

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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001. email	Mary Peters to Jane Baker, et al., re: Ireland Issues (1 page)	09/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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MSMail - Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
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[09/20/1995 - 09/27/1995]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 September 95 14:34
FROM Peters, Mary A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Ireland guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cullin, Brian P.
Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Schuker, Jill A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Jim, please take a look. I think this is all we really need to say. Conor, as you know, is reading more into anything we say than is really there -- in fact the Irish DCM called me a 9:30 last night to ask if it were true, as Conor had said, that the President is personally in touch with Major on this. [[SEP20GUI.DOC : 3650 in SEP20GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 20 September 95 14:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SEP20GUI.DOC
FOREIGN AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

September 19, 1995

Bosnia/Croatia

U.S. French Nuclear Cooperation

Visit of CWC Preparatory Commission Officials to Washington

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

Iran Sanctions: D'Amato Bill

Russia

Ireland

Somalia: Aideed Seizes Baidoa

China

Haiti Elections

Cuba -- New Foreign Investment Law

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Iraq

Kashmir

Export Control Reform: Computers

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Air Strikes

ù Last Thursday, NATO and UN commanders suspended air operation for 72 hours to monitor Serb compliance with their commitments to meet the UN/NATO conditions.

ù On Sunday, a further 72-hour pause was announced in view of the fact that the Serbs had withdrawn a substantial number of their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone and had allowed the opening of the Sarajevo airport and routes into the city.

ù The deadline for complete withdrawal of the heavy weapons is 4:00 p.m. Wednesday EDT.

ù UN spokesmen indicate that the Serb withdrawal is continuing, and that convoys and UN flights continue to reach Sarajevo without any difficulty.

ù The Bosnian Serbs should have no doubt, however, that NATO will resume the strikes if they do not follow through on their commitments, or if they resume attacks on Sarajevo or the other safe areas.

ù As the President said, Serb acceptance of the terms of the agreement is the direct result of the steadfastness displayed by the members of the NATO Alliance in carrying out decisions to protect the safe areas, along with the close cooperation between UN and NATO commanders throughout the operation.

ù It also reflects intensive diplomatic efforts by Dick Holbrooke and the rest of the U.S. negotiating team, reinforced by the efforts of the Russians and our other European partners.

ù If the Bosnian Serb commitments are fully carried out, this should give further impetus to our common search for a lasting political settlement to the Balkan conflict, building on the September 8 agreement on "basic principles" of a settlement by the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.
If the Bosnian Serbs don't comply, air strikes will resume.

ù (If asked) While Bosnian Serb compliance was not conditional on Bosnian Government actions, the Bosnian Government continues to abide by its pledge of 10 days ago that it would refrain from offensive actions in and around Sarajevo.

GoBH/Croatian Offensive toward Banja Luka

ù We have told the Bosnian and Croatian governments that military moves that risk drawing the Serbs into the conflict are very risky and unwise, and could lead to increased suffering for the civilian population. We believe all sides should refrain from offensive action.

ù We welcome the statement by Croatian President Tudjman that Croat forces have been ordered to end offensive action in Western Bosnia and will not attack Banja Luka..

Will the Bosnian Offensive Derail U.S. Diplomatic Efforts?

ù It would be inappropriate to speculate on the implications for the negotiations of the latest shifts on the ground.

ù We continue to believe that this conflict will not be settled on the battlefield, and that all parties should redouble their efforts to arrive at an early diplomatic solution. That remains the goal of the Holbrooke mission.

ù Holbrooke and his delegation are in Zagreb and Belgrade today for discussions with the parties. They will return to Washington for consultations in the next few days.

Geneva Meeting

Important progress was made at the September 8 Geneva meeting between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, and Contact Group representatives. Ambassador Holbrooke and EU negotiator Carl Bildt co-chaired the meeting.

-- In specific, the three foreign ministers announced they had agreed to basic principles for further negotiations toward final settlement. The principles are the following:

-- For the first time, all agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition.

-- Consistent with the Contact Group plan, all three agreed that under the terms of a settlement, Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation established under last year's Washington Agreements, and a Bosnian Serb republic.

-- The 51-49 parameter of the Contact Group's territorial proposal will be the basis for a settlement, subject to any adjustments the parties make by mutual agreement.

-- The two entities will have the right to establish relationships with neighboring states, but new

relationships must be consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

-- The parties have pledged to adhere to human rights standards, to ensure freedom of movement and the right of the displaced to return to their homes, and to collaborate on joint economic projects that will promote transportation links and communications among all of Bosnia's peoples.

-- As the President said, this is an important milestone on the path to peace.

(If asked whether the new diplomatic effort divides Bosnia)

-- We have not partitioned Bosnia, nor do we intend to.

-- It cannot be emphasized too strongly that according to the Geneva agreements, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a single state, retaining its seat in international organizations and its bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries in the world, including the U.S.

-- I would note President Izetbegovic's statement last week that the Serbs compromised by accepting the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Bosnians compromised by accepting a Serb republic. Izetbegovic further noted that the reason for the compromises was to end the war.

According to Izetbegovic, "the world has made clear its support for peace but not for war."

Downed French Pilots

-- We have no confirmation of the Bosnian Serb claim that the pilots are in their custody.

-- As we have reason to believe the pilots of the plane may be alive, it is inappropriate to comment further.

CORE BOSNIA POINTS

-- From the outset, we have consistently worked to relieve the human suffering in Bosnia, contain the war, and bring about a peaceful settlement. These efforts have saved many lives, brought an end to the fighting between Muslims and Croats through the formation of the Bosnia-Croat Federation, and prevented the war from spreading. However, as we all know, the fighting continues and peace has been tragically elusive in Bosnia.

-- We are now at an important moment in the history of the Bosnian conflict. The events of the last few weeks changed the situation on the ground in Bosnia and presented the sides with opportunities to settle that could disappear rapidly.

-- There is still the possibility of another path -- toward an end to fighting through a strengthened UN operation on the ground and aggressive pursuit of a new diplomatic solution. This is an opportunity we continue to try to take advantage of.

-- Over the last few weeks we have worked with our allies to strengthen the United Nations operation by supporting the Rapid Reaction Force and providing for the protection of safe areas by the threat of aggressive use of NATO air power.

-- We are now working closely with our allies on the prospect for a new diplomatic effort. There are no guarantees -- but we are determined to present the parties with a chance to reassess and pursue a peaceful settlement.

Have you retreated from troop commitments upon settlement? (Aug. 28 WP p. 24)

-- No.

-- We have long said we would be willing to participate in a NATO-led effort, under

previously-specified conditions, to help implement a viable peace settlement.

Are You considering fewer troops?

-- The number of troops we would consider devoting to settlement implementation would depend on the nature of the settlement package.

Are you presenting a U.S. map/Have you ceded Goradze to the Serbs

-- We are discussing a number of ideas, including some notions on territorial issues

-- We are not presenting a U.S. map, nor are we insisting on any particular territorial trades.

Did the Bosnians reject our plan out of hand?

-- No.

Mini Marshall plan?

-- Certainly, a major reconstruction effort would need to follow any peace settlement.

-- Hope the international community would be prepared to assist in that effort.

Haiti or Cyprus model?

-- Avoid such comparisons.

-- Any plan would be specific to the needs in Balkans.

Hasn't U.S. leadership in Bosnia failed?/What is new about the current initiative?

-- American diplomacy has had several notable successes: creation of the Federation and ending the fighting in Central Bosnia; stabilizing Macedonia; ending the siege of Sarajevo; containing the conflict; the new constitutional arrangements, and yesterday's agreement on Sarajevo.

-- New elements aiding our current efforts: recent developments on the ground,

coup
led with
general war-weariness, have created new opportunities to break long-standing
diploma
tic logjams.

Give up on multi-ethnic Bosnian state?

-- No. Continue to support maintaining Bosnia within internationally recognized
bor
ders.

-- Supported Federation, combined Croat-Muslim enterprise.

Croatians engaged in ethnic cleansing?

-- Refugee flow is human tragedy and we are actively supporting efforts of
internati
onal relief
agencies.

-- Have been reports of abuses. We strongly condemn all violations of the rights
of
civilians,
prisoners of war and international personnel.

-- We have repeatedly stressed to the Croatian government its obligation to
respect
these rights; to
investigate allegations of human rights abuses, and to hold accountable those
respon
sible.

-- Also urged government of Croatia to provide assurances to all Serbs in the
Krajin
a, and to those
who fled, that they are welcome to stay and return. Importance of allowing
internat
ional monitors (ICRC)
to assure rights of Serbs are respected. Croatian government has agreed.

-- It is not clear whether the Croatian government's actions in Krajina amount to a
systematic
policy of ethnic cleansing -- a deliberate and organized strategy of force and
intim
idation to drive all
members of an ethnic group from their homes to "purify" the area. But clearly,
seri
ous abuses have

occurred and we condemn any acts that force anyone to leave because of ethnic identity.

-- We will continue to monitor the situation closely and hold the Croats to the same standards as the Serbs and others in this conflict.

Shattuck report on atrocities

[Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck confirmed reports of egregious human rights violations committed by Bosnian-Serb forces in the aftermath of their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa.]

-- We continue to condemn the policy of ethnic cleansing. We continue to call for international access to all those detained and displaced, and for a full accounting of the whereabouts of those missing. We will continue to urge all parties in the former Yugoslavia to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

-- Ambassador Albright presented information we have on atrocities to the U.N. Security Council.

-- At our urging, the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions condemning crimes on all sides, highlighting Bosnian Serb atrocities against refugees from Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- There must be justice, and those who have violated international humanitarian law must be held accountable. We will continue to work with the International War Crimes Tribunal and urge that it prosecute those suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Such criminal actions must not and will not remain unpunished.

What about Kosovo?

-- We have told Belgrade we believe major resettlement of Krajina Serbs in Kosovo is potentially very provocative.

-- Before the "FRY" can be integrated into the world community, a solution must be found to the situation in Kosovo.

Second-level ethnic cleansing in Sandzak, Vojvodina

-- We have urged Serbian authorities to enforce laws preventing the eviction of ethnic minorities from their homes in the aim of making room for Krajina refugees.

U.S. relief to Krajina Serbs

-- We support efforts of international relief agencies, and have called for comprehensive, direct relief to all those in need.

Reconstruction aid

-- The U.S. has consulted with the EU on the size and shape of an economic reconstruction effort, should a peace settlement be achieved.

-- The Spaniards, in their EU presidency capacity, have agreed to take the lead in planning for the effort. We are consulting with Congress on what the U.S. might be prepared to provide.

-- We expect the effort to include reconstruction assistance, IFI debt relief, humanitarian aid and encouragement of regional economic interdependence in terms of trade and other economic activities.

U.S. - FRENCH NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Q: Do you have any comment on the September 19 Washington Post article on U.S. - French nuclear cooperation.

A:

ù As NSC Senior Director Bell confirmed in an on the record press briefing on August 11, we have had and continue to have a cooperation program with France in the nuclear area.

ù The program with France is not intended to help France conduct nuclear tests. As the President has made clear, the United States regrets continued French nuclear testing.

ù Our program with France is designed to help ensure the safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons under a true zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty and not to aid the development of new nuclear weapons.

ù In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to sign a CTB Treaty banning all nuclear tests regardless of level no later than the fall of 1996.

[If asked: Has the United States offered to cooperate with France on nuclear simulation]

ù Yes. Again, this effort is focused on maintaining the safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons under a zero yield CTB Treaty. There is no cooperation planned or envisioned to aid the development of new nuclear weapons.

[If asked about French overflights of the United States to the Mururoa test site]

ù Under the code of federal regulations, governments requesting overflight clearance are required to specify

whether any hazardous materials are on board the aircraft.

ù We have granted overflight clearance to several French military missions to Mururoa in 1995.

ù The French informed us of the presence of small arms and ammunition on board one flight. The French did not indicate that hazardous materials -- which would include toxic chemicals, explosive devices, and radioactive material -- would be transported on board any of the other aircraft.

[If asked whether the overflight of U.S. territory of aircraft transporting plutonium is prohibited by law]

ù The overflight of U.S. territory by aircraft transporting plutonium in any form from a foreign country to a foreign country is prohibited by Public Law 100-203 (1987), the "Murkowski Amendment."

VISIT OF SENIOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PREPARATORY COMMISSION OFFICIALS TO WASHINGTON

VISIT OF SENIOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PREPARATORY COMMISSION OFFICIALS TO WASHINGTON

-- Three senior officials from the Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission will be in Washington this week to discuss the status of U.S. efforts to ratify the international treaty outlawing chemical weapons -- the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

-- Yesterday they met with the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of State, and the ACDA Director; today they will meet with the Chairman of the JCS and the Acting Secretary of Defense. They will also be meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and their staff.

-- The CWC has enjoyed strong bipartisan support, having been negotiated by President Reagan, completed and signed by President Bush, and submitted to the Senate by President Clinton.

-- The President sees CWC ratification and entry into force as a key element of his

nonproliferation policy and an urgent next step in stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction, following the successful NPT Extension Conference.

-- That is why he welcomed the Senate amendment adopted on September 5 calling for prompt ratification of the CWC and the START II treaty and urged the Senate to provide its advice and consent to ratification before the end of this session.

IF ASKED whether Senator Helms is holding CWC hostage to the State Department reorganization plan:

-- Our dialogue with Senator Helms on that issue is continuing. Meanwhile, we have made clear for many months and will continue to make clear that the President believes that it is crucial for the Senate to complete action on the CWC (and START II) this year.

IF ASKED why the Administration hasn't done more to get CWC ratified:

-- This Administration has made clear, through its words as well as its actions, that securing CWC ratification and entry into force is one of its highest priorities.

-- Even before the President submitted the CWC to the Senate in November 1993, he pressed the case for prompt CWC ratification and entry into force in his first address to the United Nations.

-- Our most senior officials (the Secretary of State, ACDA Director, JCS

Chairman, CIA Director, and DOD Deputy Secretary) all gave strong testimony in support of the CWC last year.

-- In May, former Congressman Martin Lancaster was appointed "Special Advisor to the President and ACDA Director on the Chemical Weapons Convention." Since then, Lancaster has met with over 90 Senators or their staff to urge ratification.

-- The President has made clear on numerous occasions -- in his State of the Union Address in January, at the Nixon Center in March, at the Air Force Academy in May, and at the 50th Anniversary of the UN in San Francisco in June -- the priority he attaches to the earliest possible CWC ratification and entry into force.

-- The President emphasized the importance of CWC ratification again in his meeting with the Congressional leadership last week.

IF ASKED whether there are any substantive obstacles to CWC ratification:

-- There do not appear to be any substantive obstacles to Senate advice and consent to the CWC. Some issues, such as verification, have been raised recently in the press, but these were dealt with in great detail in the nine Senate hearings and hundreds of questions we answered last year.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

-- The United States and our NATO Allies have for some time been looking at ways to address Russian and Ukrainian concerns about the Treaty's "flank" limits. Last week

NATO Allies agreed on a proposal to be presented to Russia and Ukraine. Since the presentation of the proposal has not yet been made, it would not be appropriate to comment on its details.

-- The strategic picture has changed dramatically since the Treaty was signed in 1990. Now, neither the Warsaw Pact nor the Soviet Union exist and forces once deployed by the USSR as far west as Eastern Germany have been withdrawn to Russia. NATO Allies are looking at ways to respond to those changes, while maintaining the key elements of the Treaty, including its flank limits.

-- Allies have developed this proposal as part of a broader set of preparations for the CFE Review Conference, established by the Treaty for May, 1996. Our goal is to preserve the viability of the Treaty, which remains a cornerstone of European security.

-- The "flank" issue does not concern the overall equipment limit for Russia and Ukraine, but the restrictions which the Treaty places on the amount of equipment permitted in certain regions. Russia and Ukraine have participated fully in the Treaty's implementation over the past three years, destroying thousands of pieces of Treaty-limited equipment and submitting to hundreds of inspections under the terms of the Treaty.

-- It is not certain whether Russia will be prepared to negotiate a solution to the flank issue on the basis of the new NATO proposal. However, we and our Allies continue to reject completely the Russian idea of an "exclusion zone" in its Caucasus region. There is no basis for such an "exclusion zone" in the Treaty.

-- Any solution must be acceptable to all Treaty parties. The forum for negotiation will be the CFE Joint Consultative Group in Vienna.

(If asked about statement by Senator Helms staff that Treaty changes are not likely to be approved "anytime soon":.)

-- Any agreement along the lines of the NATO proposal would require the approval of Congress.

IRAN SANCTIONS: D'AMATO BILL

-- Believe D'Amato proposal tackles important issues, but we have only recently received the text of Senator D'Amato's bill and we will need a chance to explore it further.

-- We look forward to further consultations on this issue with the Congress.

(If pressed on whether Administration formally opposes)

-- As I said, we believe the bill deals with serious issues, but we need time to consider its provisions in greater detail.

RUSSIA

Current Items

Spring 1996 Summit in Moscow

-- As Canadian Prime Minister Chretien announced June 17, G-7 leaders and Russian President Yeltsin agreed in Halifax to hold summit on nuclear safety and security in Moscow in spring 1996.

-- Summit to cover two broad areas: safety of civilian nuclear power and security

o
f nuclear
materials. These are areas in which there is already substantial cooperation
betwee
n U.S., G-7 and
Russia. Summit will provide impetus to deepen cooperation.

Embassy Moscow Attack

-- Continue to work with Russian authorities to determine who launched rocket-
propel
led grenade
attack September 13. Security upgraded at Embassy and at consulates in St.
Petersbu
rg, Vladivostok and
Yekaterinburg. Pursuing vigorous investigation.

Belarus Balloon Shoot-down

-- Two U.S. citizens killed September 12 when hot air balloon shot down in
southwest
ern Belarus.
Appreciate President Lukashenko's condolences and creation of high-level
internatio
nal commission to
investigate.

-- Concerned, however, that Belarusian government took 24 hours to notify
Embassy and
that
some Belarusian officials have tried to fix blame on balloon pilots and event
organiz
ers. Reject any attempt
to justify this senseless and tragic incident.

-- Continuing to talk to Belarus about how this incident occurred.

Iranian Oil Swaps

-- As part of our policy of supporting independence and stability of Caucasus and
Ce
ntral Asia
states, USG willing to consider allowing American companies to swap Caspian
oil with
Iran in
short-term while alternative reliable export pipelines are developed. Long-term
ind
ependence of these
states depends on ability to export energy resources.

-- Bottlenecks in Russian pipeline system severely limit ability of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to export oil and gas. No other pipelines currently available.

-- Actively encouraging U.S. companies in region to develop alternative non-Iranian options for oil export, including pipelines through Caucasus to Turkey. That will take time.

Chevron Swap Deal with Iran

-- Chevron has not yet presented license application. We will review all applications on case-by-case basis.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Yeltsin's Warning Against NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate and transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Want to engage Russia closely in developing Europe's security structure. Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust NATO-Russia relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Russian Banking Crisis

-- Good news is that Russian government and Central Bank effectively managed complex

short-term problems. Financial markets have stabilized; no general run on deposits.

-- Expect additional bank closures and consolidations as weaker banks fold. If prudently managed, will strengthen banking system. We encourage Russian to keep working with IMF and World Bank on bank reform, as it is already doing.

Fred Cuny

-- Engaged Yeltsin, Russian officials to secure cooperation on Cuny case. Doing all we can to find out what happened, e.g., sent FBI team. Investigation ongoing.

-- Sympathize with Cuny family's deep sense of frustration. Share Cuny family's commitment to thorough and honest investigation.

-- No confirmed reports on fate of Cuny or the Russians traveling with him.

Chechnya

-- Russians and Chechens signed military agreement on July 30 that inter alia provides for cessation of hostilities, disarmament and stage-by-stage withdrawal of Russian forces.

-- Clashes continue. Implementation of agreement proceeding slowly -- complex and highly frequent snags. Situation changing daily.

-- Dispute can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides quickly to resolve these issues and move toward political agreement.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have begun serious dialogue that will continue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

IRELAND

President Has Lost Interest?

-- No, the President remains deeply interested in the peace process in Northern Ireland, and the Administration continues actively to support the efforts of the British and Irish governments to move the process forward.

-- In fact, we have had a number of contacts over the 2 weeks about how to give the process momentum.

-- Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake September 13 for over an hour. The Vice President joined them for part of the meeting.

-- Mr. Lake and the Vice President met September 8 with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

-- We also remain in touch with the Irish Government and other parties.

-- Contacts with all the parties are continuing. I am not prepared to go into any detail.

U.S. Position

-- We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons.

-- We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

Comment on Paisley Press Conference

-- Dr. Paisley is incorrect to say that the President's visit to Northern Ireland is in serious doubt. There has been no change in his plans, and in fact he is very much looking

forward t
o the trip.

-- As for the possibility that there could be "serious trouble" during the President's visit, we sincerely hope that he will be welcome in Northern Ireland, where he will be bringing a message of peace and reconciliation.

-- We regret that Dr. Paisley did not accept Mr. Lake's invitation to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland face-to-face.

Comments on Adams Visit

-- In their meeting with Adams September 13, the Vice President and Mr. Lake expressed their satisfaction that Northern Ireland has enjoyed a year of peace, and reiterated that the best guarantee of a just and lasting peace is meaningful dialogue among the parties representing the people of Northern Ireland.

-- Both the Vice President and Mr. Lake said they saw merit in the "twin-track" strategy, establishing an international body to address the issue of decommissioning of weapons, and the importance of a serious discussion of decommissioning.

-- We have had a number of constructive discussions with all parties, including Sinn Fein, over the last week.

-- Those discussions are continuing, and continue to be constructive and productive.

British Stalling on Talks?

-- As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time the President visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

Position on Decommissioning:

-- On decommissioning of weapons, the President has said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made it clear to Sinn Fein and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Decommissioning a Precondition to Talks:

-- It is up to the parties to resolve the remaining obstacles.

-- We continue to urge all parties to address outstanding issues seriously and flexibly and move to talks that will lead to a lasting settlement.

(If asked)

-- The President has not said that he favors discussing decommissioning of IRA weapons at new, all-party talks rather than before them. He has said that decommissioning remains an essential element of the peace process, and he has urged the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries to begin to discuss decommissioning seriously.

Background: USA Today of August 28 in its World Roundup says "Clinton, who has thrown his weight behind efforts to end one of Europe's longest guerrilla wars, said in a letter that he favors discussing the decommissioning of IRA arms at new, all-party talks rather than before them." The letter is one the President wrote to former congressman Bruce Morrison in July in which he said "To help heal the wounds of an entire generation of people in Northern Ireland and as part of the peace process, all the parties should have the opportunity to raise issues of concern to them. Thus, I would expect all-party talks to address policing, prisoner

issues, decommissioning of weapons and other issues of particular concern to communities and families."

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

-- The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

-- It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Election of new Ulster Unionist Party Chairman

-- David Trimble was elected UUP chairman on September 8.

-- Tony Lake called to congratulate him and to express our hope that he will visit Washington soon.

-- We hope to continue to build on the good relations with the UUP that we enjoyed during Mr. Molyneaux's tenure as party leader.

SOMALIA: AIDEED SEIZES BAIDOA

Q: What is the situation on the ground in Baidoa now?

A: According to available information, on September 19, THE FIGHTING TOUCHED OFF BY

General Aideed and his militia'S seizURE OF the southwestern city of Baidoa HAS CONTINUED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE INCREASED FIGHTING AND LOOTING HAVE CAUSED THE SITUATION TO DETERIORATE. We have no further details of the fighting or casualties.

The United States views this as a significant setback to political reconciliation i

n Somalia.

Q: What will be the fate of aid workers who have been rounded up by Aideed's forces?

Are any
Americans being held hostage?

A: We understand that approximately 18 aid workers, working for UN agencies and non-governmental relief organizations (NGOs) are being held at a compound in Baidoa by Aideed's forces.

Our immediate goal is to work for the immediate and safe release of all personnel

WHO ARE
NOW SAID TO BE "UNDER HOUSE ARREST." WE HAVE ASKED
AIDEED TO GUARANTEE THEIR
SAFE RELEASE.

(If Asked): We understand that five American citizens are among those detained.
W

e are in
close contact with the UN and NGO community in Nairobi, Kenya, which serves
as a base
for the
organizations which employ these persons.

Q: Does Aideed's seizing of Baidoa signal the beginning of a new offensive and a return to violence in Somalia? What does this forebode for the humanitarian and political situation in Somalia?

A: We hope that there will be no further violence in Somalia and that the Somali people will return to peaceful negotiations.

Political reconciliation at the local level was beginning to return in Somalia. This, in turn, permitted the movement of both locally grown and imported food supplies.

It is too early to predict if this development forebodes a return to increased violence, but it is not a good sign.

CHINA

CHINA - U.S.

Q: Is the U.S. negotiating a joint communique, with China, as the Wall Street Journal reported?

A: No. The Administration has made clear in a variety of ways that there has been no change in our approach to China. We have maintained a "One China" policy, as have the previous five administrations.

This point has been reiterated on numerous occasions, both public and private. It is explicit in the three joint communiqués already signed with China.

We do not see, therefore, a need for another communique, to say the same thing.

The Lee Teng-hui visit was a private and unofficial.

HAITI

Background: The second round of legislative elections as well as some reruns of first round elections (both legislative and local) marred by irregularities were held on September 17. Turn-out was low (probably around 20%) but process was free of violence and far better organized than the first round.

Points

-- As was the case for the first round, the elections held on September 17 were free

of violence or intimidation. In light of Haiti's recent history, this is a remarkable achievement.

-- In addition, the management and administration of the September 17 elections were significantly better than those of the first round. Haitian authorities, with the help of the international community, took effective steps to address many of the problems that arose on June 25.

-- Turn-out was low, however. While the reasons for this are unclear, it should be remembered that Haitians have now been to the polls three times in less than three months.

-- Efforts should now turn to the presidential elections which are scheduled for the end of 1995. They will result in the first transition between two democratically elected Presidents in Haiti's history.

CUBA -- NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

-- We have not yet reviewed in detail the text of the new foreign investment law but it appears to offer new opportunities for foreign investors.

-- While this would be a welcome development, it also appears to have serious limitations. Cuban citizens, for instance, are still barred from investing in property, hiring non-family employees or forming small businesses. In addition, foreign investors are required to contract labor through the Cuban government, thereby preserving the government's strict economic hold on individuals.

-- These continuing restrictions significantly limit the scope of the law and indicate that the Cuban government is not interested in fundamental changes.

-- These changes are necessary to create incentives to raise Cubans' standard of living, improve Cuba's overall investment climate, and allow individuals essential economic freedom.

-- As we have indicated, major reforms of the kind that would bring about fundamental change could merit a carefully calibrated responses from the United States.

-- Finally, we will continue to urge foreign investors to avoid investing in properties on which U.S. citizens have claims.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

Q: What is the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks?

A: Both the Israelis and the Palestinians continue to work hard to bridge their differences and have made progress.

We understand that both sides believe they are fairly close to an agreement.

Q: Will there be a ceremony for the parties to sign their agreement in Washington soon?

A: The parties have expressed their desire for a signing ceremony in Washington. As we have said, we are prepared to host a ceremony, once agreement has been reached.

IRAQ

If asked:

Q: Does the United States want to see Saddam Hussein replaced?

A: The Iraqis themselves should decide who leads Iraq. We want to see a stable Iraq that does not represent a threat to its neighbors. We support Iraq's territorial integrity.

As we have said in the past, it is difficult to foresee Saddam remaining in power where Iraq to comply fully with all the resolutions, which he is obliged to do.

Recent events, including the Hussein Kamal defection, tend to reinforce this impression.

But I don't want to speculate on possible succession scenarios. It is up to the Iraqis themselves to determine who should lead them.

KASHMIR

Background: The situation remains unclear and extremely fluid. Contact between the Al-Faran group holding the hostages and the Indian authorities continues to be intermittent and the crisis appears to be building toward a conclusion. Tension in the area continues to mount following a bomb blast in Srinagar this past weekend and troop movements by both India and Pakistan along the line of control (border) that separates them.

Points

-- We are encouraged by reports that the hostages are well.

-- We continue to work closely with the Indian authorities and hope for the speedy and safe release of the hostages.

-- We urge all involved to continue to work cooperatively to secure the release of

t
hese innocent
men.

EXPORT CONTROL REFORM: COMPUTERS

Q: Is the Administration planning to loosen export controls so that high-powered computers could help our foes build nuclear and other high-tech weapons?

A: We are now reviewing the appropriate levels for export controls on computers. Our review will take all factors into account -- including our strong commitment to nonproliferation -- in seeking to establish a level that advances U.S. interests from a military and economic standpoint.

When we last revised U.S. computer thresholds, two years ago, we said we would need to revisit those levels within about two years. That is what we have been doing.

M S M a i l DATE-TIME 25 September 95 10:00
FROM Peters, Mary A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT << Ireland >> guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cullin, Brian P.
Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Schuker, Jill A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
[[SEP22GU1.DOC : 2599 in SEP22GU1.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 25 September 95 9:59
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME SEP22GU1.DOC
FOREIGN AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

September 22, 1995

AFRICA
Somalia

LATIN AMERICA
Haiti
Honduras

EAST ASIA/PACIFIC
China
Japan

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
French/U.S. Nuclear Cooperation
CFE
<< Ireland >>
NATO Enlargement
Russia
Turkey

NEAR EAST
Egyptian POW
Iran Sanctions
Peace Process

SOUTH ASIA
Kashmir
Pakistan: Brown Amendment

MISCELLANEOUS

CCW
CWE
Export Control Reform

SOMALIA: AIDEED SEIZES BAIDOA

Q: What is the status of the aid workers who were rounded up and detained by Aideed's forces?

A: Seven of the 20 aid workers, all women, were released yesterday. The UNDP/Somalia Rep Erling Dessau was successful in gaining the release of remaining detainees today. Presently, they are enroute from Baidoa to Nairobi. We understand that they were well treated and are in good spirits.

Q: What is the situation on the ground in Baidoa now?

A: According to available information, on September 22 the fighting touched off by General Aideed and his militia's seizure of Baidoa has ended for now. We understand that Osman Hassan Ali Atto and other warlords have indicated agreement to consolidate the terms of their August 17 Nairobi Declaration in which they pledged to work towards a new national reconciliation conference and to counter "anti-peace forces."

The United States is concerned that these recent developments could portend a significant setback to political reconciliation in Somalia.

Q: Does Aideed's seizing of Baidoa signal the beginning of a new offensive and a return to violence in Somalia? What does this forebode for the humanitarian and political situation in Somalia?

A: We hope that there will be no further violence in Somalia and that the Somali people will return to peaceful negotiations.

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not a good sign.

HAITI

Lake << Trip>>

-- National Security Adviser Anthony Lake will travel to Haiti September 22 and 23 for diplomatic consultations with President Aristide, UNSRSYG Brahimi, and members of President Aristide's Cabinet.

-- Items to be discussed will include economic development, national elections, and training and fielding of the new Haitian National Police.

-- Mr. Lake will travel with a small team from the State Department, USAID and DOD."

-- This is a routine << trip>> to give Mr. Lake an opportunity to meet with U.S. Embassy, U.S. military, Haitian and UN officials to assess the progress made in Haiti over the past year.

Marcel Morissaint Allegations

Background: Alan Nairnes, writing in the current issue of The Nation quotes Haitian Justice Minister Exume as alleging that earlier this month, "U.S. officials" helped Marcel Morissaint, a Haitian national charged in the 1993 murder of former Justice Minister Guy Malary, to escape from jail and made "arrangements to have him leave the country." These allegations are untrue. In reality, the Haitian Chief Prosecutor, Jean-August Brutus, has acknowledged that he made a mistake and signed the document himself which released Morissaint from prison. There was no U.S. involvement, and Morissaint's current whereabouts are unknown.

[NOTE: Morissaint was a paid informant for the DEA in Haiti in 1991-92, and again in 1994. He had been "deactivated" in 1993 because of poor reliability.]

Q: What is your comment on Alan Nairnes' account in The Nation this week that earlier this month, "U.S. officials" helped an accused assassin, Marcel Morissaint in escaping from jail and escaping from Haiti?

A: The story is absolutely untrue. No official of the U.S. Government had anything to do with

Morissant's release. Haiti's Chief Prosecutor, in fact, has admitted that he made a mistake and signed the order himself which released Morissant from prison.

Q: What about the allegation that Morissant was on the payroll of the U.S. Embassy at the time of the murder of Guy Malary, President Aristide's former Justice Minister, in 1993?

A: No official of the U.S. Government had anything to do with the Malary assassination. Malary was a confidant of President Aristide's and his first Justice Minister. As you mentioned, the murder took place in 1993, when the military triumvirate led by General Cedras was in power.

HONDURAS

Background: The sense of Congress resolution recommends that the President order the expedited declassification of any documents in possession of the United States Government pertaining to persons who allegedly "disappeared" in Honduras and make such documents available to Honduran authorities. A number of agencies are processing extensive document requests from the Baltimore Sun through FOIA channels.

Points

-- We understand that agencies have already declassified significant quantities of documents regarding Honduras in response to FOIA requests and will continue to do so in accordance with standard procedures. The status of specific FOIA requests should be verified with relevant agencies.

-- Honduran authorities are undertaking their own investigation into human rights abuses. We have supported that effort through document reviews. Agencies are currently evaluating a more recent request for assistance from the Honduran National Commissioner for Human Rights.

CHINA

CHINA - U.S.

Q: Is the U.S. negotiating a joint communique, with China, as the Wall Street Journal reported?

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US-JAPAN STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA)

Background: Japanese public anger over the reported rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa by U.S. servicemembers has cast a spotlight on the U.S.- Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Some press reports indicate that the U.S. has agreed with Japan to review the SOFA agreement.

Points

ù The United States has agreed to review with Japan how the SOFA agreement's provisions on criminal proceedings are carried out pursuant to and under the agreement. The United States sees no need to revise the pact, itself.

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Air Strikes

ù NATO and UN commanders have agreed that Serbs have complied with the conditions and the resumption of air strikes is not necessary at this time.

ù The Serbs have completed the required withdrawal of heavy weapons from the exclusion zone. The Sarajevo airport has been opened. UN and humanitarian traffic is moving along the main routes into the city.

ù We welcome this development. The NATO air campaign in Bosnia was successful.

ù But as President said last night: renewed attacks on Sarajevo or the other safe areas, or any Serb non-compliance with their other commitments, will trigger a resumption of NATO air strikes.

ù All parties should now turn from the battlefield to the bargaining table and complete a political settlement. The time has come to end the fighting for good and begin the task of reconciliation and reconstruction in the Balkans.

ù If the Bosnian Serbs uphold their commitments, this should give further impetus to our common search for a lasting political settlement to the Balkan conflict, building on the September 8 agreement on "basic principles" of a settlement by the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.

ù (If asked) While Bosnian Serb compliance was not conditional on Bosnian Government actions, the Bosnian Government continues to abide by its pledge of 10 days ago that it would refrain from offensive actions in and around Sarajevo.

GoBH/Croatian Offensives in western Bosnia/threats to Banja Luka

ù We understand that offensive actions in western Bosnia have wound down.

ù We believe all parties should exercise restraint and turn their energies to the peace process.

ù We have told the Bosnian and Croatian governments that military moves that risk drawing the Serbs into the conflict are very risky and unwise, and could lead to increased suffering for the civilian population.

ù We welcome the statements earlier this week by Croatian and Bosnian leaders that they will not attack Banja Luka.

Will the Bosnian Offensive Derail U.S. Diplomatic Efforts?

ù We continue to believe that this conflict will not be settled on the battlefield, and that all parties should redouble their efforts to arrive at an early diplomatic solution. That remains the goal of our policy.

Next Steps

ù Principals met yesterday with U.S. negotiating team to review status of issues and next steps.

ù While much work remains to be done, Principals agreed that Bosnian Serbs' fulfillment of the UN and NATO conditions around Sarajevo has given further impetus to our diplomatic efforts and those of our Russian and other European partners.

ù The President later spoke by phone with Secretary Christopher, National Security Adviser Lake and Ambassador Holbrooke to review the status of our diplomatic efforts.

ù The President instructed the U.S. negotiating team to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to clear away the remaining obstacles to a political settlement of the Balkan conflict.

ù As the next important step in the peace process, there will be a second meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with representatives of the Contact Group on Tuesday, September 26 in New York. The meeting will be co-chaired by the United States and the European Union.

ù The purpose of the meeting is to build on the results of the September 8 meeting in Geneva, where the three Foreign Ministers endorsed a set of Agreed Basic Principles for a settlement in Bosnia. Following that meeting, the U.S. negotiating team will return to the Balkans for another round of negotiations.

Peace Plan Implementation

ù While many issues remain to be resolved in the negotiations, we have accelerated our internal preparations for the implementation of a possible peace settlement.

ù Just as American leadership is critical to the achievement of a peace settlement, so will our leadership be critical to ensuring that the agreement is implemented successfully so that the conflict is ended for good.

ù Implementation will have many aspects -- a military implementation force (IFOR) to ensure that the parties maintain a ceasefire and withdraw their forces according to the requirements of the agreement; civilian efforts to safeguard human rights, assist in the return of refugees, help establish political institutions and deliver humanitarian aid; and a regional economic reconstruction program.

ù A range of organizations will be involved in the non-military aspects - the UN and its agencies, the OSCE, the European Union, and the International Financial Institutions.

ù We believe that, to be effective, the military implementation mission should be led by NATO, with a single chain of command and robust rules of engagement. A strong and decisive NATO presence on the ground at an early stage will provide the best deterrent against violations of the agreement and the resumption of hostilities.

ù The force would operate under a UNSC Chapter VII mandate, but operational control would be exercised by NATO (i.e. no dual key).

ù The IFOR would likely include forces from non-NATO countries, who would need to connect to the NATO command structure through liaison arrangements that are still being developed. We hope Russia and other members of the Partnership for Peace will form part of the IFOR.

ù UNPROFOR's mandate would terminate, although some forces in UNPROFOR could transition to the new NATO-led forces. We hope, in particular, that Allied forces in the Rapid Reaction Force will form the lead elements of the new force.

ù NATO planners are now developing a detailed OPLAN, building on previous planning for earlier peace plans and for UNPROFOR withdrawal. They have been tasked to complete the plan by the end of September.

ù Until the planning is completed, and until there is a clearer sense of the actual provisions of the peace settlement, it would be premature to speculate on the size of the overall force or the U.S. contribution.

ù But the President stands by his commitment to contribute a substantial number of U.S. ground forces to the IFOR, subject to consultations with the Congress.

September 8 Geneva Meeting

ù Important progress was made at the September 8 Geneva meeting between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, and Contact Group representatives. Ambassador Holbrooke and EU negotiator Carl Bildt co-chaired the meeting.

-- In specific, the three foreign ministers announced they had agreed to basic principles for further negotiations toward final settlement. The principles are the following:

-- For the first time, all agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition.

-- Consistent with the Contact Group plan, all three agreed that under the terms of a settlement, Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation established under last year's Washington Agreements, and a Bosnian Serb republic.

-- The 51-49 parameter of the Contact Group's territorial proposal will be the basis for a settlement, subject to any adjustments the parties make by mutual agreement.

-- The two entities will have the right to establish relationships with neighboring states, but these must be consistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

-- The parties pledged to adhere to human rights standards, to ensure freedom of movement and the right of the displaced to return to their homes, and to collaborate on joint economic projects that will promote links among all of Bosnia's peoples.

ù As the President said, this is an important milestone on the path to peace.

ù We hope next Tuesday's meeting will build on this important progress.

(If asked whether the new diplomatic effort divides Bosnia)

-- We have not partitioned Bosnia, nor do we intend to.

-- It cannot be emphasized too strongly that according to the Geneva agreements,

Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a single state, retaining its seat in international organizations and its bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries in the world, including the U.S.

Downed French Pilots

ù As French have indicated Bosnian Serbs may have pilots in their custody. We hold President Milosevic accountable for their safety.

ù We can confirm that U.S. forces participated in three rescue attempts, which we regret were not successful. Pentagon can provide details.

ù We demand that the Serbs release the pilots immediately and unharmed.

Bosnian Serb Violations of No-Fly Zone?

-- We are concerned by reports of Deny Flight violations by Bosnian Serb aircraft based at Banja Luka. We can't confirm whether flights and air strikes reported yesterday did, in fact, occur.

-- NATO air patrols continue. NATO aircraft are authorized to intercept any violators of the no-fly zone or to respond to Serb air defense installations displaying hostile intent.

CORE BOSNIA POINTS

-- From the outset, we have consistently worked to relieve the human suffering in Bosnia, contain the war, and bring about a peaceful settlement. These efforts have saved many lives, brought an end to the fighting between Muslims and Croats through the formation of the Bosnian-Croat Federation, and prevented the war from spreading. However, as we all know, the fighting continues and peace has been tragically elusive in Bosnia.

-- We are now at an important moment in the history of the Bosnian conflict. The events of recent months changed the situation on the ground in Bosnia and presented the sides with opportunities for peace that could disappear rapidly.

-- Since June, we have worked with our allies to strengthen the United Nations operation by supporting the Rapid Reaction Force and providing for the protection of safe areas by the threat of decisive use of NATO air power.

-- And in early August, the President decided to launch a new diplomatic initiative aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement, and sent his National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, to Europe to consult with the Russians and our other European partners.

-- Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke and his team have now conducted three rounds of shuttle diplomacy in the region and have made important progress toward a settlement.

-- The September 8 meeting in Geneva of the three Foreign Ministers (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia), where agreement was reached on "Agreed Basic Principles" of a Bosnia settlement -- was an important initial milestone on the road to peace.

Have you retreated from troop commitments upon settlement? (Aug. 28 WP p. 24)

-- No.

-- We have long said we would be willing to participate in a NATO-led effort, under previously-specified conditions, to help implement a viable peace settlement.

Are You considering fewer troops?

-- Cannot say what will be the size of the NATO force or the U.S. contribution.

-- The number of troops will depend on the nature of the settlement package.

Are you presenting a U.S. map/Have you ceded Goradze to the Serbs

-- We are discussing a number of ideas, including some notions on territorial issues

-- We are not presenting a U.S. map, nor are we insisting on any particular territorial trades.

Did the Bosnians reject our plan out of hand?

-- No. They have been very supportive, as has Serbian President Milosevic.

Hasn't U.S. leadership in Bosnia failed?/What is new about the current initiative?

-- American diplomacy has had several notable successes: creation of the Federation and ending the fighting in Central Bosnia; stabilizing Macedonia; ending the siege of Sarajevo; containing the conflict; the new constitutional arrangements agreed upon in Geneva on September 8, and last week's Serb agreement to comply with UN/NATO conditions in Sarajevo.

-- New elements aiding our current efforts: recent developments on the ground, coupled with general war-weariness, have created new opportunities to break long-standing diplomatic logjams.

Give up on multi-ethnic Bosnian state?

-- No. Continue to support maintaining Bosnia within internationally recognized borders.

-- Supported Federation, combined Croat-Muslim enterprise.

Croatians engaged in ethnic cleansing?

-- Refugee flow is human tragedy and we are actively supporting efforts of international relief agencies.

-- Have been reports of abuses. We strongly condemn all violations of the rights of civilians, prisoners of war and international personnel.

-- We have repeatedly stressed to the Croatian government its obligation to respect these rights; to investigate allegations of human rights abuses, and to hold accountable those responsible.

-- Also urged government of Croatia to provide assurances to all Serbs in the Krajina, and to those who fled, that they are welcome to stay and return. Importance of allowing international monitors (ICRC) to assure rights of Serbs are respected. Croatian government has agreed.

-- It is not clear whether the Croatian government's actions in Krajina amount to a systematic policy of ethnic cleansing -- a deliberate and organized strategy of force and intimidation to drive all members of an ethnic group from their homes to "purify" the area. But clearly, serious abuses have occurred and we condemn any acts that force anyone to leave because of ethnic ident

ity.

-- We will continue to monitor the situation closely and hold the Croatians to the same standards as the Serbs and others in this conflict.

Shattuck report on atrocities

[Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck confirmed reports of egregious human rights violations committed by Bosnian-Serb forces in the aftermath of their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa..]

-- We continue to condemn the policy of ethnic cleansing. We continue to call for international access to all those detained and displaced, and for a full accounting of the whereabouts of those missing. We will continue to urge all parties in the former Yugoslavia to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

-- Ambassador Albright presented information we have on atrocities to the U.N. Security Council.

-- At our urging, the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions condemning crimes on all sides, highlighting Bosnian Serb atrocities against refugees from Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- There must be justice, and those who have violated international humanitarian law must be held accountable. We will continue to work with the International War Crimes Tribunal and urge that it prosecute those suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Such criminal actions must not and will not remain unpunished.

What about Kosovo?

-- We have told Belgrade we believe major resettlement of Krajina Serbs in Kosovo is potentially very provocative.

-- Before the "FRY" can be integrated into the world community, a solution must be found to the situation in Kosovo.

Second-level ethnic cleansing in Sandzak, Vojvodina

-- We have urged Serbian authorities to enforce laws preventing the eviction of ethnic minorities from their homes in the aim of making room for Krajina refugees.

U.S. relief to Krajina Serbs

-- We support efforts of international relief agencies, and have called for comprehensive, direct relief to all those in need.

Reconstruction aid

-- The U.S. has consulted with the EU on the size and shape of an economic reconstruction effort, should a peace settlement be achieved.

-- The Spaniards, in their EU presidency capacity, have agreed to take the lead in planning for the effort. We are consulting with Congress on what the U.S. might be prepared to provide.

-- We expect the effort to include reconstruction assistance, IFI debt relief, humanitarian aid and encouragement of regional economic interdependence in terms of trade and other economic activities.

-- Clearly reconstruction must emulate the Marshall Plan in one important aspect -- it must knit today's warring communities together in ways that encourage peaceful cooperation.

U.S. - FRENCH NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Q: Do you have any comment on the September 19 Washington Post article on U.S. - French nuclear cooperation.

A:

ù We have had and continue to have a cooperation program with France in the nuclear area.

ù The program with France is not intended to help France conduct nuclear tests. As the President has made clear, the United States regrets continued French nuclear testing.

ù Our program with France is designed to help ensure the safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons under a true zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty and not to aid the development of new nuclear weapons.

ù In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to sign a CTB Treaty banning all nuclear tests regardless of level no later than the fall of 1996.

[If asked: Has the United States offered to cooperate with France on nuclear simulation]

ù Yes. Again, this effort is focused on maintaining the safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons under a zero yield CTB Treaty. There is no cooperation planned or envisioned to aid the development of new nuclear weapons.

[If asked about French overflights of the United States to the Mururoa test site]

ù Under the code of federal regulations, governments requesting overflight clearance are required to specify whether any hazardous materials are on board the aircraft.

ù We have granted overflight clearance to several French military missions to Mururoa in 1995.

ù The French informed us of the presence of small arms and ammunition on board one flight. The French did not indicate that hazardous materials -- which would include toxic chemicals, explosive devices, and radioactive material -- would be transported on board any of the other aircraft.

[If asked whether the overflight of U.S. territory of aircraft transporting plutonium is prohibited by law]

The overflight of U.S. territory by aircraft transporting plutonium in any form from a foreign country to a foreign country is prohibited by Public Law 100-203 (1987), the "Murkowski Amendment."

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

-- The United States and our NATO Allies have for some time been looking at ways to address Russian and Ukrainian concerns about the Treaty's "flank" limits. On Wednesday, NATO presented a proposal to Russia in Brussels for a new approach to resolving this issue. Russia has reacted cautiously and will study the offer further.

-- The strategic picture has changed dramatically since the Treaty was signed in 1990. Now, neither the Warsaw Pact nor the Soviet Union exist and forces once deployed by the USSR as far west as Eastern Germany have been withdrawn to Russia. NATO Allies are looking at ways to respond to those changes, while maintaining the key elements of the Treaty, including its flank limits.

-- NATO has developed this proposal as part of its preparations for the CFE Review Conference, established by the Treaty for May, 1996. Our goal is to preserve the viability of the Treaty, which remains a cornerstone of European security.

-- The "flank" issue does not concern the overall equipment limit for Russia and Ukraine, but the restrictions which the Treaty places on the amount of equipment permitted in certain regions. Russia and Ukraine have participated fully in the Treaty's implementation over the past three years, destroying thousands of pieces of Treaty-limited equipment and submitting to hundreds of inspections under the terms of the Treaty.

-- We and our Allies continue to reject completely the Russian idea of an "exclusion zone" in its Caucasus region. There is no basis for such an "exclusion zone" in the Treaty.

-- Any solution must be acceptable to all Treaty parties. The forum for negotiation will be the CFE Joint Consultative Group in Vienna.

(If asked about statement by Senator Helms staff that Treaty changes are not likely to be approved "anytime soon":)

-- Any agreement along the lines of the NATO proposal would require the approval of Congress.

<< IRELAND >>

U.S. Role

-- We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help in the search

for peace.

-- Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.

-- First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosperous future.
People of Belfast are finally living a normal life.

U.S. Meetings

-- We have had a number of contacts over the last few weeks about how to move the peace process forward.

-- Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake September 13 for over an hour. The Vice President joined them for part of the meeting.

-- Mr. Lake and the Vice President met September 8 with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

-- We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing. I am not prepared to go into any detail.

Twin Track

-- We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons.

-- We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

Comment on Paisley Press Conference (said your visit to Northern Ireland is in serious doubt and turned down Lake's invitation to meet.)

-- Not going to comment on Mr. Paisley's statements.

-- There has been no change in President's plans, and he is very much looking forward to the trip.

British Stalling on Talks?

-- As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time the President visits Northern << Ireland >> at the end of November.

-- We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to doing all he can to achieve a lasting peace in Northern << Ireland >> .

Position on Decommissioning:

-- On decommissioning of weapons, the President has said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn Fein and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

-- The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

-- It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Election of hard-line Unionist David Trimble a setback?

-- Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists over the past year.

Deportations [Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members, some who are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

-- Issue recently brought to our attention.

-- Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

-- We are looking at the issue.

Reaction to NATO approval of enlargement study?

-- We welcome NATO approval on September 20 of its landmark study on enlarging the Alliance.

-- The study, which sets out the "how" and "why" of enlargement, will be made public when it is presented to members of the Partnership for Peace (composed of CEE and NIS countries, including Russia) in Brussels on September 28.

-- Individual presentations will also be made to members who request them. NATO will assess the presentations and decide on next steps at its December 5 ministerial meeting in Brussels.

-- The study was commissioned by NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in December 1994.

-- The study is part of a gradual, deliberate process leading to the enlargement of the Alliance.

-- Our goal is to extend the security and stability represented by NATO into the new democracies that have arisen in Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

-- By integrating them into NATO we hope to ensure the survival of their democratic and market economic reforms.

-- No decisions have yet been taken on whom to invite. Nor is there any timetable for when this will occur. Enlargement will only occur when NATO is satisfied that prospective members can contribute to the overall security of the Alliance.

-- The "how" part of the study sets out a number of steps that interested potential members must take in order to be considered for membership. These include political and military steps that contribute to the democratic goals and overall security of the Alliance.

-- We should stress that no Partnership for Peace members are a priori excluded from the possibility of becoming NATO members.

The Russian Angle: Evans-Novak Call for Immediate Enlargement

-- In addition to enlargement, NATO is also pursuing establishment of a parallel relationship with

Russia. This is being done in recognition of the important role Russia has to play in European security.

-- We understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We are working to overcome these concerns, which we believe are misplaced.

-- NATO enlargement is not aimed at Russia. NATO is a purely defensive organization. Our goal is to extend stability to areas of historic instability to ensure their future security.

-- Our purpose is to end the division of Europe, not to create new divisions.

-- At the same time, we have made clear to Moscow that enlargement will proceed in a gradual and transparent manner.

-- We strongly disagree with those who believe NATO should enlarge immediately just because Russia has concerns about enlargement.

-- Enlargement must be a deliberate process that takes into account our interests as well as those of our European partners and Allies.

RUSSIA

Current Items

General Items

Talbott-Mamedov Talks

-- Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov in Washington September 20-22 for talks with Deputy Secretary Talbott and other senior USG officials. These talks << long-scheduled >>; part of regular U.S.-Russian consultations. Covering range of bilateral and international issues.

(If pressed)

-- Subjects include Bosnia, European security and arms control issues.

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Yeltsin's Warning Against NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust NATO-Russia relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Spring 1996 Summit in Moscow

-- As Canadian Prime Minister Chretien announced June 17, G-7 leaders and Yeltsin agreed in Halifax to hold summit on nuclear safety and security in Moscow in spring 1996.

-- Summit to cover safety of civilian nuclear power and security of nuclear materials, areas in which there is already substantial cooperation between U.S., G-7 and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have begun serious dialogue that will continue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Iranian Oil Swaps

-- As part of our policy of supporting independence and stability of Caucasus and Central Asia

states, USG willing to consider allowing American companies to swap Caspian oil with Iran in short-term while alternative reliable export pipelines are developed.

-- Bottlenecks in Russian pipeline system severely limit ability of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to export oil and gas. Actively encouraging U.S. companies in region to develop alternative non-Iranian options for oil export.

Chevron Swap Deal with Iran

-- Chevron has not yet presented license application. We will review all applications on case-by-case basis.

Fred Cuny

-- Engaged Yeltsin, Russian officials to secure cooperation on Cuny case. Doing all we can to find out what happened. No confirmed reports on fate of Cuny or the Russians traveling with him.

-- Sympathize with Cuny family's deep sense of frustration. Share Cuny family's commitment to thorough and honest investigation.

Chechnya

-- Clashes continue. Implementation of military agreement signed by Russians and Chechens on July 30 proceeding slowly; complex and hits frequent snags. Situation changing daily.

-- Dispute can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides quickly to res

olve these
issues and move toward political agreement.

TURKEY: MARCUS CASE

Any comment on the Washington Post article on the charges against Amcit Aliza Marcus
, who works for Reuters?

-- We are well aware of this case, but do not have a privacy act waiver for Ms. Marc
us and
cannot provide many details.

-- The matter is currently being actively considered by a Turkish court and under th
e
circumstances we do not believe it would be appropriate to comment further at this t
ime.

If pressed on what we are doing for Ms. Marcus:

-- As you would expect, we have discussed the case with Turkish authorities.

-- It is standard procedure to provide all necessary consular assistance to American
citizens facing
difficulties abroad.

Background Info FYI Only: This case has been discussed with the Turkish government
both in Ankara and
Washington. The GOT has told us that the case has been resolved, but has provided n
o details. Our Embassy
does not want to risk compromising this resolution by publicly discussing it.

EGYPTIAN POW KILLINGS

Q: Do you have any comment on the reports that two mass graves have been found in th
e Sinai
which contain the bodies of Egyptian POW's allegedly killed by Israeli troops?

A: This matter is now under discussion between the Egyptian and Israeli governments.
I would
refer you to them for anything further on this matter.

(NOTE TO BRIEFER: Avoid any discussion of substantive "facts" regarding Egyptian discovery of graves.)

IRAN SANCTIONS: D'AMATO BILL

Background: The amendment in current form has mandatory and discretionary sanctions against foreign companies that export oil and natural gas equipment and technology to Iran. Mandatory sanctions prohibit awarding U.S. Government contracts, granting licenses, and admitting senior officers of such companies into the U.S. Discretionary sanctions include an import prohibition, a merger and acquisition prohibition, and a prohibition from receiving EXIM bank financing or commercial bank loans.

Points

- Believe the D'Amato proposal tackles important issues, but it has not yet been formally introduced.
- We will look at it seriously.
- We look forward to further consultations on this issue with the Congress.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

Q: What is the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks?

A: Both the Israelis and the Palestinians continue to work hard to bridge their differences and have made progress.

We understand that both sides believe they are fairly close to an agreement.

Q: Will there be a ceremony for the parties to sign their agreement in Washington soon?

A: The parties have expressed their desire for a signing ceremony in Washington. As we have said, we are prepared to host a ceremony, once agreement has been reached.

KASHMIR

Background: The situation remains unclear and extremely fluid. Contact between the Al-Faran group holding the hostages and the Indian authorities continues to be intermittent and the crisis appears to be building toward a conclusion. Tension in the area continues to mount following a bomb blast in Srinagar this past weekend and troop movements by both India and Pakistan along the line of control (border) that separates them.

Points

- We are encouraged by reports that the hostages are well.
- We continue to work closely with the Indian authorities and hope for the speedy and safe release of the hostages.
- We urge all involved to continue to work cooperatively to secure the release of these innocent men.

BROWN AMENDMENT

Background: The Senate passed the Brown Amendment on Thursday by a vote of 55-45 as part of consideration of the FY '96 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. The bill moves to conference after the Senate completes action. The amendment eliminates some of the Pressler Amendment restrictions. Specifically, it:

- ù provides authority to deliver approximately \$370 million of equipment to Pakistan pursuant to contracts signed prior to implementation of the Pressler amendment sanctions on October 1, 1990;
- ù permits the US to resume economic and technical assistance and limited forms of military assistance to Pakistan, including IMET, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and peacekeeping assistance;
- ù allows the US to waive storage fees for equipment embargoed by the Pressler amendment; and
- ù releases to Pakistan old or broken equipment it had sent to the US for repair or upgrade.

Points

-- Pleased that the Senate has acted favorably on the Brown Amendment, and urge that the amendment not be diluted in conference action;

-- Believe the amendment permits us to develop a stronger, more flexible relationship with Pakistan, a long-time friend in a troubled region;

-- In supporting the Brown Amendment, we have no intention of relaxing our non-proliferation goals in South Asia or elsewhere. By not releasing the F-16s, we continue to send a strong global message on non-proliferation;

-- (If asked about the F-16s): Last April we agreed with Prime Minister Bhutto that it was unfair that Pakistan can receive neither the planes nor the money it has paid for them. Therefore, we are exploring a possible sale of the planes to another purchaser.

CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) REVIEW CONFERENCE (LANDMINES/LASERS)

-- Primary U.S. objective at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Review Conference, opening September 25, will be to strengthen the CCW's restrictions on the use of landmines. We are gravely concerned with humanitarian tragedy caused by the indiscriminate use of these weapons.

-- Signed in 1980, the President obtained Senate advice and consent to CCW ratification in March of this year.

-- The U.S. has advanced the principle proposals to improve the CCW "landmines" protocol that will be considered at the Review Conference. These include, for example:

- requiring that all remotely delivered mines (those delivered by aircraft, rocket or artillery) used outside of marked and monitored minefields self-destruct after a relatively short period, so that they will not remain a threat to civilians after a conflict ends;

- requiring that all mines be detectable using commonly-available technology, to facilitate their

clearing;

- expanding the scope of the "landmines" protocol to apply in internal armed conflicts, where the greatest civilian casualties have occurred; and

- requiring that the party laying the mines assume responsibility for clearing them, including a duty at the "cessation of active hostilities" to clear them or maintain them in controlled fields to protect civilians. Where the party laying the mines no longer controls the territory in which they were laid, it would have a duty to provide assistance for their clearance, to the extent possible.

-- (If asked) The U.S. will also be prepared to support a protocol prohibiting the use of so-called "blinding" lasers, provided it protects certain military requirements for the legitimate use of lasers on the battlefield, such as targeting and range-finding.

-- Ambassador Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor to the Department of State, will lead our delegation.

ù

ù

VISIT OF SENIOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PREPARATORY COMMISSION OFFICIALS TO WASHINGTON

-- Three senior officials from the Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission are in Washington this week to discuss U.S. ratification of the international treaty outlawing chemical weapons -- the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

-- They have met with the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of State, the ACD A Director, the Chairman of the JCS and the Acting Secretary of Defense. They will also be meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and their staff.

-- The CWC has enjoyed strong bipartisan support. President Reagan negotiated it, President Bush completed and signed it, and President Clinton sent it to the Senate for advice and consent.

-- CWC ratification and entry into force is a key element of the President's nonprol

iferation policy.

It is an urgent next step in stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction, following the successful NPT Extension Conference.

-- That is why we welcomed the Senate amendment adopted on September 5 calling for prompt ratification of the CWC and the START II treaty and urged the Senate to provide its advice and consent to ratification before the end of this session.

IF ASKED whether Senator Helms is holding CWC hostage to the State Department reorganization plan:

-- Our dialogue with Senator Helms on that issue is continuing. But the President believes that it is crucial for the Senate to complete action on the CWC (and START II) this year.

IF ASKED why the Administration hasn't done more to get CWC ratified:

-- This Administration has made clear, through its words as well as its actions, that securing CWC ratification and entry into force is one of its highest priorities.

-- Even before the President submitted the CWC to the Senate in November 1993, he pressed the case for prompt CWC ratification and entry into force in his first address to the United Nations.

-- Our most senior officials (the Secretary of State, ACDA Director, JCS Chairman, CIA Director, and DOD Deputy Secretary) all gave strong testimony in support of the CWC last year.

-- In May, former Congressman Martin Lancaster was appointed "Special Advisor to the President and ACDA Director on the Chemical Weapons Convention." Since then, Lancaster has met with over 90 Senators or their staff to urge ratification.

-- The President has made clear on numerous occasions -- in his State of the Union Address in January, at the Nixon Center in March, at the Air Force Academy in May, and at the 50th Anniversary of the UN in San Francisco in June -- the priority he attaches to the earliest possible CWC ratification and entry into force.

-- The President emphasized the importance of CWC ratification again in his meeting with the Congressional leadership last week.

IF ASKED whether there are any substantive obstacles to CWC ratification:

-- There do not appear to be any substantive obstacles to Senate advice and consent to the CWC.

Some issues, such as verification, have been raised recently in the press, but these were dealt with in great detail in the nine Senate hearings and hundreds of questions we answered last year.

EXPORT CONTROL REFORM: COMPUTERS

Q: Is the Administration planning to loosen export controls so that high-powered computers could help our foes build nuclear and other high-tech weapons?

A: We are now reviewing the appropriate levels for export controls on computers. Our review will take all factors into account -- including our strong commitment to nonproliferation -- in seeking to establish a level that advances U.S. interests from a military and economic standpoint.

When we last revised U.S. computer thresholds, two years ago, we said we would need to revisit those levels within about two years. That is what we have been doing.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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NSC Emails
MSMail - Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/20/1995 - 09/27/1995]

2017-0759-F
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 September 95 09:46

FROM Peters, Mary A.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT New Ireland Point [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Cullin, Brian P.
Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Schuker, Jill A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY NOte point on Spring meeting in bold[[SEP29GUI.DOC : 2319 in
SEP29GUI.DOC
]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 29 September 95 9:46

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SEP29GUI.DOC
FOREIGN AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

September 28, 1995

AFRICA
Comoros Island Coup

LATIN AMERICA
Mexico
Colombia
Guatemala
Honduras

EAST ASIA/PACIFIC
China

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Ireland
NATO Enlargement
Russia

NEAR EAST
Egyptian POW
Iran Sanctions
Peace Process

SOUTH ASIA
Kashmir

MISCELLANEOUS
CCW
Export Control Reform
Defense
UN Peacekeeping

ATTEMPTED COUP IN THE COMOROS ISLANDS

According to U.S. Embassy sources, French mercenary Robert Denard and his lieutenant
s have taken Comoro
President Said Mohammed Djohar hostage in an apparent attempted coup d'etat
this mor
ning.

Q: What information can you provide about a reported coup attempt in the Comoros?

A: We have received reports from our Embassy in Port Louis Mauritius that a
coup may
have
taken place in the Comoros. These initial reports indicate that there has been no b
loodshed.

-- Since we have no Embassy in the Comoros, we are attempting to verify this
informa
tion
through other countries which maintain a diplomatic presence on the islands, as
well
as with our Peace
Corps personnel who are based in the Comoros.

-- I am not going to speculate on any reports until the situation becomes clearer
an
d we are able to
verify those reports.

-- (if asked): We are aware of reports that foreign mercenaries may be present in the Comoros but are unable to verify that information.

Q: What is the U.S. Government's position regarding the coup?

A: The U.S. Government condemns any interruption of the democratic process in the Comoros.

We call on all parties in the Comoros to adhere to the democratic process as contained in their constitution.

Multiparty elections, both presidential and parliamentary, have been held in Comoros

several times since

1991, and plans have been underway for presidential elections in March 1996

-- We are still trying to ascertain the facts about what may be occurring or may have occurred in the Comoros.

Q: How many Americans are in the Comoros and why?

A: There are currently about 33 Americans in the Comoros, primarily Peace Corps volunteers and

staff and missionaries and their families. The Peace Corps director in Moroni has been

in contact with

most of the Americans, and all are reported safe.

-- Peace Corps operations in Comoros are scheduled to cease on December 31, 1995 for

budgetary reasons.

-- (if asked): It would be premature to discuss evacuation of Peace Corps volunteers and staff at this point.

Q: When did the American Embassy in the Comoros Close, and why?

A: The U.S. Embassy in Moroni was closed in September 1993 for budgetary reasons. Our

Embassy in Port Louis, Mauritius has covered the Comoros since then.

-- At the time of its closure, the official Americans numbered three.

Q: What is the current status of U.S. assistance to the Comoros?

-- There is no USAID mission in the Comoros.

-- Besides the Peace Corps program, which is scheduled to close for budgetary reason
s at the end
of this calendar year, current U.S. assistance to the Comoros amounts to
approximate
ly \$370,000,
primarily scholarships for Comorians, small self-help projects for local
organizatio
ns, funds disbursed
to assist in democratization. There are also occasional small Department of
Defense
humanitarian
assistance projects.

-- It would be premature to determine the future of U.S. assistance to the
Comoros a
t this point.

COLOMBIA

[Background: President Samper's lawyer, Antonio Jose Cancino, was seriously
wounded
in an ambush by
unidentified assailants in downtown Bogota yesterday. He is expected to recover,
bu
t his driver remains in
critical condition and two bodyguards died in the attack. Cancino has
spearheaded S
amper's defense against
charges that the President accepted campaign contributions from narcotraffickers
in
the 1994 elections. After the
attack, Interior Minister Serpa publicly suggested that the United States and DEA
we
re behind the attack and other
efforts to topple the Samper government. The night before, President Samper
spoke o
f "obscure foreign
interests" -- a thinly veiled allusion to the United States -- threatening his gover
nment. Colombia's
Prosecutor General Valdivieso -- leading the investigation into the narcodollar
alle

gations -- is making a private visit to Washington today.]

Points:

-- Attack on Cancino was a deplorable, senseless act of violence. Urge restraint by all sectors as authorities investigate. Sincerely hope that Cancino and driver recover promptly, and extend heartfelt condolences to families of dead bodyguards.

-- Vehemently reject President Samper and Interior Minister Serpa's public allegations that the United States and DEA were in any way involved in the attack, or that we are conspiring against their government. Such assertions are ludicrous and totally irresponsible.

-- Investigation into allegations of improper narcodollar contributions to the President's election campaign is an internal Colombian matter. While applaud Samper government's tremendous successes in fight against Cali Cartel, democracy and good governance require full, fair investigation into allegations of wrongdoing.

(If ASKED)

-- Prosecutor General Valdivieso is in Washington on a personal visit. Will also visit New York and Boston. Understand he is meeting with some officials at the State Department; refer you to Department for further information.

MEXICO

Background: A story in this a.m.'s Post says Zedillo will repay \$1billion worth of emergency loans during his visit.

Q Is it true that Mexico will prepay \$1 billion worth of emergency loans from the United States, when President Zedillo visits Washington later this month?

-- That is a matter best addressed by representatives of the Mexican government.

-- But it is a very healthy sign that nobody's talking anymore about whether Mexico will repay; they're only asking when Mexico is going to repay.

-- This change only serves to underscore the potential and importance of the Mexican market and the ultimate wisdom of NAFTA.

GUATEMALA

-- We are committed to a frank review of US intelligence in Guatemala.

-- That process includes the review being conducted by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, a thorough and detailed study which is not yet complete.

-- John Deutch as Director of Central Intelligence is also reviewing appropriate actions as part of this process.

The President has confidence that Mr. Deutch's disciplinary and institutional action

s related to these matters will be both forceful and fair.

-- It would be premature to comment further on actions and reviews which are not yet concluded.

HONDURAS

Background: The sense of Congress resolution recommends that the President order the expedited declassification of any documents in possession of the United States Government pertaining to

persons
who allegedly
"disappeared" in Honduras and make such documents available to Honduran
authorities.

A number of
agencies are processing extensive document requests from the Baltimore Sun
through F
OIA channels.

Points

-- We understand that agencies have already declassified significant quantities of
d
ocuments
regarding Honduras in response to FOIA requests and will continue to do so in
accord
ance with
standard procedures. The status of specific FOIA requests should be verified with
r
elevant agencies.

-- Honduran authorities are undertaking their own investigation into human rights
ab
uses. We
have supported that effort through document reviews. Agencies are currently
evaluat
ing a more recent
request for assistance from the Honduran National Commissioner for Human
Rights.

CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS

Q: What can you say about the meeting between Secretary Christopher and
China's Fo
reign
Minister?

A: Secretary Christopher and China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met
yesterday in
New York to
continue discussions begun in Brunei on means of improving overall U.S.-China
relati

ons.

The discussions were cordial, serious, and substantive, covering a variety of issues of bilateral concern.

Q: Will there be a summit between President Clinton and President Jiang?

A: The issue of a possible meeting between the two Presidents was among the topics reviewed.

No conclusions were reached, and the issue remains under discussion.

Q: Does this mean there's a disagreement about whether or not a summit will take place?

A: It means that the issue remains under discussion, along with a number of other important bilateral concerns.

Q: Is the Sciolino article in today's NYT accurate in saying the Chinese "rebuffed" the U.S. offer.

A: No. Discussions are ongoing, and we still support the goal of a meeting between the two Presidents.

Q: Will Christopher meet again with Qian?

A: There are no plans for another meeting at that level. China's Vice Foreign Minister Li is staying in New York to continue discussions as needed.

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Diplomatic Track: Next Steps

ù Tuesday's New York meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia produced another important step toward a peace settlement in Bosnia.

ù In a set of "further agreed basic principles" for a settlement, the three Foreign Ministers have spelled out in greater detail the constitutional structures of Bosnia, including the establishment of a national parliament, Presidency and Constitutional Court.

ù The new document builds on the September 8 agreement in Geneva.

ù In the new document, they also committed to holding free democratic elections under international supervision.

ù The parties have agreed that central government will have responsibility for conduct of foreign policy of Bosnia after a settlement. They are still negotiating on other functions of the central institutions --e.g. its role in foreign trade, monetary policy, crime enforcement, etc.

ù While many more issues remain to be resolved before we have a final peace agreement, Tuesday's result underscores once again that the political settlement will preserve Bosnia as a single state, with continuing international recognition.

ù As the President has said, we will strongly oppose the partition of Bosnia.

ù Tuesday's result is further testament to the international community's resolve and persistent diplomacy by our team, supported by our Contact Group partners.

ù The President has instructed Ambassador Holbrooke and his team to return to the Balkans on Thursday to press ahead with the search for a settlement.

Peace Plan Implementation

ù While many issues remain to be resolved in the negotiations, we have accelerated our internal preparations for the implementation of a possible peace settlement.

ù Just as American leadership is critical to the achievement of a peace settlement,

so will our leadership be critical to ensuring that the agreement is implemented successfully so that the conflict is ended for good.

ù Implementation will have many aspects -- a military implementation force (IFOR) to ensure that the parties maintain a ceasefire and withdraw their forces according to the requirements of the agreement; civilian efforts to safeguard human rights, assist in the return of refugees, help establish political institutions and deliver humanitarian aid; and a regional economic reconstruction program.

ù A range of organizations will be involved in the non-military aspects - the UN and its agencies, the OSCE, the European Union, and the International Financial Institutions.

ù We believe that, to be effective, the military implementation mission should be led by NATO, with a single chain of command and robust rules of engagement. A strong and decisive NATO presence on the ground at an early stage will provide the best deterrent against violations of the agreement and the resumption of hostilities.

ù We and our Allies agree that the implementation force would operate under a UNSC Chapter VII mandate, but operational control would be exercised by NATO (i.e. no dual key).

ù The IFOR would likely include forces from non-NATO countries, who would need to connect to the NATO command structure through liaison arrangements that are still being developed. We hope Russia and other members of the Partnership for Peace will form part of the IFOR.

ù UNPROFOR's mandate would terminate, although some forces in UNPROFOR could transition to the new NATO-led forces. We hope, in particular, that Allied forces in the Rapid Reaction Force will form the lead elements of the new force.

ù NATO planners are now developing a detailed OPLAN, building on previous planning for or earlier peace plans and for UNPROFOR withdrawal. They have been tasked to complete the plan by the end of September.

ù Until the planning is completed, and until there is a clearer sense of the actual provisions of the peace settlement, it would be premature to speculate on the size of the overall force or the U.S. contribution.

ù But the President stands by his commitment -- first made in 1993 -- to contribute a substantial number of U.S. ground forces to a NATO-led force to assist in implementation of a Bosnia peace settlement, subject to consultations with the Congress.

Reaction to Dole letter charging lack of consultations with Congress?

ù NATO commissioned planning by the NATO Military Authorities last Wednesday, so the process is still at an early stage.

ù We fully intend to consult with the Congress as NATO planning -- and our own thinking -- evolves.

ù The President will consult with Congressional leaders on Friday to discuss U.S. negotiating strategy and thinking on implementation of a settlement.

Air Strikes

ù NATO and UN commanders agreed last week that Serbs have complied with the conditions and the resumption of air strikes is not necessary at this time.

ù The Serbs completed the required withdrawal of heavy weapons from the exclusion zone. The Sarajevo airport has remained open. UN and humanitarian traffic is moving along the main r

outes into the city.

ù We welcome this development. The NATO air campaign in Bosnia was successful.

ù But as President said last week: renewed attacks on Sarajevo or the other safe areas, or any Serb non-compliance with their other commitments, will trigger a resumption of NATO air strikes.

ù All parties should now turn from the battlefield to the bargaining table and complete a political settlement. The time has come to end the fighting for good and begin the task of reconciliation and reconstruction in the Balkans.

ù If the Bosnian Serbs uphold their commitments, this should give further impetus to our common search for a lasting political settlement to the Balkan conflict, building on the September 8 agreement on "basic principles" and the September 26 "further agreed principles" of a settlement by the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.

ù (If asked) While Bosnian Serb compliance was not conditional on Bosnian Government actions, the Bosnian Government continues to abide by its pledge of two weeks ago that it would refrain from offensive actions in and around Sarajevo.

GoBH/Croatian Offensives in western Bosnia/threats to Banja Luka

ù We understand that offensive actions in western Bosnia have wound down.

ù We believe all parties should exercise restraint and turn their energies to the peace process.

ù We have told the Bosnian and Croatian governments that military moves that risk drawing the Serbs into the conflict are risky and unwise, and could lead to increased civilian suffering.

ù We welcome the statements last week by Croatian and Bosnian leaders that they will not attack Banja Luka..

(If asked whether the Bosnian Offensive Derail U.S. Diplomatic Efforts)

ù We continue to believe that this conflict will not be settled on the battlefield. All parties should redouble their efforts to arrive at an early diplomatic solution. That remains our goal.

Reports of Mass Graves

ù Very concerned by reports of mass graves found by Bosnian Government troops in formerly Serb-held areas of western Bosnia.

ù We fully support an international investigation of these sites.

ù We are committed to seeing the perpetrators brought to justice by the War Crimes Tribunal.

September 8 Geneva Meeting

ù Important progress was made at the September 8 Geneva meeting between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, and Contact Group representatives. Ambassador Holbrooke and EU negotiator Carl Bildt co-chaired the meeting.

-- In specific, the three foreign ministers announced they had agreed to basic principles for further negotiations toward final settlement. The principles are the following:

-- For the first time, all agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition.

-- Consistent with the Contact Group plan, all three agreed that under the terms of a settlement, Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation established under

ast year's Washington
Agreements, and a Bosnian Serb republic.

-- The 51-49 parameter of the Contact Group's territorial proposal will be the
basis
for a
settlement, subject to any adjustments the parties make by mutual agreement.

-- The two entities will have the right to establish relationships with neighboring
states, but these
must be consistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

-- The parties pledged to adhere to human rights standards, to ensure freedom of
mov
ement and
the right of the displaced to return to their homes, and to collaborate on joint eco
nomic projects that will
promote links among all of Bosnia's peoples.

ù As the President said, this was an important milestone on the path to peace.

(If asked whether the new diplomatic effort divides Bosnia)

-- We have not partitioned Bosnia, nor do we intend to.

-- It cannot be emphasized too strongly that according to the Geneva agreements,
Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a single state, retaining its seat in international
organ
izations and its
bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries in the world, including the U.S.

Downed French Pilots

ù As French have indicated Bosnian Serbs may have pilots in their custody. We
hold
President Milosevic
accountable for their safety.

ù We can confirm that U.S. forces participated in three rescue attempts, which we
re
gret were not successful.
Pentagon can provide details.

ù We demand that the Serbs release the pilots immediately and unharmed.

Bosnian Serb Violations of No-Fly Zone?

ù We are concerned by reports of Deny Flight violations by Bosnian Serb aircraft
bas

ed at Banja Luka.

NATO air patrols continue. NATO aircraft are authorized to intercept any violators of the no-fly zone or to respond to Serb air defense installations displaying hostile intent.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

-- We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help in the search for peace.

-- Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.

-- First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosperous future. People of Belfast are finally living a normal life.

U.S. Meetings

-- We have had a number of contacts over the last few weeks about how to move the peace process forward.

-- Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake September 13 for over an hour. The Vice President joined them for part of the meeting.

-- Mr. Lake and the Vice President met September 8 with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

-- The Vice President will be meeting with Irish Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dick Spring this afternoon.

-- We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are

continuing. I am not prepared to go into any detail.

Twin Track

-- We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons.

-- We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

Comment on Paisley Press Conference (said your visit to Northern Ireland is in serious doubt and turned down Lake's invitation to meet.)

-- Not going to comment on Mr. Paisley's statements.

-- There has been no change in President's plans, and he is very much looking forward to the trip.

British Stalling on Talks?

-- As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time the President visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

-- We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to doing all he can to achieve lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

-- On decommissioning of weapons, the President has said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made it clear to Sinn Fein and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

-- The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

-- It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Election of hard-line Unionist David Trimble a setback?

-- Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists over the past year.

Deportations [Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members, some who are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

-- Issue recently brought to our attention.

-- Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

-- We are looking at the issue.

NATO ENLARGEMENT STUDY AND RUSSIA

Reaction to NATO approval of enlargement study?

-- We welcome NATO approval on September 20 of its landmark study on enlarging the Alliance.

-- The study, which sets out the "how" and "why" of enlargement, is being presented today

(September 28) in Brussels to members of the Partnership for Peace (composed of CEE and NIS countries, including Russia).

- Individual presentations will also be made to members who request them. NATO will assess the presentations and decide on next steps at its December 5 ministerial meeting in Brussels.
- The study was commissioned by NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in December 1994.
- The study is part of a gradual, deliberate process leading to the enlargement of the Alliance.
- Our goal is to extend the security and stability represented by NATO into the new democracies that have arisen in Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War.
- By integrating them into NATO we hope to ensure the survival of their democratic and market economic reforms.
- No decisions have yet been taken on whom to invite. Nor is there any timetable for when this will occur. Enlargement will only occur when NATO is satisfied that prospective members can contribute to the overall security of the Alliance.
- The "how" part of the study sets out a number of steps that interested potential members must take in order to be considered for membership. These include political and military steps that contribute to the democratic goals and overall security of the Alliance.
- We should stress that no Partnership for Peace members are a priori excluded from the possibility of becoming NATO members.

The Russian Angle: Evans-Novak Call for Immediate Enlargement

- In addition to enlargement, NATO is also pursuing establishment of a parallel relationship with

Russia. This is being done in recognition of the important role Russia has to play in European security.

-- We understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We are working to overcome these concerns, which we believe are misplaced.

-- NATO enlargement is not aimed at Russia. NATO is a purely defensive organization. Our goal is to extend stability to areas of historic instability to ensure their future security.

-- Our purpose is to end the division of Europe, not to create new divisions.

-- At the same time, we have made clear to Moscow that enlargement will proceed in a gradual and transparent manner.

-- We strongly disagree with those who believe NATO should enlarge immediately just because Russia has concerns about enlargement.

-- Enlargement must be a deliberate process that takes into account our interests as well as those of our European partners and Allies.

RUSSIA

Current Items

Yeltsin Phone Call

-- President spoke to Yeltsin for about 20 minutes on September 27. Focussed on European issues, particularly the Balkans and importance of continued U.S.-Russian cooperation in promoting peaceful settlement there.

-- Both Presidents looking forward to their upcoming meeting in New York.

Russians Fire on, Seize Japanese Fishing Boats

-- Regret this incident. As have said in past, such disputes should be resolved peacefully, without resort to use of force.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to

develop
 NATO-Russia
 relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust
 NATO-
 Russia
 relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and
 Pr
 ime Minister
 Chernomyrdin have begun serious dialogue that will continue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear
 cooperation
 with Iran,
 given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Iranian Oil Swaps

-- As part of our policy of supporting independence and stability of Caucasus and
 Ce
 ntral Asia
 states, USG willing to consider allowing American companies to swap Caspian
 oil with
 Iran in
 short-term while alternative reliable export pipelines are developed.

-- Bottlenecks in Russian pipeline system severely limit ability of Kazakhstan,
 Turk
 menistan and

Azerbaijan to export oil and gas. Actively encouraging U.S. companies in region
 to d
 evelop alternative
 non-Iranian options for oil export.

Chevron Swap Deal with Iran

-- Chevron has not yet presented license application. We will review all
 applicatio
 ns on
 case-by-case basis.

Fred Cuny

-- Engaged Yeltsin, Russian officials to secure cooperation on Cuny case. Doing
 all
 we can to

find out what happened. No confirmed reports on fate of Cuny or the Russians
travel
ing with him.

-- Sympathize with Cuny family's deep sense of frustration. Share Cuny family's
com
mitment to
thorough and honest investigation.

Chechnya

-- Clashes continue, as do Russian-Chechen talks. Implementation of military
agreem
ent signed
by Russians and Chechens on July 30 proceeding slowly; complex and hits
frequent sna
gs. Situation
changing daily.

-- Dispute can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides quickly to
res
olve these
issues and move toward political agreement.

EGYPTIAN POW KILLINGS

Q: Do you have any comment on the reports that two mass graves have been
found in th
e Sinai
which contain the bodies of Egyptian POW's allegedly killed by Israeli troops?

A: This matter is now under discussion between the Egyptian and Israeli
governments.
I would
refer you to them for anything further on this matter.

(NOTE TO BRIEFER: Avoid any discussion of substantive "facts" regarding
Egyptian
discovery of graves.)

IRAN SANCTIONS: D'AMATO BILL

Background: The amendment in current form has mandatory and discretionary
sanctions
against foreign

companies that export oil and natural gas equipment and technology to Iran.
 Mandato
 ry sanctions prohibit
 awarding U.S. Government contracts, granting licenses, and admitting senior
 officer
 s of such companies into the
 U S. Discretionary sanctions include an import prohibition, a merger and
 acquisitio
 n prohibition, and a prohibition
 from receiving EXIM bank financing or commercial bank loans.

Points

- Believe the D'Amato proposal tackles important issues, but it has not yet been
 fo
 rmally
 introduced.
- We will look at it seriously.
- We look forward to further consultations on this issue with the Congress.
- Policy regarding Iran:
 - The President's May 6 embargo seeks to change Iranian behavior, including
 their
 attempts to
 acquire weapons of mass destruction, their support of terrorism, their attempts to
 o
 bstruct the Middle
 East Peace Process, and the mistreatment of their minority populations.
 - Without getting into details, I would simply say that the impact of the embargo
 on Iran has
 exceeded our expectations.
 - We are confident this policy is working and that the message is clear to our fr
 iends and
 certainly to the Iranians: until Iran chooses to change their behavior we will do w
 hat we can to force
 them to do so.
 - We need to determine whether Senator D'Amato's proposal would increase the
 long
 -term
 effectiveness of this policy or be counter-productive.

ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT

Background on Agreement

Israel and the Palestinians will sign the Interim Agreement provided for in the September 13, 1993 Declaration of Principles, on Thursday, September 18, at the White House. The Interim Agreement extends Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank, will result in the phased elimination of the Israeli Civil Administration and military occupation, and provides for elections to a Palestinian Council. Implementation will be in phases extending into early 1997.

Israel will initially turn over about 30 percent of the West Bank to full Palestinian control "Zone A" and to divided control "Zone B". Remaining territory will be under exclusive Israeli control "Zone C". The ultimate disposition of settlements and IDF facilities in Zone C will be resolved in the final status discussions in May 1996.

Points

- We believe the Agreement is a major step forward toward a lasting peace for Israelis and Palestinians alike and has our full support.
- The negotiators and their leaders have prevailed over the enemies of peace. This is a good omen for good steps in the future.
- U.S. played a key role throughout process which led to Sunday's agreement.
- In closing days and hours of the negotiations, we engaged in around the clock "diplomacy by telephone" to assist and encourage resolution of final outstanding issues.
- I was in constant contact with my peace team throughout this process and spoke with Rabin, Arafat, Hussein, Mubarak and Hassan on Sunday to review the significance of the Agreement and discuss plans for the White House signing and meetings.

KASHMIR

Background: The situation remains unclear and extremely fluid. Contact between the Al-Faran group holding four Western hostages (one American, one German and two Britons) and the Indian authorities has broken off and the crisis is not likely to come to a rapid conclusion.

Points

-- We continue to work closely with the Indian authorities and hope for the speedy and safe release of the hostages.

-- We urge all involved to work cooperatively to secure the release of these innocent men.

CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) REVIEW CONFERENCE (LANDMINES/LASERS)

-- Primary U.S. objective at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Review Conference, which opened yesterday and lasts until October 13, will be to strengthen the CCW's restrictions on the use of landmines. We are gravely concerned with humanitarian tragedy caused by the indiscriminate use of these weapons. As the President said in his speech to the UN General Assembly last September, the United States is committed to the eventual elimination of all anti-personnel landmines.

-- Signed in 1980, the President obtained Senate advice and consent to CCW ratification in March of this year after it had languished in the Senate during the last two administrations.

ns.

-- The U.S. has advanced the principal proposals to improve the CCW "landmines" protocol that will be considered at the Review Conference. These include, for example:

- requiring that all remotely delivered mines (those delivered by aircraft, rocket or artillery) used outside of marked and monitored minefields self-destruct after a relatively short period, so that they will not remain a threat to civilians after a conflict ends;

- requiring that all mines be detectable using commonly-available technology, to facilitate their clearing;

- expanding the scope of the "landmines" protocol to apply in internal armed conflicts, where the greatest civilian casualties have occurred; and

- requiring that the party laying the mines assume responsibility for clearing them, including a duty at the "cessation of active hostilities" to clear them or maintain them in controlled fields to protect civilians. Where the party laying the mines no longer controls the territory in which they were laid, it would have a duty to provide assistance for their clearance, to the extent possible.

-- (If asked) The U.S. will also be prepared to support a protocol prohibiting the use of so-called "blinding" lasers, provided it protects certain military requirements for the legitimate use of lasers on the battlefield, such as targeting and range-finding.

-- (If asked about the Leahy moratorium amendment adopted by the Senate) That amendment is currently being considered by the conferees on the FY 1996 defense authorization bill, and we remain hopeful that they will be able to reconcile the goals of this provision with the military-operational concerns General Shalikashvili has expressed so forcefully to the conference.

-- Ambassador Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor to the Department

of State,
will lead our delegation.

EXPORT CONTROL REFORM: COMPUTERS

Q: Is the Administration planning to loosen export controls so that high-powered computers could help our foes build nuclear and other high-tech weapons?

A: We are now reviewing the appropriate levels for export controls on computers. Our review will take all factors into account -- including our strong commitment to nonproliferation -- in seeking to establish a level that advances U.S. interests from a military and economic standpoint.

When we last revised U.S. computer thresholds, two years ago, we said we would need to revisit those levels within about two years. That is what we have been doing.

CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT ON DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL

BACKGROUND

On September 22, the House and Senate reached agreement on a \$243 billion defense budget for next year which is \$6.7 billion more than requested by the Administration.

POINTS

-- \$243 billion includes additional B-2 Stealth bombers, an unwarranted increase in national missile defense funding as well as accelerated procurement of warships, aircraft and weapons systems.

-- Committed to maintaining best trained, best equipped, most ready armed forces

in
the world.

-- My budget protects readiness and ensures we are prepared to defend American interests.

-- Although the conferees did remove objectionable policy provisions and other unacceptable restrictions on my prerogatives as Commander in Chief and they did fund several important programs of priority interest to this Administration (e.g., Nunn-Lugar and TRP), I am very concerned by the inclusion of almost \$7 billion for procurement and R&D spending we did not request.

-- I will, therefore, not sign this bill in the absence of a broader agreement with Congress that provides adequate funding for crucial domestic programs that are underfunded in other appropriations bills.

PEACEKEEPING

Background:

At the UN yesterday (September 26), Canada formally tabled a major study on improving the UN's rapid reaction capability for peacekeeping. The Washington Times carried an article on the Canadian study reporting its major findings and focusing on Canadian proposal to enhance "standby arrangements," whereby UN member states what kinds of peacekeeping capabilities they have available for possible deployment.

Q. What is the USG position on the Canadian recommendation for enhanced UN rapid reaction capabilities?

A. We strongly support the concept of strengthening UN rapid response capabilities and we welcome the Canadian study as an important contribution to this effort. We agree with many of the study's recommendations. We will be working with Canada and other concerned states to implement many of these recommendations as quickly as possible.

Q. Does the USG support the proposal to enhance "standby arrangements" for peacekeeping?

We oppose the creation of a UN standby army. However, we support the idea that UN member states tell the UN what forces might be available for peacekeeping. Decisions to participate in UN operations will be made on a case-by-case basis. These decisions will reflect the guidelines adopted last year as part of the President's new policy on the reform of multilateral peace operations.