Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Mary Peters to Alexander Vershbow, re: POTUS trip to UK and Ireland (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)
002. email	Mary Peters to Alexander Vershbow, re: UK Ireland Trip (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)
003. email	Mary Peters to Jane Baker, et al., re: Trip (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Records (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:
[07/05/1995 - 07/31/1995]

2016-0158-F
ke5218

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

MSMail

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
By NARA, Date 04/29/19
2017-0159-F

DATE-TIME 05 July 95 13:36

FROM Hawkins, Ardenia R.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT notional schedule for Ireland ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO Peters, Mary A.

CARBON_COPY Darby, Melanie B.

TEXT_BODY

Hi Mary Ann,

Nancy would like for you to keep this notional schedule under wraps for the time being or further guidance.

[[IRESCHE.DOC : 3412 in IRESCHE.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 5 July 95 13:30

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME IRESCHE.DOC

NOTIONAL ITINERARY FOR TRIP TO IRELAND/UK

Wednesday, November 29

Morning flight from Washington to London

Events:
Dinner with the Queen at Buckingham Palace

Thursday, November 30

Events:
Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street
Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair
Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community
Tour/down time in London or:
possible speech
Meal with queen at Buckingham Palace (if do not fly during day on 29th)

Friday, December 1

Morning flight from London to Belfast/Derry
Tour Belfast/meet with residents
Reception with Political leaders
Possible visit to Cassidy Family Home (in Northern Ireland)
Late afternoon travel to Dublin

Events:
Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton
Meeting/meal with Irish President Mary Robinson

Saturday, December 2

Morning meetings with political leaders/opposition
Speech to Parliament
Possible golf depending on weather
Evening flight or Sunday morning flight from Dublin to Washington

MSMail

DATE-TIME	05 July 95 14:13
FROM	Hawkins, Ardenia R.
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT	FW: Press Release for POTUS trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO	Millison, Cathy L.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	

per Nancy's request for 10 Downing Street

From: Maxfield, Nancy H.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Press Release for POTUS trip[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 05, 1995 10:49 AM

[[NITRIPPR.DOC : 3651 in NITRIPPR.DOC]]

NOTE FROM MARY ANN PETERS:

Attached is the draft press statement. If the dates are firm I will clear with the British and Irish embassies.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE	5 July 95 13:3
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME	NITRIPPR.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

PRESIDENT CLINTON TO VISIT UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND

The President is pleased to accept the invitations of the British and Irish governments to visit the United Kingdom and Ireland November 29-December 2. The schedule will include meetings in London with Prime Minister Major and in Dublin with Prime Minister Bruton, as well as a visit to Northern Ireland. The goals of the trip

include strengthening the transatlantic partnership in which the United Kingdom plays such a special role, nurturing our close ties of friendship and culture with Ireland, and underscoring the President's support for the joint efforts of the Irish and British governments and the people of Northern Ireland to further the process of peace in the region.

# # #

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME	05 July 95 17:22
FROM	Hawkins, Ardenia R.
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT	FW: Press Release for POTUS trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO	Peters, Mary A.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	

Mary Ann, I have made minor edits (per NES) to your version sent earlier in the day.

From: Maxfield, Nancy H.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Press Release for POTUS trip[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 05, 1995 10:49 AM

[[NITRIPPR.DOC : 4427 in NITRIPPR.DOC]]

NOTE FROM MARY ANN PETERS:

Attached is the draft press statement. If the dates are firm I will clear with the British and Irish embassies.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE	5 July 95 13:3
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME	NITRIPPR.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

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# # #

MSMail

DATE-TIME 05 July 95 17:37

FROM Hawkins, Ardenia R.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Ireland/UK Press Statement [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Peters, Mary A.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

please disregard my earlier note, this is the latest version. Andrew had edits of his own to include. This has not been cleared with Nancy yet.

From: Millison, Cathy L.
To: @CROSS - Cross Hatches
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Ireland/UK Press Statement [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 05, 1995 05:30 PM

[[UKIRETRI.DOC : 4366 in UKIRETRI.DOC]]

Attached is the most recent version of the Ireland/UK Press Statement. It's filed on the G Drive as UKIRETRIP.DOC. This includes changes by both Andrew
and Nancy but still needs to go back to Nancy for final approval.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 5 July 95 17:23

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME UKIRETRI.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

PRESIDENT CLINTON TO VISIT UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND

The President is pleased to accept the invitations of the British

and Irish governments to visit the United Kingdom and Ireland November 29-December 2. The schedule will include in the United Kingdom meetings in London with Prime Minister Major and a visit to Northern Ireland; and meetings with Prime Minister Bruton in Dublin. The goals of the trip include strengthening the transatlantic partnership in which the United Kingdom plays such a special role, nurturing our close ties of friendship and culture with Ireland, and underscoring the President's support for the joint efforts of the Irish and British governments and the people of Northern Ireland to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement.

# # #

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME	06 July 95 08:13
FROM	Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT	UK/IRELAND TRIP PRESS STATEMENT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO	Fetig, James L. Mitchell, Calvin A. Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY	Baker, Jane E. Darby, Melanie B. Dohse, Fred J. Drew, Samuel N. Gardner, Anthony Gray, Wendy Harmon, Joyce A. Hawkins, Ardenia R. Hilliard, Brenda I. Joshi, M. Kay Marshall, Betty A. Maxfield, Nancy H. Millison, Cathy L. Peters, Mary A. Schmidt, John R. Sens, Andrew D. Stephens, Kathleen D. Vershbow, Alexander R.

TEXT_BODY

Per Andrew Sens, attached is the fully cleared statement on the President's trip to UK and Ireland. It's ready for release this morning.

[[UKIRETRI.DOC : 2139 in UKIRETRI.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE	5 July 95 18:17
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME	UKIRETRI.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

PRESIDENT CLINTON TO VISIT UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND

The President is pleased to accept the invitations of the British and Irish governments to visit the United Kingdom and Ireland, November 29-December 2. In the UK, the schedule will include meetings in London with Prime Minister Major and a visit to Northern Ireland; and in Ireland a meeting with Prime Minister Bruton. The goals of the trip include strengthening the transatlantic partnership in which the United Kingdom plays such a special role, nurturing our close ties of friendship and culture with Ireland, and underscoring the President's support for the joint efforts of the Irish and British governments and the people of Northern Ireland to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement.

# # #

MSMail

DATE-TIME 07 July 95 16:09

FROM Sestak, Joseph A.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Announcement of Trip to UK and Ireland [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Bob,
Navy is ready to have POTUS name DDG-80 after Winston Churchill during the trip. vr, Joe

---

From: Wozniak, Natalie S.
To: @NSC - NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Announcement of Trip to UK and Ireland [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, July 07, 1995 03:53 PM

[[UKTRIP.DOC : 4184 in UKTRIP.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 7 July 95 15:49

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME UKTRIP.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 6, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton to Visit the
United Kingdom and Ireland

The President is pleased to accept the invitations of the British and Irish governments to visit the United Kingdom and

Ireland, November 29-December 2. In the UK, the schedule will include meetings in London with Prime Minister Major and a visit to Northern Ireland; and in Ireland a meeting with Prime Minister Bruton. The goals of the trip include strengthening the transatlantic partnership in which the United Kingdom plays such a special role, nurturing our close ties of friendship and culture with Ireland, and underscoring the President's support for the joint efforts of the Irish and British governments and the people of Northern Ireland to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement.

# # #

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 11 July 95 11:40

FROM Peters, Mary A.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Subject: RE: POTUS UK & Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Dohse, Fred J.
Gray, Wendy
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
Vershbow, Alexander R.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Fred, these ideas are in addition to those included in the notional itinerary Nancy S prepared on July 5.
I will have additional suggestions for you by the end of the week.

BELFAST/NI

--. Just about every university in Ireland has offered to confer an honorary degree on the President. It would be impossible for him to choose just one to accept.. Happily, there is an organization to which all the Irish universities (north and south) belong. The current president of that organization is from the University of Ulster. One idea would be for the President to accept a joint honorary degree from the all-Ireland university conference, at the University of Ulster campus in Belfast. This has the virtue of showcasing a cross -border institution that is already working,while the fact that the event would take place at the University of Ulster should make it acceptable to the unionists.

--A possible visit to the women's center in the heart of Protestant Belfast that is run by a Catholic woman, as well as an analagous visit to a social center in the Catholic area that has a Protestant connection (still to be identified, but there are several).

--IF the Genealogical Office can trace the President's Hayes forebears to the border area of Northern Ireland , a visit to the ancestral village.. In that case, possible meeting with SDLP leader John Hume there (near Hume's home of Derry) rather than in Belfast.

--Possible visit to an International Fund for Ireland(IFI) project,

especially if the Technology Trust Fund is off the ground..

LONDON

--Announce that the USN is naming a ship after Winston Churchill (per Amb Crowe's suggestion) if Navy hasagreed. _____
From: Dohse, Fred J.
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: POTUS UK & Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, July 11, 1995 10:48 AM

We have set up the initial trip (site survey) to the UK and Ireland by the White House scheduling and advance staff for September 6-10. I will represent the NSC. A more precise schedule for the site survey visit is provided below. I would greatly appreciate your input on activities we might consider for the President's schedule during his trip later in the fall.

Sep 6-7: London

Sep 8: Belfast

Sep 9-10: Dublin

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME	11 July 95 11:40
FROM	Peters, Mary A.
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT	Subject: RE: POTUS UK & Ireland Trip [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO	Baker, Jane E. Darby, Melanie B. Dohse, Fred J. Gray, Wendy Hawkins, Ardenia R. Joshi, M. Kay Millison, Cathy L. Vershbow, Alexander R.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

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Sep 9-10: Dublin

MSMail

DATE-TIME 12 July 95 11:41

FROM Sens, Andrew D.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Subject: RE: US-EU Summit [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO
Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Dohse, Fred J.
Gardner, Anthony
Gray, Wendy
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.

CARBON_COPY Vershbow, Alexander R.

TEXT_BODY

Tony G. TL has your excellent and persuasive memo; he will discuss with Christopher and Panetta. In the fullness of time, they! will reveal their decision. FYI -- Nov 26 is absolutely out for it would take the President away during Thanksgiving weekend which he can't do.

From: Gardner, Anthony
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
CC: /R, Record at A1; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: US-EU Summit [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 12, 1995 11:09 AM

andy, any news on US-EU summit dates? if summit following uk/ireland trip impossible, is it still possible to hold it on the way over to uk/ireland? thing to keep in mind is that on november 27-28 there is scheduled an EU ministerial in Barcelona on the Mediterranean. having summit on one of those two days would pose serious difficulties, but I gather from contacts at the delegation of the EU that november 26 might be a possibility from their point of view.

MSMail

DATE-TIME 12 July 95 11:41

FROM Sens, Andrew D.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Subject: RE: US-EU Summit [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO
Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Dohse, Fred J.
Gardner, Anthony
Gray, Wendy
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.

CARBON_COPY Vershbow, Alexander R.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME	13 July 95 11:47
FROM	Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT	NEED URGENT CLEARANCE: July 13 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO	Baker, Jane E. Darby, Melanie B. Gray, Wendy Hawkins, Ardenia R. Hilliard, Brenda I. Joshi, M. Kay Millison, Cathy L.
CARBON_COPY	Fetig, James L. Mitchell, Calvin A. Wozniak, Natalie S.
TEXT_BODY	PLEASE PASS TO NANCY SODERBERG FOR URGENT CLEARANCE: [[JUL13GUI.DOC : 2858 in JUL13GUI.DOC]]
ATTACHMENT FILE DATE	13 July 95 11:43
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME	JUL13GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 13, 1995

Bosnia

Cuban-American Flotilla

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Peace Process in Northern Ireland

BRAC

China

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA

U.S. National Interests at Stake: Our interests are engaged at several levels:

-- Preventing the spread of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia beyond its current
bounds and
precluding the direct involvement of outside powers in support of regional clients.

-- Limiting the humanitarian disaster by supporting efforts, such as UNPROFOR, to cu
rtail the
level of violence and assist in humanitarian relief operations.

-- In the longer term, developing and sustaining collective mechanisms for dealing w
ith post-Cold
War disputes to reduce additional and more costly requirements for the United States
to intervene
unilaterally.

U.S. Objectives:
-- contain conflict, promote political solution;

-- help preserve Bosnia as multi-ethnic state within its internationally recognized borders;

-- relieve human suffering.

-- keep faith with our NATO allies; and

-- send a signal that ethnic cleansing and military aggression do not constitute an acceptable model
for the resolution of ethnic and territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era.

Implementation: Over past two and a half years, we have:
-- led NATO military responses to UN calls for assistance in protecting its forces a

nd the safe
areas;
-- brokered agreement ending war between Muslims and Croats and establishing bicommu
nal
Federation;
-- led Contact Group efforts toward negotiated settlement;
-- deployed peacekeeping troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to cont
ain spread
of conflict;
-- helped keep the war out of the skies over Bosnia; and
-- conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history.

Results to Date:
-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)
;
-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne
relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;
-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);
-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war
out of the
air over Bosnia for two and a half years;
-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bo
snia's
Muslims and Croats; and
-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in
Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the

conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better altern atives
that don't depend on wishful thinking.

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged appr
oach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political i ndependence and

territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its et hnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tighteni
ng his
cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosn
ia,
promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospect
s for an
overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out
war that
would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflic
t, and effectively end
the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providin g our
own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably
through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on th
e
ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequ
ate plan
and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NAT

O to deter a
repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon
our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate th e military
standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other pa rties to the conflict
in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Q & A: Hot Issues

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR ef
forts that have proven
ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-
armed
and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations person
nel. It will be used
to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to car
ry out its existing
mandate.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for
UNPROFOR.

-- It is our understanding that the French and British will seek maximum authority f
or the
commanders on the ground.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling

its mandate, the
RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troop
s to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress,
we would be
prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely i ntelligence
data;

-- provide equipment such as helicopters, radar, communications gear and night-visio
n
equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- and provide strategic lift to help bring allies' heavy equipment to the theater.

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR
, whose
presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve cond
itions for political
settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does no
t seem to be any
Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troop
s to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a vo
luntary fund
as the primary means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and
services
to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial requirements are primarily in the area of air and sea lift
to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British plan to move their initial forces wit hin the
next week, and we intend to provide the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately
$15 million in
lift services and equipment will be used to support this initial requirement.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enh
ancement
through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser targ
et
designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to a
ircraft and
helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence

support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. T
his support

would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 4,500 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ce
ilings
previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will repres
ent about $35
million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- This week we have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Sec
tion
506(a)(1) emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to $50 million of
DOD goods and
services (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide $15 mill
ion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of $12 million of transportation support to
the allies. The
Administration is also preparing a Section 614 waiver (of the FAA) that permits the
transfer of equipment
to our allies, waiving 505(c) restrictions in the FAA. This initial provision of equipment will be worth
about $3 million.

-- Next week, the Administration will conduct formal consultations with the Congress
for the
provision of up to an additional $35 million of goods and services -- again under 5
06a authorities and
primarily for transportation services and equipment.

Q: What Is Your Reaction To Akashi's Letter To Bosnian Serbs:

-- UN Special Representative Akashi's letter to Karadjic draws on the discussions co
ncerning the
RRF that have taken place in New York.

-- It is our understanding that Akashi's intent was to correct any misinformation th
at might have

caused the Bosnian Serbs to react violently in an effort to block the deployment of
the RRF to Bosnia.

-- Akashi stresses that the RRF will not take sides with any party to the conflict, and that the
addition of the RRF does not change the mission of UNPROFOR.

-- This corresponds with our understanding: the RRF is designed to protect UNPROFOR
in the
conduct of its existing mandate, not change the mandate. We hope it will do so as e
ffectively as possible.

Q: Is there a deal cut to abandon use of force by UNPROFOR in order to get the last
hostages released?

-- Our demands were steadfast throughout the period in which the UN personnel were d
etained:
unconditional release of all personnel.

-- UN authorities have assured us there was no deal. However, UNPROFOR must be able
to
withstand the possible consequences. We believe the RRF, once in place, should help
in this regard.

-- All of the options that were available prior to the events of the past several we eks remain
available, with the additional factor of the RRF.

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusi
on zones been rendered null
and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the
UN
commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and
political situation.

Q: What is your reaction to the decision by the German government to provide forces
to support the UN effort in
Bosnia?

-- I understand that Germany's Cabinet today has approved (Monday) the deployment of
German

Tornado jet fighters to Bosnia, to join NATO and UN forces already there, pending le
gislative approval.

-- This is a momentous decision for the German government, and I join with the membe
rs of the
UN and our NATO allies in welcoming it.

Q: What about the renewed fighting around Sarajevo?

-- I deplore the continued shelling of innocent civilians. I understand that five c hildren were
among those who died in the renewed round of fighting in Sarajevo.

-- It is tragedies like this that continue to highlight the fact that this conflict cannot be resolved on
the battlefield.

-- This is why we continue to call for an end to the fighting, and for the Bosnian S erbs to join the
other parties who have already accepted the Contact Group plan as the basis for a ne
gotiated settlement,
rather than a continued and futile resort to violence.

Q: How do you respond to the Bosnian claims that the latest round of No Fly Zone vi
olations indicates that the UN
has capitulated on enforcement through Deny Flight?

-- We will continue to support Deny Flight in its mission of keeping the war out of
the air over
Bosnia.

-- NATO radar detected two planes violating the no-fly zone near Banja Luka airfield

-- Deny Flight F-18s were vectored to intercept, but the Bosnian Serb aircraft rever
sed course and
returned to their base.

-- The NATO F-18s would have been authorized to engage the violators without resort
to a dual
key had the aircraft not terminated their violation.

-- (If asked: we have no evidence to support claims that Bosnian Serb planes attack
ed Bosnian
positions around Visoko.)

Q: What about Bosnian government forces detaining UNPROFOR units?

-- In the course of their current military campaign around Sarajevo, Bosnian forces
have restricted
the movement of UNPROFOR units in the vicinity of areas of combat. Their explanatio
n is that these
restrictions are to keep UNPROFOR units from becoming involved in the fighting.

-- While some of the mines deployed in the vicinity of the Canadian unit at Visoko a
re being
removed, Bosnian government forces have not yet completely unblocked the base. They
have assured
UN representatives that they are in the process of completing restoration of access
to the base, and that
they will allow convoys to enter and depart.

-- We have called repeatedly on all parties not to hinder the UN forces in carrying

out their
mandate, and have reiterated these views to the Bosnian government.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Q: How can we continue to support UNPROFOR when it won't even man the weapons colle
ction points around
Sarajevo?

-- Original Weapons Exclusion Zone concept to withdraw all weapons from the

zone. Co
llection
points were a fallback since neither side could withdraw weapons prior to the deadli
ne.

-- UNPROFOR was never manned, equipped or mandated to successfully defend the collec
tion
points from attack if the parties made a determined effort to take back their weapon
s.

-- Part of reconfiguring UNPROFOR to enable it to accomplish its primary humanitaria
n mandate
involves prioritizing its missions.

-- In light of repeated abuse of the weapons collection points and the vulnerability of UN personnel
assigned to them, the UN has determined it will no longer place its monitors at risk
for a mission they
cannot accomplish.

-- This does not mean that UNPROFOR will abandon the Safe Areas, or that other UNPRO
FOR
efforts to end the fighting around the safe areas and allow passage of humanitarian
aid convoys should
end.

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the co
nflict or to join UNPROFOR
in Bosnia.

But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if
units need to be extracted
in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, tempora
ry operations:
1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the

parties,
to use U.S. troops as
part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying o
ut in good faith.
2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of m
ilitary plans, we
would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.
3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNP
ROFOR have formidable
capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extr
action of units
whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.
UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, re
duce chances
for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acqui
re arms
and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Be
lgrade resumes all-out
support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is be
tter to work to
strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demons
trated that it is totally
ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending

the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizatio
ns are

feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and
others affected by
the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved a
nd
violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation,
which
has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation
is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alter
natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would
surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Ame
ricanizes war
and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and
American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely
i
f the international
presence remains.

CUBAN-AMERICAN FLOTILLA

Background: Cuban-American groups are planning to hold a sea- and airborne demonstr
ation today off the coast
of Cuba. They have conducted these anti-Castro "flotillas" in the past, but they're turning up the volume this year
because today is the first anniversary of the sinking of the tugboat "13 de Marzo,"

in which some 40 people died.
The organizers say that 50-100 boats and several aircraft will participate. Most of participants will stay in
international waters and airspace, but at least one boat -- the "Democracia" -- and one or two aircraft are
planning to enter Cuban territorial waters and airspace.

The USG has urged both the flotilla planners and the GOC to remain cool-headed. Sta
te Department has called the
flotilla organizers and told them that, although their activity as stated does not a ppear to violate US law, the USG
cannot protect them from prosecution and imprisonment in Cuba if they violate Cuban
law. The US Interests
Section in Havana has demarched the Cuban government, urging it to avoid overreactin
g to the flotilla. Such
appeals for calm have helped in years past but the chance of an ugly incident remain
s.

(If Asked)

Q: Do you have any comment on the Cuban-American "flotilla" planning to sail toward
Cuba
today? Since at least one boat plans to enter Cuban territorial waters, could an ug ly incident develop?

Points

-- As we have prior to past flotillas, we urge both the organizers and the Cuban gov
ernment to act
with restraint.

-- The State Department, Justice Department, and U.S. Coast Guard can provide you ad

ditional
information on this.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

[Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations app
ropriations bill last
evening passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provision
s. Your advisors have not
yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropr
iating considerably less than
we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would re
inforce the Mexico City
family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia
and Mexico. It also contains
other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.]

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations a
ppropriations
bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, g
iving the Administration
flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is pa
rticularly important
because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are too meet our int
ernational
commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. T
hese include
the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and
other
amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many prog

rams. These
reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the
committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the W
orld Bank and for
Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision
about what to
do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Aut
horization
bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the Pres
ident's ability to
conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies;
and deep funding
cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and
the Foreign
Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto
the State
Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendat
ion for the Foreign
Assistance Act.)

NORTHERN IRELAND

Question: What is the U.S. doing to keep the peace process in Northern Ireland

on t
rack? Are we talking to the
British and Irish about it?

-- The U.S. strongly supports the efforts of the peoples of Northern Ireland and the
Irish and
British governments to end the violence in Northern Ireland and find a just and last
ing settlement.

-- We have urged all sides to engage seriously in negotiations and to address issues
constructively
and seriously.

(If asked about decommissioning:)

-- As the President has said, we urge Sinn Fein to engage in serious discussions abo
ut
decommissioning.

(If asked about preconditions:)

-- As the President has said, the best guarantee of a permanent peace is for all the parties to sit
down together to discuss the future as well as their differences. Thus, we hope tha t the Irish and British
governments will quickly find a way to resolve any obstacles to the commencement of
all-party talks.

(If asked about prisoners, Clegg)

-- We would support any measures by the British Government aimed at helping the pro
cess of
healing and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

-- We have no comment on the release of Private Clegg.

Question: Will the recurring violence in Northern Ireland affect the President's pl anned trip there in early
December?

-- The historic cease-fires of the IRA and the loyalist paramilitaries remain in eff ect and the
climate in Northern Ireland is very different than it was just a year ago. The Pres ident looks forward to

visiting a peaceful Northern Ireland whose people are actively engaged in seeking a solution to their differences.

-- We understand the disturbances have calmed down that occurred in the wake of the early release of a British soldier from prison. We are pleased that the Protestant parades marking the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne appear to have passed without major incident.

MILITARY BASE CLOSURE

Background: During its voting on DoD's recommendations for military base closures and realignment, the BRAC Commission made controversial 6-2 votes (counter to DoD and Air Force recommendations) to close two of five Air Logistics Centers at McClellan AFB (near Sacramento) and Kelly AFB (near San Antonio). Up to 12,000 jobs would be affected at McClellan and 13,000 at Kelly (some of these jobs would move to the remaining three ALCs in Utah, Georgia and Oklahoma). The Commission made other changes in the Department's recommendations; for example, opting to keep open five major bases the Department had recommended be closed.

The Commission submitted its report to the President on July 1. The President has until July 15 to return the entire list to the Commission with specific rationale for the changes or forward it in its entirety to Congress. If the President returns the list to the Commission, it has until August 15 to reconsider, change or resubmit the original list. The President then has 15 days to accept or reject the entire list. Unless both houses of Congress approve a joint resolution defeating the list as a whole within 45 legislative days it becomes law.

Points

-- We are of course concerned with the decision taken by the Base Closure Commission
to make
major changes in the detailed recommendations for base closure prepared by the Depar
tment of Defense.
That list involved careful, detailed preparation over an 18 month period and reflect
s the input of and was
endorsed by our senior military leaders. The Commission report substantially deviat
es from this careful
proposal.

-- We can assure you that the President is carefully reviewing the Commission's recommendations. By law, he has until July 15 to make his decision.

CHINA

Q: What is the current status of the Harry Wu case?

-- National Security Adviser Lake met yesterday with Mrs. Wu (Ching-lee Chen) to con
vey the
President's personal concern for Harry Wu's well-being and to assure her that the Ad
ministration's
unwavering position is that Wu should be released immediately.

-- Until his release is secured, we will make every effort to ensure he is properly treated.

-- While the consular convention only requires consular visits on a monthly basis, w
e have
requested more frequent access from the Chinese authorities.

-- The President will be meeting with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger this
afternoon.
Dr. Kissinger recently returned from a trip to China, where he discussed overall U.S
.-China relations, as
well as the Harry Wu situation, with a variety of senior Chinese leaders.

Q: What are you doing to get him out?

-- We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chines
e
government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercus sions go well beyond the
legal case itself.

-- We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case
is of great
importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is complet
ed?

-- We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He
should be
released immediately.

Q: What impact is this case having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the sta
te of the relationship?

-- The Harry Wu case is receiving our full attention and is a high-priority issue. We have made
clear that it will be high on the agenda as long as he remains imprisoned.

-- Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. It is
not, however, broken, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term impo
rtance of good
relations between the United States and China remains intact.

-- We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range
of our bilateral
interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

-- We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engage
d on issues
of mutual interest.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that you renounce statem

ents by House
Speaker Gingrich on China and Taiwan?

-- We have made clear that the Speaker does not speak for the Administration on this
particular
issue.

-- We have reiterated time and again that we will maintain a "one China" policy, whi
ch precludes
any support for independence of Taiwan.

-- We cannot dictate or referee political realities in the Taiwan Straits. Those re alities require
Taiwan and China to work out their differences, as has been happening quietly and ef
fectively over the
last couple years. We urge that process be continued.

Q: In retrospect, was the decision to allow a Lee visit a mistake?

-- The President's decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was app
ropriate and
fully consistent with American values and opinion.

-- We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it con
stitute a

change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will he be allowed to visit again?

-- We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case
basis. There
is no request pending at the moment.

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announc
ed where reruns would be
taking place. The results point to an overwhelming Lavalas victory, and the reruns w

ill be far more limited than
had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are still scheduled for July 22, though it is unlikely this will
be sufficient time.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Cou
ncil's announcement. A number
of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the ele
ctions. Amb. Swing is
attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that
justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the el
ections was not
significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians were able to vote p eacefully,
without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's
history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a
repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be
remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, wi
ll require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of
an attempt to
subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especia
lly in one of the
poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral proc
ess and might
not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mista
ke. The parties, the

electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards stren
gthening Haiti's
democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing fo
r upcoming
elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicl y and privately,
that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitutio n, limiting the President
to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on tr ack, which calls
for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President i n February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform
there. It
matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, central ly planned or
market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protract
ed.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear c
hange.
Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over
50% of

Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Yeltsin remains in hospital, but understand he is resting comfortably, has had no
rmal EKGs and
is working.

-- Further understand that Yeltsin intends to be back in office on Monday and intend
s to go
forward with planned visit to Norway next week.

-- President Clinton has sent Yeltsin a get-well message.

July 12 Impeachment Vote

-- Russian Duma voted July 12 on motion to set up commission to consider impeachment

proceedings against Yeltsin. Motion failed to gather 226 votes needed to pass.

July 1 Vote of No Confidence in Chernomyrdin Government

-- Dispute between government and Duma was handled in manner consistent with Russian
law
and constitution -- that's what building democracy is all about.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Address
ing
political as well as military issues.

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence ," achieve
negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Mini
ster
Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran,
given
Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed
in building
democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not i
n our interest to
cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively
with Russia
toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with u
s to
develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlar
gement
process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME	14 July 95 09:19
FROM	Peters, Mary A.
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT	Updated Ireland guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO	Fetig, James L. Mitchell, Calvin A. Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	[[JUL13GUI.DOC : 2345 in JUL13GUI.DOC]]
ATTACHMENT FILE DATE	14 July 95 9:17
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME	JUL13GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 13, 1995

Bosnia

Cuban-American Flotilla

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Peace Process in Northern Ireland

BRAC

China

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA

Key Points:
-- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:

-- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethni
c
Bosnian state;
-- to prevent the spread of the conflict;
-- to help limit the loss of life;
-- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
-- That is why the United States
-- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
-- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history:
-- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
-- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
-- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter confli
ct.
-- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR,
which he
lped
reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less that 3,000 in
199
4.
-- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or
especially be
cause of
American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo
-- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;
-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get
out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military
inte
rvention in
the conflict.
-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the
conflict,
something
neither the President nor our people want to see.
-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support
UNPROFOR's effo
rts to deal
more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica:
-- What is happening in Srebrenica is tragic and inhumane.
-- Continued military pressure by Bosnian Serb forces against the enclave of
Srebren
ica and Zepa

is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The Un
ited States reiterates its
condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.
-- The Srebrenica safe area was established primarily as a haven for refugees
expell
ed from other
parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. An attack against this und
efended enclave and the
Dutch peacekeepers stationed there is further dramatic proof of the aggressive
inten
t of Bosnian Serb
forces.
-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact
Group
to ensure
that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dut
ch peacekeepers are
ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by
UNHCR to
the civilian
refugees in the enclave. Those who wish to leave should be allowed to depart, but
t
here should be no
forced removal of those who wish to stay.
-- Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening
UNPROFOR so
that it
can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have
su
pported been in
country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not
available.
-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their
influence
to stop this
aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers.
Serbi
a must make clear in
word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal
acts.
In particular, it should
redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the
Pale regime.
-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next
s
teps aimed at
strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its
missio
n.
-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggest

ed on Capitol Hill --
lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR o
ut of Bosnia and
draw the United States in.

Results to Date:
-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)
;
-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne
relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;
-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);
-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war
out of the
air over Bosnia for two and a half years;
-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bo
snia's

Muslims and Croats; and
-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in
Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the

conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better altern atives that don't
depend on wishful thinking.

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged appr
oach to our objectives:
-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political i ndependence and
territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its et hnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tighteni

ng his
cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosn
ia,
promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospect
s for an
overall settlement.
-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out
war that
would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflic
t, and effectively end
the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providin g our
own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably
through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on th
e
ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequa
te plan
and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NAT
O to deter a
repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon
our Allies.
-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate th e military
standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.
-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other pa rties to the conflict
in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Q & A: Hot Issues

President's Comments This Morning on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said this morning that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROF
OR may leave. Do you
expect UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serb acti
ons to
interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support this morning for multilateral lift of the arms embarg
o, was the President signaling his
expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we
do not
expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to achi
eve that goal.

Srebrenica and the Eastern Enclaves:

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanita
rian
needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROF
OR so
that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have pro
vided

options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

Q: Will you let the fall of Srebrenica stand? Will you support French efforts to r estore Srebrenica to the Bosnians
by force?

-- We are consulting with the French, the British, the Dutch, other allies, the UN a
nd the Contact
Group on possible next steps.

-- Beyond that, it would be inappropriate to comment.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We have not seen the final text.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws.
Isn't that the
Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR
and
cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for th
e
deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide $15 mil
lion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of $12 million of transpiration support to

the allies. The
Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about $3 million of equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional $27mil lion of goods
and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusi
on zones been rendered null
and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the
UN
commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and

political situation.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR ef
forts that have proven
ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-
armed
and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations person
nel. It will be used

to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to car
ry out its existing
mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for
UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling

its mandate, the
RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized $12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move
it into

theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troop
s to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress,
we would be
prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely i ntelligence
data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but no
t

with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR
, whose
presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve cond
itions for political
settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does no
t seem to be any
Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troop
s to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a vo
luntary fund
as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and
services
to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forc es, and
we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately $12 million in lift
services will be
provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enh
ancement
through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser targ
et
designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to a
ircraft and
helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence

support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. T
his support
would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower cei
lings
previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will repres
ent no more than
$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section

506(
a)(1)
emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to $15 million of DOD goods
and services
(primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide $15 mil
lion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of $12 million of transpiration support to

the allies. The
Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about $3 milli
on.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the
provision of
up to an additional $30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authoriti
es and primarily for
transpiration services and equipment.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demons
trated that it is totally
ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending
the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizatio
ns are
feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and
others affected by

the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved a
nd
violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation,
which
has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation
is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alter
natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would
surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Ame
ricanizes war
and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and
American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely i
f the international
presence remains.

U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?
-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the
conflict or

to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.
-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or
if units
need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temp
orary
operations:
1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties,
to use U.S. troops
as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carryin
g out in good
faith.
2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of m
ilitary plans,
we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.
3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNP
ROFOR have
formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an eme
rgency
extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bos
nia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.
UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, re
duce chances
for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acqui
re arms
and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Be
lgrade resumes all-out
support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is be
tter to work to
strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

CUBAN-AMERICAN FLOTILLA

Background: Cuban-American groups are planning to hold a sea- and airborne demonstr
ation today off the coast
of Cuba. They have conducted these anti-Castro "flotillas" in the past, but they're turning up the volume this year
because today is the first anniversary of the sinking of the tugboat "13 de Marzo,"

in which some 40 people died.
The organizers say that 50-100 boats and several aircraft will participate. Most of participants will stay in
international waters and airspace, but at least one boat -- the "Democracia" -- and one or two aircraft are
planning to enter Cuban territorial waters and airspace.

The USG has urged both the flotilla planners and the GOC to remain cool-headed. Sta
te Department has called the
flotilla organizers and told them that, although their activity as stated does not a ppear to violate US law, the USG
cannot protect them from prosecution and imprisonment in Cuba if they violate Cuban
law. The US Interests
Section in Havana has demarched the Cuban government, urging it to avoid overreactin
g to the flotilla. Such
appeals for calm have helped in years past but the chance of an ugly incident remain
s.

(If Asked)

Q: Do you have any comment on the Cuban-American "flotilla" planning to sail toward
Cuba
today? Since at least one boat plans to enter Cuban territorial waters, could an ug ly incident develop?

Points

-- As we have prior to past flotillas, we urge both the organizers and the Cuban gov

ernment to act
with restraint.

-- The State Department, Justice Department, and U.S. Coast Guard can provide you ad
ditional
information on this.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

[Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations app
ropriations bill last
evening passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provision
s. Your advisors have not
yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropr
iating considerably less than
we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would re
inforce the Mexico City
family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia
and Mexico. It also contains
other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.]

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations a
ppropriations
bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, g iving the Administration
flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is pa rticularly important
because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are too meet our int
ernational
commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. T
hese include
the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and
other

amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many prog
rams. These
reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the
committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the W
orld Bank and for
Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision
about what to
do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Aut
horization
bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the Pres
ident's ability to
conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies;
and deep funding
cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and
the Foreign
Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto
the State
Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendat
ion for the Foreign
Assistance Act.)

NORTHERN IRELAND

Question: What is the U.S. doing to keep the peace process in Northern Ireland on t
rack? Are we talking to the
British and Irish about it?

-- The U.S. strongly supports the efforts of the peoples of Northern Ireland and the
Irish and
British governments to end the violence in Northern Ireland and find a just and last
ing settlement.

-- We have urged all sides to engage seriously in negotiations and to address issues
constructively
and seriously.

(If asked about decommissioning:)

-- As the President has said, we urge Sinn Fein to engage in serious discussions abo
ut
decommissioning.

(If asked about preconditions:)

-- As the President has said, the best guarantee of a permanent peace is for all the parties to sit
down together to discuss the future as well as their differences. Thus, we hope tha t the Irish and British
governments and the parties in Northern Ireland, will quickly find a way to resolve
any obstacles to the
commencement of all-party talks.

(If asked about prisoners, Clegg)

-- We would support any measures by the British Government aimed at helping the pro
cess of
healing and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, including release of prisoners.

-- We have no comment on the release of Private Clegg.

Question: Will the recurring violence in Northern Ireland affect the President's pl anned trip there in early

December?

-- The historic cease-fires of the IRA and the loyalist paramilitaries remain in eff ect and the climate in Northern Ireland is very different than it was just a year ago. The Pres ident looks forward to visiting a peaceful Northern Ireland whose people are actively engaged in seeking a solution to their differences.

-- We are concerned that sporadic disturbances continue in Northern Ireland , relate d to the summer marching season and the in the wake of the early release of a British soldier from prison. We call on those responsible to refrain acts of violence and vandalism, to avoid inflaming t ensions in Northern Ireland..

MILITARY BASE CLOSURE

[Background: The BRAC Commission submitted its 1995 military base closure report to the President on July 1. By law, the President has until July 15 to return the entire list to the Commission with specific rationale for the changes or forward it in its entirety to Congress. Once the President forwards the list to Congress, the recommendations become law after 45 legislative days, unless both houses of Congress approve a joint resolution defeating the list.

Since receiving the BRAC report on July 1, senior White House officials have met sev eral times with DoD leaders to examine recommendations and alternatives regarding closing the air logistics cent ers at McClellan AFB. On July 13 the President approved the recommendations of the BRAC Commission and sent t he report to Congress (see Press Statement)].

Points:

-- Because of the overwhelming national security interest in reducing our base struc
ture in line
with the personnel reductions that have already taken place, the President has today
decided, with
reluctance and with clear understanding that the Defense Department can implement a
privatization
plan for McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases, to accept the BRAC Commission recommen
dations and
report.

-- After careful review of the recommended air logistics center closings and the eco
nomic impacts
on California and Texas, the President decided that implementing "privatization in p
lace" at McClellan and
Kelly would significantly reduce the economic impacts in those states and avoid an u
nacceptable disruption
to Air Force readiness.

Q&As:

Q: Why did the President decide to approve the BRAC Commission's recommendations?

A: As I stated earlier, the President was persuaded that despite the BRAC's recomm
endation to
close McClellan and Kelly AFBs, and given the assurances received in a letter from C
ommission
Chairman Dixon regarding privatization in place at the ALCs, the Secretary of Defens
e could in fact
carry out a privatization in place plan at these locations that would significantly reduce the economic
impact at Sacramento and San Antonio and avoid unacceptable impacts on Air Force rea
diness.

However imperfect, the BRAC process is the only way that Congress and the Executive
branch have

found to make closure decisions with reasonable objectivity and finality.

Q: Why did the decision take so long?

A: The President wanted to be sure not only that the Secretary of Defense had full a
uthority under
the BRAC report to implement the privatization at McClellan and Kelly, but also that
the privatization plan
was sufficiently robust to mitigate the economic impact of the closing of the two ba
ses.

The President also wanted to ensure that to the extent possible, tenant units now l ocated at
McClellan and Kelly could be kept in the Sacramento and San Antonio, rather than mov
ed out of the areas.

Q: How many jobs will be saved out of the 12,500 now at McClellan and the 19,000 at
Kelly?

A: Under the Defense Department original "downsizing" proposal (which the BRAC rejec
ted), the
Air Force would have kept 8,700 personnel at McClellan and 16,000 at Kelly, so that
is really the baseline
for comparison.

Under the privatization plan approved by the President today, the transition at thes
e two bases will be
spaced out over a five year period, so that 8,700 jobs at McClellan and 16,000 at Ke
lly will be retained at
the end of this period.

Eight years after the transition begins at the two bases, the Defense Department ant
icipates that the
workforce remaining at McClellan or relocated to other Air Force Bases in the Sacram
ento area will be
more than half that projected under the original "downsizing" proposal. At Kelly, t
he remaining workforce
after eight years should be roughly two-thirds of the original Air Force plan.

Throughout this period, Federal agencies will assist local authorities to develop p lans to generate

other jobs through economic reuse. If private-sector job creation proceeds at a rat e comparable to that at
the now-closed Sacramento Army Depot, there may well be no net loss of jobs in eithe
r community.

Q: Why should these communities believe privatization will work?

A: This privatization approach is not an isolated experience. It is consistent with the
Administration's initiative to reinvent government and with the recent recommendatio
n of the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to establish a time-phased plan
to privatize
essentially all existing depot-level maintenance, including the five air logistics c enters. This is an
approach the Defense Department has already begun to implement at other facilities,
such as Newark
AFB in Ohio.

Q: Why should other communities not feel that they are facing an economic calamity?

A: The President stressed the Administration's continuing commitment to assisting co
mmunities
impacted by base closure. Using the same program that has helped the host communiti
es since 1993, the
Administration will press for successful re-use of the bases' valuable assets by the communities. We put
people with experience into the communities to assist them, and planning and develop
ment grants are
available to assist in this transition. We have had considerable sucess in these ef forts, with over 10,000
new jobs and 300 employers on closed bases. Over 60 percent of civilian jobs have b
een replaced at
bases closed more than a year.

Q: Hasn't the President hurt himself by appearing so indecisive? Why didn't he ju

st send the
BRAC report on the Congress immediately, take the hit and move on?

A: In Chairman Dixon's own words, this was the greatest single deviation by a Commis
sion from
the Secretary of Defense's recommendations in the history of BRAC. So the President
had a clear
responsibility to review these deviations very carefully.

The Secretary of Defense and General Shalikashvili reported to the President that th
e closure of the depots
at McClellan and Kelly, which appeared to be the BRAC's original intent, would unacc
eptably disrupt Air
Force readiness through the turmoil associated with relocating the complex and large
activities.

The White House worked very carefully with the Defense Department and the Air Force
to clarify that a
legal basis did exist under the BRAC's report for pursuing an alternative approach
-
- privatization in place
-- and to make sure the privatization plan was robust.

The President owed it both to the impacted communities and to our Armed Forces that
he made
the right decision.

CHINA

Q: What is the current status of the Harry Wu case?

-- National Security Adviser Lake met yesterday with Mrs. Wu (Ching-lee Chen) to con

vey the
President's personal concern for Harry Wu's well-being and to assure her that the Ad
ministration's
unwavering position is that Wu should be released immediately.

-- Until his release is secured, we will make every effort to ensure he is properly treated.

-- While the consular convention only requires consular visits on a monthly basis, w
e have
requested more frequent access from the Chinese authorities.

-- The President will be meeting with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
others who
recently have returned from China (Haig, Greenberg, Whitehead) this afternoon. Dr.
Kissinger recently
returned from a trip to China, where he discussed overall U.S.-China relations, as w
ell as the Harry Wu
situation, with a variety of senior Chinese leaders.

Q: What about Mrs. Wu's recommendation that the First Lady not attend the Beijing C
onference on
Women in Development in September?

-- Mrs. Wu made that statement outside the context of her meeting with Mr. Lake. Mr
s. Clinton
is the honorary chair of the U.S. delegation, but no decisions have been made as to
her attendance or
participation in the UN Conference on Women in Development.

Q: What about Gingrich's recommendation that the conference be moved from Beijing?

-- This is a UN-sponsored conference of great significance in its own right.

-- Although we have complaints about the way China has handled issues related to the
meeting --
and have registered them fully -- it is neither practical nor appropriate for US par ticipation in a major UN
conference to be subordinated to bilateral disagreements between the host country an

d the US -- even
serious disagreements such as exist between the U.S. and China.

Q: What are you doing to get Wu out?

-- We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chines
e
government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercus
sions go beyond the legal
case itself.

-- We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case
is of great
importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is complet
ed?

-- We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He
should be
released immediately.

Q: What impact is this case having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the sta
te of the relationship?

-- The Harry Wu case is receiving our full attention and is a high-priority issue. We have made
clear that it will be high on the agenda as long as he remains imprisoned.

-- Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We
continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental imp
ortance, and the
Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

-- We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range
of our bilateral
interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

-- We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engage
d on issues
of mutual interest.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that you renounce statem
ents by House

Speaker Gingrich on China and Taiwan?

-- We have reiterated time and again that we maintain a "one China" policy, which pr
ecludes any
support for independence of Taiwan.

-- We cannot dictate or referee political realities in the Taiwan Straits. Those re
alities require
Taiwan and China to work out their differences, as has been happening quietly and ef
fectively over the
last couple years. We urge that process be continued.

Q: In retrospect, was the decision to allow a Lee visit a mistake?

-- The President's decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was app
ropriate and
fully consistent with American values and opinion.

-- We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it con
stitute a
change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will he be allowed to visit again?

-- We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case
basis. There
is no request pending at the moment.

State Department Talking Points
on UN Conference on Women in Development

This conference is about women and girls, not about China

The conference is convening in China because it is Asia's turn to host such a confer
ence. When the UN decision
was made in 1992 to hold a meeting, China was the only country in the region to offe

r to host it. At that time the
previous administration decided to join consensus with other countries at the UN to
agree to accept China's offer
to host the conference.

US participation in the conference will insure that American women and men have a vo
ice in an international forum
on issues affecting the lives of women.

At the conference and the associated NGO forum, approximately 45,000 people from aro
und the world will be
openly discussing a variety of issues.

Aside from the importance to the world's women, this conference cannot help but have
reverberations within
China.

US participation in the conference promotes a platform for our interests in such imp
ortant issues as democracy
and human rights.

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announc
ed where reruns would be
taking place. The results point to an overwhelming Lavalas victory, and the reruns w
ill be far more limited than
had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are still scheduled for July 22, though it is unlikely this will
be sufficient time.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Cou
ncil's announcement. A number
of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the ele
ctions. Amb. Swing is
attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral

council acted in ways that
justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the el
ections was not
significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time
, were able to vote
peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of the
ir choice. In light of
Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine month
s ago it was ruled by a
repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be
remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, wi
ll require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of
an attempt to
subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especia
lly in one of the
poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral proc
ess and might
not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mista
ke. The parties, the
electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards stren
gthening Haiti's
democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing fo
r upcoming
elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicl

y and privately,
that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitutio
n, limiting the President
to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on tr
ack, which calls
for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President i
n February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic
reform
there. It
matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, central
ly planned or
market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex,
protract
ed.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or
fear c
hange.
Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat,
over
50% of
Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or
Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Yeltsin remains in hospital, but understand he is resting comfortably, has had
no
rmal EKGs and
is working.

-- Further understand that Yeltsin intends to be back in office on Monday and
intend

s to go
forward with planned visit to Norway next week.

-- President Clinton has sent Yeltsin a get-well message.

July 12 Impeachment Vote

-- Russian Duma voted July 12 on motion to set up commission to consider impeachment

proceedings against Yeltsin. Motion failed to gather 226 votes needed to pass.

July 1 Vote of No Confidence in Chernomyrdin Government

-- Dispute between government and Duma was handled in manner consistent with Russian
law
and constitution -- that's what building democracy is all about.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Address
ing
political as well as military issues.

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence ," achieve
negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Mini
ster
Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran,
given
Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed
in building
democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not i
n our interest to
cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively
with Russia
toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with u
s to
develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlar
gement
process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 July 95 09:39

FROM Hawkins, Ardenia R.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT FW: notional schedule for Ireland ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Gray, Wendy
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By LOC NARA, Date 04/29/19
2017-0789-F

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Sorry, folks I should have cc'd you all when I did this. The schedule can be found on G;\EXECSEC\IRESCHE.

should Nancy ask to edit.

From: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
To: Peters, Mary A.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Darby, M. Brooke
Subject: notional schedule for Ireland ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Wednesday, July 05, 1995 01:36 PM

[[IRESCHE.DOC : 2339 in IRESCHE.DOC]]

Hi Mary Ann,

Nancy would like for you to keep this notional schedule under wraps for the time being or further guidance.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 5 July 95 13:30

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME IRESCHE.DOC

NOTIONAL ITINERARY FOR TRIP TO IRELAND/UK

Wednesday, November 29

Morning flight from Washington to London

Events:
Dinner with the Queen at Buckingham Palace

Thursday, November 30

Events:
Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street
Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair
Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community
Tour/down time in London or:
possible speech
Meal with queen at Buckingham Palace (if do not fly during day on 29th)

Friday, December 1

Morning flight from London to Belfast/Derry
Tour Belfast/meet with residents
Reception with Political leaders
Possible visit to Cassidy Family Home (in Northern Ireland)
Late afternoon travel to Dublin

Events:
Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton
Meeting/meal with Irish President Mary Robinson

Saturday, December 2

Morning meetings with political leaders/opposition
Speech to Parliament
Possible golf depending on weather
Evening flight or Sunday morning flight from Dublin to Washington

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Mary Peters to Alexander Vershbow, re: POTUS trip to UK and Ireland (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Records (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:
[07/05/1995 - 07/31/1995]

2016-0158-F
ke5218

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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002. email	Mary Peters to Alexander Vershbow, re: UK Ireland Trip (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

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NSC Emails
MSMail - Records (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip,..])
OA/Box Number: 590000

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Mary Peters to Jane Baker, et al., re: Trip (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

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