

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. email               | Ellen Laipson to Richard Clarke, et al., re: Evacuation from Yemen (2 pages)            | 05/05/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. email               | Ellen Laipson to Richard Clarke, et al., re: Update on Yemen (2 pages)                  | 05/05/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. email               | Carlos Burgos to Richard Clarke, Randy Beers, and Susan Rice, re: Yemen Sitrep (1 page) | 05/09/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. email               | Ellen Laipson to Mary Emery, et al., re: Ambassador Bander's Meeting with TL (2 pages)  | 05/23/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005. email               | Martin Indyk to Anthony Lake, et al., re: YEMEN: Bander Update (2 pages)                | 05/24/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. email               | Ellen Laipson to Susan Rice, re: UNSC Resolution on Yemen (2 pages)                     | 05/25/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007. email               | Anne Alexander to Martin Indyk, re: Yemen Cable Requested (6 pages)                     | 05/26/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 008. email               | Martin Indyk to Anthony Lake, et al., re: YEMEN UPDATE (2 pages)                        | 05/27/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 009. email               | Anne Alexander to Martin Indyk, re: [Yemeni Equipment] (1 page)                         | 07/14/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 010. email               | Anne Alexander to Martin Indyk, re: [Yemeni Weapons] (1 page)                           | 07/14/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Emails  
A1 - Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([Yemen\*])  
OA/Box Number: 570000

### FOLDER TITLE:

[05/05/1994 - 07/14/1994]

2011-0282-F

ke3448

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-May-1994 11:10 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Natalie S. Wozniak

( WOZNIAK )

FROM:

Katherine M. Veit  
(VEIT)

SUBJECT:

Here 'tis

## ADDRESS TO THE SOREF SYMPOSIUM

## THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

May 17, 1994

Thank you very much. It's a real pleasure to be invited to address The Washington Institute's Soref Symposium. I know from Martin that you are a serious audience with an interest in, and deep knowledge of, the Middle East. As the old story goes, I feel like the professor asked to lecture on the subject of floods -- knowing full well that Noah is in the audience.

With Secretary Christopher in the midst of intensive talks, I will focus tonight not on the current state of negotiations, but on our conceptual approach to the Middle East. For in many ways, the Middle East is a paradigm for our nation's approach to the post Cold War world. And it is our challenge and responsibility to build a regional environment in which the promise of a future of peace and hope can be realized.

In essence, the Middle East is now faced with a choice between two futures. One path leads to a future in which extremists, wielding weapons of mass destruction, hold sway over a region torn by inter-communal and inter-state conflicts. A future which could pose an existential threat to Israel and our other friends in the region. The other alternative yields democratic progress, the free movement of people and goods, and dialogue leading to regional security. Violence or peace; regression or freedom; isolation or dialogue: these are the choices.

On any particular day, we can witness examples of these futures. Consider events of recent days. Efforts to unify Yemen suffered a blow when northerners and southerners chose the battlefield over the negotiating table. At the same time, in a step critical to ending a prolonged conflict, Israeli soldiers peacefully transferred authority in Gaza and Jericho to Palestinian authorities.

In the middle of this era of turmoil and hope, the United States

cannot afford to be a bystander. Despite the end of the superpower rivalry, the region remains of vital interest to our nation. The free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the Gulf....The security and well-being of Israel.....A secure and lasting Arab-Israeli peace....The stability of friendly Arab countries....Our need to contain Iraq, Iran, Libya and Sudan, the reactionary "backlash states" of the region....And efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction: all these reasons give our nation a very real stake in ensuring a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic future.

We do not seek, however, to dominate the future of the Middle East. Too much of the troubled history of the region has been preoccupied with a struggle for mastery; too little effort has been devoted to a cooperative effort to promote common interests and shared values in a better future for all the peoples of the region.

Nor do we see this battle for the future of the Middle East as a "clash of civilizations." Let me emphasize this point. Some suggested that in the post-Cold War world, there is a fundamental divide pitting Western liberal democratic traditions against ostensibly opposing "civilizations" based on Islam and other religious traditions. These theorists believe there is no common ground for understanding between "the West and the rest" -- only the prospect of confrontation and conflict. They assert that the United States, as the sole remaining superpower in search of a new ideology to fight, should be bent on leading a new crusade against Islam. In a quest for a new ideology to rally against, fundamentalism would replace communism as the West's designated threat.

We strongly disagree. In the Middle East as throughout the world, there is indeed a fundamental divide. But the fault line runs not between "civilizations" or religions. No, it runs instead between oppression and responsive government, between isolation and openness, and between moderation and extremism. And it knows no distinction by race or creed. In South Africa as in China; in Burma as in Russia; and in Gaza as in northern Iraq, the universal language of personal and political freedom is being spoken by brave men and women who are fighting for human rights and democracy. And the dramatic global changes of the past four years have shown that it is a language capable of transcending the past and transforming the future.

This is as true in the Middle East and Muslim world as it is elsewhere. Our foe is oppression and extremism, whether in religious or secular guise. We draw the line against those who seek to advance their agenda through terror, intolerance, or coercion. And I can assure you that President Clinton will continue to steadfastly oppose acts of terrorism aimed at stopping the peace process or denying the people of the Middle East a future of hope. The enemies of peace have not hesitated to use violence to advance their goal. But the President has affirmed that we will not allow them to succeed.

We also reject the notion that a renewed emphasis on traditional values in the Islamic world must inevitably conflict with the West or with democratic principles. These values -- of devotion to family and society, to faith and good works -- are not alien

to our own experience. It should come as no surprise that citizens throughout the Middle East and North Africa are testing and debating the role of these values in society and government.

People in the region -- as is the case around the world -- are searching for ways to achieve responsive government, guarantee basic human rights, and guide their lives. That so many of them look to religion, to Islam is neither unusual nor unique. This is a universal quest. Islam is not the issue.

Today, the real conflicts which offend the conscience of the world are manifestly not "conflicts of civilization." In Bosnia, we are opposing hatred and the use of force. Our enemy is bigotry and ruthless nationalism. Serbian leaders may seek to legitimize their conquest with claims that they are holding off a Moslem threat to the West. But the world should not accept such patently false claims. Certainly, we will not accept it. We support a democratic Bosnian state in which Muslims and Christians live together in peace. We believe that the West has an interest in demonstrating that such a state -- in the heart of Europe -- is welcome and can survive and prosper.

Saddam Hussein's explanation of his invasion of Kuwait -- to defend Islam against a Western invader -- was as transparent as Slobodan Milosevic's claim of a civilizing battle is today. No one was fooled. The Gulf War was seen for what it was -- a bid for conquest and regional supremacy that a coalition of Islamic and non-Islamic nations faced down.

In the wake of that war, the United States has been forced to deal with two hostile regimes in the region -- secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. Elsewhere in the region we oppose the extremist policies of secular Libya and fundamentalist Sudan. And we watch carefully from Algeria to southern Lebanon, from the West Bank and Gaza to Egypt and Jordan, where extremists threaten to divert the region onto the old path of violence.

There should be no doubt. Islamic extremism poses a threat to our nation's interests. There are forces which use the cover of Islamic revival to suppress freedom, withdraw from the world, and justify hostilities. These movements threaten the United States and the global community of nations because they speak in a powerful and all too seductive language -- the age old cant of hatred, fear and prejudice. But above all -- as we have learned -- they threaten the future of the Middle East.

Although the circumstances vary, the phenomenon of extremism around the world flow from common sources: disillusionment, a failure to secure basic needs, dashed hopes for political participation and social justice. Widespread disenchantment breeds an extremism of hatred and violence -- an extremism by no means unique to the Middle East or the Muslim world. What distinguishes Islamic extremism is that it uses religion to cover its real intentions -- the naked pursuit of political power.

In the midst of this challenge, the United States must join hands with willing nations and build regional bulwarks against extremism. In Central Asia, we are cultivating relations with newly independent Islamic states like Kazakhstan. Elsewhere -- from Turkey to Saudi Arabia, from Pakistan to Indonesia -- we are maintaining longstanding alliances and friendships with both

secular and fundamentalist states with Muslim populations. Our task in the Middle East is the same.

In confronting the challenges ahead, we must energetically pursue Arab-Israeli peace; actively contain those states and organizations which promote or support religious or secular extremism; and help form a community of like-minded Middle Eastern states which share our goals of free markets, democratic enlargement and controls on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Each of these elements complements and reinforces the other. Progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking helps place extremists on the defensive and increases their isolation. In turn, undermining extremist forces makes it easier for peacemakers to proceed. When peacemaking and containment work, moderate governments find it easier to bolster their legitimacy and face down extremists within their midst. And that moderation is mutually reinforcing, as relationships which hold the promise of greater regional stability are built.

Actively pursuing peace in the Middle East is one of the Clinton Administration's highest foreign policy priorities. It is the cornerstone of our efforts to help transform the region. If, after so much hatred and strife, Arab and Jew can live in peace in the Holy Land, they can harness their immense talents and resources to the tasks of progress. And they can set an example -- create a peacemaking dynamic -- which can positively influence all the other conflicts in the region.

What happened in Gaza and Jericho last week is, therefore, both simple and profound. In a literal sense, Palestinian police took over responsibility for maintaining order from the Israeli army. But this simple transfer of authority also symbolized the transformation of relations between Palestinians and Israelis. For the first time in their history, Palestinians have achieved the right -- and responsibility -- of governing themselves. For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israelis and Palestinians have agreed in practical ways to pursue peaceful coexistence in the Holy Land.

We are all acutely conscious of the difficulties and dangers involved in this process. Between the historic handshake on the White House lawn last September and the Cairo signing nine months later, we have been constantly reminded that the forces of extremism and reaction are determined to kill the hope of peace. We cannot -- and must not -- allow them to succeed.

Some may question the wisdom and viability of the course that Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat have chosen. But this is not the moment for second-guessing. Israelis and Palestinians have decided that the status quo is intolerable and that peaceful reconciliation is preferable to endless conflict and violence. We owe them more than just the benefit of the doubt; we owe them our support and encouragement. If they fail -- if we allow them to fail -- hopes for a peaceful Middle East will be dashed. And who can say how many more lives will be lost, families torn apart, or battles will be fought before it courageous leaders can try to build peace again.

Nor can we afford to stand back and watch history unfold in Gaza and Jericho. The complexities of peacemaking are only beginning to be revealed. The Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles calls for further extension of Palestinian self-government to the West Bank. Elections in the West Bank and Gaza should take place this year. And no later than two years from now, Israel and the PLO will begin final status negotiations.

Difficulties will arise at every step of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. They involve making peace between a state and an organization composed of very diverse elements. They include the most complicated conflicts to resolve -- and the easiest to disrupt. A permanent regional peace cannot be constructed on this fragile foundation alone.

Some might question why, given these difficulties, we have decided to press ahead with our efforts to achieve a breakthrough to a comprehensive peace this year. The answer is that a Syrian-Israel agreement would provide a decisive settlement between strong states entering together into a "peace of the brave." It would put an end to the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. Jordan and Lebanon would be able to resolve their differences with Israel in short order. Full normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states of the Maghreb and the Gulf would quickly follow. In short, the logjam would be broken.

An Israel-Syria peace would do more than just shore up the agreement between Israel and the PLO and ensure a transformation in relations between Israel and the Arab world. It would also do much to advance our efforts to widen the circle of peacemakers, bolster the network of Middle East moderation and construct a bastion against the backlash states.

In the wider sweep of regional peace, Syria plays a critical role. Historically, its alliance with Iran and its support for rejectionist groups have given the forces of extremism a vital base in the Middle East. By invoking Arab nationalism, Syria has given these forces an important claim to legitimacy. Syria has used its particular influence for ill -- when it rejected Sadat's peace with Israel; but also for good -- when Damascus joined the Gulf War coalition against Saddam Hussein, and most importantly, when Syria entered into direct, bilateral negotiations with Israel.

Thus, when President Asad took the significant step of announcing in Geneva that Syria had made a strategic choice for peace with Israel, his nation's erstwhile extremist allies quickly grew nervous. Palestinian rejectionist leaders, fearful they would lose their bases in Lebanon and Syria, went off to Libya in search of new havens. Hezbollah leaders argued how best to pursue an extremist agenda in an era of Israeli-Lebanese peace. Iranian officials hurriedly visited Damascus, apparently leaving empty-handed; when they got home, the Iranian clergy began criticizing the leadership for failing to prevent the emerging isolation of their nation.

In spite of these encouraging signs, we do not underestimate the risks and costs involved in achieving an Israeli-Syrian peace. As Prime Minister Rabin has noted, the wrenching internal debate in

Israel will make the price of peace with Syria painful indeed. Although it will be hard for the United States to ease that pain, we can and will .... as President Clinton has repeatedly made clear.... we can and will help Israel minimize the risks at hand.

First, we will insist that the peace be a real peace -- not the absence of war, but a qualitative change in relations between Israel and Syria. Full diplomatic relations; an end to the boycott; open borders for people and trade; promotion of joint economic projects. As President Clinton noted in Geneva, we already have good reason to believe that Syria is now committed to real peace in the way that Israel and others define it.

Second, we will insist that the peace be secure -- the United States stands ready to participate in the security arrangements that the parties negotiate. Specific discussions on what form that participation may take have not yet begun, but our commitment is firm. And just as we have acted this past year to fulfill the President's pledge to sustain and enhance Israel's qualitative edge, so we will act to bolster Israel's early warning capability and ability to handle longer-range threats to compensate for strategic advantages it may choose to give up for peace.

Finally, we will insist that the peace be comprehensive. We will work hard with Jordan and Lebanon to ensure that their negotiations with Israel result in peace agreements. And we will insist that the wider Arab and Muslim worlds end their boycott and fully normalize their relations with Israel.

#### Dual Containment

Imagine the strategic impact of such a peace on the wider Middle East. We will dramatically reinforce our efforts to contain the threats from Iran and Iraq. Iran would be denied the means to make trouble in the Middle East heartland. Its message of hatred, its call for the destruction of the "Zionist entity," will appear before the world as an empty, anachronistic threat. Similarly, Saddam Hussein's hopes to mobilize the Arab world behind an anti-Israel banner will be dashed. The coalition that fought and won the Gulf War also changed, through its very existence, the strategic environment for making peace between Israel and its neighbors. Such a peace can, in turn, again change the strategic environment in favor of the containment of extremism.

We will be able to increasingly isolate these two backlash states and the groups they support. Through the peace process, a new regional environment will be created -- even now, it is taking form -- in which moderate Islamic states, from Turkey in the north to Saudi Arabia in the south, from Morocco in the west to Pakistan in the east, will constrain the capacity of these rogue states and organizations to extend their influence and message of hate and violence. With Syria and all other states in this camp at peace with Israel, the Middle East balance of power will shift decisively in favor of moderation. The extremists will be denied the claim that they are the wave of the future; they will have to confront the reality of failure.

This widening circle of peace will help governments find the strength to counter extremism at home as well as abroad.

Governments will have the opportunity to counter disillusionment with the demonstrated results of peacemaking. Resources will be freed to provide for the basic needs of the people, rather than the destructive requirements of wars. Regional economic development, using technologies and capital previously denied because of boycotts and conflicts, will begin to offer the taste of a better life. And once governments are able again to concentrate on the economic well-being of their people, they will feel more secure in meeting their citizens' demands for greater political participation and accountability.

We know that Middle Eastern realities will inevitably intrude to temper this vision. We do not underestimate the difficulties involved in peacemaking or the resilience of the extremist forces that prey on the region. But there is space in our memory for more than just the massacre at Hebron, the car bomb in Afula, the invasion of Kuwait and the revolution in Iran. We have already borne witness to two signing ceremonies on the south lawn of the White House: the Camp David Accords as well as the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. We now know that a peaceful and prosperous future for all the people of the Middle East is more than a mere mirage.

Let me conclude by invoking the Psalms:

The day is short  
The task is great  
It is not up to you  
To finish the work  
But you are not free  
To desist from it.

The Clinton Administration is well aware of the daunting task involved in transforming the Middle East. But we will embrace this challenge. And I know you will be with us as we do.

CC: Records

( RECORDS )

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Additional Header Information Follows  
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Date Created: 18-May-1994 11:09  
Deletable Flag: Y  
DOCNUM: 040700  
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA28:ZVFNFYKWL.WPL  
A1 Folder: MAY94  
Message Format:  
Message Status: READ  
Date Modified: 18-May-1994 11:09  
Forward Flag: YES  
Read-Receipt Requested: NO  
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO  
Message Priority: FIRST\_CLASS

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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| 006. email               | Ellen Laipson to Susan Rice, re: UNSC Resolution on Yemen (2 pages) | 05/25/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Emails  
A1 - Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([Yemen\*])  
OA/Box Number: 570000

### FOLDER TITLE:

[05/05/1994 - 07/14/1994]

2011-0282-F

ke3448

### RESTRICTION CODES

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| 007. email               | Anne Alexander to Martin Indyk, re: Yemen Cable Requested (6 pages) | 05/26/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Emails  
A1 - Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([Yemen\*])  
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[05/05/1994 - 07/14/1994]

2011-0282-F  
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### RESTRICTION CODES

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| 008. email               | Martin Indyk to Anthony Lake, et al., re: YEMEN UPDATE (2 pages) | 05/27/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Emails  
A1 - Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([Yemen\*])  
OA/Box Number: 570000

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[05/05/1994 - 07/14/1994]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Jul-1994 10:44 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wendy E. Gray  
(GRAY)

SUBJECT: Final Foreign Policy Points

Hi Nancy, Calvin et al!

Below is the final (read most current) version of the Foreign Policy Talking Points

FOREIGN POLICY TALKING POINTS

for July 8 Press Conference

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JAPAN

MIDDLE EAST

NORTH KOREA

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TAIWAN

YEMEN

G-7

Points

-- We need to focus on four areas: growth and jobs, new infrastructures for a global economy, economies in transition and the environment.

- We are following up on progress at the Detroit Jobs Conference. Growth and job creation will continue to be a priority for me and for my G-7 colleagues. Workers who produce products should benefit from their export.
- Last year's G-7 meeting was centered around a set agenda. There was almost a scorecard of how well we could meet certain pre-set challenges. And we scored extremely well-- such as in getting the Uruguay Round signed. This year is more about creating a new agenda--charting a new course of renewal.
- We need to encourage the economies of transition such as Eastern Europe that having chosen the path of freedom, they must reject intolerance and the forces of reaction and find the patience to build their market economies.
- One of my central goals is putting economics at the heart of foreign policy. I am proud of what we achieved in that regard last year with the successful passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the GATT agreement and the Framework Agreement with Japan.
- America has and will continue to show leadership in the G-7. Over the last three years, the U.S. has led the G-7 to respond to the humanitarian needs of Russia, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. At Tokyo last year, we assembled a \$43 billion multilateral program with the IMF and the World Bank.

#### CANADA

- We have a good economic relationship with Canada, our largest trading partner. Occasionally, trade disagreements between our countries do, unfortunately, arise and we try to deal with them in as fair a way as possible. With regard to lumber and grain, I regret to say that we feel that unfair Canadian practices threatened vital U.S. industries and therefore we need to pursue remedies under U.S. law. In the case of grain, we are pursuing a GATT Article 28 negotiation against U.S. countervailing duties.
- Wherever possible, I would like to see us resolve trade disputes at the negotiating table. For example, in regard to Pacific salmon, I would hope we can sit down and resolve what we see as Canada's illegal transit fee.

#### ITALY

- Italy has an impressive record of small- and medium-sized firms that have been the engine of export-driven growth. In Detroit, I singled out these firms and complimented them because they have proven so flexible and responsive to fast-changing markets and consumer demands.

## FRANCE

- I am impressed by the Franco-German partnership evolving in Europe. Having fought three bitter wars since 1870, France and Germany emerged from the rubble of World War II to establish the economic, political and cultural foundations of a lasting partnership. Such a partnership is a model for our efforts today to extend a hand to former Cold War adversaries.

## RUSSIA

- We are very pleased that President Yeltsin will participate fully in this year's Naples Summit. He will have a full day of discussions with the G-7 leaders on important political and economic issues.
- The arrangement with Russia stops well short of creating a G-8. I don't believe there is any reason to do that now. All of us in the G-7 are happy with the current arrangement, as is Russia.

## GERMANY

- We intend to keep 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe, the majority (about three-fourths) in Germany. They will provide ready forces for responding to crises beyond the NATO area and increase the effectiveness of European contributions to international peacekeeping operations. U.S. forces will make a visible and credible contribution to the collective defense of NATO members.
- We firmly support permanent membership for Germany on the UN Security Council.

## Global Prosperity in the Long Run

There are four themes in the G-7 agenda:

## 1. Global Recovery and A Common Strategy for Growth and Jobs

- Our growth strategy from last year has worked. Growth in the G-7 this year will average 2.5%, up substantially from the 1% achieved in 1993.
- The growth strategy is working better in the United States, where it has been more fully carried out, than elsewhere. The United States created all the jobs in the OECD countries in 1993, and productivity grew faster last year in the US than in Japan, the EU or Canada. We have accounted for 75% of the output growth in the G-7. And we have the second smallest budget deficit in the G-7.
- G-7 leaders will reiterate their commitment to the GATT and to ratification of the Uruguay Round. This will bring major benefits for the world economy and for the US. It is equivalent to a \$744 billion tax cut over

the next decade for the industrialized countries. For the US, it means an additional \$100-200 billion in income over the next decade, which amounts to \$1700 per family over 10 years. It will also create an additional 500,000 in the US over the decade.

## 2. A Long Term Effort to Support Economies in Transition

We have made real progress with Russia in the economic sphere through our strategy of financial assistance measured with the pace of reform.

Russia's budget deficit is now running at a lower level than many European countries (Belgium, Italy, and Greece). Monthly inflation is now at single digit rates, and half of Russian industry has been privatized. Now is the time support the consolidation of reform in Russia and to spread support for reform through all the FSU and Eastern Europe.

## 3. Cooperation in Building the Infrastructure for the 21st Century Global Economy

The G-7 should take a lead role in developing a clear understanding of how the institutions and infrastructure binding us together in the future will change as the global economy changes.

- Our international finance institutions -- together with the World Trade Organization -- and the world's telecommunications sector will be at the heart of the 21st century economy in all nations.

## 4. A Focus on Sustainable Development and the Environment

I will ask the G-7 to add its weight each year to the support both of important policy directions for sustainable development and the environment, but also for specific, concrete actions.

- We will recognize special problems of African development. We expect we will be able to go further than in the past on debt relief.
- Leaders will provide impetus to the Cairo Population Conference and to call for the completion of national environmental plans.

## Bosnia

### New Developments

- Parties were presented Contact Group's proposal July 6. It is not a "take it or leave it" package. It is based on 51/49 percent concept. They will have two weeks to consider responses. Bosnia has indicated it will accept.
- Informal PERMREP meeting held Thursday in Geneva to discuss proposal.
- We expect the Contact Group to meet again around July 20,

followed by another meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

#### Points

- We welcome the territorial proposal developed by the Contact Group as the best hope for achieving a realistic and reasonable political settlement.
- The proposal preserves Bosnia as a single union within internationally-recognized borders and provides for constitutional arrangements that establish a relationship between the Bosniac/Croat Federation and Bosnian Serb entity.
- Incentives and disincentives were included in the proposal to encourage parties to accept.
- Incentives for the Bosnian Federation included international assistance with settlement implementation and help with reconstruction.
- Incentives for the Bosnian Serbs included suspension of UN economic sanctions against Serbia.

#### HAITI

- I regret that Panama has decided to withdraw its offer for a safehaven for Haitian migrants.
- Nonetheless, our Haitian migrant policy, including safehavens will continue.
- Panama was important, but we are building a network of safehavens in several countries. We have already reached agreement in principle with Antigua and Dominica. On July 7, Grenada agreed to provide a safehaven, and we are engaged in discussions with several other countries.
- In the short run, we are substantially expanding our capacity at Guantanamo where we will continue to interview people for safehaven protection.
- Let me reaffirm that Haitians leaving by boat, which we discourage, will have an opportunity to receive protection in third country safehavens. They will not be eligible for resettlement in the U.S. Only those screened in through in country processing in Haiti will be eligible for resettlement in the U.S.

#### COMMITMENT, LEADERSHIP AND INTERESTS

- We have taken a very aggressive leadership role in confronting the crisis in Haiti. We are mobilizing a worldwide effort to restore democracy and in the meantime give safe haven to Haitians in need of protection.

- We have a moral stake in democracy and human rights everywhere. Our capacity to uphold our principles varies but when gross abuses take place nearby we can and must act.
- I've stated before our compelling interests in Haiti:
  - o We are close neighbors, with up to one million people of Haitian descent here and several thousand Americans working and living there;
  - o Worsening human rights abuses, the denial of democracy for which Haitians worked so hard and economic decline, all results of the coup, are intolerable in themselves and drive Haitians to flee in boats for America.
  - o Haiti and Cuba are the only two countries in our hemisphere now where democracy is denied. The repression in Haiti has unsettling effects on the entire region and cannot be tolerated.
  - o Drugs are coming to the United States from Haiti and that must be stopped.

#### AN ACTIVE STRATEGY

- We have worked with the international community to restore democracy. For more than a year we sought to achieve that goal by fostering a settlement between the Haitian parties. The military leaders blocked every initiative.
- Since May we have tightened the noose on the military leaders. We led the UN in imposing full trade sanctions, then focussed the pressure by banning air traffic and financial transactions, blocking assets and revoking visas. We're acting to seal the Dominican border.
- With human rights abuses worsening and knowing that sanctions are a blunt instrument, I took steps to protect innocent Haitians.
  - o We have increased our humanitarian feeding and health care programs in spite of adverse conditions.
  - o We have increased in-country refugee processing, the best and safest route to political refugee status.
  - o We have supported the international human rights monitors.
  - o And we have put into place procedures which offer all Haitians who leave by boat protection if they need it.

#### OUR DETERMINATION TO PREVAIL

- I will spare no effort to make the sanctions work to achieve our goals -- restoration of democracy, return of President Aristide. I am convinced that, if universally respected and

enforced, they can.

- At the same time, I will set aside no option which I may need to protect American interests and achieve our goals.
- I have deployed Marines off Haiti. They give us the capability to evacuate Americans if necessary.
- Given that I have not ruled out the use of force, it would be irresponsible not to be prepared should we reach that point. I will not comment on specific readiness measures.
- My message is clear: The military leaders must step down. Our determination to prevail is getting across to them. The pressure will keep building until they leave so that democracy can be restored.

#### JAPAN

##### Points

- We are ready to work with the new Japanese government, as we are with any duly-formed Japanese government. Prime Minister Murayama has expressed his desire to work together on the Framework negotiations -- and we will both press our negotiators to reach agreements as soon as possible.
- The Prime Minister has stated his support for a greater awareness of consumer needs in Japan - and the Japanese people are asking for that too. I believe the Framework talks can support many of the objectives the Prime Minister and the people of Japan seek to achieve.
- The economies of the U.S. and Japan still account for 40% of the world's GDP, making our economic relationship extremely important. In many ways, that relationship is very beneficial to both countries.
- Obviously, there are economic issues we must address (Framework talks, macroeconomic issues, deregulation efforts). We have not reached agreement in all areas, but Prime Minister Murayama and I assured each other that we would work to address these and other economic issues.

##### Japan's Macroeconomic Efforts

- There are signs of improvement in Japan's economy and business confidence is on the rise. (NOTE: 3.9% annual growth rate in 1st Quarter 1994)
- We will be following the tax reform debate in Japan closely. We seek a net stimulus that will significantly reduce Japan's current account surplus and spur domestic demand.

##### Deregulation Efforts

- As you know, Japan recently announced a package of

deregulation initiatives, which we welcome. The key issue now is to see that the initiatives are implemented fully.

#### Security

- In its first week in office, Prime Minister Murayama's Cabinet has gone to some length to reassure the U.S. and other nations that its foreign policy will be characterized by continuity and stability.
- Currently, we have returned to the negotiating table with North Korea and have the full support of our allies -- Japan and South Korea -- as well as China and Russia. We have no reason to believe that we will have anything less than full cooperation from Japan in these circumstances.

#### Middle East

#### Background

- Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat met in Paris and agreed on a procedure for advancing next stage of Palestinian self-rule. They issued a joint communique.
- They will establish committees to deal with the issues of prisoner return and refugee return, size of Jericho and early empowerment of Palestinian authority.
- Arafat pledged to convene the Palestine National Congress to amend the Palestine National Covenant.
- On July 20, FM Peres, Jordanian Prime Minister Majali and Secretary Christopher will hold a trilateral meeting in a Jordanian Dead Sea hotel, the first such open meeting in Jordan at that level.

#### Points

- I am pleased at the progress made on implementation of the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in Gaza/Jericho.
- We welcome Chairman Arafat's commitment to convene the Palestine National Congress in the "very near future" to amend the Palestine National Covenant.
- We are also pleased at the significant progress made in Jordan-Israel negotiations, including the meetings to be held later this month in Jordan between the two sides.
- I am sending Secretary Christopher to the region shortly to pursue our objective of a comprehensive peace. Continued progress on the Syrian negotiating track will be very important to achieving this goal.
- It is essential that the substantive movement registered in the Palestinian and Jordanian talks also take place on the other negotiating tracks. It is my hope that all parties

will seize the moment to make progress towards a comprehensive settlement which will benefit all the peoples of the Middle East.

#### NORTH KOREA

##### New Developments

- Talks with North Koreans begin today (July 8) in Geneva. Bob Gallucci will head US team.
- Gallucci and Dan Poneman of the NSC briefed former President Bush on North Korea, as part of briefings offered to former presidents on this issue. (No press notice yet.)
- President Carter said on July 6 that North Korea probably will not give up the used nuclear fuel rods it has removed. He urged that we don't let more plutonium be processed.
- Senator Levins en route to North Korea.

##### Points

- Based on North Korea's commitment to freeze major elements of its nuclear program during a new round of talks between our nations, we agreed to resume those talks on July 8.
- We also welcome the proposed North-South summit.
- Now is not the time to be either wildly optimistic or pessimistic about these developments. What matters here is what the North Koreans say and what they do.
- We shall continue to be steady, persistent and pragmatic in seeking a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and a strong non-proliferation regime.
- At the same time, we will continue to ensure that we meet our security commitments to the Republic of Korea.
- We are grateful to President Carter for the important role he played in helping to achieve the renewed dialogue with North Korea.
- We will take whatever prudent measures are necessary for the defense of South Korea and our forces there.

##### Senator Levin's Trip to North Korea

- We understand that this is a private visit and that he is traveling at the invitation of the North Koreans.
- As is customary on such visits, he will be accompanied by a State Department escort while there. But he will carry no message from us.
- (IF PRESSED ON WHETHER LEVIN WAS BRIEFED): This trip was arranged quickly and Senator Levin is being briefed en

route.

(NOTE: You should avoid getting into this in detail. Since the ROK denied Levin transit rights from South to North Korea, Levin will be briefed by U.S. Embassy Beijing. We should avoid focusing attention on ROK irritation over the visit. If asked whether Levin has been briefed, you should say that as a member of the SASC Levin is familiar with the issue and that you understand he will get further State Department briefings before entering North Korea.)

(IF RAISED: the South Koreans denied Levin transit to North Korea from South Korea.) We understand that they have, but you would have to talk to the South Koreans for any details about that.]

#### Nuclear Reactor for North Korea

- In the second round of talks with the United States last July, North Korea stated its desire to move away from gas-graphite nuclear technology to light-water technology. Recently, North Korea has reiterated this position.
- We welcomed that proposed shift to a nuclear program far less suited to nuclear weapons, and plan to address this issue in the third round.

(If pressed) We have never said that the United States would supply North Korea a reactor, rather that we would help them make the transition to a less dangerous technology.

#### Rwanda

##### New Developments

- The Rwandan Patriotic Front, which declared itself the country's only legitimate government yesterday, is working with Hutus to form a multi-ethnic coalition. A Hutu moderate Faustin Twagiramungu is said, by some press accounts, to be named as Prime Minister. He would have been Prime Minister under the never implemented 1993 Arusha peace accord.
- RPF leader General Kagame said the new government will abide by the Arusha agreement.
- General Kagame also claims they will declare a unilateral cease-fire once they are confident they can defend their areas of control.

##### Points

- We applaud the action by the RPF to pull back from a confrontation with the French.
- We continue to support the French humanitarian intervention into Rwanda and view it as a temporary measure until they

are replaced as soon as possible by UNAMIR forces.

- It is vital for the success of the French mission that their forces avoid positioning themselves between the armed combatants.
- We continue to support the establishment of a humanitarian zone but caution that it must be solely for unarmed civilians. It should not include the entire area held by the Interim Government of Rwanda, but should be limited to a small safe haven for humanitarian purposes only.

#### Taiwan

##### Background

- The Los Angeles Times wrote that the Administration is preparing changes in its policy toward Taiwan in several areas, including permitting American Cabinet officials to visit Taiwan and Taiwan officials visit the U.S., allowing Taiwan to use an identifiable name and permitting Taiwanese officials to meet with American officials in government settings/offices.

##### Points

- We have initiated an interagency review of our policy toward Taiwan. That review is not yet completed.
- I cannot discuss the details at this time. I won't speculate on when the review will be completed.

#### Yemen

##### Background

- The fighting in Yemen is abating and Northern forces have prevailed militarily, taking most parts Aden. Senior Southern leaders have been evacuated to neighboring countries.

##### Points

- We are concerned that humanitarian needs particularly in Aden be addressed.
- We urge the Government in Sanaa to work quickly to establish political reconciliation and restore peace and stability to the country.
- Also urge Sanaa to reach out to its neighbors and reassure them of Yemen's commitment to regional security and stability.
- We will continue to consult with our friends in the region on the situation in Yemen.

-- We strongly support the UN and Arab League missions. These missions can play useful role in restoring order and promoting reconciliation process.

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| 010. email               | Anne Alexander to Martin Indyk, re: [Yemeni Weapons] (1 page) | 07/14/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

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Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Emails  
A1 - Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([Yemen\*])  
OA/Box Number: 570000

### FOLDER TITLE:

[05/05/1994 - 07/14/1994]

2011-0282-F  
ke3448

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]