

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Kenneth Fairfax to Daniel Poneman, re: 95 Agenda (7 pages)	08/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/09/1995 - 08/11/1995]

2017-0759-F
ke5228

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 09 May 95 16:07
FROM Froman, Michael B.
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT Subject: RE: POTUS Trips in 1996 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Gardner, Anthony
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

France.

From: Gardner, Anthony
To: Froman, Michael B. G.; Walsh, Helen C.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: POTUS Trips in 1996 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Tuesday, May 09, 1995 03:36 PM

any idea where the 1996 G-7 will be held?

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: Stephens, Kathleen D.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Gardner, Anthony
Subject: RE: POTUS Trips in 1996 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Tuesday, May 09, 1995 03:31 PM

Those references must have been added downstairs. I'm equally puzzled. I recall Fred or someone downstairs referring to a NATO Summit, but there isn't one unless we call for it -- unlikely in an election year, unless we want to accelerate NATO expansion (and screw Yeltsin). Tony was checking on the venue for the G-7 during 1996. That could be the source of the reference to France. Tony?

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: POTUS Trips in 1996 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Tuesday, May 09, 1995 03:19 PM

Sandy, see below. Can you shed any light on the Belgium/France references? I didn't put them in and I'm not sure what they're referring to.

From: Dohse, Fred J.
To: Roth, Stanley O.; Stephens, Kathleen D.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Hilliard, Brenda I.; Sens, Andrew D.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By ~~100~~ NARA, Date 04/30/19
2017-0789-F

Subject: POTUS Trips in 1996 [CONFIDENTIAL]

Date: Tuesday, May 09, 1995 03:14 PM

Kathy, in your memo forwarding the scheduling proposal for the President's trip to Great Britain and Ireland you mentioned that the President would be making two trips to Europe in 1996 -- France and Belgium. Billy Webster acted surprised when he saw this. What is the purpose of the two 1996 trips and when are they? My best guess was Belgium for a NATO event and France for a G-7 Summit. Please add additional details as appropriate.

Stanley, along this same line Billy would like to know when the 1996 APEC meeting is and its location. He is already looking at a busy campaign schedule and is concerned that the 1996 APEC meeting may impact on it. Would you please provide me the details on the 1996 APEC Meeting.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 May 95 09:47
FROM Suettinger, Robert L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: FW: APEC/Ireland [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Roth, Stanley O.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

forgot to add you to this

From: Suettinger, Robert L.
To: Darby, M. Brooke
CC: /R, Record at A1; Blieberger, Marion H.; Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Subject: RE: APEC/Ireland [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, May 18, 1995 09:19 AM

I realize that you are anxious to make an announcement by a date certain, and I am trying to be cooperative. But in the process you are not only giving short shrift to Asia, but also to the planning process for the APEC trip and the state visit to Japan. It seems to me that it would be appropriate to at least permit those principally responsible for Asia policy to weigh in on the issues involving bilaterals and additional possible stops in Asia. They are unavailable at the moment. Win Lord doesn't return until Saturday.

Yes, of course you can cut the schedule in Japan back to a day plus a few hours, rushing away from what the President has called our most important bilateral relationship. I'm sure Tokyo will be accommodating and gracious. As long as there is a full business day for meetings, a call on the Emperor, a dinner, etc., the necessities can be accomplished. And no, there are no firm plans at the moment for other stops in the region, although there are a number of invitations. But the planning process has not been put in motion yet -- the entire issue has not been considered.

I will say for the record, and I spoke to Stanley about this -- he agrees -- that this approach will be noticed in Asia, and there will be quiet consequences. It will confirm in the minds of many their suspicion that this Administration is not interested in or concerned about Asia. An opportunity to improve a relationship with another Asian country will be lost. The good will garnered by going to Asia for APEC would be vitiated by questions about why the POTUS was leaving so abruptly. If that came about because we were in a hurry to make an announcement about travelling to Ireland, I think that would be unfortunate.

So, can we do what you are proposing? Yes, probably. But should we?

From: Darby, M. Brooke

To: Suettinger, Robert L.

CC: /R, Record at A1; Blieberger, Marion H.; Hawkins, Ardenia R.

Subject: APEC/Ireland [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Wednesday, May 17, 1995 06:24 PM

<<Attached File: 3328PRE.DOC>>

Bob - Ran draft by Nancy (see attached). Her sense is that if we have almost a whole day in Tokyo on the 20th, we shouldn't have to stay all day on the 21st. She wants to get to England in time for meetings on the 21st. We need asap tomorrow your sense of the earliest we could leave Tokyo (ideally late morning from Nancy's point of view).

Nancy also asks that you try to get some firmer answers on the schedule -- i.e. when we really have to be where and for how long (if we're trying to keep the schedule compressed). She thinks Win may be back tomorrow and recommends you discuss with him.

MANY THANKS! (sorry to load you down with one more project)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 May 95 18:49
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT delete [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[5-25MCBF.DOC : 4646 in 5-25MCBF.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 25 May 95 18:49
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 5-25MCBF.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

Immediate Release May 25, 1995

For

PRESS BRIEFING
BY MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

1:14 P.M. EDT

Q So tell us about this modeling job.

MR. MCCURRY: You want to know about that?

Q Yes, we do.

Q Centerfold. (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: Well, the guy who took the pictures apparently is now the guy who is the big Calvin Kline -- those of you watching on C-SPAN, this is not the real briefing, this is what we call the pre-briefing. Yes, it was a guy who now is the Calvin Kline -- they came down to the Princeton campus one day in the summer of 1976 when I thought I was going to be a reporter. And I was sitting in the university's press office waiting to actually talk to the guy who ran communications. And this photographer who's famous, whose name I should know, came in and said, well, we envision a whole series of photos, back-to-school fashions involving real-life situations with students, maybe -- even someone like him. (Laughter.)

So I spent a day with this guy seeing how you do -- they paid me \$200. I had \$200 worth of beer money in the spring semester of my senior year, which made me one popular hombre, let me tell you. (Laughter.) It was great fun. It was actually great fun. And it came out in September, and that was the end of that.

Q Has that shaped your political convictions, that there is a free lunch -- that there is a Santa Claus?

MR. MCCURRY: I decided -- there is a Santa Clause. But as everyone would quickly say, given what has happened to me since, given to my appearance, it's good that I found a good daytime job to earn gainful employment.

So that's that story.

Q You call this gainful employment?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. It was fun. You get paid to have fun.

All right, let's go. This is the official briefing of the

White House. My name is Mike McCurry. I stand here regularly, five days a week to be pummeled to death. (Laughter.) And we shall proceed with questions -- the first coming from Mr. Wolf Blitzer of the Cable News Network.

Good afternoon, Mr. Blitzer.

Q Good afternoon. Thank you so much. This letter that Abner Mikva has written to employees saying whatever he said, are you going to release a copy of this letter?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I am told the following by the Legal Counsel, that this constitutes legal advice that has been rendered by the Legal Counsel to departments and agencies. So, for that reason, the Press Office will not disseminate this as an official

document. However, should any of you find yourselves unable to acquire a copy of this, please do let one of our helpful assistants here know and maybe they can be helpful. I don't know. Maybe they can, maybe they can't.

Now, a couple of things on this letter. Some of you are interested in this letter. It is a routine practice for White House legal counsels to provide a legal opinion on the effects of the Hatch Act to relevant federal agencies and departments, as did one Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, on February 14, 1984; as did --

Q Which said?

MR. MCCURRY: -- C. Boyden Gray, November 15, 1991, for both President Reagan and President Bush. Now, what the purpose of very similar letters in all three instances was to advise departments and agencies of the implications of the Hatch Act -- what employees can do and what they cannot do under interpretations of the act.

Now, Judge Mikva's letter does reflect the changes that were made in the statute in 1993. And in both the cases of President Reagan and President Bush's legal counsels, they noted with great disdain the fact that the law at that time raised grave constitutional concerns. As Mr. Gray wrote, he's wrote "I regret that this advice may inhibit federal employees from the full exercise of their First Amendment rights, so there was a great deal of concern about that. But as you know, Congress did change the law in 1993, and the memo that Judge Mikva sent properly to federal departments and agencies reflects those changes in the law.

Q Because of the change in the law, is there any concern here that there's, therefore, a new atmosphere in which the proverbial appearance problem, finders will find an appearance problem with the suggestion that because this comes from the White House at this time under the change circumstances, it would appear to carry with it a suggestion, however intended, or however unintended, that now is the time to contribute, folks?

MR. MCCURRY: Given the wording of the memo, I strongly

doubt that that interpretation would arise, because, among other things -- and Judge Mikva's memo to the Cabinet agencies notes that in most circumstances, federal employees may not knowingly solicit, accept or receive a political contribution. So it's very clear from the wording of the memo itself that there are certain restrictions on the ability to solicit contributions.

Q But those questions have have already arisen.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, they've arisen from those who are critical of the changes made in the act in 1993. The Legal Counsel is not in any position other than to provide authoritative legal advice to department agencies and to Cabinet officers about interpretation of law.

Q What was the dissemination of the document once it was dispatched from here? I assume you had a relatively limited -- to fairly senior employees and was not -- you didn't pay for the government with it.

MR. MCCURRY: It is actually addressed to heads of all agencies and departments, and it comes in response, I am told, from some requests from Legal Counsel's ad agency, saying we need some official interpretation.

Q How long a mailing list?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know. I believe that's the narrow group of individuals -- agencies and departments. And it is cc'd by the way, to the general counsels of agencies and departments, so it clearly is intended to give legal advice directly to counsels at each of the agencies.

Q Can we have the letter?

Q Why was this done by the White House Counsel's Office? We've been told many times from that podium that the White House Counsel supplies legal advice to the Office of the President. And why was this not done by the Office of Government Ethics, for example?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, as I say, in this case, the precedent is that the Office of White House Legal Counsel provides to the department heads and agencies the rendering of this advice. This does reflect advice that is given about what is proper under the law related to political activity, and I think it is appropriate, therefore, that it come from the White House Legal Counsel.

Q Consider that the Fielding, Boyden Gray letters said you cannot contribute to a presidential campaign, and the Mikva letter --

MR. MCCURRY: Begrudgingly said that --

Q -- said that you cannot contribute to a

presidential campaign, and the Mikva letter said you can contribute to a presidential campaign. Doesn't the White House consider that

intimidating and/or --

MR. MCCURRY: No --

Q -- did you have any discussions as to whether or not it would be construed as by someone receiving that from "the boss," the White House, that they maybe should contribute as to --

MR. MCCURRY: I doubt that any head of an agency or head of a department, or a general counsel for any of those entities would find a legal memo from the White House Legal Counsel threatening and intimidating. I think they would find it helpful as they attempt to help their own employees understand what they are allowed and not allowed to do under the law, which was precisely the intent of the memo.

Now, again, you correctly point out there is a difference in the memos, but I want to make it very clear, that reflects the changes in the law made in 1993. Congress addressed --

Q I know, but doesn't that create new circumstances under which new appearances can be created? That's the whole premise here, isn't it?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, it made some changes; it, frankly, left some things standing -- the prohibitions on political activities in federal buildings, the reminder that federal employees may not conduct certain types of activity while they are at work. All of these are very carefully noted in Judge Mikva's memo.

Q What's the President's involvement now in the NATO strikes? Has he been getting reports?

MR. MCCURRY: He's been getting regular updates from the National Security Advisor on the status of the operation that's been conducted by the NATO, and as you know, the President welcomed the air strikes and statement that he issued earlier today, and said he hopes that this will encourage the parties to honor the obligations that they have had imposed on them by the United Nations, and move quickly to some type of reconciliation and move to a peace process that can bring an end to the conflict.

Q Did he have advance warning?

MR. MCCURRY: We all had advance warning, because General Smith, the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia made it very clear what type of ultimatum existed on both parties, and that was very publicly issued, and no one had any doubt that that was a serious

ultimatum.

Q That was the only advance warning the President had?

MR. MCCURRY: That was the public indicator given, and obviously NATO was involved with the planning for exercises, and the President was aware of those plans.

Q Was this a one-shot deal, or is it a policy now? I mean, is it just going to be one time?

MR. MCCURRY: Admiral Leighton Smith, who is NATO's Southern Commander, has indicated that he hopes this will serve as a signal that both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government, especially the Bosnian Serbs, need to comply with the restrictions that exist within the exclusion zone around Sarajevo. He made it very clear, though, that we'll be watching to see what type of compliance there is with the edicts of the U.N. as we go forward in the hours ahead.

Q Mike, I just didn't get a clear answer to my question. Was there some separate information the President got right before the raid went forward?

MR. MCCURRY: Look, there was a great deal of planning that went into this, as with most military exercises, and as a participant in the strike today and as the leader within NATO, we are well-apprised of the plans that they had underway, and the President --

Q What caused the change of heart? The President's remarks?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, the President --

Q -- because they've been resisting this -- less than a week ago, didn't they?

MR. MCCURRY: The United Nations Commander on the ground made the judgment that there was a change in the circumstances on the ground, and you're all aware of the heavy shelling that's occurred of civilians in Sarajevo in recent days. Now, that, I would imagine, had some impact on his decision-making, but this has been a subject that has been discussed often in recent days at the U.N. within the Security Council, as Ambassador Albright reported over the last several days.

Q But has there been a change in U.N. policy, or the

U.N.'s attitude toward the use of air strikes? Because, if not, why should the Serbs believe you? Because the pattern from the United Nations has been to ignore Serb violations as much as possible and retaliate very seldomly, and only when pushed way beyond the limit.

MR. MCCURRY: I believe that today's action speaks for itself, and the requirements of the Bosnian Serbs to take measures

immediately to comply with the exclusion zone ordered around Sarajevo ought to be now very clear, and the statements of Admiral Smith are clear, the statements that have been made by the UNPROFOR Commander are very clear, too.

Q Do you have any enhanced capability, however, to carry out any actions on your own or with the agreement of the NATO allies without Mr. Akashi's permission?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, NATO is well-equipped under the arrangements that exist through the dual -- well-equipped to respond to requests coming from the United Nations via UNPROFOR.

Q Mr. Akashi has turned down almost every request.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, there's a long history here that you're well aware of.

Yes.

Q Beyond the President's public statements in recent days on this issue, was the U.S. working or pressuring U.N. officials to accede to air strikes?

MR. MCCURRY: As I indicated, it's a matter that's been under discussion at the United Nations as Ambassador Albright has said publicly.

Q What happens if the Bosnian Serbs don't return the four artillery pieces to the storage facilities in the weapons exclusion zone?

MR. MCCURRY: They have been ordered to comply with the exclusion zone that exists around Sarajevo. I'm not going to speculate about any additional action, but I believe that the United Nations and NATO have demonstrated their determination today to see that those exclusion orders are complied with.

Q Do you know if they have received any advance warning on the target itself, like last time, like last year?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know. You'd have to relay that question to UNPROFOR commanders in Sarajevo or Zagreb.

Q The Serb leader has called the U.N. forces the enemy as a result of this bombing.

MR. MCCURRY: I'm aware that there have been some initial reactions from Pale, but I'm not in a position to respond to those. I think the actions speak louder than words in this case.

Q Different subject? The Senate appears headed toward passing a budget resolution this afternoon. Where does the White House stand on a counter-budget proposal today?

MR. MCCURRY: A counter-budget proposal is one that the

President will develop in discussions with members of the Congress and the Republican majority in the weeks ahead. The Senate is not finishing work on this measure today. The Senate, likely, as you well know, will pass a budget resolution that is significantly in conflict with what has passed in the House. The first thing that must happen now is for House Republicans and Senate Republicans to decide whether or not they're going to give massive tax cuts to the wealthiest Americans, because, at the moment, we have a strong dispute. We've got Republicans in the House, Republicans in the Senate going in diametrically opposite directions, and so we are prepared to engage with Republicans in the Congress to develop counter budget proposals, and those will occur once we have some clarity from the Congress about what the budget resolution will look like. We don't know at this point what's going to be in the budget resolution.

Q Can you say, though, whether the White House has decided that it will, in fact, come up with a counter budget proposal?

MR. MCCURRY: The President has decided that he will be offering alternative suggestions to the Congress as we develop a budget, and those suggestions might take a variety of forms as we go through that negotiation.

Q So you're not anticipating one large counter budget proposal?

MR. MCCURRY: I wouldn't rule that out.

Q Mike, Senator Conrad and a bunch of other Democratic senators have now put forward a plan that balances the budget by 2004, just one year short of the President's goal of 10 years, and it includes \$228 billion of cuts in corporate subsidies

and some other things, and it meets his criteria on almost all counts in terms of Medicare cuts and education programs. What does he think of that?

MR. MCCURRY: We're aware of the alternative, looking carefully at it, and we will be offering suggestions of our own as we go ahead.

Q To Senator Conrad you're going to be offering the suggestions?

MR. MCCURRY: No, suggestions to those what we will negotiate with in the Congress, and Senator Conrad and other Democratic Senators, I'm sure will be a part of this discussion.

Q As this process goes forward, the legislation that would pass as it would achieve this budget that the majority is mapping out up there would be mostly in the form of appropriations or authorization bills.

MR. MCCURRY: Or a reconciliation bill.

Q Right. What is the President's leverage in trying

to protect federal departments that he may believe in from being closed down? I mean, it wouldn't seem that a veto would work very well, because if you veto a bill, you get no money. So, doesn't his situation with regard to the veto change from the one that's now present with regard to the rescissions bill, for example?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, just a general observation -- I don't know if I can answer the question specifically -- but unlike the debate over budget resolutions where the President does not have a veto, as we move into the appropriations process and the reconciliation process, the President does have a veto. I think it markedly changes the leverage the White House will have as we move into these negotiations. I think the Congress is well aware of that. And as to the abolition of specific departments, the veto power of the President might be an inducement to the Congress to rethink some of the plans that the President considers very much ill-considered.

Q May I take it that he considers the proposal to abolish any and all of those three departments that the House and/or Senate have identified as bad ideas?

MR. MCCURRY: The administration has indicated they are bad ideas in the testimony that we've given and the administration policies that we've enunciated on the Hill.

Q I know, but they might become pork any day now

--

Q You may not know the answer to this, but if I can throw it out and get an answer later -- what would be the practical effect if the President's veto stands and the Republicans do not come back and pass the emergency appropriations for Oklahoma City, California, et cetera? Are there federal accounts that will be depleted, or will people in those locations actually not get money?

MR. MCCURRY: No. My understanding in the case of FEMA and the disaster assistance, they will be able to handle the immediate needs that they've got. The problem will be if they suddenly face additional disasters. The flooding in the Midwest, as you know, has been of great concern to many of us here, and should there be additional disaster needs, we might run into a problem.

I think they'll be fine in the near-term, but in the long-term we will need to have some type of relief, and ultimately, even the disaster assistance for California, which is ongoing, will need to be backed by sufficient appropriations. The President certainly hopes and expects that the Congress, once it returns, following his veto will want to sit down very quickly and address some of the problems that have existed in the legislation and finally passed by Congress, and move on to a measure that the President can sign.

Q But the comments up on Capitol Hill about the

President telling the people of Oklahoma City why they won't get their money are not valid?

MR. MCCURRY: They are not. They are overextended rhetoric on the part of some on Capitol Hill.

Q Mike, isn't it true that most of the money relating to Oklahoma relates to rebuilding the federal building and not immediate disaster stuff in Oklahoma?

MR. MCCURRY: It is correct in the case of Oklahoma City. I was thinking more specifically of California and FEMA's work in California.

Q He was asking about statements made, i.e., the people of Oklahoma, and you said they're overdrawn. Why are they overdrawn if the money is --

MR. MCCURRY: I was saying their disaster assistance provided by FEMA -- I believe some of it for Oklahoma City, but the

bulk of it, we're talking about, is for California. And those accounts are sufficient in the short term, but in the long term, especially, if they face additional need there may be accounts that are overdrawn.

Q Mike, are you saying that the White House is not having conversations at this point with Democrats on the Hill that are beginning to offer these counter budgets, that you're going to wait as long as you're going to wait, talking with the Republicans and their --

MR. MCCURRY: We've been in regular contact with Democrats on the Hill, we've had a number of them here to meet with the President just last week, and have a very good understanding of their strategy, and I think they have a better understanding of our strategy as a result of those conversations.

Q Are you welcoming, then, their efforts, or do you think there have been premature? Because you pointed out that the President has a certain calendar, a certain timing strategy. Are you happy with their timing --

MR. MCCURRY: We certainly understand and respect those individual Democrats in the Senate that would want to effect this debate by offering amendments on the current resolution, offering alternative plans. We understand precisely why they are entering into that debate, just as the President will enter into the debate as well.

Q These are plans that met the President's criteria that he's laid out. Is it the timing that you object to?

MR. MCCURRY: You are making a judgment on the Conrad alternative that we have not made.

Q A separate point. Senator Hatfield said this

morning after the passing of the rescissions package that he was afraid that if it is vetoed, that they'll need Democratic votes to pass any revised version. Has the President coordinated his approach on this measure sufficiently with Democratic leaders on the Hill that he will be able to deliver some votes? That's normally the way it works when you do a deal like this. Has he got anybody with him on this, or is he a lone gunman with a veto pen?

MR. MCCURRY: No, if there's a willingness on the part of Republicans in the Congress to come forward and develop the type of deficit reduction measure that the President has called for, we're confident that we'll be able to generate support on the Democratic side that will be sufficient to see that type of measure passed.

Q Well, understood, but there's obviously a likelihood -- what Hatfield said was the revised bill is likely going to lose some Republican votes. The question arises --

MR. MCCURRY: So they need to pick up Democrats.

Q -- so they need to pick up Democrats. Is the President prepared for this? Has he talked through this? Is there anything going on here, or is it just making it up as you go along here?

MR. MCCURRY: I won't point to any specific counts or judgments, but I think the expectation is that we could work with the Republican chairs of the appropriations committees and the Republican leadership in the House and the Senate to develop a package, and if some Republicans peeled off that bill I think we'd have sufficient assistance on the Democratic side to get final passage, provided, of course, that they move in the direction that the President has indicated they must move to protect some of these efforts that are important to people, and to trim some of the spending that we could do without.

Q How concerned are you that the debt relief for Jordan which if it's vetoed now will not be included in a new package after the veto?

MR. MCCURRY: Given its importance to the Middle East peace process, which got a nudge forward yesterday in the announcement you all know Secretary Christopher made, we would expect that support for that very necessary element of the peace process would continue to be a high priority by the Congress.

Q Mike, does the President favor repeal of the War Powers Act, and would that make the foreign policy bill more palatable to him?

MR. MCCURRY: You're asking a -- that question arises, I imagine, with respect to the Hyde amendment that he's going to offer on this?

Q I believe the Speaker has also tried to tempt you.

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. Well, like previous administrations,

we've objected to provisions of the War Powers resolution on both policy grounds and legal grounds. We believe it's not provided an effective vehicle for the type of cooperation that must exist between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch concerning both the deployment of U.S. forces and the protection of our vital

national strategic interests. And as we indicated last May, we are willing to consider making changes to the War Powers resolution. We've had an active dialogue with Congress on exactly that point.

Q Does that mean you're interested in seeing it repealed?

MR. MCCURRY: I said what I just said.

Q I understand, Mike, but that's not clear. When you talk about repeal -- are you saying that you only want it to be revised?

MR. MCCURRY: I said that we are willing to consider making changes to the War Powers resolution. And we set forward in testimony that we'd be happy to try to track down for you of a variety of views on it.

Q I understand that, but all I'm asking you is can you -- and if you can't, just say I can't -- clarify the position as to whether that means that you do not favor its repeal, but merely its revision?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, its repeal is consistent with objectives that the Executive has had for some time. We're making it clear that we're willing to consider changes so that we can enter into the type of productive dialogue with Congress that might get a War Powers Act that is sufficient to the interests of the Executive. (Laughter.)

Q Do you understand that, Brit? (Laughter.)

Q When will the veto occur --

Q You can take the boy out of the State Department -- (laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: I think I got away with that. Okay. We'll talk.

Yes.

Q When will the veto occur? When do you expect the President will veto the rescissions bill?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we imagine that the congressional leadership is confident enough to send us that final passed conference report rather quickly, so that we can send it right back to them with the very strong views of the President.

Q Meaning a date -- tomorrow, next week?

MR. MCCURRY: As to the competency of the new

congressional leadership, you'll have to ask them as to their timing.

Q Have you done any planning on how the President wants to send this message -- a major ceremony with lots of talk?

Q A cruise missile.

MR. MCCURRY: I don't want to speculate on that, but obviously, he will make a statement, a veto statement accordingly. In what form that takes will depend in part about when we get the conference report.

Q New subject. Why was there no interaction between the President and Gerry Adams?

MR. MCCURRY: Why was there -- was there any interaction?

Ms. GLYNN: I didn't even see him.

MR. MCCURRY: My beautiful deputy who was there didn't see him there.

Q He didn't go all the way down to where Adams was.

MR. MCCURRY: There were a lot of people. There were a number of political leaders there, and obviously the President did not have time to greet them all.

Q Mike, what are your expectations on the Senate Committee vote on Dr. Foster tomorrow? What is the White House handicap on this?

MR. MCCURRY: We're at a point now where I don't think it is useful for me to handicap. The Committee will act accordingly. I'd just say that we very much appreciate the work that Chairman Kassebaum did to give Dr. Foster a fair hearing within the Committee, and exactly what we predicted happened. Dr. Foster, through a very graceful and very eloquent presentation, turned a lot of opinions around, and because of that, we are very hopeful. We're hopeful not only that he will be approved by the Committee for full Senate consideration, but that he will ultimately win confirmation in the Senate.

Q Do you think it will be reported out with approval, or just --

MR. MCCURRY: Just no point in predicting now because it will happen soon enough.

Q Do you expect Kassebaum to vote for it?

MR. MCCURRY: You can ask her just as easily as I can.

Q Is the President working the phones on this today?

MR. MCCURRY: The President has been -- we've been working very closely with a variety of people in Congress. I'm not certain whether or not the President has called anyone individually.

Q Is the President going to Ireland? There's a story in The Globe today that he's going to Ireland.

MR. MCCURRY: The White House is actively discussing with the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland possible dates for a trip by the President. The President very much looks forward to accepting an invitation that would allow him to go to both the United Kingdom and to the Republic of Ireland, perhaps even as early as sometime later this year.

Q Would he be skipping London on this trip as well?
(Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: I doubt it.

Q Is the President disappointed with Sinn Fein's slow pace at decommissioning arms?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we continue to believe that an active dialogue on decommissioning is important and we recognize that now that there's been at least an informal exchange, at a ministerial level, that a dialogue is now engaged. We hope that dialogue will lead rapidly to decommissioning of weapons.

Q Are you trying to signify some impatience this week in how you deal with Adams?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, if I'm correct or not -- correct me if I'm not right, but I believe the President addressed that in his remarks, specifically, and called for a more active dialogue that could lead to decommissioning of weapons as a necessary ingredient of the evolution of the peace process in Northern Ireland.

Q He talked about all paramilitaries, and he has more of an investment in the Sinn Fein side. And I was just

wondering if he was feeling disappointed that they're dragging their feet.

MR. MCCURRY: Disappointment is not a word, but hopeful is the word I would use, that they will continue both their dialogue and move to concrete steps that will begin to change the nature of the peace there.

Q Is it true that the administration asked the British for suggestions for attendees at this conference -- got suggestions, did not invite any of the people on the list and then found the British angry and to some extent, in need of being talked into coming themselves?

MR. MCCURRY: Have not heard anything that would suggest that's true. But maybe someone can follow up here.

Q It's sort of a three-part deal. The last part doesn't have to be true for the rest of it to work.

MR. MCCURRY: To the contrary, most of what I had heard indicated that the discussion that occurred with the Embassy here had been very helpful and that there was a great deal of enthusiasm on the part of the British government about the conference. I would be surprised if it's otherwise.

Q Does the President's trip depend on true peace in Northern Ireland?

MR. MCCURRY: No, it's largely a question of scheduling.

Q Like what time? Fall?

MR. MCCURRY: Coordinating the schedules that would exist, probably late fall, perhaps early winter.

Q Would he go to Belfast or --

MR. MCCURRY: Look, I'm not going to speculate on itinerary until we announce a trip.

Q I'd like to ask another question on the Mikva letter. You were clear in saying that the letter went to agency heads and general counsels. The bottom line of the letter says your cooperation in disseminating this advice is greatly appreciated. Was there, or is there, any recommendation to those department heads not to intimidate, or not to make it sound as if you were seeking money or whatever they might be --

MR. MCCURRY: Look, this is -- it ought to be obvious that by sending a memo to heads of agencies and departments and to general counsels, we are rendering advice that they can then pass along to their employees as they see fit. And as I indicated earlier, in part this memo is sent because of inquiries that come from the agencies about how we are interpreting the statute as it was amended in 1993.

Now, as a sometime political operative, I'll tell you the following: If you want to raise money, this ain't the way to do it. There are ways in which you would have direct mail solicitations, other types of raising money, and it's very clear that this is a proper effort by the legal counsel to provide legal advice to departmental executives who are in charge with passing on that type of legal opinion to employees if they ask.

Q Well, do you know if they disseminated the actual copies of the letter to lower-echelon employees?

MR. MCCURRY: I have no idea. Call some of the heads of the agencies, departments and general counsels who got it and see how they did it.

Q Mike, since you opened the door, is the campaign

doing any of the other things it would do? Is it doing personal solicitations of heavy hitters among the sub-cabinet?

MR. MCCURRY: The work that they are doing now to raise money -- my understanding is it is focused on direct mail efforts and some of the large ticket events that they've been planning on behalf of the Clinton-Gore committee, which will occur later this year. I'm not aware of any effort to reach out specifically to political appointees or people like that.

Q Are there any categories of political appointees that you would forswear soliciting for --

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not the right person -- I can take that question and see if anyone who's running the fund raising operation over there has got any particular plan in that area.

Q For the last two re-election years, the counsel has established procedures in the White House governing how White House employees would engage in the campaign, which included, for example, separate phone lines, fax lines, space, et cetera, et cetera, for people working in the White House who were regularly in contact with the campaign.

MR. MCCURRY: Right.

Q Have you done something similar?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I fully expect we'll have similar types of arrangements that will allow us -- in the previous administrations this was done especially so proper accounting could be made of any expenditures here at the White House that were deemed political in nature. There have been a lot of discussions, many of us at the assistant to the President level have been briefed on the requirements that we will have legally to make sure that we comply fully with the law. And we've advised our employees accordingly that they'll need to take steps as we go into the re-election cycle to properly segment expenditures.

So I expect there will be number of those types of changes. They are already doing things connected with the President's travel to comply fully with federal statutes. And the Office of White House Legal Counsel has been very persistent in reminding White House staff of their requirements under the law.

Q Can you tell us any more of what those are?

Boyden Gray, for example, made public an 18-page memo outlining some of the things they did there.

MR. MCCURRY: I'll put that on my plate and deal with that at greater length tomorrow. I don't think it's -- it's not a time-sensitive question, but it is something I can look into and get more answers on.

Q In terms of war powers, since this legislation -- the law came as a result of the Vietnam War, do you think the

President should report and request troops -- permission to use troops from Congress, or should they just be free-wheeling to go in anywhere they want to go?

MR. MCCURRY: This President, while sharing many of the concerns executives have had historically about the War Powers Act has also gone to greater lengths than the previous commanders-in-chief to consult closely with Congress on troop deployments and on the use of U.S. force overseas. I would expect that to continue, and I would expect no change in the determination of the Clinton administration to consult very closely with Congress, especially when matters of national security are involved.

Q Mike, do you intend to make -- does the President intend to make the China-MFN announcement himself next week?

MR. MCCURRY: I haven't looked at that question and don't

know the answer. I'll, again, see if we can take that up next week. There is a deadline coming up June 3rd.

Q A couple of days ago you said you would try to pull together a detailing of the so-called pork in the rescissions package, which was also expenditures in the

--

MORE

President's budget. Can we expect that?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I've talked to Larry Haas about this, and you might want to give him a call to the press guy over at OMB. We've identified a number of categories of expenditures for infrastructure and buildings and highway demonstration projects and other things that we would propose to cut as part of our FY '96 submission. He said that that's a good place to go. It is, by no means, a comprehensive list, because we don't propose -- our budget proposals are not line-item when it gets down to individual projects and individual member districts. But we have proposed cutting funding as part of our own budget submissions to Congress.

Q I understand that, but are there not items that are --

MR. MCCURRY: There are some items in there that we might say, particularly when we're in the area of difficult choices qualify as, quote, unquote, "pork," I suspect there are. And I suspect that as we go through future fiscal year budget proposals, we are going to have to look carefully at many of those types of projects.

Q Can you identify them, please?

MR. MCCURRY: I can't identify them right here and now as I'm standing here --

Q No, but I mean can that be done?

MR. MCCURRY: I think if you call over to OMB they can help walk you through some of the budget documents in the '96 proposal that would be good. It would be great fun. That's right.

Thank you all. See you tomorrow.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:48 P.M.

EDT

#66-05/25

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 July 95 10:55
FROM Mitchell, Calvin A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[NOVTRIP.DOC : 2603 in NOVTRIP.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 6 July 95 8:30
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** NOVTRIP.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 6, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton to Visit to United Kingdom and Ireland

The President is pleased to accept the invitations of the British and Irish governments to visit the United Kingdom and Ireland, November 29-December 2. In the UK, the schedule will include meetings in London with Prime Minister Major and a visit to Northern Ireland; and in Ireland a meeting with Prime Minister Bruton. The goals of the trip include strengthening the transatlantic partnership in which the United Kingdom plays such a special role, nurturing our close ties of friendship and culture with Ireland, and underscoring the President's support for the joint efforts of the Irish and British governments and the people of Northern Ireland to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement.

###

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 13 July 95 20:24
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Jones, Steven R.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

I updated the BRAC points tonite and sent them to Jim.

From: Fetig, James L.
To: @NSC - NSC Staff
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, July 13, 1995 07:24 PM

[[JUL13GUI.DOC : 5140 in JUL13GUI.DOC]]

This is the daily press guidance package. Please update per yesterday's memo and provide the changes to @Press or to Natalie in person as close to 10:00 a.m. as possible.

We thank you for your cooperation today.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

13 July 95 20:18

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

JUL13GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 13, 1995

Bosnia

Cuban-American Flotilla

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Peace Process in Northern Ireland

BRAC

China

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA

Key Points:

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:
- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
- to prevent the spread of the conflict;
- to help limit the loss of life;
- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.
- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.
- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo -- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;
- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.
- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the

conflict,
 something
 neither the President nor our people want to see.
 -- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support
 UNPROFOR's efforts
 to deal
 more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica:

-- What is happening in Srebrenica is tragic and inhumane.
 -- Continued military pressure by Bosnian Serb forces against the enclave of
 Srebrenica and Zepa
 is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its
 condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.
 -- The Srebrenica safe area was established primarily as a haven for refugees
 expelled
 from other
 parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. An attack against this undefended enclave and the
 Dutch peacekeepers stationed there is further dramatic proof of the aggressive intentions
 of Bosnian Serb
 forces.
 -- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group
 to ensure
 that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are
 ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by
 UNHCR to
 the civilian
 refugees in the enclave. Those who wish to leave should be allowed to depart, but
 there should be no
 forced removal of those who wish to stay.
 -- Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening
 UNPROFOR so
 that it
 can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have
 supported been in
 country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not
 available.
 -- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their
 influence
 to stop this
 aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers.
 Serbia

a must make clear in

word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts.

In particular, it should

redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at

strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission.

n.

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill --

lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and

draw the United States in.

Results to Date:

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

;

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war

out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years;

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's

snia's

Muslims and Croats; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in

Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NAT

O to deter a

repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon

our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military

standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other parties to the conflict

in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Q & A: Hot Issues

President's Comments This Morning on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said this morning that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROF

OR may leave. Do you

expect UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serb acti

ons to

interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support this morning for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the President signaling his expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we

do not

expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to achi

eve that goal.

Srebrenica and the Eastern Enclaves:

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

Q: Will you let the fall of Srebrenica stand? Will you support French efforts to restore Srebrenica to the Bosnians by force?

-- We are consulting with the French, the British, the Dutch, other allies, the UN and the Contact Group on possible next steps.

-- Beyond that, it would be inappropriate to comment.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We have not seen the final text.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws.

Isn't that the
Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of
UNPROFOR
and
cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame
for th
e
deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15
mil
lion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a
P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transpiration support to
the allies. The
Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of
equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27mil
lion of goods
and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used

to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not

with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there

does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a voluntary fund as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser targets, designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. T

his support
would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section 506(a)(1) emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of DOD goods and services (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid, protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending

the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR. UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternative: natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict or

to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units

need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties,

to use U.S. troops

as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good

faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans,

we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have

formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency

extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances

for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire

re arms
and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

CUBAN-AMERICAN FLOTILLA

Background: Cuban-American groups are planning to hold a sea- and airborne demonstration today off the coast of Cuba. They have conducted these anti-Castro "flotillas" in the past, but they're turning up the volume this year because today is the first anniversary of the sinking of the tugboat "13 de Marzo,"

in which some 40 people died.

The organizers say that 50-100 boats and several aircraft will participate. Most of participants will stay in international waters and airspace, but at least one boat -- the "Democracia" -- and one or two aircraft are planning to enter Cuban territorial waters and airspace.

The USG has urged both the flotilla planners and the GOC to remain cool-headed. State

Department has called the flotilla organizers and told them that, although their activity as stated does not appear to violate US law, the USG cannot protect them from prosecution and imprisonment in Cuba if they violate Cuban

law. The US Interests

Section in Havana has demarched the Cuban government, urging it to avoid overreacting to the flotilla. Such

appeals for calm have helped in years past but the chance of an ugly incident remain

s.

(If Asked)

Q: Do you have any comment on the Cuban-American "flotilla" planning to sail toward Cuba today? Since at least one boat plans to enter Cuban territorial waters, could an ugly incident develop?

Points

-- As we have prior to past flotillas, we urge both the organizers and the Cuban government to act with restraint.

-- The State Department, Justice Department, and U.S. Coast Guard can provide you additional information on this.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

[Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriating considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinforce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.]

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration

flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our international commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. These include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and other amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many programs. These reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the committees to obtain additional funding for these programs, (e.g. funding for the World Bank and for Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision about what to do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

NORTHERN IRELAND

Question: What is the U.S. doing to keep the peace process in Northern Ireland on track? Are we talking to the British and Irish about it?

-- The U.S. strongly supports the efforts of the peoples of Northern Ireland and the Irish and British governments to end the violence in Northern Ireland and find a just and lasting settlement.

-- We have urged all sides to engage seriously in negotiations and to address issues constructively and seriously.

(If asked about decommissioning:)

-- As the President has said, we urge Sinn Fein to engage in serious discussions about decommissioning.

(If asked about preconditions:)

-- As the President has said, the best guarantee of a permanent peace is for all the parties to sit down together to discuss the future as well as their differences. Thus, we hope that the Irish and British governments and the parties in Northern Ireland, will quickly find a way to resolve any obstacles to the

commencement of all-party talks.

(If asked about prisoners, Clegg)

-- We would support any measures by the British Government aimed at helping the process of healing and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, including prisoners.

-- We have no comment on the release of Private Clegg.

Question: Will the recurring violence in Northern Ireland affect the President's planned trip there in early December?

-- The historic cease-fires of the IRA and the loyalist paramilitaries remain in effect and the climate in Northern Ireland is very different than it was just a year ago. The President looks forward to visiting a peaceful Northern Ireland whose people are actively engaged in seeking a solution to their differences.

-- We understand the disturbances have calmed down that occurred in the wake of the early release of a British soldier from prison. We are pleased that the Protestant parade marking the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne appear to have passed without major incident.

MILITARY BASE CLOSURE

[Background: Because of the overwhelming national security interest in reducing our base structure in line with the personnel reductions that have already taken place, the President decided yesterday (Thursday), with reluctance and with clear understanding that the Defense Department can implement a privatization plan for McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases, to accept the BRAC Commission

recommendations and report. After careful review of the recommended air logistics center closings and the economic impacts on California and Texas, the President decided that implementing "privatization in place" at McClellan and Kelly would significantly reduce the economic impacts in those states and avoid an unacceptable disruption to Air Force readiness.

Q&As:

Q: Why did the President decide to approve the BRAC Commission's recommendations?

A: As I stated earlier, the President was persuaded that despite the BRAC's recommendation to close McClellan and Kelly AFBs, and given the assurances received in a letter from the Commission Chairman Dixon regarding privatization in place at the ALCs, the Secretary of Defense could in fact carry out a privatization in place plan at these locations that would significantly reduce the economic impact at Sacramento and San Antonio and avoid unacceptable impacts on Air Force readiness.

The President believes the BRAC process is the only way that Congress and the Executive branch have found to make closure decisions with reasonable objectivity and finality.

Q: Why did the decision take so long?

A: The President wanted to be sure not only that the Secretary of Defense had full authority under the BRAC report to implement the privatization at McClellan and Kelly, but also that the privatization plan was sufficiently robust to mitigate the economic impact of the closing of the two bases.

The President also wanted to ensure that to the extent possible, tenant units now located at

McClellan and Kelly could be kept in the Sacramento and San Antonio, rather than moved out of the areas.

Q: How many jobs will be saved out of the 12,500 now at McClellan and the 19,000 at Kelly?

A: Under the Defense Department original "downsizing" proposal (which the BRAC rejected), the Air Force would have kept 8,700 personnel at McClellan and 16,000 at Kelly, so that is really the baseline for comparison.

Under the privatization plan approved by the President today, the transition at these two bases will be spaced out over a five year period, so that 8,700 jobs at McClellan and 16,000 at Kelly will be retained at the end of this period.

Eight years after the transition begins at the two bases, the Defense Department anticipates that the workforce remaining at McClellan or relocated to other Air Force Bases in the Sacramento area will be more than half that projected under the original "downsizing" proposal. At Kelly, the remaining workforce after eight years should be roughly two-thirds of the original Air Force plan.

Throughout this period, Federal agencies will assist local authorities to develop plans to generate other jobs through economic reuse. If private-sector job creation proceeds at a rate comparable to that at the now-closed Sacramento Army Depot, there may well be no net loss of jobs in either community.

Q: Why should these communities believe privatization will work?

A: This privatization approach is not an isolated experience. It is consistent with the Administration's initiative to reinvent government and with the recent recommendation of the

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to establish a time-phased plan to privatize essentially all existing depot-level maintenance, including the five air logistics centers. This is an approach the Defense Department has already begun to implement at other facilities, such as Newark AFB in Ohio.

Q: Why should other communities not feel that they are facing an economic calamity?

A: The President stressed the Administration's continuing commitment to assisting communities

impacted by base closure. Using the same program that has helped the host communities since 1993, the Administration will press for successful re-use of the bases' valuable assets by the communities. We put people with experience into the communities to assist them, and planning and development grants are available to assist in this transition. We have had considerable success in these efforts, with over 10,000 new jobs and 300 employers on closed bases. Over 60 percent of civilian jobs have been replaced at bases closed more than a year.

Q: Hasn't the President hurt himself by appearing so indecisive? Why didn't he just send the BRAC report on the Congress immediately, take the hit and move on?

A: In Chairman Dixon's own words, this was the greatest single deviation by a Commission from the Secretary of Defense's recommendations in the history of BRAC. So the President had a clear responsibility to review these deviations very carefully.

The Secretary of Defense and General Shalikashvili reported to the President that the closure of the depots at McClellan and Kelly, which appeared to be the BRAC's original intent, would be unacceptable.

eptably disrupt Air
Force readiness through the turmoil associated with relocating the complex and
large
activities.

The White House worked very carefully with the Defense Department and the
Air Force
to clarify that a
legal basis did exist under the BRAC's report for pursuing an alternative approach

-
- privatization in place
- and to make sure the privatization plan was robust.

The President owed it both to the impacted communities and to our Armed
Forces that
he made
the right decision.

CHINA

Q: What is the current status of the Harry Wu case?

-- National Security Adviser Lake met yesterday with Mrs. Wu (Ching-lee Chen)
to con
vey the
President's personal concern for Harry Wu's well-being and to assure her that the
Ad
ministration's
unwavering position is that Wu should be released immediately.

-- Until his release is secured, we will make every effort to ensure he is properly
treated.

-- While the consular convention only requires consular visits on a monthly basis,
w
e have
requested more frequent access from the Chinese authorities.

-- The President will be meeting with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and

others who recently have returned from China (Haig, Greenberg, Whitehead) this afternoon. Dr. Kissinger recently returned from a trip to China, where he discussed overall U.S.-China relations, as well as the Harry Wu situation, with a variety of senior Chinese leaders.

Q: What about Mrs. Wu's recommendation that the First Lady not attend the Beijing Conference on Women in Development in September?

-- Mrs. Wu made that statement outside the context of her meeting with Mr. Lake. Mrs. Clinton is the honorary chair of the U.S. delegation, but no decisions have been made as to her attendance or participation in the UN Conference on Women in Development.

Q: What about Gingrich's recommendation that the conference be moved from Beijing?

-- This is a UN-sponsored conference of great significance in its own right.

-- Although we have complaints about the way China has handled issues related to the meeting -- and have registered them fully -- it is neither practical nor appropriate for US participation in a major UN conference to be subordinated to bilateral disagreements between the host country and the US -- even serious disagreements such as exist between the U.S. and China.

Q: What are you doing to get Wu out?

-- We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

-- We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is completed?

-- We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He should be released immediately.

Q: What impact is this case having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

-- The Harry Wu case is receiving our full attention and is a high-priority issue. We have made clear that it will be high on the agenda as long as he remains imprisoned.

-- Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

-- We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

-- We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that you renounce statements by House

Speaker Gingrich on China and Taiwan?

-- We have reiterated time and again that we maintain a "one China" policy, which precludes any support for independence of Taiwan.

-- We cannot dictate or referee political realities in the Taiwan Straits. Those realities require Taiwan and China to work out their differences, as has been happening quietly and effectively.

fectively over the
last couple years. We urge that process be continued.

Q: In retrospect, was the decision to allow a Lee visit a mistake?

-- The President's decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

-- We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will he be allowed to visit again?

-- We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis. There is no request pending at the moment.

State Department Talking Points on UN Conference on Women in Development

This conference is about women and girls, not about China

The conference is convening in China because it is Asia's turn to host such a conference. When the UN decision was made in 1992 to hold a meeting, China was the only country in the region to offer to host it. At that time the previous administration decided to join consensus with other countries at the UN to agree to accept China's offer to host the conference.

US participation in the conference will insure that American women and men have a voice in an international forum on issues affecting the lives of women.

At the conference and the associated NGO forum, approximately 45,000 people from around the world will be openly discussing a variety of issues.

Aside from the importance to the world's women, this conference cannot help but have reverberations within China.

US participation in the conference promotes a platform for our interests in such important issues as democracy and human rights.

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to an overwhelming Lavalas victory, and the reruns will be far more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are still scheduled for July 22, though it is unlikely this will be sufficient time.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the elections. Ambassador Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.
- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.
- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.
- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

- Yeltsin remains in hospital, but understand he is resting comfortably, has had normal EKGs and is working.
- Further understand that Yeltsin intends to be back in office on Monday and intends to go forward with planned visit to Norway next week.
- President Clinton has sent Yeltsin a get-well message.

July 12 Impeachment Vote

- Russian Duma voted July 12 on motion to set up commission to consider impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin. Motion failed to gather 226 votes needed to pass.

July 1 Vote of No Confidence in Chernomyrdin Government

- Dispute between government and Duma was handled in manner consistent with Russian

law
and constitution -- that's what building democracy is all about.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices.

Address

ing

political as well as military issues.

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence
, " achieve
negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime

Mini

ster

Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will
continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with
Iran,
given
Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve
these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers
succeed
in building
democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S.
Not i
n our interest to
cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work
actively
with Russia
toward this end.

- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to develop NATO-Russia relationship.
- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.
- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Kenneth Fairfax to Daniel Poneman, re: 95 Agenda (7 pages)	08/11/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Non-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]