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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Message from President Clinton to King Fahd (2 pages)	07/23/1994	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Draft Guidance to Embassy Riyadh (2 pages)	07/00/1994	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Demarche to President Saleh (2 pages)	07/16/1994	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Yemen (4 pages)	07/18/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Ellen Laipson to Anthony Lake, re: Letter from South Yemeni leader El-Beedh (2 pages)	06/20/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	Re: Letter from Ali Salem El-Beedh to President Clinton (2 pages)	05/25/1994	P1/b(1)
006. email	Martin Indyk to Anthony Lake, et al., re: Yemen (2 pages)	05/24/1994	P1/b(1)
007. report	Re: [Yemen] (4 pages)	05/19/1994	P1/b(1)
008. email	Ellen Laipson to Richard Clarke, et al., re: Update on Yemen (2 pages)	05/06/1994	P1/b(1)
009. note	Handwritten notes from teleconference on Yemen crisis (5 pages)	05/06/1994	P1/b(1)
010. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	08/02/1993	P1/b(1)
011. cable	Re: Letter from President Clinton to President Saleh (2 pages)	05/07/1993	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
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Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F

kc3436

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. chart	Re: [Yemeni Politics] (1 page)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
013. report	Re: [Yemeni Election] (10 pages)	04/16/1993	P1/b(1)

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① Yemen

POLICYWATCH

Analysis of Near East policy from the scholars and associates of THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

Number One Hundred Twenty-Five

July 13, 1994

A SAUDI DISASTER STORY: YEMEN'S UNITY BY FORCE

by Simon Henderson

The capture last week of the port city of Aden by forces loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen marked the end of the short-lived rebellion by secessionist supporters of Vice President Ali Salem al-Beidh. The outcome is a shock to the balance of power in the Arabian peninsula and a diplomatic disaster for Saudi Arabia.

The unification of Yemen in 1989, formally endorsed by democratic elections in 1992, was always seen as an uneasy marriage. The north (previously called the Yemen Arab Republic) had the larger population, an estimated 9 million as opposed to the estimated 3 million of the south (which had been known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.) Politically, the northerners preferred straightforward Arab nationalism with a minority (benefitting from Saudi backing) following Islamic fundamentalism. The southern leadership, who had rid themselves of British colonial rule in 1967, were once hard-line communists.

Saudi Arabia's apprehension about unification was fully warranted. Within months, the Yemen Republic emerged as a close ally of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President Saleh from his capital, Sanaa, sided with Saddam. In an atmosphere of near panic, the Saudi authorities fearing subversion expelled several hundred thousand Yemeni manual laborers from the kingdom.

Saudi fear of Yemen is based on a long-running border dispute made worse by the feeling that Yemen's large and poor population would dearly love some of Saudi Arabia's riches. Saudi sensitivity is legendary: when the results of a Saudi census were announced in 1993, one Saudi newspaper carried the triumphal headline, "We are now bigger than Yemen." (The unaudited figures showed that the kingdom had 12.3 million citizens.) There is the tale that the founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz -- also known as Ibn Saud, the father of King Fahd -- said on his deathbed in 1953, "Never allow Yemen to be united." Presumably less apocryphal is the report that King Fahd agreed to U.S. troops being sent to Saudi Arabia after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when he was shown U.S. satellite photographs of Iraqi military aircraft at Yemeni air bases.

There is little doubt that Saudi Arabia -- by supplying weapons or money, or both -- exacerbated conflict between north and south Yemen. Tensions had grown because of difficulties with oil production in the north, while new oil reserves were being found in the southern territory. Southern suspicions of northern intentions regarding its slice of the national cake were already high when fighting began in early May between rival army units.

POLICYWATCH

But if the Saudi intention had been to create a long-running civil war or re-partition, events on the ground showed that policymakers in Riyadh had a mistaken view of their abilities. Northern forces quickly moved into southern territory, encircling Aden and then seizing Mukalla, eastwards along the coast where al-Beidh had set up his headquarters. Saudi efforts to secure a United Nations cease-fire resolution were successful, largely due to the lobbying efforts of its ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. But the U.N. and other Arab states proved unable to give enough life to a cease-fire so that U.N. observers could be imposed between the two sides.

On the sidelines the Gulf Arab states dithered. Some, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, almost recognized a new south Yemen state which even had a name: the Democratic Republic of Yemen. But the stance of the Gulf state of Qatar, which supported the north perhaps because of its own border dispute with Riyadh, made unity elusive.

The United States sought unsuccessfully to mediate, even using relatively heavyweight visitors like the assistant secretary of state, Robert Pelletreau. Individual U.S. officials say that the Saudis sneered at U.S. efforts, claiming that the northern advance would be halted when the well-armed southern tribes rose up in support of the Aden regime. "You don't know the tribes like we do," one senior Saudi is quoted as saying.

Under the circumstances, Saudi Arabia should have perhaps remained publicly quiet after President Saleh won control over all his national territory. But the degree of Saudi anxiety is clear. The day the fighting ended, King Fahd chaired an extraordinary meeting of the Saudi cabinet to discuss Yemen -- his first official meeting since having a gallstone operation in May. The next day, Prince Bandar flew to the G7 summit in Naples to lobby personally with President Clinton and British Prime Minister John Major.

For Saudis, the defeat for their policy in Yemen may be only of slightly less magnitude than Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait nearly four years ago. Riyadh will fear that President Saleh, boosted by success at home, will seek to pressure Saudi Arabia on borders, migrant workers and subsidies. The use of SCUD missile attacks, air force bombing and highly mobile armored units in the fighting will force analysts to revise their judgments on Yemen's military abilities. Already, Sultan Qaboos in neighboring Oman has reportedly cancelled his summer sojourn in Salalah, close to the border with south Yemen, because it is within SCUD range.

For the United States, the events of the last two months have been shown to be disastrous for its regional ally, Saudi Arabia. (It is conceivable that the status of the Saudi defense minister and a future claimant to the Saudi throne, Prince Sultan, the longtime architect of Saudi policy towards Yemen, could be diminished.) The U.S. must now help to pick up the pieces in the Arabian peninsula, so that a semblance of stability is restored, hoping that this policy is not undermined by a Saudi desire to back a guerrilla insurrection in Yemen.

Simon Henderson, a journalist with the *Financial Times* of London, is the author of The Washington Institute's Policy Paper, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*.

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Yemen

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NUMBER OF PAGES cover + 12 DATE _____FROM IO/UNP: CHRIS MURRAY TELEPHONE 647-0047TO OFFICE: NSC FAX TEL. NUMBER 395-1177DISTRIBUTE TO: Elken LaipsonSUBJECT SYG's Report of the Brahimi MissionREMARKS Liberia Resolution (for Background)

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Security Council

DISTR.
GENERAL

S/1994/764
27 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN YEMEN

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 924 (1994) of 1 June 1994.
2. The resolution, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission to the area as soon as possible to assess prospects for a renewed dialogue among all those concerned and for further efforts by them to resolve their differences. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the situation at an appropriate time, but not later than one week after the completion of the fact-finding mission.
3. On 3 June 1994, I informed the President of the Security Council that I had decided to appoint Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as my Special Envoy and Head of the fact-finding mission to Yemen (S/1994/664). On the same day, the President of the Security Council informed me that the members welcomed my decision (S/1994/665).
4. Mr. Brahimi started his mission on 7 June 1994 at Geneva where I met with him for a briefing session. He was accompanied by a political officer from the Department of Political Affairs and a staff member from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. From 8 to 19 June 1994, the Special Envoy visited Sana'a (twice) and Mukalla. He also travelled to Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt.
5. In all his meetings during the visit to the region, Mr. Brahimi expressed the concern of the international community over the deterioration of the situation in Yemen. He reviewed the elements of Security Council resolution 924 (1994), which set up the mandate of the mission, and expressed the wish to listen to the views of all the parties concerned.

II. VIEWS OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

6. At every opportunity throughout his visit to Yemen, the Special Envoy emphasized the paramount necessity of agreeing on an immediate cease-fire, as called for in Security Council resolution 924 (1994). Only when a cease-fire became effective would it be possible to expect the resumption of dialogue.

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7. At Sana'a, official discussions took place with President Ali Abdallah Saleh and a number of Cabinet ministers led by Dr. Mohammad Said Al-Attar, the Acting Prime Minister.

8. The Acting Prime Minister indicated that despite his country's reservation that the Security Council had discussed the internal situation of his country and that this might set a grave precedent in the history of the United Nations, he nevertheless welcomed the adoption by the Council of resolution 924 (1994) on the situation in the Republic of Yemen. He believed that the resolution had affirmed legitimacy within the framework of the Republic of Yemen and linked the cease-fire with a number of steps that Yemen regarded as an integral part of the resolution.

9. Regarding the cease-fire, the Yemeni side stated that the military option had been imposed on the legitimate authorities by the separatists. A three-day cease-fire was declared on 21 May 1994, even before the Security Council adopted resolution 924 (1994), in the hope that the cease-fire would be a step towards the definitive suspension of hostilities and the beginning of political dialogue. Suddenly, however, the separatists made their declaration of secession WITHIN HOURS OF the announcement of the cease-fire.

10. The Yemeni side further stated that it required guarantees from the Security Council that the cease-fire would not be exploited by the separatists and their supporters to consolidate the illegitimate separatist State and strengthen themselves with funds and weapons or to allow them to engage in political manoeuvres with a view to securing the recognition of certain States, which the Republic of Yemen would regard as a violation of the Security Council resolution. The Yemeni side also stated that the adoption of a resolution to dispatch observers would be completely unacceptable.

11. Regarding the resumption of dialogue, the Yemeni side expressed its conviction that dialogue was the best way of resolving differences. The other side was not in earnest in engaging in dialogue and was exploiting it for purposes of manoeuvre. The Yemeni side was nevertheless prepared to engage in dialogue in accordance with the following principles:

- (a) Respect for constitutional legitimacy;
- (b) Rescinding of the decision on secession;
- (c) Commitment to the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen;
- (d) Compliance with the results of the elections of 27 April 1993;
- (e) Incorporation of those combatants under the command of the rebels that remain into the legitimate armed forces, with the same rights and duties as their counterparts;
- (f) Surrender of all weapons and military equipment in the possession of the rebels to the legitimate armed forces;

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(g) That the dialogue should begin immediately and be completed within five days;

(h) That the dialogue should be conducted in Sana'a with no third party in attendance;

(i) That there should be no participation by the 16 persons against whom indictments have been issued by the Public Prosecutor.

12. The Yemeni side stated that it welcomed the statement made by the Secretary-General concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Yemen and to victims of the war, stressing that the Government of the Republic of Yemen had taken the initiative in this matter and had submitted a request for assistance to the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme at Sana'a and that a number of meetings had taken place in that regard. The Government therefore welcomed any assistance in this domain provided by the United Nations and its organs or by friendly states to the Government of the Republic of Yemen.

13. As agreed with the Government, the Special Envoy also held discussions with a group of political leaders representing 24 political parties, as well as with a group of members of Parliament representing all political parties, led by their Speaker, Sheikh Abdallah Al-Ahmar. Both groups stressed the need to preserve unity at all cost. They agreed, however, that it was necessary and urgent to reach a cease-fire and to restart dialogue, provided it was within the existing constitutional framework.

14. The mission visited Mukalla on 12 and 13 June 1994, where Southern leaders expressed their views on the situation. The Southern leaders presented an analysis of their perspective of the evolution of the situation since the unification of Yemen in May 1990. They explained that soon after unity was achieved in 1990, influential people in the leadership of the former northern part of the country who were opposed to unity, development and modernisation, launched an undeclared war on the leaders of the Yemen Socialist Party. After the parliamentary elections of 27 April 1993, the situation became further confused, violence continued unchecked and political and economic life was brought to a halt. They added that more recently, since 27 April 1994, Yemen had been involved in a serious war between the forces of the two former States, which were not integrated with each other after the unification of the country. This was also the case with many other institutions.

15. They expressed deep gratitude to the Security Council and the Secretary-General for their interest in the situation in Yemen and for the adoption of Security Council resolution 924 (1994), and reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of all six of its operative paragraphs.

16. The Southern leaders attached the highest priority to the observance of a cease-fire. In this connection, they welcomed the declaration of readiness made by Sana'a, as communicated to the Security Council through the Special Envoy, and its proposal that a military observer team should supervise the cease-fire. Since the former Military Commission established shortly before the outbreak of the war included the military attaché of the United States of America, the

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military attaché of the Russian Federation and the military attaché of France, representing the European Union, in addition to representatives of the Sultanate of Oman and Jordan and northern and southern military elements, it was necessary, on that basis, to make speedy arrangements to organize the monitoring of the cease-fire by an integrated team capable of managing the task and carrying it out in the best possible manner. The observation team should also include representatives of Africa, Asia and the League of Arab States. Subsequently, consultations can be held on the necessary arrangements for dialogue to begin between the parties concerned without preconditions or reservations.

17. They stressed the importance of giving urgent attention to the humanitarian aspect.

18. The Southern leaders suggested the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council to adopt deterrent measures against the Sana'a regime.

19. While at Mukalla, the Special Envoy met with a group of political leaders representing 22 political parties and various organizations who expressed their support for Mr. Ali S. Al-Bidh and for the proclamation of the new State made on 22 May 1994. Some expressed the hope that international recognition would be granted to that State. All demanded that the cease-fire be observed and monitored by international observers so that dialogue could begin between the two sides.

III. VIEWS OF THE NEIGHBOURING STATES

20. The Special Envoy also held talks with government leaders in Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The neighbouring states were unanimous in reiterating to the Special Envoy the expression of their deep concern over the current state of affairs in Yemen. They all expressed profound sorrow at the tragic loss of life, the suffering of the people and the destruction of infrastructure and private and public property caused by the war. All stressed that they had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of their neighbours. They also made it clear that this was a serious threat to peace and security in the region and that, consequently, the continuation of the fighting was not acceptable. All leaders were in agreement that political differences could not be resolved by force and that it was up to the people of Yemen, and to them alone, to decide how they should organize their political future.

21. Leaders from Jordan and Qatar were of the view that the preservation of unity, in a form on which the Yemenis would agree, would best serve the interests of Yemen, as well as preserve peace and security in the region. In the other neighbouring States, all leaders reminded the Special Envoy that when unity was achieved between the two Yemeni States, it had been unanimously welcomed and supported by all countries in the region. They reaffirmed their position that it was up to the Yemeni people and their leaders, who were parties to the conflict, to decide for themselves, through peaceful dialogue, whether they would live in a unified State or return to the situation which existed prior to 22 May 1990, when there were two independent States, both of which were

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members of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

22. All Governments in the region expressed the hope that the two parties would speedily comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 924 (1994) and cooperate with the United Nations to attain an immediate cessation of hostilities under adequate control and to resume dialogue.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

23. The Special Envoy and the members of the fact-finding mission paid particular attention to the effect of the hostilities on the civilian population. Immediately after their arrival, they met with the representatives of all the specialized agencies, as well as with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Special Envoy also raised the issue during his discussions at Sana'a and Mukalla.

24. At Sana'a, a member of the mission from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Serge Tell, held extensive discussions with representatives of governmental departments, foreign embassies, and international and non-governmental organizations that were directly concerned. He travelled to Taiz and Lahej governorates as part of the Inter-Agency Assessment Mission that took place from 13 to 15 June 1994. To complete his information, he was to go to Aden to assess humanitarian needs and to discuss the overall situation with leaders in the South. However, he could not do so because of the security situation in Aden.

25. The report of the Inter-Agency Assessment Mission is therefore incomplete at this stage. However, it includes a section on the situation in Aden based on information obtained from United Nations staff members who were evacuated from the city on 17 June. These reports were supplemented by information received from several international relief organizations. The most important conclusion of the mission is that a major crisis is imminent unless a political solution is found or at least a cease-fire is put into force as soon as possible.

V. ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE

26. As indicated earlier, the Special Envoy stressed everywhere the necessity of reaching an immediate cease-fire. Yet, despite the acceptance by both sides of resolution 924 (1994) and six announcements that a cease-fire would come into force, fighting has continued. Indeed, it has intensified around Aden, and, according to some reports, it has spread to areas that had not been affected up to 15 June 1994.

27. After receiving the Special Envoy on 9 June 1994, President Ali Abdallah Saleh announced in Sana'a that a cease-fire would become effective as of 1200 hours local time. However, within hours, fighting erupted again, with each side accusing the other of restarting it.

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28. President Ali Abdallah Saleh proposed reviving a Joint Military Commission, which would include Yemeni officers from the two warring parties, as well as officers from Jordan and Oman and the military attachés of France and the United States. However, subsequently, the President proposed that the revived Commission should work without its non-Yemeni members, which would make arrangements to enforce the cease-fire an internal, inter-Yemeni affair.

29. The other side rejected this proposition outright. In a memorandum submitted to the Special Envoy at Mukalla on 12 June 1994, they made a counter-proposal to the effect that a Joint Commission should be formed with all the members of the former one, plus other representatives from Africa, Asia and the League of Arab States.

30. President Ali Abdallah Saleh conveyed to the Special Envoy that the proposal made by the other side was not acceptable, but he said he would be willing to accept the participation of the non-Yemeni members of the old Commission. He would even accept the addition of two more countries: Syria and a country from the Maghreb - Algeria or Morocco, for example.

31. While the distance between the two parties was still considerable, there appeared to be enough common ground to try to work out a compromise that would ensure that a cease-fire would enter into force and that a mechanism would be established to stabilize the situation. After intensive consultations and a second visit to Sana'a, it was agreed that the two sides would send emissaries to meet the Special Envoy at Cairo and possibly to meet face to face to discuss a cease-fire and the mechanism to supervise it.

32. The Special Envoy received the two sides successively on 19 June 1994. The Government in Sana'a had earlier suggested that the meeting should be between the three political parties that had been members of the Coalition Government since the general elections in 1993. Although it was made abundantly clear to them that this suggestion was not acceptable to the other side, they nevertheless sent to Cairo a delegation composed of the two political parties that were still in the Government of Sana'a: the General People's Congress and the Yemen Reform Grouping. Consequently, there was no face-to-face meeting between the two sides.

33. It proved equally impossible to agree on a mechanism to supervise the cease-fire, as the delegation from Sana'a insisted that any arrangement had to be made within a purely intra-Yemeni national context.

34. On 24 June 1994, the Secretary-General received, successively, Mr. Abdel-Karim Al-Iryani and Mr. Haydar Al-Attas. He again expressed his concern that the cease-fire called for in resolution 924 (1994) was not being observed and that the fighting around Aden had, in fact, intensified. He very strongly urged an end to the fighting and the creation of a mechanism to supervise the cease-fire as a prelude to the resumption of dialogue.

35. On 25 June 1994, Sana'a announced that a cease-fire would enter into force as of midnight that same day. Mr. Al-Attas published a communiqué indicating that his side would stop firing if the other side would do the same. It was also agreed that on the following day, 26 June, provided the cease-fire held,

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the Special Envoy would resume discussions with the two sides, represented by Mr. Ali Al-Iryani and Mr. Al-Attas, to seek agreement on the mechanism to supervise the cease-fire. Unfortunately, once again the cease-fire did not hold for more than a few hours.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

36. It is a matter of serious concern that almost four weeks after the adoption of resolution 924 (1994), fighting has not stopped in Yemen and that repeated commitments to the cease-fire have not been honoured.

37. It is particularly worrisome that the inhabitants of the city of Aden continue to be subjected to so much suffering. Indeed, fighting has intensified in the course of the last few days and the number of casualties has risen dramatically. There is no electricity most of the time in most parts of the city and the shortage of water is serious. Hospitals lack both equipment and medical supplies to cope with the situation. The International Committee of the Red Cross and international aid organisations find it more and more difficult to carry on with their admirable work.

38. Very little is known about fighting elsewhere in this vast territory. But this is a real war, with all the dire consequences of war everywhere: human casualties, suffering of innocent people and destruction of infrastructure and public and private property.

39. Understandably, neighbouring countries are following developments in Yemen with growing concern. Past history and recent experience illustrate that a crisis such as the one in Yemen tends to affect security and stability in the whole region. It is therefore in the interest of all concerned that the conflict be contained and resolved as quickly as possible.

40. There is general consensus that:

(a) A cease-fire is necessary and urgent;

(b) A mechanism to supervise the cease-fire is also necessary and should be organised. Indeed, both sides have already agreed on some aspects of this mechanism, namely, that it should be a joint commission, that it should include a number of officers from both sides and that representatives from Jordan and Oman as well as the military attachés of France and the United States in Sana'a would take part. However, there are still differences between the two sides concerning representation from other countries;

(c) Once the cease-fire is effective, dialogue should restart with the help of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, at a venue to be agreed upon.

41. My Special Envoy was well received by the two parties, which have repeatedly expressed support for his mission. I am grateful to them, and I earnestly call upon them to translate this goodwill into active cooperation with Mr. Brahimi.

/...

8/1994/764

English

Page 6

⑨

42. I should also like to take this opportunity to express to the leaders of all neighbouring countries my deep appreciation for their cooperation with me and my Special Envoy. Their cooperation will be invaluable for the continuation of our efforts in connection with this crisis.

43. The call made in resolution 924 (1994) concerning the delivery of arms to the warring parties needs to be stressed. Enough harm has been done by the ample stocks already available to them, and surely better use can be made of the resources Yemen possesses or has access to.

44. The most urgent task ahead is to put an end to the fighting and to start providing urgent aid to the people who so badly need it, particularly, but not only, in the city of Aden.

45. The Security Council may wish, at this stage, to make abundantly clear that the present state of affairs cannot be tolerated, that the cease-fire must now enter into force without delay and that the two parties must be urgently requested to cooperate with my Special Envoy in the establishment, within the next few days, of the mechanism to supervise the cease-fire. Should the parties so desire, I would be prepared to recommend to the Council the deployment of United Nations military observers, once a cease-fire is in place. These United Nations observers could be supplementary to whatever supervisory mechanism might be agreed upon between the parties. The Council may also request the two parties to start immediately thereafter a dialogue which my special Envoy could organize in consultation with them at a mutually agreed neutral venue, possibly Geneva.

UN Doc. S/1994/764
S/1994/764

UNITED
NATIONS

S



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/866 (1993)
22 September 1993

RESOLUTION 866 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3281st meeting,
on 22 September 1993

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 813 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 856 (1993) of 10 August 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26422 and Add.1) dated 9 September 1993 on the proposed establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL),

Noting that the Peace Agreement signed by the three Liberian parties in Cotonou on 25 July 1993 calls on the United Nations and the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to assist in the implementation of the Agreement,

Emphasizing as noted in the Secretary-General's report of 4 August 1993 (S/26200), that the Peace Agreement assigns ECOMOG the primary responsibility of supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the Agreement and envisages that the United Nations role shall be to monitor and verify this process,

Noting that this would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case ECOWAS,

Recognizing that United Nations involvement would contribute significantly to the effective implementation of the Peace Agreement and would serve to underline the international community's commitment to conflict resolution in Liberia,

Commending ECOWAS for its continuing efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia,

Commending also the efforts of the Organization of African Unity in support of the peace process in Liberia,

(d) To assist, as appropriate, in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in the field in conjunction with the existing United Nations humanitarian relief operation;

(e) To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the demobilization of combatants;

(f) To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General;

(g) To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and, in cooperation with ECOMOG, coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance of mines and unexploded bombs;

(h) Without participation in enforcement operations, to coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both formally, through the Violations Committee, and informally;

4. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to conclude with the Chairman of ECOWAS an agreement defining, before deployment of UNOMIL, the roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOWAS in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in accordance with the concept of operations outlined in Chapter IV of the Secretary-General's report (S/26422), and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress and outcome of the negotiations leading thereto;

5. Encourages African States to provide the additional troops requested from them by ECOWAS for ECOMOG;

6. Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund, which would facilitate the sending of reinforcements by African States to ECOMOG, assist in supporting troops of participating ECOMOG countries and also assist in mine-clearing, humanitarian and development activities, as well as the electoral process, and calls on Member States to support the peace process in Liberia by contributing to the Trust Fund;

7. Urges the Liberian parties to commence the encampment, disarmament and demobilization process without delay;

8. Welcomes the decision to establish the transitional government and urges also the Liberian parties to begin the exercise of that government's responsibilities concomitantly with the process described in paragraph 7 above and consistent with the Peace Agreement;

9. Calls on the transitional government to conclude expeditiously, and no later than 60 days after its installation, a Status of Mission Agreement with the United Nations to facilitate the full deployment of UNOMIL;

10. Urges the Liberian parties to finalize the composition of the Elections Commission so that it can promptly undertake the necessary preparations for legislative and presidential elections by March 1994, at the latest, in accordance with the timetable foreseen in the Peace Agreement;

S/RES/866 (1993)

Page 4

11. Calls on the Liberian parties to cooperate fully in the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country by the most direct routes, in accordance with the Peace Agreement;

12. Welcomes ECOMOG's stated commitment to ensure the safety of UNOMIL observers and civilian staff and urges the Liberian parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNOMIL personnel, as well as of the personnel involved in relief operations, and strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to submit progress reports to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution by 16 December 1993 and by 16 February 1994;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Re: Demarche to President Saleh (2 pages)	07/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Re: Yemen (4 pages)	07/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Ellen Laipson to Anthony Lake, re: Letter from South Yemeni leader El-Beedh (2 pages)	06/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	Re: Letter from Ali Salem El-Beedh to President Clinton (2 pages)	05/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Martin Indyk to Anthony Lake, et al., re: Yemen (2 pages)	05/24/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. report	Re: [Yemen] (4 pages)	05/19/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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9/11/94

(f) Yemen

Yemen

Consensus among Arab Americans on what needs from us:

- more intensive effort
to effect immediate ceasefire

Saudi attack - 20 deaths in Sanaa

- moral objective denouncing use of force to solve conflict
clear statement
- try to initiate; w/ coop of A/C, negotiating process

Pellegrin mission advised at Nat.

Can they disseminate Christopher Letter to community?

Pellegrin statements?

Al Amoudy

Very pessimistic

refugees

Spillover

Salih - yesterday sent envoys to Cairo
could begin mediation

A/C needs strong support from us

- importance of standing behind reforms
don't forget to mention democracy
- arms - try to stop flow

another Afghanistan i peninsula

would spread - Specimens to Saudi

AMC

American Muslim Council

NAAA

National Association of Arab Americans

⑤ Yemen

May 9 1994

VIA FAX: 456-6218

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the American Muslim Council (AMC) and the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), we are writing to express deep concern about the violence in the Republic of Yemen that appears to have escalated into full scale civil war. We are certain that we share with you an urgent desire to end this tragic conflict before it results in the permanent dissolution of the Republic.

We urge you to use your good offices, in conjunction with the League of Arab States, to effect an immediate ceasefire in Yemen. We believe that it is vital that talks between the parties be initiated as soon as possible so that a process of reconciliation can begin and an end to the conflict can be achieved through peaceful means.

The current fighting is a serious humanitarian issue which must be addressed at once. We are given to understand that as many as 12,000 people have already been killed or injured in the conflict. In light of this tragic toll, we urge you also to do all in your power to meet the pressing needs of the Yemeni civilian population through diplomatic means and by providing emergency food, water, and medical supplies.

We thank you for considering these urgent requests.

Sincerely,



Khalil E. Jahshan
Executive Director
NAAA



Abdurahman Alamoudi
Executive Director
AMC

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Statement on Yemen

May 11, 1994

As representatives of Arab-American and Muslim-American organizations in the United States, we are deeply distressed and concerned about the ongoing violence in Yemen that could escalate into a full-scale civil war. Since May 22, 1990, Americans have taken great pride in the significant strides achieved by Yemen toward unity and democracy. Therefore, in an effort to stop the bloodshed and restore Yemen to the democratic track on which it has embarked, we call upon all parties to:

1. Effect an immediate cessation to all hostilities in Yemen
2. Seek a negotiated political solution through a national dialogue aimed at reconciliation and the safeguarding of Yemeni unity and democracy.

We appeal to all members of the Arab-American community, particularly the American-Yemeni community, to remain united behind these objectives and to mobilize their resources in support of the humanitarian needs created by the unfortunate hostilities in Yemen.

Khalil E. Jahshan
National Association of Arab Americans

Abdurahman Alamoudi
American Muslim Council

Ahmad Bahabib
American-Yemeni Friendship Association

Abdulwahab Alkebsi
Union of Supportive Shurists

Jim Zogby
Arab American Institute

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. email	Ellen Laipson to Richard Clarke, et al., re: Update on Yemen (2 pages)	05/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. note	Handwritten notes from teleconference on Yemen crisis (5 pages)	05/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

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Y

Vice President Gore met today with Yemeni Vice President Al-Bidh to discuss issues of mutual concern including improving bilateral relations between the United States and Yemen. Vice President Al-Bidh also met with members of the National Security Council including Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asia Affairs Dr. Martin Indyk.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	08/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. cable	Re: Letter from President Clinton to President Saleh (2 pages)	05/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F
ke3436

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. chart	Re: [Yemeni Politics] (1 page)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. report	Re: [Yemeni Election] (10 pages)	04/16/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Grummon, Stephen)
OA/Box Number: 726

FOLDER TITLE:

Yemen [2]

2011-0282-F

ke3436

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GCC Foreign Ministers Hold Meeting in Riyadh**Bahrain Foreign Minister Gives Address***LD1903132295 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1117 GMT
19 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Riyadh, 19 March SPA—The proceedings of the 54th session meeting of the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] began at the GCC Secretariat in Riyadh at noon today. The meeting is chaired by Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Mubarak Al Khalifah.

At the beginning of the opening session, Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Mubarak Al Khalifah gave a statement in which he said: Greetings to you all. In the name of God and with guidance, I open the first session of our 54th meeting that is taking place today in the aftermath of the latest summit meeting of their majesties and highnesses the GCC leaders at Manama last year. [passage omitted]

At the political level, Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Mubarak Al Khalifah said in his statement: We would like to reiterate the firm position of the GCC members on the need for Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions pertinent to state of Kuwait, and their support for the sisterly United Arab Emirates [UAE] in its dispute with the Islamic Republic of Iran over the three Islands, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Musa Island, which belong to the UAE.

Concerning a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East region, we would like to reiterate our call on the need to make substantive progress in the Syrian-Israeli and the Lebanese-Israeli tracks, and the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories, including holy Jerusalem.

He added: I would like to express here my happiness with our meeting with Mr. Warren Christopher in Jeddah on 12 March, and its positive outcome on our bilateral relations and other aspects of coordination and cooperation between the United States and the GCC members, as well as the progress of the Middle East process. [passage omitted]

Afterward, the session was held behind closed doors.

Release of U.S. Citizens in Iraq Urged*LD1903155195 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1503 GMT
19 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Riyadh, 19 Mar—Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Mubarak Al Khalifah, the Bahraini foreign minister and current chairman of the Gulf Cooperation Council's [GCC] Ministerial Council, has urged Iraq to hand over the two American citizens whom it has detained for days.

In reply to a journalists' question after the first meeting of the GCC foreign ministers ended, the Bahraini foreign

minister said: The issue is clear; Iraq must return the two men who have entered its territory by mistake.

In a gesture to an Iraqi intimation on its intention not to release the two Americans it is detaining before the economic sanctions imposed on it are lifted, Shaykh Muhammad called for the issue not to be stepped up. [passage omitted]

The current chairman refused to answer a question on whether the ministers had discussed the border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, he said: This is among the political issues on the council's agenda.

[Words indistinct] during this evening's meeting, which is expected to be the final meeting, and after which a final statement will be released on the current session's meetings.

On the most important political issues discussed by the ministers, the Bahraini minister said: They were about Iraq and the Middle East. However, he did not give details about the issues, pointing out that the final statement, which was expected to be released this evening, will contain the details.

Statement Issued at Final Session*LD2003160895 Riyadh Saudi Arabian Kingdom Radio
Network in Arabic 1135 GMT 20 Mar 95*

[“Text” of GCC statement issued at final session of 54th ordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council at the Riyadh General Secretariat on 20 March]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ministerial council held its 54th ordinary meeting at the General Secretariat in Riyadh on 19 and 20 March 1995. The meeting was chaired by Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Mubarak Al Khalifah, foreign minister of the State of Bahrain and chairman of the current session of the Ministerial Council. It was attended by: Rashid Abdallah al-Nu'aymi, foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates; Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, foreign minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Yusuf Bin al-Alawi Bin Abdallah, minister of state for foreign affairs of the Sultanate of Oman; Hamid Bin Jasim Bin Jabr Al Thani, foreign minister of the State of Qatar; Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad Jabir al-Sabah, first deputy foreign minister and foreign minister of the State of Kuwait.

Starting from what the higher council stressed in its 15th session held in the state of Bahrain 19-21 December 1994 to renew the determination on pushing the blessed steps on the march of cooperation in the various fields and toward broader dimensions, and to hammer down all obstacles in their path, the Council appraised itself of the steps which were taken within the framework of implementing the decisions of the Higher Council, stressing its keen interest in putting those decisions into practice to achieve the aspired-for objectives.

The Ministerial Council welcomed the initiative of the state of Qatar expressed by the heir apparent of the state of Qatar at the meeting of the Qatari Council of ministers on the 15 February 1995 and the welcome expressed by the heir apparent of the state of Bahrain of this initiative to find a brotherly solution that will preserve the bonds of amity and links of brotherhood between them through the continued mediation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the good offices extended by King Fahd bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the custodian of the two holy mosques.

The Ministerial Council also welcomed the resolution of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] Higher Council at its recent meeting in the state of Bahrain which urges to double the efforts during the coming period to resolve bilateral problems pending between the member states before holding the 16th session of the Higher Council in Muscat.

The Ministerial Council expressed its welcome at the understanding memorandum reached between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Republic in Mecca on the 27th of blessed Ramadan for its positive consequences on the brotherly relations existing between the two sisterly countries and the countries of the region and on consolidating security and stability.

On the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Arab League, it pleases the Ministerial Council to express its aspiration that this occasion be the beginning of a new era in inter-Arab relations, where the Arab nation finds the Arab League strong through respect for sovereignty and independence of all member states and the serious adherence to the Arab League charter and the charter of the United Nations and other international conventions and the mobilization of the Arab nation's potentials for progress, stability, development, and prosperity.

The Council also discussed the question of Iraq's implementation of the Security Council resolution relating to its aggression against the state of Kuwait, taking note of the resolutions of the Higher Council at its 15th session held in the state of Bahrain, which emphasized that Iraq's full implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council constitutes a fundamental element in proving its peaceful intentions toward the state of Kuwait and the neighboring states and a beginning to the consolidation of security and stability in the region.

In this context, the Council reaffirms its demand that Iraq complete its implementation of the international legality resolutions pertaining to its aggression and the clauses of Resolution 687, particularly those concerning the release of the prisoners and detainees, both Kuwaitis and nationals of other states. The demand is also that Iraq give back properties and refrain from committing any aggressive and provocative act, in compliance with Resolution No. 949.

The GCC Ministerial Council appreciates the positive positions of the UN Security Council member states,

aimed at securing full implementation of the international legality resolutions, as a contribution on their part to entrenching firm foundations for regional and international security and stability. The Council reaffirms its full eagerness that Iraq maintain its unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and it expresses sympathy toward the fraternal people of Iraq in its trials and sufferings, for which the Iraqi Government bears full responsibility as a result of its rejection of UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, which deal with Iraq's needs in food and medicine.

The Ministerial Council examined the development of relations between the GCC member countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran and the issue of its occupation of the three islands: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, which belong to the UAE. In this respect, the Council brings back to mind in particular the emphasis put by the Higher Council last summit on the position of the GCC member countries calling for preserving the security and stability of the region, and laying down natural neighborly relations based on mutual respect and noninterference in others' domestic affairs, and also for shunning the use of force, the threat to use force, and resolving differences by peaceful means.

The Council expressed its deep regrets that the Islamic Republic of Iraq did not respond to the repeated calls by the UAE to arrive at a solution to this problem by peaceful means. It expressed concern that the Iranian Government had taken measures aimed at entrenching its occupation of the three islands in contravention of international law, the Islamic Conference charter, good neighborliness principles, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states of the region.

The Council reiterates its firm position supporting and backing the position of the UAE and affirming its sovereignty on its three islands: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa. The Council also reaffirms its absolute support for all the peaceful measures and means taken by the UAE to recover its sovereignty over its three islands, and it urges Iran to agree to the referral of the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

The Council discussed the latest developments of all the aspects of the peace process in the Middle East, and stressed that a just and comprehensive peace must be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 425, the Land for Peace principle, and on a full Israeli withdrawal from the Arab occupied territories, including holy Jerusalem, and the retrieval by the Palestinian people of its legitimate rights.

The council, while noting with satisfaction the lessening of tensions which has been achieved by the peace process since it was launched at the Madrid Conference in 1991, at the same time expresses its concern over Israel's delay in implementing the Palestinian-Israeli agreement and the fact that it is continuing to change the demographic and legal position of the holy city of Jerusalem.

The Council also expresses its anxiety over the failure to achieve progress on the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks, and in this respect it renews its support for the just demand of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Lebanon and its great appreciation for their stances and serious efforts to make the peace process successful.

The Council hails the continuous efforts which the United States is exerting to remove the obstacles which are obstructing the peace process and to activate the peace process in the Middle East.

Proceeding from the deep-seated conviction that a just and comprehensive peace must be achieved for the equal and parallel security of all parties, and endeavoring to make the Middle East a region free from all weapons of mass destruction, the Ministerial Council calls on Israel to join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to place all its nuclear installations under the system of safeguards belonging to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Ministerial Council discussed the deteriorating security situation and the increasing human suffering in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the light of the Serbs' continued criminal aggression and their rejection of the peace plan. The Council condemns the Serbs for their aggressive acts, their challenge to Security Council resolutions, and their intransigence toward efforts to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and again calls on the Security Council to take all measures to guarantee that the Serbs comply with the relevant resolutions, reinforce the international protection of the United Nations, provide effective protection in the safe areas, and extend them to cover all Bosnian territory, and enable the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to exercise its inalienable, legitimate right to self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Ministerial Council called for stopping the blood hemorrhage of the Chechen people and expressed its deep regret over the continued bloodletting. It called on the disputing parties to solve their problems by means of dialogue and negotiations.

The Ministerial Council also reviewed the situation in Somalia and Afghanistan and called on the disputing parties to enter a serious dialogue to solve their differences and realize national reconciliation, preserve the unity of their peoples and the territorial integrity of their countries.

The Council also discussed a number of ministerial committees' minutes in the fields of finance, economics, agriculture, petroleum, post, telephone and telegraph, which were held earlier, and approved them, stressing the importance that the finance ministers complete their discussion on the unification of tariffs vis-a-vis the outside world in line with the resolution of the Higher Council at its 15th session in Bahrain.

The Council also endorsed the decision of the financial and economic cooperation committee that certifying the

certificates of origin and the accompanied bills as well as the certificates of the home produced food stuff usability by the embassies, delegations, and consulates in the Council member states were unnecessary, stressing to the competent authorities to apply that strictly.

In the field of post and communications, the Council agreed on adopting the memorandum of understanding on the special postal service and other resolutions concerning the charges on telephone calls and to represent the council's states in the board of directors of the company set up by INMARSAT Organization.

In the framework of economic relations between the GCC members states and the other states and international economic groups, the Council reviewed the results of the meeting held between the GCC member states and the Japanese Government last January. It expressed satisfaction over the results of this meeting, hoping that this would contribute to a rise in Japanese investments in the GCC states. The Council also reviewed the results of the 6th meeting of the joint cooperation committee between the GCC member states and the European Union in Brussels on 7 March 1995. While noting the amendments introduced by the European Union to the system of dealing privileges from the beginning of 1995 which will adversely affect the Gulf exports to the European market, a matter that does not concur with the commitments of the European side according to the cooperation treaty signed between the two sides, the Council invites the European Union to look into trade measures liable to ensure that GCC exports continue to benefit from trade privileges in entering the European market. The Council also looks forward optimistically to the joint ministerial meeting between the two groups due to be held next May. The Council hopes that this meeting will give momentum to economic cooperation between the two groups toward wider domains, a matter that would bolster trade and investment between the two groups.

The Council was informed of the results of the dialogue held between the GCC member states and the U.S. Government on 9 and 10 March 1995. The Council decided to call for the convening of a meeting of the GCC ministers of foreign affairs, finance, and oil in order to examine the economic relations between the GCC states and the other states and economic groups.

Ministers Conclude Proceedings

LD1903231195 Riyadh Saudi Arabian Kingdom Radio Network in Arabic 2230 GMT 19 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Their royal highnesses and excellencies the foreign affairs minister of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries concluded last night the proceedings of the second working meeting of their 54th session, which started yesterday morning at the headquarters of general secretariat of the GCC countries in Riyadh.

Following the meeting, His Excellency Muhammad Bin-Mubarak Bin-Hamid Al Khalifah, foreign affairs minister of the State of Bahrain and chairman of the current