being developed for the Pentagon's National Missile Defense (NMD) system "is the only technology available with an acceptable level of risk that will meet the radar requirements for the ... mission. All other radar options will require breakthroughs in radar technology, which are considered high risk." </P>

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<P>Los Angeles Daily News

June 6, 1999

Pg. AV1</P>

<P>Edwards AFB Welcomes Marine Squadrons</P>

<P>By Charles F. Bostwick, Daily News Staff Writer</P>

<P> EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE--Three hundred Marines and Marine reservists ceremoniously reported for duty Saturday at their assault helicopter squadrons' new home at Edwards Air Force Base.</P>

<P> Clad in camouflage battle dress uniforms and stepping to a tune called "French Foreign Legion," the Marines marched into a cavernous hangar to be welcomed by Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard Reynolds, commander of Edwards' Flight Test Center.</P>

<P> "This is a great day for the Flight Test Center, a great day for Edwards Air Force Base," Reynolds told the Marines as they stood at attention in front of two sea-gray helicopters. "It has been a phenomenal example of teamwork, the type of teamwork I think we will continue to see in the years ahead."</P>

<P> Uprooted by continuing defense cutbacks, the Marines serve with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764 and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 769 - cumulatively known as Marine Aircraft Group 46 Detachment Bravo - which had to find a new home with the closure this spring of El Toro Marine Corps Air Station in Orange County.</P>

<P> The squadrons, with 12 Vietnam-era twin-rotor CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters and 10 CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, moved into one of Edwards' original hangars and half-dozen adjoining buildings beside Edwards' main runway.</P>

<P> Defense cutbacks and base closures mean the sharing of bases by units from different services is becoming more common, said Marine Maj. Gen. Kevin Kuklok, commander of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, of which the helicopter squadrons are a part.</P>

<P> "It's not unusual. It is in fact a direction the secretary of defense wants us to follow," Kuklok said.</P>

<P> The move actually puts the squadrons closer to training areas at the Marine Corps' Air-Ground Combat Center at 29 Palms and the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Kuklok said. Edwards also has much better flying weather most of the time than Orange County, he said.</P>

<P> "Within 45 minutes (flying time) we probably have got everything we need for training," said Marine Lt. Col. Kevin Frederick, commander of Marine Aircraft Group 46 Detachment Bravo.</P>

<P> The squadrons contain about 180 active-duty personnel, who will live on the base or are buying or renting homes in Rosamond or elsewhere in the Antelope Valley, and about 120 reservists.</P>

<P> HMMH-764's reservists mainly live in Orange County, where the unit had been based since 1958, but most of HMM-769's reservists live in the San Francisco Bay Area, where the unit was based for 38 years until Alameda Naval Air Station closed in 1996.</P>

<P> The reservists will train at Edwards one weekend a month, and for 15 days during the summer.</P>

<P> About 40 percent of the active-duty Marines have bought or rented homes or apartments off the base, said Marine Maj. Tim Blunck.</P>

<P> Antelope Valley leaders concerned that Edwards Air Force Base might be targeted by another round of base closures like the one that shut down El Toro think the arrival of the Marines increases the base's chances of survival.</P>
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<P> But Reynolds wouldn't comment on the idea.</P>

<P> "I'd rather not speculate on that," the general said. "Both Gen. Kunkin and I support the base closure and realignment process." </P>

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<P>Washington Times

June 8, 1999

Pg. 14</P>

<P>Helms Seeks To Keep U.S. Presence</P>

<I><P>Will lead group to visit winners of nation's polls</P>
>

</I><P>From Combined Dispatches </P>

<P> PANAMA CITY - Some U.S. politicians are interested in negotiating an agreement to keep a military presence at the Panama Canal after it comes under Panamanian control at the end of the year, Vice President-elect Arturo Vallarino said last week. </P>

<P> Sen. Jesse Helms, the North Carolina Republican who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, plans to lead a delegation to Panama to discuss the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Canal Zone, Mr. Vallarino told reporters. </P>

<P> During his visit to the United States at the end of May, Mr. Vallarino said he met with Mr. Helms and White House representative Kenneth Mackay. </P>

P>

<P> Under a 1977 treaty, the United States agreed to give Panama control of the canal and to withdraw its military forces by Jan. 1, 2000. </P>

<P> President-elect Mireya Moscoso, 52, who won the office last month on promises to battle poverty and provide more jobs, faces a tough time on both fronts when the country gains full sovereignty over all its territory for the first time since 1903, when it seceded from Colombia and the U.S. Congress voted within two weeks to finance construction of the canal. </P>

<P> "The biggest challenge we face is the canal. We have to show the whole world we can manage it as well as the Americans have," said Mrs. Moscoso, who is to take office on Sept. 1. </P>

<P> But cutting unemployment may be even harder as thousands of people working at U.S. military bases lose their jobs and authorities reduce the number of canal employees in order to make the interocean waterway a profitable operation. Since its completion in 1914, the 50-mile canal has been run from Washington as a nonprofit, strategic asset. </P>

<P> Panama also stands to lose thousands of jobs and millions of dollars generated by the American military presence.</P>

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<P>Defense News

June 14, 1999

Pg. 6</P>

<P>Laser Device May Provide U.S. Military Nonlethal Option</P>

<P>By David Mulholland, Defense News Staff Writer</P>

<P>WASHINGTON -- A device that can stun a person or freeze him in his tracks may no longer be the exclusive domain of science fiction, if a new idea in nonlethal weapons reaches development.</P>

<P>The invention uses ultraviolet lasers to create channels of ionized air leading to the target, along which a high-voltage current can be transmitted for distances as great as 100 meters.</P>

<P>Created by HSV Technologies Inc., Lakeside, Calif., the idea has been sent to the Pentagon's Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Programs Directorate, Quantico, Va., for its annual call for new ideas.</P>

<P>The directorate will announce which technologies it will pursue at the end of June, according to directorate officials.</P>

<P>While there is some debate over the intensity of the lasers needed to create electrically conductive ionized channels in the air, HSV and outside officials said the lasers will be weak enough to cause only slight skin or eye irritation.</P>

<P>International humanitarian and nongovernmental groups may contest that assertion, as they vehemently oppose laser-based nonlethal weapons on grounds they cause permanent damage to the eye.</P>

<P>The ultraviolet laser's goal is similar to the taser. But instead of using the latter's gunpowder-launched metal darts that trail wires to carry the charge, the Anti-Personnel Beam Weapon (APBW) uses lasers to create electrically conductive channels. This allows the device to project a variety of electrical charges.</P>

<P>When air is ionized, it turns into a plasma, which shares many of the electrically conductive properties of metals. By using lasers to create a positively charged conduit and a negatively charged one, coupled with a capacitor bank, the APBW can set up an electrical circuit with current running through the target, according to the patent for the device.</P>

<P>At the lowest setting, the charge would mimic the electrical impulses that the brain uses to contract muscle tissues. Eric Herr, APBW's inventor and vice president of HSV, said a blast at this level would cause a person's muscles to contract, effectively freezing them in place.</P>

<P>But other charges could be used like a taser to stun someone, kill them by causing their heart to stop beating, or even halt vehicles by shorting their electrical systems.</P>

<P>A device with such capabilities is what the U.S. military has been looking for, said a Non-Lethal Weapons Programs Directorate official who requested anonymity. Richard Scheps, a senior researcher with the U.S. Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, said the idea "has a lot of viability." Scheps is not involved in the project, but has examined the patent and experimental results.</P>

<P>If the concept is successful, Herr estimates that the device could be produced for about \$50,000 each and would be about the size of a carry-on suitcase.</P>

P>

<P>The ideas for using various electric currents to achieve the results specified in the patent are well known, as is the use of lasers to ionize air, said university and government researchers. But the power required for the lasers to create electrically conductive channels is the subject of some debate.</P>

<P> "Once air is ionized, it is a very good conductor," said Ambrogio Fasoli, assistant professor of physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Physics Department Plasma Science and Fusion Center, Cambridge, Mass. But you need a powerful laser with good beam size.</P>

<P>"I would certainly not stand in front of it," he added.</P>

<P>Herr, however, argued that the type of laser used allows it to create minimally damaging energy. In experiments at the University of California at San Diego, Herr said he was able to pass a current through a plasma conduit that was weak enough for him to put his hand into the beam, causing only minor discomfort similar to a sunburn.</P>

<P>Scheps said that the device could incorporate a rangefinder to tailor the beam's strength to target distance for the minimum power needed to maintain the plasma channel.</P>

<P>The big hurdle for HSV, said Scheps, is money. People are skeptical of the idea because the small company has not built a prototype. It cannot afford the excimer laser required, which costs about \$40,000, he said.</P>

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<P>Aviation Week & Space Technology

June 7, 1999

Pg. 30</P>

<P>Microwave Weapons Await A Future War</P>

<P>By David A. Fulghum/Washington</P>

<P> U.S. experts say that the Pentagon has at least one new, nonlethal weapon waiting in the wings, but experts say it's not likely to be used against the relatively unsophisticated technical infrastructure of Yugoslavia.</P>

<P> The weapon, delivered by a glide bomb or cruise missile, can be flown within yards of a target and exploded to produce a pulse of high-power microwaves that can disable electronic circuitry in computers and communications equipment and perhaps erase software and computer memories. On a good day, the system will work over an area the size of a football field, they said. Other days the effective range can be far less.</P>

<P> At least one version of an electric-pulse generator was initially tested on a modified air-launched cruise missile similar to those fired by B-52s against heavily defended Yugoslavian targets. However, unofficial reports indicated the Joint Standoff Weapon glide bomb is also being considered for the delivery weapon. Either would have enough standoff range to protect the launch aircraft from SA-2 or SA-3 air defense missiles.</P>

<P> Pentagon officials said the weapon is not likely to be used in Yugoslavia because they want to keep its capabilities under wraps until it's needed in some future campaign against a more sophisticated foe.</P>

<P> The assertion that the U.S. had used such a weapon was made during the first few days of the Kosovo air campaign. Representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry told Tass reporters the U.S. was using Yugoslavia as a test range for its "latest secret means of destruction."</P>

<P> The Tass wire story said a new weapon created at Los Alamos National Laboratory, designed to "destroy radio electronic equipment, is in the secret U.S. inventory." The Russians said bombs were dropped by B-2 stealth bombers to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) similar to those produced by the high-altitude detonation of nuclear weapons.</P>

<P> A senior defense official said a U.S.-built high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon, fitted to a cruise missile, could quickly be readied for operational deployment, "but there is no pressing reason to use it." There are also concerns about its use because during testing, its destructive reach proved wildly inconsistent. Depending on circumstances, conditions and the target, the effective range against electronic devices has varied from 10s of yards to 100s of yards, he said. It has not been effective at a distance as great as a quarter-mile.</P>

<P> THE U.S. HAS ALREADY used the CBU-94--a munitions dispenser dropped from dive-bombing F-117s--that dispensed sub-munitions which drifted to the ground on parachutes and on the way ejected rolls of high-conductivity carbon-graphite wire that short-circuited transformer yards and electric grids at power plants. The attacks temporarily cut off electrical power to large parts of Yugoslavia. Last week, the tactics became more harsh as the U.S. began using conventional high-explosive weapons to destroy the production of electricity and cut off power for a much longer time.</P>

<P> A former director of nonlethal weapons development at Los Alamos, retired Army Col. John Alexander, has just written Future War, a book that includes accounts of how both the HPMs or electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMPs), and carbon-graphite fiber or ribbon bombs, could be used.</P>

<P> While the effects of the carbon-graphite ribbon attacks are now well-documented from raids on Baghdad in 1991 and on Belgrade earlier this year, the HPM weapon is less well known. He describes a fictional raid on Libya. Buried telephone and fiber-optic links had been destroyed by air attacks and special forces teams that planted explosives on the lines. Certainly land lines and hilltop microwave relay stations in Yugoslavia were destroyed by U.S. bombing. In Alexander's scenario, once the foe was reliant on wireless radio communications, the electric-pulse weapon was used to complete the isolation of commanders from troops in the field.</P>

<P> "Cruise missiles with EMP warheads were flown adjacent to the target and detonated, frying the sensitive internal electronics," Alexander wrote. "What little radio communications remained were effectively jammed with conventional electronic warfare equipment."</P>

<P> Alexander believes the concept, comparable to a lightning bolt strike in the vicinity of computers or other electronic equipment, is feasible as a result of his own work at Los Alamos. The very intense pulse of electromagnetic power can get into the electronic equipment by two paths--front door and back door coupling, he said. The front doors are antennas or other paths open to the outside and lead directly to the targeted equipment. If the frequency of a target is known, the pulse can be tailored to create an even higher level of damage. Back door coupling results from a standing wave of energy that may come indirectly into the equipment through wiring, power cables, poorly shielded frames, telephone lines or even holes in the black boxes.</P>

<P> Two problems are associated with protecting electrical devices from EMP and HPM. The process, called electronic hardening, is too expensive to do extensively. There also appears to be different electronic characteristics for EMP and HPM pulses. As a result, traps for one don't always work for the other.</P>

<P> It is thought that Air Force research on an HPM weapon concentrated on conventional explosives wrapped around a coil with an active electrical field. Once detonated, the explosives squeezed the field to produce the electronic pulse. This device is called an explosively pumped flux-compression generator. Researchers at Los Alamos increased peak power output of such devices to tens of terawatts, Alexander said.</P>

<P> Meanwhile, the development of precision-guided weapons would allow planners to pinpoint targets so small the limited area covered by the burst of power would be little problem. If the weapon explodes virtually over the target, the power requirements to damage it are lower, therefore the amount of explosives and the size of the weapon required is reduced, he said.</P>

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<P>Strategic Review

Spring 1999

Pg. 23</P>

<P>New Challenges Confronting The Reserves And National Guard</P>

<P>By Allan R. Millett </P>

<P>In Brief</P>

<I><P>The current policies for providing reserve combat units to the deployed active forces are already one contingency behind in concept. While moving away from a mass mobilization, total war concept to the major regional conflict requirement, the reserve forces have still not adjusted to the most likely employment need, a recurring series of overseas American interventions that do not meet the time and scope of major regional contingency status, yet require reserve unit augmentation. One major problem for the Army Guard is the limited number of full-time veteran trainers, while the 4th Marine Division assigns training teams down to the company level in its tactical units and uses active duty Marines fresh from Fleet Marine Forces duty rather than career Reservists. The Army Guard organizational structure, moreover, encourages the maldistribution of full-time personnel by rank and the perpetuation of higher headquarters of little utility. More money is not the answer to this readiness problem. </P>

</I><P>Part-time soldiers mobilized for wartime service, citizen-armies have always produced special problems in reconciling strategy and force structure. Although national strategy might dictate one kind of force, the very nature of citizen-armies means that the politics of mobilization are likely to reshape strategy rather than vice versa. The legions of republican Rome, for example, might defend the Italian peninsula, but new legions had to be formed to attack Carthage and even more different legions to guard the marches of the Empire. In colonial Anglo-North America, the militia might attempt to defend Deerfield, Massachusetts (many times), but had to convert itself into another type of army in order to mount expeditions upon Louisbourg and Cartagena.</P>

<P>In the twentieth century, the American ground forces required fundamental changes

anges because of the growing requirement for extra-Continental expeditionary duty. Unwilling to pay for regular forces in adequate numbers for such missions, the national government turned to the militia, by 1898 a volunteer service and most often identified as the National Guard, to form expanded land forces for major emergencies. The Constitutional basis and political legitimacy for Guard service in state missions and for the defense of the continental United States was well-established, but to compel Guardsmen to serve in the defense of the Canal Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippines required a major alteration of the existing law. Between 1903 and 1916 the War Department and Congress collaborated in removing the barriers to extended expeditionary duty for the National Guard. Although the reforms fell short of the ideal standards advanced by Army and Guard reformers, the changes were substantial and produced good results in World War I.

The issue of National Guard reform, however, also produced acute awareness among military planners and the political leadership that the disruption of families, professional and business careers, and the potential income loss for Guardsmen meant that mobilizations could come only in times of national crisis. The likely burden of early war casualties would fall on the Guardsmen as well as the U.S. Army; all were likely to suffer from various degrees of unpreparedness in training and equipping as they did in 1898. If one applies the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (1984) on the commitment of American forces to combat, however, only one American intervention (World War II) truly passes the test of clear national peril. All the other major conflicts involved considerable uncertainty and lack of direct menace: the War with Spain, the Filipino-American War, the Mexican Intervention of 1916, World War I, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War.

These conflicts have more in common with today's notional Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) than they do with World War II or even the World War III That Didn't Happen, the global conflict between rival coalitions led by the United States and the Soviet Union. The major conflicts fought by the United States in the Cold War era and its denouement in the Middle East and Balkans resemble the MRCs that now shape the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. One similarity that has applied since 1950 is that the United States cannot deploy all its available forces to one region because one or more additional regions remain potential hot-spots. If, for example, the United States now placed a major expeditionary force of 600,000 in one theater (as it did in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf), what would it have left to maintain a force within NATO, to meet a crisis in another region, to cope with an insurgency, to exercise military dominance in the Caribbean when the Castro regime collapses, and to accept one or more UN peacekeeping commitments? Forming new armies would be difficult. In every historical MRC since 1900, except the Mexican intervention and the Gulf War, the United States had conscription laws in operation which insured that there were plenty of "volunteers" for both the standing and reserve forces. The dwindling size of the active duty and reserve forces now leaves little margin for deployment flexibility and less room for prohibitive casualties and drawn-out commitments.

The Only Certainty is More Conflict

Future conflicts that might attract American military action will be characterized by a high degree of uncertainty across every dimension of political and strategic calculation: national interests and goals, feasibility, the enemy

, geography, intensity of operations and likely casualties, duration of the commitment, the required size and structure of the expeditionary force, the role of allies, and the cost.</P>

<P>The roots of potential conflict - in fact, continuing conflict since 1945 - have not been removed by the end of the Cold War. More and more independent states have joined the "family of nations," which has quintupled since the end of World War II. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact alliance produced 20-25 new states or proto-states alone. Balkanization or Wilsonian self-determination may have become the Fifth Horseman. The boundaries between civil war and interstate wars become more blurred all the time with the reduced threat of great power intervention, unilateral or multilateral. Yet even with the eclipse of monarchies, empires, family dictatorships, and military kleptocracies, there is no surety that raw republics, seized with the populism of deprivation, will be inexorably drawn to peace. Moreover, the spread of modern weapons of all sorts insures that any state (even non-statist armed bands and terrorists) can muster military force of some kind, ranging from "weapons of mass destruction" to lethal small arms and anti-air and anti-armor rockets.</P>

<P>The 1997 report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict paints a blood-stained picture of international relations and predicts no immediate escape from the global hecatomb. The commission counted between 20 and 30 wars since the 1980s with 20 still in progress. War-related deaths since 1989 now number more than four million, or roughly the total fatalities of the Korean War. In 1990 the United Nations had eight peacekeeping or "preventive intervention" operations underway, but it now has around fifteen such operations every year. Since 1990 the United States has conducted 48 military operations, not counting the Gulf War, 12 of these under UN sponsorship. Yet the active American armed forces have found it difficult to provide fully manned, trained, and appropriate ground forces for many of these commitments. Reserve forces - including ground combat support and combat service support units - have come to expect (if not accept) the real risk of recurring, periodic calls to federal service for contingencies that do not even merit the label of Major Regional Conflict. The only real uncertainty is just when and where reserve ground combat forces will find themselves in battle, as National Guardsmen and Marine Corps reservists did in the Persian Gulf in February 1991. The provision for ground combat reserves remains, however, the final test of reserve force policy, a fact clear to the National Guard reformers of a hundred years ago.</P>

<P>Two Different "Total Forces"</P>

<P>Every American armed service has its own reserve component, and the Army and the Air Force each have two, since "Total Force" includes the dual-service Army National Guard and Air National Guard as well as the federal-missions-only Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve. The two Air Force reserve components and the Navy and Coast Guard reserves have developed an admirable capability to integrate themselves into the active forces for training and operations, largely because their recruiting standards and active duty training requirements insure a high degree of effectiveness, albeit an expensive one. (Reserve aviation units, for example, cost only 25% less than their active force counterparts.) Personnel can be assigned as individuals or small groups according to personal or group military specializations; detachments and squadrons normally have a "gaining command" that includes them in its training and budget planning. Navy and Air Force reserve aviation units are internationally known for their aircrew proficiency.

ciency, the result of high numbers of flying hours and long experience. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, moreover, have reorganized on functional lines, so that the Air Guard specializes in forming squadrons for air superiority, offensive air operations, and tactical support while the Air Force Reserve concentrates on strategic air-lift, reconnaissance, and a wide range of ground-based support missions. Once federalized, Air Force reserves become largely indistinguishable from their active force peers, except perhaps by age.</P>

<P>Ground force reserves - especially ground combat reserve forces - are quite another matter when it comes to missions and potential effectiveness. Ground combat reserves come from three sources: the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. Since the Marine Corps Reserve includes the aviation units of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, the Marine Corps once described its reserves as the 4th Marine Division-4th Marine Aircraft Wing Team (4th DWT), but in reality this force is integrated only for training (and rarely so), since Marines understand that the reserve aviation units will be assigned in an emergency like the Persian Gulf War to an existing aviation expeditionary force. The structure of the "Total Force" Army and the "One" Marine Corps differs by the comparable size of active duty and reserve forces. The active Army of around 500,000 is outnumbered by the Army Guard and Army Reserve, which musters 600,000 soldiers in select reserve units. The select Marine Corps Reserve of 40,000 is dwarfed by an active duty force of 174,000 Marines. The participation of ground force reserves in the Gulf War, however, shows rough comparability. The Army's reservists made up about 22% of the theater forces, the Marine reservists (including aviators) about 15%. In terms of training costs, equipment allowance, personnel costs, and infrastructure demands, the Army and Marine reservists are much the same, since they (ground units only) cost about one-fifth the cost of comparable active duty units.</P>

<P>The Army Reserve, programmed to include around 208,000 members in the Select Reserve in 1999, provides individuals or specialized combat service support units to augment and reinforce the active Army. It provides experienced officers and NCOs to become the cadre of training camps upon mobilization or to perform other training missions. In peacetime it provides units that conduct and support major field exercises. The Army Reserve specializes (as the original legislation of 1916 intended) in providing officers and enlisted specialists (like medical personnel) that are in habitually short supply in the active force. Army Reserve units are undermanned in pre-mobilization status, but can be easily amalgamated on functional lines when called to active duty or dispersed to existing units. It can draw fillers from the Individual Ready Reserve, a pool of mobilizable veterans. Although it appears top-heavy in administrative structure, the Army Reserve is reasonably well organized to support an active force. It does not, however, provide many trigger-pullers.</P>

<P>The employable ground combat power of America's reserve forces remains in the Army National Guard and the 4th Marine Division. Both provide Select Reserve combat units (infantry, artillery, armor, cavalry-reconnaissance) for contingency missions. The National Guard has 48 brigades of infantry, cavalry, armor, field artillery, and air defense artillery; the 4th Marine Division has three regimental combat teams or brigade equivalents. In the Persian Gulf War the Army Guard provided four artillery battalions; the 4th Marine Division deployed four infantry battalions, a separate infantry company, one TOW anti-tank company, four tank companies, seven artillery batteries, one assault amphibian vehicle company, and four light armored infantry (LAAV-mounted) companies to the I Marine

Expeditionary Force. The Army called two Guard mechanized infantry brigades and one armored brigade into federal service, but they did not leave the United States. The Marine reserve units merged smoothly into the I MEF when they joined it in Saudi Arabia. The ready status of the National Guard combat units became an issue within the Army and the media upon their call-up and remains controversial. Although the four Marine Reserve infantry battalions retained their unit integrity when they joined parent task force/regimental headquarters, all the other Marine Reserve companies and batteries participated in Operation Desert Storm as reinforcements to parent active battalions, which either retained operational control or assigned the units to combined task forces. This employment pattern represented Marine Corps policy to use reservists to reinforce and augment active battalions. Only one reserve infantry regiment headquarters deployed, and it did not exercise any operational control during Operation Desert Storm.

The National Guard still insists (and exercises its powers under law) that its combat units be federalized with their state identifications and their highest operational headquarters intact. Although the National Guard still maintains divisions, its deployment policies focus on brigades and battalions or units of smaller size, in part because all of these organizations must be augmented to war-strength from the Individual Ready Reserve, by active duty soldiers, or by other Guardsmen.

Critics of the National Guard within the Army and in the defense analysis community always take the easy road and condemn the Guard for its political influence in Congress and its close ties to state governors and legislatures. Political aggressiveness alone does not distinguish the Army Guard from the Marine Corps Reserve. As a former Marine Corps Reserve infantry battalion commander and former national president of the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association, I can assert with some confidence that the Marine Corps Reserve also knows how to lobby on its own behalf. The difference in effectiveness between the two ground forces is shaped instead by several interacting institutional characteristics. Senior Marine officers are just as nervous as their Guard counterparts about reserve field performance and the risk of heavy casualties, but at least in 1990-1991 they had more faith that 4th Marine Division units could fight while Army generals did not display the same confidence in the three mobilized Guard combat brigades. Some organizational comparison suggests what reforms the Army Guard must undertake before it fulfills its combat responsibilities.

Reform Initiatives

Since the elevation of one of its own to the post of Secretary of Defense, The Hill has been alive with the sound of reserve reform. In 1997 Secretary William Cohen told the senior political appointee and military officers of the Department of Defense that he wanted all structural and cultural "residual barriers" to Total Force integration removed. A new flood of incentives, rewards, and protections began to appear in the next two defense authorization acts, ranging from common identification cards to a doubled number of annual commissary visits. The Reserve Forces Policy Board completed a major study in 1998 that covered most of the personnel issues that reservists know so well. If reserve force readiness could only be transformed into one big recruitment and retention problem, then those "residual barriers" would indeed be tumbling down. Training, however, and training structure for a part-time force still remains the heart of reserve force reform. Except for the fact that the ten-fold increase of federal

al active duty provides more on-the-job training, some of the most serious training issues have not been addressed.</P>

<P>Readiness and Training</P>

<P>For all its talk about the importance of geographic-organizational integrity, the Army Guard finds it challenging to man 62 brigades (combat, combat support, and combat service support) as well as smaller units on a troop base of 357,000 Guardsmen. To be employed in contingency missions, all these units would have to be amalgamated, augmented, reassigned, and disestablished, just as they have been in every war since World War I. Yet law and tradition support the perpetuation of more higher headquarters than any reasonable foreseeable mission would require. In very rough terms the "brigade slice" in the Army Guard is 5,900 and in the 4th Marine Division more than 8,000 reservists. As for training, both forces spend about the same amount of time in uniform every year, some 40 days for enlisted personnel and about 50 for officers. Their equipment in numbers and modernity are much alike and now much closer to that of the active forces.</P>

<P>One difference is the leadership competence in the officer ranks. Marine Reserve officers with few exceptions have served three or more years on active duty, but Guardsmen can win commissions through state officer candidate schools and ROTC commissioning programs, both of which require only enough active duty for initial branch qualification schooling. Moreover, Marine Reserve officers can command companies and platoons at one rank above that called for in the Table of Organization and Equipment. It is not unusual to find majors commanding companies and batteries and captains platoons. Guard officers have to qualify for a billet, then pass promotion screening. The job brings the rank.</P>

<P>Another factor in insuring combat arms qualification is the Marine Corps policy of putting all recruits through the same boot camp training regime and then continuing this integration through the School of Infantry and additional training in a military occupational specialty (MOS). Reserve Marines on initial active duty training then go to Fleet Marine Forces units to complete their minimum of six months training, and many of them extend their active duty to participate in overseas deployments or to attend additional schools or specialist training. The Army Guard depends upon its own schools and unit training to produce qualified soldiers. Both services have common problems in retaining prior-service personnel, but the Marine Corps Reserve in 1996 found half of its accessions among Marines with two or more years of active duty. The same similarity applies for MOS-qualification for officers and senior NCOs, who may find that their civilian employment puts them in a location where the Marine Reserve unit is not the same sort of unit in which they served on active duty. For Marine Reserve ground officers, this problem is not very acute, since almost all of them have training and field experience in Fleet Marine Forces expeditionary units.</P>

<P>The effectiveness of all reserve units rests, to a large degree, upon the numbers, skills, distribution, and missions of the full-time officers and NCOs assigned to the reserves. In the Army National Guard, in 1998, for example, 4,372 officers and 17,990 enlisted personnel (AGR) provided full-time support for their fellow Guardsmen, assisted by another 23,611 federal technicians, who are also qualified Guardsmen on career assignment to provide expertise to Guard units. The Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Authorization Act added another 800 federal technicians to this support force. In sum, almost 47,000 full-time Guardsmen provide

de the framework for Guard training and readiness. In the general military personnel reduction that has proceeded since 1991, the number of active duty Guardsmen has shrunk along with the drill-pay Guardsmen, but they still constitute about 12% of all Guardsmen. The Army Reserve, much to its displeasure, is not so well supported. On a troop strength of 208,000 (1998) the Army Reserve includes 11,500 AGRs and 4,500 federal technicians (1998) or roughly 8% of the total Army Reserve force. The Reserve Officers Association believes that a minimum of 10% of Army Reserve forces should be full-time soldiers. One thousand more AGRs added in FY1999 will close this support "gap."

The Marine Corps uses a similar system, assigning reserve officers and NCOs to active duty and providing regular officers and NCOs as the Inspector-Instructor staffs for every Marine Reserve unit down to the company and detachment level. In 1998 the total number of active duty Marine officers and NCOs or reserves on full-time active duty assigned to Inspector-Instructor (I&I) duty was 182 officers and 1,642 enlisted personnel. They are an integral part of the 905 officers and 15,750 Marines in the 4th Marine Division. One investigation of reserve readiness after the Gulf War suggested that the number and skills of Marine I&I staffs explained why Marine reserve companies could integrate so smoothly into the active duty establishment. A comparison of the Army Guard and Marine Corps provisions for full-time personnel shows some interesting differences that should redefine the readiness debate.

A Case in Point: Ohio's Forces

The State of Ohio can serve as an example of the contrasting commitment of regular cadre to reserve forces. Like the Army Guard, the Marine Corps Reserve has about half its members in ground combat units, the other half assigned to supporting and service units of some kind whose parent headquarters supervise units geographically separated. In Ohio the 4th Marine Division and its Force Service Support Group have seven different units and reserve centers. Three units fall into the combat support category. Four of the five companies of the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, represent the Marine Reserve combat power based in Ohio. In late 1998 the battalion was composed of 813 reservists and 51 active duty Marines.

The Army National Guard of the State of Ohio is manned by 844 commissioned officers, 213 warrant officers, and 9,518 enlisted personnel (1997). The combat arms component of the Ohio Army Guard is the 37th Armored Brigade, which consists of a brigade headquarters and headquarters company, two tank battalions, and a mechanized infantry battalion. In addition, the brigade has peacetime supervision of two other Ohio Guard ground combat units that would deploy with other higher headquarters upon mobilization: a field artillery battalion and a cavalry squadron. The strength of the headquarters and five battalions (May, 1998) is 266 officers and warrant officers and 3,131 enlisted personnel. The brigade alone is 500 soldiers below its authorized peacetime strength.

To provide training and administrative support for a state Army Guard of 10,575 officers and enlisted personnel, the Guard itself provides full-time 92 officers and warrant officers and 444 enlisted personnel on term active duty contracts (known as Active Guard/Reserve members) while 90 officers and warrant officers and 399 enlisted personnel are "federal technicians" or full-time Guardsmen who are paid by the Department of the Army as career civilian employees and integrated into the structure of the Guard and subject to military mobilization.

Thus, 1,015 officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the Ohio Army Guard are full-time soldiers, roughly 10% of the Ohio Guard's strength. The number of full-time soldiers assigned somewhere in the structure of the 37th Armored Brigade and the two independent battalions is 121 officers and enlisted personnel. These full-time soldiers constitute only 3% of the actual strength of the 37th Armored Brigade. The rest of the full-time Guardsmen are assigned to other units and higher headquarters.

The full-time staff assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines is, by comparison, seven officers and 44 enlisted personnel to provide support for a force of 46 officers and 753 enlisted personnel. The battalion's mobilizable strength (reservists and I&I staff) is 850 Marine and Navy personnel, which means that 6% of the battalion are full-time personnel or some 4% fewer full-time members than those in the Ohio Army National Guard (all components). Obviously the number of full-time Guardsmen is heavily influenced by the number of homestations the Guard maintains and may vary with the special demands of units that have a heavy capital investment in major weapons systems like helicopters and tanks. The same consideration applies to combat service support units that care for, train with, and maintain high technology systems like operational communications or terminally guided ordnance.

A more appropriate analysis of full-time support personnel would compare the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines and the 37th Armored Brigade. The companies of the Marine reserve battalion each have eight full-time, active duty Marines and one Navy corpsman who perform in functional terms all the duties of a higher (battalion) headquarters staff. The companies of the combat arms battalions of the 37th Armored Brigade have two or perhaps three full-time Guardsmen assigned to them, with the number of full-time Guardsmen increasing at the battalion and brigade level. On the assumption that each Guard battalion has five companies, this distribution means that only about half the full-time Guardsmen in the brigade are in direct, routine contact with the fighting troops. While the Marine battalion (five companies) has 51 full-time Marines and sailors in its structure, the counterpart Army Guard battalion has only 10-15 full-time soldiers within battalions whose average strength is only about 200 trigger-pullers fewer than their Marine reserve counterpart. In other words, the Marine reservists benefit from the guidance of one regular Marine for every seventeen reservists, while the Guardsmen are served on a scale of one full-time soldier for roughly every 50 Guardsmen and that advisor is one of their own, not a professional soldier.

The cost of Guard full-time personnel is substantial and is directly related to the ranks and grades of the officers and enlisted soldiers in these billets. Of the active Army officers assigned to the Ohio Army Guard, 40 of 73 are majors or above; for the non-commissioned officers, 277 of 444 are staff non-commissioned officers (E-6 or above). The pattern for federal technicians is the same: 27 of 48 are field grade officers and 277 of 399 enlisted technicians are staff non-commissioned officers. For FY1994 almost half of the Ohio Army Guard's federal dollars (\$29 million of \$63.5 million) went to pay the federal technicians. The State of Ohio provided the Ohio Guard with \$12 million for FY1994, part of which funded the four full-time general officers and other Guardsmen assigned to agencies with state missions. The 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines has two lieutenant colonels (the commanding officer and senior I&I) for the 864 Marines and Navy corpsmen; the Ohio National Guard needs 95 lieutenant colonels for a force only 15 times larger. Even though both reserve forces provide headquar

ters for units that are stationed outside the state boundaries, the difference in rank-overhead is still striking.

Despite the easy observation that the Marine Corps provides more full-time support at the company and detachment level - which it does - the Army National Guard is not undermanned with full-time soldiers, but it appears that only a small proportion of them are actively engaged in training. Instead they are administrators, planners, accountants, maintenance and supply specialists, and recruiters. Many are dedicated to the construction and repair of the Guard's extensive (and expensive) physical plant, facilities that often represent serious political commitments, intense lobbying, and Congressional interest. By preserving a command architecture and rank structure more appropriate for World War II or Cold War M-Day concepts, the Army Guard's combat formations are undermanned, over-administrated, and inadequately trained for operations at the brigade level. For all the obfuscation and recrimination that followed the Persian Gulf War, the real lesson is that the Army Guard's combat units could get into the fight more quickly and efficiently if they would follow the pattern of Army Guard combat service support units, and that is to reinforce and augment active force formations already in business and do so as battalions or smaller units.

Options

The efficacy of reserve ground combat organizations remains the major policy challenge for Total Force planners - as it has since 17th century America.

Air and naval forces create their own special conditions for service, and these appear to be relatively well-in-hand. Reserve combat support and combat service support units - many of them overextended for the last 20 years - have proven their value time and again in large and small contingency missions. The Total Force concept, however, will be difficult to implement for missions less demanding than a major regional contingency of the duration of the Korean and Vietnam wars, especially if reserve ground combat forces are expected to participate in a full and timely manner. Deployments of frequent occurrence and short duration - perhaps using only a fraction of the reserves available, but still requiring reserve units - should be limited to combat service support units only, units provided in adequate numbers either to supply individual and small groups of volunteers or to allow frequent rotation where involuntary call-ups are inescapable. Ground combat units should be saved only for MRCs and structured and trained on the assumption that they will not be used in elements larger than battalion task forces, integrated into larger active force formations. This policy would, in effect, simply rationalize the de facto practice now in place, but might allow some trimming of reserve administrative overhead.

Another option would be to restructure the Army Guard and Marine Corps Reserve ground combat units for less-than-MRC missions (the interventions in Haiti and Somalia come to mind), but that would require more fundamental restructuring - such as turning half-strength battalions into full strength companies; providing enhanced training and active duty trainers; forming true "gaining command" relationships with active force units; a willing acceptance of the reinforcing and augmentation role that might restrict the active duty opportunities for senior officers and SNCOs; and a far more rigorous initial active duty training for or enlisted personnel and longer active duty requirements for officers. The Marine Corps Reserve has already taken this road, and the Army Guard needs to follow it rather than pretend that it will do World War II better. The Army Guard could, in fact, have it both ways. It might create select battalions and companies

es that could meet rapid deployment criteria to reinforce and augment active Army units, but it could also maintain battalions (but not brigades) that could be made deployable within 90-120 days from federalization. In fact, the Department of the Army in April 1998, announced an experiment that would integrate Guard and Active Army light infantry companies within active Army battalions.

Since the end of conscription in the United States in the 1970s, the armed forces have struggled to make the Total Force concept of active force-reserve integration fit the nation's real-world contingency missions. As long as Cold War-driven contingency plans took precedence, the provision for large (division and brigade) reserve ground combat formations made some sense, however marginal. Even the major regional contingency requirement was appropriate as the basis for structuring reserve ground combat forces. The new world disorder, however, demands the reevaluation of the assumptions that shape reserve ground combat formations. Such a serious reconsideration has not yet begun.

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<P>Vietnam Vets' Remains Are Identified </P>

<P> The remains of two U.S. Marine aviators who were unaccounted for in the Vietnam War have been identified and will be returned to their families for burial in the United States. </P>

<P> The Pentagon announced yesterday the positive identification of Capt. Robert A. Holt, of Reading, Mass., and Capt. John A. Lavoo, of Pueblo, Colo. They were flying a combat mission over Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, on Sept. 19, 1968, when their F-4B Phantom jet crashed with no trace of survivors.
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<P> With the accounting of these two men, there are now 2,061 Americans listed by the Pentagon as unaccounted for from the war.</P>

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<P>Defense Daily

June 9, 1999

Pg. 6</P>

<P>A Tale Of Two Sturgeons: Bath Iron Works Upgrades</P>

<P>By Vago Muradian</P>

<P> BATH, Maine When Bath Iron Works [GD] prepared to get its \$218 million modernization effort underway last year to claim 15 acres from the Kennebec River in a expansion bid critical to its survival, the nations oldest major shipyard ran into a force more powerful than the Pentagon or Congress: two short-nose river sturgeon.</P>

<P> Despite decades of research--including a three-year \$1 million study--the two endangered fish simply decided not to behave the way biologists said they would. Most of their counterparts were coerced into relocating away from the area slated for dynamiting and dredging.</P>

<P> But not Sturgeon No. 16, a male, and No. 22, a female. They refused to leave, baffling scientists, and forcing the company to put its plans on hold for two months, until early Jan., when it could assure--as required by federal environmental regulations--the safety of the primitive fish.</P>

<P> "If they all left when they were supposed to, we could have started work right away," Walter Cantrell, the chief of Baths Land Level Transfer Facility, the formal name of the renovation, told Defense Daily during a recent interview here. "But No. 16 stayed the whole time we were studying them, and No. 22 joined him later. Now, we didnt tag every fish in the river, but a statistically valid sample. So that got us into the question, if those two are there, are there others in this statistically valid sample that also decided to stay?"</P>

<P> The entire episode illustrates the challenges facing companies nationwide that are seeking expansion into environmentally-sensitive areas, such as Bath which has no other option but to expand into the Kennebec.</P>

<P> Bounded on land by a protected marsh, the Carlton bridge across the Kennebec--soon to be joined by the new Sagadahoc--and the town of Bath, the 56-acre shipyard had only one direction in which it could go for the land it needed to expand: the river.</P>

<P> The nations smallest major yard needs the added room to more effectively compete for the DD-21 future destroyer contract as well as improve its efficiencies on the LPD-17 amphibious ships it will build as a subcontractor to Avondale Industries [AVDL]. On DD-21 Bath in cooperation with Lockheed Martin [LMT] is competing against Ingalls </P>

<P> To do that, Bath had to become an expert on the sturgeon. The study was part of a nearly \$4 million environmental effort that included tearing down an old dam that for decades has kept the sturgeon from prime spawning grounds.</P>
>

<P> But after years of study, apparently the only thing that appears certain about the fish is that its ugly. Everything else, however, appears to be wrong.</P>

<P> Marine scientists said the sturgeon is migratory. Its not. The same biologists claimed the bottom-dwelling fish feeds only on the silty river bottom. But sometimes, it likes to dine on the surface.</P>

<P> And in tagging the fish, studies indicate that there are more of the fish than expected. So many more in fact that the short-nose river sturgeon may no longer qualify as an endangered species under federal regulations. Government officials recently have suggested that there may be far more of the fish than it thought. Large and bony, for millennia the cartilaginous fish has prowled Americas great rivers, including the Kennebec.</P>

<P> But its unappealing physical appearance has not been enough to protect the fish--prized for its tender flesh and flavorful eggs that produce the finest caviar. The sturgeon has been relentlessly hunted, earning it a berth on the nations first endangered species list in 1974.</P>

<P> And on the list its stayed, another living fossil teetering on the verge of extinction, or so everyone thought until the General Dynamics-owned shipyard started its strategic modernization plan.</P>

<P> Before Bath could start dynamiting the river bed to reclaim the 15 acres it needed, studies had to determine how the blasting and dredging would impact the fish. Could they tolerate three blasts a day, every working day, for three months?</P>

<P> Studies concluded that the noise, which is six times louder underwater than on the surface, is largely harmless to mature sturgeon. Some smelts were killed in test blasts, but only a handful. One conclusion was that the largest danger of the blasting probably was to local fisherman.</P>

<P> "Theyre big fish, about five feet long and up to 50 pounds and theyve got big teeth," Cantrell said. "The blasting makes them real mad, real mad. Id hate to be the guy who catches one after one of those charges go off."</P>

<P> To minimize physical injury from the blasting and dredging operations, engineers had to devise a way to get the fish away from the worksite. For most of the fish, the solution was deceptively simple. Apparently as in humans, sex and food appear to be the keys to a sturgeons heart, with both having been used to lure the fish to safety. Also, the primitive fish also are easily distracted, Cantrell added.</P>

<P> "When there is a disturbance in the water, like a boat, they get distracted," he said. "Were not sure why, but we found that if we stir up activity in places other than where we want them to be, theyre curious about

t it. So wed put a boat in the water and theyd go follow it." </P>

<P> According to company executives, the entire process may sound comical, but is simply the price of doing business.</P>

<P> "If it preserves the environment, its worth doing," Cantrell said.</P>

<P> Frustration with the process, he added, sets in when well-intentioned r egulations backfire and end up safeguarding an area some claim doesnt deserve p rotection at all.</P>

<P> Abutting the south end of the shipyard is a roughly 20-acre marsh, whic h is protected, forcing engineers into the river and a process from which they emerged as one of the nations leading sturgeon experts.</P>

<P> "We thought the marsh had always been there," Cantrell said. "Well, it hasnt."</P>

<P> Cantrell made the discovery when looking at an old picture of the yard in which no marsh occupies the area in question today.</P>

<P> "Turns out its man-made," Cantrell said. "About 70 years ago, the phone company started dumping their cable reels in the river; you kno w, those big wooden reels everyone uses as picnic tables. Well, over the years, mud filled in around thousands them and a marsh developed."</P>

<P> Although man-made, and likely contaminated by the petrochemicals that t he cables were made of, the marsh must be preserved, Cantrell said.</P>

<P> "It may sound like a contradiction, but there you have it," h e said.</P>

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<P>Wall Street Journal

June 8, 1999

Pg. B19A</P>

<P>Companies View Potential Contracts As More Valuable Than War Payments</P>

<P>By James Efstathiou, Dow Jones Newswires</P>

<P>Companies that lost property, cash or expected profits as a result of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait have abandoned about \$900 million in compensation claims against Iraq, in many cases to promote current or future business relationships with Baghdad.</P>

<P>While the companies range from construction outfits to drug makers to food-processing concerns, many share a common characteristic: They hold or covet contracts to sell humanitarian supplies through a multibillion-dollar United Nations aid program.</P>

<P>In interviews and in documentation offered to the U.N. Compensation Commission in Geneva, company officials say they are dropping their claims under pressure from Iraqi officials as a condition for doing business under the U.N. 's "oil-for-food" program.</P>

<P>Caught Off Guard</P>

<P>The maneuver has caught U.N. officials off guard, but for the companies involved, the choice is clear: Drop a claim that may amount to a fraction of real or prospective business with Iraq, or watch contracts go to other firms. "My understanding is [Iraqi officials] did come to our French company," said Art Fruchtmann, general counsel for Ingersoll-Dresser Pumps SPA in Liberty Corner, N.J. The discussion led the joint venture to drop its claim so it could protect contracts to sell Iraq Ingersoll water pumps, Mr. Fruchtmann said.</P>

<P>Since December 1998, 21 companies have withdrawn claims totaling about \$900 million, according to Michael Raboin, deputy executive director of the Compensation Commission. Another 25 firms have asked for written confirmation that they hold no claims against Iraq, he said.</P>

<P>U.N.-Controlled Oil Sales</P>

<P>Iraq's responsibility for invasion and occupation losses was set in 1991 by Security Council Resolution 687 and accepted by Baghdad in the cease-fire with the Allied Coalition. Claims are paid with the proceeds of U.N.-controlled oil sales; Iraq retains operational control of the program, including the right to choose suppliers.</P>

<P>Since its creation in 1991, the commission has received 2.6 million claims from individuals, corporations and governments seeking more than \$300 billion. Nine years after the invasion, companies are to begin receiving payments this summer.</P>

<P>U.N. Security Council members here in New York said they were aware of the withdrawals, but had few details. Diplomats are reluctant to interfere in Iraq's

business dealings and remain deadlocked over how much to loosen economic sanctions to encourage Iraqi cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors. The U.N. placed Iraq under economic sanctions for invading Kuwait, and they can't be lifted until inspectors verify the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The oil-for-food program was launched in 1996 as a six-month sanctions waiver on \$2 billion of oil exports primarily to raise money for food and medicine. Today, the program allows the export of as much as \$5.26 billion of crude every six months for a range of humanitarian imports, including oil-sector spare parts. In the six months ended May 24, Iraq sold \$3.93 billion of oil.

Revenue Siphoner

Iraq has challenged the size of some claims, as well as provisions that siphon off 30% of revenue, almost all of it for the compensation fund. In approved corporate claims, the commission has awarded on average 24% of the asserted losses, according to U.N. records.

Iraq's U.N. Ambassador, Saeed H. Hasan, has said companies bringing "excessive, exaggerated" claims against Iraq should not be rewarded with contracts, but he did say he didn't know whether Iraq was requiring vendors to drop claims to participate in the program.

A U.S. State Department official accused Baghdad of manipulating the program to "escape that obligation" of paying compensation. Washington has yet to determine how to respond, the agency said.

Pressure from Baghdad also has raised difficult questions for firms such as Tekfen Construction & Installation Co. Tekfen is one of Turkey's largest conglomerates, with interests in banking, construction and food services.

The company submitted a claim of \$3 million to \$4 million for a variety of losses, including confiscation of property and the loss of performance bonds, said Murat Gigin, a former company president and current board member. The bonds are used as security for construction projects.

Tekfen also has signed humanitarian-aid contracts with Baghdad valued at \$17 million to \$20 million, the bulk of which cover parts needed to repair a key pump station on the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline.

Mr. Gigin said Tekfen withdrew its claim after Iraqi officials said company equipment had been returned and performance bonds released. Noting that pressure tactics were "not beyond Iraqi negotiating capabilities," Mr. Gigin said there were no conditions for future business placed on his firm from Baghdad.

An Egyptian diplomat in Geneva said companies from his country that supply food and medicine to Iraq have also been asked to drop claims.

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<P>Omaha World-Herald

June 6, 1999</P>

<P>Ex-SAC Chief Butler Faults Nuclear Moves </P>

<P>By Niz Proskocil, World-Herald Staff Writer</P>

<P> The United States will continue to spend billions on nuclear weapons it doesn't need because of recent Senate action, a Cold Warrior who has turned into an anti-nuclear activist said in Omaha on Saturday.</P>

<P> Retired Air Force Gen. Lee Butler, former commander of the Strategic Air Command, fielded questions from 14 people at the Distinguished Leaders Dialogue, sponsored by All About Omaha, a young-adults group. In his talk, Butler addressed the crisis in the Balkans, the Cold War, Latin America and a conflict that has festered for decades between India and Pakistan over the disputed province of Kashmir.</P>

<P> Saturday's talk was held at the W. Dale Clark main library.</P>

<P> The Senate action Butler referred to was the defeat last month of a proposal offered by Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb. The measure would have removed limits on dismantling strategic nuclear delivery systems. It failed 56-44.</P>

<P> Butler said the United States and Russia together have about 30,000 nuclear weapons "grotesquely" capable of mass destruction.</P>

<P> In his 33-year military career, Butler served in several Pentagon positions, the last as director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Gen. Colin Powell. Butler retired from his position at Offutt Air Force Base in March 1994.</P>

<P> As commander at a strategic command center, he would have assumed responsibility for launching nuclear weapons upon orders from the White House. Butler's views on using nuclear weapons changed when he first visited the Soviet Union, "the homeland of my sworn enemy," in 1988 and witnessed the country's economic distress, he said.</P>

<P> "It was a humbling experience," Butler told the group. "Russia was a co

untry nearly 100 to 200 years behind."

When Dana Cohn asked Butler to discuss his fight to ban nuclear weapons, he declined to comment out of respect for the leaders of the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base.

Butler refuses to give speeches about his anti-nuclear stance when he is in Omaha, he said. "I do that as a courtesy to my successors," he said.

In 1996, in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Butler said he came away from his career in the Air Force "deeply troubled by what I see as the burden of building and maintaining nuclear arsenals."

Butler did talk Saturday about his recent trip to India, where he conferred with scientists and officials about what he called the country's "ready, fire, aim" nuclear weapons policy.

"That's what we're dealing with," Butler said. "You go to Pakistan and you get the same story." Both countries tested nuclear devices within a few months of each other last year.

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Strategic Review

Spring 1999

Pg. 17

Mr. Clinton's War On Terrorism

By Andrew J. Bacevich

In Brief

The Clinton administration's much ballyhooed war on terror and related penchant for doomsday scenarios reveal less about an actual threat than they

do about the premises of current U.S. foreign policy. The persistence of terrorism represents an affront to Bill Clinton's frequently expressed confidence that globalization is destined to give birth to a new international order characterized by peace and democracy. An all-out offensive to eradicate terrorism will permit the so-called "inexorable process of globalization" to triumph. But this view overstates the immediate danger posed by terrorism and robs it of its political context. That threat should not be taken lightly, but it demands a response informed by strategic realism not hyperbole. </P>

</I><P>Bill Clinton wants you. The President who as a young man adroitly avoided military service now summons his countrymen to enlist in a great crusade. Having throughout his administration proclaimed that a new age of peace and prosperity beckons, Mr. Clinton has now ascertained that the nation is in grave peril. </P>

<P>"Terrorism," the President has concluded, "is the enemy of our generation."1 Armed with weapons of fearsome lethality, that enemy threatens to bring the world's only superpower to its knees. Appearing on national television, Secretary of Defense William Cohen warns of an attack by anthrax-wielding fanatics that kills half the residents of the nation's capital and paralyzes the federal government. A veteran of Mr. Clinton's National Security Council conjures up the prospect of a small nuclear device vaporizing the Empire State Building, contaminating the eastern seaboard with radiation, and leaving as many as 200,000 people dead.2 White House terrorism czar Richard A. Clarke warns of an "electronic Pearl Harbor," a coordinated cyber attack on the nation's critical computer networks. That attack succeeds in "shutting down 911 systems, shutting down telephone networks, and transportation systems. You black out a city, people die. Black out lots of cities, lots of people die. It's as bad as being attacked by bombs."3</P>

<P>Such dire forebodings have convinced Mr. Clinton's national security team that terrorism, in the words of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, is "the war of the future."4 To fight that war, the administration has jettisoned traditional U.S. policy that categorized terrorists as criminals and defined terrorism as a law enforcement issue. In its place, Mr. Clinton has instituted a comprehensive new strategy, global in scope, proactive in approach, and tapping the resources of agencies across the federal government. Initiatives include the creation of a national stockpile of vaccines and antibiotics for use in response to chemical or biological attack, the training of emergency response teams in major cities across America, and the hardening of government facilities at home and abroad. The President has even proposed the creation of a "Cyber Corps" to protect against burgeoning threats to the nation's electronic infrastructure. </P>

<P>But the aim of this new strategy is not simply defensive. The administration intends to preempt terrorist action, to identify and dismantle terrorist networks, and ultimately to eradicate the threat altogether. Rather than reactive, the strategy aims to seize the initiative. "In all our battles" against terrorists, the President vows, "we will be aggressive."5</P>

<P>Seizing the initiative implies a greater reliance on military power. In Mr. Clinton's war against terrorism, the Pentagon plays a leading role, employing its high-tech arsenal not only to exact retribution but also to take the offensive. In that regard, the August 1998 cruise missile strike against the Al Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, alleged to manufacture compounds essential for the

e production of nerve gas, marks a fundamental shift in policy. By no means a one-shot affair, this attack, according to Secretary Cohen, illustrates "the long-term, fundamental way in which the United States intends to combat the forces of terror."⁶

Yet this new emphasis on the use of U.S. military power does not imply that waging war on terrorism is exclusively the government's affair. According to Mr. Clinton, a full-fledged national mobilization is in order. In the fight against terror, "every American counts."⁷ Overcoming terror will require heroic exertions. The President does not hesitate to liken those exertions to the sacrifices that earlier generations made in the fight against Hitler and Stalin. The war against terror, the President warns, promises to be a "long, hard struggle." But just as our fathers and grandfathers persevered to "protect our values in World War II and the Cold War," so too, in responding to this new and dangerous foe, Americans must rise to the occasion and "we must prevail."⁸

Evaluating the Threat

The terrorist threat to the United States and its interests is real. Yet terrorism itself is not new. Nor, arguably, is the threat increasing. Indeed, the available data suggest just the opposite. As measured by the State Department's annual report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, the incidence of international terrorism over the past decade has declined substantially. Since reaching a peak of 665 incidents worldwide in 1987, the level of activity has fallen by over half. In 1998 273 attacks occurred, the lowest level since 1971. The preponderance of those attacks were directed against property and caused no casualties. In 1998, not a single incident of international terrorism occurred in the United States. Since 1992, the number of Americans killed each year due to international terrorism has averaged fewer than ten.

As apocalyptic speculation has supplanted factual analysis, U.S. officials have tended to discount the trends suggested by their own data. According to the Clinton administration, numbers don't tell the true story. Indeed, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism insists that when it comes to measuring terrorism "we shouldn't place too much emphasis on statistics."⁹ Rather than statistics, the administration points to a comparative handful of incidents - the World Trade Center (1993), Oklahoma City (1995), Atlanta's Centennial Park (1996), Khobar Towers (1996), U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) - as evidence that terrorism is on the rise and becoming ever more deadly. An incident hardly less significant than attacks occurring on American soil or targeting Americans abroad, in this view, was the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shin Rikyo religious sect in March 1995. In the administration's view, this qualifies as a threshold event, the violation of an old taboo suggesting a willingness by terrorists worldwide to employ weapons of mass destruction. The result, according to the administration, is a "new" terrorism: mindless, random violence perpetrated by deranged primitives like the Unabomber or by maniacal fanatics like Usama Bin Laden, employing weapons of increasing sophistication and lethality, and portending death and devastation on an unprecedented scale.

In truth, the administration's growing preoccupation with terrorism and penchant for doomsday scenarios reveal less about an actual threat than they do about the premises of American foreign policy in the Clinton era. In a sense, the President's bleak prediction about mounting terror provides the inverse of his

vision of international politics. Terror, according to the President, "is a desperate act to turn back the tide of history."¹⁰ The abiding conceit of Mr. Clinton and his compatriots is their insistence upon having correctly discerned the direction in which that tide is carrying the world.

<P>The Promise of Globalization</P>

<P>Since becoming President, Mr. Clinton has subjected Americans to an endless barrage of diplomatic happy talk. The essence of the President's views on international politics can be summarized briefly. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the "inexorable logic of globalization" is transforming the international order.¹¹ Democracy and free market principles are on the march. As the "indispensable nation" and the leading exemplar of democratic capitalism, the United States both inspires this transformation and provides the engine that propels it forward. The worldwide embrace of political values and economic policies favored by Americans is both inevitable and irreversible. There emerges as a result an international order whose abiding characteristic is "openness," with trade, capital, people, and ideas all moving freely across borders. Within the foreseeable future, this openness will yield a world that is both peaceful and prosperous and in which old notions of politics as a competitive quest for power lose their salience. With nothing to fight over, international politics will become simply an extension of politics at home, indeed, of Mr. Clinton's own domestic agenda. The result, predicts the President, will be "a new era of interdependence where nations work together - not simply for peace and security, but also for better schools and health care, broader prosperity, [and] a cleaner environment."¹²

<P>On the face of it, the myriad crises of the Clinton era would seem to refute such rosy expectations: wars in the Balkans, endemic violence in Africa, a nuclear arms race in south Asia, Russia's downward spiral into criminality and chaos, and, above all, the proliferating requirements for U.S. forces to overthrow miscreants, punish misdeeds, restore order, and protect innocents from calamity. Faced with an accumulation of such incidents, the administration has steadfastly insisted - until NATO plunged into large-scale war in the Balkans - that they merely constitute minor bumps along the road to world peace. In this view, an eruption of disorder simply marks a phase in the transition, however halting, to something better: in the case of Haiti, for example, to genuine democracy; in the case of Bosnia, to a harmonious, multi-ethnic state; in the case of Russia, to a society devoted to the rule of law and the principles of the free market. Granted, there remains a handful of obdurate nations, like Iraq, Cuba, or North Korea, unwilling or unable to undertake that transition. These the administration dismisses as "rogue states" - outliers destined to wither and die, their prospective collapse eagerly anticipated as validating the administration's rendering of history.

<P>Terror, however, represents an affront to this relentless optimism that an otherwise acquiescent public has found difficult to ignore. Indeed, Americans of late have worked themselves into a tizzy over terrorism. Like "nuclear winter," Islamic fundamentalism, and global warming before it, terrorism in the late 1990s has lodged itself in the national psyche as a seemingly existential threat. Best-selling novelists and Hollywood producers exploit that fear and in so doing lend it credibility: the terrorist bent on committing mayhem becomes the villain du jour. From the halls of Congress, demands for action emerge. Predictably, pranksters and crazies get into the act, triggering a rash of false alarms

and phony reports - all duly reported by the news media as if today's hoax foretells anthrax in your mailbox tomorrow.</P>

<P>Given his eagerness to tell people what they want to hear, Mr. Clinton is not about to pooh-poo such fears. Yet neither can he allow hysteria over terror to discredit his cheerful vision of a global village amicably presided over by the United States. Instead, he explains terror as a malignant byproduct of an otherwise salubrious and necessary process of globalization. Thus, according to Mr. Clinton, terror feeds on the very qualities that define the international order that he is laboring to create. The openness that lies at the heart of the administration's conception of international politics "makes us more vulnerable to the forces of destruction that know no national boundaries."¹³ Openness becomes the window through which an insidious new menace enters. The same revolution in information technology that promotes global integration now constitutes for the United States a point of acute vulnerability. To don the mantle of global indispensability is to become a target. Thus, Mr. Clinton explains, terrorists single out the United States for attack precisely because "we're the most open society on Earth" and because "we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic human values."¹⁴</P>

<P>Absent a plausible response to the threat that openness itself fosters, the vision of globalization becomes untenable. Thus, the administration has little choice but to declare war on terrorism. Terror becomes the one obstacle capable of derailing the process of globalization. Hence, the need to mount an all-out effort to eradicate it. Hence, too, to justify that effort, the tendency to portray terror in extreme terms.</P>

<P>Strategic Realism</P>

<P>Given an ample investment of American energy, know-how, technology, and treasure, we can expect that the war on terror will produce its share of tactical successes, enough perhaps to divert, at least temporarily, attention from the assumptions on which the war is based. In the end, however, tactical dexterity, no matter how impressive, will not compensate for the faulty premises on which the war is based.</P>

<P>For the campaign against terror is the wrong war against the wrong enemy. It rests on a flawed conception of international politics, of America's role in the international system, and of the consequences that derive from that role. The problem is not that Mr. Clinton is unlikely to win the decisive victory that he promises - although that is certainly the case - but that victory will not secure the utopia that he sees just over the horizon.</P>

<P>Insisting that terrorism is irrational and atavistic, the Clinton administration robs it of political context. But like it or not, terrorism represents the continuation of politics by other means. To acknowledge the truth of that proposition is no more to approve of terror than acknowledging the truth of the Clausewitzian dictum that it parallels is to approve of war.</P>

<P>The terrorist acts in pursuit of political objectives. The survival of terrorism in the era of globalization demonstrates irrefutably the persistence of politics beyond the end of the Cold War. Despite the President's eagerness to conjoin foreign and domestic affairs into a genial worldwide campaign on behalf of health care and a cleaner environment, people who actually inhabit that world

- including more than a few within the United States - insist that matters of fundamental importance and abiding concern remain unresolved. Prominent among them are disputes over the sanctity of life, the meaning of freedom, and the definition of justice. Unhappily, there remains much to fight about.

Acknowledging the existence of such hotly contested terrain gives rise to two implications. First, it means that, the administration's expectations notwithstanding, competition will remain central to international affairs. Community will not replace contention. Thus, maintaining the uniquely favorable position that the United States enjoys today will require more than proclaiming the virtues of democracy and open markets while chiding recalcitrant nations to get on "the right side of history," as Mr. Clinton is wont to do. Terrorists - and others - will challenge the United States not because we are virtuous and they have an affinity for mindless violence. They will do so because we are very powerful, very rich, and intent on obliging others to conform to a particular set of moral, political, and economic norms. Such challenges to U.S. preeminence are inevitable. Thus, Americans will discover that hegemony involves hard work and heavy lifting. "Peace," to the extent that it exists, is likely to be provisional.

There is a second implication, of more immediate relevance to the matter at hand. The survival of politics means that an effective strategy against threats manifesting themselves as terror must itself be broadly political. Recognizing that terror is not simply a disembodied phenomenon does not constitute a basis for complacency. The possibility of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction exists and cannot be ignored, although danger from that quarter involves practical challenges that prophets of doom tend to overlook. Yet an effective response to terror, while not excluding coercive means, should entail not all-out war in pursuit of utopia, but a differentiated strategy that tailors a particular response to a specific threat. Without conceding an iota of the principle that terrorist methods are immoral and violate international law, such a strategy will recognize that the underlying problem is not terror as such, but the grievances, ambitions, and apprehensions that propel groups or individuals, however wrong or misguided, to violence.

An effective strategy may well entail the unilateral use of force to deflect a challenge to American interests and ideals emanating from a particular quarter. It may also mean - depending on the circumstances - a response that relies on other methods: contemptuous disregard, containment, mutual concessions, contacting third parties to do the dirty work, or even appeasement.

The Israeli Experience

In this regard, Americans should find the Israeli experience instructive. In its brief history, no country has been more beset by terror than has Israel. Nor, for the most part, has any country been more uncompromising in responding to terror: "an eye for a tooth" long defined the basic approach. Yet Israelis have now concluded - a point conceded by all but the most defiant hard-liners - that resistance and retaliation alone cannot provide an antidote to terror or a recipe for security. The peace process represents a bold, if problematic effort to devise an alternative strategy. By no means implying a capitulation to terror, this strategy nonetheless obliges Israel to negotiate with unsavory characters whose influence derives in no small measure from their past use of terror and who continue to benefit from terror perpetrated by others.

<P>What does the Israeli experience mean in practical terms for the United States? It does not mean that the U.S. should defer any of Mr. Clinton's proposed initiatives. Let us stockpile antidotes to biological agents, guard against the threat of suitcase-sized nuclear devices, and raise a corps of cyber warriors to ward off attacks on the nation's computer networks. By all means, let us bring to justice any terrorist who dares to harm an American citizen anywhere in the world.</P>

<P>The Israeli experience does mean that the U.S. response to terrorism - and to challenges to American hegemony more generally - should distinguish between threats demanding direct military action and those for which an alternative approach may make more sense. That should not imply timorousness. As is the case even today in Israel, when the United States does decide to use force, it should act with vigor and dispatch and without apology. To do otherwise is to call into question our own seriousness and resolve.</P>

<P>In truth, even in an era of precision weapons, conventional force remains a blunt instrument, of greater use in punishing governments that harbor or assist those who perpetrate terror than in attempting to pick apart a shadowy terrorist apparatus. Indications that the Al Shifa plant did not, after all, play a role in producing chemical agents for use by terrorists should suffice to make that point.¹⁵ Indeed, American military power may be less useful against terrorists themselves than against states that sponsor terror or offer terrorists sanctuary, even if only through inattention. Doing so will emphasize the point that in a world of sovereign states, governments will be held accountable for illegal activity occurring within their jurisdiction.</P>

<P>Thus, President Clinton is not wrong in sensing that terrorism poses a grave danger. But the danger is less to national security than to the pretensions to which he and his contemporaries have been disposed ever since the 1960s. In that sense, the true enemy of "our generation" - if that phrase includes more than simply those who share Mr. Clinton's political outlook - is not terror. It is instead the extraordinary self-regard and hubris that have been abiding characteristics of the baby boomers.</P>

<P>When it first burst onto the national scene, Mr. Clinton's own generation split over the question of who constituted America's enemy. In siding with those who concluded that the true enemy was here at home, not in the jungles of Indochina, Bill Clinton acted in ways celebrated as morally correct and politically enlightened. The war that served as the basis for that generational rift ended in defeat for the United States. For a time, the baby boomers' chief claim to distinction was that they had facilitated that defeat.</P>

<P>With the passage of time, it has become increasingly clear that Vietnam represented not a moment of triumph, but a failure of nerve. Filmmakers aren't likely to remake "Saving Private Ryan" to honor the generation born in the aftermath of World War II. Indeed, to suggest, even obliquely, that a "war" on terrorism might redeem that earlier lapse by offering the prospect for equivalent achievement is as fatuous as it is pathetic.</P>

<P>So let "our generation" join the President in his war on Usama Bin Laden and any other scoundrel who has the temerity to attack our people. But let us do so without deluding ourselves either about our own virtue or about what such a war

ar will achieve. We will perhaps then be less disappointed by the results.</P>

<P>Notes</P>

<P>1. Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President on Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century," National Academy of Sciences, January 22, 1999.</P>

<P>2. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).</P>

<P>3. Tim Weiner, "The Man Who Protects America From Terrorism," The New York Times, February 1, 1999.</P>

<P>4. Quoted in Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "Terrorism: U. S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania," September 1, 1998.</P>

<P>5. "Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century," op. cit.</P>

<P>6 William S. Cohen, "We Are Ready to Act Again," The Washington Post, August 23, 1998.</P>

<P>7. Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President on American Security in a Changing World," George Washington University, August 5, 1996.</P>

<P>8. Ibid.</P>

<P>9. Ambassador Philip Wilcox, "Special Briefing on the Release of Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996," April 30, 1997.</P>

<P>10 Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President," 53rd United Nations General Assembly, September 21, 1998.</P>

<P>11. Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy," San Francisco, February 26, 1999.</P>

<P>12. "Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century," op. cit. 13. "American Security in a Changing World," op. cit.</P>

<P>14. Bill Clinton, "Address to the Nation by the President," August 20, 1998.</P>

<P>15. James Risen and David Johnston, "Experts Find No Arms Chemicals at Bombed Sudan Plant," The New York Times, February 9, 1999. </P>

<I><P>Andrew J. Bacevich, a West Point graduate, is professor of international relations at Boston University, where he also serves as director of the Center for International Relations. He is the co-author of Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (1998) among other books. His essays have appeared in a variety of scholarly and general interest publications, to include The Journal of Military History, Diplomatic History, The National Interest, The Wilson Quarterly, Orbis, and Survival. He received a Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from Princeton.</P></I>

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

June 9, 1999</P>

<P>Russian Anti-Ship Missile Targets Multi-\$B Market</P>

<P>By Nikolai Novichkov, JDW Correspondent</P>

<P> Moscow -- The new Russian 3M-54E1 anti-ship missile (ASM) will enable a tacks on single or group surface targets at a safe range from counter-attack a nd will capture a large slice of the predicted multi-billion dollar market, acc ording to manufacturer Novator Design Bureau and Russian state export corporati on Rosvoorouzhenie.</P>

<P> The 3M-54E1 ASM was unveiled last month at IMDEX ASIA 99 and a marketi ng programme launched. Novator's Deputy Designer General Vyacheslav Gorbatenko told Jane's Defence Weekly that missile tests have been completed and it can be delivered to customers within 12 months of contract signature.</P>

<P> With a launch mass of 1,570kg, the missile has a 450kg high-explosive warhead which increases the missile's large surface ship kill probability. The new Russian missiles, with a stand-off range of 300km, will be delivered as par t of a missile system comprising a 3M-54E1 anti-ship missile, a fire control sy stem, a launcher, a ground servicing system and a simulator, Gorbatenko said.</P>

<P> According to Russian experts, there will be a \$10-12 billion market fo r anti-ship missiles up to 2005. Rosvoorouzhenie officials believe the missile could achieve good sales, particularly as replacements for older systems in the short term.</P>

<P> The missile is 6.2m long, compatible with standard Western torpedo tub es, and has a two-stage winged configuration. A solid-propellant booster propel s the missile from a multi-purpose vertical launcher on board a surface ship or a submarine's torpedo tube of 533mm diameter.</P>

<P> This first stage separates after climbing to altitude, the second stage's cruise turbofan engine starts and the missile's tail unit deploys. The missile descends to 10-15m above sea level and flies towards a target using an inertial guidance system through cruise phase in accordance with target designation data inputted in its on-board control system. At the terminal phase of the trajectory the missile flies 5m above the water.</P>

<P> When attacking area surface targets, several missiles can be launched in salvo and approach the targets from different directions. </P>

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<P>Washington Post

June 9, 1999

Pg. 17</P>

<P>Turkey Requests Death By Hanging For Rebel Kurd</P>

<P>By Associated Press </P>

<P> IMRALI ISLAND, Turkey, June 8Dismissing his calls for peace, prosecutors demanded today that Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan be hanged for leading a 15-year rebellion against Turkey that has killed more than 30,000 people.</P>

<P> Ocalan watched calmly from his seat in a bulletproof, bombproof chamber in the courtroom. </P>

<P> "With the aim of establishing an independent state on Turkish territory, [Ocalan] formed and led the armed gang . . . which carried out thousands of terrorist attacks, ruthlessly killed tens of thousands of people and left a s many disabled," Chief Prosecutor Cevdet Volkan said.</P>

<P> He asked the court to punish Ocalan under a law that calls for the death penalty for separatism and treason.</P>

<P> After Volkan read his statement, the presiding judge, Turgut Okayay , asked Ocalan if he had anything to say. "I need time to prepare," Ocalan responded, and the court adjourned until June 23.</P>

<P> Ocalan's Kurdish Workers' Party issued a statement late Monday warning that it would be "suicide for the Turkish state" if Ocalan is executed. "All forms of struggle to defend the national honor, pride and cause of the Kurdish people would then be legitimate," the statement said.</P>

<P> Throughout the trial, which began last week, Ocalan has told the court that he should not be hanged because he could serve the state by working for peace and calling on his fighters to surrender. Volkan dismissed the offers as "insincere," saying that Ocalan was simply trying to save himself.</P>

<P> Guerrillas have staged sporadic attacks during the trial, which is being held on the prison island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara about 40 miles south of Istanbul, where Ocalan is the sole inmate.</P>

<P> He is widely expected to be convicted and sentenced to death. If the punishment is endorsed by the legislature, he would be the first person to be hanged in Turkey since 1984.</P>

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<P>Janes Defence Weekly

June 9, 1999</P>

<P>Turkey Approaches USA For Patriot System</P>

<P> Turkey has recently made an informal inquiry in Washington concerning the price and detailed technical specifications of the Raytheon Systems Company Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.</P>

<P> Following the 1990-91 Gulf War, Turkey had expressed an interest in acquiring the Patriot but this scheme was later abandoned. There are currently US Army Patriot PAC-2 (Patriot Advanced Capability-2) SAM batteries deployed at Incirlik air base in southern Turkey protecting US aircraft monitoring the no-fly zones over Iraq. The Patriots were deployed in January following a Turkish request after Baghdad threatened to strike US bases in neighbouring countries.</P>

<P> The US government has told Ankara that it is willing to deliver an unknown number of Raytheon Systems Company Improved-HAWKs to Turkey as the SAM has been phased out of service with the US Army and US Marine Corps and significant quantities are now available for export. Unconfirmed reports say Turkey is interested in the purchase of about 12 Improved-HAWK batteries.</P>

<P> During the 18th annual American-Turkish Council meeting held in Washington last month, senior Turkish officers made an informal inquiry on the possibility of purchasing one or more Patriot batteries, said Turkish military sources.</P>

<P> Turkey is likely to be interested in the Patriot PAC-2 as the more advanced PAC-3, for which the prime contractor is Lockheed Martin Vought Systems, is currently undergoing field trials in the USA.</P>

<P> A basic PAC-2 battery, including radars and eight launchers, with 32 missiles in the ready to launch position, costs \$60 million while each missile costs about \$700,000. The PAC-3 system costs almost four times as much as the PAC-2, said a military source. Besides the US Army, the Patriot SAM has already been purchased by Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. The Greek contract, signed in Athens earlier this year, is for the PAC-3 with the Guidance Enhanced Missile.</P>

<P> Referring to Turkey's interest in joining the US-Israeli developed Arrow missile system, sources said that Turkey has not so far officially applied to join the scheme.</P>

<I><P>- Lale Sariibrahimoglu, JDW Correspondent, Additional reporting by Christopher F Foss</P></I>

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<P>New Republic

June 21, 1999

Pg. 8</P>

<U><P>Washington Scene</P>

</U><P>Patriot Games</P>

<P>By Jacob Heilbrunn</P>

<P> A DAY AFTER THE release of the Cox report on Chinese espionage, an all-star roster of conservative writers gathered at the Heritage Foundation to feast on its findings. The feasters included William C. Triplett, coauthor of a book about China and the Clinton administration called Year of the Rat, and Kenneth Timmerman, a writer for The American Spectator, who has claimed that as many as 10,000 Chinese nationals in the United States are spying for their homeland. But the star of the show--or, as Triplett simply called him, "the man--was Washington Times defense reporter Bill Gertz, author of the breathless new book "Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security." ; Filled with embarrassing tidbits and sweeping allegations about the Clinton administrations conduct of foreign policy, it has just debuted on The New York Times best-seller list.</P>

<P> In Washington, Gertz is a familiar figure, one whose foreign policy scoops in the right-wing Times have confounded the Clinton administration and delighted its conservative critics. "He is a burr under the saddle of the Clinton administration," confirms James Woolsey, Clinton's first and most disenchanted CIA director. "Bill is a voice that has to be listened to in this town."t;</P>

<P> Indeed, Gertz's reporting has been a source of consternation not only for the administration but also for The Washington Post and The New York Times, both of which he regularly scoops. It was Gertz who revealed in a March 1998 story that, in preparation for Clinton's June summit meeting in China, National Security Council aide Gary Samore had drawn up a plan offering China expanded commercial and scientific cooperation in exchange for China's agreement to join the Missile Technology Control Regime. Under Samore's plan, the United States would have issued a "blanket presidential waiver of Tiananmen Square sanctions to cover all future commercial satellite launches."</P>

<P> Gertz, who is 47, says that, for him, "Woodward and Bernstein were models." As Gertz tells it, he wants to use investigative reporting to expose evil and wrongdoing in high places; those high places just happen to be occupied by Democrats these days. A college dropout, he landed an interview in 1985 with The Washington Times' swashbuckling editor, Arnaud de Borchgrave. "We talked about Woodward," de Borchgrave recalls. "The more Gertz talked, the more I was convinced he had the right stuff." De Borchgrave put Gertz on the defense beat and introduced him to his first intelligence sources.</P>

<P> From the outset, Gertz explored nuclear nonproliferation and Third World arms transfers, which would become key post-cold-war issues. His first big break came in the late '80s, when he revealed that China was going to sell intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. But it's during the Clinton era that Gertz has started scoring his biggest stories. In 1994, he filed a series of articles--based on documents leaked to him from inside the Pentagon--about how the Clinton administration was supposedly giving away the store to the Russians during negotiations over ballistic missile defense. Subsequent articles on the administration's bungling of policy toward China and North Korea followed suit. Before long, it seemed, Gertz was breaking a story a day. As for his sources, Gertz obviously won't reveal them. "There is a big witch-hunt under way to find sources," he told me.</P>

<P> Yet it is an open secret that Gertz gets his stories--usually buttressed by classified documents--from disgruntled conservative military and intelligence officers within the bowels of the Pentagon and the CIA. As Gertz puts it in his book, the Clinton "betrayal of American national security so angered some intelligence, defense, and foreign policy officials that they responded in the only way they knew how: by disclosing some of the nation's most secret intelligence"--to Bill Gertz.</P>

<P> Woolsey, who provided a blurb for Gertz's book, is quick to note that he wasn't aware that the book would have a 60-page appendix reprinting classified documents. Actually, the appendix--"The Paper Trail"--is 66 pages, if you include the six pages Gertz's publisher, Regnery, left conspicuously blank "at the request of the National Security Agency." Woolsey doesn't approve of these leaks.</P>

<P> Which raises the basic dilemma of Gertz's unbridled approach. He calls his moles in the national security bureaucracy "dissidents and patriots." But what kind of patriot gives away state secrets to the press--and, furthermore, what kind of patriot prints them? If Gertz really was a Bob Woodward--digging for damaging secrets and wrongdoings about a Republican president--you can bet he wouldn't be the toast of the Heritage Foundation.</P>

<P> And, though Gertz's sleuthing skills are not in question, the judiciousness with which he weighs and assesses the pertinence of the classified documents handed over to him is another issue entirely. In 1997, for instance, Gertz disclosed that North Korea already possessed nuclear weapons and was planning to conduct nuclear tests. He repeats this claim in his book. But Gertz's basis for this accusation is the leaked transcripts of debriefings of North Korean defectors. The CIA has let it be known that the North has enough fissile material to build at least one nuclear bomb. And clearly the North wants to build one. But does it actually have the weapons? Other reporters might have been more cautious about treating assertion as fact, given the possibility that the defectors could be exaggerating to enhance their importance or are really double agents.</P>

<P> More recently, in The Washington Times, Gertz revealed, once again on the basis of classified information, that national security intercepts indicated that Chinese secret agents were notifying Beijing that the American missile attack on the Belgrade embassy had, in fact, been deliberate. But exactly how was Gertz--or his source--aiding American national security by revealing such information? The story simply alerted the Chinese to the fact that the United States

s can read their codes, which the Chinese, in turn, will surely alter.</P>

<P> No doubt, the bureaucracy tends to make a fetish of secrecy--the CIA, which still refuses to declassify important cold war documents, above all. All too often, classification serves as a way of endowing readers with an illusory sense of importance. As George F. Kennan has observed, for all the posturing by foreign policy experts, most of what one needs to know can be obtained by toddling off to the local library.</P>

<P> Most, not all. By handing over reams of classified documents to a reporter just because they oppose the particular incumbent president and his policies, Gertz's "unsung heroes" run the risk of jeopardizing U.S. intelligence-gathering in ways that, by definition, we can't know about. This may be personally risky and even politically shrewd. But is it "patriotism" and "dissent"? When challenged, Gertz bristles: "There seems to be the notion that unless you leak to The New York Times or The Washington Post you have an ulterior motive. I really don't care what the motive is." Maybe he should.</P>

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<P>Washington Post

June 9, 1999

Pg. 25</P>

<P>An End To The Sudan Tragedy</P>

<P>By Bill Frist</P>

<P> The Post's May 7 editorial "Sudan: The Unending War" brought to light two critical points about that barbaric war of "ethnic cleansing." One is that our actions in Kosovo emphasize our failure to act in the much larger war in Sudan. Without Kosovo, the war in Sudan would continue in obscurity. The other is that it is time for the United States to redouble its efforts toward bringing the war to a conclusion. As bad as the situation has become and intractable as the conflict may seem, we may have a small chance for peace.</P>

<P> But the United States must redouble its efforts strategically with a realistic understanding of our strengths and limitations. What may seem like minor differences among our options actually can represent fundamental differences between success and failure. The appointment of a special envoy may bring needed attention and diplomatic weight to that effort, but it would represent neither a clear understanding of our limitations nor a strategy that can maximize our effectiveness.</P>

<P> A strategy that does so requires three basic steps in the coming months:</P>

<P> We must recognize the conflict for what it is: a calculated and sustained effort by the regime in Khartoum to subdue, eradicate or forcibly convert to Islam large segments of their own population. The fact that it is not exclusively a Muslim against Christian or Arab against black African war must not distract us from its barbarity. Even without a clear "good guy," the war is indiscriminate and patently evil. As the editorial pointed out, it already has claimed more lives than the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Somalia combined.</P>

<P> We must conduct our relief operations so they address the roots of the humanitarian disaster, not just the symptoms. We must continue to change our operations so they do not inadvertently abet the agenda of Khartoum by allowing the government to use our food donations as a weapon -- as it does with its calculated denial of access to relief flights that carry our contributions through the United Nations.</P>

<P> We also must change the nature of our generous contributions, moving away from simply food, literally falling from the sky into starving villages, to one where we seek to help establish the most basic civil and economic institutions in the areas outside the government's control. It is the near absence of those institutions in some areas that prevents the Sudanese from sustaining themselves. I plan to introduce legislation that will address those shortcomings, both in our own programs and in the United Nations. Congress can urge the president to continue implementing those changes, but we also must be prepared to support him fully as he does.</P>

<P> We must work harder to reinvigorate the existing multilateral peace process and bring significant pressure to bear on the warring parties and supporters to come to the peace table. Khartoum uses seductive diversions -- "confessions" of war-weariness and other hints that a "breakthrough" is at hand -- to avoid a process in which it would actually have to produce results.</P>

<P> The rebels continue to be fractious on their endgame. A strong peace process based on an airtight list of principles and measures of success can encourage both to deliver tangible results. A special envoy alone, secret "diplomatic missions" or any other effort that does not bring the combatants and their supporters to the table cannot provide three essential elements: the elimination of a scapegoat for a failed process, sustained pressure on all parties to show progress and a healthy dose of embarrassment for the world regarding the situation.</P>

<P> The tragedy of Sudan has been perpetuated by shameful, worldwide

eglect and a stunning lack of resolve. Until Khartoum succeeds in its goal of ethnic cleansing, the war will never go away on its own. Short of military intervention or comprehensive U.N. sanctions, for which there is no political will, a coherent, cooperative and realistic strategy offers the best chance for progress -- albeit 16 years late.

The writer, a Republican senator from Tennessee, chairs the Foreign Relations subcommittee on African affairs.

Editor's Note: The editorial referred to appeared in the Current News Supplement, May 7, 1999.

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New Orleans Times-Picayune

June 7, 1999

Pg. B5

Hunting Witches On Military Bases

By Tom Teepen

What do you do if a political witch hunt flops? If you're Congressman Bob Barr, you set off on a real witch hunt. Only to discover the witches can do a little hunting of their own.

Barr was demanding President Clinton's impeachment long before Monica showed up, arguing that if Congress just looked long enough, it would surely find some reason. Bitter that the Big Warlock got away, he has had to settle for harrying the lesser witches.

About two dozen of them tracked the Georgia representative to a hometown constituent meeting recently in Marietta to protest his demand that the U.S. military stop sanctioning pagan religious services on its bases. Barr was set off by a story about a spring rite performed by Wiccans -- or pagans, witches, nature worshippers: you pick one -- at Fort Hood in Texas.

<P> Barr started firing off letters to the military sputtering about the armed services condoning godlessness and indiscipline and letting standards go, more or less literally, to hell.</P>

<P> The matter has set off a Web site war.</P>

<P> The military pagans' site -- and, yes, there really is one -- argues for paganism's legitimacy and its rights under freedom of religion, all quite soberly. Barr, on his site, lumps homosexuality, witchcraft and "other bizarre behavior" together and wonders whether "armored divisions will be required to travel with sacrificial animals for Satanic rites."</P>

<P> Why armored divisions, I don't know, but if you are actually scared of people who say they are witches, I suppose it is not surprising that your worries could achieve a certain, oh, extruded quality. Is Barr indifferent to the prospect of the infantry leading goats to slaughter? Is he willing to forfeit the animal rights crowd? Does this man care nothing for re-election?</P>

<P> Actually, Wiccan practices have been recognized by the military chaplain's handbook for years, and the faith has had tax-exempt religious status in Barr's own state since 1981. Rites have been carried out at numerous military installations -- apparently without anyone, as Barr fretted in his constituent session, dancing naked around trees or bonfires.</P>

<P> It's fair to guess that at a meeting in which a preacher's invocation for "Brother Barr" got a huge round of applause and Barr got a standing O just for showing up, the witches of the Magickal Cauldron -- not even Lady Galadriel, high priestess and elder of the Grove of the Unicorn -- changed any minds, Barr's least of all. But at least the congressmen heard them out and shushed the audience's grumbles. Fair enough.</P>

<P> Hope, though, that the good witches will keep trying. Who knows? One might get close enough to Barr one day to kiss him and turn him into a prince.</P>

<P> <I> Tom Teepen is national correspondent for Cox Newspapers. </P></I>

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<P>International Herald Tribune

June 9, 1999</P>

<P>If Kosovo Refugees Don't Return, The War Is Lost</P>

<P>By William Pfaff, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Times Syndicate</P>

<P> PARIS - The aim of Belgrade and Moscow, at this stage in the Kosovo crisis, is to move the affair toward control by the United Nations, so as to strip as much power as possible from NATO in managing what follows.</P>

<P> Belgrade's intentions have been made clear by the controlled Yugoslav press. The agreement which last week NATO presented to the world as the Milosevic government's capitulation is described by the Yugoslavs as actually having been a Yugoslav victory.</P>

<P> The Western foreign ministers' difficulty in getting Russian agreement in drafting a Security Council resolution fixing terms for the international presence in Kosovo was directly related to this effort to reinterpret the outcome of the war and impose that reinterpretation in the formulation and execution of the UN mandate for Kosovo.</P>

<P> The war is being transformed again into a political struggle, a medium in which Slobodan Milosevic has thus far demonstrated abilities superior to those of any of his Western challengers.</P>

<P> NATO went to war because it had failed to prevail in political negotiations. In the present situation it has continued bombing because it has grasped the importance of what currently is going on at the negotiating tables. A pause would have acknowledged that it had abandoned the initiative.</P>

<P> NATO must have a broad mandate from the UN Security Council to exercise firm authority in Kosovo, if it is to carry public opinion inside its own countries as well as abroad. China and Russia have veto power.</P>

<P> Belgrade claims victory because the agreement offered to Yugoslavia last week by Finland's Martti Ahtisaari and Russia's Viktor Chernomyrdin, which Mr. Milosevic accepted and the Serbian Parliament ratified, makes no mention of a future referendum on Kosovo's sovereignty. Kosovo is merely promised "substantial autonomy" under Yugoslav sovereignty.</P>

<P> Moreover, the Kosovo Liberation Army is to be "demilitarized." The Western-drafted Rambouillet plan, which Belgrade refused to sign in April, had promised a referendum on Kosovo independence, and it associated the KLA in any settlement.</P>

<P> Yugoslavia says its army was never defeated. It says the war is being halted by the United Nations, as demonstrated by the resort to a Security Council

l resolution. By enduring six weeks of NATO "aggression," the Belgrade press says, Serbia has defeated the Western plan to detach Kosovo from Serbian sovereignty. </P>

<P> Talks between NATO and Serbian officers during the weekend stalled because the Serbian army's representatives refused to set a "rapid and precise calendar" for the retreat of Serbian forces, as required in the document ratified by Serbia's Parliament. They said this could only follow the Security Council resolution.</P>

<P> An official of the Foreign Ministry said the Yugoslav military delegation's mandate in these "technical discussions" rested on the principle of "total respect" for Yugoslavia's "territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo is an integral part." The talks will merely set terms "for the deployment of an international security presence under UN auspices, established by the Security Council." </P>

<P> The Milosevic government is following the same negotiating strategy as in previous dealings with Western opponents and international authorities. For Belgrade, the purpose of negotiations is to reinterpret what has previously been agreed upon in a way which ultimately reverses the agreement already reached.</P>

<P> What is happening is extremely important, since what occurs at the United Nations will heavily influence if not decide the ultimate outcome of the whole confrontation between the Milosevic government and the international community. It will determine whether the refugees go home.</P>

<P> If NATO is not in clear control of Kosovo, with international approval, and the Kosovars are not offered a convincing prospect of permanent protection from the power that has just brutally expelled them from their own country - or of independence - the refugees will not go back.</P>

<P> If they do not go back, Mr. Milosevic has won. Kosovo will have been purged of its ethnic Albanian population. The goal of a "greater Serbia" for Serbs alone will have been advanced. President Milosevic's remaining task will be to dispose of the Hungarian minority that remains inside his country, and recover the Republika Srpska, now part of Bosnia. Macedonia, Montenegro and rival Albania will all have been destabilized.</P>

<P> The war is far from over. It has entered a new politico-military dimension in which, at this writing, Mr. Milosevic may have regained the initiative. There would appear to be a significant risk that this war, after all, has been lost, and with it peace in the Balkans. The implications for Europe and the Western alliance could then prove very large.</P>

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<P>Los Angeles Times

June 7, 1999

Pg. 2</P>

<U><P>Washington Outlook</P>

</U><P>Effort To Stop Bleeding In Balkans Is No Blueprint For Inte
rvention </P>

<P>By Ronald Brownstein</P>

<P> Even if the fraying peace agreement with Serbia can be stitched back together, it would be an overstatement to describe it as a triumph after all the human suffering and physical destruction that have ravaged Kosovo these last 10 weeks. But if NATO can compel compliance--admittedly still a big if--the agreement would represent a vindication for President Clinton and the alliance.
</P>

<P> Clinton is routinely accused of lacking the self-discipline to set a course and stick to it. But, amid calls for the deployment of ground troops on one side and demands for withdrawal on the other, he persevered in the NATO air campaign against Serbia. He has been rewarded with an accord that--if it reco
vers from the last-minute impasse in negotiations and then holds through implem
entation--offers a better outcome than almost anyone in Washington considered p
ossible until the moment it was announced. </P>

<P> Yet even if this becomes a victory for NATO, it is unlikely to est
ablish the clear-cut precedent that its supporters had hoped for. On both sides
of the Atlantic, the war's advocates--many of them with roots in antiwar polit
ics of the 1960s and 1970s--saw Kosovo as the model for a new generation of hum
anitarian military intervention to prevent atrocity, even within national borde
rs. British Prime Minister Tony Blair planted this flag most boldly when he dec
lared: "Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter." </P>

<P> But the high political, financial and human costs of this campaign a
pppear just as likely to make the Western leaders think long and hard before rai
sing arms against atrocity again. "Clearly, this is not an experience that anyb
ody would like to repeat any time soon," says former Clinton national security
aide Ivo Daalder, now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. That assess
ment solidified as the agreement itself became murkier over the weekend. </P>

<P> The morality of taking a stand against "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo is virtually beyond dispute. What will remain disputed--even if the agreement holds--is whether the U.S. and its allies can afford to intervene in cases (like this one) that offend their values more than their interests. </P>

<P> Those who support this form of armed Samaritanism can point to a simple and powerful fact: Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was forced to back down, even without a ground invasion. But the road to that result exploded the dream of an antiseptic, low-risk war. By fighting solely from the air, NATO kept down its fatalities to a remarkable level (none on the battlefield, and two in a training accident). But in almost all other ways, the engagement proved more difficult than expected--with more bumps still possible ahead. </P>

<P> Says Daalder: "If the idea was that a bit of bombing would bring Milosevic around . . . , there proved to be big costs that nobody really anticipated: 1.4 million people expelled, thousands murdered and raped, the expenditure of \$10 billion plus and the worsening of relations with China and Russia." </P>

<P> Add to that list political tensions at home and abroad. NATO has displayed remarkable unity through the 10-week campaign, but strains have shown as it persisted. Germany announced it would not support a ground war; Hungary, a new NATO member bordering Yugoslavia, rolled up the welcome mat by announcing it would not let its territory be used as a staging ground for an invasion. </P>

<P> At home, the reaction was also sobering. When public support has eroded for earlier wars, it has usually been because American casualties were rising. But even without casualties, disappointment in the results drove down support for U.S. involvement in Kosovo from 61% in April to 49% by late May, according to Gallup surveys. Milosevic's intransigence even did what independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr's interrogations could not: Clinton's job approval rating--which remained buoyant throughout impeachment--dropped from 64% immediately before he launched the war in March to just 53% in late May. </P>

<P> And it wasn't only the public that quickly grew restive. The next president--no matter his (or her) party--is likely to view Kosovo as a warning about the difficulty of sustaining congressional support for military action in the era of the 24-hour news cycle. </P>

<P> Democrats mostly backed Clinton, but when Milosevic didn't seem to waver, their support did. Only a week before Milosevic apparently accepted the agreement, 29 House Democrats wrote Clinton urging a bombing pause to jump-start negotiations. All signs pointed to sharper Democratic divisions if Clinton concluded he needed ground troops to win the war. </P>

<P> For a future Republican president, the signs were even more ominous. Texas Gov. George W. Bush, Elizabeth Hanford Dole and Sen. John McCain of Arizona--arguably the three Republicans best positioned to actually win the White House next year--all endorsed the bombing and even the use of ground troops. </P>

<P> But when they looked over their shoulders, the trio found very few f

ollowers. Overwhelming majorities of congressional Republicans repeatedly voted against participation in the conflict; even while the bombs were dropping, 86% of House Republicans in April voted against a resolution to support the air war. </P>

<P> Those numbers, of course, partially reflect antagonism toward Clinton. But they also embody a resurgence of isolationist sentiment in the GOP that would create problems for Bush, McCain or any other potential Republican president contemplating another Kosovo-like mission. </P>

<P> A generation ago, the U.S. fought the Vietnam War to prove that it would (as John F. Kennedy memorably said) "pay any price and bear any burden" to contain communism. Instead, Vietnam proved the opposite: The U.S. concluded that at some prices were too high to pay. </P>

<P> Even if last week's agreement is pieced back together, Kosovo is likely to produce a more ambivalent verdict. It demonstrated that the West could intervene forcefully against a humanitarian outrage. It reminded the world that American leadership remains the indispensable component of international stability. But it also showed that these things all carry a painful price. In that way Kosovo sets a benchmark of benefits and costs that will test our leaders--and ourselves--the next time a slaughter of the innocents bloodies a faraway place. "If you have the will and the leadership, I am absolutely convinced this kind of intervention is a model that makes this a better world," says Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.). "Do I think it is a model that is likely to be followed by the next president? On that, I'm not nearly as certain." </P>

<I><P>Ronald Brownsteins column appears in this space every Monday.</P></I>

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<P>Christian Science Monitor

June 9, 1999

Pg. 10</P>

<P>Are Transatlantic Ties Sound?</P>

<P>By David D. Newsom</P>

<P> Should the current developments in Kosovo and Serbia bring peace to the Balkans, the result will be a vindication of NATO strategy and a strengthening, temporarily at least, of transatlantic relations. But security issues do not represent the whole fabric of such relations.</P>

<P> A recent Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) task force on "The Future of Transatlantic Relations" concluded that "relations are on an even keel.... There are currently no serious disputes across the Atlantic and none on the horizon."</P>

<P> After talking with friends and reading the press during a visit to the United Kingdom and Switzerland last month, I have doubts about these rosy conclusions. At least three potential areas of difference are visible on the horizon.</P>

<P> Kosovo is but the tip of a larger iceberg - NATO's future.</P>

<P> Europeans show little enthusiasm for a US concept of the alliance that will, in the language of the CFR report, "draw Europe over time much further in to a global strategic partnership to help shape the international system in the new era." What this means to members of the CFR task force, and to at least some in the US government, is that NATO will assume greater burdens "toward those regions where vital American interests are threatened - most particularly in the greater Middle East and, to a lesser and more potential degree, in the Asia-Pacific region." Yet this objective will not be easy to achieve with European nations that differ from Washington on how to deal with "rogue" states such as Iran and Libya. And Kosovo, after all, is in Europe, even if outside the original borders of NATO.</P>

<P> The survival of NATO, as the one institution that maintains the US link to Europe, is important, but that survival could be in jeopardy if Washington presses to assume responsibilities far beyond the agreed NATO boundaries - however Kosovo turns out.</P>

<P> The United Nations is another point of contention. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher, on the News Hour with Jim Lehrer on May 26, emphasized that Germany could not intervene in an "out of area" conflict without the endorsement of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Most Europeans still regard UN approval as important, in contrast to the US which, because of anticipated Russian and Chinese opposition to American objectives, has written off the international organization as a player in global disputes.</P>

<P> But security issues are not the only ones where differences lie. The quarrel over subsidies for bananas, to the French in particular, is more than a commodity trade dispute. It is at the heart of arrangements made in the immediate post-imperial years to help poorer colonies such as Martinique and Guadeloupe survive economically. The French resent what they see as a US initiative under the political pressure of powerful Central American banana producers.</P>

<P> Charges of subsidies are also a factor in the growing aircraft sales co

mpetition. Boeing complains that Airbus, with the French government as a partner, is partially subsidized. Europeans say heavy US defense contracts awarded to Boeing balances the scale.</P>

<P> High-tech developments in the US trouble Europeans sensitive to the growing technological gap between Europe and America. Today European protests center on products of genetic engineering. The London Daily Telegraph on May 21 prominently displayed news of the impact of pollen from genetically engineered corn on the monarch butterfly and reported demands for the banning of the commercial release of such crops. Given the major investment and widespread development of such products in the US, efforts to restrict their export could be another ripple on transatlantic waters.</P>

<P> Trade issues may seem marginal to the life-and-death security issues. If not resolved, however, they affect public attitudes in European democracies and make more difficult the cooperation essential to a firm Atlantic relationship, even with successes in the security field.</P>

<I><P> David D. Newsom, a former US ambassador and undersecretary of state for political affairs, lives in Charlottesville, Va.</P></I>

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<P>Boston Globe

June 8, 1999

Pg. 15</P>

<P>Advice Unheeded</P>

<P>By Thomas Oliphant, Globe Columnist</P>

<P> Less than two weeks ago, the "consensus" around here had decided that the indictment for war crimes of Slobodan Milosevic by the international tribunal in The Hague was just about the worst thing that could have happened.</P>

<P> Bound to mess up the chances for a quick resolution of the Kosovo mess, we were told. Facing the klink, Milosevic was certain to dig in even deeper. And, of course, as long as his shrinking domain was facing attacks "only" from above, a dictator's ability to hold on was by conventional definition indefinite because bombing could never resolve a situation on the ground.</P>

<P> I remember attempting at the time to determine if there was some basis for all this certainty from the twin commentariats of think tank and media muse and concluding that it was all coming out of thin air. The difference between a analysis of news and what is charitably called speculation acquired more weight when, just days later, Milosevic accepted on paper a diktat from his opponents as well as from Russia without any discernible regard for the fact that he had just been indicted.</P>

<P> And this was just one of the latest episodes in a string going back to the evening in late March just before the first bombs began to fall on Serbia, when the fact that then-Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's plane had done a U-turn over the Atlantic was confidently said to spell a disastrous rupture in US-Russian relations.</P>

<P> Now we're all at it again, like passengers massed on one side of a ferry boat all running to the other side. As I write, there isn't any ink to dry on any agreement, and already we're imagining the impact of "success."</P>

<P> The only people I trust in military and diplomatic circles have been vehemently urging caution for days - caution about whether there will be any Serbian ink, whether it will dry, what will happen if it does, and how any "agreement" will be implemented. The one thing I can count on, they keep saying, is that the military campaign will not end until there is an unmistakable sign that "all" Serbian forces in Kosovo are on the way back to Serbia. In short, the advice is that we should take it a day at a time, and you would think that in a business supposedly structured around breaking news that would be advice that people know how to take.</P>

<P> But that's not how most of the system is operating. If there's one guaranteed loser out of all this it is misnamed 24-hour news cycle, built around television but with print a significant enabler.</P>

<P> At the beginning of this decade, the crisis that became the Persian Gulf War enshrined the never-ending news cycle with genuine success - led by a maturing CNN with a major assist from the traditional networks.</P>

<P> It was hard news, as in information, all the time. Sure it missed a few - the true record of the Patriot missile and "precision" bombing, the significance of Saddam Hussein's permitted survival, Gulf War Syndrome - but that was the nature of the story, not the coverage.</P>

<P> Fast forward. Today, the traditional networks have cut past the bone on coverage, and CNN remains fantastic but only during the diminishing hours when it actually has news on. What the system, enabled by print and new cable networks, is really selling and competing over is spin and attitude - pursuits mostly suitable for entertainment.</P>

<P> And so, while the bombs fell, the mob gave us Milosevic's first-week tr

umph that could not be reversed, Madeleine Albright's war, the decimation of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the securely dug-in Serbian armed forces, the emergence of nasty Russia as political power triumphant, almost daily accounts of NATO's collapse of unity and will, the pointless futility of air campaigns, and the hideous timing of the war crimes court.</P>

<P> By emphasizing the spin cycle to such an extent, the system has once again compromised the credibility of its once-basic product, news. Any hints that anybody learned anything from the impeachment fiasco are clearly premature.</P>

<P> But the proprietors of printing presses and networks should understand that confusing people in a crisis is the worst way to promote your product when more people are paying attention.</P>

<P> In the meantime, my private phone lines are open and my TV is tuned to C-Span. Slower, but much more reliable.</P>

<I><P> Thomas Oliphant is a Globe columnist. </P></I>


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<P>Boston Globe

June 8, 1999

Pg. 15</P>

<P>NATO's Latest Miscalculation</P>

<P>By James Carroll</P>

<P> So the bombing continues. As does the maneuvering of Slobodan Milosevic. And so does NATO's deadly inability to align ends and means.</P>

<P> The universally desired end is a halt in the violence, matched with conditions to enable expelled and displaced refugees to return home. But what means

does NATO employ now? If initial news reports after the abrupt suspension of peace talks Sunday are correct, the main sticking point between Yugoslav and NATO military commanders concerns the role of the United Nations in authorizing the peacekeeping force deployed in Kosovo.</P>

<P> NATO insists on its own exclusive dominance in the region and is prepared, apparently, to extend and intensify the air war against Yugoslavia to achieve it. Those who want to involve the United Nations more directly in the control of the postwar peacekeeping force, notably Russia, are dismissed as water-carriers for Milosevic. That the definition of the peace-force mandate has at least temporarily derailed the negotiations should not be a surprise, since NATO has effectively fought the war over this point.</P>

<P> Why has it done so? Is it because the military effectiveness of the peacekeeping force - its ability to protect civilians and disarm diehard belligerents - really depends on overt NATO command and control? No. If NATO yielded before a UN command structure, Britain, the United States, and their European partners could still dominate postwar arrangements. But they would have to do so in true concert with Russia, because of the power deriving from its Security Council veto (China has no reason to thwart Russian influence, and could be expected in this case to work in tandem with Moscow).</P>

<P> Despite Russia's success in bringing the conflict to the threshold of resolution on NATO's own terms, NATO is prepared to continue the war rather than enter into a real post-war partnership with Russia.</P>

<P> Why is that? Is it because Russia will only do the bidding of its Slavic cousins, the Serbs? But Russia has not hesitated to defy Belgrade's wishes in the peace negotiations, and the Kremlin has successfully marginalized those in its own corridors who wanted to make common cause with Milosevic.</P>

<P> Obviously, NATO's agenda in Yugoslavia is not identical with Russia's, but are the differences on the question of pacifying Kosovo so unbridgeable as to forgo at the outset any attempt at power sharing? The explanation must lie elsewhere. In fact, the overriding, but hidden, question that has lurked below the surface of the war from the start is this: What are NATO's true intentions toward Moscow? That was, of course, last year's question when NATO expanded eastward, despite Russia's objection. A certain Russian paranoia about the West can be forgiven. What is truly remarkable, and very lucky, is that such paranoia has not dominated Russia's response to NATO's air war against Yugoslavia. But how can Russia be expected to react when its motives and reliability as peacekeepers in its own region are labeled suspect?</P>

<P> It is commonplace to say that the Kosovo war began with a terrible set of miscalculations - NATO's and Serbia's both. As the peace process falters, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that NATO is miscalculating once again - perhaps more fatally than ever. Its intention to deploy NATO troops as an occupation army reeks of hubris - the occupation as a trophy of "victory." Yet the prospects for long-term peace in the Balkans would be enhanced if, instead of being an occupation army clearly allied with one side, the peacekeepers could be seen as a relatively neutral presence committed to a trans-national standard of peace and justice. In particular, the peacekeepers should themselves be an emblem of East-West reconciliation, not an impediment to it.</P>

<P> The need for such an outcome is dramatized by the crucial post-war task of the War Crimes Tribunal. Its mandate comes from the United Nations, but if its investigators are identified with NATO - transported in NATO vehicles, guarded by NATO soldiers - its claim to moral and legal objectivity in assessing a war to which NATO was a party is vitiated. The War Crimes Tribunal exists to break the endless cycle of revenge by replacing it with justice, but as an adjunct of NATO, the tribunal can be seen only as yet another instrument of revenge. As such, it will come to nothing.</P>

<P> But the gravest consequence of NATO's climactic miscalculation in refusing to yield even the appearance of control to the United Nations will surely lie in the chain reaction it sets off. In Russia, in China - and in a dozen other, smaller nations - the question must now be, what can we do to deter such a war being waged against us? As Steven Erlanger of The New York Times reports, an answer comes from Serbia. "I'm sorry I don't live in North Korea, with a nuclear bomb," a Belgrade historian said, "because then they wouldn't dare to have done this to us."</P>

<P> The hope of the 1990s was that the world could begin to move away from the weapons of mass destruction. Priority was given to the dream of nonproliferation. But that dream is in the dust now, in the rubble that NATO is still creating. Instead of defusing the armed insecurity of Russia and other potentially hostile states, NATO is - still - justifying it. The final collateral damage of this war, the last unintended consequence, could well be the havoc wreaked by the biological, chemical, and - God forbid - nuclear weapons of the next.</P>

<I><P> James Carroll's column appears regularly in the Globe. </P></I>>


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<P>Cleveland Plain Dealer

June 7, 1999

Pg. 2</P>

<P>Today's Wars Inspire Questions, Not Parades</P>

<P>By Dick Feagler</P>

<P> On Nov. 11, 1918, my father, who was 9, heard a great clattering and clanking sound outside his house on Woodhill Rd.</P>

<P> He ran out to the front porch. A streetcar, flags flying from its driver's cab, was laboring up the hill, towing a cast-iron hot water tank, fastened on with a chain.</P>

<P> This hot water tank, shooting sparks and making a racket as it was dragged along, was an awkward, extremely low-tech victory symbol. We had won World War I. It was a day of pride, relief and, of course, residual grief for all we had lost to reach that day.</P>

<P> Scarcely more than two decades later, my father was in San Diego, awaiting a staging for a possible assault on the Japanese mainland. All my uncles and cousins were in uniform, scattered here and there, one on Okinawa, one in Germany, one in Italy.</P>

<P> Then, suddenly, in two blinding flashes, World War II was over. Our neighbor, Mr. Wilson, draft-exempt, who lived two doors down, came over to see my mother.</P>

<P> "We're going to drive downtown to celebrate," he said. "Would you like to go along?"</P>

<P> She said she would. And that's why I have a memory, distorted by the haze of years, of standing in the middle of a chaotic maelstrom of noise on Prospect Ave. while horns blew and people cheered because after all that sacrifice, peace had finally come.</P>

<P> No one younger than me can recall that sort of celebration. It never happened again. It was the last time we allowed ourselves to think that peace might be a forever thing.</P>

<P> Tom, who runs my favorite gas station, has a much younger photo of himself taken somewhere in Korea. The Tom I know walks with an arthritic limp now. The Tom in the photo is young and supple. He cradles his M-1 rifle near a barricade of sandbags.</P>

<P> When Tom came home from Korea, nobody blew horns on Prospect Ave. For years, while checking the air in my tires or wiping the dipstick to check my oil, Tom was bitter about America's ignorance of his war.</P>

<P> I had some sympathy with him but not much. The only war I ever saw firsthand was the Vietnam War. I visited Vietnam as a correspondent 50 years after my father saw the hot water tank bouncing and sparking its way up Woodhill Rd. And barely more than two decades after the horns blew wildly on Prospect Ave.</P>

<P> Three days after I got home from Vietnam, I was on a No. 9 bus on Mayfield Rd., surrounded by people who were reading the newspaper stories about the

e TET offensive. Many of the readers were World War II vets and the headlines puzzled them.</P>

<P> "I don't get it," one of the men said. "I thought we had Saigon."</P>

<P> I kept my mouth shut. What I wanted to say was, "Hey, pal, in this new kind of war, we don't 'have' anything."</P>

<P> The rules of war had been changed. In the Cold War, the rules had been very simple. The Russians were armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons and so were we. The rules were: One false move and everybody dies.</P>

<P> But now there were these strange, nagging wars that won no absolute victories and spawned no joyous parades.</P>

<P> Once we had been able to pretend that war was a cure for a certain kind of disease. We could delude ourselves into thinking that the end of a war was a final thing. Winning a war was like inventing the polio vaccine or stamping out TB.</P>

<P> Now we know that war is like malaria. It can be treated but not cured. It can be cowed into regression, but it will flare up again. It stays in the human bloodstream. No noisy hot water tank can chase it away. No chorus of horns on Prospect Ave. can exorcise it.</P>

<P> We are close to V-Y Day in the Balkans. But the buses that pass my street drag no clanking water tanks. No neighbor has called to suggest that we go downtown to celebrate.</P>

<P> We have pummeled a nation into agreeing to make a temporary peace with us. But when the small euphoria, the mild, horn tooting among politicians ends, we will be left with questions about the future.</P>

<P> Do we really believe that we have created a lasting peace in the Balkans - a region whose very name is synonymous with chaos and strife?</P>

<P> And, now that we have invaded a sovereign nation and interfered with its internal insurgence, where do we go next? Do we take on Turkey, our new NATO ally, for its treatment of the Kurds? What, if anything, is the plan?</P>

<P> I look back wistfully, through my father's young eyes, at that hot water tank bumping its way up Woodhill Rd. And then at those horns blowing on Prospect.</P>

<P> Once we thought America could go in, take her losses, make the world better, and get out. Now, it seems, our job is to continually discipline a dysfunctional world.</P>

<P> We have, somehow, become weary and jaded parents, dropping our smart bombs on nations that can't seem to behave. Suffering conscience pains as we make them suffer. Winning temporary, hollow victories that bring no lasting relief.
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<P>Long Island Newsday

June 8, 1999

Pg. 34 </P>

<P>This Time Draw A Border Around Strobe Talbott </P>

<P>By James P. Pinkerton</P>

<P> QUICK QUIZ: Who once sang, "Imagine there's no countries" ? You're ri
ght if you answered John Lennon.</P>

<P> Now how about this: "Nationhood as we know it will be obsolete." Was th
at the next line of "Imagine," the late Beatle's 1971 utopian anthem? No, those
words were written by Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state for this parti
cular nation, when he was still a columnist for Time magazine, on July 20, 1992
.</P>

<P> Yet even if he can't carry a tune, attention should be paid to Talbott.
He is more than a paper-pusher: He was the top U.S. negotiator in the Kosovo p
eace talks, spending some 50 hours negotiating last week with Russia's Balkans
envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to strike the
accord that as of this writing is still discordant.</P>

<P> But precisely because the effort to replace "the old order" with "a new
one that answers all the legitimate needs of people"-as President Bill Clinton
said at the NATO summit in April - has foundered, it's worth pausing over the
past words of U.S. leaders, in hopes of gaining insight in- to what they might
be thinking now, and perhaps doing in the future.</P>

<P> Talbott has left a plentiful paper trail: In addition to 20 years of wo
rk for Time, he has written, co-written or edited nine books about the Soviet U
nion and the Cold War. One theme runs through most of them: that Ronald Reagan,
described in "Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in N

uclear Arms Control" (1984) as a "befuddled character," deserves most of the blame for the nuclear arms race of the '80s. Indeed, in 1990, as his magazine dubbed Mikhail Gorbachev "Man of the Decade," Talbott credited Gorbachev with revolutionizing not just the USSR but the rest of the planet: "The Gorbachev phenomenon may have a transforming effect outside the communist world, on the perceptions and therefore the policies of the West." Of course, Gorbachev was no hero. He was simply the last apparatchik who tried - and, happily, failed - to preserve the Soviet Union. But Talbott's 1992 essay does reflect a transformation in his own mind, from the Reaganism he was against to the internationalism he was for. "It has taken the events in our own wondrous and terrible century to clinch the case for world government," he wrote that summer, when candidate Clinton already looked like a winner against George Bush. Talbott joined the State Department the next year.</P>

<P> If nothing else, Talbott expressed himself plainly: "All countries are basically social arrangements, accommodations to changing circumstances ... they are all artificial and temporary." He pointed to the then-emerging European Union as a "pioneer" of "supranational" regional cohesion that could "pave the way for globalism." Talbott's vision of post-patriotic internationalism stands in sharp contrast to, for example, Abraham Lincoln's vision of this country as one united by "mystic chords of memory, stretching from battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land," but he's certainly in tune with our present-day NATO allies in the conflict with Serbia.</P>

<P> As British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, Operation Allied Force represents "a new doctrine of international community." But there's just one thing. What if it doesn't work? No doubt, NATO can eventually bring Milosevic to heel, but even if he yields, should this 11-week undertaking fill Americans with confidence about the effectiveness of such interventions? When Clinton said that he, Blair and the rest of the NATO-crats would "chart a course for the NATO alliance for the 21st Century, one that embraces new members, new partners and new missions," should that be regarded as a promise or a threat? To the Strobe Talbotts of the world, it's more than a promise: It's a career opportunity. The tragic irony of John Lennon's life is that the man who sang about "nothing to kill or die for" in "Imagine" was himself killed by a deranged stalker in 1980; surely there are even more armed and dangerous people loose in the world today. That's bad news for American taxpayers, not to mention American soldiers on the cutting edge of intervention.</P>

<P> But for Talbott-types, looking beyond their own petty borders for new venues to think big thoughts and make big pronouncements and undertake big missions, it's a global-government dream come true. </P>


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<P>Washington Times

June 8, 1999

Pg. 16</P>

<P>Foreseeable Friction</P>

<P>By Amos Perlmutter</P>

<P> President Clinton recently declared Kosovo would follow the Bosnian model. Will it? The answer is emphatically no. Bosnia was pacified once all three rivals accepted Dayton's political solution and made NATO's military intervention possible without violence.</P>

<P> This is not true of Kosovo now, and certainly not in the future. The Kosovo "peace accords" have not been achieved by mutual consent of the adversaries. It is an armistice imposed on Serbia after a long war of devastation. For the KLA it is a "document" they did not endorse. The Serbs and the KLA were not included in the agreement negotiations between NATO and Russia. This agreement represents the end of Kosovo Phase One.</P>

<P> There is only one winner in this war - Germany. It was Germany that supported the Russian plenipotentiary, Victor Chernomyrdin, without whom there would have been no agreement.</P>

<P> This war ended Germany's 50 years of military silence. Though the most significant NATO military power, it did not shoot one bullet during the Cold War. Now, for the first time since Nazi Germany, German planes flew as part of NATO over the skies of Yugoslavia.</P>

<P> President Clinton can hardly claim a clear-cut diplomatic victory. Although 75 percent of the air power was American, the negotiations took place on Bonn. Realizing that his polls were going down and that Vice President Albert Gore's candidacy needed rescuing, the president has gone along with the German-Russian peace plan.</P>

<P> Since all the major issues have not been worked out, what is to be expected after Kosovo I? The continuation of war between the revitalized KLA and the Serb military. Slobodan Milosevic has not been deposed and thrives on war. We are now entering Kosovo II. There will be no peace until the KLA takes its revenge on the Serbs. The air war and the horrendous plight of the refugees have given birth to a newly invigorated KLA - now a force of 17,000 (more than the PLO had in 1968). Revitalized, trained and armed, they are now ready to resume their expected role - the authoritarian military domination of Kosovo. The

y were clandestinely supported by NATO and colluded with NATO forces. According to the June 5 New York Times, the KLA identified Serb targets for NATO to bomb while the State Department continued contact with them throughout the war. A KLA official told the New York Times, "We will carry on with our resistance because we do not believe in the maneuvers of Milosevic, who has been massacring civilians for years."</P>

<P> As NATO's client, the KLA is ready to launch aggression from Albania, and will not relent until Kosovo becomes an independent Albanian state, that will eventually confederate with Albania proper to become Greater Albania. Neither the KLA nor the Serbs took part in the negotiations in Bonn, and what now will take place is a continuation of the war.</P>

<P> On the issue of sovereignty, Article 5 of the peace plan clearly demonstrates the Serbs have gotten a better deal now than under Rambouillet. Serb sovereignty has been recognized once again in the so-called "interim" period. NATO and the United Nations are entering a less than "semi-permissive environment."</P>

<P> It is not clear who will have military command and control of Kosovo. There are two contradictory versions. NATO declares it will be in charge of all Kosovo. However, the Russians say they will have their own command, and not be part of the NATO command as they are in Bosnia. The Russians are partners of the Serbs, not NATO.</P>

<P> Mr. Milosevic is certainly a survivor, and he and his government were not defeated. They are still in power. The argument by some NATO leaders is that once the war is over the Serbs will realize the extent of the catastrophe inflicted by NATO and will oust Mr. Milosevic from power. Remember Saddam Hussein? He is still around. A vindictive NATO that does not support Serbia economically and tightens sanctions is shortsighted and politically dangerous. We don't want Serbia as a pariah state. We should aspire to make Serbia a democratic state, and by economic reconstruction we may succeed in toppling Mr. Milosevic by democratic means.</P>

<P> Since our major goal has been to bring the refugees back home and to rebuild Kosovo, which will cost billions of dollars, we should remember that real sovereignty over Kosovo is Serbia's. Are we going to establish a separate international protectorate in Kosovo? The war consolidated the position of Mr. Milosevic. Economic reconstruction will bring upon the rise of democratic forces, which is what we want and need in Serbia.</P>

<P> The relative success of Bosnia has to do with the effective political partition of the province and its reluctant acceptance by its three peoples. The Albanians have not accepted the Bonn agreement. This was a war of miscalculations on all sides. We thought Mr. Milosevic would kowtow to bombing, and he hoped NATO would split. Both were wrong. We certainly underestimated the refugee catastrophe of Kosovo, which was enhanced by the use of air power. Now, instead of partitioning Kosovo as we did Bosnia, we are underwriting a Kosovo II war between the KLA and the Serbs.</P>

<P> The unfortunate lesson of this tragic "humanitarian war" is that in order to save one people, the Albanians, we have destroyed Serbia. This kind of international regime guarantees more catastrophes. We must clearly examine th

e folly of an oxymoron called "humanitarian war."

Amos Perlmutter is a professor of political science and sociology at American University and editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies.

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Washington Times

June 8, 1999

Pg. 16

****Foreseeable Friction****

By Frank J. Gaffney Jr., The Washington Times

Few phenomena better illustrate the sorry state of the debate about U.S. security policy than the Beltway elite's rush to congratulate President Clinton on his "victory" over Slobodan Milosevic. This one fits the profile of most of Mr. Clinton's political achievements. It is far less a triumph than it appears; it has come at an exceedingly high price; and it is likely shortly to be seen for what it is: an act of expediency that proves thoroughly problematic over the longer term.

Consider a few of the reasons why the latest deal with Mr. Milosevic is actually a debacle, at best a cease-fire, not a durable - let alone a just - resolution of the war over Kosovo:

* Mr. Milosevic will remain in power, relegitimated as a man with whom the civilized world can make agreements, unrepentant despite his indictment on war crimes. The folly of this Holbrookian approach became manifest Monday when the Serb despot once again reneged on his commitments. Even after Mr. Milosevic finally directs his military to sign an implementation accord, it is a sure bet he and his friends in Moscow and Beijing will be working in the United Nations and elsewhere to secure better terms for Belgrade.

<P> At the very least, leaving Mr. Milosevic in power means he will remain in a position to strike again - perhaps next in Montenegro or against the ethnic Hungarian population of Serbia's northern Vojvodina region.</P>

<P> * The Russians will be rewarded for their role in brokering this deal in myriad ways. For starters, the Kremlin is being offered an opportunity to protect its Serbian client's interests by putting Red Army troops into the midst of NATO's expected deployment in Kosovo. This strategically ill-advised step is all the more bizarre when one reflects on the fact that the Atlantic Alliance is effectively inviting Moscow to reoccupy a part of Eastern Europe - at that a part it was unable to wrest from Marshal Josip Broz Tito five decades ago.</P>

<P> We can only guess, moreover, at what the full cost entailed in rewarding the Russians for their "help" will ultimately prove to be in political and economic terms. At a minimum, it surely will translate into a new Western willingness to accommodate Russian demands for additional financial assistance. In this way, billions of additional dollars can be expected to be sluiced from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank's coffers into Russian bank accounts in Switzerland, Cyprus and the Cayman Islands and other black holes.</P>

<P> * Mr. Clinton's deal with Mr. Milosevic will entail the open-ended deployment of at least 7,000 heavily armed U.S. troops in Kosovo. As a practical matter, this means a commitment to this mission of roughly 3 times that number (when those training to go in and those who have just rotated out are included). These forces will be relocated, probably permanently, from Germany. The costs of these deployments will, inevitably (at least over time) come out of the Pentagon's hide.</P>

<P> Such expenditures will compound the already serious shortfall in America's defense resources - a shortfall arising in part due to the diversion of Pentagon funds to pay for expensive peacekeeping operations in Bosnia (the scene of Mr. Milosevic's penultimate act of aggression) and elsewhere and to the Defense Department's subsidizing of the care and feeding of this conflict's refugees at Fort Dix and in-theater. Replenishment of the war stocks squandered in this campaign will be slow in coming and probably incomplete - leaving the U.S. military even less prepared to deal with the real, strategically significant "contingencies" now in the offing.</P>

<P> * As the U.N. Security Council will be asked to mandate the operation, that body will probably be the final arbiter concerning its nature and conduct - a further sign that NATO's, to say nothing of the U.S., freedom of action will be circumscribed. Let us be clear: The emphasis on an "international" force does not mean NATO will avoid having to foot the bill, just that it will not run the show.</P>

<P> * Of particular concern is the fact that U.S. forces in Kosovo will apparently not be under American command. This only increases the danger that our deployment there will risk another Somalia debacle if it turns out not to be a "permissive" environment.</P>

<P> And how can it be "permissive"? There is little likelihood that Serb forces will completely leave. (Claims we will be able to verify their full departure are laughable; we don't know how many are there now, or their whereabouts!)

Already there is talk of "demilitarizing" the Kosovo Liberation Army, not "disarming" it.</P>

<P> Consequently, we should expect to see American and perhaps other international forces caught in the cross-fire. If so, will the United States once again cut and run rather than accept casualties, or bear such a price on an ongoing basis? Either way, it seems hard to believe "all the refugees" will actually return home - even if they had someplace to which to return.</P>

<P> * Perhaps most odious of all, the American taxpayer will be obliged to pay the lion's share of the huge costs associated with rebuilding not only Kosovo, but Serbia, as well. To the extent Serbia remains under Mr. Milosevic's control, such payments will amount to war reparations to his regime - a moral abomination, as well as a strategic disaster.</P>

<P> The deal negotiated by Russia's best friend in the Clinton administration, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Slobodan Milosevic via Russian and European intermediaries is what one would expect: A Faustian compromise that gets President Clinton off his latest petard, but at a potentially monstrous expense. NATO may never recover from its pyrrhic victory; the U.S. military's hollowed-out status has been enormously exacerbated; Russia's mischievous pass-interference for an odious client has been rewarded and encouraged; and we are poised to provide political and economic life-support for Mr. Milosevic's regime.</P>

<P> This bill of particulars makes a mockery of the Clinton-Gore administration's efforts to take credit for having achieved a glorious triumph over Slobodan Milosevic. Even more damning is the gullibility and shortsightedness of the Beltway politicians and pundits who are now embracing such transparently unfounded, and unsustainable, "spin."</P>

<P> <I>Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is the director of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times. </P></I>>


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<P>Fort Worth Star-Telegram

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>Good Intentions, Bad Results </P>

<P>By Molly Ivins</P>

<P> AUSTIN -- Oh, what an unlovely little war. The bombing campaign over Kosovo has definitively proved two things: that "surgical strike" is the most ludicrous oxymoron in the language and that "collateral damage" is the most repulsive euphemism. Nothing else about the bombing campaign over Kosovo is clear-cut, except that now, as at the beginning, those who suffer from certitude about any of this are morons. And I was in favor of the whole thing. </P>

<P> I think we come out of this with honor and not much else. But that's more than can be said for either Vietnam or Grenada. There has to be a better way. Let's concentrate on finding it. Bombing for peace is not the answer.</P>

<P> We did not get involved in this because we wanted oil or land or gold. We did not even get involved to help some ally to whom we had a commitment. We got involved to stop Slobodan Milosevic and his troops from committing a mass atrocity against their own people. We failed.</P>

<P> We get brownie points for purity of intention, but nothing else. We already knew from our misadventure in Somalia that purity of intention is neither justification nor consolation for a miscalculation of war.</P>

<P> As Jimmy Carter, among many others, concluded, the entire war in Vietnam was "a mistake." One of the great understatements of our age. Robert McNamara, whose name we used to put on that war, said more starkly, "We were wrong." I don't think we were mistaken or wrong in our understanding and purpose, as we were in Vietnam. But in the end, it didn't make much difference, did it? That the murder, rape, pillage and mass deportation of Kosovars would have happened had we bombed or not is no consolation to either them or us.</P>

<P> Our consolation is that we tried. Our shame is that our means failed.</P>

<P> From the beginning, I think the one thing that was clear was that this was a situation so complex it was neither morally nor militarily clear. Throughout this campaign, there has been a relentless baying chorus of critics insisting that President Clinton should have done this, that or the other; or that Clinton should not have done this, that or the other. I would have more respect for these critics were it not so painfully obvious that their only interest was in bashing Clinton -- and any pretext at all would do. Principled opposition to this venture came from both right and left, and deserves respect: Tom DeLay and his fellow fools in Congress do not.</P>

<P> As we are now apparently in the end game of this tragic episode, I think, there are a few lessons we can draw from it, and as usual, I find myself in disagreement with the conventional wisdom.</P>

<P> * I think there is one clear lesson here, and it involves our military:

those who have been arguing for the development of rapid deployment and rapid response capability have been in the right all along. Those of you who have followed this debate or read William Greider's excellent book on the subject, 'Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace,' know that we have been trying to follow two strategies simultaneously, and not doing either very well. The defense industry is, as always, pushing us to spend incredible amounts on advanced military hardware, which often doesn't work terribly well: witness, the famous Apache helicopter fiasco.

<P> Time for Clinton and Defense Secretary William Cohen to weigh in heavily on the side of the brighter brains in the Pentagon who have been arguing for reshaping the military so that it is more flexible rather than more muscle-bound.

<P> * On the end-game, as regards not letting Milosevic negotiate or niggle his way toward his original purpose, fine, let's be as tough on the terms as we need to be. But for heaven's sake, why would anyone suggest doing something so mean-spirited and counter-productive as having the Turks, the Serbs' ancient enemies, serve as an occupying force? We don't need to humiliate or further alienate the Serbs. Surely our experiences with Japan and Germany after WWII show that some magnanimity in victory -- or even this semi, hollow, non-victory -- is not only right, but shrewd policy as well.

<P> * Finally, let me suggest that perhaps the single most important lesson of this sad chapter is to emphasize the importance of whom we select as our leaders. Slobodan Milosevic was elected three times in legitimate contests by people who are not murderous, genocidal villains. They just voted for one. It behooves us to pay close attention to whom we vote for. And I remind you that those who do not vote make just as much difference in the selection of our leaders as those who do.

<I><P> Molly Ivins is a columnist for the Star-Telegram.</P></I>

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<P>Orlando Sentinel

June 8, 1999

Seems Clear That NATO Had Lost This War Before It Even Began

By Charley Reese

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's war against Yugoslavia reminds me of my high-school Latin teacher. Miss Katie Monroe, a fine lady, was fond of saying, "Boy, if you're arguing with me, you've already lost."

Seems more than clear to me that NATO had already lost its war against Yugoslavia despite the peace agreement announced last week. No matter what deal is made, NATO lost.

NATO lost its moral standing by violating its own charter and the United Nations Charter by attacking a sovereign nation at peace with its neighbors.

It lost its military credibility. The world's most powerful military alliance bombed a little country of about 10 million people for more than 70 days as of this writing and failed to do significant damage to the Yugoslav army. At the end, NATO was still flying at 15,000 feet to avoid casualties. That's a problem with attacking a small country. There is nothing impressive about a bully's victory.

This is being duly noted, you can be sure, in the war rooms of larger countries.

What ought to alarm Americans but apparently doesn't is the foolishness, ineptness and immorality of American leaders. Clearly the Clinton administration is unqualified to play with armies and air forces, much less nuclear weapons.

Take, for example, the basic equation of costs vs. benefits. The United States has no national interest in the question of Kosovo. Whether its part of Serbia, independent or part of Albania has absolutely no effect, positive or negative, on the American people.

On the other hand, setting U.S.-Russian relations back several decades, to use the phrase of Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, affects U.S. national interests big time. When you have pro-Western men such as Chernomyrdin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin talking about nuclear war becoming a real threat, this is serious. NATO's behavior has caused the Russians to believe that they may be next. The slogan making the rounds in Moscow is "Serbia today, Moscow tomorrow." This feeling won't change with a peace agreement.

Despite what arrogant little twits in Washington say, this is a dangerous situation. Wars are often made of unintended consequences, misjudgments and apprehensions. The crowd dismissing Russian anger are the same ones who confidently predicted that three or four days of bombing would bring Milosevic to his knees.

The significant part of this agreement is that its implementation plan

must be in the form of a U.N. Security Council Resolution, which means that Russia and China will have a voice and veto. Politicians characterize anything as a victory, but it seems to me that this is a victory for Milosevic and the Russians.

Assuming we survive this folly without glowing in the dark, Americans should see it as an object lesson. Next fall, when you get ready to choose a president, be careful which one you choose. The world is unstable. The main and most important duty of a president is the conduct of foreign policy. The domestic blarney of the candidates, in the final analysis, boils down to various vote-buying schemes. I'm pretty sure any domestic damage a president might cause can be repaired. That's not true in foreign affairs. Blunder into a war and you can end up on a one-way street with no turn-around and no exit.

In the meantime, I expect the Balkan peace to be as difficult as the Balkan war.

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<P>Omaha World-Herald

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>NATO And America Aren't The Winners </P>

<P>By Cal Thomas, Los Angeles Times Syndicate</P>

Washington - Only a U.S. president who knows more about making love than war would declare the puny and ineffective one-sided assault on the former Yugoslavia to be a victory. By any objective standard, the goals of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, not of NATO and the United States, have been achieved.

Even while negotiations seem to be faltering, why shouldn't Milosevic and his Russian enablers now declare they are ready to accept NATO's "peace plan"? Milosevic's stated goal of ethnically cleansing Kosovo is virtually complete, abetted by NATO bombers. It is unlikely that substantial numbers of Kosovars

will return to their original homes, if they are still standing, to live amid the mass graves of relatives and friends.</P>

<P> Milosevic remains in power, even though he is an indicted war criminal. He may feel empowered to conduct more ethnic cleansing against other groups of people he doesn't like. The Serbs have been resisting those they view as interlopers for 600 years and aren't about to stop now because an impeached president of the United States (who was also declared in contempt of court) says they should.</P>

<P> Anyone with a sense of history longer than the instant replay must surely know the folly of President Clinton's goals to battle evil and hatred between peoples who don't like each other. He might as well declare war on original sin from which all curses flow.</P>

<P> In 1941 Adolf Hitler committed more than 30 divisions to the region, including the armored vehicles and the elite Waffen SS. After four years, the Nazis were forced to withdraw, suffering more than half a million casualties. Only President Clinton and a historically challenged American public would accept the fiction that we have "won" the "war" against such a battle-hardened people.</P>

<P> Serb nationalists regard Kosovo as land that once, and still, belongs to them. They point to American support of Israel and ask why the United States thinks it is acceptable for Jews to return to a homeland after nearly 2,000 years, yet we oppose the right of Serbs to return to Kosovo and the driving out of people they see as occupiers. It is not necessary to agree with this thinking, but it does deserve a response.</P>

<P> When nations involve themselves in madness, the condition can become contagious. Vietnam was madness. So is our affair in the Balkans. The Turks tried to subdue the region for 500 years and were finally expelled. The Austro-Hungarians lost their empire when they tried to replace the Turks. The Nazis crawled out on a trail of blood. What makes us think that a little war-on-the-cheap with no ground troops and no casualties on our side, other than a few accidental deaths, is going to succeed when much more committed nations failed?</P>

<P> In these modern times, feelings eclipse facts. The administration and NATO will congratulate themselves, even as many conservative commentators are in full-throated praise. Someone will nominate Bill Clinton for the Nobel Peace Prize to ensure his "legacy." Al Gore won't have this foreign policy albatross restricting the reinvention of himself. And the aging hippies can gather around a summer bonfire and sing, "All we were saying was give peace a chance."</P>

<P> We have not defeated evil or hatred in the Balkans. It will come back, as it always has. President Clinton can't be trusted on this, and he has no credibility on anything else. That's because if the man didn't have bad character he would have no character at all. As the late and liberal Washington Post editorial page editor Meg Greenfield wrote just before the House impeachment: "On the big test, the test of presidential credibility, he's lost."</P>

<P> Character influences all human action. If one has good character, even mistakes can be reconciled to good motives. But if one's character is bad, every action is reduced to doubts and second-guessing because one can never be sure

if that person's motives are good or if there is a hidden agenda.</P>

<P> When the president's approval ratings started to fall, the "peace with honor" option kicked in. The bombing mission may be ending, but NATO and the United States aren't the victors. Slobodan Milosevic is.</P>

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<P>Omaha World-Herald

June 6, 1999</P>

<P>V-K Day; Or Is It? </P>

<P>By William F. Buckley Jr., Universal Press Syndicate</P>

<P> New York - There are a lot of loose ends, we have been informed minute by minute since Thursday, but President Clinton should take it and run.</P>

<P> What we don't know about Milosevic is everything, except that he is a liar. Clinton and he are, in that respect, made for each other. We don't know whether the bombing caused him to cave, insofar as he has done so. We don't know what were the pressures he felt from parliament (he actually has a parliament), or what pressures he felt from the people and, finally, the army.</P>

<P> The estimate published in The New York Times on Friday opens fresh eyes on military ledgers. Seventy-two days of bombing resulted in the loss of 5,000 soldiers and 1,200 civilians. On a good day in 1917-18, there were losses of 20,000 on the military front. The bombing of Dresden killed more than 100,000 civilians. So we are invited to believe that Milosevic has surrendered because of his losses?</P>

<P> Of course we need to add to human losses - which affect Mr. Milosevic only insofar as they diminish his firepower - the loss of buildings and bridges. And most critical - some armchair strategists, like this pundit, said so way back - seems to have been the loss of electricity and water. The citizens of Belgrade don't like to be without electricity, which on Day 68 we got around to de

priving them of by pummeling the electrical plants.</P>

<P> A temptation is to rewrite the doctrine that bombing doesn't ever succeed in stopping aggressors. Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, as recently as a fortnight ago, reminded his vast constituency that he led an investigative team to Germany in 1945 at the behest of President Truman to investigate the effect of our saturation bombing of three years on the German war machine. He told us that notwithstanding the thunder from the skies over Germany, when the Nazis surrendered, their productive capacity was up 30 percent over the first of the year.</P>

<P> The reason we'd go slow in revising the bombing-doesn't-do-any-good doctrine is that we don't quite know what Milosevic is up to and can't safely conclude that he agreed - sort of - to the cease-fire terms because his own war machine had been stopped dead. There were no ground forces to contend with, and he still had left tanks and infantrymen. Did he pull out because of the incremental bomb on Day 71?</P>

<P> Meanwhile, what Milosevic had accomplished was the despoliation of the Albanian parts of Kosovo. Approximately 90 percent of all ethnic Albanians have been uprooted from their homes in Kosovo: more than one million people. The grand purpose of the war was to keep them from being disturbed. A derivative purpose of the war now becomes to bring them back, rebuild their homes and schoolhouses and places of worship and rekindle a few hundred local economies.</P>

<P> Will they come flocking home? Well, that depends in part on whether they have reason to believe that, once returned, they will be safe. To the end of protecting them from wayward armed Serbs, they will have the protection of 50,000 troops. Under what command? An interesting, perhaps a vital point: The Belgrade negotiators have insisted that the security forces fly the United Nations banner. The NATO people have held out for troops under NATO command. The Russian presence, if there is to be one, would benefit from U.N. sponsorship because that way Moscow wouldn't have to pay the soldiers' salaries.</P>

<P> But at an operational level it is a dizzying challenge to work out who has a veto power over what. Could Russia - or China, for that matter - veto the prolongation of a U.N. security force? Or could we veto their veto? Round and round we go. How long would protection be needed? One estimate, by Gen. Brent Scowcroft a few weeks ago, was 40 to 50 years. One might as well view Kosovo as a permanent NATO military camp, like Fort Sam Houston.</P>

<P> What will the 35-year-old Kosovar bricklayer and his wife decide? To stick it out in Macedonia, or to try to immigrate elsewhere - or to go back to their scorched half-acre? We don't know. It will be very long time before the shutter closes finally on the refugee scene.</P>

<P> But in terms of the hole we were in, at least we stopped digging. We have to assume that one of the provisions of the new understanding did not call on Milosevic's reporting for duty to the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. So many little details like this one will sprout up. Having done so, let us hope they won't, down the line, gobble the whole mess up.</P>

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<P>Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel

June 6, 1999</P>

<P>America Showed Strength In Balkans After Europe Faltered</P>

<P>By Tim Cuprisin</P>

<P> It shouldn't come as a surprise that Slobodan Milosevic has been bombed into accepting the agreement he could have had peacefully back in March.</P>

<P> It's easy to think the conflict over the province is a distinct and isolated crisis, a war simply about the fate of the Kosovar Albanians. But a trip through Bosnia and Croatia constantly reminds you that Kosovo is just the latest battlefield in a bloody war that has dragged on through the 1990s, adding the term "ethnic cleansing" to the world's vocabulary.</P>

<P> And at each stop along the way, Milosevic has been defeated. At most of them, the U.S. has been the ultimate force behind his defeat.</P>

<P> People in the Balkans rightly chide Americans for their ignorance of the 600-year-old roots of the Kosovo problem. It's just as foolish to ignore the recent history of the region.</P>

<P> The forces behind the breakup of Yugoslavia are a complex stew of competing nationalist forces compounded by the collapse of European communism. But the first rhetorical shot in this long, long war was fired by one Slobodan Milosevic in 1987 in Pristina, the capital of the then autonomous province of Kosovo.</P>

<P> "No one should dare to beat you!" he told a crowd of Serb loyalists protesting the fact that the Albanians, 90% of Kosovo's population, controlled the police and the local government. That Albanian control led to complaints that the Serbs were being oppressed in the very cradle of their nation.</P>

<P> Milosevic capitalized on Kosovo's mythic role in Serbian identity as the

site of a 1389 battle with Ottoman Turkish forces that symbolized the ultimate defeat of Serbia and its occupation that didn't end completely until 1912. He rode the issue to take control of politics in Serbia.</P>

<P> By playing the Kosovo card, by raising the taboo issue of Serb nationalism where it had been suppressed by Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia's postwar communist leader, Milosevic started the fire.</P>

<P> Two years later, after rising to Serbian president on the strength of the nationalist issue, he ended Kosovo's autonomy, tossing barrels of gasoline on to the flames that eventually consumed Yugoslavia.</P>

<P> After Kosovo lost its autonomy, leaders of the other Yugoslav republics saw the potential for Milosevic to take similar steps against them. That increased the already growing power of nationalist movements in Slovenia, Croatia and elsewhere.</P>

<P> Then the Yugoslav dominoes started tumbling: </P>

<P> Slovenia broke away in a 10-day war in 1991. It was a tiny country with few Serbs, and</P>

<P> Milosevic let it go without much of a fight.</P>

<P> Croatia, with a sizable Serbian minority in the Krajina border region with Bosnia, declared independence that same summer. Milosevic backed the Krajina Serbs, at least at first, leading to a war that ruined vast stretches of Croatia.</P>

<P> Macedonia got away peacefully, declaring its independence in 1991. That independence was guaranteed by American troops, the first U.S. military contingent in the region.</P>

<P> By 1992, multiethnic Bosnia held a referendum on independence. The Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, boycotted and began a war characterized by the senseless siege of Sarajevo, with the cosmopolitan Bosnian capital pelted by sniper fire and artillery shells for nearly four years.</P>

<P> In Kosovo, a passive resistance movement led by Ibrahim Rugova began to lose popular support as the '90s drew to a close. That led to the birth of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which took up arms against the Serbs.</P>

<P> While American troops haven't played any combat role in the Balkans, the U.S. role has been decisive on every front except that first battleground in Slovenia.</P>

<P> In Croatia, the war ended in the spring of 1995, with a massive offensive by the American-trained Croatian army that swept across Krajina. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs, abandoned by Milosevic, fled in advance of the enemy.</P>

<P> They ending up as refugees in Serbia and still ask why the world the world wasn't outraged by this episode of ethnic cleansing.</P>

<P> In Bosnia, it was the U.S. that pushed a NATO bombing campaign that led

Slobodan Milosevic to the conference table in the fall of 1995 and pressured him to turn his back on the Bosnian Serb leadership and accept the Dayton Accords, which stopped the shooting.

Today, Bosnia is virtually partitioned with an international force keeping the Serbs apart from the somewhat rickety federation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. There's no telling when international forces, including around 6,000 U.S. troops, may leave.

In the battles for the ruins of Yugoslavia, Milosevic has ended up on the losing side each time.

The Balkan war began with Serbian nationalist demonstrations focusing on Kosovo as a near-religious symbol of Serbia. Now, this war appears to be ending with the destruction of the building blocks of modern society in Serbia. Bridges and rail lines, power plants and oil refineries, phone lines and water supplies lie in ruins.

Milosevic and other top Serb leaders have been indicted as war criminals by the tribunal representing the international community.

And despite the anti-American sentiment that gets an airing regularly in TV reports from Serbia, it remains to be seen whether it will last very long after the bombs stop or whether moderate elements will rise from the mess that Milosevic has made of his country.

The key fact of recent Balkan history that can't be ignored - including the most recent chapter in the skies over what's left of Yugoslavia - is that American action was needed to stop the slaughter.

While many Americans rightly cringe at the "collateral damage" of the air campaign against the Serbs, it's important to remember that the U.S. was dragged into action in the Balkans by what's been nearly a decade of war and the forced movement of people because of their religion or ethnicity.

To people who've faced Serbian armies on the field of battle, the U.S. role in ending all of this is clear.

On a taxi ride through the rain-slick streets of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, a cabbie railed against Milosevic, and Croatia's own president, Franjo Tudjman. He railed against the Europeans for waiting too long to act.

"Europe is weak," he said, shouting in a mixture of English and Croatian. "Only America is strong."

Reporter and columnist Tim Cuprisin recently returned from Bosnia and Croatia, his third reporting trip to the former Yugoslavia since 1994. He also reported from the old Soviet bloc after the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 1990.

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<P>Air Force Times

June 14, 1999

Pg. 53</P>

<P>A Gloomy Picture Of Justice</P>

<P> Your story on public perception of high profile military justice cases painted an excessively gloomy picture of what we in the military have accomplished over the past two years.</P>

<P> But first, let's make it clear that no trial should be conducted in the press. Unfortunately, we do not have a set of rules that requires the press to limit itself to simply reporting a trial as it unfolds or prevents defense counsel from trying their cases in the media. Given this reality, and the discovery of military trials as a source of national news, we have learned what it takes to win or, at least, stay even in the court of public opinion.</P>

<P> The first principle, of course, is to maintain our integrity and operate a self-respecting system of justice. The recent trials of two Marine aviators resulting from the Italian gondola mishap illustrate other principles as well.
</P>

<P> We went out of the way to make sure all the proceedings were open to the press and public, the victims and relatives of the accused. The benefits of openness are clear: no one can seriously accuse us of a witch hunt or scapegoating on the one hand, or of covering up or pulling our punches on the other.</P>

<P> We established a media center with a one-way video feed to accommodate more media organizations than show up for the Super Bowl. Neutral judge advocates were made available to explain court-martial matters to the press. Morning and afternoon press conferences were conducted when necessary.</P>

<P> We anticipated the issues and engaged the media. We issued press releases for each major development. We prepared a spokesman so well for "60 Minutes" that the show changed its theme.</P>

<P> No doubt we could have done better, but the public-affairs effort in the gondola-mishap cases was a very successful operation that shows how far we have come since Kelly Flinn.</P>

<P>Brig. Gen. Ted Hess, USMC, Staff judge advocate to the commandant, Washington, D.C.</P>

<P>Editor's Note: The article referred to appeared in the <I>Current News Supplement</I>, May 25, 1999.</P>


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<P>Washington Times

June 9, 1999</P>

<P>U.N. Into The Breach</P>

<P> The West and Russia may have struck an unprecedented peace deal in Cologne yesterday on a draft United Nations resolution for the Balkans, but what the international peace keepers were committing their troops to may be a questionable, indefinite campaign. NATO called the Cologne agreement agreed to by the G-8 countries "a clear road map" that could bring the war to an early end. Bringing the Kosovo war to an honorable end is, of course, the whole idea -- honorable in the sense that the Kosovars go home and indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic goes to jail. However, that kind of clarity of purpose is still a long way off.</P>

<P> It is clear we have a responsibility to help put back together what we have bombed to smithereens in Kosovo -- and to try to restore the lives of the some million displaced during the NATO air campaign. Certainly the Serbian leadership is criminally responsible, but we have a humanitarian responsibility, too. As for Serbia, it should be clear once and for all that not a penny will go that way until a new and more civilized leadership is in place.</P>

<P> But about the only thing that is clear regarding this agreement is that the international community will bear the weight of responsibility for the rec

onstruction of Yugoslavia. The plan included no definite exit strategy, no time limit for the international presence and no specific limitation of powers on the international community involved. Looks like the United Nations, which will be voting on the resolution in the next day or so, will adopt another country to rule.

This is not to mention the fact that the organization that will oversee this peacekeeping force -- the United Nations -- hasn't exactly had stellar success in bringing peace to the Balkan region in the past, or any number of other regions for that matter. It is not a good sign that what started out as a NATO war -- without permission asked from the Security Council, and rightly so -- will now end with a peacekeeping force under United Nations control. That means that the proxies of the Serbs, the Russians and their allies, the Chinese, will be able to exert undue influence on the course of action. Looking at the changes in the G-8 position that have taken place since last week, one might already say that they have. Is the Clinton administration back to clinging to the apron strings of the United Nations? Just when it looked as though it had found the wherewithal to act on its own, we seem to be back to square one.

Almost four years and \$2 billion a year later, the United Nations is still "transitioning" Bosnia to peace -- with 32,000 troops in the country. But even if Kosovo is not to be another Bosnia, whoever heads up the Kosovo peacekeeping force needs to consider how dependent it will be making both the ethnic Albanian and Serbian people on the international community.

Though the United Nations draft resolution calls Yugoslavia to begin an immediate withdrawal, and the Kosovo Liberation Army to demilitarize, the draft's focus is on the international community's responsibility for peace. Even the demilitarizing of the KLA is a task of the international force. Among a few of the international peace keepers' other responsibilities are: ensuring public safety, monitoring the borders, establishing an interim administration for Kosovo, ensuring the return of the refugees, performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; facilitating Kosovo's political process and establishing a police force. About the only thing the international community's civil and security force is not doing is providing the country with a tir to breathe, but that could be easily added in the next draft.

As if those tasks weren't enough to keep the community busy, it is signing on to continue those tasks ad infinitum. Clause 19 of the resolution states that the United Nations: "Decides that the civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise."

For now it looks like we are headed for an open-ended case of codependence with the Kosovars. But at least the United Nations will be able to take credit for a "landmark agreement." Who would want to argue with that?

	
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<P>Christian Science Monitor

June 9, 1999

Pg. 10</P>

<P>The Hard Work Of Peace</P>

<P> The hopeful note struck June 3 by the announcement of a breakthrough in Kosovo peace negotiations is now barely audible. That should surprise no one who has followed events in the Balkans. That announcement was a prelude to much tougher negotiations over details.</P>

<P> How quickly must the Serb forces be withdrawn? How many of those troops can return to Kosovo after an "international security presence" is established? Must a UN Security Council resolution precede any such "presence"?</P>

<P> These questions are difficult, but resolvable. The agreement by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and his parliament to a set of conditions presented by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari stands. Those conditions are in line with NATO's fundamental goal of reversing the "ethnic cleansing" orchestrated by Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo. They include full withdrawal of Serb forces, though with provision for a small number (hundreds, at most) to return in symbolic recognition of continued Yugoslav sovereignty.</P>

<P> NATO has to stand firm on such points. Belgrade is angling for a larger military presence in Kosovo, but to allow that would discourage Kosovar Albanian refugees from returning to their homes.</P>

<P> The timing of the withdrawal could have some flexibility. Serb commanders have valid concerns about being attacked by Albanian guerrillas, as well as by NATO, as they withdraw. Their path of retreat is complicated by bombed roads and bridges. The logistics can certainly be worked out, however. The key requirement is an agreed-upon mode of withdrawal, one that can be verified by NATO.</P>

<P> And the Security Council resolution? Russia and the G-7 industrial nations are laboring to put one together. The Russians resist a peacekeeping force dominated by NATO, but nothing less is going to bring the refugees home and have enough muscle to prevent outbreaks of violence. Moscow's need to work in harmony with the West should trump its impulse to run interference for Milosevic, who is hoping the UN-related talks may win him a better deal.</P>

<P> Peacekeeping duty in Kosovo is something no NATO country eagerly anticipates. Parts of Kosovo lie devastated. Emotions will run high among returning Kosovars. Disarming Albania guerrillas that have been fighting the Serbs, and gaining some ground of late, will take extraordinary patience and courage. But it's part of the peace framework.</P>

<P> Some critics in Washington and elsewhere may see appeasement of Milosevic in this still fragile peace process. That's hard to credit. NATO's air campaign continues until the Serb pullout verifiably commences. Milosevic is left with a few symbols of sovereignty but no real control in Kosovo. NATO peacekeepers, already gathering at Kosovo's border, are preparing to move in.</P>

<P> It will be hard for Milosevic to reap any glory from this, though he'll undoubtedly try. Serbia's people should recognize that, yet again, their highly nationalistic leader has brought nothing but harm to their nation.</P>

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<P>Long Island Newsday

June 8, 1999

Pg. 32 </P>

<P>Testing, Testing</P>

<I><P>Milosevic was trying to see how far he could push NATO, but NATO pushed back</P>

</I><P> Reports of a breakdown in the Kosovo peace talks yesterday were-as Mark Twain said of his premature obituary - greatly exaggerated. That was just Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's way to test the resolve of NATO and see how far he could push his luck. It was infuriating - and wholly predictable. That's how Milosevic has operated in the past in his skirmishes with Croatia and his role as reluctant peacemaker in the Bosnia civil war. He pushes the envelope close to the breaking point, then he backs off briefly and test

s again. The lesson for NATO is to push back even harder and hold him to every comma and semicolon of any agreement he endorses.</P>

<P> So it was not entirely surprising that hours after NATO declared its intention to resume bombing infrastructure in Serbia (read: civilian targets), Milosevic offered quick assurances that he intended to carry out a peace agreement despite the weekend's stalemate.</P>

<P> That stalemate resulted from NATO and Yugoslavia's looking at the peace agreement</P>

<P> in totally different ways. NATO assumed that it was a done deal and began discussing detailed timetables and routes for the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo. The Serbs assumed that the agreement was just a broad framework and details would have to be negotiated, one by one.</P>

<P> In addition, Serbs expected that no troops would be withdrawn until the overall agreement was ratified by a vote in the United Nations Security Council.</P>

<P> The two sides, it became instantly clear, were talking at cross-purposes. Just as clearly, Milosevic was testing to see how desperate President Clinton and his allies were to end the war, and how far they could be pushed to obtain concessions. That's negotiating by attrition, and NATO should have none of it.</P>

<P> Threatening to resume the air war full force was exactly the sort of response that was needed. Sure enough, Milosevic - a connoisseur of force - backed off.</P>

<P> In turn, however, western powers at a Group of Seven meeting in Bonn agreed, along with Russia, to draft a formal resolution on the Kosovo peace agreement to be presented without delay to the Security Council. The big concession to Serbia in it is avoiding any mention of NATO in the composition of an armed peacekeeping force - with the understanding among all involved that NATO will be an essential part of the force. That's OK. If a few semantic dodges are necessary to push the agreement through, fine. Just so long as Milosevic understands that NATO is willing to keep bombing if the Serbs balk at talking. </P>

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<P>Boston Globe

June 8, 1999

Pg. 14</P>

<P>Summing Up Kosovo</P>

<P> Delays and glitches notwithstanding, NATO's war against the Serbs is all but won. Critics, this newspaper included, had pointed out that airpower alone without ground troops had never defeated a determined enemy. President Clinton and the allied command maintained all along that airpower would carry the day, and it did - even if it failed to protect 1.5 million uprooted Kosovars. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that other despots will come to terms because of bombing alone. Slobodan Milosevic certainly could have held out longer. His army was still intact. It was a ground war that he most feared, and he might have reconsidered earlier if a ground war had not been taken off the table in the beginning. Nonetheless the war is likely to end with no allied combat deaths - another milestone in the history of warfare.</P>

<P> NATO's other great success was keeping the alliance together. Milosevic had banked on splitting the alliance and that somehow Russia would come to his rescue. In the end, Russians did play a crucial role, but not the one Milosevic wanted them to play. In the end, NATO succeeded in maintaining the credibility of the alliance.</P>

<P> The two other allied war aims, saving the Albanian Kosovars from ethnic cleansing and maintaining the stability of neighboring countries, were not realized. Albania and Macedonia have been put under enormous stress by the waves of refugees, and ethnic cleansing accelerated under NATO's attack.</P>

<P> As for Milosevic, he gained two important concessions that were not offered at Rambouillet. He didn't have to open up the rest of Serbia to allied forces, and a referendum on Kosovo independence is not part of the present agreement. He also got the Russians and perhaps other non-NATO forces into the Kosovar occupation mix.</P>

<P> Two enormous tasks more difficult than the war itself remain: moving the refugees back into Kosovo and persuading them they are safe, and disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army. Ironically, it is Milosevic whose savagery gave the KLA its impetus as a fighting force and it will be his NATO enemies who will have to "demilitarize" them. </P>

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<P>Chicago Tribune

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>No Time To Waver On Kosovo</P>

<P> Weary and frustrated after more than 10 weeks of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Americans were surprised last week to find Slobodan Milosevic capitulating. But in the days since, he has balked at a timetable for pulling his forces out of Kosovo. This was a disappointment, but not a surprise, and handled right, it should prove only a temporary roadblock. In any case, it is proof that in this conflict, there is no substitute for persistence.</P>

<P> The Serbian strongman would like to call off the bombing first and work out the peace details later. He knows that once NATO has stopped the aerial attack, it will be under great pressure not to resume them. And he doubtless would like to exploit any loophole he can find to allow him to maintain his brutal grip on Kosovo.</P>

<P> So far, his latest gambit is failing. The Clinton administration responded in the only way it could, by announcing that the aerial onslaught will continue until Milosevic begins to remove from Kosovo all the Serbian forces that have terrorized and expelled the ethnic Albanian populace. Their departure will be followed closely by the arrival of a peacekeeping force. Only then will a few hundred Serbian troops be allowed to return, mainly as a symbolic show of sovereignty over a province that remains, for the moment, a part of Yugoslavia.</P>

<P> The temptation to stop the bombing and hope for the best has to be resisted. It was NATO's implacable resolve that finally forced Milosevic to sue for peace, and it is only continued pressure that will induce him to abide by a settlement that will allow the people of Kosovo to return to their homes with confidence. If that takes a few days--or a few weeks--Clinton should not waver.</P>

<P> Milosevic is not the only obstacle to a successful peace agreement. After the peacekeepers move into Kosovo, they will have the task of persuading the Kosovo Liberation Army to lay down its arms and pursue its goals peacefully. Absent KLA cooperation, the United States and other nations sending troops may be caught between opposing sides in a bitter civil war. If peace really does take hold, of course, the West will need to find money to help rebuild the province that Milosevic shattered.</P>

<P> Once the U.S. entered the war, it accepted, along with its NATO allies, a long-term responsibility for the welfare of Kosovo. The unflagging determination shown by the administration so far is just what will be needed in the months and years to come.</P>

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<P>Miami Herald

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>India And Pakistan: Playing With Fire</P>

<I><P>Their border war has a nuclear backdrop. Time to defuse tensions.</P>

</I><P> With India and Pakistan fighting a nasty border war, the United States and the United Nations must do all they can to defuse the situation. Why? Because of the possibility, however remote, that an escalation could lead to an unthinkable disaster -- the use of nuclear weapons.</P>

<P> It's odd that so little attention has been given to this ticking bomb. For that, blame NATO's air war in the Balkans. The United States and much of the Western media understandably have been intensely focused on Yugoslavia.</P>

<P> But imagine the concern if, in the early days of the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet forces had begun exchanging artillery and rocket fire across the 50-mile Bering Strait separating Alaska and Russia. At the dawn of the nuclear age, that would have been a harrowing experience.</P>

<P> Today, a scenario like that is being played out between India and Pakistan. For the past month they've exchanged artillery fire in the Himalayas in a simmering border dispute over Kashmir. Thus far the conflict has been contained, but tensions have worsened with India's use of planes and Pakistan's assertio

n that all-out war is possible.</P>

<P> The world cannot be at ease until this conflict ends. In that vein, the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the United Nations all have urged restraint and exhorted India and Pakistan to seek a diplomatic solution.</P>

<P> That doesn't seem likely. Since winning their independence from Britain in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars -- two of them over Kashmir . India is predominantly Hindu but claims Kashmir, which has a Muslim majority, as one of its 25 provinces. Pakistan, which is Muslim, says the Kashmiri should decide.</P>

<P> The shooting began when militant Muslim separatists took over outposts in the Himalayas that had been vacated by India. From their frozen perches, rebels fired on Indian troops seeking to retake the camps. With that, the conflict quickly escalated. India believes that Pakistan armed the rebels and sent in mercenaries. When artillery didn't work, India sent jet fighters.</P>

<P> With both India and Pakistan vowing not to back down, the dustup could get ugly fast. The world has survived more than a half-century without a nuclear exchange between adversaries -- and there is no suggestion that this will happen in this dispute.</P>

<P> But this fight is a recipe for disaster. It involves proud but belligerent adversaries, each of whom has defied global pressure for nuclear disarmament in the past year by testing and building nuclear weapons. Add to that an overlay of competing religious and territorial claims, and the stew is complete. Calmer voices must intervene. Peacemakers, including the United States, must act now -- before it is too late. </P>

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<P>Baltimore Sun

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>NATO Must Stay The Course</P>

Stall: Milosevic still probes for alliance disunity, to make ethnic cleansing permanent.

ENDGAME is a term in chess for the final stage of a match when most of the pieces have been removed from the board. But the struggle over Kosovo is no game. Real people are being killed, raped and left dispossessed. NATO can't afford to lose in the endgame the future for Kosovars that it won through military and diplomatic action.

This means no bombing pause that allows Serbia's forces to regroup or complete ethnic cleansing while the United Nations Security Council stalls over a resolution. The agreement that mediators President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia wrung from Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic must be kept.

This requires that Yugoslav forces in Serbia start withdrawing before the bombing stops. NATO and other peacekeepers poised on the border would move in immediately. There should be no vacuum of authority. That would, among other things, protect the ethnic Serb minority of Kosovo from any rash actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

The deal calls for a U.N. Security Council resolution as soon as possible to legitimize the peacekeeping by putting blue helmets on NATO and Russian troops. But implementation of the cease-fire cannot wait for that.

Such a resolution is subject to veto by great power China, which is not part of the deal and not well-disposed toward Washington at the moment. (That's only one reason why frivolous grandstanding against Beijing is not in the U.S. national interest.)

For the bombing to halt, the Yugoslav generals meeting NATO officers on the Macedonian border must agree to the fine print under the headings to which Mr. Milosevic agreed. The Serb centers of power have to be on the same page, and there is reason to think they are. Military-implementation talks are not a stage for Mr. Milosevic to win back what he lost or to finally achieve NATO disunity.

When that agreement is established, the bombing should halt very quickly. The air campaign appears to have succeeded, through the virtue of NATO unity, despite every effort by Mr. Milosevic to divide the allies. That is also his final tactic in the endgame. NATO has learned the power of its unity, and its members must keep it together to the end.

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<P>Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville)

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>Spying: The Eternal Game</P>

<P> Normally kept low key by design, military intelligence has a high profile currently. That may be a good thing; its importance to the nation cannot be overestimated.</P>

<P> Novelists and movies notwithstanding, much of the work is dull and plodding. But it pays off handsomely at times.</P>

<P> Intelligence agents collect information. When information is not available in the public domain, they seek to get it in other ways.</P>

<P> In December 1939, a German spy asked for a guided tour of the U.S. Army's Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland - and got it, later sending Nazi bosses a detailed report on American weapons.</P>

<P> Sometimes it is that easy.</P>

<P> The Japanese had spies on Honolulu but most of the information they got to plan their attack on Pearl Harbor was from published data.</P>

<P> Breaking the Japanese code and deceiving the enemy with a fake message that revealed the U.S. plans made a major difference in the outcome of one of the most decisive battles of the war, at Midway.</P>

<P> Battles from North Africa to Normandy were made easier because the allies learned the secret of the Nazi code machine Enigma, and kept up with its constant improvements.</P>

<P> Undoubtedly, the Japanese and German spies also had successes, although more is known about their failures - for example, the use of Navaho Indians in the Pacific to send messages in their native language baffled the Japanese. </P>

<P> The success of the Soviet Union, our allies in World War II, in stealing U.S. atomic bomb secrets is well known, however. That makes it doubly hard to understand how the United States allowed Chinese spies to purloin our most valued secret technology to supplement what they got legally.</P>

<P> From the Cox committee report, it is clear that the Chinese were able to patch together information taken from the public domain with top secret information

mation gathered from nuclear weapon laboratories that allowed them to make a great leap forward in military capability.</P>

<P> While it happened over a period of years, it was not discovered until the 1990s, during the Clinton administration. The FBI wanted a wiretap on the chief suspect, but it was the only such request turned down by Janet Reno's Justice Department on her watch. The suspect never has been charged, presumably for lack of evidence. </P>

<P> Lapses in security are considered more serious in war time, but they can have major consequences even when they occur during peace, which is best described as the interim between wars.</P>


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<P>Omaha World-Herald

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>Not Quite Victory </P>

<P> National commentators were atwitter over the possibility of a negotiated cease-fire in Yugoslavia as the possibility unfolded Friday and Saturday. By Sunday morning, even ABC's conservative panelist, William Kristol, was distancing himself from other Republican critics of the president.</P>

<P> "Clinton won," Kristol said, "and there's no point in carping."</P>

<P> As it turned out, a breakdown in talks between NATO commanders and their Yugoslav counterparts made Kristol's assessment premature. Nonetheless, the possibility still seemed alive that Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslavian president, would eventually agree to NATO demands in order to stop the air war against his country.</P>

<P> This could indeed lead to a victory for President Clinton. It could end the bombing while NATO unity remained intact. It could produce conditions favoring the return to Kosovo of survivors of the million ethnic Albanians forced f

rom their homes by Milosevic's campaign of terror. Perhaps the ability of Serbi
a-dominated Yugoslavia to persecute its ethnic minorities will have been broken
. Perhaps the political survival of Milosevic himself will be in doubt.</P>

<P> The president, in going to war, took a course that put American prestig
e and the lives of hundreds of thousands of people on the line, in the opinion
of this editorial page recklessly and without sufficiently consulting with Cong
ress or preparing the American people. This voice and other voices have called
attention to the apparent fragility of the NATO consensus, the difficulty of wi
nning a war with air power alone and the possible loss of domestic support if a
sudden proliferation of American deaths bumped up against the unrealistic expe
ctations, which Clinton had allowed to materialize, of a low-casualty operation
for Americans.</P>

<P> Some of these concerns remain - and will need to be examined even if th
e war ends in the best-case scenario. The idea of a war without American casual
ties is too unrealistic to serve as any kind of precedent. High-altitude bombin
g still has its limitations, including its inability to substantially affect th
e behavior of compact military units operating under cloud cover. Multilateral
action also has the drawbacks that come with allowing the most cautious member
of a coalition to veto the actions of the others.</P>

<P> Moreover, some people are already predicting that potential Third World
foes, unable to protect themselves against this kind of war, would seek weapon
s of mass destruction - nuclear, biological or chemical - to deter the industri
al powers from waging such a war in the future.</P>

<P> In this war, however, some of the worst concerns went unrealized. If th
e negotiators now manage to put a deal together that avoids the many pitfalls,
it could indeed be called a victory for Clinton - and by extension a victory fo
r America.</P>

<P> Furthermore, although the humanitarian effort to help the Kosovars was
a short-term disaster, the possibility exists that a negotiated settlement, in
the long run, will improve conditions for the people whom Milosevic had hounded
from their homes. So if all goes right, the Kosovars, too, could benefit.</P>

<P> Such a "win" should be on the wish list of every American.</P>

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<P>Dallas Morning News

June 8, 1999</P>

<P>India-Pakistan Conflict Has Larger Implications</P>

<P> The fighting in Kashmir is hardly worth the United States' rapt attention except for one crucial fact: The combatants, India and Pakistan, have nuclear weapons.</P>

<P> No one wants to see the fighting go nuclear. Yet that risk is very high. Whenever the Pentagon hypothesizes war between mostly Hindu India and mostly Muslim Pakistan, the result usually is a catastrophic nuclear exchange.</P>

<P> The Indian and Pakistani elites see it differently. To them, their nuclear competition mirrors the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, which resulted in neither direct fighting nor nuclear war.</P>

<P> The comparison is invalid.</P>

<P> During their half-century rivalry, the United States and the Soviet Union never shared a border or claimed parts of each others' territory, as India and Pakistan do. They never fought a "hot" war; India and Pakistan have fought three, and even now are killing each other with great gusto.</P>

<P> The United States and the Soviet Union knew that a nuclear attack by one would provoke obliteration by the other. Conversely, with so few nuclear weapons on each side, India or Pakistan may realistically contemplate a first strike that destroys the nuclear capability of the other.</P>

<P> The United States and Soviet Union had sophisticated systems to prevent accidental attacks. They had "hot lines" to enable instant communications between their leaders. India and Pakistan have nothing of the sort.</P>

<P> Besides, the Cold War was not so low risk. The United States and Soviet Union came close to mutual annihilation several times.</P>

<P> Nuclear powers have a special responsibility to keep their differences from transmogrifying into new Hiroshimas. Yet the countries are behaving as if their territorial dispute has no larger implications.</P>

<P> Resolving Kashmir is the key to denuclearizing South Asia. Unfortunately, the dispute is not easily resolved. Pakistan has the better claim, given the territory's Muslim majority. But India refuses to budge from the two-thirds that it controls or to permit international arbitration.</P>

<P> The most realistic solution is to make permanent the 52-year-old "line of control" that separates the Indian and Pakistani armies. That would not satisfy everyone. It might prevent a nuclear holocaust.</P>

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