

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. email	Beverly Roundtree to John Feeley, et al., re: Concurrence Request ASAP (13 pages)	10/02/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMAil - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/02/1995 - 10/27/1995]

2017-0759-F
ke5230

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 October 95 18:02
FROM Baldwin, Kenneth
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Lunch re Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kessinger, Jodi
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Jodi:

This luncheon is Fred's request (per Kay). It is on her schedule, but I would still show her the e-mail to start her memory.

From: Joshi, M. Kay
To: Dohse, Fred J.; Peters, Mary A.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Lunch re Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, October 04, 1995 04:45 PM

I have scheduled the lunch to discuss Ireland trip for Wednesday, October 11, at 12:00 in the White House Mess. Val Martinez from State will join.

I have cleared Martinez.

Any problems or questions, please let me know.

Thank you.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 05 October 95 09:43
FROM Joshi, M. Kay
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Lunch re Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kessinger, Jodi
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

They are:

Nancy
Fred
Mary Ann
Val Martinez

From: Kessinger, Jodi
To: Joshi, M. Kay
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: Lunch re Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, October 05, 1995 08:46 AM

Kay - do you have a list of invitees?

From: Joshi, M. Kay
To: Dohse, Fred J.; Peters, Mary A.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Lunch re Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, October 04, 1995 04:45 PM

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I have cleared Martinez.

Any problems or questions, please let me know.

Thank you.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 12 October 95 07:30

FROM Naplan, Steven J.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]UK-Ireland Sched request

TO Schuker, Jill A.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

The scheduling request I put together for POTUS to talk with UK/Irish press prior to his trip has made its way back to us.

FYI: It was returned with a note from Nancy suggesting that the matter should be discussed at the 5 pm today, as well as other US press and TV opportunities.

I'm holding the packages.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 October 95 09:15
FROM McCormick, Shawn H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Cullin, Brian P.
Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Naplan, Steven J.
Schuker, Jill A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY Battenfield, Pat
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
McCormick, Shawn H.
Rice, Susan E.

TEXT_BODY No changes to the Zambia section.

From: DeShazer, MacArthur
To: @PRESS - Public Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @AFRICA - African Affairs
Subject: Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, October 20, 1995 08:07 AM

[[OCT19GUI.DOC : 2375 in OCT19GUI.DOC]]

The Nigeria piece was updated to reflect latest concerns. Shawn will update Zambia by 10:00.

Thanks

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 20 October 95 8:5

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** OCT19GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

October 19, 1995

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Ireland

Turkey
NATO Enlargement
Russia
Loose Nukes
CFE

MIDDLE EAST
Iran

ASIA
China

LATIN AMERICA
Cuba
Honduras

AFRICA
Zambia
Nigeria

MISCELLANEOUS
Birth Defects and Gulf War Illnesses
UN Peacekeeping Personnel
Spent Fuel and Waste Issues
Export Control Reform
Defense

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Diplomatic Track: Next Steps

ù Cease-fire remains in effect and fighting stopped throughout most of Bosnia.

ù We remain concerned about continued fighting in northwest Sanski Most and Prijedor and threat posed to negotiations.

ù CJCS Shalikashvili expressed concerns to all parties on Saturday in Bosnia/Croatia

ù As President said, all parties must abide by terms of cease-fire and seize opportunity to work out differences at bargaining table.

ù Successful implementation of cease-fire should give further impetus to diplomatic efforts of our negotiators, with their Contact Group partners, for a political settlement.

ù Our negotiating team, led by Deputy Secretary Talbott, concluded talks yesterday in Moscow regarding preparations for the U.S. proximity talks and Russia's role in the implementation of a peace settlement.

ù Yesterday's talks were productive, however, there were no final agreements.

ù The team met with officials in Paris this morning and will travel to Brussels this afternoon where Deputy Secretary Talbott will brief NATO officials.

ù A/S Holbrooke and his team along with EU and Russian negotiators met with President Milosevic in Belgrade and President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo yesterday to discuss upcoming proximity talks. They are in Zagreb today for consultations with President Tudjman.

Proximity Talks

ù Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry and CJCS Shalikashvili had productive hearings with both the senate and the house over the past two days regarding implementation of a peace settlement.

ù Proximity talks scheduled to begin October 31 at Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio.

ù Talks will be co-chaired by Holbrooke and EU negotiator Bildt. Each party will send delegation able to make prompt decisions and commitments.

ù Talks will be followed by a Paris peace conference. May be meetings after

peace conference before final settlement signed, and London meeting on implementation.

Peace Plan Implementation

ù NAC last Wednesday approved concept of operations for implementing settlement in B/H.

ù Based on this approval, detailed planning by NATO Military Authorities will proceed.

ù SACEUR General Joulwan briefed the President and his national security team last night on the state of NATO'S plans.

ù Number of forces for operation not determined - will depend on peace agreement modalities.

ù NATO will brief UN, UNPF contributors and interested PFP countries this week.

ù Russia invited to "16-plus-one" meeting with NAC in future to discuss NATO's implementation planning.

ù The concept is broken down into 5 phases:

--Phase I: Preparation Phase. We are presently in this phase now.

--Phase II: Entry. Begin at signing of peace agreement. Military forces would deploy to area by sea and land.

--Phase III: Implementation. Deployment of forces in country to secure critical areas and main outposts.

--Phase IV: Transition to Peace. Initial robust forces would slowly drawdown over a year as peace agreement took effect.

--Phase V: Exit. Orderly hand over of commitments to appropriate civilian organizations and the withdrawal

of IFOR and equipment.

Secretary Perry said he favors a 12-month time limit for the NATO-led implementation force that will implement a Bosnia settlement. What is U.S. policy?

ù Has been U.S. position that NATO-led operation to implement military aspects of Bosnia peace settlement should be of fixed duration (also in NATO concept of operations approved by NAC).

ù Expect operation can be completed in a year, but no precise end date has yet been set.

ù End date will take into account terms of peace settlement and recommendations of NATO planners - now completing OPLAN for operation.

(If asked whether we will seek Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in IFOR)

ù President has said we would welcome and encourage an expression of Congressional support.

ù (If pressed:) While we do not believe Congressional authorization is required, we would welcome Congressional support.

ù Questions about what we might do in face of funding cutoff by Congress hypothetical.

(If asked whether we will pursue War Criminals)

ù IFOR mission is to implement the peace agreement.

ù Pursuing war criminals not part of the mission, but will take them into custody if we come into contact with them.

Military Stabilization

ù Our goal to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission.

ù Preference to establish balance of forces between Federation and Bosnian Serbs
thr
ough arms control

measures for build-down.

ù Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, prepared to
equip/train
Federation forces for effective
self-defense capability.

ù Effort separate from NATO-led implementation force. First step: lifting of arms
e
mbargo.

New Ethnic Cleansing/Reports of Mass Graves

ù Very disturbed by recent reports of renewed campaign of ethnic cleansing by
Bosnia
n Serbs. We condemn
detention of massive numbers of non-Serbs in Banja Luka.

ù Concerned by mass graves in formerly Serb-held areas of western Bosnia.

ù Disappearance of large numbers of draft-aged men and establishment of
concentratio
n-camp conditions are
repugnant and must cease immediately.

ù U.S. charge in Belgrade told Milosevic and high-level Serbian officials of
indigna
tion, demand Belgrade
government do everything to halt these activities immediately, and demand
Bosnian Se
rb respect for
international humanitarian laws and Fourth Geneva Convention.

ù President said Sunday we fully support International Tribunal for the Former
Yugos
lavia in investigation of
war crimes.

ù We actively support international organizations such like UNHCR and Red
Cross in a
ttempts to document fate
and whereabouts of missing persons.

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

General Points on peace plan implementation

ù Many issues remain to be resolved in negotiations. We have accelerated internal preparations for implementation of possible peace settlement.

ù American leadership critical to achievement of peace settlement and ensuring agreement is implemented successfully so conflict is ended for good.

ù Implementation's many aspects: 1) military implementation force (IFOR) to maintain cease-fire and ensure forces withdrawal by agreement requirements; 2) civilian efforts to safeguard human rights, assist in refugee return, 3) help establish political institutions and deliver humanitarian aid; and 4) regional economic reconstruction program.

ù Range of organizations involved in non-military aspects - the UN and its agencies, the OSCE, the European Union, and International Financial Institutions.

ù Believe military implementation mission must be NATO-led, single chain of command with robust rules of engagement. Strong/decisive NATO ground presence at early stage provides best deterrent.

ù Our position: implementation force deployed only if settlement accepted by parties.
We will not impose peace.

ù Even after settlement, will be tensions among parties/possible violations by local elements.

ù NATO-led force must have Chapter VII mandate and robust rules of engagement to ensure settlement terms

upheld, and provide capability for force self-defense.

ù IFOR likely include forces from non-NATO countries, connected to NATO command structure by liaison arrangements still being developed. Hope Russia and other PFP members will join IFOR.

ù Last Saturday Perry discussed with Grachev approaches for Russian contribution to IFOR. Some areas of common ground emerged. Important differences remain in command-and-control arrangements.

ù Russia has sent military team to SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) to participate in peace implementation force planning.

ù NATO planners developing detailed OPLAN, built on previous planning for earlier peace plans and UNPROFOR withdrawal.

ù Until planning completed, and clearer sense of provisions of peace settlement, premature to speculate on size of overall force or U.S. contribution.

President stands by commitment (1993): contribute substantial number of U.S. ground forces to NATO-led force for implementation of peace settlement, in consultation with the Congress. (If pressed: Total number could be in 50-70,000 range cited by Secretary Perry, including supporting forces as well as ground forces deployed to Bosnia.)

ù Too soon to predict what will be cost of U.S. contribution or length of the operation.

ù We intend to consult with Congress as NATO planning and our own thinking evolve.

ù President met with Congressional leaders September 29 to discuss U.S.

negotiating
strategy for implementation
of settlement.

Terms of the cease-fire

ù Cease-fire will last 60 days from October 12, or until completion of Proximity
Pea
ce Talks and Peace
Conference, whichever is later.

ù Parties committed to ensure all military commanders issue and compel
compliance wi
th clear orders
precluding all offensive operations, patrol and reconnaissance activities forward
of
friendly positions, all
offensive weapon' firing including sniper fire, laying of additional mines, and
crea
tion of additional barriers and
obstacles.

ù All parties ensure all civilians and prisoners treated humanely and all POWs
excha
nged.

ù Parties will cooperate with cease-fire monitoring activities of UNPROFOR.

ù All parties will provide free passage and unimpeded road access between
Sarajevo a
nd Gorazde along two
primary routes for all non-military and UNPROFOR traffic.

September 26 New York Meeting

ù September 26 's New York meeting of Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and
the
Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia produced important step for peace settlement in Bosnia.

ù Set of "further agreed basic principles" for settlement : three Foreign Ministers
spelled out in greater detail
constitutional structures of Bosnia: establishment of national parliament,
Presidenc
y & Constitutional Court.
New document builds on Sep 8 agreement in Geneva.

ù New document: they committed to holding free democratic elections under
internatio

nal supervision.

ù Parties agreed that central government has responsibility for conduct of foreign policy of Bosnia after settlement. Still negotiating on other functions of central institutions --e.g. for foreign trade, monetary policy, crime enforcement, etc.

September 8 Geneva Meeting

ù Three foreign ministers agreed to basic principles for further negotiations toward final settlement.

-- First time, all agreed Bosnia-Herzegovina continue as single state, with present borders, and continuing international recognition.

-- Consistent with Contact Group plan, all three agreed under the terms of a settlement, Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation established under last year's Washington Agreements, and Bosnian Serb republic.

-- 51-49 parameter of Contact Group's territorial proposal basis for settlement, subject to adjustments parties make by mutual agreement.

-- Two entities have right to establish relationships with neighboring states, but these must be consistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

-- Parties pledged to adhere to human rights standards, to ensure freedom of movement and right of displaced to return to their homes, and collaborate on joint economic projects to promote links among all Bosnia's peoples.

ù Agreements further testament to international community's resolve and persistent diplomacy by our team, supported by our Contact Group partners.

ù President said we strongly oppose the partition of Bosnia.

ù Geneva & New York agreements: B/H remains single state, retaining seat in international organizations and bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries in world, including U.S.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

ù We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help in the search for peace.

ù Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.

ù First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosperous future. People of Belfast are finally living a normal life.

ù One can literally say that there are individuals walking the streets in Belfast alive today who would not be had we not gotten involved. American engagement has been an essential ingredient in the search for peace.

U.S. Meetings

ù We have had a number of contacts over the last several weeks about how to move the peace process forward.

ù Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams recently met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. The Vice President joined them for part of the meeting.

ù The Vice President and Mr. Lake met with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

ù On September 29, the President saw Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, who was at the White

House for a meeting with the Vice President.

ù The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Nancy Soderberg, recently conducted a round of consultations with all parties in Ireland and the UK.

ù We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing. We are not prepared to go into any detail.

NSA Lake's Trip to London

ù NSA Lake returns from London today. He was there for consultations with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the President's trip, and other issues. While there, he will also meet with Northern Ireland political leaders.

ù If asked: Mr. Lake is accompanied by Deputy NSA Nancy Soderberg and Director for European Affairs Mary Ann Peters.

Twin Track

ù We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning the paramilitaries' weapons.

ù We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

British Stalling on Talks?

ù As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time the President visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

ù We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to achieving a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

ù On decommissioning of weapons, we have said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn Fein and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

ù The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

ù It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Election of hard-line Unionist David Trimble a setback?

ù Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists over the past year.

Deportations [Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members, some who are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

ù Issue recently brought to our attention.

ù Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

ù Staff reviewing issue.

TURKEY

NYT Editorial on Arms Sales to Turkey

Q: Any comment on the NYT editorial on Tuesday (October 17) calling for the U.S. to halt arms

sales to Turkey because of human rights abuses.

-- We strongly disagree with the conclusions in the New York Times article.

-- Turkey is a close NATO ally located in an extremely important and dangerous part of the world.

The U.S. looks to Turkey for support for Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq

and as a secular

bulwark against the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

-- For more than ten years, Turkey has been fighting against a ruthless Kurdish terrorist

group,

the PKK, in the southeastern part of the country.

-- While Turkey clearly needs to work on improving its human rights record, we do not

believe

that cutting off financial assistance or halting military sales is the answer.

-- Any such moves would be likely to have the opposite effect from the one intended

and could

seriously damage U.S. security interests in the region.

-- We support the ongoing efforts of Prime Minister Ciller to implement her democratization

program,

which would address many of the concerns raised in the NYT editorial.

Turkish No-Confidence Vote and Demirel Postponement

Q: Any comment on Demirel's cancellation of his trip to Washington?

-- President Demirel postponed his working visit to Washington and his call on President

Clinton

scheduled for October 18.

-- He had to remain in Ankara to perform his constitutional duties in the wake of the no

confidence vote against the Ciller government on Sunday (October 15) in the Turkish

parliament.

-- Turkey and the United States have important business to conduct, and President De

mirel

remains most welcome here at a mutually convenient future date.

-- (If asked) No date has yet been set.

Q: What is your comment on the defeat of Turkish PM Ciller in the vote of no-confidence?

-- We are following developments with great interest.

-- President Demirel has subsequently asked Prime Minister Ciller to try to form a new government. That process is now underway. It would be inappropriate to speculate on the outcome.

Marcus Case

Q: Any comment on the Turkish court action October 12 on the case of Amcit Reuters reporter Aliza (a-LEE-za) Marcus?

-- We are following this case very closely. Ms. Marcus is charged with "inciting racial enmity" in an article published under her by-line which was published in a Turkish newspaper.

-- The article contained allegations that Turkish military authorities forcibly evacuated villages in southeastern Turkey to deny access to them by terrorist PKK forces.

-- Her case came to trial in Istanbul on Thursday (October 12), but the court continued the case until November 9 after hearing arguments.

-- We have expressed our deep concern over this case to the Turkish government and urged that the charges against Ms. Marcus be dropped.

-- We will continue to work with Turkish authorities for a successful resolution to this case.

NATO ENLARGEMENT STUDY AND RUSSIA

Reaction to NATO enlargement study?

-- We welcome NATO approval on September 20 of its landmark study on enlarging the Alliance.

-- The study, which sets out the "how" and "why" of enlargement, was presented on Thursday (September 28) in Brussels to members of the Partnership for Peace (composed of CEE and NIS countries, including Russia). The general reaction was highly favorable.

-- Individual presentations will also be made to members who request them. NATO will assess the presentations and decide on next steps at its December 5 ministerial meeting in Brussels.

-- The study was commissioned by NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in December 1994.

-- The study is part of a gradual, deliberate process leading to the enlargement of the Alliance.

-- Our goal is to extend the security and stability represented by NATO into the new democracies that have arisen in Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

-- By integrating them into NATO we hope to ensure the survival of their democratic and market economic reforms.

-- No decisions have yet been taken on whom to invite. Nor is there any timetable for when this will occur. Enlargement will only occur when NATO is satisfied that prospective

members can contribute to the overall security of the Alliance.

-- The "how" part of the study sets out a number of steps that interested potential members must take in order to be considered for membership. These include political and military steps that contribute to the democratic goals and overall security of the Alliance.

-- We should stress that no Partnership for Peace members are a priori excluded from the possibility of becoming NATO members.

Russian Reaction to NATO Enlargement

-- In addition to enlargement, NATO is also pursuing establishment of a parallel relationship with Russia. This is being done in recognition of the important role Russia has to play in European security.

-- We are aware that Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Russian Ambassador

Churkin repeated these concerns following the enlargement briefing in Brussels on Thursday (September 28). We will continue working to overcome these concerns, which we believe are misplaced.

-- NATO enlargement is not aimed at Russia. NATO is a purely defensive organization. Our goal is to extend stability to areas of historic instability to ensure their future security.

-- Our purpose is to end the division of Europe, not to create new divisions.

-- At the same time, we have made clear to Moscow that enlargement will proceed in a gradual and transparent manner.

-- We strongly disagree with those who believe NATO should enlarge immediately just because

Russia has concerns about enlargement.

-- Enlargement must be a deliberate process that takes into account our interests as well as those of our European partners and Allies.

NATO Adopts Go-Slow Approach on Enlargement

Can you comment on press reports from Williamsburg that NATO has adopted a go-slow approach to enlargement due to concerns over Russia? Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev even welcomed the reports.

-- As Secretary Perry has made clear, this is a false report. NATO has not adopted a go-slow

approach to enlargement but is pursuing the "gradual, deliberate and transparent process" leading to enlargement that was foreseen by the Alliance from the very beginning.

-- There has been no acceleration or deceleration to the process.

-- NATO's approach to enlargement is spelled out clearly in the NATO enlargement study which was approved by NATO on September 20 and presented to members of the Partnership for Peace in Brussels on September 28.

-- No timetable exists at present, but NATO is committed to moving ahead. NATO expansion is not a question of "if"; that issue has already been resolved.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Kozyrev to be Replaced

-- Have seen reports you have. Following with keen interest.

(Set-back for U.S.-Russian Relations?)

-- Have no reason to believe Yeltsin has turned away from policy of engagement with West. For our part, remain committed to engagement with Russia, and very much looking forward to Monday's meeting with Yeltsin.

(Kozyrev to be at Hyde Park?)

-- Kozyrev was named as part of Yeltsin's official party; have heard nothing so far to change that.

Hyde Park Meeting

-- Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to hold working meeting at Hyde Park, New York on October 23.

Will review range of bilateral and other international issues.

Reaction to Decision to Use Multiple Routes for Exporting Caspian Oil

-- Welcome decision by Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC) to develop multiple export routes from Caspian for transport of early oil extracted by AIOC.

-- Believe multiple routes will enhance AIOC's ability to export oil to Western and traditional markets by promoting competitive business practices in oil transport, increasing export capacity, and encouraging increased oil production.

-- All countries in region benefit from decision. Expect it to foster greater cooperation among countries in region, improving prospects for development and stability.

AIOC Decision a Loss for Russia?

-- Not at all. See this as win-win situation. Considerable early oil will be transported from Caspian through Russia. And multiple routes could increase Russia's own capacity to develop and

export Russian oil.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia

relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust NATO-Russia relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have begun serious dialogue that is continuing.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Chechnya

-- Have seen reports that Russians have suspended peace process over recent Chechen attacks, including attempt to assassinate Russian force commander in Grozny. Condemn attacks like that, whose purpose is to undermine the fragile effort to find negotiated settlement.

-- Dispute in Chechnya can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides to work together to implement military agreement and to find political solution.

LOOSE NUKES

Concerning the beryllium case in Lithuania:

ù There was a case in Lithuania in 1993 involving the seizure of beryllium. The Lithuanian government alerted us to this case and we cooperated with them fully.

ù For particulars, I would refer you to Lithuanian legal authorities.

(If asked/needed:)

ù In 1993, approximately four tons of scrap beryllium was stolen in Lithuania.

ù While the material had been legally exported from Russia, it was later discovered that the approximately 8,000 pounds of beryllium was combined with less than 1/25 of an ounce of enriched uranium

On the (possible) claim that senior Russian officials have been involved in nuclear smuggling:

ù We have no credible evidence of this.

On the Frequency of Nuclear Smuggling & the U.S. Response:

ù The vast majority of reported nuclear smuggling cases have been simple scams or have involved material not suitable for weapons use.

ù We cannot corroborate the other allegations in the 60 Minutes report.

ù The prevention of nuclear smuggling and the security of nuclear materials are top national security priorities. Last month, President Clinton strengthened our already robust efforts in this area with a Presidential Decision Directive which set out specific goals, objectives and priorities for each Department and Agency of the U.S. government.

ù Despite the fact that the vast majority of suspected cases of nuclear smuggling turn out to be scams, we take all reports seriously. The Department of State chairs an interagency response group which reviews every report and takes appropriate action. If necessary, U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, scientific, diplomatic and military resources can be brought to bear on very short notice.

ù For additional information, please contact the State Department.

(If needed/asked:)

ù The Departments of Energy and Defense, the FBI and the Customs service all have pr

pared talking points on their nuclear material security and anti-nuclear smuggling activities.)

On our programs to prevent nuclear smuggling:

ù Keeping nuclear weapons and nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states is a vital U.S. priority. As part of our overall nonproliferation policy we have been active on several fronts.

ù At the request of the Kazakhstani government, we airlifted over half a ton of vulnerable weapons-grade uranium -- enough to make dozens of nuclear bombs -- to a safe storage facility.

ù We are cooperating with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus on projects to improve the security of nuclear materials. Cooperative projects with these nations are underway to improve the security of many tons of materials at more than two dozen locations. One such cooperative project -- a project at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk -- was just concluded on September 21.

ù We are also cooperating with many additional nations -- including Lithuania -- on efforts to improve border controls and police enforcement capabilities to detect and deter possible cases of nuclear smuggling.

ù We have reached an agreement with Russia under which 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Soviet-era nuclear warheads are being blended down to low enriched uranium not suitable for nuclear weapons, sold to the U.S., and burned in civilian nuclear power plants.

ù We have already reached agreement with Russia to end the production of plutonium for weapons purposes.

ù The U.S. is also pressing for a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, as President Clinton urged at the

1993 UNGA.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

ù The United States and our NATO Allies have for some time been looking at ways to address Russian and Ukrainian concerns about the Treaty's "flank" limits.

ù Last [] month NATO presented a proposal to Russia in Brussels for a new approach to resolving this issue. Russia has reacted cautiously and will study the offer further.

ù The strategic picture has changed dramatically since the Treaty was signed in 1990. Neither the Warsaw Pact nor the Soviet Union exist. Forces once deployed by the USSR as far west as Eastern Germany have withdrawn to Russia. We are looking at ways to respond to those changes, while maintaining the key elements of the Treaty.

ù NATO has developed this proposal as it prepares for the CFE Review Conference, established by the Treaty for May, 1996. Our goal is to preserve the viability of the Treaty, which remains a cornerstone of European security.

ù The "flank" issue does not concern the overall equipment limit for Russia and Ukraine, but the restrictions which the Treaty places on the amount of equipment permitted in certain regions. Russia and Ukraine have participated fully in the Treaty's implementation over the past three years, destroying thousands of pieces of Treaty-limited equipment and submitting to hundreds of inspections under the terms of the Treaty.

ù We and our Allies continue to reject completely the Russian idea of an

"exclusion zone" in its Caucasus region. There is no basis for such an "exclusion zone" in the Treaty.

ù Any solution must be acceptable to all Treaty parties. The forum for negotiation will be the CFE Joint Consultative Group in Vienna.

(If asked about statement by Senator Helms staff that Treaty changes are not likely to be approved "anytime soon":)

ù Any agreement along the lines of the NATO proposal would require the approval of Congress.

IRAN SANCTIONS BILL

Q: What is the administration's position on the bill Senator D'Amato introduced on September 8, targeting foreign trade with Iran's petroleum sector?

A: We support the objective of limiting Iran's income while the government directs its resources to the support of objectionable policies. We appreciate the Committee's attention to this effort.

However, this proposal would not be effective in discouraging trade with Iran. Although it would advance our policy of pressuring Iran, it would harm American economic interests and upset our relation with key allies and foreign industry.

Some of our major allies--such as Canada, the EU, and Japan--have substantial trade relations with Iran and would consider even a limited US-imposed secondary boycott an intrusive trade barrier.

A unilateral boycott would be inconsistent with our commitments under the GATT and would invite retaliation from some of our major trading partners.

It could reverse the progress we have made on lifting the secondary and tertiary Arab League boycott of Israel. It would be very difficult to square our free trade arguments on this issue with a unilateral secondary boycott of Iran.

For all of these reasons we are not supporting the bill at this juncture, but welcome further discussions with Congress on these issues.

CHINA

Three Gorges

Background: An article in Friday's WSJ notes that an IWG has recommended to Ex-Im Bank that the Chinese Three Gorges Dam project not be financed. The article extensively and accurately quotes a memo signed by Sandy Berger.

Points

-- NSC concluded that the USG should not offer commercial assistance to the Three Gorges project because of environmental and human rights concerns related to the project.

-- We have opposed projects with similar concerns at the World Bank and believe our policy should be consistent in this case.

-- We believe any effort to provide commercial assistance would be taken to court for a protracted period anyway.

-- We have significant concerns about the project's financial feasibility. We believe that official Chinese government estimates of cost may be far too low.

-- The decision is not binding on the Ex-Im Bank. The board will consider our conclusions and base its decisions on the statutory requirements for financial, technical, environmental soundness.

-- The NSC conclusion does not preclude U.S. companies from doing business at Three Gorges. It only extends to the role of the USG in the project.

CUBA

Q: WHAT IS THE REACTION OF THE WHITE HOUSE TO SENATOR DOLE'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WILL BRING THE HELMS/BURTON BILL TO THE SENATE FLOOR FOR DEBATE TODAY?

-- The Administration believes that the Cuban Democracy Act provides all of the authority the President needs to carry out a firm and effective Cuba policy.

-- President Clinton demonstrated with his decisions last Friday both the principle and the practice of the Cuban Democracy Act when he strengthened enforcement of the US embargo and our support for the Cuban people.

-- The Administration has indicated its concerns with provisions of the Helms and Burton bills that restrict Presidential authority.

-- They would also keep us from taking effective actions during a difficult transition period in Cuba and make an equitable solution to property issues in Cuba less likely.

Q: WILL THE PRESIDENT VETO THE HELMS BILL IF PASSED?

-- The President wishes to maintain the bipartisan basis of US Cuba policy. He hopes to reach an agreement with the Congress to avoid a public division over Cuba policy that will only benefit the Castro dictatorship.

CASTRO VISA APPLICATION

Background: President Castro applied for a visa on October 9 as head of the Cuban delegation to the special session of the UNGA to commemorate the UN's 50th anniversary.

Points

- ù President Castro applied for a visa on October 9 to attend the special session of the UNGA.

- ù The State Department will be considering his application in light of the United States' international obligations and in accordance with U.S. law.

- ù Castro himself applied for and received visas in 1960 and 1979 to attend sessions of the General Assembly in New York.

CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT

-- The President decided to take a series of steps to invigorate the Cuban Democracy Act's (CDA) goal of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

-- These steps are consistent with the spirit and the letter of the CDA and implement precisely what it calls for: Use the embargo effectively to put pressure on the Castro government and help those people and forces in Cuba that are struggling for democratic change.

-- Nothing in these decisions reflects a weakening of our commitment to the embargo. On the contrary: Every element of the embargo remains in place and the means to enforce it

will be strengthened.

At the same time, this Administration will reenergize its efforts to reach out to the Cuban people through the free flow of ideas and information and by strengthening the island's fledgling civil society.

ENFORCING THE EMBARGO

-- The President has directed that the office in charge of enforcing the embargo, the Office of Foreign Assets Control be significantly beefed up, both here and in Miami.

-- The Attorney General is also reviewing how best to enforce the provisions of the embargo.

-- If we are serious about going after those who violate the embargo, then we ought to make sure that we have rules that can be complied with. Today, many Cuban-Americans circumvent the travel rules and go to Cuba without a license. They do not do it to flout the law or because they do not believe in the embargo. They do it because of the time it takes to get the license and because in many instances time is of the essence. Therefore, the President has decided to provide a general license for Cuban-Americans to

make an annual visit to Cuba for humanitarian reasons. This will help those who really need to travel on an urgent basis. It will cut down on violations of the embargo. And it will make enforcement of the law fairer and easier.

REACHING OUT TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE

-- We share the CDA's commitment to promote democracy in Cuba through the power of ideas and by reaching out to the Cuban people.

-- Our other decisions are designed to strengthen those on the island who can be agents of change: Human rights activists, dissidents, independent organizations.

-- First, the President has authorized the establishment of reciprocal news bureaus in Cuba and the U.S. Of course, we will not approve Cuban bureaus until a full range of US news bureaus are granted entry to Cuba. This decision will significantly increase the flow of news to and from Cuba, thereby helping the Cuban people escape their state's monopoly over information.

-- Second, we will allow U.S. NGOs to help their counterparts in Cuba in a variety of ways.

-- US NGOs will be authorized to provide support to human rights organizations and other NGOs in Cuba.

-- The USG will be providing a grant to Freedom House to work with Cuban NGOs to advance the cause of democracy.

-- We will allow the sale and donation of communications equipment -- such as fax machines, copiers, computers, etc. -- to Cuban NGOs who promote democratic values and respect for human rights.

-- Third, travel regulations will be amended to clarify who can and cannot go to Cuba.
a. Under these new regulations, transactions to finance tourist travel to Cuba remain prohibited. Like other elements of the embargo, this ban will be more strictly enforced than before. At the same time, the rules will make clear that travel for scientific, news-gathering, educational, cultural, religious purposes, or for the purpose of helping independent activities on the island, is permitted.

WESTERN UNION

-- Finally, the President has decided to authorize Western Union to set up offices here and in Cuba

to send wire transfers more simply and at a lower cost to those who need to pay
 emig
 ration fees or for
 family emergencies. The rules on remittances remain the same -- Western Union
 simpl
 y will make
 transfers easier and cheaper.

HONDURAS

Background: The Honduran human rights ombudsman is conducting
 investigations into r
 eported abuses which
 took place in Honduras in the 1980s. In conjunction with his investigation he has
 r
 equested access to U.S.
 government files which may have relevant information.

Points

ù Dr. Balladares, the human rights ombudsman for Honduras, has requested that
 certai
 n U.S. government
 documents relevant to his investigation be made available.

ù State Department, which initially received the request, will shortly begin
 reviewi
 ng appropriate documents for
 declassification and release to Dr. Balladares.

ù We anticipate other agencies will work with State Department to provide
 similar as
 sistance to Dr. Balladares.

ù On September 12 the DCI confirmed that the CIA was currently conducting a
 review o
 f what happened in
 Honduras during the 1980's. (Deutch National Press Club quote: "I expect that we
 wil
 l learn lessons from that
 review -- lessons about how to not do things while I'm Director and in the future."

)

ZAMBIA: FORMER PRESIDENT KAUNDA

(IF ASKED)

Q: Has the Government of Zambia arrested former president Kenneth Kaunda?

A: No. On the evening of October 17, government-run television announced that Kaunda had been asked to report to the police. This sparked minor rock-throwing disturbances in downtown and suburban areas of Lusaka, including near the University of Zambia, during the morning and afternoon of October 18.

These disturbances ended by the evening of October 18, and at mid-day on October 19, the government announced that the police had been instructed not to detain or arrest Kaunda.

Q: What is the security situation in Lusaka now?

A: The situation in Lusaka has now returned to normal. There have been no reports of disturbances elsewhere in Zambia.

In response to the disturbances on October 18, the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka issued an advisory for U.S. citizens to exercise caution and limit movements in and around Lusaka.

Q: Why did the police summon Kaunda?

A: This is not clear. There have been reports that police wished to question Kaunda with respect to violence in recent parliamentary by-elections; moreover, in recent days, government spokesmen have publicly questioned Kaunda's Zambian citizenship, leading to speculation that he could be deported.

Q: What is the U.S. Government's attitude?

A: As the 1996 Presidential elections approach, the U.S. appeals to all parties to respect the democratic process, the constitutional rights of citizens, and to take steps to ensure that the election campaign is orderly, free and completely fair.

NIGERIA

Background: Nigeria announced on Tuesday, October 10, long prison sentences for those Nigerian military officers and civilians accused of coup-plotting including four life sentences, 15 years for former President Olusegun Obasanjo and human rights activist Beko Ransome-Kuti and 25 years for General Abdulsalam Abacha. The Nigerian military regime has also moved several alleged coup plotters from Lagos to an ill-equipped and sub-standard prison in the northeastern part of the country.

Q: What is your reaction to Nigeria's decision to impose long sentences on former President Obasanjo and others?

A: The United States strongly condemns the long prison sentences imposed on those Nigerian military officers and civilians accused of coup-plotting including four life sentences, the 15 year terms dealt former President Obasanjo and human rights activist Beko Ransome-Kuti and the 25 year term imposed on General Yar'Adua. Their trials were conducted secretly, and the United States is aware of no evidence to substantiate the charges.

Since the arrests began last March, the United States, the international community and a broad spectrum of Nigerians have consistently deplored the secret process that has

resulte
d in the denial of due
process and application of harsh sentences.

We also remain concerned about reports of maltreatment and the failure to afford
re
gular
medical treatment to those detained.

The United States reiterates its call upon the Nigerian Government to speed the
tra
nsition to
democracy starting by the release all political detainees immediately and
unconditio
nally.

Q. What is your reaction to reports that several alleged coup plotters were moved
fr
om Lagos to
substandard prisons.

A. The United States is deeply concerned about reports that the Nigerian military
re
gime has
moved several alleged coup plotters from Lagos to an ill-equipped and sub-
standard p
rison in northeastern
part of the country.

-- We remain concerned about reports of maltreatment and the failure to afford
regul
ar medical
treatment to those detained.

Q: Will the United States impose additional sanctions?

A: The United States will keep all measures under review as it looks for progress
in
Nigeria's
transition to democracy.

-- The United States reiterates its call upon the Nigerian Government to speed the
t
ransition to
democracy, starting by releasing political detainees.

BIRTH DEFECTS AND GULF WAR VETERANS' ILLNESSES

Background: The November issue of Life magazine, which is on the newsstands this week, has a cover story on birth defects in the children of Gulf War veterans. Called the "Tiny Victims of Desert Storm," the article uses a series of anecdotes and photos to compose a moving portrait of birth defects in Gulf War veterans' families.

Questions and Answers:

1. What is your reaction to the Life magazine article about birth defects among the children of Gulf War veterans?

Birth defects are a heartbreaking issue for parents and families, and are of great concern to the Clinton Administration. Careful research is needed to determine whether or not miscarriages, birth defects, and other reproductive outcomes are more prevalent among Gulf War veterans compared with other U.S. citizens.

2. Isn't it surprising that Gulf war veterans seem to have babies with so many types of defects?

Overall, there is about a 3 percent chance that a baby will be born with a serious birth defect. There are literally hundreds of different types of birth defects. So in any large group of individuals who have had babies, such as Gulf War veterans, it is expected that there will be some babies affected by a variety of types of defects. On the other hand, most environmental agents known to cause defects will cause a specific type or pattern of defects. For example, the drug thalidomide caused an epidemic of missing limbs, and German measles causes ear, eye and heart anomalies. So it will be particularly important to look for an unusual pattern of defects among the babies of Gulf War veterans.

3. Why don't other family members of Gulf War veterans have the same birth defects?

Most birth defects occur sporadically. Conditions that recur in successive generations or in multiple siblings are rare and represent a small fraction of all birth defects. When a child with a birth defect is born, other family members usually don't have the same birth defect.

4. What do we really know about the risk of birth defects among Gulf War veterans' children?

Thus far, several studies of birth defects or miscarriages have shown no overall increased rate for Gulf War veterans and their families. For example:

In Mississippi, medical records of 54 children born to Persian Gulf veterans from two Mississippi National Guard units were evaluated. The birth defect results were comparable to that for the general population.

In another study, pre-Desert Storm miscarriage rates were compared to post-Desert Storm miscarriage rates for 6,392 pregnancies at six Army hospitals; they were 8% for both time periods. A similar study of 1500 pregnancies at William Beaumont Army Medical Center also found no difference in miscarriage rates pre and post deployment; the rates were 12% for each.

Other, more comprehensive studies are underway (see below).

5. Why isn't the Administration doing more to get to the bottom of this problem?

The President and the Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Health and Human Services are committed to helping our service members and their families find answers and to providing the care that they need.

The studies which have been done thus far are reassuring, even though they were limited.

ted to specific geographic areas. Nevertheless, DOD, HHS and VA are moving forward with other studies of birth defects among a random sample of Gulf War veterans, as well as looking at all birth defects and specific types of birth defects in certain hospitals and geographic areas where data can be accurately analyzed.

These studies will help us determine whether service in the Gulf War is associated with reproductive problems such as birth defects. The studies will also evaluate whether specific exposures seen to be associated with reproductive problems. These studies will help Gulf War veterans who are concerned about future pregnancies. New research studies underway include:

DOD Research

DOD is conducting a comparative study of pregnancy outcomes, including birth defects, among 500,000 Gulf War veterans and 700,000 other active duty personnel and their spouses. Preliminary results of this study, based

on medical records at military hospitals, will be available soon.

DOD is conducting a study of reproductive outcomes of 16,000 couples, comparing Gulf War veterans and similar veterans who did not serve in the Gulf War. This study will not be limited to children born in military hospitals.

DOD is also conducting another study comparing birth defects among Gulf War veterans to Gulf-era veterans who live in states (such as Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, and Oklahoma) that have comprehensive birth defect information. This study will not be limited to children born in military hospitals.

DOD (with assistance from CDC) is conducting a study focused specifically on the rate of Goldenhar Syndrome

among children born in military hospitals.

HHS/CDC Research

CDC is conducting a telephone survey with approximately 1,500 persons from Iowa who were deployed to the Gulf and 1,500 persons from Iowa who served at the time of the Gulf War but who were not deployed to the Gulf. This survey includes questions about pregnancy outcomes, including birth defects. Data collection began in late September and results are expected in August 1996.

VA Research

VA will be conducting a mail survey of 15,000 Gulf War veterans and 15,000 Gulf-era veterans to evaluate a variety of health issues, including pregnancy outcomes. The survey will begin shortly.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SERVING IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Background: The Washington Post and Washington Times carry stories story on an Army medic stationed in Germany who refused to don UN insignia after his unit was ordered to deploy to Macedonia as part of the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) operation. The Army has begun court-martial proceedings against Spc. Michael New for disobeying a lawful order. New's defense for his actions is: "I swore allegiance to my country not to the UN."

On Friday, 46 House members wrote President Clinton a letter requesting "a full legal and constitutional analysis of the justification of your orders placing members of the U.S. armed forces under the

'command' of foreign UN
offices, especially your orders to U.S. Army Spec. Michael New."

Points

-- Refer all questions relating to the specific case of Michael New to the Army
Publ
ic Affairs
office.

-- On current U.S. policy concerning placing U.S. troops under foreign or UN
"comman
d":

--- Under long-standing U.S. policy, most recently reaffirmed by the President in
hi
s May
1994 "Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," the President retains
and
will never
relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the
Preside
nt will
consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a
competen
t UN
commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The
UN ope
ration in
Macedonia is a case where the President has made this judgment.

-- If asked whether this policy is new or adopted only under the Clinton
Administrat
ion:

--- There is nothing new about this policy. U.S. military personnel have participat
ed in UN
peace operations since 1948. American forces have served under the operational
cont
rol of
foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I and
II, Ope
ration
Desert Storm, and in NATO since its inception.

-- Regarding questions relating to the letter by Rep. Dorman et al.:

--- The President has only just received the letter. He will respond to the request
for a full
legal and constitutional justification in the near future.

ENERGY, NAVY AND IDAHO SETTLE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND WASTE ISSUES

Background: DOE and the Navy have come to an agreement with the state of Idaho regarding spent fuel and radioactive waste issues at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). As a result, on Tuesday, October 17, the Federal District Court in Idaho vacated the injunction it had previously imposed at the request of Idaho which had barred the shipment of naval and DOE spent nuclear fuel to INEL. The agreement allows the Navy to resume shipping spent fuel to Idaho immediately for examination and temporary storage up to the next 40 years; it also permits essential DOE spent fuel shipments to occur over the next several years. The Navy -- prevented by the injunction from either refueling or decommissioning its nuclear powered warships -- can now fully operate these ships to perform their national security missions.

Points

- ù This agreement achieves the goals of national security while addressing environmental protection and the careful stewardship of public funds:

- ù (National Security goals, if needed) It enables the Navy to fully operate its fleet of nuclear powered warships to perform their national security mission, and
- ù Enables the United States to recover spent fuel from reactors in foreign countries for purposes of nuclear non-proliferation, if such an acceptance policy is adopted.

- ù This complex issue was resolved on a bi-partisan basis, with the Administration working with Governor Batt, Idaho's Congressional delegation, and other Democratic and Republican members of Congress.

gress, such as
Senators Warner, Inouye and Snowe, and Congressman Norm Dicks.

ù It is a fair deal, accelerating environment restoration at INEL with a binding
com
mitment to move all of the
spent fuel out of the state of Idaho by 2035.

ù (if needed in response to a question on where/when will there be a permanent
repos
itory for nuclear spent
fuel) The Administration remains committed to a permanent solution for spent
fuel d
isposal. We believe
that this agreement supports that goal.

EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMPUTERS

The announced revisions of U.S. export controls on computers are designed to
enhance
the effectiveness of our
export control system, protect our national security, and ease regulatory burdens
on
both government and
industry.

New levels set to avoid trying to control the uncontrollable, in light of the enormo
us advances over the past two
years in capabilities of computing systems in widespread commercial use.

In addition, we will continue to implement Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative
(EPCI), which provides
authority for government to block exports of computers even below the new
thresholds
to end-uses or
end-users of military or proliferation concern. Criminal as well as civil penalties
apply to violators of the EPCI.

Department of Commerce developing additional measures to inform exporters of
obligat
ions and potential
proliferation and other security risks.

(If asked about multilateral coordination):

Administration consulting with Japan in context of bilateral arrangement on high

per
 formance computers. Also
 consulting with partners engaged in negotiations to establish successor to
 COCOM (the
 New Forum), to promote
 consistent approach to computers.

(If asked) The revised controls will become effective after they are implemented
 in
 formal Commerce
 Department regulations.

CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT ON DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL

Background: On September 29, the House rejected by a wide margin the
 conference report
 on the FY 1996
 Defense Appropriations Bill. As reported by the conferees, the bill would have
 provided
 for a \$243 billion defense
 budget for next year -- \$6.7 billion more than requested by the Administration.
 The
 bill's defeat in the House was
 attributable to a strong bloc of "pro-life" Members concerned by the watering
 down of
 the House-passed
 provision in the bill on abortion and other Members opposed to the increase in
 spending
 for programs such as
 the B-2 and National Missile Defense.

Points

-- Committed to maintaining best trained, best equipped, most ready armed forces
 in
 the world.

-- The Administration's budget protects readiness and ensures we are prepared to
 defend
 our
 American interests.

-- Although the conferees did remove objectionable policy provisions and other
 unacceptable

restrictions on my prerogatives as Commander in Chief and they did fund several important programs of priority interest to this Administration (e.g., Nunn-Lugar and TRP), I am very concerned by the inclusion of almost \$7 billion for procurement and R&D spending we did not request.

-- With the defeat of the Conference Report by the House, the bill now goes back to the conference to be reworked. As the conferees consider how to revise the bill to improve its prospects of ever being enacted into law, it is important that they understand that absent a broader agreement with Congress that provides adequate funding for crucial domestic programs that are underfunded in other appropriations bills, the President will veto any defense appropriations bill that adds extra billions for defense programs not in my request.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 26 October 95 20:01
FROM Naplan, Steven J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT ireland sched. request for POTUS [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Dohse, Fred J.
CARBON_COPY Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Gray, Wendy
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Schuker, Jill A.

TEXT_BODY

Back on October 14 Nancy verbally approved scheduling request 7543 for POTUS to do a roundtable with British/Irish media at the White House in advance of the Europe trip. (It already had McCurry's verbal approval as well.)

At the time the request was considered a bit late getting in.

I was told that Nancy has signed the package and that it had moved on to scheduling.

Today, Brenda Hilliard told me that there was no sign of 7543.

How do I proceed?

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 27 October 95 16:44
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Ken Walsh [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Johnson, David T.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

David --

Lunch with Ken Walsh (and he now tells me he is inviting Bruce Auster to come along) is scheduled for Monday, November 6 at 12:30 p.m. at The Oval Room on Connecticut Avenue.

One of the things Ken wants to talk about is something he is writing on the Ireland trip.

This has been added to your e-mail schedule.

Thanks,
Natalie

From: Johnson, David T.
To: Wozniak, Natalie S.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: RE: Ken Walsh [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, October 26, 1995 07:41 PM

Go for the travel day.

From: Wozniak, Natalie S.
To: Johnson, David T.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: Ken Walsh [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, October 26, 1995 07:13 PM

David,

Ken Walsh, U.S. News & World Report (955-2502), wants to try again to have lunch with you one day next week.

Schedule for next week?

OR, better yet, the President travels to Detroit and New York on Monday, November 6, the following week. How about then -- assuming Ken is not traveling with the President?

Natalie