

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. email	Kathleen Stephens to Fred Doshe, re: Major pull-aside (3 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Ireland and trip...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/01/1995 - 06/19/1995]

2017-0759-F

ke5217

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 June 95 14:57
FROM Stephens, Kathleen D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: N. Ireland [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Darby, Melanie B.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
CARBON_COPY Vershbow, Alexander R.
TEXT_BODY

Please pass to Nancy:

-- As we discussed by telephone, I sent to you earlier today package 4153 containing a notional schedule for a Presidential trip Sept. 29-Oct 2. I have heard indirectly and you may already have heard directly from Amb. Smith that she (and presumably the Irish) are less than happy that the bulk of the President's time in Dublin will be on a Sunday, and that it's so short. She will make a pitch for him addressing the Dail, which must be on a weekday. It seems to me there'd be time for some of this on Monday Oct. 2 if the President can depart as late as mid-afternoon.

On your schedule in Belfast:

-- I have passed on your views to the people arranging your appts. in Belfast -- they think what you have in mind sounds just right. Accordingly, they will work on:

Tuesday afternoon (after 3 pm) meeting with UUPers we didn't see in Washington, hopefully including Molyneaux;

Tuesday late afternoon drinks with SDLP types and perhaps others (but not Sinn Fein)

Wednesday or Thursday morning visit to Stormont, including call on minister and briefing (they'll talk to conference organizers to fit it in best to a lull in the conference schedule)

No/no press event

-- I am leaving for London on Friday and can be reached through Monday evening through the American Embassy in London (Larry Robinson). I will ask the Consulate in Belfast to leave a schedule for you to pick up at the Europa on Tuesday when you arrive so you can see what they've arranged. Depending on the precise time of the UUP appt, I'll look for you at the

Europa on Tuesday around 3 or 4 pm!

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 12 June 95 14:31
FROM Stephens, Kathleen D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Major points [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Drew, Samuel N.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Attached are draft points for John Major pull-aside in Halifax. Would you help me by providing a few Bosnia-related points (and improvement on other points too, of course)?

[[612MAJOR.DOC : 3637 in 612MAJOR.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 12 June 95 14:31
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 612MAJOR.DOC

POINTS FOR HALIFAX PULL-ASIDE
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Major will want to discuss developments in Bosnia. You may want to ask Major about his June 7 meeting in London with Kozyrev. Major will be interested in your latest thinking on timing and itinerary of your possible travel to the UK and Ireland later this year.

UK/Ireland Trip

-- Appreciate your efforts to find mutually agreeable dates for a trip before the end of the year. If agreeable to you and the Irish, hope to announce soon dates and itinerary to include London, Belfast and Dublin.

-- Would be delighted if we could go to Belfast together if your schedule permits.

Northern Ireland

-- George Mitchell will be making another trip later this month to

follow up on the Conference.

-- Believe Gerry Adams understands the IRA must do something on decommissioning. We will keep pushing. Do you see any signs of movement by Sinn Fein or the loyalists? Important that political momentum be sustained.

Bosnia

(Sandy/Nelson: please provide)

Russia/NATO

-- Key now is to channel Russian concerns about NATO into effort to enhance the NATO-Russian relationship. As discussions begin in Brussels, need to urge active Russian participation and real give-and-take.

Transatlantic Initiatives

-- I discussed our ideas for strengthening transatlantic relations with Chirac and Santer earlier this week.

-- Want to discuss in more detail with you and the EU in the coming months. Hope we can launch a new initiative at time of next U.S.-EU Summit.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 June 95 09:04
FROM Darby, Melanie B.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT PRESS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Dohse, Fred J.
Gray, Wendy
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.

TEXT_BODY Attached is the most recent version of the press guidance which incorporates a few changes Nancy made over the weekend. [[JUNE19.DOC : 2304 in JUNE19.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 19 June 95 8:5

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JUNE19.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

June 19, 1995

G-7 Economic Summit

Bosnia

China

North Korea

Vietnam

French Nuclear Tests

Iraq/Jesse Jackson

UK/Ireland Trip

Russia

Congressional Missile Defense Funds

HALIFAX
Key Points

G-7 Meeting

Halifax is another building block in a sweeping enterprise to construct the international architecture that will propel prosperity into the 21st century.

-- Opening and expanding markets: NAFTA, Uruguay Round, APEC, Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.

-- Integrating the former Communist countries into the global market economy. (Over 50% of Russia's GDP now comes from the private sector.)

-- Promoting economic reform in the developing world. (APEC and Miami initiatives encourage continued economic reform and trade liberalization in Asia and Latin America.)

-- Reforming the international financial institutions to meet the challenges of the

global economy.

Called in Naples for review of international institutions; took on added urgency in the context of the Mexico crisis.

-- Will agree to package of measures to avoid international financial crises, and ensure an effective multilateral response should a crisis occur.

-- Leaders also will lay out guidelines to make development institutions more effective and efficient.

Reforming the international economic system to a rapidly changing world is not a one-shot deal; Halifax is the first step in an ongoing process of adjustment to the new challenges we face going into the 21st century.

HALIFAX Q's & A's

G-7 Meeting

Dollar

Q: Are you going to press the G-7 to do something to strengthen the dollar?

A: A strong dollar is very much in the interest of the U.S.

-- We will not use the dollar as an instrument of trade policy.

-- We are prepared to continue working with our G-7 colleagues to improve conditions for financial market stability.

Unilateralism

Q: Don't your proposed sanctions against Japan undermine the WTO and the multilateral trade system -- precisely at the time you and your G-7 colleagues are calling for strengthened international

i
nstitutions?

A. Personally committed to multilateral system; helped bring 7-year old Uruguay Round to conclusion.

-- Most serious threats to multilateral system are sustained current account surplus and closed markets.

No New Bretton Woods?

Q: Last year, you called for an ambitious review of international institutions -- a Bretton Woods for the post-Cold War era. But the likely results of Halifax are likely to be pretty marginal. Has the institutional review been a failure?

A: Globalization of world economy provides great opportunities; that's why I've put so much emphasis on opening markets to U.S. exports.

-- Globalization also presents certain challenges.

-- Halifax is part of larger effort to adjust the international system to the challenges of the 21st century.

-- Not a job for a single meeting, or even a single year; rather, one important step in an ongoing process of adjustment.

Murayama Meeting

Competitiveness of U.S. Autos/Parts

Q: Why is the U.S. risking a trade war with Japan over autos when U.S. auto makers, unlike their European competitors, are not really making an effort to enter the Japanese market?

A: There is little doubt that Japan could do more to open its auto and auto parts market.

-- Impact of Japan's closed market on Japanese consumers is clear: Shock absorbers

cost three times as much in Japan as they do in the U.S. Alternators cost five times as much.

An Acura LS sells for \$9,000 more in Japan than it does in the U.S.

-- U.S. companies are globally competitive.

-- In auto parts, we have a \$5 billion surplus with rest of the world, but a \$12 billion deficit with Japan.

-- Big Three have invested over \$100 billion in part five years to become competitive, are selling a number of right-hand drive vehicles in Japan, including the Jeep Cherokee.

-- The foreign share on the U.S. auto market is more than 30%, 24% in Japanese cars alone. The

foreign share of Japan's market is only 4.6%.

-- Europeans don't have fair access either. Their share of the Japan market is only 2.8%. They estimate that they should have a 10% share if Japan opened its market.

Voluntary Plans/Managed Trade

Q: The U.S. is demanding that the Japanese auto companies agree to plans to purchase a specific value or percentage of U.S. auto parts. Isn't that managed trade?

A: Seek to unmanage one of Japan's most highly managed sectors and regulated industries.

-- Japanese auto companies and parts suppliers tied up in keiretsu system; limits capacity of competitive foreign firms to enter the market.

-- Proposed voluntary plans, which the Japanese agreed to in 1990 and 1992. Japan rejected, but offered no counterproposal.

-- Seeking to level the playing field for all foreign producers, not just U.S. firms. Trying to open

Japan's market, rather than close our own -- the approach taken by the Europeans.

Aviation

Q: In addition to the auto dispute, you also are also in a conflict with Japan over its refusal to approve routes requested by Federal Express. Do you intend to impose sanctions here as well?

A: Take the issue of Federal Express' rights under our aviation agreement with Japan very seriously.

-- Japan's Minister of Transport Kamei is in Washington now for a meeting of the APE

C transportation officials, and Secretary Pena will be discussing this issue with him.

-- Prefer to resolve this dispute through consultations, but do need to get it resolved.

BOSNIA

U.S. Objectives:

- contain conflict, promote political solution;
- help preserve Bosnia as multi-ethnic state within its internationally recognized borders;
- keep faith with our NATO allies; and
- relieve human suffering.

Implementation: Over past two and a half years, we have:

- led NATO military responses to UN calls for assistance in protecting its forces and the safe areas;
- brokered agreement ending war between Muslims and Croats and establishing bicomunal Federation;
- led Contact Group efforts toward negotiated settlement;
- deployed peacekeeping troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to contain spread of conflict;

- helped keep the war out of the skies over Bosnia; and
- conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history.

Results to Date:

- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)
 - U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;
 - shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);
 - NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war out of the air over Bosnia for two and a half years;
 - negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats; and
 - war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.
- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.
- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.
- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

- Our ultimate goal is to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict based on the plan developed by the Contact Group (U.S., Russia, France, UK and Germany). That plan would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;
- To put pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already

accepted by the other parties, we are, with the consent of the Bosnian government, negotiating with Serbian President Milosevic to obtain his recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and a tightening of his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- To help prevent an explosion of fighting that would result in a resumption of all-out war, increasing casualties and humanitarian suffering while ending the prospect for a negotiated settlement, we support continuation of UNPROFOR's mission. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- We are taking additional steps to support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

Provision of U.S. Ground Forces: We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing

ting U.S. ground forces to
the conflict or to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to
withdraw or if
units need to be extracted
in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete,
tempora
ry operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the
parties,
to use U.S. troops as
part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were
carrying o
ut in good faith.
2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and
review of m
ilitary plans, we
would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.
3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNP
ROFOR have formidable
capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency
extr
action of units
whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Rapid Reaction Force: We are supporting creation of a UN Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF)
, short of providing U.S.
ground forces.

-- On June 15, the U.S. joined in passing a UNSC resolution establishing a rapid
rea
ction force to
provide military reinforcements for UNPROFOR.

-- The RRF will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel
and to enh
ance its
capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- The troop contributing nations have indicated that they see establishment of the
RRF as critical
to their ability to maintain UNPROFOR in a manner that enables it to implement
its m
andate.

-- Following meetings with French President Chirac Wednesday and our briefings to the Hill Thursday, the House and Senate Majority Leaders stated that they did not object in principle to support for the RRF as a means to protect UNPROFOR troops.

-- Congress has, however, asked that certain conditions be met in providing our support for a UN resolution establishing the RRF.

-- The U.S. vote was cast in keeping with the spirit of the letter provided Wednesday by the House and Senate majority leaders.

-- The resolution does not require the U.S. to directly incur any financial obligations. As Ambassador Albright noted at the time, our vote was cast on the clear understanding that determination of financial obligations would occur later.

-- The Administration believes that, by providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness -- we cannot merely return to the previous status quo.

Q & A's:

Q: Why would we urge restraint on the Bosnian forces trying to end the strangulation of their own capital city?

-- We share the Bosnian Government's concern over the siege of Sarajevo. Serbs have been shelling innocent civilians and restricting access to the city for nearly four years, with only some periods of relief.

-- But our overall goal remains to seek a negotiated end to the conflict. We do not believe that a lasting solution can be found on the battlefield. Therefore, we urge all parties to the conflict to refrain from actions that tend to lessen the prospects for a negotiated peace.

-- Bosnian Government has made right choice in accepting Contact Group plan as basis for a settlement. High time that Bosnian Serbs did so as well.

Q: Doesn't the effort by the Bosnians to lift the siege militarily provide new impetus to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Q: Why do you continue to support the costly UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid, protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternatives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending American troops to fight in a ground war in the Balkans -- which the administration and the American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Q: If the mission of the RRF is merely to protect UNPROFOR, what good is it?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the commander of UNPROFOR with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations

person
nel.

- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:
- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;
- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;
- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.
- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What will the command and control arrangements be for the RRF? Won't UN command and control arrangements for the RRF merely ensure that it is just as ineffective as previous efforts to use NATO airpower to protect UNPROFOR?

-- Those nations providing forces have indicated in their presentations at the UN that at the RRF would be under the existing UN chain of command, and it would operate under the operational control of the UN military commanders in the theatre who would continue to be under the overall direction of the secretary-general and his special representative.

-- It is our understanding that the French and British will seek maximum authority for the commanders on the ground.

Q: How is the RRF going to be funded in light of Congressional objections to paying for it as a normal UN

operation?

-- UNSC resolution passed last night makes clear the arrangements for funding RRF to be determined later.

-- Don't want to speculate on how this issue will be resolved.

-- We are continuing our consultations with Congress and with other UN members in order to find a solution.

Q: But didn't enactment of the UNSCR commit the U.S. to pay for the RRF in the normal way, as British claim?

-- UNSC resolution says that funding "modalities" to be determined later. We made clear, in voting for resolution, that question of how operation will be funded is, therefore, open.

-- There are several options and it wouldn't be productive to debate them in public.

Q: Do you rule out a normal UN-assessed operation?

-- Not ruling in or ruling out any option.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as helicopters, radars, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- and provide strategic lift to help bring allies' heavy equipment to the theater.

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid, and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: Are there plans to retaliate against the Bosnian Serbs for shooting down our F-16?

-- It would be inappropriate to discuss.

Q: What about reports that our intelligence knew of the SA-6 prior to Captain O'Grady being shot down?

-- I have asked the Defense Department to evaluate the sequence of events leading up to the loss of the F-16.

CHINA

[Background: Chinese Ambassador Li met with Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis on Friday to announce his recall to China for "consultations." He read a prepared statement placing the blame solely on the U.S. He did not indicate when he would return.

Li Daoyu was scheduled to return to China at the end of June anyway. This may be simply an effort on China's part to dramatize an otherwise routine return in hopes that the U.S. will take more

urgent steps to "eliminate the serious effects" of Lee's visit. Zhou Wenzhong, (pronounced Joe Wen Joong) consul general in Los Angeles, who was scheduled to become DCM, will act as chargé. The US ambassador to Beijing is also scheduled to depart China within a short time. China has not yet given agreement for his nominated replacement. So in effect, both sides will be represented at the chargé level.]

-- We regret China has chosen to withdraw its ambassador to the U.S. in protest of the decision to allow Lee Teng-hui to pay a private visit to Cornell University.

-- That decision was made as a courtesy to a distinguished graduate of an American college, and was in keeping with American values and opinion.

-- It was not aimed at China, and carried no implication of a change in U.S. policy toward either China or Taiwan.

-- Notwithstanding this unfortunate action on China's part, the United States will continue to abide by its commitment to a "one China" policy, and will adhere to the three communications that form the foundation of our bilateral relationship.

-- The U.S. Ambassador to China, J. Stapelton Roy, is currently completing his farewell calls after four years of distinguished service in Beijing. His return is not a recall, and is totally unrelated to the action China has taken. His replacement has not yet been formally nominated.

-- We hope that the Chinese Government will look at its own long-term interest in maintaining

intaining a
constructive relationship with the United States.

-- The United States and China have a number of important issues upon which we
need
to
exchange views and work together during the coming months. We urge the
Chinese side
to work
cooperatively with us in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.

NORTH KOREA

Background

On June 13, the US and DPRK released a joint press statement that provided that
KEDO
will select the reactor
model and prime contractor for the light water reactor project in North Korea.
The
same day, the KEDO
Executive Board -- the US, ROK and Japan -- issued a resolution supporting the
joint
press statement, and
deciding that both the reactor model and prime contractor will be South Korean.
Tog
ether these two documents
confirm that the ROK will play the central role in the LWR project. In the joint pr
ess statement, North Korea also
reaffirmed its commitment to implement the Agreed Framework (i.e. to keep the
freeze
, and agreed to accept
visits from teams to work on spent fuel storage and cooperative measures (i.e.
monit
oring) and phased
deliveries of heavy fuel oil.

Points

-- The agreement between the US and North Korea resolved some of the key
issues rela
ted to the

implementation of last year's framework.

-- Specifically, it confirms that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO, will select what kind of reactor will be built in North Korea and who will be the prime contractor for it. KEDO has decided that both the reactor and the prime contractor will be South Korean.

-- This agreement will keep the freeze on North Korea's dangerous nuclear facilities and help the implementation of the Agreed Framework to go forward.

(If pressed)

-- The agreement also provides for us to send teams to North Korea to work on storage of the spent fuel there and to work out cooperative steps to monitor and deliver heavy fuel oil to North Korea.

Q: Isn't this something the South Koreans and Japanese have a hard time with?

A: No. We consulted closely with both allies throughout these negotiations and both support this outcome.

Q: Won't there just be another crisis next week or soon after?

A: I am sure the road ahead will be long and difficult. But this agreement removes serious obstacles and allows us to move forward.

Q: What about North-South dialogue?

A: We continue to support North-South dialogue strongly, and believe it is essential to long term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

VIETNAM

Background

The press reported Tuesday, June 13, quoting Senator McCain, that Secretary Christop her had sent a recommendation to you urging you to normalize relations with Vietnam. There were al so reports that he is planning to travel to Vietnam in August; Christopher has no plans for a trip to Viet nam.

Points

-- When I announced the lifting of the trade embargo against Vietnam in February 1994, I said that any further steps in our bilateral relationship with Vietnam would be dependent on more progress on POW-MIA issues. My goal was the fullest possible accounting.

-- Last month, I sent a delegation to Vietnam, headed by Deputy Secretary of Veteran s Affairs Hershel Gober, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord and Deputy Assistant Secret ary of Defense Jim Wold to push for additional progress on POW-MIA accounting.

-- The evaluation of the results of that delegation is still ongoing.

-- Once that evaluation is complete I will decide on possible further steps in our relationship with Vietnam based on whether they will help achieve further progress on POW/MIA account ing.

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS

Background

In his first press conference as President, Chirac announced that France intended to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific in the fall and complete its testing no later than May 1996. Chirac indicated his commitment to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty no later than the fall of 1996.

Points

-- The United States regrets France's decision to resume nuclear testing at this time.

-- We continue to urge all of the nuclear powers, including France, to join in a global moratorium as we work to complete a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty at the earliest possible time.

-- In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to end French nuclear testing no later than May 1996 and to sign a CTB Treaty no later than the fall of 1996.

-- We will continue to work with France and all other states participating in the CTB negotiations to ensure that a Treaty is ready for signature as early as possible.

-- The United States has not changed its policy; we will not resume testing.

JESSE JACKSON

[Background: Jackson just announced that he wrote you suggesting he travel to Baghdad to seek the release of the two Americans held in Baghdad. He claims he has some assurances of success if he goes but claims "there seems to be a hitch in the White House ... they are determined that they will not communicate with Saddam Hussein."]

If asked:

-- Reverend Jackson has informed us that he is discussing with the Iraqis a humanitarian effort to

secure the release of the two Americans.

-- If he undertakes this mission, he would have our best wishes for success. There is no justification for holding Mr. Daliberti and Mr. Barloon. They should be released immediately to join their families.

Is Jackson going to Baghdad?

-- I would direct such questions to Reverend Jackson.

-- If he goes, it would be in a purely private capacity. He would not be acting in any way as a representative of the US government. He would carry no messages nor be authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Administration.

Why won't the US communicate with Saddam?

-- Iraq is well aware of our view that the two men should be granted clemency and be released immediately.

-- We do not believe we should enter into negotiations with Saddam Hussein.

INCIDENTS IN IRAQ

[Background: There was a rebellion by a small number of republican guard armored troops in Abu Ghurayb, near Baghdad. The troops attacked a radio transmitter in Abu Ghurayb, the incident appears to be over, but the current situation is not entirely clear. The mutiny involved tanks from the republican guard, the elite of the Iraqi military, was apparently put down by other republican guard units. The rebellion was led by members of the Dulaym tribe, one of the major Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq, and was possibly sparked by the regime's torture and killing of a senior Dulaym tribal member accused of coup plotting against Saddam. The prison

where Mr.
Barloon and Mr. Daliberti
are detained is in Abu Ghurayb. While the rebellion may have included an
attempt to
free Iraqi prisoners, we have
no evidence that Barloon and Daliberti were factors in any way.]

Q: What about reports of fighting in Iraq?

-- Apparently there was a rebellion of some sort within the Republican guards.
Our
information
indicates it was quickly put down.

Only if asked:

-- As far as we can tell, the incident did not involve the prison where Mr. Barloon
and Mr.
Daliberti are being held.

UK/IRELAND TRIP

Q: Did you discuss with Prime Minister Major dates for a trip to the UK and
Ireland?

-- I hope to pay a visit to the UK and Ireland soon. My staff is working with the B
ritish and Irish
governments to find a mutually convenient date.

(If asked)

Q: Would your trip include a visit to Northern Ireland?

-- I would like to visit Northern Ireland but as yet have no firm plans to do so.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there.

-- Long-term strategy. We understand transformation underway will be complex and protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Reaction to Budennovsk Hostage Situation

-- Strongly condemn this brutal act of terrorism and deplore the cold-blooded murder of innocent victims by Chechen guerilla band. No justification whatsoever for this act of vicious violence.

-- All hostages should be released immediately.

-- Offer condolences to family members of the innocent victims.

-- Events in Budennovsk are further evidence of need to end conflict in Chechnya.

Chechnya

-- Chechnya part of Russia, but Russia must act there in accord with international standards.

-- Have made clear to Yeltsin my strong view that Russia should end military operations, pursue durable cease-fire and seek negotiated political settlement.

-- OSCE mission on ground in Chechnya, can help.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- As have told Yeltsin, process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- Remain firmly opposed to sale, given Iran seeks nuclear weapons capability. Have shared information with Russians on Iranian plans.

-- As agreed in Moscow, Vice President and Chernomyrdin will discuss this further when they meet June 29-30.

Impact of Chechnya/Iran Reactors on Bilateral Aid

-- Our assistance aims to advance U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S.

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. But address those through frank talks, like I have with Yeltsin, not by cutting off assistance that is in our interest.

CFE

-- CFE a cornerstone of European security. Important Russia comply with all Treaty provisions this year.

-- Russians concerned about long-term impact of flank zone limits. We are prepared to work actively with Moscow to resolve those concerns at 1996 CFE Review Conference so Treaty regime is preserved.

-- Russian implementation of all Treaty provisions key to our ability to help solve their long-term concerns.

START II

-- Expect Senate to complete ratification of START II soon. Yeltsin confirmed his commitment to START II ratification.

-- START II reductions important to -- and in interests of --both countries. Once ratified, can consider further steps.

Nuclear Materials Security

-- Have discussed with Yeltsin. Have common interest in ensuring tightest possible security over nuclear materials. Want to expand cooperation in this area.

Russian Missile Technology Sales to Brazil

-- U.S. and Russia signed MOU in 1993 committing Russia to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines regarding its exports of missiles and missile technology.

-- Consult regularly with Russians; have not found Russia to act inconsistently with commitments it assumed in 1993. Continue to monitor Russian performance on MOU.

CONGRESSIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE FUNDS

If asked about recent House action to add approximately one billion dollars to missile defense and to legislate a solution to the ABM/TMD demarcation issue:

-- The extra money for missile defense, should it become available, would be used for theater missile defense or treaty-compliant ABM systems.

-- Even though the House defeated an amendment to the bill that stated that no money should be spent to violate the ABM Treaty, the Republicans made clear that nothing in the bill would violate the Treaty.

-- With regard to ABM/TMD demarcation, I am still committed to seeking a negotiated solution to the demarcation issue.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 June 95 11:56
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Latest Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[JUN20GUI.DOC : 2850 in JUN20GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 19 June 95 11:56
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JUN20GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

June 20, 1995

Bosnia

China

North Korea

Vietnam

French Nuclear Tests

Iraq/Jesse Jackson

UK/Ireland Trip/Sinn Fein

Russia

Congressional Missile Defense Funds

Nuclear Testing

B-2

BOSNIA

NEW DATA IN BOLD

U.S. National Interests at Stake: Our interests are engaged at several levels:

-- Obviously, we have a vested security interest in preventing the spread of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia beyond its current bounds. We must preclude enlarging the conflict through spillover or the direct involvement of outside powers in support of regional clients.

-- We also have an interest in limiting the humanitarian disaster by supporting efforts, such as UNPROFOR, to curtail the level of violence and assist in humanitarian relief operations.

-- In the longer term, this crisis directly engages our clear national interests in developing and sustaining collective mechanisms for dealing with post-Cold War disputes. Only in this way will we reduce additional and more costly requirements for the United States to intervene unilaterally.

-- Toward that end, our policy seeks to strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NATO to deter a repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do

this if we abandon our Allies. Rather, our goal -- indeed our obligation -- must be to send a signal, in conjunction with others in the international community, that ethnic cleansing and military aggression such as have occurred in Bosnia do not constitute an acceptable model for the resolution of ethnic and territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era.

U.S. Objectives:

- contain conflict, promote political solution;
- help preserve Bosnia as multi-ethnic state within its internationally recognized borders;
- keep faith with our NATO allies; and
- relieve human suffering.

Implementation: Over past two and a half years, we have:

- led NATO military responses to UN calls for assistance in protecting its forces and the safe areas;
- brokered agreement ending war between Muslims and Croats and establishing a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- led Contact Group efforts toward negotiated settlement;
- deployed peacekeeping troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to contain spread of conflict;
- helped keep the war out of the skies over Bosnia; and
- conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history.

Results to Date:

- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994);
- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;
- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);
- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war out of the air over Bosnia for two and a half years;
- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Our ultimate goal is to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict based on the plan developed by the Contact Group (U.S., Russia, France, UK and Germany). That plan would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- To put pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties, we are, with the consent of the Bosnian government, negotiating with Serbian President Milosevic to obtain his recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and a tightening of his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- To help prevent an explosion of fighting that would result in a resumption of all-out war, increasing casualties and humanitarian suffering while ending the prospect for a negotiated settlement, we support continuation of UNPROFOR's mission. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate,

most notably
through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on
th
e
ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable,
an adequa
te plan
and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support
missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- We are taking additional steps to support the Bosnian Federation, which has
helpe
d end the
fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and
Croat
s, and improved
the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate th
e military
standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

Q & A:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to
the co
nflict or to join UNPROFOR
in Bosnia.

But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to
withdraw or if
units need to be extracted
in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete,
tempora
ry operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the
parties,
to use U.S. troops as
part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were

carrying o
ut in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of m

ilitary plans, we

would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNP
ROFOR have formidable

capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency
extr

action of units

whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Q: What is our position regarding the UN Rapid Reaction Force?

We are supporting creation of a UN Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), short of
providing U.

S. ground forces.

-- The U.S. joined in passing a UNSC resolution establishing a rapid reaction
force

to provide

military reinforcements for UNPROFOR.

-- The RRF will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel
and to enh

ance its

capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- The troop contributing nations have indicated that they see establishment of the

RRF as critical

to their ability to maintain UNPROFOR in a manner that enables it to implement
its m

andate.

-- Following meetings with French President, the House and Senate Majority
Leaders s

tated that

they did not object in principle to support for the RRF as a means to protect
UNPROF

OR troops.

-- Congress has, however, asked that certain conditions be met in providing our
supp

ort

for a UN resolution establishing the RRF.

-- The U.S. vote was cast in keeping with the spirit of the letter provided Wednesday by the House and Senate majority leaders.

-- The resolution does not require the U.S. to directly incur any financial obligations. As Ambassador Albright noted at the time, our vote was cast on the clear understanding that determination of financial obligations would occur later.

-- We will be working with the Congress in the days ahead to find a mutually acceptable approach that permits us to support our Allies' efforts to protect the troops they have placed in harms way in an effort to help stabilize the situation in Bosnia.

-- The Administration believes that, by providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness -- we cannot merely return to the previous status quo.

Q: Why would we call for a cease fire when the Bosnian forces are trying to end the strangulation of their own capital city?

-- We share the Bosnian Government's concern over the siege of Sarajevo. Serbs have been shelling innocent civilians and restricting access to the city for nearly four years, with only some periods of relief.

-- Our overall goal remains to seek a negotiated end to the conflict. We do not believe that a lasting solution can be found on the battlefield. Therefore, we urge all parties to the conflict to refrain from actions that tend to lessen the prospects for a negotiated peace.

-- Bosnian Government has made right choice in accepting Contact Group plan as basis for a

settlement. High time that Bosnian Serbs did so as well.

Q: Doesn't the effort by the Bosnians to lift the siege militarily provide new impetus to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Q: Why do you continue to support the costly UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid, protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been

saved a
 nd
 violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation,
 which
 has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation
 is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alter
 natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that
 would
 surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war
 and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending American troops to fight in a ground war in the Balkans -- which the
 administration and the American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely
 i
 f the international
 presence remains.

Q: How can UNPROFOR contribute to stability when it won't even continue to
 man the
 weapons collection points
 around Sarajevo?

-- When the Sarajevo weapons exclusion zone was first considered, the rationale
 was
 for all
 weapons to be withdrawn from the zone. The collection points were a fallback
 when i
 t became evident
 that the parties to the conflict could not withdraw their weapons prior to the deadl
 ine.

-- Unfortunately, UNPROFOR was never manned, equipped or mandated to
 successfully de

fend
 the collection points from attack if the parties made a determined effort to take back their weapons. In
 light of repeated abuse of the weapons collection points and the vulnerability of UN
 personnel assigned
 to them, the UN has determined it will no longer place its monitors at risk for a mission they cannot
 accomplish.

-- Part of reconfiguring UNPROFOR to enable it to accomplish its primary humanitarian
 mandate
 involves prioritizing its missions. This does not mean that UNPROFOR will abandon the Safe Areas
 themselves, or that other UNPROFOR efforts to secure compliance of the parties with
 agreements to end
 the fighting around the safe areas and allow passage of humanitarian aid convoys should end.

Q: What actions will UNPROFOR take now that the last hostages have been released?

Was there a deal cut to
 abandon any use of force?

-- We welcome the release of the hostages, and call on the Bosnian Serbs to take the
 next step of
 honoring their own pledges to permit the delivery of humanitarian aid by convoy to the Safe Areas and end
 hostilities around them.

-- Our demands were steadfast throughout the period in which the UN personnel were detained:
 unconditional release of all personnel.

-- All of the options that were available prior to the events of the past several weeks remain
 available, with the additional factor of the RRF which is being put into place.

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null

and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Q: If the mission of the RRF is merely to protect UNPROFOR, and not enforce existing UN mandates, what good is it?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the commander of UNPROFOR with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What will the command and control arrangements be for the RRF? Won't UN command and control arrangements for the RRF merely ensure that it is just as ineffective as previous efforts?

forts to use NATO airpower
to protect UNPROFOR?

-- Those nations providing forces have indicated in their presentations at the UN
th
at the RRF
would be under the existing UN chain of command, and it would operate under
the oper
ational control of
the UN military commanders in the theater who would continue to be under the
overall
direction of the
secretary-general and his special representative.

-- The commanders of the UN forces are French and British, and we have had
assurance
s from
both countries that this force will be used to perform tasks that have previously
be
en impossible for
UNPROFOR.

-- It is our understanding that the French and British will seek maximum
authority f
or the
commanders on the ground.

Q: How is the RRF going to be funded in light of Congressional objections to
paying
for it as a normal UN
operation?

-- UNSC resolution passed last night makes clear the arrangements for funding
RRF to
be
determined later

-- Don't want to speculate on how this issue will be resolved.

-- We are continuing our consultations with Congress and with other UN
members in or
der to find
a solution.

Q: But didn't enactment of the UNSCR commit the U.S. to pay for the RRF in the
norm

al way, as British claim?

-- UNSC resolution says that funding "modalities" to be determined later. We made clear, in voting for resolution, that question of how operation will be funded is, therefore, open.

-- There are several options and it wouldn't be productive to debate them in public.

Q: Do you rule out a normal UN-assessed operation?

-- Not ruling in or ruling out any option.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as helicopters, radar, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- and provide strategic lift to help bring allies' heavy equipment to the theater.

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid, and preserve conditions for political settlement.

CHINA

[Background: Chinese Ambassador Li met with Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis on Friday to announce his recall to China for "consultations." He read a prepared statement placing the blame solely on the U.S. He did not indicate when he would return.

Li Daoyu was scheduled to return to China at the end of June anyway. This may be simply an effort on China's part to dramatize an otherwise routine return in hopes that the U.S. will take more

urgent steps to "eliminate the serious effects" of Lee's visit. Zhou Wenzhong, (pronounced Joe Wen Joong) consul general in Los Angeles, who was scheduled to become DCM, will act as chargé. The US ambassador to Beijing is also scheduled to depart China within a short time. China has not yet given agreement for his nominated replacement. So in effect, both sides will be represented at the chargé level.]

-- We regret China has chosen to withdraw its ambassador to the U.S. in protest of the decision to allow Lee Teng-hui to pay a private visit to Cornell University.

-- That decision was made as a courtesy to a distinguished graduate of an American college, and was in keeping with American values and opinion.

-- It was not aimed at China, and carried no implication of a change in U.S. policy toward either China or Taiwan.

-- Notwithstanding this unfortunate action on China's part, the United States will continue to abide by its commitment to a "one China" policy, and will adhere to the three communiques

that form the
foundation of our bilateral relationship.

-- The U.S. Ambassador to China, J. Stapelton Roy, is currently completing his
farew
ell calls after
four years of distinguished service in Beijing. His return is not a recall, and is
totally unrelated to the
action China has taken. His replacement has not yet been formally nominated.

-- We hope that the Chinese Government will look at its own long-term interest
in ma
intaining a
constructive relationship with the United States.

-- The United States and China have a number of important issues upon which we
need
to
exchange views and work together during the coming months. We urge the
Chinese side
to work
cooperatively with us in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.

NORTH KOREA

Background

On June 13, the US and DPRK released a joint press statement that provided that
KEDO
will select the reactor
model and prime contractor for the light water reactor project in North Korea.
The
same day, the KEDO
Executive Board -- the US, ROK and Japan -- issued a resolution supporting the
joint
press statement, and
deciding that both the reactor model and prime contractor will be South Korean.
Tog
ether these two documents
confirm that the ROK will play the central role in the LWR project. In the joint pr
ess statement, North Korea also
reaffirmed its commitment to implement the Agreed Framework (i.e. to keep the
freeze
, and agreed to accept

visits from teams to work on spent fuel storage and cooperative measures (i.e. monitoring) and phased deliveries of heavy fuel oil.

Points

-- The agreement between the US and North Korea resolved some of the key issues related to the implementation of last year's framework.

-- Specifically, it confirms that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO, will select what kind of reactor will be built in North Korea and who will be the prime contractor for it. KEDO has decided that both the reactor and the prime contractor will be South Korean.

-- This agreement will keep the freeze on North Korea's dangerous nuclear facilities and help the implementation of the Agreed Framework to go forward.

(If pressed)

-- The agreement also provides for us to send teams to North Korea to work on storage of the spent fuel there and to work out cooperative steps to monitor and deliver heavy fuel oil to North Korea.

Q: Isn't this something the South Koreans and Japanese have a hard time with?

A: No. We consulted closely with both allies throughout these negotiations and both support this outcome.

Q: Won't there just be another crisis next week or soon after?

A: I am sure the road ahead will be long and difficult. But this agreement

removes
serious obstacles and
allows us to move forward.

Q: What about North-South dialogue?

A: We continue to support North-South dialogue strongly, and believe it is
essential
to long term peace and
stability on the Korean peninsula.

VIETNAM

Background:

The Vietnamese have announced that their president will visit the United States.

Q: What is the reason?

--President Le Duc Anh, like many other foreign heads of state, has indicated that
he will
attend the 50th anniversary celebration of the United Nations in New York in
October

--He has not requested any meetings with Administration officials, nor are any
plan
ned.

--He has no plans to visit Washington during this trip.

The press reported Tuesday, June 13, quoting Senator McCain, that Secretary
Christop
her had sent a
recommendation to you urging you to normalize relations with Vietnam. There
were al
so reports that he is
planning to travel to Vietnam in August; Christopher has no plans for a trip to
Viet
nam.

Points

-- When I announced the lifting of the trade embargo against Vietnam in

February 199

4, I said that

any further steps in our bilateral relationship with Vietnam would be dependent on m

ore progress on

POW-MIA issues. My goal was the fullest possible accounting.

-- Last month, I sent a delegation to Vietnam, headed by Deputy Secretary of Veteran

s Affairs

Hershel Gober, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord and Deputy Assistant Secret

ary of Defense

Jim Wold to push for additional progress on POW-MIA accounting.

-- The evaluation of the results of that delegation is still ongoing.

-- Once that evaluation is complete I will decide on possible further steps in our r
elationship with

Vietnam based on whether they will help achieve further progress on POW/MIA
account

ing.

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS

Background

In his first press conference as President, Chirac announced that France intended
to

resume nuclear testing in the

South Pacific in the fall and complete its testing no later than May 1996. Chirac i
ndicated his commitment to sign

a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty no later than the fall of 1996.

Points

-- The United States regrets France's decision to resume nuclear testing at this tim
e.

-- We continue to urge all of the nuclear powers, including France, to join in a glo
bal moratorium

as we work to complete a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty at the earliest
possibl

e time.

-- In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to end
Frenc

h testing no
later than May 1996 and to sign a CTB Treaty no later than the fall of 1996.

-- We will continue to work with France and all other states participating in the CTB negotiations to ensure that a Treaty is ready for signature as early as possible.

-- The United States has not changed its policy; we will not resume testing.

JESSE JACKSON

[Background: Jackson just announced that he wrote you suggesting he travel to Baghdad to seek the release of the two Americans held in Baghdad. He claims he has some assurances of success if he goes but claims "there seems to be a hitch in the White House ... they are determined that they will not communicate with Saddam Hussein."]

If asked:

-- Reverend Jackson has informed us that he is discussing with the Iraqis a humanitarian effort to secure the release of the two Americans.

-- If he undertakes this mission, he would have our best wishes for success. There is no justification for holding Mr. Daliberti and Mr. Barloon. They should be released immediately to join their families.

Is Jackson going to Baghdad?

-- I would direct such questions to Reverend Jackson.

-- If he goes, it would be in a purely private capacity. He would not be acting in any way as a representative of the US government. He would carry no messages nor be authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Administration.

Why won't the US communicate with Saddam?

-- Iraq is well aware of our view that the two men should be granted clemency and be released immediately.

-- We do not believe we should enter into negotiations with Saddam Hussein.

INCIDENTS IN IRAQ

[Background: There was a rebellion by a small number of republican guard armored troops in Abu Ghurayb, near Baghdad. The troops attacked a radio transmitter in Abu Ghurayb, the incident appears to be over, but the current situation is not entirely clear. The mutiny involved tanks from the republican guard, the elite of the Iraqi military, was apparently put down by other republican guard units. The rebellion was led by members of the Dulaym tribe, one of the major Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq, and was possibly sparked by the regime's torture and killing of a senior Dulaym tribal member accused of coup plotting against Saddam. The prison where Mr. Barloon and Mr. Daliberti are detained is in Abu Ghurayb. While the rebellion may have included an attempt to free Iraqi prisoners, we have no evidence that Barloon and Daliberti were factors in any way.]

Q: What about reports of fighting in Iraq?

-- Apparently there was a rebellion of some sort within the Republican guards. Our information indicates it was quickly put down.

Only if asked:

-- As far as we can tell, the incident did not involve the prison where Mr. Barloon and Mr. Daliberti are being held.

SINN FEIN/UK/IRELAND TRIP

Q: Reaction to Gerry Adams' statement that Sinn Fein is ending its exploratory talk
s with British ministers?

A: While we have not seen a complete transcript of Mr. Adams' remarks, we note the
press is reporting Adams
also indicated a desire to continue to meet with British ministers, which we
welcome

-- We want to see the dialogue between and among the various parties in
Northern Ir
eland deepen, broaden and
make progress.

-- The President on May 25 termed the ministerial-level talks a step of
tremendous
promise and expressed the
hope the parties would soon all sit down together to discuss the future and their di
fferences.

-- The President also appealed to all who are observing the cease-fire to take the
next step and begin to discuss
serious decommissioning of weapons.

-- This remains our position. We urge all sides involved in the search for a lasti
ng peace in Northern Ireland to
approach the political discussions seriously and imaginatively.

Q: Did you discuss with Prime Minister Major dates for a trip to the UK and
Ireland?

-- I hope to pay a visit to the UK and Ireland soon. My staff is working with the B
ritish and Irish
governments to find a mutually convenient date.

(If asked)

Q: Would your trip include a visit to Northern Ireland?

-- I would like to visit Northern Ireland but as yet have no firm plans to do so.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there.

-- Long-term strategy. We understand transformation underway will be complex and protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Reaction to Budennovsk Hostage Situation

-- Strongly condemn this brutal act of terrorism and deplore the cold-blooded murder of innocent victims by Chechen guerilla band. No justification whatsoever for this act of vicious violence.

-- All hostages should be released immediately.

-- Offer condolences to family members of the innocent victims.

-- Events in Budennovsk are further evidence of need to end conflict in Chechnya.

Chechnya

-- Chechnya part of Russia, but Russia must act there in accord with international

s
standards.

-- Have made clear to Yeltsin my strong view that Russia should end military operations, pursue durable cease-fire and seek negotiated political settlement.

-- OSCE mission on ground in Chechnya, can help.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- As have told Yeltsin, process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- Remain firmly opposed to sale, given Iran seeks nuclear weapons capability. Have shared information with Russians on Iranian plans.

-- As agreed in Moscow, Vice President and Chernomyrdin will discuss this further when they meet June 29-30.

Impact of Chechnya/Iran Reactors on Bilateral Aid

-- Our assistance aims to advance U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S.

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. But address those through

fra
nk talks, like
I have with Yeltsin, not by cutting off assistance that is in our interest.

CFE

-- CFE a cornerstone of European security. Important Russia comply with all Treaty provisions this year.

-- Russians concerned about long-term impact of flank zone limits. We are prepared to work actively with Moscow to resolve those concerns at 1996 CFE Review Conference so Treaty regime is preserved.

-- Russian implementation of all Treaty provisions key to our ability to help solve their long-term concerns.

START II

-- Expect Senate to complete ratification of START II soon. Yeltsin confirmed his commitment to START II ratification.

-- START II reductions important to -- and in interests of --both countries. Once ratified, can consider further steps.

Nuclear Materials Security

-- Have discussed with Yeltsin. Have common interest in ensuring tightest possible security over nuclear materials. Want to expand cooperation in this area.

Russian Missile Technology Sales to Brazil

-- U.S. and Russia signed MOU in 1993 committing Russia to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines regarding its exports of missiles and missile technology.

-- Consult regularly with Russians; have not found Russia to act inconsistently with commitments it assumed in 1993. Continue to monitor Russian performance on MOU.

CONGRESSIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE FUNDS

If asked about recent House action to add approximately one billion dollars to missile defense and to legislate a solution to the ABM/TMD demarcation issue:

-- The extra money for missile defense, should it become available, would be used for theater missile defense or treaty-compliant ABM systems.

-- Even though the House defeated an amendment to the bill that stated that no money should be spent to violate the ABM Treaty, the Republicans made clear that nothing in the bill would violate the Treaty.

-- With regard to ABM/TMD demarcation, I am still committed to seeking a negotiated solution to the demarcation issue.

Nuclear Testing and CTB

Q: Secretary Perry said yesterday that the U.S. is considering a resumption of nuclear testing. Is that true?

A:

The Administration is not considering a resumption of nuclear testing. The U.S. has been observing a moratorium on nuclear testing since September 1992 and the President recently extended

ed that moratorium
through September 1996, assuming completion of a CTB by that time. Thus, the
U.S. h
as most likely
conducted its last nuclear test.

ù The U.S. is examining a number of issues related to the CTB negotiations,
includin
g the question of what kinds
of experiments or stockpile stewardship activities will be permitted under the
CTB.

ù The U.S. position with regard to these kinds of activities was articulated by the
National Security Adviser on
January 30, 1995, in a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace:

-- The CTB Treaty must be comprehensive and promote our vital national interest

in curbing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;

-- The CTB must not prohibit activities required to maintain the safety and rel
iability of our nuclear stockpile; and

-- The CTB must be signed by all declared nuclear states and as many other natio
ns as possible.

[If asked]

Q: Is it true that the Pentagon is considering a 500 ton testing option?

A:

ù That is one option, among many, that is being examined at the working level.

ù No decisions have been made.

FUNDING FOR ADDITIONAL B-2 BOMBERS

Background: During debate last week on H.R. 1530, the FY 1996 defense
authorizatio
n bill, the House defeated an
amendment by Representatives Kasich and Dellums to delete \$553 million
approved by t
he Committee on National
Security for production of additional B-2 bombers beyond the 20 previously

authorize

d. The amendment would

also have restored the legislative caps limiting the cost of the program and restricting the total buy to 20 aircraft.

The amendment was strongly supported by the Administration.

Q: Why does the Administration oppose buying more B-2 bombers? Isn't the Pentagon's

bomber force inadequate

for the two-Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy?

A: - There is no military requirement to procure more than 20 B-2s.

- The Defense Department's recently-completed Heavy Bomber Study, which was the

most comprehensive

and exhaustive review of our post-Cold War bomber requirements ever conducted, concluded

that the current

bomber force as approved in the Bottom Up Review is adequate to meet our strategy.

- The extra money approved by the House, unless reversed, would put us on a path to spending an additional

\$30 billion for 20 more B-2s. This spending cannot be accommodated within the Pentagon's

Future Year defense

Plan (FYDP) without seriously distorting other modernization needs.

- General Shali and Admiral Owens have written Congress endorsing this view and

making it clear that the

Joint Chiefs do not favor buying additional B-2s. The White House has also underscored

this position in its

Statement of Administration Position (SAP) on the House-passed bill.