

Ethnic Issues

Will Russia disintegrate into Bantustans?

Bogdan Szajkowski



recently, of Tajikistan, followed this route. To this list can also be added Karakalpakia, an autonomous republic on the territory of Uzbekistan, whose Supreme Soviet on 10 April 1993 approved a new Constitution under which the territory will become a sovereign parliamentary republic within Uzbekistan.

The third stage is the disintegration of the Russian Federation. The trend for the fourth stage of further disintegration of the Federation's components into even smaller entities is already clearly detectable.

Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? was the title of a somewhat prophetic book by Andrei Amalrik, published in 1970. He lived until 1991, he would have witnessed the final disintegration of the Soviet Union. Today, only two years later, rereading Amalrik we must ask: Will Russia be fragmented into numerous smaller units, the equivalent of South Africa's old Bantustans? The signs are that the processes are set for the 'Bantustanisation' of the once-powerful Federation.

The past four years have seen the emergence of a multitude of conflicts and flashpoints in the former Soviet Union. A map prepared by the Office of the Geographer of the United States at the beginning of 1990 listed some 40 ethno-territorial conflicts in the Soviet Union. By March 1991, some 80 conflicts had been identified by a Russian academic, Vladimir A. Kolossov. By February 1992, Kolossov had listed 164 conflicts affecting 70 per cent of the territory of the former Soviet Union.¹ Today both publications are already substantially out of date. My own research suggests over 204 ethno-territorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union.²

The Soviet Union officially ceased to exist on 8 December 1991, when the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus unilaterally abrogated the Union Treaty of 1922 and created the amorphous Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This was the first stage in the disintegration of the Bolshevik empire.

Thereafter trends were set for the second stage — the disintegration of the former constituent republics. It is worth bearing in mind that, while the first stage of disintegration proceeded along the lines of existing borders and the titular majority of a particular republic, the second and subsequent stages are delineated along ethnic lines without clearly defined or indeed previously acknowledged (identifiable) borders.

demands for independence of the so-called Transnistria Republic and the Gagauz Republic fractured the territorial and political cohesion of the Moldovan Republic and set a precedent for future divisions accompanied by civil wars and militarisation of a number of areas. The disintegration of Georgia and, more

Ethno-territorial conflicts

Although the Soviet Union was a multinational state, only 67 nations out of the 103 recorded in the 1989 census had their own autonomous areas. As early as 1918, Lenin set out the framework for the ethno-territorial division of the Soviet state. According to him, there could be no norm which would ensure the right of all ethnic groups to their own autonomous territories. Rather, autonomous and ordinary districts should be united for economic purposes in large autonomous regions (*krais*). Consequently, internal divisions of the former Soviet Union were purely administrative: ethnic demarcations seldom corresponded to the ethnic composition of a particular area. Frequent changes in the political-territorial organisation were used mainly for the centralised control and direction of the economy and society. The residues of this Leninist policy are still with us today.³

Between 1941 and 1957 repeated changes in the national-territorial organisation of the Soviet Union were made. In 1941-44, seven peoples accused of collaborating with the German occupiers were deprived of their autonomous status and deported to Siberia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The claims of the deported peoples (14 altogether) for the restoration of the boundaries of their states now have a legal basis in addition to their historical and moral foundations. In 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a special resolution on justice for deported peoples. One of the main points envisages the reconstitution of their national-territorial units with the boundaries which existed on the day of their deportation. But how, in practical terms, is that to be implemented, and what would be the political consequences? What rights do the titular peoples have to their designated territories if their boundaries are legitimised only by Soviet power, which no longer exists?⁴

The catastrophic decline of the Russian economy has had substantial negative consequences for Russia's state sovereignty. The recently published data on the socio-economic situation during the first quarter of 1993 make grim reading indeed.⁵ The 19 per cent drop in industrial production during the first quarter,

compared with the same period in 1992, has been accompanied by a 193 per cent inflation rate, compared with December last year. The percentage of unprofitable enterprises in all sectors of the national economy rose to 21, compared with 17 per cent last December. The highest proportional share of unprofitable enterprises (between 41-47 per cent) was recorded in the republics of Tuva and Sakha (Yakutia), the Magadan *oblast* and the Chukotka *okrug*. By the end of March 1993, one per cent (1.1m persons) of the total labour force of Russia had been registered as unemployed. Some 38 per cent of the unemployed are young people under 30 years of age. One in every three residents of Russia now has a per capita income below the minimum subsistence level. At the same time there has been a sharp increase in crime – 12 per cent up on the first quarter of 1992 – with only 45 per cent of reported crimes solved.

Communist collectivism and ethnicity

The common denominator for potentially the most explosive conflicts is the intertwining between Communist collectivism and ethnicity. One of the most important aspects of the operation of Communism was the collective nature of the system. Individual rights (including human, civil and property rights) were subjugated to the collective and controlled by the Communist party-state. The system not only negated the individual but, more important, used the oppressive apparatus in order to enforce compliance with collective (party-state) values, structures and procedures. Communist collectivism reinforced group rather than individual identity, but at the same time offered a comfortable net of social and political arrangements. There were few if any choices to be made, the answers were all but supplied, little if any exercise of individual responsibility was required. The persistence of the political culture of collectivism remains one of the main obstacles to the effective transformation of the former Communist societies. It is also the main factor in the re-emergence of the ethnic conflicts.

There are both objective and subjective elements in the concept of ethnicity.⁶ The objective elements cover characteristics which are actually held in common – kinship, physical appearance, culture, language, religion and so on. Some combination of these characteristics, but not necessarily all, would have to be present for a group of people to qualify as an ethnic grouping. The subjective elements rest on the feeling of community. What is important here is the representations which a group has of itself – regardless of whether those representations are actually correct or not. 'The myth can be potent, and it is the group's representations of itself that are important.'⁷

I should like to stress the importance of the subjective elements. Ethnic groups can only be understood in terms of boundary creation and maintenance. In such cases a common culture is not a defining characteristic of an ethnic grouping; it may, in fact, come into existence as a result of a particular grouping asserting its own position. Cultural features are used by ethnic groupings to mark the groupings' boundaries. Similarly, notions of kinship can be projected and/or constructed so as to give greater body to the feelings of commonality within the grouping. The retreat into ethnic socio-political boundaries and values offers safety at turbulent times. In post-Communist Russia, as elsewhere in the former Communist countries, it has become one of the most poignant socio-political forms of organisations and threats.

The decline of presidential authority

The continuous power struggle in the centre and, in particular, the confrontation between the Russian President on the one hand and

the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of the People's Deputies on the other, has already had a very adverse effect on the regions.

One of the more recent examples comes from the Rostov *oblast*, where the local soviet abolished on 30 April 1993 the post of the representative of the Russian President. The representative and his staff were told to vacate their offices within a week and stop their activities. A serious conflict between the Supreme Soviet of Mordova and President Yeltsin (and thus the Russian Federation) erupted in April 1993 over the right of the Federation's President to interfere in the republic's power structure. On 2 April the republic's Supreme Soviet voted (by 116 votes to 37) to abolish the position of President of the Mordovan Soviet Socialist Republic. The deputies blamed the incumbent, Vasily Guslyannikov, for current economic hardships and accused him of abusing his position and attempting to create one-man rule. In turn, Boris Yeltsin on 8 April issued a decree confirming the powers of Guslyannikov. The decree has been seen in Mordova as a violation of Article 78 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 3 of the Federation Treaty which state that federal power may not intervene in the organisation of the republics' power structures. On 20 April Mordova's Supreme Soviet, ignoring the presidential decree, dismissed the government and created a new Council of Ministers.⁸

The growing disenchantment of the regions with the Russian Federation and President Yeltsin's policies were also reflected in the voting figures during the referendum of 25 April 1993.⁹ In 10 of the 19 republics – Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Altay, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabarda-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Mari-El, Mordova and Chuvashia – Yeltsin failed to win a vote of confidence from the majority of voters.¹⁰ It is interesting to note that several major *oblasts* and *okrugs* voted against the President. In the European part of Russia, voters in Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orel, Penza, Pskov, Ryazan, Saratov, Smolensk, Tambov and Ulyanov *oblasts* expressed lack of confidence in Yeltsin. Beyond the Urals, voters in Altay *krai*, Admur and Chita *oblasts* and the Aga-Buryat and Ust-Orda Buryat autonomous *okrugs* also failed to deliver a vote of confidence.¹¹

Crisis of statehood

The population's confidence in the authority of the state is extremely low. Laws that have been adopted are inoperative. There is increasingly evidence of a crisis of authority and of deepening antagonism between the executive and representative bodies.

As a consequence of the Russian Federation's inability to develop its own concept of state formation and bringing the federal mechanisms into operation, authorities in some of the republics and in *krais* and *oblasts* have been quite successful in building up their power structures based on the efficient interaction of local sources of power. Against the backdrop of the constant weakening of presidential and federal powers and the increasing turmoil in Moscow, local administrations have become guarantors of stability and formed the nuclei of state formation. There has been growing evidence that local soviets are slowly paralysing presidential power and breaking down the unity of executive power.

By now, many of Russia's regions have elected their own heads of administration. Previously, these had been appointed by President Yeltsin. The new heads have become responsible to the local electorate and are primarily influenced by local factors and conditions. Their legitimacy is based mainly on local constituencies rather than on central, federal authorities. If they are to

survive in their posts they must above all respond to local demands for greater economic and political autonomy. The resolution of the local agenda – social/ethnic problems, border adjustments and so on – are often at variance with the interests of the Federation and its structures. The elected heads of local administration are unlikely to support the federal authorities (including the President) for long.

In many respects we are seeing the repetition of the 'Gorbachev delusion'. Here was a man confident that he was running *perestroika*, but his *perestroika* operated only in the centre and was executed through presidential decrees. Meanwhile, the peripheries and local party bosses strengthened their own powers and developed and slowly put into operation their own ideas reflecting local needs and aspirations.

The inoperability of the Federation Treaty

The Russian Federation technically consists of 18 union republics and 69 other subjects of the Federation (6 *krais*, 51 *oblasts*, 1 autonomous *oblast* and 11 autonomous *okrugs*). Eighteen of the 20 republics identified in the Federation Treaty¹² and invited to sign the Treaty did, in fact, put their signatures on the document on 31 March 1992.¹³ Tatarstan and Checheno-Ingushetia refused to sign. Subsequently, Checheno-Ingushetia split into two separate entities. The Ingush Republic, created by the decision of the Russian Parliament on 4 June 1992, has so far not signed.

The Federation Treaty offered, at least in principle, the opportunity to conclude additional agreements on the re-allocation and mutual delegation of powers. More than a year after its signing, hardly any of the Treaty's provisions have been implemented.

The proclamation of norms has not been followed by appropriate additional legal provisions which would allow the exercise of rights granted in the Treaty. According to the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, Ramazan Abdulatipov, a majority of the subjects of the Federation are dissatisfied with the way the Treaty is being executed.

The central and most contentious issue is that of the status of the components of the Federation and consequently the rights and obligations of the Union republics vis-à-vis the Federation, and similarly the rights of *krais*, *oblasts* and *okrugs* vis-à-vis the republics and the Federation.

The Treaty appears to hold the prospect for all the 87 subjects of the Federation to be given the rights and status of Union republics. Many of the *krais* and *oblasts* and several autonomous *okrugs* have been demanding political and economic rights equal to those of the republics. However, neither the federal nor the republican authorities are willing to accede to these demands, increasingly afraid of the loss of economic and political control and the possibility of demands for a greater degree of political independence.

After a year of confusion over the precise rights and obligations of the subjects of the Federation, President Yeltsin has only recently indicated his opposition to *krais* and *oblasts* acquiring the constitutional right to issue their own laws.¹⁴ He has also spoken against the equality of all the subjects of the Federation as

political rights. Not only do his pronouncements contradict the spirit of the Federation Treaty, but in many cases they come too late since many of the subjects of the Federation have already adopted a variety of their own legal provisions, which they see as being within their sphere of competence.

In the absence of any effective execution of the Treaty provisions, the republics and regions want to replace the federal authority, a demand which is fiercely opposed by the centre. The

absence of a clear demarcation of powers between the centre and the regions is contributing to the weakening of state authority and the integrity of the Federation. For as long as the shape of the new federal structure and the prerogatives of its constituent parts remain unclear, problems of constitutional authority and delineation of prerogatives will, more likely than not, lead to a series of escalating conflicts.

The republics of Tatarstan and Yakutia-Sakha have drafted their own Constitutions. That of Tatarstan ignores the existence of the Russian Federation, while the Yakut version allots only defence and boundary protection to the federal level. There are numerous claims for the partition of 'double republics'. Given the incredibly complex pattern of ethnic distributions, no national and/or linguistic boundary can be wholly satisfactory to all parties. The Yakuts, for example, refer to the boundary of Yakutia as it was in the early nineteenth century, Tatarstan to that before 1552. They also express concern for their 'blood brothers living abroad', claiming the right to annex their settlement areas or at least to establish autonomous territories for them.¹⁶

On 30 April 1993, Kalmykia became a presidential republic within the Russian Federation, when deputies voted by an overwhelming majority to dissolve the Supreme Soviet and replace it with a 25-member 'professional' Parliament. They also abolished the local soviets throughout the country. The decision followed the election, on 11 April, of Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, a 30-year-old multimillionaire, as President of the republic. Subsequently, Ilyumzhinov imposed direct rule through a system of personal representatives in whom he vested special powers. The new President has emphasised the need for economic autonomy from Russia. It is, however, hard to imagine that such an autonomy can be achieved without the loosening and eventual severance of federal links with Russia.

The Tuva Supreme Soviet defied the Russian Federation on 11 May 1993 and amended the republican constitution to include the right to self-determination and the right to secede from Russia.¹⁷ It was decided that a new constitution would be debated by the Parliament in June. Nationalists in the republic have long argued that Tuva's incorporation into the Soviet Union was no more legal than that of the Baltic states. Given that two-thirds of the population is Tuvian, secession has become an achievable option.

Bashkortostan has been in serious dispute with the Russian Federation for over 18 months now. In the spring of 1992, the republic's Supreme Soviet demanded of the Russian leadership that 30 per cent of Bashkortostan's industrial output should remain in the republic. The republic signed, albeit with serious reservations, the Federation Treaty establishing the Russian Federation. Bashkortostan insisted that a special appendix should be added to the Treaty. In it, the republic proclaimed that land minerals, natural and other resources (including oil, of which Bashkortostan is a major producer) on its territory are the property of its population and not of the Federation. It declared that issues related to the utilisation of its resources will be regulated by Bashkir law and agreements with the federal government. The republic has also proclaimed itself an 'independent participant in international law and foreign economic relations, except areas it has voluntarily delegated to the Russian Federation'.

In April 1993, Bashkortostan's Parliament approved a question to be put to a republic-wide referendum: 'Do you agree that the Republic of Bashkortostan must have economic independence and treaty-based relations with the Russian Federation and Appendix to it, in the interests of all the peoples of the Republic of

Bashkortostan? The wording of the question predetermines the outcome of the voting – few if any of the voters in the republic are likely to object to greater economic independence. In practice it means the freedom to export its products and maintain its own tax system, whereby Bashkortostan remits fixed payments to the Russian Federation budget, keeping the rest for itself. What is more significant, however, is that the republic's authorities intend to place any agreement with Russia on 'treaty-based relations', i.e., relations between states. By asserting at the referendum the need for treaty-based relations, the Bashkir authorities have put pressure on Moscow to admit that Bashkortostan has a special status within the Federation. That precedent can now be followed by any of the Federation's units.

Tatarstan declared its sovereignty on 30 August 1990. On 21 February 1992 the Parliament of Tatarstan decided to hold a referendum on the status of the republic. Four million voters were asked: 'Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics (states) on the basis of fair treaties?' The referendum took place on 21 March 1992, despite the ruling of Russia's Constitutional Court that it was unlawful. The results confirmed the earlier decision on the declaration of sovereignty of the Tatar state.

In November 1992, the Parliament of Tatarstan adopted a new Constitution which clearly defined the powers, sovereignty and independence of the republic. At the same time the deputies insisted on associated membership for Tatarstan of the Russian Federation – something that is not envisaged by the Federation Treaty. After the adoption of the Constitution, Moscow faced the dilemma of whether to sign a treaty with Tatarstan as an equal partner, thus creating a political precedent, or whether to treat the republic as an integral part of Russia, which Tatarstan refused to acknowledge. The second option could have far-reaching economic, military and political repercussions.

The nationalist and secessionist movement in Tatarstan continues to grow in strength. Eleven organisations and movements in the republic advocate the complete independence of Tatarstan. In an appeal issued on 13 April 1993 they called for a boycott of the all-Russia referendum on 25 April, arguing that Tatarstan had never voluntarily been a part of Russia and that the people of Tatarstan did not need a referendum into which the imperial forces wanted to drag them.¹⁸

On 11 May 1993, during President Mintimer Shaimiev's visit to Budapest, Tatarstan, in pursuit of its independent foreign and economic policy, signed an economic cooperation agreement with Hungary for 1993-98. Under the agreement Tatarstan will deliver 1.5m tons of crude oil per year to Hungary and in return receive industrial and agricultural products. It was the first such agreement negotiated between Tatarstan and a foreign country. In 1992 trade turnover between the two countries exceeded \$235m.

The Tyumen region, rich in oil and natural gas, refused to sign the Federation Treaty in March 1992 and is now threatened with the secession of two of its autonomous *okrug*s: Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets, both of which want to acquire the status of separate republics. Secession of the two *okrug*s would reduce the area of the Tyumen region from 1.4m sq km to a mere 161,000 sq km and deprive it of much of its resources and industry.

The division of the Magadan Oblast and the creation of the Chukotka Republic became a reality when, on 11 May 1993, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation decided that the separation of the Chukchee autonomous *okrug* from the Magadan oblast was in accordance with the Russian Constitution. In 1989

the Chukchee accounted for only 7.3 per cent of the *okrug*'s population, while Russians and Ukrainians made up 83 per cent. In September 1990, the *okrug*'s soviet proclaimed itself an autonomous republic, and in March 1991 it decided to separate from the oblast. Magadan's authorities contended that such a decision could be taken after a referendum had been held. The Court's decision opens the way for the secession of numerous other *okrug*s throughout the Russian Federation.

Conclusions

The argument in this article is based on two broad assumptions. The first is that the residues of Communism will remain for a long time to come. It has proved relatively easy to carry out structural transformation in the former Soviet Union in order to achieve the edifices of liberal democracy. However, their functioning is more often than not at variance with liberal democratic principles and values. These will be able to take root only with generational change. The symbiotic relationship between Communist collectivism and ethnicity will continue to dominate the wider political agenda. It is the most difficult aspect to tackle because it reflects the basic, and in some sense perhaps irrational, feelings of individual and group insecurity.

At the same time, however, it has in political and strategic terms become the avenue for the expression of political, economic and social aspirations which had been denied so far. The substantial credibility gap which exists between the old structural (federal) arrangements and the demands of an essentially new post-Communist situation can only be bridged by drastic action: either by the dismantling of the old structure or through their fundamental modification. So far there has been little, if any, evidence of either.

Russia still wants to remain a federation rather than, for example, a confederation, a commonwealth or a community of nations. The old Tsarist slogan 'Russia is indivisible' is used as a rallying point by new democrats and old Communists alike. In one important respect the new Federation Treaty is even more reactionary than the 1922 Union Treaty, which contained at least a token provision for secession from the Union. The new Treaty does not. According to it, the territory of the Federation is integral and inalienable. The spectre of the disintegration of Russia is indeed threatening, but it is a progressive reality. The way this reality is dealt with in the long term will determine the stability of international relations.


The second assumption is that there are two incompatible processes taking place in Western Europe, on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, on the other. For four decades now the West European agenda has been dominated by integration in political, economic and strategic terms. This has been a long and arduous process based, first, on the clear identification of separate interests and, second, on the development of common strategies and goals. The East is now only at the stage of identifying separate interests. Integration may follow in due course, but if it is forced or artificially accelerated it will inevitably be full of cracks and consequent instabilities.

Perhaps one of the most important lessons to be learned from the historical experience of the former Soviet Union, and from the tragic events in former Yugoslavia, is that the federal organisation of the state and the multinational structure of its population are quite different things. There is an urgent need to re-examine our well-accepted analytical and methodological tools such as the concept of the nation-state, sovereignty, self-determination, nation and borders.

AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1993

VOLUME 49 NOS 8-9 £4.00 \$7.00

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
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APR 14 1993

Russia Has No Special Minority Rights Claim

JOHN VAN PELT - STAFF

ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION



1

*Moscow's efforts to protect
ethnic Russian minorities
ignore the human rights
of millions of non-Russians
in former Soviet republics*

By Bohdan Pyskir

ALTHOUGH Moscow is losing its ability to govern Russia, it is nevertheless trying to extend its control over neighboring states. Citing Russia's "vital interests" and "special responsibilities" Boris Yeltsin recently asked the world community to deputize Russia so it can start policing what used to be the Soviet Union. On Feb. 28, in a speech to the Civic Union (an ad-hoc coalition of former Communist Party apparatchiks and managers of state enterprises), the Russian president indicated that "the time has come for distinguished international organizations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers of a guarantor of peace and stability in regions of the former USSR."

Mr. Yeltsin's appeal to legitimate a new Russian sphere of influence is unlikely to be repeated by a conservative successor, should he be ousted. The move would probably be taken unilaterally.

Months before Yeltsin's Civic Union address, Russian politicians and statesmen had begun stumping internationally for the sheriff's job, mainly on the platform of protecting the human rights of the 25 million ethnic Russians who, due to the breakup of the USSR into 15 independent states, have suddenly become minorities in foreign countries. Judging from the response of Western decisionmakers and opinion shapers they have succeeded in distorting the minority question in the former USSR by defining it as an exclusively Russian problem. This has dangerous implications not only for Russia's neighbors but also for the global community.

Misleading figures

First of all, the figure of 25 million Russians living in diaspora is in itself misleading. This number may reflect the most recent Soviet census of 1989. But the census, in the opinion of many specialists, deliberately overstates the strength of the Russians to mitigate the demographic strength and growing restlessness among the USSR's non-Russian nationalities. Already by 1989 Russians were returning to Russia from the other republics by the thousands, and this trend accelerated visibly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Clearly, if another census were taken today there would be considerably fewer than 25 million people living outside of the Russian Federation who declare themselves Russian.

aspura. Yet, it is not clear that Russians in other countries would welcome Moscow's intervention on their behalf. In Ukraine a majority of its 11 million ethnic Russians voted for Ukrainian independence in December 1991. Also, most of the Russian officers stationed in Ukraine opted to swear allegiance to Ukraine rather than return to an uncertain future in Russia. For many in the Russian diaspora, emotional and economic roots run deeper in non-Russian soil. Actually, in relative terms the Russian problem of diaspora is no larger than the problem of diaspora for any of the other former Soviet republics. The Russians living in diaspora account for about 17 percent of the total ethnic Russian population. This is about the same percentage of minorities living in other states that one finds among all the other 14 titular nationalities of the former Soviet republics.

Russia has the largest number of ethnic minorities. More than 27 million non-Russians reside within the Russian Federation. Put another way, almost 40 percent of the former Soviet Union's minorities live in Russia. Thus the issue is not only minorities living outside Russia, but those who live within its borders.

What about non-Russians?

While Russia is making an international bid to protect minorities outside its borders, many of the minorities living in Russia are asserting their independence. Russia faces the prospect of disintegration. Addressing only the "25 million Russian minority" issue ignores the 27 million non-Russian minorities who live in Russia.

Russia's neighbors say Moscow is merely using the pretext of protecting Russian minority rights to mask latent imperial and nationalistic ambitions. Claims of Russia's "vital interests" and "special responsibilities" on the territory of the former USSR are particularly troublesome to the second largest former Soviet republic, Ukraine, which is home to the largest number of Russians living in diaspora. The Ukrainian government sees Yeltsin's bid to become the internationally sanctioned regional policeman as following a pattern of Russian revanchism established by three of the most powerful political figures in Russia: Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, speaker of the parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov, and the military-industrialist Arkady Volsky. All have issued repeated public declarations against Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Further alarming Ukraine and other former Soviet republics is that such revanchist rhetoric appears in Russia's new military doctrine. Specifically, it assigns to Russia's armed forces the mission not only of defending Russia's citizens, but an arbitrarily defined group of so-called "Russian speakers" living in the newly independent states bordering Russia. Meanwhile, Russian military units are already engaged in bloody military actions in four former Soviet republics - Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan.

Regardless of Russia's underlying motivations, giving it an international green light to act as a guarantor of peace and stability will only heighten tensions. This is especially true with Ukraine, which cites its national security concerns vis-à-vis Russia as the primary reason for delaying ratification of the START I treaty. Not only will nuclear disarmament be jeopardized by an escalation of Russo-Ukrainian tensions, so will 25 percent of Europe's natural gas, which runs through Ukraine's pipelines.

The West isn't powerless

Many think there is little the West can do to positively influence the course of events in the former Soviet Union. By assuming helplessness, the West imagines it is absolved from the burden of thinking through the implications that resurgent militant Russian nationalism-cum-imperialism will have on the democratic and economic development of the former Soviet Union. Propping up the West's powerlessness is the curious but popular notion of Russian nationalism as a dangerous rattlesnake. The argument is that if America does not sidestep the rattlesnake (but rather presses Serbs for a peace settlement in Bosnia, for example, or opposes Russia's attempt to reestablish its imperial grip over former republics), then it will be bitten - not in the US's best interests. Some snake-shy sages suggest that there is little the West can do to counter the resurgence of Russian nationalism - except helplessly watch as the reptile grows and slithers along its tragic path.

Actually, the West can play an important role in defusing ethnic tensions in the former USSR. President Clinton may have taken a tentative first step in doing this when he mentioned during a Vancouver summit press conference that the US is concerned about the human rights of Russian minorities - and of all minorities - living in and around the region.

The American president should follow up on this statement by sending a clear signal that aid to former Soviet republics will be preconditioned on meeting human rights standards set by international law. Rights of *all* minorities living on the territory of the former USSR need to be honored, not only those of the Russian minorities. While recognizing Russia's and the former republics' special interests in their diaspora, the US, along with the international community, should refuse Russia's or any other country's bid to unilaterally "police" its neighbors. Additionally, American mediation may prevent diplomatic tensions over minority rights in the former Soviet Union from developing into conflicts. An honest broker is needed in helping ease tensions between Ukraine and Russia. That also could salvage the START treaty.

■ Bohdan Pyskir is a research fellow at Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Institute.

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Gore/Chernomyrdin

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

Internal Transcript

September 2, 1993

REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AT TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY

Room 450, Old Executive Office Building

11:04 A.M. EDT

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Prime Minister and distinguished guests, it is a great pleasure to announce to you today the signing of several important agreements between the United States and Russia.

The Prime Minister and I have worked very hard over the past two days to bring to life the vision first sketched by President Clinton and President Yeltsin at their summit meeting in Vancouver. It is time to leave behind the vestiges of the Cold War and reach for a new partnership between the United States and Russia.

I would like to begin with a statement of personal thanks to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin for bringing to our discussions an unusual and, I would say, unprecedented businesslike approach to make this commission a working instrument with which to fashion concrete agreements at a highly detailed level, to bring into practice the commitments that were made by our respective presidents. It has been an extraordinary set of conversations, and I attribute the success of these conversations and negotiations, principally to the experience and dedication and businesslike approach of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. It has been a great pleasure.

Nowhere will the partnership between our two nations be so keenly felt as in the area of high technology cooperation. Each of our countries spent the Cold War years pouring our resources into competition. So much was achieved, but at such a high cost to both our nations. Now, we can work together to advance a joint agenda in energy, in space, science and technology, using our cooperation to keep costs down and to cut expenses that would otherwise have to be borne by both nations to husband our limited resources and to work together for our mutual.

Turning 40 years of competition into a future of cooperation is no easy task. Our presidents agreed at Vancouver that high-level attention would be needed to jump start our cooperation, and their agreement was the genesis of this commission.

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and I have focused fully on beginning that process of jump starting our cooperation during the two days of commission meetings here in Washington. Our aim is to broaden the U.S.-Russian partnership so that it encompasses not only security and foreign policy concerns, but also the evolution of an economic partnership for the future.

I'm very pleased to say to you that the Prime Minister generously extended an invitation to me to come to Moscow later this year for the next meeting of our commission and I have accepted. And, not only that, but the committees and working groups, established under our commission, will begin work immediately with their next meetings to take place in Moscow. I'm very much looking forward to my visit there.

MORE

Nothing pleases me more, however, than the results we already see emerging, especially the agreements on space cooperation that we are signing here today. Everyone remembers the great firsts that each of our space programs has achieved. Sputnik I, the very first space satellite, electrified the world when it was launched on October 4th, 1957. We were equally excited when Yuri Gagarin became the first human being to fly in space in 1961. We witnessed a long series of dramatic breakthroughs and first achievements by the Russian cosmonauts.

Then came the great period of lunar exploration with the Luna probes and the U.S. Apollo program. But the agreements that we are going to sign here today, much as they owe to the accomplishments of that competitive era most clearly have their roots in the Apollo-Soyuz rendezvous and docking in July of 1975. It was through this project that Russian and American space scientists and engineers, cosmonauts and astronauts first began to work together. And I'm very pleased that we have here today General Tom Stafford and General Alexi Lyonov, who flew together on that path-breaking mission, and first met each other in space and have since become great friends.

And, gentlemen, would you both stand to be recognized here today? We're honored at your presence. (Applause.)

Our common future holds more of what the Apollo-Soyuz project foretold. Close work together to minimize costs and cut the time needed to do projects while achieving more than would otherwise have been possible.

Let me review briefly for you the agreements that we are signing related to space. First, the commercial launch agreement, which will give Russia access to the international launch services market. Second, a joint statement on space cooperation which defines a phased approach for cooperation on human space flight. This statement embraces the potential for cooperation on a truly international space station if technical and partnership considerations are met, as we believe competently they will be.

Finally, two joint statements, one on environmental monitoring and space science, and the other on aeronautics will help us to set a broad strategy for cooperation in global environmental change, as well as in the design of future aircraft.

Dan Goldin, our NASA Administrator, and Yuri Koptev Director of the Russian Space Agency will have much to do in coming months to nail down the agenda of our joint work. I know, however, that they relish the task, and we will stand ready to help.

In many ways, the agreements on space that we are signing today represent the leading edge of what we're striving to accomplish, Russia and the United States together. From broad market access for Russian high technology goods, to long-term projects to work together in complex, productive ways.

At the same time, I would like to take special note of an agreement we are signing today that puts an important issue behind us. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Missile Technology Control Regime. By committing to adhere to the guidelines of the MTCR and by taking this first step toward entering the MTCR regime, Russia is showing its readiness to be a responsible partner in the sale of high technology goods and services. This is a welcome and important step, and I would like to recognize the hard work of Under Secretary of State Davis and Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin in bringing it to pass.

But space is not all we have worked on during this meeting. We have had, also, an exceptionally productive series of discussions on energy matters -- gas, oil and nuclear energy, as well

as our efforts on both sides to deal with removing barriers to trade and investment. And they exist in both nations and they must be removed in both nations.

In this, I think the Prime Minister will agree with me when I say that we owe much to the experience and suggestions that the American business community has brought to us during these sessions. Several leaders among the community met with us yesterday and offered valuable suggestions. The President's Chief of Staff, Mack McLarty has been of invaluable help and shares with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin a background in the gas industry, which has helped to make our progress possible.

We welcome the input of business and we expect to work directly with companies through the joint U.S.-Russian Business Development Committee, chaired on the U.S. side by Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, and on the Russian side by Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin, each of whom also serve as the vice chairs of their respective delegations in the commission.

Ultimately, it will be the American business community and not just the American government that supplies the capital and technology that Russia needs and that the United States needs to bring to Russia in our cooperative effort to develop the business opportunities of mutual benefit and to continue the process of long-term reform.

Just to mention a few of the accomplishments on the energy side, we will be working closely with Russia and our own business communities to complete the many U.S. private sector oil and gas deals that are ready to go. We were able, I'm pleased to say, to agree to two specific projects relating to the private sector. In one, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, will sign an agreement shortly after we sign our agreements, providing \$28 million in guarantee and insurance support for Texaco's \$80-million oil well restoration project in Western Siberia. In another, OPIC and the Russian State Investment Corporation are together supporting a new investment fund managed by Paine-Webber.

These investments, \$50 million from OPIC and \$25 million from Russia are for a private investment fund that is a model for the joint cooperation that we are trying to achieve. We will work very hard to expand our energy, trade and investment. We have agreed that each of our governments will name an ombudsman; one American and one Russian, who will work full-time to identify and overcome obstacles to specific investment and trade projects. Each of these ombudsmen will report directly to the commission. The Prime Minister and I will be directly involved in assisting these ombudsmen, identify and remove obstacles to trade and investment.

At the same time, Energy Secretary O'Leary will be working with her counterpart, Minister Shafranik, to define new policies that will encourage cooperation in energy, building upon the very productive discussions that they have had this week, starting in Houston and continuing here in Washington.

Finally, we agreed to launch an important joint study on nuclear reactor safety issues. This study will add to the fund of knowledge that has been accumulated in the past few years and will help us plan the most productive areas for joint work on nuclear safety issues.

I especially appreciate the Prime Minister's personal commitment to this cooperative work designed to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants in Russia. There was an entirely new kind of dialogue on this issue -- again, thanks principally to the personal commitment and businesslike approach of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

The Prime Minister and I have agreed in the course of our meetings that our commission should specifically focus our work on two other very important subjects: the environment and science. We will be organizing two groups to carry forward these agendas, and we'll see their first inputs at our next commission meeting which, as I mentioned, will take place later this year in Moscow.

In conclusion, I would like again to extend my thanks to the many people on both the U.S. side and the Russian side who have made this meeting possible and have made the first discussions of our commission so successful.

Mr. Prime Minister, if the beginning of our commission foretells its future, then this commission has the potential for being one of the most productive engines that we have to propel us forward into new areas of cooperation and partnership. I welcome the challenge, as I know you do, and I heartily look forward to working with you.

Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I want to extend my thanks to you for what you have just said. Thank you for providing all those valuable details about our work.

(INCOMPLETE TEXT)

* * * * *

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We would be prepared to answer any questions that you might have. Please designate whether it's for the Prime Minister or for me.

Q I have a question for both the Vice President and the Prime Minister. There's been a lot of talk about cooperation on a space station, but when will both countries actually decide whether or not there will be a joint U.S.-Russian space station?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We have already decided that work will begin immediately to define the nature of the cooperation which will follow from this agreement. There are three phases to the agreement, the first of which will begin November 1st. In fact, the joint work has been underway for almost four months now in an effort to understand fully and in detail the advantages to both nations of the kind of cooperative work that is now beginning.

The engineers and scientists have been working, in many instances, literally night and day. They have established a very close relationship under the leadership of Mr. Koptev and Dan Goldin. And as a result of their work and of the agreement that has just been signed, it is now possible for both the United States and Russia to gain tremendous benefits from a cooperative space station effort that will lead in the third phase to a truly international effort.

We have been in close consultation with our international partners in Europe, Japan and Canada. Jack Gibbons, the President's Science Advisor, has been in personal communication from the early hours of this morning in describing this to them. They are enthusiastic. We have consulted with our Congress and have been receiving a very positive response to the possibilities contained in this agreement. And the work on the first phase will begin immediately.

PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: I can simply confirm that we will start work immediately and that all that is required now is those persons who have been assigned responsibility for this get down to work. I don't think there are any impediments now to joint launches.

MORE

Q What's the benefit to the United States in cooperating with the Russians on a space station?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: What are the benefits to the United States? Well, there are substantial benefits. We will have a better space station than any of the options that emerged from the review, although this joint project builds very much upon all of the work of the space station review. But the combined station will be significantly better than any of the options that we could orbit on our own. It will have more power, significantly more capacity for science experiments, a better orbit, more useful for many of the projects that will be undertaken on the space station. It will have lower cost than would otherwise be the case -- significantly lower cost, with savings -- with launch savings, with life cycle savings, and with savings in other areas. And it will be able to achieve its orbit four years earlier than would otherwise be the case.

There is a natural fit between important components of the Russian program and the American program that allow our cooperative work to produce a superior station at lower cost.

Just to take one example -- the zero-G effects will be significantly better in this station than without our cooperation with the Russians. The capacity for us and our international partners to conduct science experiments of all kinds will be significantly improved.

Q Mr. Vice President, European officials in Moscow at the moment have expressed concern that this agreement should involve the U.S. government and the Russian government, government to government, for a space station rather than partnership between the U.S. and -- Has that issue been settled? Did you discuss it here? What are your positions on that?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We're totally confident that the agreement is in its proper form. We have relied confidently on the Prime Minister and Mr. Koptev for a clear understanding of exactly how the agreement should be structured on the Russian side. We have no doubts whatsoever that that has been accomplished in the proper way.

Do we have a Russian reporter who might wish to ask a question?

Q Mr. Prime Minister, recently Russia cancelled an agreement with India -- high technology and missile technology -- at the behest of the United States. Will the commercial space launch agreement make up financially for the loss of revenues from the cancellation of the India --

PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: With regard to our relations with India, I understand your question is how will we share profits. I'm sure we'll work that out. Sharing profits is really the easiest challenge for us. I'm sure we'll agree with the Indians if we have to as to how we will share profits. I'm sure we will come to closure with them on that.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let me address the same question by saying this. The amounts contained in this agreement were arrived at during extremely detailed and careful discussions by our space experts and were arrived at completely and totally on the basis of the advantage financially, scientifically, and technologically to the United States and to Russia from the work of the space group in isolation. And it should be very clear that it stands completely on its own and is in the very best interests of both the United States and Russia.

Q Did you tell us that the international space station is in orbit by '96?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: The question was, did I say the international space station is in orbit by '96. I did not use that date. I said that the international space station can reach orbit four years earlier than would otherwise be the case.

The international space station will come in phase three of this agreement and that is the phase that requires by far the most design work and will follow after the experiences that we both have in phases one and two.

But I would like to ask if my colleague agrees that it is appropriate -- I would suggest that Mr. Dan Goldin of NASA and Mr. Koptev of the Russian Space Agency join us in responding to some questions about the space station. They might even want to provide an illustrative picture of what their talks have led to.

Mr. Goldin; Mr. Koptev. I would emphasize that the pictures they are about to show you are illustrative of one of the most promising ways in which the two programs can be matched together.

MR. GOLDIN: Let me start by saying that the acceleration of the program starts by the United States working with the Russians on the MIR I space station. That gets us started immediately. It is a three-phased program. Phase one would have an intensive effort of the United States flying the shuttle to the MIR space station and utilizing the resources on that space station to get a lot of good scientific data and engineering data that will help accelerate the space station program.

We're going to work cooperatively with the Russians and with the Department of Commerce in forming joint activities between American companies and Russian companies. This is a government to government agreement. And during this first phase, one of the exciting things we are talking about is working on a solar-powered gas dynamic power generator, which will give us a new form of generating energy in space.

Mr. Koptev could describe the first phase of the program and show how the MIR will be used.

MR. KOPTEV: Ladies and gentlemen, on the chart you can see the configuration which describes the first stage and our cooperation on space exploration and research. I must tell you that this stage is already underway. It was put into effect on June 17th last year by our two Presidents. And today Russian cosmonauts are being trained to fly the shuttle and American astronauts are being trained now -- or rather, will start early next year so that in early 1995, an American astronaut could join us for three months in our mission.

As a follow-up to that mission, during the first stage, namely 1995-'97, three or four missions will be carried out by American astronauts on the MIR stations. There will be a rendezvous and dockings and a complicated configuration mission with the station and the shuttle participating together -- (end of tape side one; begin side two) instruments, thereby enabling us not only to carry out an interesting program in the best interests of both countries -- microgravity, biology, medicine, long missions for manned space craft and remote sensing of the Earth.

In addition to that, our organizations and agencies will also have gained some experience in terms of managing and controlling a complicated space station where very complicated life support and payload, transportation system, thereby laying the foundation for us at

the next stage to start building a Russian-American station, which will provide the foundation for further enhancement in terms of an international station.

Thank you.

MR. GOLDIN: Let me point out, in this picture we show the first experimental gas dynamic solar-powered generator that will perform cooperatively in the bay of the shuttle as it docks with the MIR station.

The second phase of the program, which is also bilateral, will again build upon what we've learned in MIR. And this will be launched earlier than the planned redesigned space station that we had talked about, that the Vice President had referred to. And it is anticipated that this would occur in the 1997 time frame and it will involve a whole series of features from Russia, the United States and the U.S. laboratory. We will begin some very, very advanced scientific microgravity and life sciences research that will set the stage for the international station and allow us to really begin the final integration of our systems.

And Mr. Koptev might want to describe a little bit about what the configuration looks like. Again, it's a typical configuration, not the final one.

MR. KOPTEV: Well, this configuration was developed through joint effort of American and Russian scientists, an effort which has been going on for several months now. It builds upon those plans and the design and technological groundwork which was delayed in our two countries. And the basic thrust here is to ensure the presence of American and Russian cosmonauts and astronauts as soon as possible on the new base complex, which will enable us as early as 1997 to start working on a serious program on biology and microgravity, and also which will serve as the foundation or, let's say, the main base around which we can start building an international station.

This basic unit will serve as the basis. We're now developing one in Russia. This will be the basis of our MIR 2 station, but we would be prepared to make it available for a joint Russian-American station. This builds upon all the experience and all the work which we have gained over the past seven years on the MIR operation. But since 1971, we have been running orbital units and structures of a very promising and complex nature.

Now, as we continue developing this one, we will build in a special gas turbine and solar-powered energy power supply unit which will supply power for the experiments and other projects which will be carried out together with the American laboratory module.

Now, to make sure that we are going in the right direction, it is our intention that the prototype of this unit as early as in 1996 will be flight-tested on the MIR station and on the American shuttle spacecraft. This is a very promising aircraft -- you will see it on the third chart -- because it enables us in the presence of astronauts to develop this into an international station.

MR. GOLDIN: And finally, this would be the concept for an international space station with the Japanese, European modules, the Canadian arm, the U.S. trusts, and a very robust power system. And one of the things that the Vice President was referring to was the fact that it will not just have one form of power generation, but two, which makes it richer and much more robust. And this station would be flying in a much higher orbit, which allows a much wider variety and an enrichment of what we could do for environmental monitoring and Earth control. We fly Atlas Mission on a shuttle in the United States one week, once a year, to calibrate our Earth

observation satellites. We have enormous potential now in this higher orbit to do a much better job in supporting the mission to Planet Earth, which is crucial to all of us.

And the key point here is we're going to do the detail planning between today and November 1st, which will allow us time for robust consultations with our international partners so that they're part of it, to consult with the U.S. Congress that the Russian government could work with their internal government mechanisms. So this will really be a very well-thought-out activity, that we're not just going to rush, but on November 1st we should be ready to do the right things.

And I just want to say something very personal. I spent the major portion of my career working on weapons and tools of war, and I am absolutely delighted to be working with Mr. Koptev and the wonderful engineers in Russia. We have an opportunity to change the direction the world is going in, and I agree with the Vice President and the Prime Minister, this is a historic moment. And I'm just very excited. Mr. Koptev, I want to give you a hug. (Laughter and applause.)

MR. KOPTEV: Thank you very much. Simply to add and to put the marker down on this, considering the potential for criticism, someone might, for instance, say that Russia is only providing support and the base unit. Let me preempt those questions and say that this is not really the case because we are thinking in terms of delivering and installing Russian modules on the station which will appear as components and which will also serve as a basis for programs both in the interest of Russian national programs and in the interest of the international community.

Thank you very much.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: And I might add -- mention again of the joint development of the new gas turbine technology, which will be U.S. and Russian cooperatively.

Q What orbit are you talking about and when is phase one going to start?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: -- 51.6. It's a higher orbit our program has used in the past, but is superior for coverage of more of the Earth's surface. It requires somewhat more lift, which has been the principal reason why we have not moved to that kind of orbit before. But one of the advantages of this joint program will be to enhance our mutual lift capacity.

Q You know that our readers are those people who stand very close to problems of our planet, problems of Earth. Usually we're faced with such questions as to, okay, all this is very fine and good. I also had the opportunity to interview Charles Stafford before this mission. But nothing changed in terms of the man on the street. What are the benefits of all those projects to the man on the street and to the poor and the destitute? That's number one. And number two, what is your view, do American leaders have an understanding and appreciation for our domestic problems?

MR. KOPTEV: Let me start with your second point. Something which is very important to our delegation and to myself personally and also to the Russian man on the street, to your readers, is the fact that we enjoy a very good understanding on the part of the leaders of this country. I'm sure you are well aware of the programs which have the support of President Bill Clinton. And one of the items on the top of his agenda is Russia. And one of the reasons why we have been working so successfully is that we enjoy a full understanding on the part of the United States administration for the problems which we are faced with for the economic process

that is underway in our country. And this is extremely, extremely encouraging to us. We understand each other very easily.

Now, considering the outcome of this visit and also the benefits from these -- that we'll reap from the space program, number one, Russia has never refused and will never give up on space exploration because this is for the benefit of all mankind, for the benefit of all the earthlings. Let me give you an example. We have benefited from the remote sensing of the Earth because remote sensing satellites, for instance, help us discover new oil reserves, new raw materials. Can you imagine how much money we would have otherwise had to invest just to go prospecting for them? But when you have pictures from space, you just go there, you drill a well and you starting working. That's number one.

Number two, the documents which we signed today are extremely important in the area of energy and the area of fuel -- open up new vistas and new prospects for investment. This removes a number of problems that we had to attracting additional investment into our country. This was virtually impossible in the past. It was rather an exception than the rule. Today we agreed that our businessmen will start cooperating on this, and we are trying to do our best to provide the necessary climate for them to cooperate. And all the Russians will stand to gain from this. And Americans will also stand to gain from this.

We're not asking for handouts. We want to work together. We want to make money together. And whatever money we make, we want to put to good use to improve the living conditions for our people in both countries. Of course, I could quote figures here. We signed some agreements which would enable us to work beyond the year 2000. They are very long-term documents. They're well-thought-out papers and documents. Of course, we can report the specific figures to you and to our people. And I'm sure we'll be able to do that.

But once again, let me tell you that I am extremely encouraged and pleased by the mission which was assigned to me. I want to confirm that we achieved a considerable breakthrough in our relations. We attach immense importance to not just some kind of pro forma exercise, what we want this commission to achieve is to work on a continuous which will be a working body which will be doing specific business with specific responsibilities.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let me respond briefly to the same question by saying that there's something very different about this commission compared to any joint dialogue our two countries have had in the past. This is a business-like commission concerning itself with the details of practical agreements that will create jobs both in Russia and in the United States; that will be of benefit to taxpayers both in Russia and in the United States; that will allow mutual advantages that have economic benefits to the person in the street in both countries; and will also, we hope, lead to a continuing process by which we find ways to remove the barriers to the enormous investment that we want to see from the United States and from the rest of the world in Russia.

A brief comparison: The nation of Hungary has 1/20th of the population of Russia -- five percent -- and yet American business investment in Hungary is 500 percent greater than it is in Russia. We are investigating and discovering the practical reasons why more investment hasn't flowed more quickly to the mutual advantage of both countries and the man in the street in both countries. And our work is going to be continuing. We have agreed to meet at least twice a year, alternating our meetings between Moscow and Washington, with the work of our committees to continue on an ongoing basis.

And I want to again compliment our vice-chairs, Secretary Ron Brown and Minister Aleksandr Shokhin of the Business

Development Committee, and also vice-chairs of the commission. They have been concentrating on some of these economic issues as well.

I might say that we've run out of time. I think there was one more Russian question. Could we take it very briefly. Very briefly if we could.

Q This is a question for both of you gentlemen. Usually over the past years, Russia and America were traditional rivals in terms of who will be the first to fly a mission and who will win more medals at the Olympics. Was it a draw here, or someone won, who was defeated?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We both won.

Chernomyrdin:
~~MR. KOPIEV:~~ Let's say it was a draw. (Applause.)

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (Applause.)

END

U.S. and Russia Sign Economic, Technical Pacts

Internationalizing Space Station, Aiding Nuclear Safety Are Aims

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and Russia signed a wide range of economic and technical agreements yesterday aimed at pumping U.S. cash into the Russian economy, enhancing nuclear safety and turning the proposed U.S. space station into an international project.

In a day of cheery ceremonies and upbeat briefings, President Clinton, Vice President Gore and other administration officials hailed the agreements as a prelude to a new era of cooperation on energy, the environment, arms control and technology.

"I'm personally very happy about this," Clinton said after meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

As expected, Russia agreed formally to join the United States and more than 20 other nations in abiding by the Missile Control Technology Regime, a 1987 agreement limiting commerce in missiles. The move officially ended a U.S.-Russian dispute over Russia's sale of rocket engines to India. That dispute had twice delayed Chernomyrdin's visit here.

The agreement to work together on development of the controversial space station will "minimize costs and cut the time needed to do projects while achieving more than would otherwise have been possible," Gore said.

"We're going to have Russians and Americans working very closely together," a White House official said. "We'll get more space station faster," with a new target of "getting something up and flying in the 1996-97 time frame," about four years earlier than previously planned, the official added.

Clinton used the occasion to press the Russians on two key foreign policy points not related to the agreements, White House officials said. He urged Russia to improve its relations with Japan, a potential source of capital investment, and to complete the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic nations. Chernomyrdin offered no timetable for the troop withdrawal, a White House briefer said, "but the Russians clearly understand the need" for it.



President Clinton and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin meet at the White House. Agreements signed were praised as a prelude to a new era of cooperation on energy, the environment, arms control and technology.

In addition to the space station, agreements signed yesterday included:

- A commitment by the Overseas Private Investment Corp. to provide \$50 million for a fund to invest in new businesses in Russia. The Russian government will provide \$25 million for the fund, which is to be managed by Paine Webber Inc. and aims to stimulate private investment in the struggling Russian economy.
- An agreement to cooperate in the development of Russia's oil and gas industry. The United States will provide environmental expertise and technology to the Russians, and the Export-Import Bank will help finance increased U.S. investment in the Russian energy industry.
- Establishment of an "ombudsman" in each country to facilitate the other's economic activity.
- An OPIC commitment of \$28 million in insurance and loan guarantees to back Texaco Inc.'s \$80 million project to restore oil wells in western Siberia, a project critical to Russia's effort to reverse a drop in its oil production.
- Creation of six "working groups" to foster economic relations, as agreed by Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at their Vancouver summit in April. The first

two, on business development and bilateral energy deals, are to be headed by Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown and Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary, officials said.

The Russians departed without completing one major deal that they have been seeking for more than a year: the proposed sale of more than \$200 million worth of surplus bomb-grade uranium to the United States for conversion into fuel for nuclear power plants.

Uranium industry sources said the Russians were upset at the failure to sign this contract, but administration officials denied this. They said all bilateral issues related to the proposed sale have been resolved and the only remaining obstacle is a dispute between Russia and Ukraine over dividing the proceeds. That dispute could be resolved when Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk meet today in Kiev, U.S. officials said.

A White House official said the details of the space station agreement remain to be worked out. "The relative amounts of American and Russian content and the impact on our own contractors remains to be seen," she said. "It's possible there will be a net job gain" in this country.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

September 2, 1993

United States-Russian Joint Commission on
Energy and Space

Joint Statement on
Cooperation in Space

Having reviewed the status of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes dated June 17, 1992, the Parties note with satisfaction past agreement on the following: the flight of a Russian cosmonaut on the Space Shuttle System in 1993 and 1994, and American astronauts on the MIR station, the docking and a joint flight of these two space complexes in 1995. These activities are consistent with the national space programs of both countries and the overall development of a spirit of trust, partnership, and long-term political and scientific and technological cooperation between Russia and the United States.

Based on the agreement reached at a meeting of the U.S. and Russian Presidents in Vancouver on April 3-4, 1993 and June 17, 1992, the Parties see great promise and mutual benefit through cooperation in space science and exploration activities.

Given the particular importance for Russia and the U.S. of their respective efforts in developing a new generation of orbital stations for scientific and technological progress and human activities in space, the Parties regard further cooperation in this area as most important, and consistent with the interests of both Russia and the U.S., as well as the broader international community.

With this in mind it is the intent of the U.S. and Russia to undertake a cooperative human space flight program. Interim investigation has already indicated potential advantages of joint cooperative activities in a truly international space station program. The Parties intend to pursue such cooperation in accordance with the following principles:

- joining on a mutually beneficial basis the resources and the scientific, technological, and industrial potentials of Russia and the U.S. in space activities to carry out a large-scale program of scientific, technical, and technological research;
- working with each of our current partners, and in accordance with earlier international obligations assumed by each of the Parties under the Freedom and MIR projects;

- operating in an orbit which is accessible by both U.S. and Russian resources;
- utilizing compatible service systems, enhancing reliability of the station and increasing the flexibility of transportation and technical maintenance;
- performing activities under cooperative programs on mutually beneficial terms, and including on a contract basis the procurement of individual systems and units or the provision of services.

The first phase of our joint programs begins immediately and is designed to form a basis for resolution of engineering and technical problems. This initial phase encompasses an expansion of our bilateral program involving the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Russian MIR Space Station. The MIR will be made available for U.S. experiments for up to two years of total U.S. astronaut stay time. The number of Space Shuttle flights and the length of crew stay time will depend upon the details of the experiments to be defined by November 1, 1993. During phase one, the use of the Russian modules "Priroda" and "Spektr," equipped with U.S. experiments, could undertake a wide-scale research program. These missions will provide valuable in-orbit experience in rendezvous, docking, and joint space-based research in life sciences, microgravity, and Earth resources. It will bring to reality performance of large-scale space operations in the future. The Parties consider it is reasonable to initiate in 1993 the joint development of a solar dynamic power system with a test flight on the Space Shuttle and MIR in 1996, the joint development of environmental control and life support systems, and the joint development of a common space suit.

Subsequent joint efforts on the second phase will be directed to the use of a Russian MIR module of the next generation, in conjunction with a U.S. laboratory module and the U.S. Space Shuttle. This facility would provide an interim human-tended space science capability where significant scientific experimentation can take place in a microgravity environment and also provide practical experience gained out of the use of different transportation systems (including the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Russian Proton), performance of complex construction and assembly efforts and command and control process of orbital structure of considerable complexity. Successful implementation of this phase could constitute a key element of a truly international space station.

It is envisioned that the U.S. will provide compensation to Russia for services to be provided during phase one in the amount of \$100 million dollars in FY 1994. Additional funding of \$300 million dollars, for compensation of phase one and for mutually

agreed upon phase two activities, will be provided through 1997. This funding and appropriate agreements will be confirmed and signed by no later than November 1, 1993. Other forms of mutual cooperation and compensation will be considered as appropriate.

All the above programs are mutually connected and are considered as a single package, the main goal of which is to create an effective scientific research complex earlier and with less cost than if done separately. The Parties are convinced that a unified Space Station can offer significant advantages to all concerned, including current U.S. partners, Canada, Europe, and Japan.

The precise planning process and organization of drafted phases of joint activity will give the opportunity to benefit both countries through expanded cooperative efforts on the space station project.

The Parties hereby instruct NASA and RSA, in pursuance of this Joint Statement, to develop by November 1, 1993, a detailed plan of activities for an international space station. This will serve as the basis for early review and decision within each government and as the basis for consultations with the international partners. Upon conclusion of the process of government approval and consultation, appropriate implementing agreements will be signed. NASA and RSA will include within the plan overall configuration, volumes, and forms of contributions and mutual compensation for Russian and U.S. activities.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

September 2, 1993

FACT SHEET

U.S.-Russian Commercial Space Launch Agreement

Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed an agreement today between the United States and the Russian Federation regarding commercial space launch services. The agreement opens the international commercial space launch market, hitherto limited to U.S., European and Chinese launch service providers, to Russia. The Russian space launch industry, with its strong performance record, should find a ready market for its services. We also believe this agreement is a first step toward Russian entry into other high-technology international markets.

The agreement establishes basic rules for the commercial space launch market concerning government involvement in such areas as subsidies, marketing inducements and corrupt business practices. Russian commercial space launch providers will be able to compete for contracts to launch up to eight telecommunications satellites, in addition to the INMARSAT 3 satellite, to geosynchronous earth orbit for international customers until December 31, 2000. Up to four launches may be of two satellites, and these may be counted as one, if the parties mutually agree that market conditions warrant such treatment. Russia will also be able to provide three launches (of seven satellites each) to low earth orbit for the Iridium system. Russian proposals for additional launches to low earth orbit will be reviewed by the parties and decided by mutual agreement as this unpredictable market segment develops.

The agreement obligates Russia to charge prices for its launch services comparable to Western prices for comparable services. Prices more than 7.5 percent below the lowest Western bid for launches to geosynchronous earth orbit would trigger consultations in which the Russians would need to explain why such a price was comparable to Western prices.

Other provisions of the agreement include information exchange, a mid-term review, annual consultations on its operation and urgent consultations on bids suspected of being out of compliance with the agreement. An "anti-bunching" provision prevents more than two launches under the agreement in a 12-month period. The agreement requires the U.S. to exercise "best-efforts" to issue export licenses for operations under the agreement, but the U.S. reserves its right to deny export licenses or impose sanctions when required under U.S. law. The parties may terminate the agreement by mutual consent.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

September 2, 1993

FACT SHEET

U.S.-Russian Missile Export Controls Agreement

Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Missile-Related Exports today, at the conclusion of the inaugural meeting the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Space and Energy. The agreement illustrates our mutual commitment to promoting nonproliferation and effective export controls. It provides a strong foundation upon which we will continue to build our partnership with Russia in space cooperation and other areas of mutual interest.

The U.S. and Russian reached an agreement on missile export controls on July 15. This agreement cleared the way for an expanded partnership on proliferation issues and in space cooperation. In the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Russia agreed to conduct its missile-related exports according to the criteria and standards of the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This formal commitment on the part of Russia met a major objective of the U.S. and the 22 other members of the MTCR. We also reached an understanding on the disposition of Russia's cryogenic rocket engine contract with India. We expect a final arrangement on this issue to be reached by the beginning of next year.

Russia's commitment to abide by the criteria and standards of the MTCR is a welcome and important step that shows its readiness to be a responsible partner in the sale of high-technology goods and services.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

September 2, 1993

United States-Russian Joint Commission on
Energy and Space

Joint Statement on
Cooperation in Aeronautical Sciences

The United States and the Russian Federation have agreed in principle to undertake new cooperation in the area of fundamental aeronautical sciences.

As part of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Energy and Space, co-chaired by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the two sides agreed to take concrete steps to complete the framework for new cooperative research in fundamental aeronautical sciences, utilizing the complementary capabilities, facilities and talents of each side.

The Commission agreed that cooperation will take place through a variety of mechanisms, including cooperative scientific research projects, cooperative utilization of test facilities and test articles, jointly-sponsored scientific conferences, symposia and workshops, and exchanges of data, information and documentation. Areas that were noted as particularly promising included hypersonic research, transition and turbulence, thermal protection system materials, chemically reacting flows, and composite structures and materials, including computational modelling.

In order to arrive at a concrete agreement on the framework for cooperation in fundamental aeronautical sciences, the Commission agreed that a delegation of specialists from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will travel to Russia during the month of September 1993 for the purpose of holding technical discussions with ROSKOM OBORONPROM. These discussions will be for the purpose of identifying specific projects and joint research activities to be pursued over the next several years between the two countries. The delegations will also discuss the establishment of a U.S.-Russian Joint Working Group in Aeronautical Sciences to manage the cooperative relationship.

The Commission also agreed that following the September 1993 meeting of technical specialists, representatives will meet in Washington, D.C., for negotiations on the text of a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Aeronautical Sciences between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and ROSKOMOBORONPROM. It is expected that these negotiations will be completed in time to permit the new agreement to be signed and enter into force by November 1, 1993.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

September 2, 1993

Joint Statements on Space Cooperation,
Aeronautics and Earth Observation

Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin issued three joint statements today in the areas of space and aeronautical cooperation. Through our high-technology partnership, the U.S. and Russia will work to realize new technological advances, productivity gains and cost savings. These joint statements create a framework and a strategy for cooperation in these important high-technology areas.

Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space

In a joint statement signed at the conclusion of the first meeting of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Energy and Space, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to combine our considerable experience and resources in space to carry out a large-scale program of scientific, technical, and technological research. Both sides agreed that significant mutual benefits could be achieved through cooperation in space science and exploration activities.

Through the joint statement, the U.S. and Russian have agreed to begin the first phase of space cooperation immediately. This phase will expand cooperation involving the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Russian Mir Space Station. A second phase will provide an interim human-tended space science capability, by utilizing a Mir module with a U.S. laboratory module and the U.S. Space Shuttle. It also will provide practical experience in the use of different transportation systems, performance of complex construction and assembly efforts, and command and control.

All planned U.S.-Russian space cooperation programs are interconnected and have the common goal of creating an effective space-based scientific research complex earlier and with less cost than if undertaken separately. The United States and Russia are convinced that a unified Space Station can offer significant advantages to all concerned, including current U.S. partners -- Canada, Europe and Japan. The U.S. and Russia will jointly develop a detailed plan of activities for such a Space Station. This plan will serve as the basis for early review and decision within each government and as the basis for consultation with their current international partners.

**Joint Statement of the Development of Cooperation in
Environmental Observations from Space and Space Science**

The Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed that the U.S. and Russia will examine the enormous potential and mutual benefit of expanding cooperation in environmental

observations from space and in space science. The joint statement highlights the importance each country attaches to bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of space-based Earth observation, environmental monitoring and space science and the benefits to be gained from such cooperation by both sides.

To advance U.S.-Russian partnership in this area, we will conduct a joint study to determine the feasibility of cooperative programs in environmental observations from space and in space science. The study will be conducted by NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Russian Space Agency, under the auspices of the 1992 U.S.-Russian Space Cooperation Agreement. It is to be completed by November 1, 1993.

Joint Statement on Cooperation in Aeronautical Sciences

The Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed that the U.S. and Russia will undertake new cooperation in the area of fundamental aeronautical sciences. To this end, the U.S. and Russia will negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in Aeronautical Sciences between NASA and the Russian State Committee for Defense Industries (Roskomoboronprom).

Later this month, a delegation of NASA specialists will travel to Russia to meet with Russian officials and visit technical institutes which may be involved in the agreed-upon activities. The delegation will identify specific projects and joint research activities of mutual interest and discuss the potential establishment of a U.S.-Russian Joint Working Group in Aeronautical Sciences to manage the cooperative relationship. It is expected that these negotiations will be completed in time to allow the new agreement to be signed and enter into force by November 1, 1993.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

September 2, 1993

FACT SHEET

Joint US-Russian Energy and Investment Agreements

Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, co-chairs of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Energy and Space, signed several important agreements today at the end of their two-day meeting to promote greater U.S.-Russian cooperation in energy and space. These agreements represent our joint intention to strengthen economic cooperation and significantly increase trade and investment, especially in energy-related projects. The agreements will also help to bolster Russia's move to privatize major areas of its economy and increase joint cooperation between our two governments, as well as our private sectors.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) announced two major projects for Russia, demonstrating the Administration's commitment to further assist Russia's efforts to implement economic reforms. OPIC President Ruth R. Harkin and Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin signed the first-ever U.S.-Russian Investment Fund. This \$100 million project will support the privatization process in Russia and provide substantial equity investment to new, emerging businesses. The fund is expected to generate over five times the initial amount of investment in the Russian economy, roughly half a billion dollars, while also creating investment opportunities for U.S. businesses. OPIC will provide a \$50 million loan guarantee with Paine Webber, who will manage the fund, and the Russian Government has agreed to contribute \$25 million.

OPIC signed an additional agreement providing \$28 million in loan guarantees and insurance for Texaco's \$80 million project to restore oil wells in Russia's Western Siberia region. The Administration is hopeful this and similar efforts will help the Russians to begin rebuilding their energy sector by restoring and increasing vital oil exports.

A Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Fossil Energy, signed by Secretary of Energy O'Leary and the Russian Minister of Fuels and Energy Yuriy Shafranik, will facilitate cooperation in fossil energy development. Through this agreement the U.S. and Russia will work jointly in four major areas: to identify improved technologies for supplying residential and industrial energy needs; to develop environmental remediation technologies by transferring U.S. know-how and technology which may improve Russia's environmental protection measures; to conduct joint

research and development for improving the production and distribution methods of non-nuclear energy sources; and to provide recommendations to commercialize and privatize Russian facilities.

EXIMBANK and the Russian Ministry of Finance signed a memorandum of understanding that will lead to an expansion of the range of exports to Russia currently financed by Eximbank. Signed by EXIMBANK Chairman Kenneth D. Brody and Russian First Deputy Minister of Finance Andrey Vavilov, the memorandum outlines the principles to be included in a Project Finance Agreement currently under negotiation which would allow EXIMBANK to expand the scope of trade relations between the U.S. and Russia to new oil and gas projects, as well as projects in other promising sectors. We believe this is one of many steps the Russians have taken to demonstrate their continued commitment to promote market reform and encourage further privatization.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

September 2, 1993

United States-Russian Joint Commission on
Energy and Space

Joint Statement on
the Development of Cooperation in
Environmental Observations from Space and in Space Science

Having reviewed the status of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes dated June 17, 1992, the Parties agree that it would be mutually beneficial to examine expanded cooperative activities in Environmental Observations from Space and in Space Science.

Given the particular importance to Russia and the United States of their current efforts to understand the scientific basis for global environmental change and to conduct scientific exploration to expand human understanding of the origin and nature of the solar system and universe, the Parties consider further cooperation in this area as most important and consistent with the interests of both Russia and the United States, as well as the entire international community.

With this in mind, the U.S. and Russia will ask the Joint Working Groups established under the 1992 Space Cooperation Agreement to initiate a study to define and determine the feasibility of cooperative programs in Environmental Observations from Space and in Space Science. This joint study shall be pursued in accordance with the following principles:

- o joining on a mutually beneficial basis the resources, and the scientific and technical potential and experience of Russia and the United States in Environmental Observation from Space and Space Sciences;
- o committing to the full and open sharing of civil space-based and in situ data for the purposes of Environmental Monitoring and Global Change Research;
- o working with current international partners (in coordination mechanisms such as the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites), and bilaterally in the U.S.-Russian Joint Working Groups on Solar System Exploration, Astronomy and Astrophysics, Solar-Terrestrial Physics, Earth Sciences, Mission to Planet Earth (including the Subgroup on Operational Satellites Systems and Data Exchange), and Space Biomedical and Life Support Systems, and consistent with existing international obligations assumed by each of the Parties;

- o seeking to expand U.S.-Russian cooperation in Environmental Observations from Space and in Space Science with a goal to increase international cooperation to minimize cost, decrease duplication, and increase the scope and effectiveness of research in these disciplines.

The Parties hereby instruct the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Russian Space Agency, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the Russian Federal Hydrometeorological and Environmental Monitoring Service, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and other relevant entities to undertake, in pursuance of this Joint Statement, the planned studies that will define development of the specific projects involving both countries' firms and organizations, being guided by the above principles and provisions and by existing agreements of both nations with their international partners, with a completion date for the studies not later than November 1, 1993.

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Human Rights Issues

COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992

R E P O R T

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED



FEBRUARY 1993

Printed for the use of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign
Affairs of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives respectively

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61-307cc

WASHINGTON : 1993

(WCL) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), respectively.

In June the ILO issued a report on Romanian compliance with ILO conventions. Although it noted with satisfaction changes in the Labor Code prohibiting discrimination on the basis of political connections or social origin, it underscored the need to increase measures to ensure a tolerant and discrimination-free workplace for the country's ethnic minorities, particularly Gypsies (see Section 5).

b. *The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.*—The 1991 legislation permits workers to organize into unions and to bargain collectively. There is no clear procedure to define which unions are recognized by management as negotiating partners, but with the exception of the railway workers' strike, this lacuna did not cause major problems in 1992. Continued state control over most industrial resources and the absence of independent management representatives complicates collective bargaining efforts. In addition to basic wage scales established through collective bargaining, most workers as well as pensioners receive thrice-yearly increases indexed to prospective price increases. The amount of the indexed increases is determined through government/trade union negotiations. There are no export processing zones.

c. *Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.*—The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it was not practiced.

d. *Minimum Age for Employment of Children.*—The minimum age for employment is 16, although children as young as 14 or 15 may work with the consent of their parents or guardians but only "according to their physical development, aptitude, and knowledge." Working children under 16 have the right to continue their education, and employers are obliged to assist in this regard. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MOLSP) has the authority to impose fines and close sections of factories to enforce compliance with the law. No violations of this policy were documented by the media or the MOLSP in 1992, and child labor does not appear to be a problem.

e. *Acceptable Conditions of Work.*—Most wage scales are established through collective bargaining at the enterprise level, but based on minimum wages for given economic sectors and categories of workers set by the Government after negotiations with industry representatives and the labor confederations. Minimum wage rates are generally observed and enforced. In 1992 the minimum wage did not keep pace with inflation, and it is criticized for not providing a decent standard of living for a worker and his family, although basic necessities like housing and medical care still are partly subsidized by the Government.

The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours or 5 days, with overtime to be paid for weekend or holiday work or work in excess of 40 hours. Paid holidays range from 15 to 24 days annually depending mainly on the employee's length of service. Employers are required by law to pay additional benefits and allowances to workers engaged in particularly dangerous or difficult occupations.

Some labor organizations press for healthier, safer working conditions on behalf of their members. The MOLSP establishes safety standards for most industries and is responsible for enforcing them. However, the MOLSP lacks sufficient trained personnel for inspection and enforcement, and employers generally ignore its recommendations. In general, workers are not committed to occupational safety and health and appear to value increased pay over a safe and healthful work environment. Neither the Government nor industry, still mostly state-owned, has the resources necessary to improve health and safety conditions in the workplace.

RUSSIA

In its first year of post-Soviet existence, Russia made substantial progress toward democratic change, the reform of its political and economic systems, and the dismantling of the remnants of the former Soviet state. President Boris Yeltsin, popularly elected in June 1991, governs with the Russian Parliament under the amended 1978 Russian Federation Constitution. Structurally and constitutionally a holdover from the Soviet period, the Parliament consists of the Congress of People's Deputies, which generally meets twice a year, and the smaller Supreme Soviet, which sits permanently. Conflict between the two branches over economic and constitutional reform, which occurred throughout the year, peaked at the Congress' December session. Nonetheless, at year's end a Yeltsin government, dedicated to the continuation of reforms, was in place with former Deputy Prime Minister for Fuels and Energy Viktor Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister. The Congress agreed to Yeltsin's proposal for a referendum in April 1993 to determine the delineation of constitutional powers.

In January 1992, the Government initiated its deep and far-reaching economic reform intended to transform the Soviet command economy rapidly into a free market. The program featured price liberalization, a decree on bankruptcy, and by fall a large-scale privatization program designed to turn every Russian into an owner of shares in enterprises. As a result, the economy has become increasingly "monetized," shortages have generally eased, and the private sector is growing rapidly. Nevertheless, the economy continued its serious decline as industrial production plummeted, inflation soared, the value of the ruble dropped precipitously, and traditional trade patterns were disrupted. Resistance to the reform package in Parliament increased through the year as the painful process of weaning unprofitable state enterprises from government subsidies began to be felt. Attempts to maintain an economic community on the basis of the Commonwealth of Independent States unraveled as many former republics increasingly went their own way. However, toward the end of the year, competition between producers and a coherent system of property and contract rights began to emerge.

Russia adopted legislation to end the repressive political activity of the former Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1992. The Parliament passed two laws codifying President Yeltsin's 1992 decree dividing the KGB into two separate agencies: the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Ministry of Security (MBRF). Both agencies are banned from monitoring domestic political activity. The 1992 laws require both organizations to respect human and civic rights, outline rules and procedures governing their activities and investigations, and establish presidential and legislative oversight over each agency's activities. Legislative oversight of the security services, however, is still in its infancy and is hampered by close ties between the security services and the parliamentarians charged with their supervision. Although the Russian Government began to plan military spending in a more open and democratic fashion, figures for total military expenditures are not yet available. As quickly as the Government began to work on the defense budget in this fashion, however, it found itself having to reduce military spending. Last May the Government announced plans to decrease expenditures by 12 percent.

The Russian authorities continued to implement the human rights gains of recent years despite the state of flux in the political and economic arena. In April the Congress further amended the existing 1978 Constitution to strengthen its political and human rights provisions, adopting language from international covenants. A new constitution is now in preparation but has been stymied by the conflict between Parliament and the President.

Freedom of speech and press, assembly and association, and religion were largely respected. Restrictions on freedom of travel continued, pending the full implementation on January 1, 1993, of the 1991 law on exit and entry. In other areas, however, the protection of human rights remained unevenly implemented. The judiciary, still reflecting its Communist heritage in personnel and practice, is not yet fully independent or empowered to act as a guarantor of human rights in spite of legislation to promote its independence. Other human rights problems include harsh prison conditions, unofficial discrimination against Jews, pressures exerted against independent labor unions, and continued use of the residence permit system which restricted freedom of movement.

The Russian armed forces appear to have used excessive force in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. In addition, Russian troops are still in place in most of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The troops became embroiled in a number of controversial conflicts, some involving the Russian minorities in the republics. (See reports on Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.) They occasionally acted without the Russian Government's approval. In some cases, Russian security forces also assisted the security forces of other republics in violating fundamental freedoms.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from

a. *Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.*—There were no confirmed reports of political killings by Russian authorities in 1992. (See Section 1.g. concerning reported deaths of civilians in North Ossetia and Ingushetia.)

In the northern Caucasus, political rivals at times resorted to violence. In Dagestan for example, a people's deputy representing the Democratic Dagestan movement was assassinated in February by unidentified assailants. Earlier, unidentified persons also attempted to assassinate the chairman of the Dagestan Council of Ministers, the Trade Minister, and other government officials.

b. *Disappearance.*—Ingush sources claim 1,687 persons were missing in early November as a result of fighting in North Chechnya. These sources believed many of the persons are probably dead (see Section 1.g.). As of late December, the Russian

Ministry of Internal Affairs in Prigorodny district had received requests to search for 118 Ossetians and 210 Ingushes.

c. *Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.*—There are no legal prohibitions against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in the amended 1978 Soviet Constitution or in any other Russian law.

In North Ossetia, the Ingush alleged that in subduing Ingush villages Russian and Ossetian forces tortured unarmed civilians. There were also reports that thousands of Ingush taken prisoner by Ossetian irregulars were treated brutally.

Russian detention or incarceration practices inherited from the Soviet Union remain harsh. In many prisons, conditions threaten the health and the life of prisoners. Many prisoners continue to suffer from mental and physical abuse and mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement, according to a wide variety of reliable sources. As in past years, there were no instances in which law enforcement personnel were punished for using excessive force or in which victims were able to seek redress.

Prisoners are frequently placed in unduly harsh punishment cells for violations of rules. No administrative process exists to ensure that prisoners are not arbitrarily or inappropriately sent to such cells. Changes in procedures instituted in 1992 limit the time a prisoner may be held in such cells to no more than 60 days during a year and a maximum of 16 days at a time. In labor camps, where prisoners live in barracks, prisoners may only be placed in cells for a maximum of 6 months a year.

During Soviet rule, Article 188-3 of what is now the Russian Federation's Criminal Code was used to extend the sentences of prisoners who had nearly completed their sentences. The Article prescribes an additional 3- to 5-year sentence for a prisoner guilty of "malicious disobedience" in labor camps. Although this law still exists, it was not reported to have been used in 1992.

Eleven corrective institutions for women in Russia also hold hundreds of children, who suffer from poor conditions and are allegedly subject to physical abuse. Parliament recently passed amendments entitling pregnant women and mothers to better conditions and food in prison, but few women inmates are believed aware of these rights.

Cruel and degrading treatment of military conscripts, sometimes resulting in death, remained a problem in 1992. The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, an organization formed to draw attention to this matter, continued to press for a halt to violent hazing of new recruits.

At times local authorities allegedly still threaten persons with psychiatric examinations and compulsory commitment; however, no instances of long-term hospitalization of sane persons were reported in 1992. In June Parliament passed a law on psychiatric care that established norms and procedures for subjecting an individual to psychiatric care. The law calls for obligatory examinations of patients in institutions every 6 months to evaluate their condition and check for wrongful hospitalization. Potential for abuse exists in provisions that allow the hospitalization of a person on the basis of an oral complaint by a common citizen.

d. *Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.*—Persons may still be detained arbitrarily and arrested without warrants. The Criminal Code requires that detainees be charged or released within 72 hours. Criminal Code amendments enacted in May provide for court review of arrests and empower judges to order the release of those arrested. One of the authors arrested for the alleged publication of state secrets in a Moscow News article about chemical weapons obtained his release under provisions of these amendments. Several of the plotters of the August 1991 coup attempt were also released under these provisions of law. The April Criminal Code amendments also enhanced the right to counsel and implemented certain amendments to the 1978 Constitution that further enhanced individual rights in the judicial process. According to press reports from April, there are some 15,000 persons in pretrial detention, many of whom have been held for longer than 18 months due to a serious backlog of cases that was exacerbated in 1992 by the rising crime rate and a breakdown in the system for appointing new "people's assessors" or lay judges.

In September the Russian general prosecutor's office in Nalchik arrested Yuri Shanibov, President of the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples, on charges of "inflaming ethnic hatred." The arrest was aimed at curtailing his political activity. Shanibov has advocated separatism and the creation of an Islamic confederation in the Northern Caucasus. Shanibov later was released following large popular demonstrations supporting him.

Internal exile was not known to have been used as punishment in 1992.

e. *Denial of Fair Public Trial.*—The courts, which historically served as tools for

ership at all levels. No trial date has been set for those accused of plotting the August 1991 coup attempt. Six of the accused have been released pending trial; the others remain incarcerated. Most judges remain poorly trained and have as yet little understanding of the concept of an independent judiciary. In June, however, the Supreme Soviet passed a law strengthening the status of judges. The law, among other things, substantially increased judicial salaries and benefits, established professional competency requirements for new judges, and mandated lifetime appointments for new judges. Russian judges say the new law has raised judicial morale and has begun to attract better applicants to the judicial profession. Military tribunals handle cases of offenses by active duty personnel under the military code.

Russian state prosecutors continue to exercise powerful influence over the investigative process and over courtroom proceedings. They, not the courts, supervise police investigators, leaving open the potential for coverup of police abuse and investigative errors.

In April the Russian Parliament passed amendments that declare the accused innocent until proven guilty. In practice, however, Russian criminal justice is based on the presumption of guilt. The acquittal rate is less than 1 percent of the cases. Generally, trials are public. Defendants have the right to attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence.

The court appoints an attorney for defendants who do not have one. Defense attorneys, however, operate within a system that is still biased against their clients. They are often not able to work with their clients during the early stages of investigations, in spite of efforts to reform the system that included allowing defense attorneys to contact their clients from the onset of an investigation. Court-appointed attorneys often appear only at the trial, perhaps months into the proceedings. As was the case in the Soviet system, defense attorneys typically approach the courtroom phase of a case as a last chance to appeal for leniency in sentencing rather than as an opportunity to prove their client's innocence.

The Constitutional Court, created in late 1991, played a powerful role in popularizing the idea of an independent judiciary. Tasked only with review of constitutional questions, the Court nevertheless pursued its activist agenda. It demonstrated that it can successfully challenge both the executive and Parliament. Lengthy proceedings on the legality of presidential decrees banning the former Soviet Communist party and on the constitutionality of the Communist Party established the Court as a symbol of the beginning of an independent judiciary. Its decision, rendered in November, upholding the essence of the ban while permitting the grassroots party structures to organize, was another step toward judicial independence.

Former Soviet President Gorbachev's refusal to testify before the Court in October was criticized for encouraging a lack of respect for the judiciary, thereby hindering the establishment of a fully independent court system and the rule of law. Another obstacle was the lack of appropriate judicial remedies allowing the court to exercise authority. For example, the Court attempted unsuccessfully to force Gorbachev to testify by temporarily restricting his travel to the West. Comments about Gorbachev by the Chief Justice also cast a shadow on the Court's impartiality.

Toward the end of 1992, the Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Justice were drafting legislation to reform the Russian criminal and civil codes as well as the criminal procedure and civil procedure codes. Additional legislation on the legal status of defense attorneys was also being drafted. Various drafts of legal reform legislation differ significantly and reflect a continuing battle between conservative adherence to stale "Soviet" legal norms and creative introduction of more modern Western legal criteria. In September President Yeltsin signed a decree ordering the establishment of a legal reform experiment in several Russian regions, to be conducted in 1993, that would introduce legal innovations such as the jury system.

There are no known political prisoners in Russia. However, approximately 40,000 persons remain incarcerated for violating laws that prohibit a variety of commercial activities, some of which are now legal, commonplace, and even officially condoned. f. *Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence.*—In 1992 Russia adopted laws designed to end the repressive activities of the former KGB. These laws codified President Yeltsin's decree dividing the KGB into two agencies, required both to respect human and civic rights, and established executive and legislative oversight. A law passed in March and made public in May required the security services to seek permission from the public prosecutor to open mail, tap telephones, and enter homes; the authorities, however, may proceed without such permission if "inaction under the circumstances may result in a terrorist or subversive act." Warrants for such actions may be obtained after the fact, within 24 hours. In spite of these reforms, electronic monitoring of residences and telephones reportedly continued at reduced levels. Foreign radio broadcasts were not jammed.

As they shift to a free market system during a period of economic hardship, charges have not been dropped, and the industry is suffering from acute financial problems. The Government has cut publications are suffering from acute financial problems. The Government has cut subsidies to most publications. By presidential order, only six "socially significant" newspapers receive government subsidies. The Government indirectly subsidizes all newspapers by guaranteeing a percentage of newsprint to each at controlled prices. Paper and ink remain controlled by monopolies, distribution costs are rapidly increasing, and many papers are underpriced and have their circulations falling. Consequently, many publications, including well-known newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestia, are on the brink of financial collapse. Many publishers

4. The Soviet Union's 1991 law on public organizations remained in effect for Russia during 1992. That law legalized a multiparty political system, allowed the formation of political parties and mass social movements, and guaranteed such organizations the right to propagate their views. The law also allowed political parties to field candidates in elections, guaranteed citizens the right to participate, and declared all parties equal before the law. All public organizations must register their by-laws and the names of their leaders with the Ministry of Justice. Political parties must

also present 5,000 signatures and pay 5,000 rubles to register as a Russian Federation party.

Roughly 300 political organizations functioned unhindered in 1992. Many of them were formed in 1991 and represented a wide political spectrum including monarchists, anarchists, nativists/Fascists, Socialists, and social democrats. More than 100 sociopolitical movements seeking greater autonomy for minorities continued to be active in autonomous regions and oblasts throughout Russia. The Russian Government facilitated the activities of some of these groups. The Government promoted an international conference to discuss the rights of indigenous peoples.

The law on public organizations does, however, ban groups advocating violent change in the constitutional system or groups subordinating the moral order. A Moscow-based gay and lesbian rights group was denied registration in the fall under the latter provisions. President Yeltsin's ban of the Communist Party was in part upheld and in part overturned by the Constitutional Court in November. The Communist Party's right to exist as a political organization was reaffirmed. The question of Communist Party assets was referred to lower Russian courts to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The Liberal Democratic Party, banned for its alleged support of the failed August 1991 coup, was permitted to resume political activities. The Justice Ministry, however, in June revoked the party's registration for falsifying its registration documents. In October President Yeltsin banned the newly established National Salvation Front, noting that the group called for the overthrow of the "lawful authorities, including the President."

c. *Freedom of Religion.*—Freedom of religion prospered in Russia in 1992. With the lifting of legal restrictions on its activities, the Russian Orthodox Church returned to the mainstream of Russian daily life. On January 7, 1992, Orthodox Christmas was observed as a national holiday in Russia for the first time since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Government leaders, including President Yeltsin, attended services. Legislation passed in September established Russian national holidays, including Orthodox Christmas.

The visibility of religion increased dramatically. Religious services and other programs were televised throughout the year. Official and unofficial religious groups held seminars, conferences, and revival meetings, frequently in public facilities. Public advertising of religious services and street proselytizing in major cities was common. The press extensively covered religious issues, including statements of religious leaders and Orthodox Church events. Missionaries from almost every world religion are present in Russia, and an increasing number of such groups opened permanent offices.

Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Government were strengthened significantly in 1992. Government officials, including President Yeltsin, frequently appeared at Orthodox Church-sponsored events. The Government contributed to the rebuilding or renovating of Orthodox Church buildings and monasteries and returned many additional churches and other facilities to the Church.

The Government sometimes limited the activities of Western religious organizations at the behest of the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, the Church sought to restrict Billy Graham's proselytizing. Some Western groups experienced difficulties in purchasing time for television programming or renting prestigious facilities for seminars and conferences, although in most cases alternatives were available. At the local level, authorities frequently displayed favoritism toward the Russian Orthodox Church (ROFC), especially in conflicts with the Russian Orthodox Free Church over the use of church buildings.

Obstacles to complete freedom of religion still exist to some extent on the local level, where remnants of the old state and party bureaucracy sometimes hinder or harass religious believers. A primary cause of these local problems is the requirement under the 1990 Soviet Law on Religion that religious groups of 10 adults or more register with local authorities. Some groups view the requirement itself as contradicting their beliefs and therefore refuse to register. Although failure to register has not resulted in harassment, groups must register to acquire the status of a "juridical person" and to receive benefits, including access to the media and the right to establish their own schools, own property, and engage in social work. The registration process therefore allows for obstructionist tactics by local authorities, such as lost applications, endless reviews of applications, or denial of adequate facilities. This problem is most prevalent in cases of non-Russian Orthodox groups, principally Protestants and the ROFC.

The number of clergy and places of worship in Russia is still inadequate for the population, but churches were opened in 1992 in increasing numbers. Seminaries and other institutions of clerical education continued to expand their enrollment, limited only by their financial resources. Bibles and children's Bible stories were

common items on sale at street kiosks in major cities. There are no restrictions on the importation of religious materials.

Young men who object to military duty because of their faith continue to be subject to prison terms. Legislation providing alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors is still being discussed.

d. *Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.*—Citizens were generally free to travel within the country. All adults are issued internal passports which must be carried during travel. Internal passports are also used to register visits of more than 3 days with local authorities, although this requirement is generally ignored by travelers not staying in hotels.

Nevertheless, the right to choose one's place of residence, though guaranteed by law, continued to be restricted in practice. Under the "propiska" (pass) system, all citizens must register their place of residence. However, Russian authorities enforced provisions of the propiska law selectively. For example, while many persons who did not register were not punished, numerous Chechens were rounded up from Moscow hotels in September because they were in the city illegally.

The authorities also continue to apply restrictions on travel abroad. In April the Government began to require a new invitation form designed to limit the number of exit visa solicitations. Corruption in the passport and visa-issuing offices, exacerbated by a shortage of new passports, remained a major impediment to unrestricted emigration and travel abroad.

Nonetheless, thousands of Russians traveled abroad and emigrated during 1992, and many former Russian citizens who now reside abroad were allowed to return to visit.

A Russian citizen leaving the country continues to need an exit visa, as well as a passport valid for foreign travel, and permission to enter the country of destination. Prospective travelers must obtain passports and exit visas in their places of residence. Local Offices of Visas and Permits were sometimes closed because of instability, thereby restricting the issuance of passports and exit visas. Numerous persons wishing to emigrate were also denied permission on secrecy grounds.

A new emigration bill, passed by the Soviet Union's Parliament in May 1991, is scheduled to come fully into force in Russia on January 1, 1993. This law eliminates the requirement to obtain exit visas before traveling abroad. According to the implementing resolution, an invitation from a first-degree relative in the country to which a person is emigrating will no longer be required. Instead, emigrants may submit either an invitation from any relative abroad or permission to enter the country to which they are emigrating. The resolution also annulled the 1967 decree under which emigrants to Israel were required to give up their Soviet citizenship.

The May 1991 law, however, perpetuates the practice of restricting the emigration of those with access to state secrets. Under this law, Russians taking a position requiring access to state secrets will now have the opportunity to acknowledge formally their acceptance of restrictions on emigration and travel abroad. Further, the normal maximum restriction is 5 years. The law also retains the requirement to receive permission from close relatives in Russia before emigrating. Would-be emigrants, however, will be able to settle this problem in the courts, if they are unable to secure the permission of close relatives. The law also added a new emigration restriction on draft-age men who have not yet completed their obligatory military service.

Nevertheless, because the law is not in effect, there were many instances in which access to state secrets or inability to obtain the permission of relatives blocked emigrants' ability to leave. A presidential commission was set up in the fall of 1991 to review cases of refuseniks who had not worked with secrets for more than 5 years. By January the commission had lifted exit restrictions in many such cases. However, the commission later became bogged down with the question of the citizenship of Russians returning from the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Russian parliamentarians prepared their own version of an emigration law in 1992. The Russian draft law is similar to the Soviet law and also contains a provision on secrecy. According to press reports, however, the Russian parliament in December voted to uphold the Soviet emigration law. It was also agreed to establish a new parliamentary commission with the participation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to review cases of persons refused permission to leave the country because of their access to industrial secrets.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The amended 1978 Russian Federation Constitution, which remains in effect, in principle allows the Russian people the right to change their government. President Yeltsin was elected to a 5-year term in 1991 with approximately 60

vote. The Russian Parliament, however, has yet to be elected in a free and fair election, and it is still not certain, therefore, that the Russian people have the ability to change their government peacefully and democratically. The Russian Parliament was elected under the Soviet system in 1990. While the election was relatively democratic by Soviet standards (and included secret balloting and some competition), the Communist Party was able to ensure its continued dominant role. Hence, the current parliament is dominated by ex-Communists, who have increasingly opposed Yeltsin's brand of radical reform. A constitutional crisis occurred in December, brought on by Parliament's efforts to curb the President's powers to carry out his reform agenda. President Yeltsin called for a referendum to decide the basic principles of a new constitution, including the delineation of powers of the three branches of government.

President Yeltsin has advocated the ratification of a new constitution and, with it, early parliamentary elections (due in 1995), by the end of 1993. The 1978 Constitution establishes the Congress of People's Deputies (parliament), as the highest organ of state power. The Presidency was created only in 1991, and its power relative to that of Parliament was never fully resolved. The current Parliament is unwilling to cede additional power to the Presidency. The proposed April referendum on delineation of the separation of constitutional powers is intended to help break the impasse between the two branches of government. The Constitutional Court is beginning to emerge as an independent part of the government structure and may play a crucial role in resolving the dispute.

The amended 1978 Constitution provides equal political rights for men and women, but women do not occupy many leading positions in politics and government. Members of Russia's ethnic and religious minorities face no legal limitations on political participation.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

There are numerous domestic and international human rights groups active in Russia. They have easy access to the local press and world media. A new human rights center opened, providing offices for domestic groups that previously had difficulties in securing such space. Financing remained a problem for many groups but was mainly a reflection of Russia's difficult economic situation and not of government interference. Russian authorities encouraged international investigation of alleged violations of human rights.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

The 1978 Constitution was amended in 1992 to include verbatim language from international human rights documents to protect the rights of all persons in Russia. Ethnic Russians make up 81 per cent of the population of the country. Members of ethnic minorities occupy high office in the Russian Government. In a number of cases, titular minorities govern autonomous republics.

During the year, the Government sought to distance itself further from Soviet-era anti-Semitism. Jews enjoyed increasing cultural and religious freedom. Some synagogues were returned to congregations, and in other cases congregations made arrangements to use the facilities without forcing the present occupants to leave.

Anti-Semitism continues to exist among the population, however, and was evident in political expression. Anti-government demonstrators advocating a return to Soviet-era policies and practices often used anti-Semitic imagery, brandishing placards calling President Yeltsin a Jew and effigies decorated with the Star of David or swastikas. The openly nationalist organization Pamyat continued to propagate anti-Semitic ideas in its own newspaper, one of 30 Russian publications containing Fascist and anti-Semitic material. In early October, members of Pamyat raided the offices of the newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets, demanding that the paper stop publishing the Russian people and hand over the names of authors who had published embarrassing the Russian people and hand over the names of authors who had published articles about Pamyat. Members of the organization paraded freely in Moscow.

Public expressions of anti-Semitic feelings added to Jews' fear that in times of economic hardship and political unrest they would be singled out for arbitrary retribution. In March, when openly anti-Semitic groups sponsored a rally in downtown Moscow, some Jewish families kept their children home from school for fear they would be harmed while out in public.

At the risk of being charged with violating press freedoms, the General Prosecutor in August initiated criminal proceedings against a number of openly anti-Semitic newspapers. The publisher and editor-in-chief of Russkoye Voskreseniye, a newspaper whose masthead features a "raving Fuehrer" and swastikas, was arrested.

Earlier, human rights groups had charged that the prosecutor's Moscow office was lax in pursuing such cases.

Women are entitled to the same legal rights as men, including the right to participate in all areas of the social, political, and economic life of Russia. An extensive system of day-care and maternity leave allows women to retain employment after having children. Women are well represented at many levels of the general economy but generally not paid the same as men for equal work. Positions of influence and prestige, moreover, are still disproportionately occupied by men.

As Russia's economic situation has deteriorated, women have often been the first to be laid off, a reflection of the resurfacing of the society's traditional view of the male as breadwinner. Violence against women certainly occurs but its extent is unknown. It is known, however, that police often do not take an interest in cases of violence against women. Interest in women's issues in Russia is only now beginning to grow and is focused primarily on economic factors.

Section 6. Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association.—On paper, the right of workers to form and join unions of their own choosing improved in 1992. The Russian Government eased trade union registration requirements and issued a decree requiring the old Communist trade union center, the Federation of Independent Russian Trade Unions (FNPR), to offer workers who had formerly been compelled to belong to the FNPR the freedom to reregister with a union of their choice without fear of retribution. In September the Labor Code was amended to reflect some elements of the Government's reform agenda.

These decrees, however, had little practical effect in diminishing the role and status of the FNPR and its hold on worker membership. The FNPR retains its inherent advantages arising from close traditional links with enterprise directors and near monopoly control over key social security benefits such as workers' vacations, children's summer camps, and sick and pregnancy pay. In September the Supreme Soviet bowed to strong pressure from the FNPR and blocked a government attempt to transfer the vast FNPR-controlled social security funds to a neutral body. The FNPR also did not implement the union reregistration decree, as required, and the Government did little to enforce it.

The FNPR, the Russian successor organization to the former official Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), sought to redefine its former role as a "transmission belt from the Communist Party to the masses" by attacking the Government's economic reform policies. FNPR attempts to recast its image into that of a democratic trade union center largely failed, as holdovers from the AUCCTU continued to control the FNPR apparatus and a majority of its branch and regional affiliates.

Democratic labor leaders consider the FNPR's control of social security functions usually performed by the State or privately by individuals as the greatest obstacle to the growth of independent, democratic trade unions in Russia. Vigorous and sustained attempts throughout the year to break this virtual monopoly had little practical effect. The strong FNPR lobby in Parliament provided legislative cover, and the Government seemed unwilling to confront the FNPR head-on.

An economy in deep crisis further limited the establishment of independent labor groups. With the prospect of widespread unemployment looming, many workers were reluctant to exercise their right to form and join free trade unions because independent labor activists were often the first to be laid off or lose access to social benefits provided by their enterprises or the FNPR. Enterprise directors, local FNPR leaders, local government officials, and police and judicial authorities applied various forms of direct and indirect pressure on workers who attempted to form free unions. Democratic worker activists faced legal harassment and physical violence. Several prominent democratic labor leaders were assaulted in circumstances they believe were connected with their labor activities.

Notwithstanding these obstacles, the democratic workers' movement, which began in Russia only in the summer of 1989, continued to grow. There now may be several hundred non-FNPR, unionlike organizations across Russia. Most are small, however, and may serve more as workers' associations, for they do not seem to carry out traditional union activities. Enterprise directors routinely ignore them.

The coal mining areas of Kuzbas in western Siberia and Vorkuta above the Arctic Circle continued to represent the largest and most potent centers of independent, democratic organized labor in Russia. The Independent Miners Union (NPG) and workers and strike committees in these areas have inspired new democratic labor activity far beyond these regions.

During the first half of 1992, strikes became workers' preferred means of resolving labor disputes, as alternative institutions to resolve such conflicts were weak or

nonexistent. After the "social partnership" mechanism failed to stop frequent resort to strikes, the Government sought to restrict the right to strike to maintain labor peace. In May the Government declared that it would enforce a Soviet law dating from 1989 which requires a lengthy dispute settlement process, bans strikes in the Government and military services, and contains broad, undefined references to "essential services." The Government demonstrated this tougher, antistrike policy against one union in particular, the Independent Air Traffic Controllers Union, which faced a severe government crackdown following an August strike.

The FNPR's former parent organization, the AUCCTU (renamed the General Confederation of the Trade Unions—GCTU), lost its official standing in the International Labor Organization (ILO) when the Soviet Union dissolved. The GCTU has requested the status of a nongovernmental organization in the ILO. The Russian Government has designated for purposes of representing Russian workers in the ILO. However, two members of an alternative union, SOTSPROF, were included as technical advisors in the Russian delegation to the 1992 ILO conference. Democratic leaders were rarely included in government delegations or at ILO conferences but have been able to maintain extensive contact with other national trade union centers.

b. *The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.*—Almost all Russian workers in the state sector are virtually automatically members of an FNPR affiliate. Outside the mining industry and some segments of the air transport industry, the vast majority of Russian workers must still rely upon the FNPR and enterprise work councils to represent their interests.

Russian government authorities in 1992 demonstrated greater willingness to deal with democratic labor leaders, inviting them to become members of consultative bodies and concluding separate wage agreements with their unions. Enterprise directors, however, dealt only with those democratic unions that were powerful enough to strike and were generally hostile toward or ignored other non-FNPR worker groups that arose in their midst. Even in those enterprises in which strong democratic unions existed, management often resisted concluding collective bargaining arrangements with them.

There are no export processing zones in Russia.

c. *Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.*—The Russian Labor Code was amended in September to prohibit compulsory labor.

d. *Minimum Age for Employment of Children.*—The Labor Code was amended in September to regulate the working conditions for minors aged 14 to 16. However, with the loosening of central government economic controls, children beneath that age began to enter the work force in noticeable numbers for the first time.

e. *Acceptable Conditions of Work.*—The bottom rung of the official pay scales for each industry in effect serves as an administrative minimum wage. Reform plans call for the establishment of minimum wages but do not stipulate how they should function in a highly inflationary environment. Although wages rose considerably during the year, severe shortages of cash throughout the country prevented many workers from being paid for significant periods of time. A majority of the population fell below the Government's minimum standard of living, and the minimum wage was inadequate to provide a worker and family a decent living standard. The amended Labor Code reduced the workweek to 40 hours; however, in practice, workweeks can vary considerably. As enterprises faced the discipline of the market for the first time, many workers were required to work significantly more hours or under particularly dangerous conditions. Other workers worked far fewer hours because the disordered state of the Russian economy required them to spend many hours a day searching for basic necessities for their families.

Workers received other benefits in addition to their wages, such as subsidized prices for basic goods and foodstuffs in state stores and at their enterprises, but the value of these benefits declined as many prices began to approach market prices. In addition, the quality of state-subsidized housing, health care, and transportation, on which the vast majority of the population must rely, continued to be very low.

Russian law establishes minimum conditions of workplace safety and worker health, but these standards were generally ignored. Furthermore, no effective enforcement mechanism exists. In 1992, as in previous years, thousands of Russian workers died on the job, were injured or became invalids. Workplace safety control- lers, pilots, locomotive drivers, and armed forces members. In 1992, there again were numerous mine disasters in Russia. Miners report that these accidents will continue as long as wages are tied directly to productivity. Few significant safety measures were adopted in the aftermath of these accidents.

SAN MARINO

San Marino is a democratic multiparty republic ruled by a coalition government. Legislative authority is vested in a unicameral parliament, the Great and General Council. Executive authority is exercised by the 11-member Congress of State (the Cabinet), composed of two Captains Regent and nine members chosen by the Great and General Council. The Captains Regent are assisted by three Secretaries of State (Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Finance) and by several additional secretaries. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has come to assume many of the prerogatives of a Prime Minister.

Police forces are centralized in one organization, the Civil Police which has three branches, including an investigative branch. Security and ceremonial representation are performed by two military corps, the Gendarmerie and the "Guardie di Rocca." These forces are controlled by and responsive to elected government officials.

The principal economic activities in San Marino, whose population totals about 22,000, are farming and light manufacturing. Tourism is a vital but seasonal industry. In addition to income, corporate, and sales taxes, the Government derives most of its revenue from the sale of coins and postage stamps to collectors throughout the world and from payments of an annual budget subsidy by the Italian Government under the terms of the Republic's Basic Treaty with Italy.

Individual human rights are provided for in the legal code of the Republic and respected in practice. San Marino's legislature and Government have demonstrated a strong interest in and commitment to the protection of human rights. Some laws in the San Marino legal code, in particular with regard to transmission of citizenship, do not accord the same rights to women as to men.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from

a. *Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.*—Neither Government forces nor opposition organizations engaged in political or extrajudicial killings.

b. *Disappearance.*—There were no cases of disappearance or abduction.

c. *Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.*—Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment are prohibited by law, and there were no reports of violations.

d. *Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.*—There were no reports of arbitrary arrests, detentions, or exile.

e. *Denial of Fair Public Trial.*—The rights of the accused are protected by procedural safeguards which are guaranteed by law and observed in practice. Judicial arrest warrants are required. Detainees may not be held more than a few days without being formally charged or released. Although there is no legally prescribed limit on pretrial detention, San Marino's uncrowded criminal dockets ensure that the courts hear most cases within days or weeks. The procedural law grants trial judges considerable discretion in this regard, but there were no indications in 1992 of any abuse of this authority. The right to a public trial and legal counsel are provided for. The accused may request that a court-appointed attorney be provided at no cost. There is no incommunicado detention, and the accused may not be compelled to answer questions or make statements without having an attorney present.

f. *Judicial Authority.*—Judicial authority is turned over in part to Italian magistrates in both criminal and civil cases. Cases of minor importance are handled by a local conciliatory judge. Appeals go, in the first instance, to an Italian judge residing in Italy. The final court of review is the Council of Twelve, a group of judges chosen for 6-year terms (four replaced every 2 years) from among the members of the Great and General Council.

g. *Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence.*—The concept of privacy of the home is respected by the authorities; judicial warrants are required for searches.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including

a. *Freedom of Speech and Press.*—Freedoms of speech and press are respected. There is no Government censorship. While there are no daily newspapers, periodicals are published irregularly by the Government, some political parties, the labor unions, and business associations. A private press publishes a weekly bulletin with local news; such news is also available in local editions of several Italian dailies. Daily television news coverage of San Marino is broadcast by a private Italian television station located in Italy. This program is financed both through advertising and a contribution by the San Marino Government. A recent Italy-San Marino bilateral agreement established a new television station financed jointly by the San

U.S. Embassy in Moscow

CRS Issue Brief

U.S. Embassy in Moscow: Options for Congress

Updated February 10, 1992
(Archived)

by
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SUMMARY

The U.S. Government has been trying to acquire a new embassy in Moscow since 1967. This effort stalled in 1985, when U.S. officials halted work on the embassy's new office building due to the discovery of sophisticated, Soviet-placed listening devices in the building's structural shell. Since 1985, Congress has sponsored several study missions in attempting to determine an acceptable solution that meets U.S. needs. And the State Department has made a number of changes in its Foreign Buildings Office, including the creation of the Moscow Embassy Building Control Office (MEBCO), which now oversees the project.

Following the Reagan Administration's proposal of October 1988, the Bush Administration in FY1991 requested \$270 million to raze the compromised, 65%-complete structure and to reconstruct a new building on the same site. Other plans for the chancery have included constructing a new building on another site, completing the unfinished building for unclassified purposes, and the removal and replacement of several floors of the unfinished building -- known as the "Top Hat" proposal.

Congressional authorization and appropriation committees did not fully support the \$270 million Bush Administration plan. Unable to resolve their differences over the options and how to set priorities among time, cost, space, and security considerations, Congress ultimately provided no money for the Moscow Embassy in the FY1991 Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill (P.L. 101-515, H.R. 5021). For FY1992, the Administration requested \$130 million to complete design work and initiate construction of a new building, presumably on the existing foundation. However, on Mar. 7, 1991, citing its frustration with Congress over the issue, the Administration switched positions requesting authority to demolish the top floor of the 8-story new office building and add 3 new, secure floors, a so-called "Top Hat" (Note: The plan was later changed to razing the top 2 floors and adding 4 new ones at a cost of \$215 million).

Congress remained divided, however, when the House approved an appropriation of \$130 million for construction of a chancery, subject to the Administration's submission of a comprehensive plan of how it would meet the U.S. mission's requirements in Moscow (H.R. 1415 and H.R. 2608); and the Senate, in view of the opposition to this formula by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, and subsequently the full Appropriations Committee, approved \$130 million specifically for the "raze and rebuild" option.

House and Senate conferees ultimately compromised on \$100 million in FY1992 for the construction of an entirely new chancery building, and also directed the Department of State to consider alternatives for retaining the unfinished new office building. This decision was signed into law in P.L. 102-140 (H.R. 2608). The State Department presented then withdrew a set of three proposals for the chancery, in order to reassess U.S. needs in Moscow and throughout the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The final proposal will be presented to Congress after State Department teams return from the CIS and make their recommendations.

ISSUE DEFINITION

Following years of division over the Reagan and Bush Administrations' approaches to meeting U.S. requirements for a new chancery in Moscow, Congress, in the State Department Appropriations bill (P.L. 102-140, H.R. 2608), approved \$100 million for FY1992 for the construction of an entirely new chancery building, reportedly on the new embassy compound. The State Department withdrew its previous proposals for the chancery, in order to reassess U.S. needs in Moscow in light of overall demands and projected costs for diplomatic facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, now the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The State Department must still report to Congress on its final design proposals for the new chancery building and also with proposals on potential uses for the unfinished new office building, which Congress elected to retain.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Embassy Agreements

The United States and the Soviet Union originally agreed in principle to an exchange of properties in October 1967. In the exchange of properties agreement, signed in Moscow on May 16, 1969, the United States accepted a 10.16 acre site on Konyushkovskaya Ulitsa in the Krasnopresnenskiy district of Moscow, and retained under separate conditions the existing 1.79 acre ambassadorial residence (known as the Spaso House) on Spasopeskovskaya Ploshchad in the Kievskii district (see plot plan attached). In return the United States made available the 12.53 acre, Mt. Alto site in Washington, D.C. to the Soviet Union. Both countries provided the properties for use free of charge for a period of 85 years.

The 1969 agreement held, among other things, that the United States would vacate the existing office building on Chaykovsky Ulitsa "as promptly as possible after the new buildings ... are ready for occupancy" -- a period of not greater than 4 months after completion of the new office building. It further called for the conclusion of a separate Agreement on Conditions of Construction -- subsequently signed in December 1972 -- to answer any questions related to the actual construction of the two embassy complexes.

A key factor of the 1972 agreement was the provision that, "The chanceries will be occupied simultaneously at an agreed upon date after final completion and acceptance. All other buildings may be occupied at any time after completion and acceptance and put to their designated use." This clause has prevented the Soviets from gaining access to their new chancery building in Washington, D.C., while the U.S. chancery building in Moscow remains unfinished and unoccupied.

It was not until the signing of a Protocol of Negotiations on Construction in March 1977, however, that either side took possession of their respective sites and began construction. The Protocol allowed the Soviets to begin work in 1977 in exchange for concessions on the cost of construction of the U.S. Embassy and for use of additional facilities in Moscow. The United States did not begin construction until

after June 1979, when the State Department's Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) concluded negotiations on a construction contract with a Soviet government firm, Soyuzvneshstroyimport (SVSI). The delay was due to complications in the negotiations over technical control of construction and costs.

SVSI was to carry out all Stage I work, which included pre-construction site clearing and preparation, site work, and structural work. Stage II involved finish construction, including installation of mechanical and electrical equipment, finishing floors and walls, door and window installation, and finished roofing. SVSI, in Stage II, would install electrical and mechanical systems and do the finish work on floors one through three under the supervision of U.S. contractors. Floors four through eight, the secure areas of the complex, were to be completed with U.S. materials and American labor. U.S. negotiators agreed to the reciprocal terms requiring the use of local firms for Stage I, in part due to the conclusions of a team of U.S. architects representing FBO. They reported in 1971 that it would be possible to rely considerably on the use of Soviet labor and materials, including pre-cast concrete, without compromising the structural integrity of the building. Subsequent reports indicate the building is structurally sound.

The New Office Building: Construction Plans and Problems

The new Embassy compound in Moscow was designed to alleviate the overcrowded and aged conditions of the existing office building and to anticipate future space and technical security needs. The new complex would include the chancery building with adjacent consular offices, library, and auditorium; an underground concourse with recreational facilities, commissary, cafeteria, nursery, and other support services; a warehouse; a 9-classroom school, and Marine Security Guard quarters; 123 apartments and 11 townhouses; and an underground garage for 130 cars. The new office building was to be 8 floors and a basement with a total floor space of 167,586 square feet. Floors four through eight were to house all secure spaces, including conference and work rooms for classified activities. Total secure office space was intended to be approximately 56,600 square feet.

Cost Overruns

The original 1976 cost estimate for the entire complex, planned for completion in 1982, was between \$75 million and \$100 million. According to a 1987 GAO report however, there were indications that as early as October 1975, FBO officials recognized that the project would cost \$100 million or more. Internal State Department documents of November 1978 and July 1979 revealed that total estimated project costs were then \$129 million and the completion date had slipped to 1983. As of March 1987, approximately 2 years after the State Department had ordered cessation of all work, Congress had appropriated a total of \$192 million for the project, \$65 million of which pertained to the new office building. About \$22 million has been expended on the construction of the new building.

The State Department has submitted claims totaling about \$20 million against SVSI for compensation for increased costs due to defective work and delays in

construction. The Soviet contractor also filed claims, totaling about \$10.3 million, against FBO for failure to approve working drawings in accordance with the master schedule and for delays in providing materials. These claims remain unresolved. The Soviets have rejected State Department claims for defective work as unsubstantiated and lacking proper documentation. FBO has also been evaluating possible claims against U.S. contractors.

Security Breach

By 1985, congressional intelligence committees began receiving the first testimony indicating that the structure of the new office building contained an extensive system of Soviet electronic surveillance devices. The State Department locked out the Soviet contractor on Aug. 19, 1985, and all work on the new office building ceased. It appears, however, that U.S. officials knew of the security problems long before 1985. On Apr. 29, 1987, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported that the intelligence community had been aware of technical penetration since 1982. The committee concluded that, "the United States did not employ a systematic, stringent security program to detect and *prevent* Soviet technical penetration efforts." A *Washington Post* article of June 18, 1990, suggested that, even with this earlier knowledge of Soviet penetration, the United States took no action. Rather, an interagency committee headed by the CIA concluded that U.S. experts could neutralize any systems they found before completion of the building. According to former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, who was commissioned by the State Department to study the problem, U.S. officials relied on "what was then seen as superior U.S. technology and ingenuity to counteract Soviet efforts."

Office of Foreign Buildings Operations

As more details emerged, Congress and the media began focusing attention on the Department of State's Foreign Buildings Office (FBO) and its role in the construction problems of the Moscow Embassy. The Director of FBO is responsible for the construction of all overseas consular and diplomatic facilities, including the Moscow Embassy, under the authority of the Secretary of State (Foreign Service Building Act of 1926 - 22 U.S.C. 292-302). In light of the security and management problems, some have questioned whether FBO was, and is, capable of efficiently managing the Moscow project. State Department officials believe that several changes within FBO have addressed the major management problems, and are sufficient to ensure the successful completion of the Moscow chancery project.

Dating back to 1963, the GAO and the State Department's Office of Inspector General have issued 21 reports documenting numerous deficiencies in FBO's management. Critics have claimed that the cost and time overruns, and the security problems of the Moscow Embassy project were due to FBO mismanagement. According to the GAO, however, cost increases were due primarily to other factors: increased project requirements and inflation (\$43.7 million), security enhancements (\$36.8 million), and "cost overruns caused by Soviet delays in project completion (\$20 million)." The GAO study indicated seven principal causes for time delays, five of which were directly related to the pace and quality of the Soviet contractor's work.

Security oversight during construction involved a separate office at the Department of State, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. A security engineering officer from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security was on site and charged with coordinating the security program related to construction with FBO officials. The United States posted 20-30 Navy Seabees in Moscow to monitor the construction process for any attempts to compromise the security of the building, including technical penetration efforts. The Seabees did not supervise Soviet contract employees, but reported their findings to the on-site security engineering officer, not to FBO officials. Former Under Secretary of State for Management Ivan Selin stated in a Mar. 28, 1990 hearing that, "quite literally nobody was in charge."

FBO has attempted to counter lingering doubts concerning its ability to manage overseas construction projects by adopting and implementing several GAO, Department of State Inspector General, and privately derived recommendations. FBO officials have attempted to restructure the Office's organization, increase personnel, and improve internal policies and procedures. It has centralized the responsibility for the various phases of its development projects in one Program Management Division. Specifically for the Moscow Embassy project, State Department officials created the Moscow Embassy Buildings Control Office (MEBCO) to direct the Moscow project from the initial design phase through completion of the project. MEBCO is separate from FBO and its Director, Carl Christenson, reports directly to the Under Secretary for Management and the Assistant Secretary for Administration.

Additionally, at the direction of Congress, the State Department transferred to FBO, and to MEBCO for the Moscow Embassy project, responsibility for implementing all construction security operations, a task that previously resided in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Diplomatic Security will continue to establish priorities and standards, monitor compliance throughout construction, and issue security certification for completed facilities, but FBO and MEBCO will be responsible for the implementation of those policies and standards, including transit and site security.

Current Status of the Moscow Embassy Project

Conditions of Existing Facilities

Without the new office building, the Moscow Embassy office facilities remain cramped. All buildings, except for the new office building, are finished and in use, including the housing units. The existing office building located on Tchaikovsky Ulitsa in the same block, but not contiguous with the new complex, also remains in use. The existing building previously housed all classified activities in roughly 6,000 square feet of secure office space. A Mar. 28, 1991, fire in the existing building, however, burned a portion of the roof and caused primarily smoke and subsequent water damage to an undisclosed amount of office space in the central core of the building. Some classified space is located in the top floors of the building, where the fire was reportedly the worst. The damage forced embassy staff to relocate temporary offices throughout the new embassy compound (in the auditorium, the gymnasium, the cafeteria, and elsewhere, though not in the new office building). Consular sections have returned to their original office space in the side wings of the fire-damaged building. Renovations will again have to be made to the existing office building, including its secure areas,

because of the fire. This renovation work is now underway, with the goal of returning the existing office building to full use.

Originally built in 1948, the existing office building, despite several renovations and modernization efforts, is regarded by many as dilapidated, unsafe, and a major source of morale problems among the American staff. Many also consider the quality of the technical security conditions and measures in the existing office building as grossly inadequate. In 1981, in anticipation of moving into the new office building, FBO stopped all but minimal maintenance on the existing office building as a cost-saving measure. By 1989, however, officials recognized that the building would be needed for an extended period of time and they began refurbishing the building. FBO completed renovations and upgrades in electrical, alarm, and fire prevention systems in March 1990. In a follow-on project, the FBO is converting housing units in the lower floors of the south wing -- no longer necessary because of the housing in the new complex -- into unclassified office space.

Beyond secure space needs, the demands on the Moscow Embassy's consular and commercial sections have increased dramatically. Issuance of non-immigrant visas alone from the Moscow post has risen from 5,371 in 1985 to 10,672 in 1987 to 52,515 in 1989, and finally to 101,936 in 1991. Refugees and immigration applicants have also risen, confronting American Embassy personnel with large processing backlogs. In response to this demand, the United States and the Soviet Union increased embassy staff ceilings: from 225 in October 1986, to 272 in August 1989, to 282 as of August 1990.

Some in the State Department are concerned that there may be insufficient housing for additional staff. Currently, the United States leases some 95-100 off-compound housing units for embassy staff. This practice, preferred by some personnel, has led to growing security concerns in Moscow as there have been reports of several crimes against official Americans, including burglaries, muggings, and a reported rape. The volatility of the domestic political and economic situation in Moscow could cause further problems.

Status of Negotiations

The incomplete building and a reassessment of U.S. needs led the State Department in 1989 to initiate negotiations with the Soviets over property issues to enable the United States to rebuild the new building, as well as to meet other long-term space needs.

The negotiations have had three main goals. First, American negotiators hope to sign another exchange of properties agreement. The United States wants to gain control over the area between the existing office building and the new complex. The site, known as the Change building site, currently contains the unoccupied Change building and some apartment buildings occupied by Soviet citizens. These people and buildings would have to be removed before the United States could use this space. U.S. planners feel that controlling access in the area between the existing office building and new office building compound is important for insuring the security of the entire complex.

The significance of the Change building site is particularly important to the second goal of the negotiations -- an extended lease on the existing office building. The U.S.

Government hopes to retain this office space, located on a busy Moscow street, for unclassified walk-in purposes. If successful, there will be a strong incentive to link this facility with the new embassy compound via the Change building site.

The third goal of the negotiations is to reach a terms-of-construction agreement with the Soviets on the reconstruction of a new, secure chancery building. State Department officials actually began these discussions in September 1990. In the absence of congressional direction, the State Department is negotiating for a terms-of-construction agreement in general terms that are compatible with multiple options. State Department officials have expressed concern in past hearings that congressional delays weaken Special Negotiator for Property Issues, Ambassador Nicolas M. Salgo's negotiating effort. Moreover, they warn, concessions of land on the part of the Soviet Union will almost certainly have to be met by concessions by the United States. The Soviet Union has expressed its desire to increase its land holdings in Washington, D.C. for additional housing facilities.

The *Washington Post* reported on Mar. 8, 1991, that Under Secretary Selin indicated in his Mar. 7, 1991, hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Communications that negotiations supporting the "Top Hat" plan were "about 90 percent" complete. With the approval to construct an entirely new chancery building on the embassy compound, but with the final proposal undefined, State Department negotiator Salgo will have to adjust the negotiations to produce the needed terms-of-construction agreement to begin work on a new building. State Department officials do not see this as a complicating factor, implying that the negotiations to a large degree were waiting on a decision on what and where the United States wanted to build the chancery building.

Options for Congress

The tenor and focus of congressional debate have moved since 1985 from the early stages of outrage at the act of bugging the new office building and at the U.S. system that allowed it to happen (see CRS Archived Issue Brief 87232) to the stage of debating the options and the politics of making a decision. Having made a decision the focus has now shifted towards design studies and implementation. The following section provides a brief look at the four principal options which the State Department and Congress considered. Although the State Department looked into 12 or more different proposals, four principal options emerged over time: to tear down and rebuild anew on the existing foundation, to build an entirely new building on another site, to partially raze the new office building then add new secure floors onto the existing stem (now known as "Top Hat"), and to complete the new office building for unclassified purposes, finding secure, unclassified space elsewhere in the compound.

The Reagan and Bush Administrations had backed the tear down-rebuild option up until March, 1991, when President Bush shifted support to the "Top Hat" approach. Secretary of State James Baker stated in hearings before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that this change was due to frustration over the inability of Congress to support the preferred tear down-rebuild option.

The Administration's deviation from the tear down-rebuild option created a similar turn in Congress, but did not result in resolution. Those who favored tear down-

rebuild insisted that it was still the most secure option and was still the preferred choice of the Administration, the intelligence community, and the intelligence committees in Congress. They argued that the shift to "Top Hat" was purely political and that selecting an option for the Moscow chancery should be based on security and other functional considerations, but not on political criteria. Those Members who supported the "Top Hat" approach claimed that it was a realistic alternative that would provide an equal quality of security for less money and in less time. They contended that despite the claims that the Administration did not really want "Top Hat," it was requested by the Administration and has the approval of the intelligence community.

The House, attempting to avoid further delay on the question, approved H.R. 2608 with a compromise formula contained in a floor amendment (Representative Berman). The compromise, which had the support of authorizations committees in the House and Senate and the House Committee on Appropriations, provided the State Department with the requested \$130 million in FY1992, but required the Administration to choose between the options and report back with justification for its decision. The Senate Committee on Appropriations disagreed with this formula, however, and the Senate, in its version of H.R. 2608, approved \$130 million to tear down and rebuild the new office building. House and Senate conferees deliberated and resolved this issue by satisfying the two principal desires of Members: to create a secure building, and to prevent the wasteful destruction of the partially completed new office building. The final appropriation (P.L. 102-140) provided \$100 million for an entirely new building, reportedly at a site on the embassy compound. It also instructed the Department of State to consider possible alternative uses of the unfinished new office building in Moscow.

In January 1992, State Department officials presented, then withdrew, a set of three proposals, stating that they wanted to reassess the project in consideration of new information regarding overall regional requirements for service and facilities. State Department study teams are now in the CIS assessing the availability of real estate for new missions. Presumably upon their return State Department planning and design officials will finalize and present their proposal for the Moscow facility.

Below are listed the four main options that have been considered over the past several years. All plans called for the implementation of a secure construction program, which, if necessary, includes fabricating structural components in the United States and, under secure conditions, transporting these materials to the construction site where U.S. personnel will construct the building. Additionally, some options would require the completion of exchange-of-properties agreements and all options would require terms-of-construction agreements with the Soviet Union. Time and cost estimates for all of the options are approximate at best. State Department officials state that additional funds -- beyond the \$100 million -- are necessary to complete the new chancery building and will be requested in future years. How much more is dependent on the final plan.

Construction of a New Chancery

Initial thinking on this possibility was to construct a new chancery building on a new site, most probably on the Change building site between the existing (old) office building and the new office building compound. Relevant officials seemingly had rejected the idea of building on the embassy grounds. Reportedly, however, the

conference committee agreed on this approach in their FY1992 appropriations decision. Design work on an entirely new building was part of the initial design study approved in the reprogramming for FY1991, but it was not anticipated that the building would be located on the embassy compound. The cost of this option was originally estimated at \$300 million, with additional funding needed either to demolish the new office building (\$5 million) or complete it to caretaker status pending a decision on its final use (\$12 million). This estimate, however, was based on the assumption that the new building would be approximately the same size and fulfill the same functions as the unfinished new office building. Current thinking may envision a smaller structure.

Estimates to complete a new building could reasonably fall between the 65 months originally estimated for the "raze and rebuild" option, which would not require new foundation work and the 8 years estimated for constructing a new building on an unacquired piece of land, such as the Change building site. If construction occurs on the new embassy compound, then the project would not require an exchange-of-properties agreement and the negotiations could be far less involved according to State Department officials. The new construction would require a construction agreement and site tests, and would have to go through the normal process of design approvals.

Implications. Time estimates are uncertain, due to the lack of a final plan and the potential benefits or costs of building on the existing compound, where significant excavation and other work was done for the existing configuration of underground structures and other buildings. State Department officials believe that construction time would be significantly less for a project on the existing embassy grounds, say over the parking garage, than for one on another site. Estimates, in the range mentioned above, indicate that new construction might require, at a minimum, one additional year over the tear down-rebuild proposal and the "Top Hat" proposal (see below for time estimates on these two options). At a maximum, new construction could conceivably take 3 years longer, depending on negotiations and construction difficulties. Chief Negotiator Salgo's office believed, however, that negotiations would not delay the project.

The \$300 million estimate is highly dependent on the size and purpose of the building to be built. Some now anticipate costs of approximately \$240 million for a new structure on the existing embassy compound. If by retaining the unfinished new office building for unclassified activities, the State Department could build a smaller secure annex, then costs could be significantly less than \$300 million. If, on the other hand, the design of the new building is of similar size and configuration then the estimate could be quite similar. It could conceivably be greater once demolition and other as yet unanticipated construction costs develop. For the original proposal to build on another site, the difference in spending (\$280 million for tear down-rebuild, \$215 million for "Top Hat" versus \$300 million for this option) was due to the added cost of laying a new foundation and basement on the new site. Some of these costs may be avoided if the building is constructed on the existing compound.

State Department officials originally opposed plans for new construction on a new site, arguing that the acquisition of additional land for building would have complicated and slowed negotiations with the Soviet Union. Use of the Change building grounds would have required the relocation of resident Soviet citizens, in a city plagued with severe housing shortages. Although the State Department is already negotiating for this property, the relocation of its residents might have delayed construction schedules.

Congressional Reaction. There had been no public effort, prior to the conference agreement, to gain authorization for this option -- although there was sufficient support to include it with the President's proposal in the reprogramming of funds for preliminary design work approved in 1990. The increased time for completion and the additional cost were major factors in explaining the lack of congressional support for this option. The main advantages to this option are that it breaks the deadlock between those Members who wanted an all new building because it would be more secure, and those who felt that to destroy the unfinished new office building would be a terrible waste of the tax-payers money.

Complete the New Office Building for Unclassified Purposes

In light of the recent decision, completing the new office building for unclassified purposes becomes far more likely. The State Department is currently studying options for the building, but this proposal has had two variations: the first, which has greater support, would utilize the space for offices and cost an estimated \$35 million-\$40 million; the second would renovate the space into apartments, costing approximately \$20 million-\$30 million for 42 temporary duty apartments.

Using the new office building for unclassified purposes would be one solution to U.S. unclassified space needs in the next few years. Completion of the new office building would provide approximately 167,586 square feet of total floor space. If used as apartments, it would alleviate some of the U.S. Embassy's housing problems in Moscow. Timing is also an issue as the State Department's interpretation of the 1972 Agreement, occupying the new office building allows the Soviet Union to occupy its chancery in Washington, D.C.

State Department officials, in opposing this option, claimed that using the building for apartments or unclassified purposes is a false economy. They asserted that the United States could acquire less expensive unclassified office, housing, or public access space elsewhere in Moscow. They also contended that using the building for public use purposes (e.g., as a commercial or cultural center) would raise security problems for the embassy, since it would allow and require access to the compound by Soviet citizens and other third-country nationals. Commerce and USIA officials reportedly were also hesitant to use the new office building for such purposes.

Raze and Rebuild the New Office Building

The Administration's proposal to raze the new office building and build another building on the same foundation was the first option. Prior to making the "Top Hat" proposal, the State Department claimed this option to be the most efficient in terms of meeting secure space needs in a timely fashion. It claimed that the reprogramming, approved in 1990, allowed partial design work to proceed immediately, saving one year and an estimated \$8 million in annual maintenance, security, and administrative costs on the unfinished new office building. State Department officials stated that this proposal would allow the United States to occupy a new facility 65 months from the date when Congress gave its approval for the design funds reprogramming, and if the remaining funds were appropriated in a timely fashion. Thus, according to State Department officials, had the Congress decided on this option in October of 1991, because of the lead time provided by the reprogramming the new Chancery would have

been completed in the next 53 months. Building time was estimated at 3 years with the remaining time filled with design work and the bidding and selection processes.

Construction costs would have made up approximately \$120 million of the total estimate of \$270 million, including \$5 million for demolition of the new office building. The remaining \$150-160 million would provide logistical support, warehouses to hold materials and equipment, security equipment that would have gone into the building, housing for the American construction workers, and other purposes. The new design would have provided approximately 61,800 square feet of secure office and conference space. It also would have provided approximately 90,500 square feet of unclassified space. It did not provide, however, for additional housing -- a need some Members viewed as an equally high priority.

Renovation of Top Floors for Classified Use

The second approach proposed by the Bush Administration was initially recommended by the 1987 Schlesinger report, and proposed the dismantling and reconstruction for classified use of the top three floors of the new office building. The report also suggested that the State Department build an additional secure annex elsewhere. State Department officials publicly considered two variations of this option: the reconstruction of the top 4 floors of the new office building with a cantilevered overhang (over the stem of the first 4 floors), which would contain secure work areas; and the new "Top Hat" variation, which called for the demolition of only the top two floors of the new office building and the construction of 4 new, secure floors on the remaining 6-story stem. The State Department estimated that the "Top Hat" option would cost approximately \$215 million and take 54 months to complete.

In a 1988 report to the State Department, the BDM Corporation concluded that the Schlesinger option could not guarantee security in the reconstructed building. State Department officials agreed that the "Top Hat" plan would not have produced a *building* that would be as secure as the new chancery building proposed in the "raze and rebuild" option or the entirely new building plan selected by Congress. However, they did maintain that the additional construction in the "Top Hat" plan would have provided the U.S. embassy with the necessary quality and quantity of secure space, at less cost, and much sooner than these other proposals. Some Members of Congress questioned the ability of the State Department to limit and conduct all classified activities to the 4 secure floors without allowing for any classified discussions, transactions, or work to occur within the lower 6 floors.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 102-138, H.R. 1415

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Authorizes appropriations for \$130 million in FY1992 and \$130 million for FY1993 for the construction of chancery facilities in Moscow, U.S.S.R., pursuant to the submission of a comprehensive plan by the Administration for meeting U.S. embassy requirements in Moscow. Signed into law Oct. 28, 1991.

P.L. 102-140, H.R. 2608

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies FY1992 Appropriations. Appropriates \$100 million for the construction of an entirely new chancery building in Moscow for FY1992. Signed into law Oct. 28, 1991.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS

- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 1992; report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991. 137 p. (102d Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 102-106.)
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992; hearing. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991. 1280 p.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee of Conference. Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year ending Sept. 30, 1992, and for other purposes; report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991. 106 p. (102d Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 102-233.)
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee of Conference. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993; report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991. 157 p. (102d Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 102-138.)
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993; report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991. 126 p. (102d Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 102-53.)
- Security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. [Moscow trip report by Representatives Daniel A. Mica and Olympia J. Snowe.] May 12, 1987. 19 p.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Operations. An overview of the Office of Foreign Buildings in the Department of State. Hearing, 101st Congress, 2d session. May 1, 1990. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1990. 70 p.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1992; report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991. 142 p. (102d Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 102-106.)
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Report on security at the United States missions in Moscow and other areas of high risk. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1987. 13 p. (100th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 100-154.)

CHRONOLOGY

- 10/28/91 ---** President signed H.R. 2608 (P.L. 102-140) into law, appropriating \$100 million for an entirely new chancery building.
- 03/07/91 ---** State Department requests authorization for the "Top Hat" plan, in which the top floor of the new office building is demolished and 3 new, secure floors are added on top of the remaining 7-story stem.
- 02/04/91 ---** State Department requested \$130 million in FY1992 budget to complete design work and initiate construction of a new chancery building.
- 07/00/90 ---** Congress approved a \$3.8 million reprogramming of unobligated balances to initiate design work on two alternatives for the chancery building: a structure to be built on the same site as in the administration's "raze and rebuild" option, and a structure to be built on another site.
- 12/20/89 ---** Secretary of State Baker announced State Department's intention to proceed with razing the new building and rebuilding on the same foundation.
- 10/27/88 ---** President Reagan endorsed the razing of the new chancery building.
- 04/05/87 ---** U.S. press reported the existence of an extensive surveillance system in the structure of the new office building at the Moscow Embassy.
- 06/00/86-02/00/87 ---** United States accepted as substantially completed housing units, Marine security guard quarters, school, and the concourse.
- 03/03/86 ---** United States terminated its contract with the Soviet contractor (SVSI).
- 08/19/85 ---** State Department officials halted work on the new office building.
- 09/14/79 ---** U.S. Embassy, Moscow, cornerstone was laid.
- 03/30/77 ---** United States and the Soviet Union signed a Protocol of Negotiations on Construction permitting construction to commence, and setting a July 1, 1982, completion target.
- 12/04/72 ---** United States and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement on Conditions of Construction, containing simultaneous occupancy language.
- 05/16/69 ---** United States and the Soviet Union signed an exchange-of-sites agreement.

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

U.S. General Accounting Office. Overseas construction: Design and construction of U.S. Embassy complex in Moscow. April 1987. 23 p.
GAO/NSIAD-87-125BR.

----- U.S. Embassy, Moscow: Why construction took longer and cost more than anticipated. October 1987. 34 p.
GAO/NSIAD-88-23.


----- Overseas construction: State initiates corrective actions, but improvements still needed. October 1987. 25 p.
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GAO/NSIAD-91-43FS.

U.S. Department of State. Report to the Secretary of State on the Moscow Chancery construction project [by James R. Schlesinger] [June 1987]. 13 p.

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Embassy construction controversies: Moscow and Washington, by Joel M. Woldman and Stuart D. Goldman. [Washington] 1989.
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U.S. Embassy Facilities, Moscow



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U.S. & International Assist.

CRS Issue Brief

U.S. and International Assistance to the Former Soviet Union

Updated October 7, 1993

by
Curt Tarnoff
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division



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U.S. and International Assistance to the Former Soviet Union

SUMMARY

Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to introduce sweeping reforms in the late 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, and the difficult economic and political challenges faced by its successor states since then have continually raised the issue of providing Western humanitarian, economic, and other aid.

Since December 1990, when President Bush agreed to a Soviet request for urgent food and medical assistance, the U.S. Government has committed over \$10 billion in U.S. assistance and credits for the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU), including \$5.5 billion in agricultural credit guarantees; \$700 million in Food for Progress concessional loans; more than \$1 billion in Eximbank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) programs; \$417 million in humanitarian and technical assistance; \$1.1 billion in grant food aid; \$235 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for humanitarian and technical assistance; roughly \$101 million in technical assistance from non-AID Government agencies; and \$800 million and \$115 million of DOD funds for demilitarization and transport of humanitarian assistance, respectively.

In addition to U.S. assistance efforts, other major bilateral pledges of assistance have been made by West European countries, especially Germany, as well as by Japan and Canada. In addition, multilateral organizations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are expected to play the most significant role in providing financial assistance. Total U.S. and other donor commitments of assistance to the former Soviet Union since 1990 is over \$90 billion.

Whether, how much, under what conditions, and to whom in the successor entities of the Soviet Union assistance might be given, however, remain matters of ongoing debate within the executive branch, in Congress, and among other major providers of both bilateral and multilateral assistance. (See also CRS Issue Briefs 90139, *U.S. Agricultural Assistance to the Soviet Union: Policy Issues*; 92093, *Russia and Other Soviet Successor States: Assistance from International Financial Institutions*; and 92128, *Russian Economic Reform and the IMF: Mission Possible?*)

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- *Congress approved, and President Clinton signed, legislation on September 30 appropriating \$2.5 billion in technical and humanitarian assistance for Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.*
- *In the wake of the political crisis in Russia, Strobe Talbott, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on the Newly Independent States, told a congressional committee on October 6 that the Administration plans to proceed with, if not accelerate and intensify, U.S. assistance. Secretary Christopher will visit Moscow about October 21 where, among other things, he will assess the effectiveness of U.S. aid in supporting political and economic transition in Russia and the other NIS countries.*

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Status of U.S Assistance to the Former Soviet Union

Aid to the Soviet Union: Developments Before August 1991

Through most of the Cold War years, U.S. Administrations provided few direct economic aid grants, concessional loans, or other benefits to their chief rival, the Soviet Union. Indeed, normal trade was severely restricted by law. The United States did on a few occasions provide emergency disaster assistance, as in the case of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the Armenian earthquake; CCC export subsidies in 1964 and 1972-1973; and direct CCC credits in FY1973-FY1974.

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to the Soviet leadership in 1985 and his subsequent efforts to introduce sweeping political and economic reforms brought renewed U.S. support for closer bilateral economic relations. In 1987, the Soviet Union gained access to subsidies for U.S. wheat purchases under the Department of Agriculture Export Enhancement Program (EEP). A new U.S.-Soviet trade agreement was reached at the Washington summit in June 1990, and, following Soviet approval of a free emigration law, a measure (H.J.Res. 346) approving extension of most-favored-nation treatment for Soviet goods was signed into law in October 1991.

The President also pledged to work to integrate the Soviet Union into the world economy, initially by supporting Soviet associate or observer status in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international bodies. In July 1990, the U.S. Administration presented Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze with a paper outlining areas of economic and agricultural reform in which the United States could offer technical assistance, such as market development, and food storage and distribution. The Administration also reversed its earlier opposition to Soviet membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

On Dec. 12, 1990, in response to a Soviet request for urgent food and medical assistance, President Bush announced an aid package (not requiring additional congressional approval) that included up to \$1 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credit guarantees for Soviet purchase of agricultural goods. He authorized the Export-Import Bank to provide up to \$300 million in credits to the Soviets for purchase of U.S. goods (the maximum allowed under the 1974 Stevenson-Byrd amendment to the

Export-Import Bank Act without further congressional approval). He offered technical assistance to improve food distribution and implement other economic reforms. He also pledged \$5 million for a public-private medical assistance program to address Soviet shortages of medicine and medical supplies under the International Disaster Relief program. Finally, the President announced that the United States would propose that the Soviet Union be given "special association" with the IMF and World Bank. This association, however, would not allow Moscow to draw on IMF loans.

To extend CCC and Eximbank credits to Moscow, the President had to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment (Subsection 402(c)(2)(A)) of the Trade Act of 1974. He transmitted the waiver to Congress on Dec. 29, 1990, citing the high level of emigration permitted by the Soviet Union in 1990 and assurances from the Soviet government that those high levels of emigration would continue. He renewed the waiver on June 3, 1991, citing continuing Soviet reductions in barriers to emigration.

On Feb. 6, 1991, the Administration announced that it would send medical aid directly to the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) following the Soviet military crackdown and bloodshed there in January 1991. Under this program, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) paid for administrative and some transportation costs, and medicines and medical supplies were donated by private sources. According to Administration spokesmen, the shipments were designed to demonstrate U.S. concern about the Baltic states and were part of a broader policy of increased official contacts with the individual Soviet republics. During 1991, donated pharmaceuticals and medical supplies valued at about \$26 million were supplied to the Baltic states and the republics of the Soviet Union.

On June 12, 1991, in response to a request from the Soviet Union, President Bush approved an additional \$1.5 billion in U.S. agricultural guarantees. The President's decision followed Soviet assurances that the grains would be fairly distributed among Soviet republics and the Baltic states. This offer did not require additional congressional approval.

Aid to a Soviet Union in Transition: August 1991 to December 1991

The aborted coup attempt in August 1991 renewed the issue of increasing U.S. and other Western aid to the Soviet Union. Although Germany, France, and Italy called for higher amounts of assistance to democratic forces in the Soviet Union, other leaders, including President Bush, were more cautious, arguing that it was premature to make decisions on future assistance until a rigorous and comprehensive Soviet economic reform program was in place. On Sept. 10, 1991, while on a fact-finding trip of the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Baker indicated a shift in this U.S. position. He said that the Soviets only needed to make a commitment and develop a plan toward free market economic reforms to receive U.S. aid.

In the following months, as the Soviet Union sank deeper into disarray, a number of actions supporting further aid were taken.

Agricultural credit guarantees. During the attempted coup, President Bush put a brief hold on this program, but quickly resumed it when the coup failed. The President made available remaining agriculture guarantees, and made their terms more favorable (guaranteed 100% of the principal and about 5.6% of the interest on private

bank loans to finance these purchases). On Nov. 20, 1991, the Bush Administration announced a further aid package, including \$1.25 billion in agricultural credit guarantees. These initiatives did not require additional congressional approval.

Humanitarian food and technical assistance. The Administration's Nov. 20, 1991, initiative also included \$165 million in food aid to be provided to particularly deficit regions of the former USSR, as well as technical assistance. On Dec. 9, 1991, AID notified Congress of its intent to reprogram \$5 million of appropriated FY1992 foreign assistance funds for technical assistance for the former Soviet Union.

Weapons safeguarding. Representative Aspin and Senator Nunn included in the conference report on the defense authorization measure (H.R. 2100) a proposal that would allow the President to use up to \$1 billion in defense funds to deliver emergency food and medicine to the Soviet Union, as well as to help the Soviets with military conversion. The proposal also included assistance to dismantle nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Although the initiative was dropped when it received no support from the Administration and was criticized by many in Congress, a similar proposal was incorporated into H.R. 3807, the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 102-228, signed into law Dec. 12, 1991). It allowed expenditure of up to \$500 million of Defense Department appropriations -- \$400 million for assistance with weapons destruction and safeguarding and \$100 million for transport of humanitarian relief. The Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill, H.J.Res. 157 (P.L. 102-229, signed into law Dec. 12, 1991), appropriated these funds.

On Dec. 12, 1991 (4 days after creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States) Secretary of State Baker outlined a series of actions the U.S. Government intended to pursue to help safeguard or destroy Soviet nuclear and other weapons, establish democratic institutions, stabilize the economic situation, and overcome dire food and medical shortages, including doubling the amount of medical assistance thus far provided; sending food stocks left from Desert Storm to regions in particular need, such as Armenia, the industrial cities of the Urals, St. Petersburg, and Moscow; augmenting ongoing USIA programs; and working with Congress to establish Peace Corps programs in some republics and a \$100 million technical assistance program. President Bush named then-Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger as Coordinator for U.S. assistance efforts toward the former Soviet Union. To discuss the division of labor and responsibilities for assisting the region, he proposed hosting an international conference in January 1992.

Aid to the Former Soviet Union: Developments in 1992

On Jan. 22, 1992, at the international donors conference on aid to the former Soviet Union (FSU), President Bush pledged, pending Congressional approval, \$645 million in additional assistance from FY1992 and FY1993 funds. In concluding remarks one day later, Secretary Baker announced that the United States would shortly begin a major short-term airlift. Operation Provide Hope, begun on Feb. 10, 1992, provided emergency food and medical supplies to the states of the former Soviet Union. Ambassador Richard Armitage coordinated 65 flights by the U.S. Air Force that carried some \$28 million in Defense Department surplus food stocks as well as surplus medical supplies to 11 republics and 24 cities.

H.J.Res. 456, the continuing resolution providing foreign aid appropriations for the remainder of FY1992 (P.L. 102-266, signed into law April 1), contained several provisions related to aid for the former Soviet Union. One repealed the Stevenson and Byrd amendment restrictions on provision of export credits. Another provided the President with the authority to provide additional FY1992 humanitarian and technical assistance to the FSU from existing ESF resources. The Administration decided to allocate \$150 million in additional resources from the authorization.

On Apr. 1, 1992, President Bush outlined a comprehensive package of assistance to the former Soviet Union. It included a number of new initiatives that would establish U.S. policy with regard to the states of the former Soviet Union and would provide various forms of assistance to them. He also reiterated previous aid proposals that would contribute toward his new policy initiatives.

The President announced U.S. participation in a multilateral G-7 \$24 billion package of support for Russia. The U.S. contribution to that package was estimated at roughly \$4.5 billion -- a commitment of \$1.5 billion toward a \$6 billion ruble stabilization fund; \$1 billion of \$4.5 billion in IMF, World Bank, and EBRD loans, counted as part of the regular U.S. contribution to those organizations; and \$2 billion of an \$11 billion G-7 contribution in bilateral aid, largely composed of CCC agricultural credit guarantees, Eximbank loan guarantees, and some humanitarian assistance.

The President also proposed legislation that would, in the words of Secretary of State Baker, "unite the executive and legislative branches around a bipartisan program that can mobilize the American people" in support of assistance for the former Soviet Union. The Freedom Support Act of 1992 was submitted to Congress on April 3 and introduced as S. 2532 on April 7.

In conjunction with his aid announcement, the President offered \$1.1 billion in CCC agricultural credit guarantees -- \$600 million for Russia and \$500 million for the other states. The credit offer did not require additional congressional approval. The Administration also reiterated its humanitarian and technical assistance funding request for FY1992 (\$150 million) and FY1993 (\$470 million) that was included in the AID FY1993 congressional budget presentation.

The Freedom Support Act, extensively amended by Congress, was approved by the Senate on July 2 (76-20) and by the House on August 6 (255-164). The conference report on the Freedom Support Act was approved by the House on October 1 and by the Senate on October 3, and the bill was signed into law on Oct. 24, 1992. As enacted, S. 2532 authorized \$505.8 million in FY1993 divided into several broad areas: \$410 million in humanitarian and technical assistance (of which \$15 million was earmarked to set up a Democracy Corps and \$12 million for American Business Centers); \$70.8 million for various educational exchange programs (of which \$20.8 million was for USIA programs); and \$25 million for State Department and USIA expenses for the region. Beyond these authorizations, the Freedom Support Act authorized \$500 million in new funds for nonproliferation and disarmament activities in the former Soviet Union, of which \$400 million was from the defense budget and \$100 million was from security assistance funds (ESF and military assistance). The bill also authorized a \$12 billion increase in the U.S. quota to the IMF intended for all countries, but expected to benefit the former Soviet Union, and endorsed a U.S. contribution of up to \$3 billion in

previously appropriated monies for proposed currency stabilization funds that would be implemented under IMF auspices.

Funding for these activities and others were contained in a series of appropriations bills. The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993 (P.L. 102-391, H.R. 5368) appropriated \$417 million for the former Soviet Union, largely for humanitarian and technical assistance. The law also appropriated \$12 billion for the increase in the U.S. quota to the IMF. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993 (P.L. 102-396, H.R. 5504) provided up to \$400 million (in addition to the \$400 million appropriated in FY1992) for activities authorized under the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, to assist the republics in the storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons, and \$15 million for humanitarian aid transportation costs. The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 (P.L. 102-395, H.R. 5678) appropriated \$25 million for USIA and State Department to set up new diplomatic posts in the FSU, appropriated \$2 million to establish a Russian Far East Technical Assistance Center at an American University, and funded educational and cultural exchange programs.

On Oct. 29-30, 1992, the United States announced a \$412 million aid package for the FSU at the Tokyo Conference for Assistance to the Newly Independent States, the third and final follow-on meeting to the January conference held in Washington, D.C. Composed of new aid, the assistance included \$250 million in grant emergency food aid, \$100 million in wheat and corn feed stocks, \$38 million in DOD excess Meals-Ready-to-Eat and bulk processed foods, and \$14 million in emergency medical supplies. This initiative did not require additional congressional approval.

Aid to the Former Soviet Union: Developments in 1993

In its original FY1994 foreign aid request, the Administration had proposed \$703.8 million for the FSU humanitarian/technical assistance account, an increase of roughly \$287 million from the FY1993 level of \$417 million. It also requested another \$400 million from the FY1994 defense budget for the nonproliferation fund.

Increasing concerns regarding the economic and political stability of Russia and a consequent chorus in the United States calling for an aggressive U.S. response led the Clinton Administration to give high priority to Russia and the issue of further assistance in its incipient foreign policy pronouncements. On March 5, the President pledged to take new action to provide innovative solutions to Russia's problems, including financial assistance efforts.

The Administration also indicated its desire to work with the G-7 nations to formulate a package of assistance more efficacious than the \$24 billion proposal promised in April 1992 but that the Russians and some American analysts assert was never fully delivered (most estimates of actual "disbursements" range from \$11 billion to \$18 billion). Rather than wait for the July Tokyo conference of G-7 heads of state, the President and other G-7 leaders agreed to have their representatives discuss the aid issue at a meeting on March 13-14 in Hong Kong. At the President's suggestion, a representative from Russia was invited to participate. That meeting was concluded with the promise that an aid package, expected to be targeted and more visible to the

average Russian citizen affected by the economic reform process, would be forthcoming within several weeks.

Vancouver Summit Initiative. On April 4, immediately following his Vancouver summit meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, President Clinton announced a \$1.6 billion package of U.S. assistance to Russia. All of the programs utilized existing FY1993 resources, and none of the funds required new appropriations from Congress: \$924 million of the package -- \$700 million in agricultural loans, \$194 million in food grants, and \$30 million in medical and maternal/child health grants -- was assistance additional to that already designated for Russia and the FSU. Roughly \$676 million was derived from FY1993 funds and programs previously expected to go to the FSU, if not for Russia specifically.

While the package may not have been entirely new, aspects of it suggested a shift from the Bush Administration approach. Perhaps most important were the terms of loans for agricultural commodities. The \$700 million in loans came from the Food for Progress Program (FFP) on highly concessional terms, with a long grace period and repayment schedule and a low interest rate. This stood in sharp variance to the 3-year repayment, market rate interest loans that characterized the CCC agricultural credit guarantees that composed the bulk of Bush Administration assistance to the Soviet Union and its successor states since 1990. In providing more concessional loans, the Administration appeared to be responding to critics of the Bush approach who argued that the CCC program was a trade program, not foreign assistance, and inappropriate for a country that was having difficulty repaying its debts. In November, Russia defaulted on its CCC guarantee repayments, thereby foreclosing the possibility of new loans until it paid up. Although the Paris Club rescheduled some of these repayments on April 2, possibly clearing the way for further CCC guarantees, it is likely that concessional loans will supplant the CCC program for the foreseeable future. However, a major obstacle to the use of Food for Progress was an already reached ceiling of \$30 million on transport expenditures for FFP commodities. Congress was asked to lift this ceiling in the Freedom Support Act, but the provision was removed at the last minute due to budgetary issues. To overcome this obstacle, the Secretary of Agriculture used emergency authority to transfer funds from another program to cover the shipping costs associated with the Russian assistance. The funds also covered additional transport costs arising from the requirement that 75% of FFP shipments be carried on U.S. freighters, a requirement that would greatly increase transport expenses and diminish the amount of real food assistance made available. (See CRS Issue Brief 90139, *U.S. Agricultural Assistance to the Former Soviet Union*, for further details.)

Another change from previous policy was an increase in levels of assistance targeted at privatization efforts, from \$20 million to \$60 million. Many believe that the more quickly and extensively privatization occurs, the better the new revolution can be made irreversible. The Clinton Administration also targeted funds at resettling Russian officers to facilitate a withdrawal from the Baltics. \$6 million would be used to build 450 houses for officers returning to Russia and to provide employment training to assist their return to civilian life.

The privatization and officer resettlement initiatives illustrate the Administration's proclaimed effort to make its assistance more highly visible to the average Russian citizen than the earlier aid program. The President claimed that 75% of the assistance would be used outside Moscow and the same proportion would be

provided to non-governmental bodies. The democracy initiatives announced at the summit were also very directly targeted at the average person. The Administration intended to bring together a range of exchanges and training programs to encourage person-to-person contacts between Americans and Russians. In one, perhaps public-relations-driven effort, the summer of 1993 was designated "Democracy Summer" with approximately 3,000 Russians brought to the U.S. for education and training.

The appointment of presidential friend Strobe Talbott as Ambassador at Large for the Newly Independent States was one sign of the Administration's desire to place the aid issue at a higher level of priority. At the summit, the President announced several further moves in this direction, including appointment of Vice President Al Gore to co-chair a commission on technological cooperation with the Russian Prime Minister; Commerce Secretary Ron Brown to co-chair a business development committee with the Deputy Foreign Minister; and appointment of a full-time investment ombudsman.

The importance of trade, often viewed as a substitute for large-scale assistance, was given some prominence in the summit announcement. The Administration stated its support of Russian membership in GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and access to the Generalized System of Preferences. It included in the aid package credit and guarantee agreements that were being negotiated for some months -- an \$82 million Export-Import credit for Caterpillar Inc. machinery to be used on a gas pipeline project; and a \$150 million guarantee from the Overseas Private Investment Corp for an oil project by DuPont Co's Conoco Inc unit. It also promised to try to push to completion by April 14 a \$2 billion Export-Import oil and gas loan (the deal was finally signed on July 6).

Finally, the Administration outlined \$215 million in further proposed uses for the \$800 million nonproliferation fund that was appropriated in the defense budget for FY1992 and FY1993. \$130 million would go for dismantling nuclear delivery vehicles, \$75 million for warhead storage facilities, and \$10 million for nuclear materials accountability and control. There had been some criticism of the Bush Administration for moving slowly on utilizing the fund, although disagreements between Russia and Ukraine on nuclear disarmament were in part responsible for delays. (See CRS Issue Brief 91144, *Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union*, for further details.)

At Vancouver, President Yeltsin extracted a promise from President Clinton that the United States would review outmoded legal restrictions on trade and other relations that treated Russia "as though we were still a communist country." As a result of that review, the Administration transmitted to Congress on July 27, 1993, the FRIENDSHIP with Russia, Ukraine and Other New Independent States Act (S. 1296 and H.R. 3000). Although the draft bill would eliminate many vestiges of Cold War legislation, it would not affect the two restrictions of greatest concern to Russia, the Jackson-Vanik amendment and COCOM restrictions on technology exports.

April 15 Bilateral U.S. Aid Proposal. According to the President, the summit package was only the first step of a U.S. effort to assist Russia. The second step was the April 15, \$28.4 billion G-7 package (not counting the \$15 billion public debt rescheduling that occurred on April 2) which rests on IMF and other multilateral organization financial resources (See multilateral aid section below). The third step was to be a \$1.8 billion U.S. assistance package announced at the conclusion of the G-7 meeting of finance and foreign ministers.

The \$1.8 billion Clinton Administration initiative, funding for which was approved by Congress on September 30, is largely in the form of grant assistance. Five hundred million of the total was initially anticipated for a U.S. contribution to a proposed \$4 billion G-7 fund that would help Russia privatize its state-owned enterprises. As agreed by the G-7 in July, the fund will be \$3 billion, with a U.S. contribution of \$375 million -- \$250 million in export credits and \$125 million in grants and technical assistance. See the multilateral section below for details.

As proposed in April, \$250 million dollars of the new assistance would be targeted at improving gas and oil production through imports of U.S. equipment, energy and environmental programs, and nuclear reactor safety; \$155 million would go toward private sector development -- assisting agribusiness, setting up two new funds to invest in small business (a Russia Far East Fund and a U.S. contribution to a multilateral development bank fund), and providing technical assistance for newly privatized firms; \$220 million would provide support for democracy, including expanded person-to-person exchanges and increased legal and media assistance; \$75 million would be used to promote medical and pharmaceutical production; \$145 million is expected to stimulate trade and investment, mostly through additional subsidy appropriations for Eximbank and OPIC (as noted below, Congress increased to \$300 million subsidy appropriations for Eximbank activities in the NIS); \$165 million would be used to construct more homes for demobilized soldiers returning from the Baltics and to help design a comprehensive housing program for Russia; and the remaining \$300 million would support similar activities in non-Russian former republics. (See Table 1 for comparison between proposed aid package and congressional guidelines enacted in P.L. 103-87.)

Congressional Response. Arriving at a funding mechanism for the proposal, however, required extensive negotiations between the Administration and Congress. Meeting on May 26, the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee approved the \$1.8 billion assistance proposal. Of that amount, \$1.6 billion was included as an FY1993 supplemental attached to the FY1994 foreign operations appropriations bill. Because there was insufficient money left under the foreign assistance budget cap for FY1993, appropriators turned to the defense budget for additional funds. With the agreement of the Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, \$979 million of the package would be drawn from supplemental FY1993 defense funds; \$630 million would come from a FY1993 foreign assistance supplemental appropriation. The remaining \$200 million would be added to the FY1994 foreign aid appropriations bill. The full House Appropriations Committee approved the measure, H.R. 2295, on June 10, and the House passed it by a vote of 309-111 on June 17. An effort, sponsored by conservatives and members of the Congressional Black Caucus, to remove the \$1.6 billion FY1993 supplemental increase for the FSU was defeated by a vote of 289-140.

Following weeks of negotiations over whether to use defense funds as part of the Russian aid package, the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee met on Sept. 12, 1993, and approved full funding of the President's request. Although the subcommittee followed the same formula used by the House -- \$1.6 billion FY1993 supplemental funds, of which \$979 million would be taken from unspent defense money, and \$904 million for FY1994 -- the Senate panel made two important modifications by earmarking \$300 million specifically for Ukraine and shifting \$300 million of the broad technical and humanitarian aid proposal to the Export-Import Bank for loans and guarantees of U.S. exports to the former Soviet Union. The bill further designated specific amounts of the combined FY1993/1994 \$2.5 billion package for selected

programs, amounts that were similar, but not exactly the same as those recommended by the President.

Prior to Senate consideration of H.R. 2295, a political crisis erupted in Russia on Sept. 21, 1993, when President Yeltsin dissolved the legislature and called for elections, but was challenged by parliament hard-liners who declared Yeltsin's actions unconstitutional and sought to take power. Nevertheless, congressional supporters of Russian assistance endorsed Yeltsin's decisions and argued that it was even more critical for Congress to move forward with the aid package to demonstrate continuing U.S. support for economic and political reform in Russia. Two days later, on September 23, the Senate approved H.R. 2295, including the full \$2.5 billion FY1993/1994 aid proposal for the former Soviet Union. During debate, however, Senators added a number of conditions, many of which were adopted in modified form in the final bill (see below).

While the political crisis in Moscow continued, Congress finalized action and the President signed H.R. 2295, including the \$2.5 billion FSU aid package, on September 30. Rapid congressional consideration resulted from both Congress' desire to signal support for President Yeltsin and perhaps more importantly, to enact the legislation prior to the end of the fiscal year after which the FY1993 supplemental funds (\$1.6 billion) for Russia would no longer have been available. Finding the necessary money entirely out of FY1994 appropriations would have presented considerable obstacles, given the declining budgets for foreign aid and defense, and the desire by many to maintain domestic spending levels.

As shown in Table 1, Congress generally agreed with the Administration's plan for allocating the \$2.5 billion. One of the most notable changes is the \$300 million transfer to the Export-Import Bank, action taken primarily so that Eximbank loans and guarantees for Russia and the other NIS nations do not come at the expense of financial backing for other countries. Lawmakers also expressed their intent that this not be an aid package exclusively for Russia but provide at least one-third of the total for the other states. (This is consistent with Administration estimates.) The final bill further recommends that Ukraine receive at least \$300 million and Armenia \$18 million. Although Congress approved the package, Members attached conditions, some allowing a presidential waiver, that will affect whether Russia and the other former republics remain eligible for American aid. Among the most significant are

- Russian government must be making progress in implementing comprehensive economic reforms;
- Russian government must not use aid to expropriate or seize ownership or control of assets, investments, or ventures;
- NIS governments must not direct any action in violation of the territorial integrity or national sovereignty of another NIS country (national interest waiver and exemption for humanitarian and refugee programs);
- No aid to enhance the military capability of any NIS country (demilitarization, defense conversion, non-proliferation exemption);
- Russian aid reduced by \$380 million unless President certifies on Apr. 1, 1994, that Russia has not provided assistance to Cuba during past 18 months (national interest waiver); and

- No aid for Russia unless President certifies that (1) Russia and Latvia and Estonia have set a timetable for withdrawal of Russian troops; or (2) Russia has continued to make substantial progress toward withdrawal.

**TABLE 1. Russia and Other NIS Aid:
\$2.5 billion FY1993/1994 Package
(millions of dollars)**

	<u>Request</u>	<u>Enacted</u> (P.L. 103-87)
Private Sector Development	647	894
Privatization & Restructuring	125	125
Trade and Investment	490	485 *
Democratic Initiatives	295	295
Humanitarian Assistance	239	239
Energy and Environment	228	285
Officer Resettlement & Housing	190	190
Non-Russia NIS Special Funding	300**	---
TOTAL	2,513	2,513

* Includes \$300 million transfer to the Export-Import Bank.

** Non-Russia NIS aid distributed among other sectors in enacted bill.

Issues for Congress in 1993

To What Extent Should the U.S. Help the Former Soviet Union?

Although a broad consensus supporting provision of some assistance, if only of a humanitarian nature, predates the August 1991 coup, a continuing issue for Members of Congress is the amount of aid that should be provided. Congress recently approved an appropriations bill containing \$2.5 billion in FY1993 and FY1994 assistance to the FSU but will likely consider further aid initiatives in the future.

The precarious state of the new economies -- Russia has a total debt burden of roughly \$80 to \$85 billion and suffered an inflation rate of 2,000% last year -- threatens both their political stability and efforts to make a transition to a market economy. The IMF has put the foreign official financing requirements of Russia alone at \$22 billion for 1993.

Many in the foreign policy community, including former President Richard Nixon, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Robert Strauss, and members of Congress, argue that the FSU republics require more U.S. as well as other Western aid if they are going to succeed in establishing democracies and free market economies. The crux of their view is that the economic and political stability of the region is of vital importance to U.S. interests. Consequently, some support a long-term program of development assistance, and some have even called for a "Marshall Plan" for the FSU, suggesting large-scale infusions of assistance. Arguing for additional assistance in a floor speech on Mar. 4, 1993, Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations

Subcommittee, suggested that the U.S. defense budget would be \$100 billion greater next year if the Soviet Union still existed as a military threat.

Some, Senators Nunn and Lugar most prominently, fearing lack of control over nuclear and other weapons and the proliferation of those weapons and their technology globally, have argued successfully that the safeguarding of those weapons is a genuine U.S. defense priority and proper national security expenditure. As a result, \$800 million in defense budget funds has been allocated to help the republics with defense conversion, safeguarding and dismantling weapons (an additional \$400 million has been requested for FY1994), and more than \$300 million of DOD funds has been allocated to provide humanitarian food and medical assistance. Arguing that it would promote U.S. security interests, Congress supported the use of \$979 million in FY1993 defense funds to be used to assist the FSU under P.L. 103-87, the FY1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations approved by lawmakers on Sept. 30.

Those expressing caution or opposition regarding outlays of assistance argue that, given the size and number of republics and the depth of their problems, the United States could not provide sufficient aid to make a difference. They suggest that anything more than humanitarian assistance would be money down the drain until substantial economic reforms are implemented. Besides, in providing an increase in the U.S. quota to the IMF, it is expected that, with much greater resources at its disposal, the IMF will take the lead in providing aid to the new republics.

Some also argue that, with the Cold War over, United States interests in the region are less vital. Critics of further assistance also raise reservations regarding provision of assistance when the U.S. economy is not fully recovered from recession and foreign assistance programs in general are unpopular with the U.S. public. In considering the Freedom Support Act, many members of Congress linked congressional support for the aid package with Administration support of an extension of unemployment benefits and an accelerated jobs program for Americans. The House floor debate on H.R. 2295 focused largely on this issue of domestic versus foreign priorities. Proposed amendments to the foreign assistance authorization and appropriations bills that would cut funding to the FSU raised most of these arguments again in 1993. Efforts to cut funding were defeated in the House by large margins.

This debate is affected by uncertainties over developments in the former Soviet Union, especially who is in charge and what entities the United States should deal with, as well as questions about the future direction of their policies. Those parts of the former Soviet Union that pursue a course of political democratization, marketization of the economy, and international dialogue, are likely to be included in future congressional action on aid and trade. If there are significant moves away from reform and disintegration and chaos threaten, assistance to those parts of the former Soviet Union is unlikely to be considered.

Both the Freedom Support Act and the FY1993 foreign operations bill contain general and specific conditions that the states of the FSU are expected to follow in order to receive assistance. Conditions, left to the broad discretion of the President, include whether these countries are undertaking economic and political reform, whether they are following international standards of human rights, whether they are adhering to international treaties, and whether they are denying support to terrorists. Other conditions established by Congress are more firm. Under the FY1993 Foreign

Operations Appropriations Act, the President was required to make a determination on whether Russia had made substantial progress in withdrawing its troops from the Baltics. If he could not so certify, half of the grant aid appropriated to Russia could not be delivered. On May 31, the President certified that troop levels had declined by 60-70%. Under the same Act, however, all aid to the government of Russia must be terminated if it has not withdrawn all of its forces or completed negotiated agreements with the Baltic states by Oct. 6, 1993. On August 23, one day after Russia suspended its troop withdrawal from Lithuania, the Clinton Administration warned Russia of the possible cessation of assistance. On August 30, the Lithuanian president stated that President Yeltsin had agreed to remove the troops as planned.

As noted above, the recently enacted Foreign Operations Appropriations (P.L. 103-87) places a number of conditions on prospective aid to the former Soviet Union. A House-passed foreign aid authorization bill for FY1994 (H.R. 2404) and a Senate-reported companion measure (S. 1467) also contain several provisions -- some similar to those in the appropriations bill -- that could potentially inhibit assistance to the FSU. Those contained in the authorization bills would strengthen Freedom Support Act prohibitions regarding withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics; prohibit aid to FSU states that sell certain weapons to Iran; make the extent to which an FSU state moves to close nuclear facilities in Cuba a criteria for determining the degree of assistance; and prohibits aid to countries that provide assistance to or engage in nonmarket-based trade with Cuba.

What Kind of Assistance Should the U.S. Provide?

With passage of the Freedom Support Act in 1992 authorizing technical assistance and educational exchange programs for the former Soviet Union, the United States now provides a wide range of emergency humanitarian relief, development, and trade and investment programs to the region. One issue that is likely to be a continuing consideration by Congress is the appropriate composition of the aid program, both among and within different types of assistance.

Until the Vancouver summit, almost three-fourths of promised and delivered U.S. assistance had taken the form of credit guarantees or related financing under USDA, Eximbank, and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) programs. Many critics argued that credit was an inappropriate form of aid for countries straining unsuccessfully to keep up with their debt payments. In fact, further agricultural credit guarantees were suspended for Russia in November when it defaulted on its repayments. The proposed alternatives -- rescheduling the agricultural guarantee debt accumulated by the FSU states when the Soviet Union still existed and providing long-term concessional loans -- have now been met to some extent. On April 2, 1993, the Paris Club reached agreement on rescheduling of debt owed by the FSU and Russia. It is expected that repayment of \$1.1 billion owed against USDA-guaranteed credits extended to the FSU in 1991 will be deferred to the 1995-2000 period. After Moscow failed to comply with a payment requirement due on June 30, U.S. and Russian officials worked out another agreement -- announced on September 30 -- that calls on Russia to pay \$420 million by the end of 1993.

As noted above, food aid offered at Vancouver was in the form of concessional loans and grants. The President's \$2.5 billion aid initiative approved by Congress on

September 30 is largely in the form of grants. Whether the dominant proportion of U.S. aid now shifts to grants and concessional loans remains to be seen.

Another possible focus of congressional attention is the make-up of specific projects and programs intended to assist the former Soviet Union. The Freedom Support Act proposes, and AID and other executive agencies are currently implementing, technical assistance and related programs in sectors ranging from energy to agriculture to housing. Some observers have suggested that this is an attempt to do a little of everything, thereby stretching limited resources too thinly. Each type of aid has its proponents. Some argue that a larger proportion of U.S. grant assistance should be concentrated in agriculture-related sectors so that dependence on foreign exchange draining imports could be ended. Some would give priority to the oil industry in order to build foreign exchange. Still others make the case for concentration of U.S. assistance on trade and investment programs to help both U.S. business and the private sector in the new republics. Economist Jeffrey Sachs and others have argued for the creation of a multibillion dollar "social safety net" for unemployed and retired Russians that might prevent social unrest during the transition to a market economy. While the Administration's Vancouver package and April 15 proposal maintain a U.S. effort in a wide range of sectors, there is a strong emphasis on private sector rather than Government, outlying areas rather than Moscow, oil and gas production, and people-to-people exchanges.

Is U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union Effective?

Many questions regarding the effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts have been raised in recent months. Increasingly, as U.S. aid programs move from funding to implementation, members of Congress and others are asking if these programs are having the desired impact. For most programs, it is too early to tell. Most technical assistance programs have only just begun to be implemented, with technical advisors on the ground since the summer of 1992. The U.S. development experience in Eastern Europe since 1989, a model for many of the new programs, is only now being evaluated in a way that might provide some sense of program effectiveness.

Although foreign aid accountability requirements and the difficulty in identifying appropriate organizations and individuals to assist are factors in the speed of implementing programs, concern remains that aid implementation has been too slow. The Clinton Administration, which intended its recent aid initiatives to be implemented rapidly to show support for President Yeltsin's reforms and smooth the transition to free markets for vulnerable groups, claims (as of July 27) that over 64% of the Vancouver aid has been obligated already and will soon be in evidence on the ground.

Some observers perceived a lack of coordination and monitoring of aid programs within the Bush Administration that, they felt, damaged the overall effectiveness of the program. The appointment of Strobe Talbott as ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the Secretary of State on the new independent states (Thomas W. Simons, Jr. will serve under him as aid coordinator), and the high level of personal attention the program has received from the President suggest that the Clinton Administration intends to carefully coordinate the activities of AID, State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the many other departments and agencies involved to some extent in providing assistance to the region. It is also expected to closely monitor programs in response to congressional concerns that foreign aid funds have been or will be lost and

to ensure that aid is responsive to FSU needs. One recent U.S. proposal -- that the G-7 set up a permanent mission in Moscow specifically to better monitor its aid -- was adopted at the July Tokyo summit, despite an initially cool response from France. It will be called the Support Implementation Group.

Multilateral and Bilateral Programs of Other Countries

Because its own resources are insufficient, the response of the United States to the former republics' requirements for assistance will depend in part on the extent to which other countries provide aid. Accordingly, the issue of assistance has been treated largely as an international concern to be dealt with both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Multilateral Aid

The United States has attempted to coordinate aid policy through both the vehicle of the G-7 and through the larger international forum of a Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States. On January 22-23, 1992, the United States convened a conference of the foreign ministers of 47 potential donor governments and representatives of 7 international organizations to discuss coordination of assistance activities for the FSU. It established working groups on food, medicine, energy, shelter, and technical assistance. In the final coordinating conference that met in Tokyo on Oct. 29-30, 1992, the 70 donor countries and 19 international organizations that attended expressed their concern over concentrating strictly on short-term, emergency aid. To stress medium- and long-term assistance, the World Bank was appointed to lead donor aid coordination in the future. The Bank has set up Country Consultative Groups (CCGs) for each of the new republics to improve the overall efficiency of longer-term donor assistance.

On Apr. 1, 1992, the G-7 announced a \$24 billion package of assistance for Russia to be provided during 1992. The proposed U.S. contribution of \$4.5 billion represented roughly one-fifth of the total G-7 effort. The March 1993 parliamentary challenge to President Yeltsin precipitated a G-7 effort to demonstrate support for Russian democracy prior to the Tokyo summit planned for July. G-7 "sherpas" met in March and finance and foreign ministers met on April 14-15 to come up with a package of assistance that might have an impact on the April 25 referendum on Yeltsin's leadership. The result was a \$43.4 billion assistance plan. This included \$14.2 billion in currency stabilization support efforts, utilizing the \$6 billion stabilization fund approved by the G-7 last year, a \$3 billion IMF Systemic Transformation Facility, a \$4.1 billion IMF stand-by loan, and \$1.1 billion in World Bank import assistance. A further \$14.2 billion will be drawn from World Bank, EBRD, and bilateral export credits and guarantees, for import assistance. The package also included the already announced (April 2) \$15 billion Paris Club public debt rescheduling that allowed Russia to repay debts due in 1992 and 1993 over the next 10 years.

At the July 1993 Tokyo summit, the G-7 established a \$3 billion Special Privatization and Restructuring Program that is expected to distribute funds over an 18-month period. It will be made up of \$500 million in bilateral grants, to be used largely for technical assistance to newly privatized companies; \$1 billion in bilateral export credits and \$1 billion in World Bank and EBRD loans to be used by Russian companies to import Western goods; and \$500 million in World Bank loans to be used

by local governments to help them make up for health, education, and other services previously supplied to employees by state-owned companies.

The bulk of G-7 aid proposals, past and present, rest on assistance provided, not bilaterally, but multilaterally by the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). However, to date, their participation in the assistance program has been limited due to the failure of Russia to meet macro-policy reform conditions. Pending appropriate policy reforms, the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD were expected to lend Russia as much as \$4.5 billion during calendar year 1992 (not including the \$6 billion ruble stabilization fund that has not yet been implemented). However, only about \$1.6 billion was offered. In 1993, members of the G-7 encouraged the multilaterals to alter their standard approach and to ease up on prior conditionality and provide assistance earlier as a way of encouraging later reform. Following the G-7 April 15 aid package announcement, the IMF opened a new loan window for this purpose -- the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF). Despite pressure on the IMF from the United States and other donors, in early June 1993 the IMF held up approval of a \$1.5 billion loan to Russia, intended to be the first under the STF, pending fulfillment of specific economic policy reform conditions. The loan was finally approved on July 1. On June 17, the World Bank approved its largest project loan ever, \$610 million to assist Russia in rebuilding its oil industry. For details on aid provided by international financial institutions, see CRS Issue Brief 92093, *Russia and Other Soviet Successor States: Assistance from International Financial Institutions*, and 92128, *Russian Economic Reform and the IMF: Mission Possible?*.

Bilateral Aid

According to the General Accounting Office, only 44% of the roughly \$90 billion in worldwide commitments of assistance to the Soviet Union and its successor states up to the end of 1992 had been disbursed. One reason may be that more than two-thirds of this assistance has taken the form of export credits and credit guarantees, which many believe Russia and the other new states are reluctant to borrow. The proportion of assistance that is grants versus loans has become an issue amongst international donors with the United States pressing its allies in the G-7 to offer more grant assistance. Its original proposal for the privatization fund adopted by the G-7 at Tokyo included \$2 billion in bilateral grants. Opposition by other G-7 countries lowered this figure to \$500 million, of which Japan will provide at least \$90 million and Germany \$80 million.

Germany has committed the largest amount of assistance to the FSU -- according to State Department figures, roughly two-thirds of G-7 and European Community (EC) commitments made between September 1990 and the end of 1992. Expenditures and planned commitments by Germany since 1989 total more than \$54 billion. A part of this amount is free grants and direct subsidies with a large share relating to the transition agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops (including building housing for departing Soviet soldiers) from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR); the largest part is credits and direct grants; and the rest relate to ruble balance transfers relating to claims of the former GDR for export surpluses to the Soviet Union. Along with the United States, German Prime Minister Helmut Kohl has taken a lead role in appealing to other members of the G-7 for increases in aid to the FSU. However, in early August, the German government announced it would stop providing export credit guarantees for Russia under its "Hermes" program until the

Russian debt repayment record improved. In 1992, Germany was forced to pay roughly \$562 million to cover defaults from former Soviet states.

Although Japan had been expected to be a major donor, its contributions have been restrained by the unresolved dispute with Russia over ownership of the southern Kuril Islands. Up to the end of 1992, Japan had pledged roughly \$2.6 billion in loan assistance and \$150 million in grant humanitarian aid. The aid has been largely for the Russian Far East, although Japan has urged other donors to allow the Central Asian Republics (CAR) -- Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan -- to be classified as so-called developing countries, thus allowing them to receive loans at highly concessionary rates. This reflects apparent growing Japanese interest in strengthening relations between itself and the CAR. Concurrent with its hosting of the G-7 meeting on Russian aid in April, Japan bowed to heavy pressure from the United States and other G-7 nations and pledged \$1.8 billion in bilateral aid for Russia, mostly in the form of credits and guarantees. Unlike previous years, it did not push its demands for return of the Kuril Islands at the July G-7 summit held in Tokyo.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 103-87, H.R. 2295

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1994. Appropriates \$903.8 million for FSU. Contains supplemental appropriation with \$1.6 billion in assistance for FSU. Reported by Appropriations Committee June 10 (H.Rept. 103-125). Passed House, amended, June 17 (309-111). Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee Sept. 14 (S.Rept. 103-142). Passed Senate Sept. 23 (88-10). Conference report (H.Rept. 103-267) agreed to by House Sept. 29 (321-108) and by Senate Sept. 30 (87-11). Signed into law Sept. 30, 1993.

H.R. 2404 (Hamilton)/S. 1467 (Pell)

Authorizes appropriations for foreign aid for FY1994. Authorizes \$903.8 million in assistance for FSU. H.R. 2404 reported by House Foreign Affairs Committee June 11 as Division B of H.R. 2333 (H.Rept. 103-126). Introduced as H.R. 2404 June 14. Passed House, amended, June 16 (by voice vote). S. 1467 introduced and reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sept. 16 (S.Rept. 103-144).

S. 1296 (Pell)/H.R. 3000 (Gephardt)

Act For Reform in Emerging New Democracies and Support and Help for Improved Partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and Other New Independent States (FRIENDSHIP Act). S. 1296 introduced July 27 and referred to Foreign Relations Committee. H.R. 3000 introduced August 6 and referred to seven House committees; marked-up by Foreign Affairs Committee Oct. 7, 1993.

APPENDIX
**U.S. Bilateral Assistance and Credits for
 The Republics of the Former Soviet Union**
 (in millions of U.S. dollars)

	FY1991	FY1992	FY1993	Total
<u>Grant Assistance</u>				
Humanitarian Assistance				
<i>Medical</i>				
USAID Disaster Assistance	5	12	--	17
DOD Excess Medical Donations	--	100	50	150
<i>Food Assistance</i>				
USDA Food Aid (includes Title I)	--	293	850	1143
DOD Excess Stock Donations	--	62	40	102
<i>Transportation</i>				
DOD Transportation Funds	--	100	15	115
Subtotal	5	567	955	1527
Technical Assistance				
Economic Support Funds	5	230*	--	235
USAID Development Assistance	--	5	5	10
P.L. 480, Farmer-to-Farmer	--	10	10	20
Other USG Technical Assistance	--	32	69	101
Subtotal	5	277	84	366
Humanitarian/Technical				
Humanitarian/Technical Asst. Account	--	--	417	417
DOD Nonprolif./Disarmament Fund				
Nonproliferation/Disarmament	--	400	400	800
Total Grants	10	1,244	1,856	3,110
<u>Credit Programs (Face Value)</u>				
USDA Export Credit Guarantees	1,915	2,645	1,000	5,560
USDA Food For Progress Credits	--	--	700	700
Eximbank Guarantees	--	119	250	369
OPIC Financing and Insurance	--	126	566	692
Total Credits	1,915	2,890	2,516	7,321
Total Grants & Credits	1,925	4,134	4,372	10,431

Source: Department of State.

* Of the \$230 million of ESF allocated for FY1992, \$33.8 million was reprogrammed from FY1991 appropriations and \$196.2 million is from FY1992 appropriations. \$103 million of the FY1992 funds has been carried over and is planned for obligation in FY1993.

Note: FY1993 obligations for food assistance and CCC credit programs may change. Total does not include the Clinton Administration's April 15 aid proposal, U.S. contributions to international financial institutions, or July 6 \$2 billion Eximbank gas and oil loan. DOD excess donations are preliminary estimates based on market value.


Women

Soviet Union

a country study

Federal Research Division
Library of Congress

Edited by
Raymond E. Zickel
Research Completed
May 1989



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Sex and Contraception

Soviet society in general did not approve of unmarried couples living together but was somewhat more tolerant of occasional premarital sexual relations. The lack of suitable contraceptive devices, combined with rare public discussion about contraception, led to a large number of unwanted pregnancies. Studies in Leningrad have shown that 38 percent of all babies born in Leningrad in 1978 were conceived before marriage. A Soviet study revealed that the number of children born out of wedlock in the Soviet Union amounted to nearly 10 percent of all births, ranging from 22 percent in the Estonian Republic to 3 percent in the Azerbaydzhan Republic. Courts could order an unmarried father to pay child support if he lived with the child's mother; otherwise, the law was not firm, especially where proof of paternity was insufficient. No social stigma was attached to illegitimate children, and unmarried women received maternity benefits. Sex for sale—prostitution—however, was illegal and punishable by law. The Soviet penal code severely punished individuals running a brothel, pimping, or soliciting.

Although women were officially discouraged from having abortions, they were legal and were the chief form of birth control in the country. An estimated 8 million took place each year. Abortions were free for working women and cost 2 to 5 rubles for other women, depending on where they lived. Despite their availability, an estimated 15 percent of all abortions in the Soviet Union were illegally performed in private facilities. The approximate ratio of abortions to live births was nearly three to one.

In Muslim regions, the rate of abortion was much lower than in the European part of the country, although the higher her status or the more Russified the Muslim woman was, the more likely she was to have an abortion. Ironically, in European areas the situation was reversed; less educated couples were more likely to seek abortions than better educated couples, who were likely to use effective contraception.

The Soviet Family

The Soviet view of the family as the basic social unit in society has evolved from revolutionary to conservative; the government first attempted to weaken the family and then to strengthen it. According to a 1968 law, Principles of Legislation on Marriage and the Family of the USSR and the Union Republics, parents are "to raise their children in the spirit of the moral code of a builder of communism, to attend to their physical development and their instruction in and preparation for socially useful activity."

Evolution of the Soviet Family

The early Soviet state sought to remake the family, believing that although the economic emancipation of workers would deprive families of their economic function, it would not destroy them but rather base them exclusively on mutual affection. Religious marriage was replaced by civil marriage, divorce became easy to obtain, and unwed mothers received special protection. All children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, were given equal rights before the law, women were granted sexual equality under matrimonial law, inheritance of property was abolished, and abortion was legalized.

In the early 1920s, however, the weakening of family ties, combined with the devastation and dislocation caused by the Civil War (1918–21), produced a wave of nearly 7 million homeless children. This situation prompted senior party officials to conclude that a more stable family life was required to rebuild the country's economy and shattered social structure. By 1922 the government allowed some forms of inheritance, and after 1926 full inheritance rights were restored. By the late 1920s, adults had been made more responsible for the care of their children, and common-law marriage had been given equal legal status with civil marriage.

During Stalin's rule, the trend toward strengthening the family continued. In 1936 the government began to award payments to women with large families and made abortions and divorces more difficult to obtain. In 1942 it subjected single persons and childless married persons to additional taxes. In 1944 only registered marriages were recognized to be legal, and divorce became subject to the court's discretion. In the same year, the government began to award medals to women who gave birth to five or more children and took upon itself the support of illegitimate children.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the government rescinded some of its more restrictive social legislation. In 1955 it declared abortions for medical reasons legal, and in 1968 it declared all abortions legal. The state also liberalized divorce procedures in the mid-1960s but in 1968 introduced new limitations.

In 1974 the government began to subsidize poorer families whose average per capita income did not exceed 50 rubles per month (later raised to 75 rubles per month in some northern and eastern regions). The subsidy amounted to 12 rubles per month for each child below eight years of age. It was estimated that in 1974 about 3.5 million families (14 million people, or about 5 percent of the entire population) received this subsidy. With the increase in per capita income, however, the number of children requiring such assistance decreased.

In 1985 the government raised the age limit for assistance to twelve years and under. In 1981 the subsidy to an unwed mother with a child increased to 20 rubles per month; in early 1987 an estimated 1.5 million unwed mothers were receiving such assistance, or twice as many as during the late 1970s.

Family Size

Family size and composition depended mainly on the place of residence—urban or rural—and ethnic group. The size and composition of such families was also influenced by housing and income limitations, pensions, and female employment outside the home. The typical urban family consisted of a married couple, two children, and, in about 20 percent of the cases, one of the grandmothers, whose assistance in raising the children and in housekeeping was important in the large majority of families having two wage earners. Rural families generally had more children than urban families and often supported three generations under one roof. Families in Central Asia and the Caucasus tended to have more children than families elsewhere in the Soviet Union and included grandparents in the family structure. In general, the average family size has followed that of other industrialized countries, with higher income families having both fewer children and a lower rate of infant mortality. From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the number of families with more than one child decreased by about 50 percent and in 1988 totaled 1.9 million. About 75 percent of the families with more than one child lived in the southern regions of the country, half of them in Central Asia. In the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian republics, families with one and two children constituted more than 90 percent of all families, whereas in Central Asia those with three or more children ranged from 14 percent in the Kirgiz Republic to 31 percent in the Tadzhik Republic. Surveys suggested that most parents would have had more children if they had had more living space.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the government promoted family planning in order to slow the growth of the Central Asian indigenous populations. Local opposition to this policy surfaced especially in the Uzbek and Tadzhik republics. In general, however, the government continued publicly to honor mothers of large families. Women received the Motherhood Medal, Second Class, for their fifth live birth and the Heroine Mother medal for their tenth. Most of these awards went to women in Central Asia and the Caucasus (see table 21, Appendix A).

*Children playing in Orel,
Russian Republic
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard*



*Children playing on an ice slide
during winter holidays
in Khabarovsk, Soviet Far East
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard*



members ranging in age from fourteen to twenty-eight. The Komsomol's structure mirrored the party's structure, from its primary units in schools and workplaces to its first secretary. The congress of the Komsomol met every five years and elected a central committee, which in turn elected a bureau and secretariat to direct the organization's day-to-day affairs between central committee meetings. Komsomol members were encouraged to take part in political activities of the CPSU and to assist in industrial projects and harvesting. Most important, its members received preference for entry into higher education, employment, and the CPSU.

The other two youth groups, the Young Octobrists and the Pioneers, were organizations devoted to the political indoctrination of children through age fifteen. The Young Octobrists prepared children ages six to nine for entry into the Pioneers, which in turn prepared them for entry into the Komsomol beginning at age fourteen.

Sports Organizations

In 1989 the Soviet Union had thirty-six sports societies, consisting of an urban and rural society for each of the fifteen union republics and six all-union (see Glossary) societies. All but two of these organizations were operated by the trade unions. The State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports served as the umbrella organization for these societies. Each society built its own sports facilities, secured equipment for its members, and hired a permanent staff of coaches and other personnel. Each held local and all-union championships for various sports, and each society's teams played against the teams of other societies. Although in theory the Soviet Union had no professional sports, each society supported athletes who played sports full time. Furthermore, the best, or "master sportsmen," received additional pay from the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports.

Gender and Family Roles

In 1989 the Soviet Union resembled other modernized European societies in terms of divorce rates, roles of men and women in marriage, and family size, structure, and function. The twin pressures of urbanization and industrialization have radically changed gender and family relations in the Soviet Union since 1917. These changes, however, were less evident among the non-Russian populations of Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Role of Women

Article 35 of the Soviet Constitution clearly states that women and men "have equal rights" and possess equal access to education

and training, employment, promotions, and remuneration and to participation in social, political, and cultural activity. Women also receive special medical and workplace protection, including incentives for mothers to work outside the home and legal and material support in their role as mothers; the latter support includes 112 days of maternity leave at full pay. At the conclusion of their maternity leave, women may take up to a year of leave without pay and return to the same job if they desire. Employers may not discriminate against pregnant or nursing women by reducing their pay or dismissing them, and mothers with small children have the right to work part time.

Nevertheless, both within society in general and within the family, the position of women in 1989 was not equal to that of men. Soviet authorities have often pointed to the high percentage of women in certain fields as proof of gender equality in the country. For example, in the 1980s women constituted just over half the country's work force, four-fifths of its health workers, more than two-thirds of its physicians and economists, and three-quarters of those employed in education. The authorities neglected to add, however, that the average pay for most women in these fields was below the country's average pay. Moreover, the higher the level in a profession, the smaller the percentage of women. For instance, in 1984 women constituted 83 percent of elementary school directors but only 42 percent of secondary school directors and 38 percent of middle school directors. In the early 1980s, 46 percent of all collective farm workers were women, but they constituted only 1.9 percent of collective farm chairpersons.

Women were also underrepresented in the CPSU and its leadership. In 1983 women constituted only 27.6 percent of the membership of the party and only 4.2 percent of the Central Committee; in 1986 they were totally absent from the Politburo (see Social Composition of the Party, ch. 7).

Male-Female Relationships

Male-female relationships in the Soviet Union reflected not only the stresses generally present in urban and industrial societies, plus those peculiar to communist societies, but also the influence of different cultural traditions. Predictably, the non-Russian Central Asian and Caucasian nationalities exhibited more traditional attitudes regarding marriage, divorce, and abortion than did the European population of the country.

Marriage

Unless specified otherwise by the laws of the individual republics, Soviet citizens may marry at age eighteen without parental

permission. The Latvian, Estonian, Moldavian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Kazakh, and Kirgiz republics have lowered this age to seventeen years. In 1980 approximately 73 percent of the brides and 62 percent of the grooms were under twenty-five years of age. One-third of all marriages involved persons under twenty years of age, and in 20 percent of the marriages involving persons under that age the bride was pregnant.

In the larger cities, newly married couples often lived with either set of parents; often the honeymoon consisted of a short private stay in the parents' home. About 70 percent of childless young couples lived with parents during the first years of marriage because of low income or a shortage of housing.

Cultural compatibility played a larger role in the selection of a mate than did race, religion, occupation, or income. Soviet surveys also pointed to love, mutual attraction, and common interests as important reasons given for marriage. British sociologist David Lane has observed that "companionship" between spouses has been a more important notion in the West than in the Soviet Union, where couples have often taken separate vacations while the children were sent to camp.

Roles in Marriage

Most married women in the Soviet Union worked outside the home in addition to fulfilling their roles of wife, mother, and homemaker. As in other industrialized countries, women had difficulty reconciling the demands of career and home. At home, Soviet women spent more than twice as much time on housework as men—an average of twenty-eight hours a week as opposed to twelve—and women resented this. Before marriage, the average woman was said to have had forty-two hours a week of free time, but after marriage this number was cut in half. Not surprisingly, Soviet research has shown that marital happiness was directly connected to the extent a husband shared in domestic work. Husbands and wives from the elite tended to share decisions and housework to a greater extent than those from other social strata. In blue-collar and agricultural families, the husband was considered head of the household, although the wife held the purse strings.

Nationality appeared to be less of an influence on marital roles than social status and place of residence. By the mid-1970s, even most Muslim husbands were willing to share in some housework with their wives; the higher the socioeconomic status of the family, the more the husband shared the work. In Muslim families and in other nationality groups where the patriarchal system has remained strong, the husband was regarded as the head of the family

and made most of the major family decisions. Among younger and better educated Muslims, however, and in the European part of the Soviet Union, the husband and wife shared in the decision making, a practice that may have resulted from the wife's increasing contribution to family income.

Divorce

With a rate of 3.4 divorces per 1,000 people, the Soviet Union was second only to the United States (4.8 divorces) among industrialized countries in 1986. David Lane has asserted, however, that the real family disintegration rate between these two countries was comparable because the legal difficulties and expense of a divorce in the Soviet Union encouraged "unofficial" divorces or separations.

The Soviet divorce rate varied according to region and population density. In Soviet Central Asia, it was two to three times lower than in European areas; the rate was also higher in cities and in newly developed regions. Divorce rates in rural areas averaged about 40 percent of those in cities.

Surveys have shown that couples divorced for a variety of reasons. Drunkenness, incompatibility, and infidelity were major causes; jealousy of the spouse, separation, and physical incompatibility were minor causes. In the Muslim areas of the country, conflict between the wife and the husband's parents was a major reason for divorce; however, Muslim women were less likely to initiate divorce than women in other regions of the Soviet Union. Stronger devotion to family life and the nature of marriage itself lowered acceptance of divorce in Muslim areas. Soviet surveys have shown that 87 percent of urban and 84 percent of rural Uzbeks opposed divorce for couples with children, whereas only 54 percent of urban Russians and 51 percent of urban Estonians held this view.

Housing problems and the lack of privacy contributed significantly to the high rate of divorce. One study showed that nearly 20 percent of divorces occurring during the first years of marriage were attributed to housing problems and about 18 percent to conflicts with parents. In 1973 in Leningrad, 31.7 percent of divorcing couples had lived with parents or in a hostel, 62.3 percent in a shared apartment, and only 5.1 percent in a separate apartment.

Divorces cost between 60 and 200 rubles depending on income and were granted more quickly if the couple had no children. In general, divorces were relatively simple to obtain, but the court always attempted to reconcile the couple first. Courts also generally awarded the mother custody of the children.

Family and Kinship Structures

The extended family was more prevalent in Central Asia and the Caucasus than in the other sections of the country and, generally, in rural areas more than in urban areas. Deference to parental wishes regarding marriage was particularly strong in these areas, even among the Russians residing there.

Extended families helped perpetuate traditional life-styles. The patriarchal values that accompany this life-style affected such issues as contraception, the distribution of family power, and the roles of individuals in marriage and the family. For example, traditional Uzbeks placed a higher value on their responsibilities as parents than on their own happiness as spouses and individuals. The younger and better educated Uzbeks and working women, however, were more likely to behave and think like their counterparts in the European areas of the Soviet Union, who tended to emphasize individual careers.

Extended families were not prevalent in the cities. Couples lived with parents during the first years of marriage only because of economics or the housing shortage. When children were born, the couple usually acquired a separate apartment.

Function of Family

The government has assumed many functions of the pre-Soviet family. Various public institutions, for example, have taken responsibility for supporting individuals during times of sickness, incapacity, old age, maternity, and industrial injury. State-run nurseries, preschools, schools, clubs, and youth organizations have taken over a great part of the family's role in socializing children. Their role in socialization has been limited, however, because preschools had places for only half of all Soviet children under seven. Despite government assumption of many responsibilities, spouses were still responsible for the material support of each other, minor children, and disabled adult children.

The transformation of the patriarchal, three-generation rural household to a modern, urban family of two adults and two children attests to the great changes that Soviet society has undergone since 1917. That transformation has not produced the originally envisioned egalitarianism, but it has forever changed the nature of what was once the Russian Empire.

* * *

Excellent monographs analyzing Soviet society include *Soviet Economy and Society* by David Lane and *Modern Soviet Society*, originally

published in French, by Basile Kerblay. In *Poverty in the Soviet Union* and other articles and books, Mervyn Matthews discusses the problems of poverty and low wages in certain sectors of the Soviet economy. Providing a general overview of the Soviet Union, Vadim Medish's *The Soviet Union* contains useful insights into Soviet society, as does the *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union*. In their monograph *Modernization, Value Change, and Fertility in the Soviet Union*, Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp provide useful information on the position of women in Soviet society and on male and female roles. Genia K. Browning's *Women and Politics in the USSR* focuses on the position of Soviet women in society in general and Soviet feminism in particular. Gail Warshofsky Lapidus has written several informative books and articles on Soviet women. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

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The Gender Factor in Soviet Mass Politics: Survey Evidence from Greater Moscow

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Based on a representative sample of 504 respondents from the Moscow oblast of the Soviet Union, gender differences in both political and non-political variables (which may serve to explain the connection between gender and the political) were investigated. With controls for age, education, income and membership in the Communist party, women were found to be more favorable to the Communist party, less in favor of radical change, less politically interested and efficacious, more likely to vote but less likely to be involved in unconventional participation. Several intervening variables were examined as possible explanations for these gender differences, including feminist orientation, compassion, religiosity and fatigue.

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Being male or female often colors the way people behave politically. The best known instance is the "gender gap" in voting and party identification which emerged in the United States during the 1980s. With varying degrees of magnitude and consistency gender differences have also been documented on political efficacy, participation, political tolerance, support for democratic values, support for the political status quo, political interest and knowledge, and policy attitudes such as those toward defense spending, social welfare, and environmentalism (Erikson, Luttbeg and Tedin 1991; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Poole and Ziegler 1985; Sapiro 1983; Klein 1984; Baxter and Lansing 1983). While the bulk of the research has been conducted in the United States, many of these differences are found in European countries as well (Wilcox 1991; Inglehart 1990; Katzenstein and Mueller 1987; Norris 1988).

Using a March 1990 representative sample from the Moscow Oblast of the Soviet Union we shall test hypotheses about gender differences in politics

NOTE: We are grateful to several agencies for support for this research, including the National Science Foundation (SES-9003868), the College of Social Sciences at the University of Houston, the Dresser Foundation, and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

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based on the general research findings in the United States and Europe, as well as the (mostly nonsurvey) gender research on the Soviet Union. To what extent are the gender cleavages found in the West also found in the greater Moscow area? What is the basis for these gender cleavages? Some gender differences may be inherent (i.e., biological), but most are likely due to the interaction of gender with societal roles and expectations. To the extent we find gender differences in our sample, we shall also test a series of hypotheses about how other variables (like religiosity) might link gender to dependent political variables.

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE SOVIET CONTEXT

While the Soviet Union (and its successor) is obviously a society very different from western democracies, studies of Soviet emigrants indicate that gender differences in the U.S.S.R. may operate in a fashion similar to the West. For example, Carnaghan and Bahry (1990) found that compared to men, Soviet women had less political interest, felt less politically influential, were less efficacious, were less tolerant of diversity and less likely to support democratic norms. Soviet women were also more supportive of social welfare spending than men—although the differences were not large—and were slightly more likely to oppose defense spending. In addition, they were more religious than their male counterparts. As in the West, many of these differences were influenced by the extent to which women held a feminist orientation.

We thus begin with the hypothesis that gender differences on political questions in the greater Moscow area are similar to differences generally found in the West. But two caveats apply. First, the survey data we report were collected in a period of considerable political and economic uncertainty. There is reason to suspect that women are more "risk adverse" than men. Thus we might anticipate significant gender differences on issues relating to political reforms. Second, it is possible that the specific culture of a nation impacts on the way men and women behave in the political arena (see Wilcox 1991). In the Soviet Union there are a number of cultural traditions which for women may both determine their politicization and shape their political attitudes in a fashion different from their male counterparts.

Gender equality was official dogma in the U.S.S.R.¹, at least in theory. However, women were hardly the equal of men in terms of "status"—e.g., the positioning of a person in society (Gray 1989; Buckley 1989; Gruzdeva and Cheritikhina 1986; Holland 1985; Mamanova 1978; Hansson and Liden 1983; Lapidus 1978; Jancar 1978). This fact had been officially recognized

¹ For example, Lenin called for the socialization of housework and child care, and for an end to the "domestic shift" (Buckley 1985: 49).

since the late 1960s when Soviet theorists acknowledged that the attainment of gender equality would be a protracted process. In the upper echelons of political life the Soviet hierarchy was almost exclusively male. Only two women ever served as members of the Politburo; in 1990 only 7 percent of the local and regional communist committee secretaries were female. But in a variety of lower level and ceremonial elective political offices, women were present in abundant numbers. However, once competitive elections were introduced, the number of female representatives dropped dramatically. In the first more-or-less free elections since 1917, only 16.4 percent of the representatives elected in March of 1989 to the Congress of People's Deputies were women—a drop from 32.8 percent in the last Supreme Soviet (Bohr 1989; 15). The old political order was patriarchal, much like the West. But the new order, if anything, appears a step backward for gender equality. We hypothesize, therefore, that for this (and other reasons discussed below) women will be less enthusiastic about political reforms than men.

The economic structure of the Soviet Union differed, of course, dramatically from that of the West. Compared to the West, women in the Soviet Union had greater economic independence and security (Rohrlich-Leavitt 1975; 631). In addition there were more women in the professions than men, and more women than men were enrolled in the higher schools and technical colleges (Shlapentokh 1984; 171). But traditional patterns of gender stratification still existed in the higher reaches of industry, even when women dominated numerically. For example, 82 percent of schoolteachers were women but only 34 percent were principals (Shlapentokh 1984: 197).

Lack of employment outside the home cannot explain this pattern, as almost all women in the Soviet Union and its successor states who are not students or pensioners work full time.² The pattern cannot be explained by education. The proportion of women with higher education closely parallels that of men. Thus, in the upper echelons, the Soviet economic structure did not differ all that much from the West in terms of male domination. But it differed substantially at the lower ends, both in terms of equality of educational opportunity and equal access to the professions. The old order also guaranteed employment, and a minimal level of social services. In gender research, much is made of work-related structural impediments to political participation (Andersen 1975; Jennings 1979; Andersen 1985). These were less pronounced in the U.S.S.R. than in the West, and should contribute to an equality in politicization across gender.

² But, as in the West, women in the Soviet Union made about two-thirds the salary of men (Gray 1989; 26).

But despite structural advantages for women, in contrast to the West, feminism has been a weak force in shaping gender role attitudes—even in the large Soviet cities. One reason is that until recently the percentage of women in Soviet society was considerably greater than the percentage of men.³ To be competitive in the marriage market not only required women to adopt traditional female values but, according to a comprehensive analysis of societies with "too many women" (Guttenberg and Secord 1983: 20), numerical gender imbalance leads females to have low self-esteem and feel subjectively powerless. Feminism has also been subject to strong criticism by the Communist party and the media as a "bourgeois affectation"—one which subverts natural physiological and psychological gender differences. The party feared feminism would undermine the state's goal of large families among Soviet (Slavic) women (Buckley 1989: 176; Holt 1985: 263).

In addition, the communist system had a series of built-in biases which served to depoliticize women. Men discouraged women from becoming politically involved (Browning 1987). Politics can be ruthless, much more so than in the West. Losers often paid a much larger penalty than in the West—a penalty many women are not willing to risk (Lapidus 1978: 115). Also, party work required a great deal of time. Just belonging to the party meant one incurred a substantial obligation to perform "social work," which is not easily accommodated by women with children (Shlapentokh 1989, 118). Women did not have an independent power base. Women's organizations were mostly ineffective in socializing women to political activity (Browning 1987). There was a widespread belief among Soviet women that politics is a "dirty and demanding business," better left to men (Buckley 1989: 179; Gray 1989: 36; Jancar 1979: 204). These factors would clearly lead us to expect the women in our analysis to be less politicized than men, particularly in areas like political interest, knowledge, participation, and efficacy.

But it is in everyday existence that the lives of women in the Soviet Union differed dramatically from both Soviet men and women in the West. With the need for a larger work force it became essential by the 1960s for women to be both "producer and reproducer" (Gray 1989). The Soviet government began demanding more women work full time, and at the same time produce more offspring. In 1989, 51 percent of the Soviet work force was female. Over 92 percent of all women worked a full-time, 40-hour week

³ Following the losses in World War II, women outnumbered men in 1946 by 26 percent. By 1979 it was only 18 percent, mostly among older women (Buckley 1989, 189). The numbers have now evened out among those under 25, but the influence of the past imbalance is still of consequence among older women and perhaps for the socialization of younger ones.

(contrasted to 24 percent in 1928; 56 percent in 1945; 73 percent in 1959) (Gray 1989; Lapidus 1982).

In western democracies it has been documented that when both husband and wife work, the woman still takes a greater responsibility for the domestic chores. Taking into consideration all types of work, an employed woman with young children puts in 10 hours a week more than an employed man with young children (Vanek 1980). This gender difference in work effort is greatly exacerbated in the Soviet Union and its successor states. Women tend to be employed in middle-to-low ranking occupations which emphasize manual, low skilled, physically taxing work (Gruzdeva and Chertikhina 1986: 155). In addition to these tasks, Soviet women also assume virtually all the responsibility for domestic chores. Much has been written about the "double shift" worked by most Soviet women (Browning 1989; Gray 1989; Gruzdeva and Chertikhina 1986; Hansson and Liden 1983; Jancar 1978).

Domestic tasks are particularly burdensome given the scarcity of consumer goods, which often entails standing in line for hours. In addition to working 40 hours a week, women in the former Soviet Union typically work another 41 hours at domestic labors, contrasted to 15 to 20 hours on the part of men. One Moscow study showed that 50 percent of men took no part in child-rearing, 67 percent never cooked, 44 percent washed no dishes, 66 percent did no housework and 89 percent did no laundering (Peers 1985: 124). According to Shlapentokh (1984: 190) the pressure of this double shift has a marked adverse effect on the health of Soviet women, who fall sick with more frequency than their male counterparts. The double shift with its consequences for time, energy, and health must certainly have repercussions for women in political life in terms of energy available to participate and keep abreast of political events. Thus we would expect to find Soviet women with less time and energy for things political, with a consequent low level of political efficacy.

In summary, contextual factors lead us to hypothesize that women will be more risk adverse than men, with attendant political consequences. Educational and work-related experiences should reduce gender-related differences in politicization. But the countervailing factors of a lower feminist consciousness and the tradition of working a "double shift" should accentuate these differences.

THE SAMPLE

Data for this analysis come from a survey of residents of the Moscow *Oblast*. Interviewing was conducted in-person at the respondent's home between February 17, 1990 and March 4, 1990 by a field staff assembled and super-

vised by the Institute of Sociology at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Sampling was a two-stage process. At the first stage, 32 regions of Moscow and 54 populated areas of the Moscow *Oblast* were selected from all geographical units within the *Oblast*. At the second stage, individual respondents over the age of 16 were selected from lists of residents maintained by the central address bureau. A total of 550 respondents was randomly selected from the list. Of these, 40 could not be contacted after three visits to their homes. One person refused to be interviewed,⁴ and one questionnaire was discarded because it could not be verified. Four questionnaires were unusable due to missing data. Thus, the total number of respondents is 504 (see appendix for more details).

The Soviet Union has one of the most diverse populations in the world, and a sample from the Moscow *Oblast* cannot, of course, be generalized to the entire Soviet Union. The Muslim population, in particular, is decidedly different from the European population on matters of male-female social relationships. But even in European U.S.S.R. there are marked differences between life in the large cities and life in the countryside. However, several points relevant to our sample merit mention. The Moscow *Oblast* is 21 percent rural, with the city of Moscow contributing 56 percent of the population. Thus there is a reasonable amount of urban/rural heterogeneity in the sample.⁵ Also, the frequencies and relationships in the Moscow data are quite similar to those reported in more geographically heterogeneous samples (Tedin n.d.; see also Gibson and Duch 1991). Nevertheless, we would expect the residents of greater Moscow to have more in common with their western counterparts than residents of smaller more geographically remote areas of the U.S.S.R. In practice that surely means *greater* gender differences outside of Moscow than for our Moscow area sample.

Politics were changing rapidly in the Soviet Union at the time of the survey, and it is important to place the interview dates in historical perspective. The all-union elections, the first free and fair elections since 1917, had been held the previous year. The republic-level elections were about a month away. Gorbachev was six months away from winning the Nobel Peace Prize. The non-Baltic republics were just beginning aggressively to assert their claims of sovereignty. The conservative challenge to the democratic reforms was not yet

⁴ Refusal rates for fact-to-face interviews in the Soviet Union are remarkably low. Soviets see participating in opinion surveys as a civic obligation, and refusal rates are usually not more than 3-5 percent (Shlapentokh 1990, 101).

⁵ We do not, however, wish to argue that the rural population in Moscow *oblast* is representative of the rural population in the rest of the U.S.S.R. One major difference is the rural residents of the Moscow *oblast* are part of the same media market as the urban part.

a defining feature of the political landscape. It was about a year-and-a-half before the *coup* attempt of August 18, 1991. In short, there was still some euphoria over the new political rights, but a growing despair about economic circumstances.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Our primary independent variable is, of course, gender. We shall first analyze the effect of gender on five categories of political variables which have frequently shown gender differences in western mass publics. Presented in Table 1 are the bivariate product/moment coefficients between gender and the dependent variables. In columns two through five are the regression statistics. The partial coefficient for gender reported in column 2 is the effect of gender on the dependent variable controlling for education, age⁶/income⁷, and CPSU membership. Column 3 is the effect of education on the dependent variable controlling for all other independent variables, and so on for columns 4 and 5. Partial coefficients are computed only for those bivariate relationships that were statistically significant.

Support for the Communist Party and Political Status Quo

Items under this heading have in common a concern that change is occurring too rapidly; that slower may be better or that the status quo may be preferable to change. Thus respondents were asked if the Communist party should be removed from its official "leading role" (67 percent agreed it should). At the time of the survey, Article 6 of the constitution giving the party the leading role had not yet been repealed. Respondents were also asked to rate the Communist party on a ten-point scale,⁸ and to respond (agree/disagree) to

⁶ Bahry (1987: 74-96) found strong generational effects and treated age as dummy variables. We cannot test her findings with the Moscow data as the first three generational units she used do not have enough cases in our data for analysis. We made several tests for generational effects, but found age had more impact treated as a continuous variable.

⁷ Income does not, of course, mean the same in the U.S.S.R. as it does in the West. It was also a weak predictor of political variables in the SIP data (Silver 1987). We chose income over alternative measures in the Moscow survey because it had a stronger correlation with gender ($r = -.18$). Experiments with other measures of "income" do not substantively change coefficients indicating gender differences.

⁸ In the "leading role" question respondents were asked to agree/disagree with the statement: "Laws giving the Communist Party the leading role in society should be removed": 35 percent strongly agreed, 32 percent agreed, 20 percent were uncertain, 12 percent disagreed and 2 percent strongly disagreed. On the 10-point (low values being negative) rating scale (1-11) for the Communist party, the mean was 4.8.

Table 1

BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GENDER, INTERVENING VARIABLES AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Gender** Simple r	Gender beta(h)	Age beta(h)	Education beta(h)	Income beta(h)	CP Member*** beta(b)	R ²
<i>Gender Dependant Variables</i>							
Leading role for CP be removed	-.21*	-.18 (.36)*	-.13 (.010)*	.21 (-.21)*	.10 (-.09)*	.02 (.01)	.13
Rate CPSU	.16*	.14 (.82)*	-.20 (.041)*	-.03 (-.08)	-.05 (-.13)	.24 (1.3)*	.12
Reform too Rapid	.19*	-.16 (.33)*	.05 (.003)	-.23 (-.24)*	-.09 (-.08)*	.07 (.13)	.11
Radically change society	-.17*	-.15 (.20)*	-.18 (.008)*	.13 (.09)*	.06 (-.04)	-.06 (-.07)	.09
Democratic Norms	-.10*	-.05 (-.08)	-.08 (-.005)*	.25 (.20)*	.14 (.10)*	-.03 (.05)	.12
Tolerance	-.09*	-.06 (-.14)	-.09 (-.007)*	.09 (.10)*	.05 (.05)	-.04 (-.08)	.03
Support for Elections	-.23*	-.19 (-.33)*	-.16 (-.010)*	.32 (.38)*	.06 (.05)	-.08 (.12)*	.25
Political Interest	-.14*	-.13 (-.08)*	-.14 (.008)*	.20 (.15)*	.10 (.07)*	.15 (.21)*	.13
Political Discussions	.19*	-.14 (-.18)*	.00 (.000)	.25 (.15)*	.03 (.01)	.06 (.07)	.11
Political Knowledge	-.16*	-.10 (-.14)*	.05 (.002)	.23 (.15)*	.20 (.11)*	.16 (.21)*	.18
Political Efficacy	-.28*	-.23 (-.41)*	-.09 (-.006)*	.28 (.24)*	.00 (.00)	.10 (.16)*	.18
Voter Turnout	.12*	.14 (.20)*	.12 (.005)*	.13 (.09)*	-.04 (.03)	.06 (.08)	.05
Unconventional Participation	-.23*	-.19 (-.64)*	-.27 (-.033)*	.23 (.38)*	.02 (.03)	-.04 (.15)	.19
collectivize agriculture	.00						
collectivize industry	.00						
should be more income equality	.12*	.09 (.18)*	.03 (.002)	-.15 (-.15)*	-.06 (-.05)	.03 (.07)	.05

	Gender** Simple r	Gender beta(b)	Age beta(b)	Education beta(b)	Income beta(b)	CP Member*** beta(b)	R ²
environmentalism	.01						
favor German reunifac	.05						
USSR ensure peace in Europe	-.05						
<i>Gender/Intervening Variables</i>							
Women's Role	.07						
Caring and Compassion	.25*	.25 (.36)*	.11 (.005)*	.04 (.03)	.04 (.02)	-.06 (.08)	.08
Fatigue	.21*	.19 (.33)*	.11 (.007)*	-.11 (-.09)*	-.07 (-.06)	.01 (.02)	.09
Religion	.17*	.14 (.18)*	.11 (.005)*	-.17 (-.11)*	-.08 (-.05)	-.16 (-.20)*	.10

*p < .05

**male = 1, female = 2

***not a member = 1, inactive member = 2, active member = 3

the following statement: "Political reform in this country is moving too rapidly" and to an item from the study of post-materialism (Inglehart 1990) which allows a respondent to choose a course calling for society to be "radically changed by revolutionary action."⁴

As can be seen in Table 1, women are in general more favorable to the Communist party than are men. They are more opposed to the removal of the "leading role" for the party, and on a ten-point scale they rate the party more favorably than do men. These findings fit with the nonsurvey work on Soviet women. Lapidus (1978: 194) and Browning (1989: 204) argue that women have a strong positive orientation toward communism as the only system that can deal effectively with the problems women confront. The same point is made by Sariban (1984) who feels that compared to men, women (the "mainstay of the regime") have a positive perspective on the political order.

This outlook is also reflected in a conservative stance regarding political change. Women tend to believe that reform is "moving too rapidly," and are more likely to reject the statement "our society must be radically changed by revolutionary action." These data fit broadly with the western literature (Norris 1988). In addition, Soviet scholars argue that women are a bastion of traditionalism and conservative values in the U.S.S.R. (Lapidus 1978; Buckley 1989; Browning 1989). Our interpretation is that women are, with good reason, more "risk adverse" than men. Women have generally fared worse than men during times of social chaos and turmoil (Johnson 1980; Black 1981; Kendrigan 1984). For all its shortcomings, the old regime did provide full employment and at least minimal social services. In addition, some women must have been aware that the political reforms in east Europe and the Soviet Union had the practical effect of greatly reducing female representation in legislative bodies. The new order, on the other hand, provided no guarantees, except perhaps for continued economic and political uncertainty.

⁴ On reform moving too rapidly, 3 percent strongly agreed, 13 percent agreed, 16 percent were undecided, 44 percent disagreed and 23 percent strongly disagreed. The post-material item reads: Here are statements concerning the kind of society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. (1) The course of development of our society must be radically changed by revolutionary action (22 percent), our society must be gradually improved by reform (50 percent), our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces (21 percent), don't know (6 percent). The "radical change" option is chosen by a rather large percentage of our greater Moscow sample. In the 22 countries in the World Values Survey only South Africa had a greater percentage (25 percent) calling for change by revolutionary action. The next highest percentage was found in Argentina (13 percent) (Inglehart 1990: 39).

Support for Democratic Values

We have constructed three scales pertaining to democratic values. The first measures support for norms of democracy; the second is a measure of political tolerance, and the third is a measure of support for competitive elections. The "norms of democracy" scale originated with Prothro and Grigg (1960) and was further developed by Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982). It measures support for the *procedural* rights, such as the right to a fair trial. The tolerance scale employs the Sullivan et al. (1982) "least liked groups" approach and indicates the extent to which respondents will tolerate activities by the groups they like least, such as speaking in a respondent's city or holding public rallies. Support for competitive elections is a six-item scale which measures the extent to which respondents endorse the principle of meaningful electoral competition between candidates as opposed to the "acclamatory" elections which characterized the Soviet Union before Gorbachev.¹⁰ Generally speaking support is high in greater Moscow for the norms of democracy and competitive elections. However, in the case of political tolerance where unpopular groups are referenced, commitment to the democratic value of tolerance is much lower. The data reflect the same abstract vs. specific effects we see in other countries.

We find that compared to men, women are less supportive of democratic values, but the differences for the tolerance and the norms of democracy are small and become nonsignificant with controls. However, the difference in

¹⁰ These frequencies for the items that compose these scales, and the reliability and validity of the scales have been reported at length elsewhere. The scales were created using factor analysis and factor scores (See Gibson, Duch and Tedin n.d.). Four agree/disagree questions were used to create the norms of democracy scale. They are: "No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as any one else." "It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express themselves freely." "When the country is in great danger we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if this violates their civil rights." "If someone is suspected of treason or other serious crimes, he can be sent to prison without a trial." For the political tolerance scale a respondent indicates whether his or her two most disliked groups should be allowed to make a speech, be allowed to hold public rallies, not be outlawed and not be banned from running for public office. The support for competitive elections variables is based on agree/disagree responses to the following questions: "Elections to local Soviets should be conducted in such a way that there are several candidates for each post." "It is necessary to ban elections and allow the CPSU to rule the country." "Political parties other than the Communist party should be legalized." "Competitive elections between the Communist party and other parties will improve the way the authorities work in the Soviet Union." "A one-party system in the U.S.S.R. promotes the development of democracy."

the case of support for competitive elections is quite robust, and remains so after controls are imposed.

One reason men may be more supportive of competitive elections than women is that men, as we just saw, are more hostile to the Communist party. Elections could remove the party from power. The relatively lower support among women for competitive elections may be mostly driven by a greater support for the party. To test this possibility we controlled for a preference that "the leading role for the Communist party be removed" and the rating of the Communist party on a ten-point scale (in addition to education, age, income, and CPSU membership). These two controls reduce the *beta* and the regression coefficients for gender by almost half (*beta* = .09; *b* = .16). The differences between these coefficients and those in Table 1 are statistically significant and indicate that a substantial part of the greater support among men for competitive elections is due to a greater hostility to the Communist party.¹¹ Nevertheless, men's higher support for competitive elections still remains, although at a lower level, even with controls for attitudes toward the party (*p* < .01).¹² The remaining gender difference may in part reflect a greater risk adverse conservatism among women due to their vulnerability from the fallout of rapid social change.¹³

Political Interest and Knowledge

Respondents were asked two straightforward political interest questions. First, how interested were they in politics. Second, how frequently did they have political discussions.¹⁴ Knowledge was measured by asking the respondents

¹¹ The statistical hypothesis was tested by putting a confidence interval at the .05 level around the regression coefficient seen in Table 1. The confidence interval for the gender regression coefficient ranges between .22 to .50. Controlling for rating the Communist party and preference for removing the party from its leading role lowers the partial *b* to -.16. We thus reject the null hypothesis that attitudes about the party have no effect on gender differences in support for competitive elections.

¹² The standard error for gender in the reestimated equation is .06, *T* = 2.56 and *R*² is .48.

¹³ Using the *Los Angeles Times* survey of the European U.S.S.R. Duch (1992) found that men are more supportive of a free market economy than are women (*r* = -.18). Also, support for free market economics is strongly related to a truncated version of the support for elections scale (*r* = .45) using three of the six items in the Moscow study. Thus part of the remaining difference could be spurious, driven by the link between competitive elections and support for markets, or women could simply be less supportive in general of radical change.

¹⁴ The questions/statements were: "How interested are you in politics?"—very interested 17 percent, interested 49 percent, not very interested 28 percent, not at all interested 6

living in the city of Moscow to give the name of the chairman of the Moscow Province Executive Committee and the first secretary of the Moscow Province Committee of the CPSU. Those living outside the city of Moscow were asked to give the name of the chairman of the Moscow Province Executive Committee and the first secretary of the Moscow Province Committee of the CPSU. The correct responses were summed.

Our sample of Moscow area women are decidedly less directed toward politics than are men. They have less political interest, are less likely to talk about politics, and have less political knowledge. These relationships all hold with controls for age, education, income and party membership. They support findings from *emigre* data (Carnaghan and Bahry 1990), and the general thrust of research in western democracies.

Efficacy and Participation

Political efficacy was measured with a two-item scale using the questions, "People like me have no say about what the authorities do," and "Sometimes politics seems so complicated that people like me can't really understand what is going on" ($r = .34$).¹⁵ Our first measure of participation was whether or not the respondent had voted in the all-union elections (82 percent voted). The second measure is an index of unconventional political participation. Respondents were asked if they had or would participate in a variety of activities such as signing a petition, joining a boycott, or participating in a protest group.¹⁶

The largest gender difference in the study ($r = .28$) is on the key variable of political efficacy (a variable which consistently has large gender differences cross-nationally).¹⁷ It is the level of efficacy that is thought to be the psycho-

percent; "How often do you discuss politics with friends?"—frequently 36 percent, occasionally 55 percent, never 9 percent.

¹⁵ The frequencies for "people like me . . ." were: strongly agree 20 percent, agree 51 percent, undecided 14 percent, disagree 15 percent, strongly disagree 1 percent. For "politics too complicated" the frequencies were: strongly agree 15 percent, agree 38 percent, undecided 14 percent, disagree 30 percent, strongly disagree 4 percent. In recent years it has been common to separate "internal" from "external" political efficacy. We do not do so in this case because the items are strongly related and have similar relationships to key variables.

¹⁶ Respondents were asked if they "would never do, probably could do, or have done" nine unconventional political activities. These activities are signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending an unofficial but lawful meeting, joining an unofficial strike, occupying a factory, plant or office building, attending unofficial cultural events, participation in an informal political movement, distributing *Samizdat* or *Tamizdat* or participating in a protest group. An additive scale was created which ranges from 1 to 15 and has a mean of 6.1.

¹⁷ Even in the 1980s there remain substantial gender differences in the United States on

logical key not only to political participation but to general competence in the political arena (Almond and Verba 1963). Gender differences in the United States are markedly reduced when controls are imposed for age, education and income.¹⁸ But in the greater Moscow area, these controls have a very marginal effect in reducing its relationship with gender (from .18 to .25). One reason is there is less gender stratification on these variables in the greater Moscow area than in the United States. But if efficacy differences are not explained by standard SES variables, what does explain them? Lapidus (1978: 199–202) argues that low efficacy among Soviet women stems from a belief that politics is a male domain—a belief that is common in many nations including, until quite recently, the United States. Perhaps low levels of efficacy are also due to a general feeling of powerlessness and low self-esteem arising from the numerical imbalance of men and women we discussed earlier.

Women do, however, vote more frequently than men. But, this difference is not surprising as voting is a *conventional*, regime-supporting form of political behavior. In studies of Soviet participation, nonvoting is associated with *nonconventional* forms of political behavior (Bahry and Silver 1990). Men are more likely to participate in this form of political activity than are women, but unlike the case of efficacy, the coefficient is reduced substantially by controls for social background, with age and education overshadowing the impact of gender (see Table 1).

Policy Orientations

The survey does not have a large number of policy questions, and many of those available do not directly address the hypothesis. There are, however, two questions taken from the SIP survey concerning the collectivization of industry and agriculture. These show that Moscow area citizens oppose the privatization of industry, but favor it for agriculture.¹⁹ There is an agree/disagree

political efficacy. For example, in the 1988 NES for the question "Government and politics are too complicated that people like me really can't understand what is going on," 59 percent of the men in the sample disagree while only 41 percent of the women disagree. On the item "People like me have no say . . .," 54 percent of the women agree and 46 percent of the men.

¹⁸ Creating an efficacy variable using the same indicators for the 1988 NES, the bivariate relationship is $-.14$, which drops to $-.08$ (a drop of 43 percent) with controls for age, education and income. The same controls for the Soviet Union drop the coefficient 11 percent. Of course, one of the reasons social background factors do not have as large an effect on reducing gender differences as they do in the West is there is a good deal more equality between the sexes on these factors than in the case in the West.

¹⁹ The industrial question reads: Some people in the Soviet Union say that the state should own all heavy industry. Others say that all heavy industry should be owned

question which reads "These ought to be more equality of income even if it means that some people will not work as well as they do now." There are also two questions on pollution and the environment which we have combined to form a scale.²⁰ Finally, there are questions about the desirability of German reunification, and on whether or not the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. should be responsible for ensuring peace in Europe.²¹

There is only one gender difference on public policy—"there ought to be more equality of income in the U.S.S.R." Women are more favorable, as the gender research and our risk adverse thesis would predict. The lack of differences on other policy issues, however, is likely due as much to the limited selection of topics as the absence of effect.

NONPOLITICAL INTERVENING VARIABLES

While it is possible that some gender differences may be biological in origin, it is our assumption that most differences we see in politics are due to the interaction of gender with societal roles and expectations. In the language of causal models, if a model were properly specified the effects of gender on a dependent variable would all be indirect. There would be no direct effects as they would be dissipated through the intervening variables.

Key variables which may intervene between gender and political orientations are sex role socialization, feminist consciousness, religiosity, situa-

privately. What you think (on a one-to-seven scale) of this issue. State control (1,2,3) is favored by 71 percent, 19 percent choose the middle category and 10 percent choose privatization. The agricultural question reads: Some people in the Soviet Union believe that the state should provide all agricultural production. Others believe that all agricultural production should be in private hands. What you think of this issue. State control is favored by 12 percent, 29 percent take the middle position and 59 percent prefer privatization.

²⁰ The first question reads: If we, in this country, want to enhance economic development, we shall just have to accept environmental problems: strongly agree 4 percent, agree 12 percent, undecided 8 percent, disagree 50 percent, strongly disagree 26 percent. The second question reads: The protection of the environment and the struggle against pollution is less urgent than often suggested: strongly agree 5 percent, agree 6 percent, undecided 4 percent, disagree 49 percent, strongly disagree 35 percent. The relationship between the items (r) is .34.

²¹ On Germany: the question reads: Are you for or against the reunification of the two Germanies?—yes 56 percent, no 25 percent, undecided 19 percent. The withdrawal question reads: Some say the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. should immediately withdraw their troops from the territory of other countries in Europe. Others say they should stay to ensure a peaceful evolution, but they should start withdrawing their troops in a balanced way. What is your view—both U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. should withdraw (+6 percent), both should stay (+5 percent), other/DK (9 percent).

tional factors, and life experiences (Conover 1988; Kathlene 1989; Miller, Hildreth and Simmons 1988; Wuthnow and Lehrman 1990). Gender differences on these variables are, in addition, often interesting in-and-of themselves, as they provide useful information about gender roles in the greater Moscow area.

Below we define four possible intervening variables. Our analysis strategy is to simply ask if each variable is *potentially* important in explaining the relationship between gender and dependent political variables. If a variable is potentially important it will be related to both gender and the dependent variable in a nonspurious fashion, and a control for the intervening variable should reduce the *b* linking gender to the political variable.

Feminist Orientations

Feminist writers have argued the existence of a unique "woman's perspective" which stresses caring and responsibility toward others and the importance of interpersonal relationships (Gilligan 1982; Costain 1988; Conover 1988; Davis and Robinson 1991). It has been suggested that women who are most independent of male influences are the ones who are best able to develop this "woman's perspective" to its fullest, while this ability is impaired among those least independent of the dominant male culture (Conover 1988). The most frequently proposed mechanism for women to discover their unique "woman's perspective" is through a feminist identity and consciousness (Conover 1988: 988). It is argued that feminist women are most able to develop this "woman's perspective" because of their detachment from the dominant and traditional culture, while nonfeminist women are least able to develop their dormant "woman's perspective" because of their adherence to traditionalism. In effect, nonfeminist women tend to adopt the same values and interests of the dominant (male) culture. Their political attitudes tend to be similar to those of men, while women with a feminist identity tend to see politics from a different (woman's) perspective.

Several studies employing samples from both the United States and Europe support the notion that women with a feminist orientation view politics differently than nonfeminist women and men. Those with a feminist outlook tend to be more efficacious, oppose military involvement, are more sympathetic to the disadvantaged, are environmentalist, and are more supportive of democratic norms (Conover 1988; Deitch 1988; Wilcox 1991; Carroll 1988).

We define feminist orientation as a belief that men and women should have equal roles (Klein 1984: 103). The concept will be measured with a single agree/disagree statement which reads: "Women should take care of running their homes and leave the running of the country to men." The

Table 2

FEMINIST ORIENTATION AMONG WOMEN AS RELATED TO DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables							R ²
	Women Only**							
	Feminist Identity (simple r)		Feminist Identity beta(b)	Age Beta(b)	Education Beta(b)	Income Beta(b)	CP Member Beta(b)	
	Female	Male						
Democratic Norms	.04	.01						
Political Tolerance	.11	.08						
Support for Elections	.11	.02						
Remove CP leading role	.00	.03						
Rate Communist Party	.13*	.09	.12 (.28)*	-.15 (-.028)*	.08 (.21)	.03 (.08)	.08 (.51)	.05
Reform is too rapid	.08	.10						
Radically change society	-.06	-.09						
Political Interest	.07	.10						
Political Discussions	.12*	.06	-.08 (-.04)	-.02 (-.00)	.28 (.17)*	.06 (.03)	.00 (.00)	.10
Political Knowledge	.14*	.06	.12 (.16)*	.06 (.01)	.22 (.13)*	.07 (.04)	.13 (.20)*	.09
Political Efficacy	.18*	.26*	.14 (.10)*	-.09 (-.01)	.25 (.20)*	.00 (.00)	.04 (.07)	.11
Voting	-.09*	.00	-.07 (-.03)	.08 (.01)	-.05 (-.03)	-.05 (-.03)	.00 (.00)	.01
Unconv. participation	.12*	.05	.02 (.04)	-.29 (-.031)	.21 (.31)*	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	.17
Collectivize agriculture	.01	.09						
Collectivize industry	.00	.20*						
Want more equality	.07	.01						
Environmentalism	.20*	.12	.18 (.26)*	-.04 (-.004)	.12 (.21)*	.09 (.16)	-.03 (-.15)	.08
Favor German Reunification	.05	.01						
USSR ensure peace	-.01	-.07						

*p < .05

**Partial coefficients are computed only when the bivariate coefficient for women is statistically significant. The partial coefficients are for women only.

frequencies are strongly agree (12 percent), agree (29 percent), undecided (15 percent), disagree (37 percent), and strongly disagree (7 percent).

Table 1 shows that feminist consciousness in the greater Moscow area is unrelated to gender, and thus is not an intervening variable. This null relationship is not, however, surprising as Conover (1988) found the same pattern in her analysis of U.S. data. Nevertheless, in Europe women frequently show higher levels of feminist consciousness than do men (Welch and Thomas 1998; Norris 1988). Among women, feminist consciousness has proven to be a potent predictor of political orientations (Wilcox 1991; Conover 1988). We investigate the variable for the Moscow area sample by presenting in Table 2 the bivariate correlations with the dependent variable for men and women separately. We can see that the effect of feminist orientation is clearly stronger among women than men, with the significant correlations being the ones most frequently found in the West.

To determine the extent to which feminist orientation is a function of social background factors we shall control for age, education, income and CPSU membership among *women only*. We could employ the entire sample and control for gender as well. Our decision not to do so is based on conceptual considerations. It is, of course, possible for both sexes to be feminist. But as Klein points out, the psychological processes of identification for men and women are quite different. Part of the definition of feminism is "a feeling of belonging to one's group" (Klein 1984: 98). Men's feminism cannot be rooted in group membership. In addition, comparable studies of feminist orientation typically analyze women only (Conover 1988; Wilcox 1991).

Table 2 shows that of the seven significant relationships between feminism among women and dependent variables, four remain significant with the introduction of controls for social background. The decrease in the bivariate coefficients is mostly due to the positive relationship between feminism and education.²² The strongest relationship, and one of the strongest partial coefficients in study, is the effect of feminism on environmentalism. A major theme in the woman's perspective literature is that this orientation leads particularly to heightened concern for the environment (Steger and Witt 1991). Feminist women are also more efficacious. Cross-nationally, differences in efficacy are probably the single most consistent finding in the studies of feminist orientation (Wilcox 1991; Carnaghan and Bahry 1990, Conover 1988). We find also that feminists are more politicized in that they are more knowl-

²² The product/moment correlation is .17. However, a detailed investigation reveals the expected interaction between age and education does not exist as it often does in western data. Adding an age/education interaction yields almost a near-zero coefficient and no increase in the explained variance.

edgeable about politics, more likely to have engaged in political discussions and more likely to participate in unconventional political behavior. Earlier, we found that women were more favorably disposed to the Communist party than were men. We can now further elaborate on this theme by noting feminist women are more positive to the Communist party than nonfeminists—even when age, education, income and party membership are controlled. Despite male domination at the elite level, women—and more specifically feminist women—apparently felt that their interest were being served by the Communist party (or at least in contrast to possible alternatives).

Gender Differences in Religiosity

Well-documented cross-national differences exist between men and women in religiosity, with women typically scoring 5 to 25 percent higher on a variety of measures of religiosity (Wilcox 1991; Inglehart 1990; Norris 1988). For example, in the United States men are twice as likely as women to profess a lack of religious faith; women are more likely to claim they attended church in the "past seven days" by a margin of 46 to 35 percent (Wuthnow and Lehrman 1990: 302). Our measure of religiosity taps personal commitment (less likely to be influenced by official policy) rather than activity. Respondents were asked to indicate which of the following best described their attitude toward religion: "I am an atheist" (10 percent); "I am not religious" (60 percent); "It could be said that I am a religious person" (26 percent); "I consider myself a highly religious person" (4 percent).

The relationship between religiosity and gender is .17 (lower than for either education or party membership, see partial *betas* in Table 1), but it is still possible that this variable serves as intervening between gender and dependent political variables. But religiosity proves to be a poor candidate as an intervening variable for the dependent variables under analysis. Among the political variables in Table 1 only the coefficient for the rating of the Communist party (–.16) is above .15.²³ This relationship is, of course, not surprising given the party's official position regarding religion.

If religiosity is an intervening variable between gender and rating the Communist party we would expect a control for religiosity would reduce the bivariate regression coefficient. However, a partial for religiosity increases *b* from .82 to .97.²⁴ Although the difference is not statistically significant, it

²³ Three other coefficients are statistically significant beyond .05: tolerance (.09), efficacy (.10) and knowledge (.10). The more religious are less tolerant, less efficacious and less knowledgeable.

²⁴ The standard error is .27. The increase in the coefficient is in part due to the fact that

alerts us to the likelihood that religiosity may not affect the relationship between gender and views of the party in an additive fashion.

We can see how religiosity works by computing product/moment coefficients within categories of the religiosity variable. Among the religious (30 percent of the sample) the relationship between gender and rating the Communist party is $-.30$ ($p < .05$), while among the nonreligious it is $-.07$ (n.s.).²⁵ Thus in the case of rating the party, the gender relationship is mostly accounted for by the 30 percent who are religious, with religious men being more hostile to the party than religious women. Based on our earlier discussion, it would seem that religious women face cross-pressures not faced by religious men which may somewhat mitigate female hostility toward the party.

Religiosity would seem to be a variable of lesser consequence in the greater Moscow area than in the western democracies—at least within the context of the dependent variables we are analyzing. For the most part it does not explain the link between gender and dependent variables, mostly because it is unrelated to the latter. Thus, religion seems less politicized in the Soviet Union than it is in the West. At a general level, the explanation must surely involve the different role religion has played in the West vs. the Soviet Union.

Gender Differences in Caring and Compassion

Several theorists suggest that, compared to men, women are more compassionate, nurturing and protective. Women, it is argued, are more oriented toward interpersonal relationships which emphasize understanding and caring about others (Ruddick 1980; Gilligan 1982). Some see the source of this gender difference as biologically determined (Hafen et al. 1978; George and Lawrence 1982). More frequently it is seen as a consequence of sex role socialization (Sapiro 1983; Iglitzin 1976; Amundsen 1971). For example, the social roles of mother and caretaker have conditioned women to be more nurturing and caring, while the social roles that emphasize career advancement have conditioned men to be more competitive, individualistic and rule oriented (Kathlene 1989; Conover 1988; Klein 1984).

Surveys have consistently shown that women contrasted to men are more supportive of social welfare policies, environmentalism, and more opposed to

there is a positive relationship between gender, rating the Communist party, and religion. the relationship between religion and rating the party is negative.

²⁵ Due to small sample sizes in the two end categories, the "very religious" and "religious" were combined into one category ($N = 143$). The "not religious" and "atheists" were combined into a second category ($N = 337$). The possibility of a spurious relationship can also be rejected as the bivariate b linking religiosity to rating the party increases from $.70$ (s.e. = $.20$) to $.80$.

aggression and violence—e.g., more opposed to capital punishment, defense spending, and more in favor of gun control (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Steger and Witt 1991; Poole and Zeigler 1985; Miller 1988; Gilens 1986). It does not seem unreasonable, as many have conjectured (Smeal 1984; Klein 1984; Freidan and Decter 1982), that gender differences in compassion are at least one key factor explaining these policy differences between men and women. A “caring and compassion” scale was taken from a personality inventory developed by Cloninger (1986) to study personality correlates of alcoholism. Respondents were given a booklet and asked to “Read each statement and decide if it is true or false in reference to you personally.” Items for the caring and compassion scale were selected based on face validity and analyzed with factor analysis. The scale was created using factor scores.²⁶ The four items read:

- People find it easy to come to me for help, sympathy and warm understanding.
- I feel it is more important to be sympathetic and understanding of other people than to be practical and tough-minded.
- I am usually more upset than most people by the loss of a close friend.
- I am often moved deeply by a fine speech or poetry.

In the factor analysis these items loaded cleanly on the first factor. However, the scale may be a measure of “sentimentalism” as well as caring and compassion. If it is contaminated with sentimentalism we hypothesize the scale would be related to education, with the more educated being less sentimental. The relationship, however, is nonsignificant ($r = .04$). We might also expect older respondents to be more sentimental. And we do, indeed, find a weak positive relationship ($r = .12$).

Table 1 shows a correlation of .25 between gender and “caring and compassion.” The relationship is not reduced (partial $\beta = .25$) with controls for age, education, income and party membership. From a comparative standpoint, the robust regression coefficient for the Moscow area would seem to be of some consequence. The “woman’s perspective” literature holds that caring and compassion is a gender difference that generally cuts across cultures. It is not likely to be influenced by the moral or social climate of a

²⁶ Each question had an “undecided” middle category in addition to yes or no. For the principle components analysis, the first factor had an eigenvalue of 1.8 and accounted for 37 percent of the variance. All loadings were over .50. However, the reliability coefficient (alpha) for the scale was only .48.

particular country (for examples of system-level effects on gender relationships see Wilcox 1991).

Again, if "caring and compassion" helps explain the link between gender and dependent variables it must also be related to those dependent variables. If one assumes the Soviet system under the Communist party was more likely to provide a minimal safety net for citizens than its free market alternative, then one might expect a positive relationship between "caring and compassion" and an evaluation of the Communist party. There is a weak negative relationship ($r = -.15$) with wanting to "remove the party" from its leading role (the compassionate did not want it removed).²⁷ However, a control for "compassion" reduces only slightly the regression coefficient between gender and wanting to "remove the party," indicating that compassion is not an intervening variable.²⁸ Other variables likely to be linked to caring and compassion such as environmentalism, a desire for more income equality, or views about the USSR's role in insuring the peace have nonsignificant coefficients.²⁹

Thus our hypothesis that "caring and compassion" serves as a link between gender and political variables is not supported with these data. "Caring and compassion" is strongly linked to gender, but not to our political measures. However, our available dependent variables are ill suited to any rigorous test of the "caring and compassion" hypothesis. We would expect the variable to be linked to policy questions such as government aid to dependent children or assistance to the disadvantaged, which were not included in the survey. For the moment, all we can do is note the strong connection between gender and caring, and the fact it is unaffected by controls for background factors.

Situational Factors

Advanced industrial societies have fostered an expected division of labor whereby men tend to assume primary responsibility as wage earners and women tend to assume primary responsibility for family and other domestic matters. As a result, when women pursue a career outside the home they

²⁷ There is an even weaker relationship ($r = .09$, $p < .05$) between compassion and rating the Communist party. The more compassionate rate it higher. However, this coefficient is too small to analyze further.

²⁸ It is more likely that gender spuriously links compassion and the attitude about the party. A control for gender (the test for spuriousness) reduces the b by 32 percent from .22 to .15 (the lower confidence interval for b linking gender to the party variable by only 8 percent (from .39 to .36; the lower confidence interval is .21).

²⁹ The only other statistically significant relationship between "caring and compassion" and a dependent variable reported in Table 1 is a not easily interpretable link with voter turnout ($r = .17$). The more caring were more likely to turn out.

frequently also retain primary responsibility for matters dealing with home and family.

Employment for women is in some ways a two-edged sword. In the United States and many European countries, employed single women or married women without children have greater political efficacy, greater levels of participation, more political interest and are more likely to have feminist attitudes than homemakers. This difference is particularly pronounced among those with a college education (Davis and Robinson 1991). However, the effects of employment diminish substantially for women with young children—particularly in the areas of political interest, efficacy and participation. At the same time the presence of young children in the home has little effect on men (Andersen 1975, 1985; Jennings 1979; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Norris 1988). Important contributing factors are certainly a lack of time plus fatigue.

It seems likely that the effect of marriage, children, and employment on political orientations will vary considerably from one culture to another. To the extent that employed women have few labor saving appliances and must assume the bulk of the responsibility for household chores, lack of leisure time and a deadening fatigue is likely to suppress politically relevant interests.

In the analysis of gender differences the standard situational variables include employment, marital status, and children living at home. It is generally thought that employment for women heightens political awareness, while young children absorb leisure time that might otherwise be directed toward politics. If the literature on the "double shift" is correct, we would expect that Soviet women would be a good deal more fatigued than men and suffer more from health problems given their physically demanding employment, plus the lion's-share responsibility for domestic work. The personality inventory contains five questions which roughly measure both personal fatigue and the type of minor illness that often accompanies overwork. These measure were investigated using factor analysis, and a five-item scale derived from factor scores scale was constructed.³⁰ The items are:

- I am more energetic and tire less quickly than most people.
- I often need naps or extra rest periods because I get tired so easily.
- I usually can stay "on the go" all day without having to push myself.
- I have less energy and get tired more quickly than most people.
- I need extra rest, support, or reassurance to recover from minor illness or stress.

³⁰ The first factor had an eigenvalue of 1.89 and reproduced 48 percent of the variance. All the items loaded at .60 or greater on the first factor. Reliability (alpha) is .61.

In the Moscow area women clearly experience more fatigue than Moscow area men ($r = .21$, $\eta^2 = .19$). Even though age, education, and income are all have a significant link to fatigue, we see from Table 1 that gender is easily the strongest predictor. Thus our survey evidence lends strong support to the anecdotal accounts that the much discussed "double shift" in the Soviet Union takes an important toll on the energy women have available for activities other than their job and domestic chores, even when age, education, income, and CPSU membership are held constant. While women in all societies are likely to bear a greater responsibility for domestic chores even when they work full time, the situation would seem to be particularly acute in the Soviet Union. For example, the same five items are included in the 1987 General Social Survey for the United States. The relationship with gender is only .04.

This fatigue factor is accentuated among women of child-bearing age.³¹ These findings document empirically a common speculation in the sex role literature. Combining all types of activity and assuming no gender differences in energy, the life of women is frequently more taxing than that of men. However, unlike the "caring and compassion" factor, it would seem that the fatigue variable would be subject to considerable system-level variation. These gender differences appear not be as great in some western societies as they are in the U.S.S.R.

Fatigue is related (mostly weakly) to a number of dependent variables.³² The fatigued were more positive toward the Communist party ($r = .11$), and less likely to want party removed from its leading role ($r = -.16$). The fatigued were also less supportive of the norms of democracy ($r = -.10$), less supportive of competitive elections ($r = -.17$), and less likely to want society changed by revolutionary action ($r = -.12$). The intuitive explanation is that the fatigued feel less capable of coping with change. The fatigued were also less likely to discuss politics ($r = -.19$), to have participated in unconventional political behavior ($r = -.15$) and were considerably less efficacious ($r = -.23$). The explanation here seems straightforward, as all are related to the energy one can bring to the political area. The remaining variables listed in Table 1 were not significantly related to fatigue.

We shall analyze in more detail those relationships with coefficients greater than .15. In particular, is fatigue an intervening variable between gender and dependent variables or are the relationships spurious? The standard method to distinguish between an intervening variable and spurious-

³¹ Unfortunately, respondents were not asked if they had children. However, if we compare married women between 24 and 45 with all other women the former report more fatigue than the latter ($\eta^2 = .16$, $p < .05$).

³² All coefficients reported below are significant at $p < .05$.

ness is to put a confidence interval around the (unstandardized) regression coefficient and control the background variable(s) (Cnudde and McCrone, 1969). Testing for spuriousness, we see in Table 3 that in no case does gender alone reduce the bivariate *b* between fatigue and dependent variables below the lower confidence interval for *b*. A more rigorous test requires controlling all the background variables listed earlier in Table 1. Here the controls drop *b* below its lower confidence level for a belief that "the party's leading role should be removed," support for competitive elections, and unconventional participation. The low coefficients in these instances mean that relationships are likely spurious, but since the background variables are not statistically independent it is possible that some more complex developmental sequence might exist.³³

In the case of political discussions and political efficacy the spurious explanation can be rejected. Fatigue would appear to be one (of several) variables that likely intervene between these background variables and the two dependent variables being analyzed. We can also infer that for discussions and efficacy there must be other unmeasured intervening variables, as the partial *b* for gender remains statistically significant with the background variables

Table 3

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN FATIGUE AND FIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH CONTROLS FOR GENDER, AGE, EDUCATION, INCOME AND CPSU MEMBERSHIP

	Regression Coefficients		Partial	
	Simple <i>b</i>	Lower Confidence Level	Gender**	All Background Variables***
Remove CPSU from Leading Role	-.18*	-.07	-.13*	-.06
Support Competitive Elections	-.17*	-.08	-.12*	-.04
Political Discussions	-.13*	-.07	-.11*	-.08*
Political Efficacy	-.18*	-.09	-.17*	-.12*
Unconventional Participation	-.25*	-.06	-.16*	-.02

**p* < .05

**Partial coefficient between fatigue and dependent variables controlling for gender only.

***Controlling for gender, education, age, income and CPSU membership.

³³ The relationships of the other background variables with gender are age ($r = .00$), education ($-.11$), income ($-.17$) and membership in the party ($-.17$). However, since gender has the strongest link to fatigue when all background factors are the equation (see Table 1), it seems unlikely that a developmental sequence exists of any consequence which posits gender as antecedent to other background variables.

and fatigue in the equation.³⁴ Unless one accepts the argument for biological determinism, there must be additional intervening variables which account for this relationship.

But we still cannot be sure to what extent fatigue is intervening between gender and the two nonspuriously linked dependent variables as opposed to the remaining background variables. Using a simple three-variable model and employing the standard test where a hypothesized intervening variable (fatigue) is controlled we find the bivariate b between gender and political discussions reduced 28 percent, and the b between gender and efficacy is reduced 24 percent (but not below the lower confidence interval for either).³⁵ This reduction would seem to be some evidence that fatigue intervenes between gender and the dependent variables. Employing the same method and controlling for fatigue with the five background variables in the equation reduces the b for gender more than for any of the other background variables, but none drops below its lower confidence interval.³⁶ The statistical evidence is thus not conclusive. But combined with other research on gender in the U.S.S.R., there is at least a minimal plausibility that women were less engaged in than men in some forms of politics due to the consequences of greater demands placed on their time by work and domestic responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

In the introduction to *Women of the World: A Comparative Study*, Iglitzin (1976) writes "[t]he daily lives of most women in western and non-western countries vary only by degree." In the final chapter of *Women and World Change*, Black (1981) concludes "these chapters . . . show the essential irrelevance of [political] ideologies." They argue there are strong continuities across cultures in the unique ways males and females live their lives. On several non-political variables our Moscow data seem to confirm this notion. Women were more religious than men, more fatigued, and scored higher on a scale of

³⁴ For political discussions the bivariate b for gender is $-.15$ (s.e. = $.05$); for efficacy the partial b for gender is $.36$ (s.e. = $.08$).

³⁵ For political discussions the bivariate b is $.45$; the lower confidence interval is $.25$. Partialing for fatigue yields a b of $.32$. For efficacy, the bivariate b is $.49$; the lower confidence interval is $.33$. Partialing for fatigue yields a b of $.37$.

³⁶ Referring back to Table 1 for political discussions, there are two significant b coefficients—gender and education. Adding an additional control for fatigue lowers b from $-.18$ to $-.14$ (22 percent), but only lowers b for education from $.15$ to $.14$ (6 percent). Looking again at Table 1, efficacy, there are four significant b coefficients—gender, age, education and CPSU membership. Controlling for fatigue lowers b for gender from $-.41$ to $-.34$ (17 percent). The coefficient for age is lowered by 15 percent; the coefficient for education by 12 percent; the coefficient for CPSU membership by .00 percent.

caring and compassion. These differences are expected, based on cross-national research. If the generalization about continuities is true, a logical inference is that most gender differences on matters political should differ crossculturally only in magnitude, not in direction. That conclusion is the one at which we arrive in our analysis of gender differences in the greater Moscow area.

Among our specific findings are that women tended to be conservative in the sense that they are more risk adverse than men. This observation is, of course, not original. But women in our sample were more likely to believe that reform was too rapid, to oppose a radical change in society, to oppose removing the Communist party from its "leading role," and less enthusiastic over the move to competitive elections. Compared to men, they had a greater preference for the status quo. From one perspective, the greater preference among women for the old order may seem puzzling. The status quo in all nations tends more or less to be patriarchal. With change may come improvement. But rapid change usually means social dislocation, where the vulnerable (often women) pay the higher price. Under the old order women had the protections of full employment, at least minimal social services, and a guarantee of reasonable representation in lower level political bodies. Change, it appears, was more threatening to women than to men.

On virtually all measures, women were less politicized than men. They were less interested in politics, had less political knowledge, fewer political discussions, were less likely to engage in unconventional participation, and had a lower sense of political efficacy. We see these tendencies in western democracies, but the pattern seems more pronounced in the greater Moscow area. Despite the emphasis in much western writing on structural impediments to full citizenship for women, a lesson from these data is one of the limits of structural circumstances alone. Women in the Moscow area are as well educated as men, and the percentage of women in the work force is the same as for men. Obviously attitudes play an important role. For example, women with a feminist outlook had more political discussions, more political knowledge, were more likely to participate in unconventional politics, and importantly, were more politically efficacious than non-feminists. But feminism is a weak force in the U.S.S.R. and its successor, and may well be a factor accounting for relatively low politicization among women. Role expectations are important as well. In all societies many women work a "double shift." But in Soviet society where almost all women work full time, women are expected to assume virtually all domestic responsibilities as well. This burden may well contribute to the depoliticization of women in our sample. One factor we expected to contribute to conservatism and depoliticization but

did not was religiosity. Women were more religious than men, but that difference had little political consequence.

There were aspects of the Soviet political order which some have hypothesized might reduce or eliminate gender differences on important civic values, such as support for competitive elections, political efficacy and political participation. At the official level, the Soviet Union had a progressive view on the status of women as equal participants in the political process. Beyond public ideology, research in the West has stressed the liberating role of education and full-time employment. But under conditions which differ substantially from those in the West, women contrasted to men in the greater Moscow area seem much like women contrasted to men in the five-nation classic, *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963).

APPENDIX: THE SAMPLE

The Universe: The Moscow survey is based on a representative sample of the Moscow *Oblast*. The *Oblast* is an area of 47,000 square kilometers, and includes 39 administrative rations, 69 cities, and 74 urban settlements. The population of the *Oblast* is nearly 16,000,000, and 79 percent of the *Oblast* is classified as urban. The city of Moscow has a population of roughly 9,000,000.

The Sample: The Moscow sample was drawn through two stages: 32 regions of Moscow and 54 populated areas of the Moscow *Oblast* were selected from all geographical units within the *Oblast*. At the second stage, individual respondents were selected from lists of residents maintained by the central address bureau. A total of 550 respondents was randomly selected from the list.

Respondent Selection: Like the European U.S.S.R. survey, the Moscow respondents were randomly selected from lists of residents maintained by the central address bureau.

Response Rate: Of the 550 respondents selected, 40 respondents could not be contacted, even after as many as three visits to their homes. In addition, there was a single overt refusal to be interviewed, and one additional questionnaire was rejected because it could not be verified. Four interviews included too much missing data to be usable. Thus, the total number of respondents in the survey is 504. The response rate is therefore 92 percent.

The Questionnaire: The survey instrument was constructed primarily in the U.S., but was pre-tested in Moscow, and was significantly revised by both the American and Soviet research teams working closely together. The survey asked a broad array of questions on many topics. The survey instrument was back-translated twice and every effort was made to insure that the questions, though mainly Western in origin, were tailored to the Soviet cultural context. Special attention was given to training the interviewers in techniques more

common in Western survey research. Of course, the respondents had no idea that the survey was in any way connected with an American research project.

The Interviewers: Interviewers were recruited and trained by staff from the Institute of Sociology (U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences). The interviewers were instructed in standard interview techniques. All of the 59 interviewers used in the project completed the questionnaire. Like interviewers in the West, these interviewers were largely female (66 percent). Their average age was 24 years. Reflecting their associations with the Academy of Sciences, the interviewers are quite well educated: three-fourths report an average monthly income of less than 150 rubles per family member. Only 5 percent of the interviewers are members of the Communist party, while 70 percent are members of a trade union. Thus, the Moscow interviewers are better educated than western interviewers, but in most other respects are similar to their western colleagues.

Several steps were taken to discourage cheating on the interviews. First, a fairly elaborate system of supervision was put in place. Second, each questionnaire was carefully checked by a supervisor. Third, with just a few exceptions interviewers were not allowed to conduct a great number of interviews. The average number of interviews conducted per interviewer is 8.5 (minimum = 1 interview, 3 interviewers; maximum = 16 interviews, 2 interviewers). Finally, a small percentage of cases was selected for verification. No instances of falsification were discovered.

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Received: September 25, 1991

Accepted for Publication: May 20, 1992

Books/Rhoda Koenig

FROM RUSSIA WITH HORROR

C T 100

“... When Bonner was eleven, she hid behind the draperies to witness a new entertainment: ‘In that room they had the purges’ ...”

Mothers and Daughters, by Elena Bonner. Translated by Antonina W. Bouis. Alfred A. Knopf; 368 pages; \$23.

SOME ASPECTS OF ELENA BONNER'S LIFE IN prewar Russia were very like those of a well-to-do childhood on the West Side: going with her grandmother to a department store for prettier clothes than her mother allowed; falling asleep in her spacious apartment to the music from a restaurant on the floor below; playing cosacks and robbers. But others were decidedly not and, though sounding like extracts from a thirties farce, were all too real: Elena was told that, although she should not be friends with one of her schoolmates, another was acceptable because his father “was a poet who suited the Party despite his permitting some wrong motifs”; her mother never hugged or kissed her, as such behavior was “petit bourgeois.”

The greatest disparity, however, between Bonner's parents and Western ones was their fate. Like her late husband, Andrei Sakharov, Bonner's mother and father were harshly punished for displeasing the Soviet regime. Her first inklings of what would befall them insinuated themselves subtly into her cozy world of dark velvet, cherry jam, and Pushkin. The apartment hotel where they lived contained a large, columned hall used for movie showings and New Year's-tree parties. In 1934, when Bonner was eleven, she hid behind the draperies to indulge her “love of eavesdropping and spying” and to witness a new form of entertainment: “In that room they had the purges.”

One night, after watching her nervous neighbors being quizzed about their domestic lives and their knowledge of party policy, she saw her father, a high official in the Comintern, called to the head of the room. “Someone at the table said that Papa had written something incorrect in Leningrad. Papa immediately agreed and said he hadn't understood right away. Another man at the table mentioned a name and said that Papa had insulted that man


and had been crude and that he had to correct himself. Papa agreed again.” What was more distressing for the little girl than seeing her father so uncharacteristically meek was hearing him pressed to talk about his non-proletarian first wife. Bonner put the unpleasantness out of her mind, but a process had started that reached its climax when she came home from school three years later to find her mother distraught and trembling (“She seemed to be pulling an invisible shawl

and I offered her some change and a piece of bread.” Her father never came back. The mother's death, five years ago, in Bonner's house, was the first time the death of anyone in her family had not been a mystery.

Bonner's poignant memoir of her first fourteen years—sensitively translated by Antonina W. Bouis—points up the similarity between being a child and living under Communism. Both instill a fear of seemingly random punishments, a resentment of lack of privacy and of senseless rules; both encourage one to make the most of eavesdropping and inferences. And with both, rebellion is a necessary prologue to maturity or freedom. Bonner dates the great change in her thinking from the day she learned that the shots she had heard in the night were fired by a man upstairs who had killed two of the secret police who had come for him and wounded another. “No one wanted to talk to me about him, but he became a hero for me. That was a break, a chasm in my consciousness. I couldn't connect the thought that he was a hero, that everyone should shoot when they come for him, with my conviction that our country was the best, and that the whole world needed the Revolution.”

Bonner's recollections of summer holidays, favorite sweets, and first loves (“Six or seven girls from my class jumped me when I came out of school alone. They knocked me down and hit me with their schoolbags, shouting that I

shouldn't sit with Shura, since they were all in love with him, too”) are all the more touching, given our knowledge of how they will disappear. She still finds it hard to believe that such things happened, but even harder to believe that some people still deny them. “When I hear people say that they didn't know, say, ‘God, could it really have been like that?’ or more rarely, ‘It couldn't have been!’ I want to shout, ‘Don't believe them!’ It means they didn't want to see, didn't wish to know. And most importantly, it means that their heart never ached, they never helped with a package, a letter, compassion, a word, a



ELENA BONNER: One of the “strange orphans” of Russia.

around herself”), her father gone, and the room full of soldiers. “Mama's look at me was in farewell. That meant it was she. That was better than Papa, because Papa would save her. No. No one could save anyone. Otherwise they would have saved their friends. Then it would be better if it were Papa. No.” It was both.

Bonner's mother was taken to a labor camp for eight years, her father for ten, without correspondence privileges, making Elena one of what Ilya Ehrenburg called “the strange orphans.” When her mother returned unexpectedly and rang the doorbell, “I thought she was a beggar

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Children

By Liesl Schillinger

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10 THE NEW REPUBLIC SEPTEMBER 20 & 27, 1993

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and made polishing gestures with his hands, but since my shoes were suede, I shook my head, gave him a few hundred rubles and asked some questions. His name was Igor; he said he made 2,000 rubles on a bad day (\$2), and 7,000 rubles on a good day (\$7)—not bad in a city where people earn 25,000 rubles a month. "Do you go to school?" I asked. "Yes," he said, looking away, "I go to school." "So you come here after school?" I pressed. He quirked his head. "Yeah." He looked like the cover illustration of Horatio Alger Jr.'s book *Ragged Dick*—the story of a young orphan in New York in the middle of the last century who starts by shining shoes and ends up a millionaire. "What do you want to be when you grow up?" I asked Igor. "A bank president," he said. I laughed, and wished him well, and as I prepared to leave, he stopped me. "Russians pay me a few hundred rubles, but I charge Westerners a dollar," he said. I paid up.

Certainly, the majority of Russian children have attention lavished on them and do not hold jobs of any kind. Still, even the sheltered ones are not immune to the new cynicism of the times. Schoolchildren once sang the "Sunrise Song": "May there always be sunshine, may there always be sky, may there always be Mama, may there always be me." Today, to the same tune, they sing: "May there always be vodka, salted fish and salami, cigarettes in my pocket, and a wife in my suitcase." When Russian children play hide and seek and tag, they choose who is to be "it" with a haunting chant: "German comes out of the mist; takes a knife out from his pocket; I will cut you, I will beat you, anyway I'm going to *get* you." Their parents may be smiling and shaking hands with new German colleagues, but centuries of mistrust survive in the children, the next generation of East-West business partners. And the wariness is not unfounded. The main showroom of Detsky Mir (Children's World) has been cleared of toys and filled with Porsches, Audis, Mercedes and BMWs. Russian children may not know exactly why, but they sense that their rights to childish things are at risk from the West, even if their country's borders are not.

Detsky Mir still has toys, but many are priced out of reach. Dendy, a Russian Nintendo variant, costs several months' salary; imported remote-control toy cars might as well be Lamborghinis. Until two years ago, Russian children did not have Legos, Barbie dolls or My Pretty Pony. They had wooden trains, bears and horses, plastic trucks, big-eyed hard plastic dolls with kerchiefs and aprons and hand-molded plastic toys—including dolls shaped like humanoid onions. "My son wants *transformer* and Gameboy. I will probably buy him this, but most parents can't," says Andrei Kasyenko, father of two boys. "Two years ago, we didn't even know these toys existed." Now, Russian parents are forced to disappoint their children in ways that were once impossible, and the sign of their failure stares at them from every new street kiosk. "On the street, they sell American chocolate bars and gum, and everywhere the kids cry, 'Mama, Mama, I want it,'" Kasyenko complains. "And they can't have it... there

are so many ads on the T.V. for these things."

The medium that whips American children into a frenzy is proving no less effective in Russia. The country's excellent children's programming is now constantly interrupted for ads: chocolate mallow bars, Coca-Cola, cigarettes and alcohol, clothing and computers. Children figure heavily in the commercials—the better to instill juvenile obsessions and parental guilt. In one ad, a primped and cosseted pair of 5-year-olds giggle as they race through a store, stuffing the cart with luxury items; in another, the same kids exchange a lascivious infantile kiss as they loll in the back of a foreign car, just before another spending spree.

The hottest toys right now—at least for girls—are Mattel's Barbie and her less expensive Russian imitator, Veronika. Veronika, a bleached-blond, was an instant success when she hit the stores this year, despite her lack of bendable legs, which cost extra to make. Nastya, 9, is one of the lucky ones who has a genuine Barbie. Her mother rented one room in their two-bedroom apartment to a Westerner, and so can afford to buy her daughter the most popular toys. "My mother got me a Barbie, and it wasn't even my birthday or anything," Nastya told me proudly. "Barbie is the most stylish toy, so I have everything I want." Everything? She thought a while. "Well, I would like the Barbie House, but it is very expensive," she said. "But I think I'll get it." Nastya knows that not all children share her good fortune. "Of course it's sad when someone else has toys and you can't have them," she said. "But that's just the way it is."

LIESL SCHILLINGER is a free-lance writer.

WHITE HOUSE WATCH

GORED

By Fred Barnes

Vice President Al Gore had little choice when President Clinton asked him if it was O.K. to ballyhoo Gore's National Performance Review as the White House trolled Congress for votes for Clinton's budget. Gore said yes. But Clinton was doing him no favor. To neutralize grouching about meager spending cuts in the budget, Clinton insisted "a lot more savings" were in the pipeline. Just wait for Gore's report. Clinton touted NPR twice to newspaper editors gathered at the White House on August 2. "The vice president's report on reinventing government... will have many more suggested budget cuts," he said. The performance review, the president told Nevada reporters the next day, "will recommend some substantial increases in spending

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DEVUSHKI!

By Liesl Schillinger

Moscow today may be politically volatile, politically capricious and politically daring, but one thing it is not—and probably never will be—is politically correct. The average Western woman arrives in Moscow to discover that the rules of the gender game have changed: there are no “women” in Russia. There are only *devushki*—girls—or *babushki*—grandmothers. Whether you’re addressing a fortyish saleswoman in a shop or asking a 50-year-old woman on the street for directions, you use the same word: *devushka*; and every Russian woman lives in cold-sweated anticipation of the day when one more gray hair, one more pound, will push her over the line to *babushka* status. I asked a female colleague of mine if it was ever allowable to refer to a grown woman as “woman” or “lady.” From her alarmed reply, I gathered that calling someone “woman” was roughly equivalent to saying, “Hey, bitch.” So *devushka* it remained, despite my reservations.

A funny thing happens when people call you *devushka*. At first, it stings; for instance, when your Russian boss says, “You see, *devushka*, we don’t do it that way.” Straight rebuttals to such comments are not the feminine tack here; gentle persuasion and guilt are the chief female weapons. Frank disagreement produces cold, offended smiles and zero cooperation. So what’s a girl to do? First, you realize that all you want is to get what you want, no matter what people call you. Second, you use the local tools. And third, scarily, you slowly begin thinking of yourself as something diminutive, something not very menacing that ends in “*ushka*.”

“I would never want to be an American woman,” my mild, plump Russian friend Marina told me one day at a neighborhood dining hall. “They are too aggressive, too manly. That is very unattractive. It is good to be soft.” Shura, a stocky Brezhnevite who has gray hair but who is arguably not yet a *babushka*, announced to me a few weeks ago, “It is awful the way American women have flat stomachs. No man could like that; I tell you, it is like a board.” Giving a few firm slaps to her own hearty midsection, she announced, “A woman must have a belly.”

Russian men seem less particular and have a relentlessly romanticized view of women. This means that you walked across streets, your parcels are carried, your doors are opened, your wishes are granted if you cry and you are told incessantly that you are pretty and that

your clothes become you. It also means that many of the men you encounter are going to chat you up, not only in bars or cafés or discos, but on the subways, on buses, on sidewalks, down alleys. As you walk down any street, a chorus of “*devushka!*” echoes after you.

No place is more rife with these kind of encounters than the Moscow metro, the megalithic Stalinist showcase that combines German efficiency and Russian chaos. Every minute thousands of Russians emerge from trains, jostling and shoving, their cloth shoulder bags rammed with sausages and cheese, their trendy plastic shopping bags decorated with bare-buttocked models, their briefcases or pets hugged to their chests. Only one thing can divert them from the lemminglike progress from train to exit: the sight of a woman.

Twenty-two-year-old Robin Sweat left Florida and moved to Moscow in January to study Russian. She is tall and thin with long auburn hair, and as we met over drinks at News Bar, a dark, glistening, high-ceilinged pub popular with Westerners and Russians, she raged over her metro torments. “I’ll be standing on an escalator, and I’ll feel someone tugging at my hair. I turn around, and a man will be stroking my hair and saying, ‘*Devushka*, you have such pretty hair.’ I pull away, and they get angry and say, ‘*Devushka*, let us go out—why will you not come out?’ Men will come up to you, grab you and kiss you, then stand back and beam as if you were going to thank them. They’re like, let’s go back and have sex right now. I wish I had a big cattle prod,” she fumed. “Every woman I know has had the same problem,” she said. But when she told her Russian woman friends about the constant pestering, they were amazed at her anger. “They told me it’s a compliment, they said that it reaffirms their femininity.”

But at midnight on a deserted street, no woman is looking for affirmation. One evening I was walking home with my friend Alejandra, a British-Venezuelan with long ringlety hair. As we walked down the Old Arbat, man after man ran up to us, laughing, grabbing at our wrists, asking for a smile or a light. At first it seemed like the usual harassment, but then a boy ran up to us and began hopping grotesquely like a jumping jack. He was well-dressed, well-scrubbed, thin and young, but he was not looking to flatter. We hissed at him to leave us alone, and he gave up and went away, swearing. We walked on silently. Just then, ahead of us we saw a black van advancing up the wide, cobbled walkway between the new Baskin-Robbins and the Arbat’s rococo lampposts.

We kept walking. The van drove toward us, between the double row of light poles. A long-haired boy jumped out of the passenger seat and walked up to us. “*Devushki*,” he said, with a terrorist’s smile, “you need help. People might bother you.” The driver was now pulling up alongside us. “Yes, people like you,” I retorted, and kept walking. The driver opened the door and demanded that we get in. I spun Alejandra around and ran back up the empty Arbat, pulling her along with me. We found a lit storefront and pounded on the glass door; a bewildered

doorman appeared. He saw the men and the van, and as I hurriedly explained the situation, he nodded and opened the door.

Alejandra and I stayed with him until the van drove away. Then we turned around and headed back for home. With a sinking feeling, we watched two men ahead, on the other side of the Arbat, make a quick diagonal path toward us. We were ten meters from the door when they cut us off. "*Devushki*," they laughed. Giving a slap to the back of our coats, they grinned and ran on up the Arbat. Alejandra and I looked at each other. They were gone. We didn't speak, we just punched the building code and made our way upstairs.

The next day at work, I told my colleagues about the incidents and they laughed. "What do you expect, *devushka*," they said. "You can't walk after dark without a man. You should have stayed at the club until it got light." When I protested that I hadn't been alone, I had been with a friend, and that in New York I was used to walking unaccompanied whenever I felt like it, they shook their heads. "No way," they said. "The men don't know you're from New York. Next time, go out with a man—actually, better to go out with several men."

LIESL SCHILLINGER is a free-lance writer.

The Republicans and Perot.

LOVING TOO MUCH

By Fred Barnes

Republicans are like that pop culture cliché, women who love too much. They know they shouldn't get involved with Ross Perot, that the relationship will come to no good, but they can't help themselves. GOP Representative John Kasich of Ohio insists Perot is really a Republican at heart. "His views are largely the same as mine," says Kasich, who talks to Perot regularly. "It's a great relationship, and I suspect it'll be sustained." Newt Gingrich says the message to Perot should be: welcome. "A guy who gets 19 percent of the vote is legitimate," he argues. "A guy with 67 percent approval and 99 percent name I.D. is legitimate."

The mating dance between Republicans and Perot is in full swing, and Perot is doing his part. He praises Republicans like Kasich and Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico ("two of the best") for their deficit slashing schemes. "The best minds in the Congress on debt reduction just happen to be Republicans," Perot told Phil Donahue. And what is Perot's fondest dream? "If I could wish for one thing right now in terms of political parties, it would be for the Republicans to get over the

funeral, to revitalize themselves and have strong leadership and to have strong, positive, constructive programs," he said in a T.V. interview with David Frost in May. "That's starting to happen."

Maybe, but what's really starting to happen is a Republican-Perot love-in. Republican National Chairman Haley Barbour invited two surprised Illinois organizers for Perot's United We Stand America to sit in on the GOP national committee's summer meeting in Chicago in July. Senate Republican leader Bob Dole met in Kansas City in June with a dozen regional coordinators from Perot's 1992 presidential campaign. (Dole has known Perot for more than twenty years.) In May, House freshman Republicans invited Perot to speak to them. And ten congressional Republicans, including Gingrich, have ponied up \$15 to join United We Stand America.

Why are Republicans so eager to attract Perot? It's the 19 million votes he got. "By and large, they're people with Republican voting habits," says Barbour. True. A survey by Stanley Greenberg, President Clinton's pollster, found that "among all Perot voters, 62 percent voted for Reagan at least once and 62 percent for Bush in 1988." George Bush drove them away in 1992. Now they "remain committed" to Perot, according to Greenberg. So even Jack Kemp, after zinging Perot on trade and taxes, said on CBS's "Face the Nation" in July: "I'd like to invite him into the Republican Party."

Republicans need Perot voters to oust Clinton in 1996, but their more immediate concern is 1994. GOP pollster Frank Luntz, who worked for Perot in 1992, believes Perot could prompt a stampede of voters to Republican congressional candidates next year. "He can affect one out of ten [votes] right now, maybe as high as one out of eight," says Luntz. "That could turn five dozen House races and eight to ten Senate seats." All Perot has to do is urge his followers to back GOP challengers as a way of "sending a laserlike signal to Washington." Even if Perot merely instructed his troops to back challengers in general, whether Republican or Democrat, that would help Republicans. They're the minority in both houses, so they have fewer incumbents.

In statements at his weekend rallies, Perot has fueled Republican hopes of a 1994 alliance. In Boise, Idaho, on July 18, Perot exclaimed, "1994 is coming. We've got to climb in the ring. . . . You can be the swing vote in nearly every state and district in the United States. You're a 500-pound gorilla at the edge of the branch, eating a banana and staring at them." The worst fear of Republicans is that United We Stand would field its own candidates, split the non-Democratic vote and allow Democrats to win. Perot claims he has no plans for that. "We hope we don't have to," he told Frost. "We have no desire to be a political party. We do have a strong desire to give the people a voice in this country."

There's another reason for Republican optimism about détente with Perot. Republicans swoon over his new anti-Clinton rhetoric. He sounds like Dole or Gingrich, only his megaphone is bigger. In his half-hour infomercial on NBC on April 25—the second of three this year—Perot predicted what will happen if Clinton

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P. C4

From Proletarians to Pinups

In the New, Anti-Feminist Russia, Sexploitation Meets Mandatory Motherhood

C4 SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1993

By Katrina vanden Heuvel

"IN POST-COMMUNIST Russia," a Russian friend likes to say, "there are only two images of women. Mother or whore." I used to think she was exaggerating, but in the last year, more and more Russian women have told me that they feel trapped between a state-sponsored campaign for family values and a newly unfettered mass media that depicts women as sex objects for male consumption.

The front line in the family values crusade is in the Russian Parliament. Sometime this spring, a motley crew of old-style conservatives and newfangled democrats is expected to pass a law that will strip women of economic and reproductive rights.

Katrina vanden Heuvel, an editor at the Nation, writes about Russian politics and society.

In draft form, the Law on the Protection of the Family grants all rights to the family, which it defines narrowly as a "cell" in which there are children—natural or adopted. Only the family, not individual members, can own an apartment or a house, a plot of land or a car. The law gives the family—not women—the right to decide how many children to have. Another provision proclaims "the priority of the family is the upbringing of children," which will compel women to leave the workplace as day care centers close and other social services are slashed. "In reading the draft law," a friend said, "you come to the conclusion that the only thing a woman will be able to do in life is to fulfill the state-approved role of motherhood, since other opportunities for self-realization are denied her."

One ominous provision of the law declares that every child has the

right to life from the moment of conception—which many women believe is a step towards undermining Russia's liberal abortion law. The provision may have been spawned by government panic over the country's dramatically falling birthrate. Last year, for the first time since World War II, deaths in Russia exceeded births.

"How can one talk about democratic principles," asked Tatyana Khudyakova, a Russian journalist who writes about women's issues for *Izvestia*, "if attempts are being made to deprive each one of us of the right to dispose of our body, housing or pay?"

Amid the grim realities of Russian life, the proposed law seems like yet another quixotic attempt to restore a mythic past—in this case, where women stayed home to serve husband and children and divorce was rare. But in today's Russia, more than half of families with three or

more children live in poverty, divorce rates are high and each year, some 700,000 fathers of children under a year old leave their wives. Every fifth Russian woman is the family's only breadwinner.

While the law winds its way through the parliament, the Russian mass media promotes its own version of family values. Professional women, with very few exceptions, are characterized as anti-family. ("The most important thing women produce are children," the liberal newspaper *Nedelya* announced.) Newspapers embracing the political spectrum blame "overemancipated, masculinized women" for social ills from juvenile delinquency to divorce. At the same time, even the most

respectable newspapers and magazines use photographs of naked women in the fierce circulation battles that characterize today's Russian press life today. "In our press," sociologist Olga Voronina recently noted, "women's faces and characters appear much less frequently than their bodies."

The 15-year-old daughter of a close friend recently confided that many of her classmates consider hard-currency prostitution a prestigious trade. After scanning several mainstream newspapers, I began to understand why. Last September, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, a liberal paper with 8 million readers, featured an article promoting a new 24-hour call girl service for Western and Russian businessmen. The firm's young founder told the newspaper that his girls "are between 18 and 30 years old, cost 10,000 rubles per

hour or 25,000 rubles per night, and wear beautiful clothes." (An average monthly salary in Moscow nowadays is about 5,000 rubles—approximately \$10 at present conversion rates.)

Another popular newspaper, Moskovskii Komsomolets, regularly runs ads "seeking young women without complexes for rich men." And Evening Moscow, once favored by pensioners and soldiers, recently ran a story promoting the Miss Sex '92 contest. Photos of the topless contestants cuddling with doubles of Stalin, Lenin and Hitler were scattered across the front page. Family values weren't completely forgotten: The winner won an iron and a washing machine.

Television, unconstrained by FCC-style regulations, is no exception. In December, Russia's Channel 2 showed an advertisement for a secretarial firm seeking women be-

tween the ages of 18 and 25. (Sexist and ageist job advertisements are common.) The ad showed a young woman and her boss dining at an elegant and intimate restaurant. "Ease his business anxieties," a male announcer says, as the couple leaves the restaurant. Even television's so-called family hour is not off-limits. My daughter's favorite Sunday morning cartoons were followed by "Miss Moscow Striptease '92." The prize: a fur coat and a trip to Berlin.

For Russian girls and young women in desperate financial need—80 percent of the unemployed are women—the media's promotion of a lucrative and glamorous life through prostitution or other thinly disguised sexual services is seductive. A Russian sociologist, E. Rybina, predicted recently in the weekly newspaper Private Life that "the current political and economic situation in this country will push many more women into prostitution. Certainly it is sad, but prostitution today is the highest paying profession for women."

In some ways, Russian women face the same sexual stereotypes that American women confronted 30 years ago. Not surprisingly, more and more Russian women are forming activist and self-help groups—from rape crisis centers in cramped apartments to women's studies programs in high-rise academic institutes. Although the Russian women's movement is small and disorganized, it is fast-growing, diverse and no longer confined to Moscow or St. Petersburg.

In November, I attended the Second Independent Women's Forum in Dubna, two hours outside Moscow,

where some 500 women braved freezing temperatures and the crippling cost of internal travel to network, agitate and organize. As Russian women introduced themselves to the conference participants, it was as if the whole of society were on stage—from businesswomen to unemployed rural women, teachers, factory workers, doctors, politicians and even women veterans of the Afghan War.

At the end, forum participants issued an appeal to the Russian Parliament, requesting that the hearing on the draft family law be postponed until "the bill is finalized in accordance with the standards of international law and widely discussed by the general public." With the cooperation of a few sympathetic deputies, women's groups in Moscow will hold a public hearing in the parliament next month to bring Russian and world attention to the law's discriminatory nature. On another front, several women who attended the forum have created a group to monitor and challenge sexism in the Russian press; they plan to meet with editors and reporters. "We are not calling for a new kind of censorship," one of the organizers told me. "We want some fairness and open-mindedness. In the current climate, we understand that calls for censorship of sexually explicit material and moral policing can be easily turned against women."

"It seems to me," wrote a 15-year-old who attended the Dubna forum, "that we women should not remain silent and close our eyes to what we see all around us . . . We must begin, before it is too late, by actively fighting for our dignity, so that people understand that you cannot build a free society by degrading women." The Russian political elite and mass media, overwhelmingly male and hostile to women's rights, would do well to heed her words. She is Russia's future.

My Secret Past: The KGB File

Elena Bonner

In early August 1991 a man who introduced himself as Andrei Stanislavovich Pshchedomsky telephoned, saying he was assistant to Chairman Ivanenko of the Russian Republic KGB. His chief, he said, wanted to meet with me. Out of old disident habit, I replied that I didn't pay calls on the KGB and if they wanted to see me they should send an official warrant. The man quickly assured me that I had misunderstood, that "they" had great respect for me and simply wanted to meet me. At the time the independent KGB of the Russian Federal Republic was in its infancy. I had no idea what it would become, but expected nothing good. Still, I was curious.

I said, "If you really want to get acquainted, come to see me."

A few days later, they did. At first our conversation didn't go very well. We had little to say to each other. We chatted about my articles in *Moscow News*, which they said they had liked, and the Sakharov Congress. I finally asked them why they had come. They said that they wanted to establish contact with political figures and with the public at large. They wanted a clearer idea of what was expected of them and hoped to work out a new concept for their organization.

As for the new concept, I recommended that they get in touch with one of the Congressional experts who had studied the new (Union) law on the KGB and had found that it violated almost every human right. I told them that I didn't consider myself a political figure and that when I spoke out on issues that worried me I was expressing only my own opinion, that I didn't belong to any political party, and that they therefore had made a mistake in coming to see me. But in general, our conversation was amicable. I had never seen people from the KGB trying to act in this way, especially in my own kitchen over a cup of coffee on a bright sunny day. So I said that I'd like to have something from them: permission to read the KGB files on my parents and my uncle and help in locating the manuscripts and diaries of Sakharov that were stolen by the KGB in Gorky.

Ivanenko promised to satisfy my first request immediately, but he wasn't sure what he could do about the second. And with that, they left.

A few days later Andrei Stanislavovich called and invited me to come to the KGB on Monday to read the files. But that Monday was August 19—the day of the *Putsch*. It was only on the twentieth, when I caught a fleeting glimpse of Ivanenko in the Moscow White House, that I remembered the offer—and immediately forgot it. But Andrei Stanislavovich called again, and soon I was crossing for the first time in my life the marble threshold and mounting the marble steps of the building on Lubyanka Square, the place everyone calls the Big House.

I walked down what seemed miles of corridors. I saw the internal prison, now an accounting office—a small three-story building in the inner courtyard connected by a complicated pas-

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sageway to the main building that surrounds it on all sides. There were several cells, very small, on two floors. Prisoners were kept there for short periods, just a day or two. They were tried in a courtroom separated from the prison by a short corridor and up a short flight of stairs. A pleasant young lieutenant showed me around. In the passageway between the inner prison and the courtroom, which was now sealed, he told me that his grandfather had been tried in the courtroom and

drei Dmitrievich had first chosen in 1983 at my suggestion but later rejected. It's too bad I hadn't known about this edition earlier. I never knew which edition the former leaders of the Soviet Union had read—the KGB one, the one published in *Zvezda* magazine, or the American edition. At the concert that opened the Sakharov Congress in 1991 Gorbachev told me that he had read the memoirs with great attention, and I could have asked him then.

The second present Bakatin gave me was more modest, since it only

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had gotten the most common sentence of those days—execution by shooting (the most extreme punishment).

The sentence was carried out on the other side of Lubyanka Square in the cellar of the Military Collegium building. An underground passage, which goes beneath the entire square, under the subway tunnels and city communication lines, connected it with the main building of the KGB. This had been the last road walked by many thousands of people. I didn't see the passage and I don't even know if it is still there. A lump in my throat kept me from asking.

I took the underground passage from the old KGB building to the new one twice in order to see V. V. Bakatin, the new—poet *Putsch*—chairman of the KGB. At our first meeting he gave me a marvelous present: a two-volume set of Andrei Sakharov's memoirs, published in 1986—that is, three years before the book appeared—in handsome blue covers, in manuscript format, on good quality paper, in large type. The volumes are convincing evidence that Sakharov's manuscripts had been stolen, not by random petty thieves, but by the Committee on State Security, the KGB.

The KGB's edition had the title *Pages of Reminiscences*, the title An-

drus confirmed a loss. I received two documents. Here is the complete text of the first:

Note.

File of Operative Investigation No. 4490 on Bonner, Elena Georgievna, was received by First Department Fifth Directorate of the KGB USSR from the UKGB [the main directorate of the KGB] of Moscow and Moscow Oblast on December 16, 1971, and refilled as FOI No 3223. On December 29, 1972, FOI No 3223 was transferred to File of Operative Development No. 10740, and on July 4, 1988, to it was added FOD No. 1532 in 200 volumes on Sakharov AD ("Askold"), received from the KGB for Gorky Oblast (our No. 14616).

That is all the document says. It doesn't make clear when they started investigating me. And it seems that I wasn't appended to Sakharov's file but that he was attached to mine. Of course, he had always said I underestimated myself and that for the KGB I was Enemy No. 1. Strangely, our cases were put together in the same file only in 1988.

The second document also consists of a single page, but there is writing on both sides. I find in it that I had been

given the nickname "Fox" (see front).

Resolution

On stopping surveillance of File of Operative Development No. 10740, on August 9, 1989, I, Colonel Shevchuk, A. A., chief of First Department Fifth Directorate KGB USSR, examined the materials of file No. 10740 on "Fox" on "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and found: that the materials have lost their relevance, in connection with which (Bonner, Elena Georgievna FOD No. 10740) I resolve: close the case, removing "Fox" from all operative surveillance and destroy the materials.

At the bottom: "Agree. Chief Ninth Department Fifth Directorate KGB USSR Colonel Baranov, A. V."

At the top of the page: "Secret. Confirmed. Chief Fifth Directorate KGB USSR Major General Avonov, E. F. 6 September 1989." On the reverse side:

Order on destruction of file No. 10740, September 6, 1989... burn volumes 1, 41, 71, 130, 200, 280, 340. Previously destroyed by decree of 10/17/1988 a total of 116 volumes... Order of 12/19/1988... 116 volumes. Order of 1/4/... total of 114 volumes... Order of 4/5/1989... 42 volumes. Order of 5/29/1989... 44 volumes. Order of 6/5/1989... 43 volumes. Order of 7/28/1989... 40 volumes. Order of 7/28/1989... 44 volumes. Order of 8/1/1989... 17 volumes.

That means a total of 583 were destroyed. The first seven were burned on the basis of the resolution quoted. But what was the basis for the destruction of case files compiled before September 6, 1989?

Did the burned volumes include Andrei Dmitrievich's manuscripts and diaries? I keep hoping that they will be found. I hope that they destroyed only the evidence of the many years of surveillance—reports by informers, and other materials they describe with the words "operative development." First they fill up so much paper and then they destroy it—200 volumes on Andrei and 383 on me. I'm not much interested in how they investigated us, how deeply they got into our intimate life. And I don't want to know the names of the people we considered friends but who worked for the KGB. Today I continue living as I had before—the methods and concerns of the old KGB do not interest me. And I'm not so sure that it can be changed enough to meet the standards of a democratic state.

In my first visit to the Big House, the Russian KGB had modest offices on a single floor, the seventh. Andrei Stanislavovich told me that he couldn't understand why the KGB of the USSR didn't arrest him while he shuttled back and forth between that building and the White House. Why did they allow him to leave? Why did they let him back in? But by November the Russian KGB had expanded, and in December his office had moved to the fifth floor. It was strange to look out the window of his office and see the large round square below, with the empty pedestal of the Dzerzhinsky monument in the middle, and the Okhotny Ryad perspective radiating

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The New York Review

ALL FOR BOOK

It. It was lovely! I had walked
these windows so many times,
facing inward, feeling the oppres-
sive building suffocating me. And now
I was inside. And the case files of my
family were before me.

Father's case file is No. 11888. The
order for his arrest and a search war-
rant issued in June 1937 appear on the
first page. He was arrested "at the sec-
tion for receiving prisoners of the 10th
section GUOB"—where apparently he
had been brought from the offices of
the Comintern, where he worked.
Page 2 gives information identifying
the prisoner, including photographs
taken on the day of his arrest—full
face and profile. He had been
beaten—there is a large bruise under
his right eye and his wide-eyed stare is
unrecognizable. I had seen eyes like
that. Many of them. In an exhibit of
photographs of the prisoners of
Auschwitz. The fourth page lists what
was taken during the search of his
house: "1. personal correspondence
and various documents. 2. counter-
revolutionary, Trotskyite materials.
3. 2 revolvers, Mausers, No. 6117 and
No. 268563, and 48 bullets." On the
other side of that page there is a note:
"In view [sic] of the absence of keys
and the impossibility of searching the
suitcase and trunk were sealed with
seal No. 30."

A resolution follows (page 5) on the
selected method of restraint—deten-
tion under guard—dated November
15, 1937, five and a half months after
his arrest. It says: "For several years
perpetrated anti-Soviet work, as a
member of a Trotskyite-rightist organ-
ization in the Comintern system and
collaborated with foreign intelligence."

In the transcript of the first interro-
gation, Father gave our ages, incor-
rectly. He wrote, "My children are a
daughter, Lusya Alkhanova, 13, and a
son, Igor Alkhanov, 10." But I was al-
ready fourteen and Igor was nine. Did
he make a mistake? Forget? Or was
there a hidden meaning for him in that?
And in giving our names (in other case
files I have seen, they wrote only
"daughter," "son," or "two children")
was he attempting to extend an unreal
spiritual thread to us, simply by repeat-
ing our names, by reproducing them on
paper? Oh, my inflexible Communist
father! The transcript ends with his
words: "I have never participated in
any oppositions, fractional groups, or
deviations. G. Alkhanov" (page 7).

Then comes another resolution
(page 8) dated August 1937 (no day
given):

I, commander of the 9th division

duty to bring to your attention the
following. Before my work in the
Comintern, I worked for many
years in the Party [illegible] hon-
estly and loyally to the party of
Lenin and Stalin. When I moved
to the apparatus of the Comintern, I
was gradually drawn into anti-
Party work. I found myself among
the Trotskyite-right group of
Pyatnitsky. [Iosif Pyatnitsky was
secretary of the Comintern's Ex-
ecutive Committee.] At first I
thought that Pyatnitsky and his al-
lies held the correct Stalinist posi-
tions. However, I later saw that
this group in its makeup and di-
rection was Trotskyite-right-wing.
Having realized that—instead of
exposing the group and struggling
ruthlessly against it—I helped
that group and became a member
of that group. Therefore I bear the
responsibility for the counter-
revolutionary work of the entire
group. In view of the specific con-
ditions of work in the Comintern
apparatus (the need to be conspira-
torial) I could not know the entire
activity of the group but only parts.
But those parts were counter-
revolutionary enough. They kept
Trotskyite and rightist elements in
responsible posts in the most im-
portant sectors. They recruited
dubious and spying elements in
secret places. My personal coun-
terrevolutionary work consisted
in that on the one hand I knew in-
dividual facts of anti-Party work
of this group and did not expose
them or protest against them and
on the other hand that in my own
work in the Balkans I recruited
and trusted leftist and Trotskyite
elements, for instance the famous
Trotskyite [illegible] and his
brothers, or the leftist elements of
the Bulgarian party, who led the
struggle against Dimitrov. I will
give more detailed information on
my counterrevolutionary work
and the work of the Pyatnitsky
group in my statements [sic].
15.XI.1937.

Then from page 10 to page 126 come
the interrogations of six Comintern
workers from September to December
1937. And the page numbering is
changed there, too. On page 10 you
can see 149 crossed out, all the way to
page 164, when a third numbering be-
gins. Father's second interrogation—
also his last—was on December 29,
1937. According to the third num-
bering, it begins on file page 126. When
asked if he pled guilty, Father said:
"Yes, I am guilty of being a member of



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—Friedrich Raimann



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espionage work for many years?"

"No, I do not confirm that."

The pause, for a cigarette would have ended. And the tea. And his life!

On December 30 the investigator announced the end of the investigation, and on December 31 charges were written for case No. 11888 "charging member of the counterrevolutionary terrorist organization in the Comintern system and agent of Japanese intelligence" Alikhanov Gevork Sarkisovich under articles 1a-17-8 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Above that was stamped: Approved. And signed: Vysinsky.

On February 12 (file page 138) the preliminary meeting was held to prepare for a trial. February 13, the minutes of the closed court of the circuit session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The session began at 18:00. "The defendant stated that he had nothing to add and asked the court to spare his life."

The sentence: "The military Collegium of the Supreme Court USSR sentenced Alikhanov Gevork Sarkisovich to the highest measure—execution with confiscation of all his personal property. The sentence is final [one word illegible—E.B.] resolution of the Central Executive Committee USSR of 1/XII/34 is immediately executed. The meeting ended at 18:15."

The last page of volume 1 (file page 142):

Secret. Note. The death sentence on Alikhanov Gevork Sarkisovich was executed in Moscow on February 13, 1938. The decree on realizing the death sentence is kept in the Special Archive of the First Special Department of the NKVD USSR, Vol. 3, page 72. Chief of the 12th section of the First Special Department NKVD USSR State Security Lieutenant [signature]

Volume 2 contains materials on my father's rehabilitation following the death of Stalin. According to information supplied by the KGB agents, he was not a spy. There are no reports from Alikhanov G.S. at all. That means that he did not work for the KGB-NKVD-OGPU.

But there follows a list of twenty Comintern workers (including Father), whose files had been falsified by the investigator, along with his statement that he "had used physical means of influencing statements on orders of his superior and with him had beaten Pyatitsky and many other prisoners."

That investigator, before his own arrest in 1957, had worked his way up to lieutenant general. He survived the camps and returned to Moscow, something that was not allowed until 1987 for prisoners of conscience, or dissidents, when they completed their camp sentences. So it seems that the administration treated former investigators better than their victims.

The investigator's superior had been arrested in 1938 as a Polish spy and sentenced to death. His wife applied for posthumous rehabilitation for him. When the case was reexamined, the charges of espionage were dropped. But "The rules for [rehabilitation]

Even the rehabilitation files have falsifications in them. The Lieutenant General of Justice who was in charge of rehabilitating my father wrote on November 17, 1954, "Please instruct the appropriate registry office to give Bonner Ruth Grigoryevna certificate of death for her husband, Alikhanov Gevork Sarkisovich. Alikhanov Gevork Sarkisovich, born 1897 in Tbilisi, was condemned on February 13, 1938, by the Supreme Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, and while serving his sentence died of pneumonia on March 11, 1939." So this comrade general buried my father one more time, making up a new date and month and year for his death.

My mother's investigation file No. 15871 is very brief, and it seems completely insignificant compared to the file on her exonerated, which had

see anyone. As I reread that part in Mother's file, I can't keep from smiling, through tears, of course. It reminds me of my own interrogations, when I played dumb, sounding like an idiot, repeating over and over, "I'm not important."

Mother's file ends on page 8, with an excerpt from the transcript of the Special Meeting of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR on March 22, 1938. Bonner Ruth Grigoryevna—as a member of the family of a traitor of the homeland—is to be incarcerated in a corrective labor camp for eight years, starting from 9/XII/37. File to be sent to the archives." Beneath is a stamp marking that I was sent from the Butyrki Prison to Akmol. And there is a No. 461218 c/o Karlag.

The file on my uncle, Mother's brother, Bonner Matvei Grigoryevich,



been started long before the rehabilitation process as a result of the complaints I was able to make as an army veteran. When I read it, Andrei Stanislavovich said that I was fortunate—in many cases wives had given evidence against their husbands. In the prison photograph Mother is smiling triumphantly, confirming the thought I had at the time that she was waiting impatiently to be arrested at last.

Her file was begun before her arrest. It opens with a note (file page 1) dated November 4, 1937, "Former Comintern worker Alikhanov Gevork Sarkisovich was arrested by the Third Department GUGB as a member of a counterrevolutionary Trotskyite organization and as a Japanese spy. Living in Moscow, at Gorky Street, 36, apt. 317, Hotel Luxe, is Alikhanov's wife, Bonner Ruth Grigoryevna, b. 1901, Siberia, Verkhne-Ostroznoye, not a Party member [Mother had already been expelled from the Party], USSR citizen, studying at the Stalin Industrial Academy. She has children.... The children are in Leningrad at Bonner's mother's. Bonner is subject to arrest."

But when she filled out her prison dossier, Mother did not write that she had children. And in her only interrogation, when asked "What lies of Alikhanov's do you know?" she replied, "I don't know any of Alikhanov's friends, since none of my friends have

begins with the resolution to select a method of restraint and a charge dated September 29, 1937, which states there is "enough evidence to indicate he is a member of a counterrevolutionary espionage organization and doing undermining work against the USSR for Japan."

The full text of his first interrogation on the day of his arrest on October 26:

Question: You have been arrested for counterrevolutionary activity. Give a statement on this.

Reply: I have done no counterrevolutionary activity.

Question: That is not true. Your stubbornness will not hide your criminal activity from the investigation. We suggest you give truthful answers.

Reply: I am not hiding anything and I repeat that I have never done any criminal activity against Soviet rule.

Question: We are warning you that we will have to use the existing materials of the investigation against you. We suggest once more that you give exhaustive evidence about your criminal activity.

Reply: I can only repeat what I said, that I have not committed any crimes against Soviet rule.

The second (and last) interrogation was on November 21. In it Matvei confessed fully that he had been a Japanese spy. The materials in the in-

articles 58.6 and 11 of the Criminal Code RSFSR, and then it says: "I consider this present investigation file No. 35719-37 charging Bonner MG to be complete and in accordance with decree No. 99485 of the NKVD USSR General Commissar of State Security Comrade Yezhov am sending it to be reviewed in the first category. The charges were written on December 31, 1937. Leningrad."

The last page in the file, page 27: "Note. Decision of the Commission NKVD and the Procurator of the USSR on [the date is not filled in] 1937 in relation to Bonner Matvei Grigoryevich was executed on 20/XII/1937." What decision was that? Why was it carried out ten days before the charges were filed? Did they first shoot him and then do the paperwork?

Besides these three cases, I read the file on Father's friend Alexei Konstantinovich Stolyarov. He was arrested because at the Party meeting in the summer of 1937 he said that he couldn't believe that Alikhanov was an enemy of the people. After that his comrades in the Party organization of the Red Professors Institute devoted several meetings to his past sins. He had visited a sick coworker, whose husband was later arrested. He had been at the institute but did not attend a rally calling for the death of either Marshal Tukhachevsky or someone else. He had not criticized Abram Deborin—the Marxist philosopher attacked by Stalin as a Menshevik Idealist—when this was demanded. And he dared to defend an arrested

man! He was expelled from the Party "for ties with enemies of the people and for deceiving the Party." At the moment of his arrest he was working as an accountant at a sewing factory. At his first interrogation he did not admit his guilt—he was accused of being in that same Trotskyite-rightist and espionage group as Father, even though he had nothing to do with the Comintern. At the second interrogation he admitted his guilt fully. But he was not shot. There is a copy of his autopsy in the file, which makes it clear that he died of beatings before trial. That's why he was not rehabilitated and "the case against Stolyarov was closed 9/13/54 for unsubstantiated charges." Alyosha Stolyarov, who lent me good books and then discussed them with me. Father's friend!

I read the files on many others who worked for the Comintern. They are all similar, astonishing in their identical style. At the first interrogation no one admits guilt. And in the second they all confess "fully." The period between the first and second interrogation lasts from two or three days to one to two months. It was almost six months for Father, and ten for Pyataisky. The transcripts of the confessions are all the same in content, varying only the countries for which they are said to be spying. And the language is strangely similar for people from different ethnic groups. And they all got the same sentence—execution by shooting. The trials lasted ten to fifteen minutes. The longest was Pyataisky's—twenty minutes. And in all the

notes on rehabilitation there is a fake date of death "while serving the sentence."

I am not naming names. The investigators also have children and grandchildren. And their victims—all of them, each and every one in the files I read—gave evidence against someone else. Mother's is the only file without such evidence—she didn't have a second interrogation. And she told me that they didn't beat her.

One more thing. I don't think the archives should be moved from where they were kept. They are in order there. But measures should be taken to keep them from being destroyed. I don't know how. But I do know that given our civic sloppiness, the simple transfer of the files from one place to another could lead to their destruction.

The recent history of our country is a total lie. Just look at my family—there are not only lies in the investigation files and the charges during the period of "violation of Soviet legality." There are also lies in the death certificates issued by registry offices during the period when "the cult of personality" was exposed and people were rehabilitated. The highest state officials also lied. During the months and years when Andrei Dmitriyevich Sakharov asked the fate of his papers—in 1988 and 1989—they were in fact being burned. Such were the lies of the perestroika era.

—translated by Antonina W. Buis

The Democratic Vista

Murray Kampion

Who Will Tell the People?
The Betrayal of American Democracy
by William Greider.
Simon and Schuster, 464 pp., \$25.00

Karl Marx's economic interpretation of history has fallen so far out of fashion that William Greider fairly startles us with how well its application can work in *Who Will Tell the People*. The rest of us sit numb with asking ourselves over and over, "What's wrong with the Democratic Party?" and Greider bobs up with an answer as plausible as it is simple: Nothing at all is wrong with the Democratic Party from the point of view of the cadre of Washington lawyers who are its government in exile.

The senior among them is Robert Strauss, universally recognized as "Mr. Democrat." Strauss's firm, Aklin, Gump, Greider observes, represents "everything from Drexel Burnham Lambert to the Motion Picture Association of America, from McDonnell Douglas to AT & T." Strauss is currently on leave as ambassador to Russia, doing his country honor and service as explorer of new economic frontiers.

An ascending junior is Tommy Boggs, son of Hale Boggs, the deceased former majority leader of the House. One ornament of Patton, Boggs and Blow is Ron Brown, chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Brown's elevation was popularly recognized as a mark of the new authority of

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June 25, 1992

Democrats of color. It seems to have been rather more significant as evidence of Tommy Boggs's increasing authority as a Democrat of power and profit. His new office has inhibited Brown's activities as lobbyist; but all the same, while Old Nippon was out-trading us and the congressional Democrats were threatening reprisals, Brown was on the Hill crying mercy for twenty-one Japanese electronics companies.

When Frank Lorenzo was breaking the machinists' union and ruining Eastern Airlines, David Sawyer, seasoned Democratic consultant, managed his advertising campaign; and Strauss and Boggs bore his briefs and helped him block a congressional bill to force his quarrel into mediation. Having been unashamed to help Lorenzo trample working people, Strauss and Boggs were unembarrassed to repair to bankruptcy court and collect their share of \$12 million in legal fees for helping wreck Eastern.

Strauss and Boggs are old stagers in the Washington bar's Democratic cadre. Stuart Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter's domestic policy adviser, is newer to their mercenary troop but has found in its foragings a sovereign cure for his defeated liberal wounds.

Eizenstat, Greider informs us, represented the National Association of Manufacturers in its efforts to weaken "a workers' right-to-know law on toxic chemicals" and upheld Public Service Indiana's struggle against over-intrusive acid rain legislation

with so much agility of address that Public Service Indiana rewarded him with a seat as a director.

When he is not employed at the public woe, Eizenstat does his voluntary bit for the public weal by writing speeches for the Democratic Speaker of the House and the Democratic majority leader of the Senate.

The collective expression of Straussism, Boggsism, and Eizenstatism is the Democratic Leadership Council, which is financed by ARCO, Dow Chemical, Prudential Bache etc. The DLC's aim is to persuade the party to return to the mainstream of American politics, i.e., to where its corporate patrons feed and fec distinguished counsel.

The DLC's preferred presidential candidate is Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas, a longstanding associate. It would be ridiculous to belabor Clinton for this choice of guiding light: Where else does hope reside in our politics when Republicans and Democrats alike get 70 percent of their campaign funds from corporate PACs in dolings serenely bipartisan? Political commentators a while ago discarded the economic interpretation of history; otherwise they might be less puzzled to notice how few voters have even bothered with the Democratic primaries. The simplest answer is a question: Why should ordinary voters care when they can't see any more difference between Republicans and Democrats than the corporate PACs do? □

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The Washington Post

September 8, 1993, Wednesday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 2754 words

HEADLINE: Russian Youth Consign 'Soviet Man' to Dustbin

SERIES: SCARS OF COMMUNISM, Part 4 of 4

BYLINE: Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Foreign Service

DATELINE: KOMSOMOLSK-ON-AMUR, Russia

BODY

The exploits of Ivan Sidorenko and his bride, Dusha, quickly became the stuff of Soviet legend. After a month-long journey from European Russia, by the Trans-Siberian Railroad and then by boat, the two young idealists reached a desolate spot on the banks of the Amur River where -- on May 10, 1932 -- they laid the foundation stone for a new socialist city.

The communist utopia that Ivan and Dusha hoped to carve out of the virgin taiga of the Soviet Far East is now a sprawling, smog-filled industrial wasteland. Named in honor of the Communist Party youth movement, Komsomolsk-on-Amur has one of the highest crime rates in the former Soviet Union. Its factories, which include several huge defense plants, are on the verge of bankruptcy. Its half-million inhabitants are, for the most part, disillusioned and bitter.

"My grandparents thought they were building communism. Of course this was all nonsense," said Olga Sidorenko, 18, who was born and raised in Komsomolsk. "To live here is like committing slow suicide. The only reason we don't move away is because there is nowhere else to go."

A student in computer studies at the Komsomolsk technical college, Olga says she "respects" her grandfather Ivan, who died a hero's death in 1942, defending the city of Stalingrad from Nazi invaders. But she is barely on speaking terms with her grandmother, Dusha, now 82, who was showered with honors as one of the "first builders" of Komsomolsk and lives a few blocks away. Their points of view are just too different.

This is the final article in a series examining the legacy of communism, an ideology that, from the center of Europe to the Pacific Ocean, has left political, environmental and psychological scars that will almost certainly haunt Russia and its neighbors well into the next century. Based on a week-long visit to Komsomolsk, one of a handful of Soviet cities that are the pure products of the communist era, this story looks at the results of the most ambitious ideological experiment of all -- the attempt to create a new type of

"Soviet Man."

Built at the height of the Stalinist terror, Komsomolsk was out of bounds to foreign visitors until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Today, the city that was regarded by Soviet ideologists as a laboratory for the construction of a communist society is attempting to break out of six decades of enforced isolation. It has been a frustrating, jarring experience, tinged with a hope -- particularly among younger people -- that life will eventually improve.

"You have to remember that there were always two iron curtains," said Oleg Mospak, 38, a journalist who recently launched a newspaper, Komsomolsk Entrepreneur, that specializes in classified ads. "There was the Iron Curtain around the Soviet Bloc and then there was a second iron curtain around places like Komsomolsk. We lived in a closed city within a closed country."

Ironically, the type of human being that has emerged from this sociopolitical laboratory has turned out to be almost the precise opposite of the type the ideologists had in mind. The communists strove to create a country of true believers, members of a disciplined collective dedicated to carrying out the egalitarian ideas of Marx and Lenin. Instead, they produced a generation of cynics who regard the state as a hostile, utterly alien body and are interested only in their own private happiness.

"My generation doesn't believe in anything -- Lenin, God or anything else," said Olga Sidorenko. "We don't expect anything at all from the state. We know that if we want to make a success of our lives, we will have to rely only on ourselves."

"For the earlier generation, ideals were important, but now it's quite the opposite," said Sergei Basharin, 20, a third-year student at the Komsomolsk technical college. "We are just interested in finding ways of achieving a comfortable standard of living -- to have an apartment, a car, to be able to start a family."

Prisoners and Peasants

A portrait of her dead husband stares down from the wall of Dusha Sidorenko's apartment in the center of Komsomolsk. A stern-looking figure dressed in military uniform, Ivan Sidorenko was held up to generations of local schoolchildren as a model Soviet citizen. Streets and schools have been named in honor of the fallen Bolshevik.

According to Soviet propaganda booklets, Sidorenko's early exploits included the Stakhanovite achievement of mixing 937 loads of cement in a single shift as commander of the 1st Komsomol Red Guard Crack Battalion in Ukraine. This was almost double the official target, earning Sidorenko what the propagandists described as "worldwide fame." Such was Sidorenko's devotion to communist ideals that -- after marrying the bright-eyed Dusha at age 25 -- he immediately established a commune.

"There were five families living in the same house, which we built together. We shared everything, including clothes. If you needed some boots, you put on the first pair that fit," recalled Dusha, whose father and grandfather both perished in the Russian Civil War of 1920-22. "Okay, things didn't turn out the way we expected, but I don't regret anything. We gave everything we had to the

movement. We worked day and night for an ideal. We all believed in Lenin."

Sidorenko and his comrades were glorified by the Soviet state for more than half a century as the "first builders" of Komsomolsk. It took the collapse of communism to reveal that the myth was largely a lie. The propaganda pictures of brigades of enthusiastic young communists deliberately concealed a much bigger army of convicts and political prisoners. There is some evidence that these slave laborers actually prepared the ground for the arrival of the "first builders."

"Practically everything that was written in those history books was untrue," said Sidorenko's daughter-in-law, Tamara, whose own parents were among the millions denounced as "enemies of the state." Arguments over the falsification of history are one of the main reasons why Tamara, 48, and her daughter, Olga, now have little to do with Dusha. Vasily Sidorenko, Tamara's husband and Ivan and Dusha's son, died several years ago.

According to recently published documents, Komsomolsk was one of the centers of the vast prison camp system known as the gulag. In the two decades between 1933 and 1953, when Joseph Stalin died, nearly a million people passed through the camps in the Komsomolsk region. Hundreds of thousands died as the result of disease and malnutrition.

The other principal source of labor for the construction of the gigantic defense factories, pompous public buildings and squalid apartment blocks of Komsomolsk was the peasantry. Robbed of their land during the collectivization drive of the early '30s, the former peasants streamed into the cities in search of work. Paid starvation wages, they were in effect part of the forced labor system.

"At public rallies, the Komsomol members kept on boasting that they had built the city. There was never a word about us. We were nothing but slaves. Komsomolsk was built by prisoners and former peasants, like me," said Fyodor Boltov, 69, who has vivid memories of the terrible winter of 1931-32, when the Bolsheviks threw him and his family out of their house and confiscated their four cows and seven horses.

The story of Boltov's family is itself a minor epic, one of the millions of individual stories that make up the tragic tapestry of modern Soviet history. Two of his eight brothers were killed during the first wave of violence against the peasants. Another two died of starvation during the famine that followed the collectivization campaign. Boltov himself served four years in prison for stealing a handful of grain. His father was arrested as an "enemy of the people."

"They promised us a bright, wonderful future. We waited and waited, but it never came," said Boltov, who bottled up his hatred of the communist system, keeping his experiences a secret even from his son until just a few years ago. "Later, they wanted me to join the [Communist] party. But this would have been a betrayal of all those who died -- and I refused. How could people like me believe in the ideals of this society when so much force was used against us?"

The 'Lost Generation'

Born in 1945, as Soviet troops were sweeping toward Berlin, Tamara Sidorenko

belongs to what is sometimes referred to as the "lost generation." These are the people who were too young to experience the full force of Stalinism -- with its mixture of terror and idealism -- but too old to shake themselves free of the Soviet collective mentality. They were brought up to believe in communism, only to discover that it was a false god.

"You can put a cross on our generation," said Tamara, a teacher at a local high school. "We were completely dependent on our parents. They told us what we could do and what we couldn't do. They never told us what happened during the Terror. Even so, we grew up in an atmosphere of fear. We were afraid of everything. It never occurred to us to try to challenge the system. As far as we were concerned, it was unchangeable."

Unlike Germany, where Nazism collapsed as a result of a military debacle, Russia had to pay the price of victory in World War II. Undeclared on the battlefield, the communists remained in power for another 45 years, using the vast natural resources of the world's largest country to prop up an increasingly bankrupt system. It was not until nature and people were brought to the brink of total exhaustion that the entire totalitarian edifice came crashing down.

For the "lost generation," the realization that the Soviet system let them down is a comparatively recent one. It is the result of the campaign of glasnost, or openness, launched by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s in his unsuccessful attempt to reinvigorate the country's faltering economy. The scorn for the system is expressed by the Russian slang expression Sovok, which sounds like "Soviet" but means "dustpan" in normal language.

A Sovok is "Soviet Man" -- not as the ideologists conceived him, but as he actually turned out. A Sovok is lazy, irresponsible and submissive, the passive receptacle of decades of Soviet propaganda. Outwardly respectful of authority, a Sovok will think nothing of stealing from the state or cheating his neighbor. A Sovok is everything Russians despise about themselves. The Soviet Union may have collapsed, but middle-aged Russians say it is impossible to rid themselves completely of the Sovok mentality.

"I still feel the Sovok psychology -- the narrow-mindedness, the lack of freedom, the bitter disappointment, the feeling that life has passed us by, that we have been cheated," said Alexander Markov, 42, the editor of Komsomolsk Entrepreneur. "We were convinced that our country was the best place on Earth, that the Americans wanted to bomb us. All this was hammered into us from an early age. We sincerely believed."

In most cases, the discovery that communist ideology was a fraud led to cynicism. Occasionally, however, it produced the opposite extreme -- a complete rejection of socialist ideals. Vladimir Barishev, for example, graduated from a police academy in 1980 as a fanatical believer in Marxism-Leninism. Dispatched to Komsomolsk for practical training, he seemed set for a brilliant career as a police investigator. The gulf between the theory of police school and the reality of life in the crime capital of the Soviet Far East shocked him.

"I became a victim of my own convictions. When I found out about crime in high places, they told me to mind my own business. When I complained that prisoners were being used as a source of cheap labor, they said I was too inquisitive," said Barishev, 33, who now works as a public defender at a very

low salary. "I believed blindly in Gorbachev, but eventually I understood that the system cannot be reformed."

Barishev's idealism has cost him dearly. If he had stayed in the police, he would probably have his own apartment by now. Instead, he lives with his wife and two children in a 9-by-12-foot rented room in a communal apartment.

No Politics, Please

Age 10 when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Olga Sidorenko belongs to the first generation of Russians to be raised in an atmosphere of freedom. By the time she went to high school, teachers no longer felt the need to lie to their pupils. At home, parents no longer felt compelled to hide the truth about the Stalinist terror. Hers is the first generation not to know fear.

"Fear?" Olga asked incredulously, when a visitor suggested that old ways of thinking would take a long time to die. "What is there to be afraid of?"

If there is a cause for moderate optimism about the future of Russia as it emerges from seven decades of totalitarian rule, it is in the attitudes of the new generation of Russians. Hopes of a swift transition from dictatorship to democracy have been dashed by economic turmoil and ethnic upheavals. It is now clear that real change in Russia -- and the rest of the former communist world, for that matter -- will be a generational change.

Their parents and grandparents may feel bitter or nostalgic about the past. But what is most striking about the new Russians is precisely the absence of nostalgia, the mistrust of great ideas and great experiments. Just as their shattering defeat in World War II inoculated a generation of Germans against the ideas of Hitler's National Socialism, self-inflicted economic disaster seems to have persuaded a new generation of Russians to turn its back on utopia.

Both the far right and the far left have made great efforts to persuade young people that democracy is unsuited to Russia's autocratic traditions. So far, however, they appear to have had little success. A recent opinion poll of the 21-29 age group showed that only 7.5 percent have any sympathy with the national-patriotic and communist groups that dream of reviving a great empire. Most young Russians are completely apolitical.

"As soon as someone begins a conversation about politics in our institute, everybody else turns away in disgust," said Olga Sidorenko, echoing a widespread opinion. "None of the present politicians is worth voting for. Yeltsin promised us a lot, but he too has given us very little."

If there is a sense of yearning among young people, it is a yearning for a normal life. "My parents slaved all day for a pittance and ended up with nothing. I want to live better than they did," is a typical comment.

A native of St. Petersburg, Sergei Basharin enrolled at the Komsomolsk technical college to study aeronautics. A few years ago, he would have automatically found a prestigious job at the Komsomolsk Aviation Factory, which used to churn out Su-27s, one of the Soviet Union's most sophisticated fighter jets. But the factory has fallen on hard times and will soon be laying off workers.

"I now realize that there is no future in plane-building," said Basharin, who plans to go into "business" when he leaves college next year. Through a series of clever trading deals, the 20-year-old student already earns more money than both his parents. He buys clothing at relatively low prices in European Russia and sells it for a high markup in the Far East.

The pragmatism and sense of initiative displayed by budding entrepreneurs like Basharin are impressive. But there is a darker side to the youthful obsession with making money. In their hankering for a Western standard of living, many youngsters are willing to engage in semi-criminal activities. In the cutthroat world of Russian business, in which traders outnumber producers 10 to 1, profit is frequently little different from extortion.

"There is no set of strict moral codes any more," said Masha Volkenstein, 40, a Moscow-based sociologist, who is otherwise encouraged by the spirit of tolerance among young people. "There is a criminal element in much of this commercial activity. To be successful frequently means to get involved with the racket, and that is worrying."

For the new entrepreneurs spawned by Russia's chaotic lurch toward capitalism, however, the gift of freedom is more important than the fear of anarchy.

"Marx insisted that everybody had to be equal. He did not give people the right to fail," said Mospak, the founder of Komsomolsk Entrepreneur. "Now we have the right to fail or to succeed. It's up to us. This is an idea that is entirely new in our society."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, FYODOR BOLTOV, WITH HIS GRANDDAUGHTER, HOLDS FAMILY PHOTOS. DURING COMMUNIST ANTI-PEASANT VIOLENCE IN THE 1930S, BOLTOV WAS JAILED, FOUR OF HIS BROTHERS DIED, AND HIS FATHER WAS ARRESTED. LUCIAN PERKINS; MAP, BRAD WYE

TYPE: FOREIGN NEWS, SERIES

SUBJECT: U.S.S.R.; TEENAGERS (AGE 13-20); COMMUNISM; SOCIALISM; ECONOMIC INDICATORS; TIME AND HISTORY; POLITICS

ORGANIZATION: RUSSIA

BY ANDREW SOLOMON

Photographs by Gueorgui Pinkhassov

TRAVELING IN RUSSIA RECENTLY AS a writer, I came quickly to feel like a spy — not a foreign agent for America, but a spy for each emerging social class to the others. Members of the Russian mafia — the organized-crime circle — were fascinated to hear that intellectuals think the criminal class exerts social influence. The intelligentsia were obsessed with the greed of the new rich businessmen, whom they blame for the end of heroic idealism. A return to the Orthodox Church has left homosexuals worried about repressive neo-conservatism; nightclub owners are wondering whether the artists who flourished underground can survive in the new daylight. Politicians wonder whether power will remain in the hands of government or will devolve to these chaotic elements. Within all these social strata, the changes are most clear among members of the younger generation.

Overall, their outlook is harsh indeed. According to an article in the mainstream newspaper Argumenty i Fakty in April, "Young Russian malcontents are considering suicide every second." One-third want to leave the country. Since 1989, the birth rate has dropped 30 percent, as discouraged young people choose not to have children. Even so, some young Russians are plunging ahead with often-decadent abandon to find freedom, wealth and power, defying the timidity, and idealism, of the older generation.

Those making remarkable lives for themselves, the minority that falls outside these depressing statistics, have broken up into hundreds of different *tusovki*, a colloquial word that mixes the ideas of "clique," "scene" and "social circle." In this world, the Wild West mentality of 19th-century America mixes with a decadence reminiscent of Berlin between the wars. These *tusovki* are divided by gulfs of ignorance. Only someone from the outside can move

Andrew Solomon is the author of "The Irony Tower: Soviet Artists in a Time of Glasnost."

SQUATTERS' RIGHTS

Petlyura's place, right, is a center for lost souls. Petlyura is flanked by Pani Bronya and her husband, who thinks he's Lenin.

TOUGH GUYS

A couple of mafia sorts, below, use their car to stake a claim to a Moscow street.




Young Russ

Some sex, more drugs and a

... look like magazine July 18, 1993





a's Defiant Decadence

satiable lust for money and power in the brave new post-communal world.

easily from group to group, reporting to one what is happening in another. It's a shame that Russians can't do this more easily, because the essential truths about the new Russia lie not in the behavior or beliefs of any one group, but in the very diversity of vision, opinion and goals now rising from the wreckage of Communism.

RAVES, PARTIES AND NIGHTCLUBS

WE ARE GOING TO A RAVE, Kristall II, at the big St. Petersburg ice-skating rink. Beforehand, we visit Viktor Frolov, debonair man-about-town, who is loosely connected to the party's organizers. There are a pop singer, a few artists, some models, a film actress and others without clearly defined jobs. The women are all attractive and are wearing Western-type makeup and retro-chic clothes. The men have leather jackets. Frolov is an eminently courteous host. Everyone must have several drinks and get high before we go: hashish, now available only for hard currency, is expensive, but whereas it used to be difficult to procure, it is today always available for anyone with money. Some take mushrooms, easily found in the woods around Petersburg. Some do cocaine to prepare for the long night. Earlier this year, customs officers seized a shipment of the drug that had arrived in Petersburg disguised as detergent. Television news showed officials confiscating this cargo; three days later, every dealer had it in bulk.

At around 2 A.M. we drive to the rink. There are about 2,500 people there. The sound system is turned up; there is live music by a visiting Dutch band and relentless, recorded techno-music. There is an elaborate laser show. Half of the rink has been boarded over to make a dance floor. On the other half, people are skating. In the grandstands, people smoke more hash or pass out on the seats. From the bar in the corner, people buy big cups of vodka. We are on the wrong side of the Neva, and at night the bridges go up; we will not be able to get home until they go down again at 6 A.M. Everyone agrees that raves are no longer "in" — no trend can last more than a year — but members of every fashionable tusovka have nonetheless come this evening. "The craze is over," explains Georgi Guryanov, a painter. "But there's nothing else to do."

There is a 10 to 20 percent mafia contingent. Everyone knows who the mafia people are. They will get a share of the profits from this party; every club or bar or party in Russia pays the mafia between 20 percent and 60 percent of their revenue. "In your country, you have taxes," someone explains. "And we have this system."

The rave scene in Russia began with the First

Gagarin party on Dec. 14, 1991, organized by Yevgeny Birman and Aleksei Haas. Held at the Cosmos Pavilion at VDNKh, the ultimate Stalinist temple to the socialist state, it attracted more than 4,000 people. "The First Gagarin was amazing because everyone was so hungry for it," explains Birman, who has since organized other major parties. "We're trying to mix the semiotic in this post-modern world and bring these different tusovki together. It's about auto-eroticism and an absolute beauty code, which we never had in the Soviet period."


Birman is boyish, exuberant and fun; Haas has a cosmopolitan professionalism and a hard self-assurance before which Madonna might quail. I chat with him in his Moscow apartment near Red Square while his American wife prepares dinner. "The First Gagarin's budget was \$12,000," he explains. "We had to pay for security, music, D.J.'s, rent, firemen. We gave the mafia 20 percent" — a low figure, achieved, it is clear, by sharp negotiations — "and we didn't make a profit. But I proved to myself that these people did exist in Moscow. I went out in my car in the weeks before the party, and when I saw the right kind of people, I gave them invitations. I invited 1,000 friends for free. We ran TV ads on the day of the party; they were in English, to select the audience." The First Gagarin was unlike anything ever before seen in Moscow. Lasers bounced off the rich architecture; Western disk jockeys played the latest music; the crowd was incredibly sophisticated.

Haas plans to open a club in the autumn. "You come in from the provinces to Moscow," he explains. "You want to do something. You're ambitious, you're young. What do you see? Success is in the hands of these big mafiosi driving expensive cars, with pretty girls around them. It's dark energy, evil. I want to start a club for light energy, a place for clean people with good bodies and smart minds. You can't win people over to light energy by being a hippie. I want a club for ambitious people with success written all over them. I'm not going to have alcohol there: it makes people retreat into the fog, and our lives are foggy enough. I'm going to have the best sound system and the best music and amazing D.J.'s. And the price will be really low. That's democracy, it's for everyone, it's for the new Russia."

I WANT TO SEE THE CLUBS OF MOSCOW. I mention five names to Vladik Mamyshev-Monroe, a Marilyn impersonator and hero of Russian pirate television. "Mafia, prostitutes, a few businessmen," he says. I ask about Diskoteka Lise, the biggest in Moscow. "Oh, no," he says. "Even in America you must have these places, full of heavy middle-aged Georgian women with bleached hair, blue eye shadow and Lurex tank tops, shimmying out of time to old Debbie Harry songs."

After trying a few really dreadful places — at one, three bananas and three drinks cost \$95 — I am in despair.

BUT IN MID-APRIL, I GO TO THE PAINTER Sveta Vickers's new club in the Hermitage Theater, where I find members of the artistic-bohemian tusovka, with people from television, some actors, painters, conceptualists and intellectuals. The club has been put together on a relatively limited budget. There is a big room in front with tables and chairs where people can drink and talk; in the theater itself there is a dance floor. I run into more than 100 people I know within my first half-hour at Sveta's; there are no strangers here. "I would be happy to come every night," says Tanya Didenko, a musicologist and host of the voguish late-night television music-talk show Silence Number Nine. Arisha Grantseva, an artist, is holding court at a table in the corner; painters come by to say hello, and M. C. Pavlov, a rapper, drums out time on the back of his chair. I see Alika Smekhova, a film actress, and Alla Mitrofanova, a Petersburg art critic. I meet a Bulgarian-Swiss performance artist



SHOW AND TELL

The performance artist Garik Vinogradov, above, has a soothing, almost hypnotic effect on his audience.


SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Aydan Salakhova, left, is a gallery owner with a mission: to show Russians with money what is beautiful.

SUPERCOOL

"First teach the people to be human," says the rapper M. C. Pavlov, "and then maybe you can start on politics."





and a Greek architect. Vladik Mamyshev-Monroe says it's clearly the only decent club in town. I even spot Aleksei Haas on the far side of the room. The club has not advertised at all; everyone knows of it by word of mouth.

Sveta, at the center of it all, laughs. "You know," she says, "I have two big advantages over these other people who are running clubs. In the first place, none of them are Jewish! And in the second place, none of them are mothers!"

The pleasure of Sveta's club lies in something Russian, something I have never encountered in a club in the West. It lies in visionary, exuberant love, which you feel all over the place, as tangible as the decoration or the music. "We know how to enjoy," a young painter says to me. "We grew up with the image of our parents suffering together. The legacy of that communal pain of the bohemian world is strong in us, and it makes our joy palpable."

I GO WITH SOME FRIENDS TO VISIT PETLYURA for the first time. Near Pushkinskaya, on Petrovsky Boulevard, we come to what appears to be a construction site. One of our party heaves a shoulder against a hidden door, and we enter a large

courtyard, dominated by a 30-foot-high copy of Vladimir Tatlin's construction "Monument to the Third International." "This is it," someone whispers to me. This building, once the home of a nobleman, later divided into communal apartments, is now Petlyura's squat. It is a fine example of Russian 19th-century architecture, a pale yellow neo-classical building, appallingly decrepit.

We go into an entryway and down a hallway painted in black with silver graffiti. We knock on a door. It flies open at once, and from within come the sounds of Tibetan monks chanting, and a heavy smell, sweet and acid, of decay and vodka and ethyl spirits. We can see six people sitting around a table and drinking. "We've come to see Petlyura," we say.

One of the group, the performance artist Garik Vinogradov, agrees to show the way. We walk through a large dance hall, now empty, to a bar. The walls are covered with a giant collage that includes old Soviet models, Barbara Bush, men in trench coats smoking obscure brands of cigarettes, Audrey Hepburn and the Sistine Madonna. At one end, there is a blackboard announcing prices. Along the walls, instead of banquettes, there are broken television sets and small tables. Lounging on one of the televi-





sions is a man about five feet tall, with a Leninish goatee, wearing bright red trousers and a big shapeless crimson jacket; gathered around him are a hodgepodge of young men and women.

"Come in, sit down," Petlyura says.

Petlyura's place has become a sort of haven for lost souls. People who have run away from home, have had problems with drugs, are wandering in this new post-glasnost world with no sense of direction come to Petlyura's and find a community and a way of life there. "Everyone carries on about glasnost," says Petlyura, disdainfully. "So before we were slaves to the Communists and the K.G.B. And now to the democrats and capitalists. It's still a hollow sham. My place is an escape from all that."

There are currently 34 people living in Petlyura's place. Petlyura was brought up in an orphanage, and this background has served him well: everyone has assigned duties on rotating schedules. The residents must do their share of scrubbing and cooking and serving. "It's like the military," Moscow critics say; "more like a kibbutz," replies Petlyura. Who can stay and for how long is a matter decided by Petlyura alone. "They are all my rules," he says, "and whoever doesn't like them is free to go elsewhere." The

mascot of his house is a demented ethnically Polish woman dwarf of about 65 called Pani Bronya, who is always in evidence; her husband, who believes that he is Lenin, stands guard outside.

The second time I go to Petlyura's, Lenin is wandering around the courtyard in uniform. Inside, people are gathering: about a dozen are drinking at the bar. A room next door has been transformed into a "boutique," and racks of old Soviet clothes are for sale at very low prices. The people pouring into shop are dressed in a sort of thrift-shop chic and have a slightly punky manner.

We go to Vinogradov's part of the squat, where a performance is taking place of "experimental" music that involves a lot of chanting, some black light and incense. Then we go to see an exhibition of work by one of the squat's residents, who has done a series of paintings called "Untold Fairytales," which shows zebras and giraffes floating on icebergs in an Arctic landscape. "I'd never really thought about art," she says, "until I came here about two months ago."

Petlyura's is the best and most interesting of these places, but there are other squats with other tusovki with bars and dance halls. Every Wednesday, there's dancing at the Third Path, on the far side

of the river; I try to go one evening, but am told that it's having a few weeks off because "the violence has been getting out of hand." Violence? "Mafia hooligans," the man at the door tells me. I look around at the destruction. "There's nothing to steal here," he says. "We have nothing." And he closes the door.

THE LIFE OF THE MIND

EVERYONE IN RUSSIA SEEMS TO BE starting a magazine. There are literally thousands of new magazines, mostly made with photocopiers (access to which was restricted under Communism): some are commercial, but most are not. They are about a particular subject — microbiology, business advice, fashion, the arts. Most have a circulation of between 50 and 500.

Perhaps the most impressive at the moment is Kabinet, the brainchild of a group of Petersburg intellectuals. Each quarterly issue contains several hundred pages of dense philosophical text, translations of Western criticism, satirical essays and sharp cultural commentary; each is designed by a different Petersburg artist.

I attend a staff meeting of the magazine, held in the Arabian salon of an 18th-century palace, where the artist Timur Novikov currently has an exhibition of textile pieces. The lights are low, and Eastern music plays in the background. The editors of Kabinet — Viktor Mazin and Oleissa Turkhina — read aloud a brilliantly provocative dialogue "in the style of Plato" about Timur's work. The company of 25 includes Timur; Irina Kuksinaite, artist, actress and Vogue model, who has just opened an exhibition in a palace nearby; Georgi Guryanov, painter; Yevgeny Birman, organizer of raves, and other intellectual-social trendies.

After the reading, the company smokes hash and drinks Crimean Sherry while debating the merits of Mazin's translation of Paul de Man on the Hegelian sublime. Mazin explains to me that he has translated several books of critical theory recently, without thought of publication, because he wants to share them with his friends. Irina Kuksinaite talks about the semiotic distinctions between the German concept of fatherland and the Russian concept of motherland. Others ask me about Lacanian revisionism in America, and discuss the validity of the Stalinist apologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whom they are translating for the next issue. Then we get onto the subject of the rave that night, who will go, what to wear and what the music is going to be.

In Moscow, at the end of a dinner party, a young philologist recites Greek futurist poems of the 30's. Another guest responds with Mayakovsky. I say that this is unusual dinner-party behavior by American standards. "But how, then, do you sustain an oral poetic tradition?" an architect asks softly.

ROCK, POP AND RAP

THROUGHOUT THE 70'S AND THE EARLY 80's, the lyrics to songs by Akvarium, Kino or Boris Grebenshchikov gave information about a better way of life to Soviet people. Rock music was heroic, the performers closely tied to the intelligentsia. Pop musicians represented official culture; their music was often on the radio, but their popularity was suspect and usually artificial.

I see Boris Grebenshchikov, who is about to release a new album. His records once sold in the millions; he now expects to sell 15,000 or 20,000. "It's time for Russian pop now," Irina Kuksinaite says, "because all anyone wants is dollars and muscles."

In Moscow, I spend an evening with Artvorn

sian National Television. "When I was younger," he says (he is now 38), "the situation was incredibly simple. They were black and we were white. We stood for vitality and goodness in a society that was flaccid and evil. Young people choose the simplest thing. For us, the simplest thing was to be moral; today, the simplest thing is to live well. In my day, you were marginal because the system gave you no other options, and you expressed your politics with rock. Now, if you want to be in politics, no one is stopping you. It's not forbidden; it's just sickening. But you can't very well sing about that."

This helps to explain the vapidness of the new Russian pop — repetitive tunes, lyrics beyond fluff. One of this year's most popular songs goes: "You are a stewardess named Yana. You are adorable and wantable. You are my favorite stewardess." Most new Russian music is an inept compound of Western ideas. Bogdan Titomir — male sex symbol of Russia, hero of teeny-boppers — has a video that features a kickline of Russian boys dressed in American football uniforms and helmets trying to dance like Michael Jackson. The Russian record industry has been destroyed by economic liberalization; only the lucky few can afford records, and the profits for singers like Titomir come from endless concert tours. Titomir is out of town when I am in Moscow, but I hear about his life style, big car, managers, tours. "Does Bogdan get mobbed when he walks down the street?" I ask one of his friends. "Bogdan," I am told, "does not walk down the street."

The managers for the big pop stars are all tied to the mafia. "I get bribes pushed at me all the time," says Troitsky. "People offer hundreds of dollars to get a video shown once. The man with my job at one of the commercial channels got murdered a few weeks ago. I don't take bribes — it's part of my old-fashioned heroic mentality — so I've only had my life threatened once. The managers drop like flies."

I have dinner with the rapper M.C. Pavlov, whom I remember from his days in the rock band



Zvuki Mu. Pavlov keeps out of the serious pop scene, but his new band is making videos, and his records are out; his concerts are increasingly popular, and even Titomir has admitted that he is the only true rap artist in the country. "I wouldn't mind becoming nationally famous," he says, "but I don't want to get into crime. Corporate sponsorship would be good." Pavlov is for the cultural elite, the supercool; he played at the First Gagarin party, where the nationally famous Titomir was in the crowd.

"Heroic Russian rock," Pavlov says, "was for listening to like a political speech, but it wasn't for dancing. We wanted to bring some fun into this country. We do some rap and some house and some R&B and some jazz." All these forms are popular

PARTY ANIMALS

Viktor Frolov, man about St. Petersburg, and friends, above, revving up for a night on the town. From left: Valera Katsuba, Frolov (seated), Alisa Leonova and Vladik Manyshv-Monroe.

MOVER AND SHAKER

A bandful of people under 40 are defining the younger voice in Russian politics, including Sergei B. Stankevich, left.

LA-DI-DA

A nontraditional fashion show, held at a golf course in Moscow.

gamated Russian music that is based on Western ideas yet unlike anything heard in the West. "We're not black," says Pavlov. "Nor red. We're white." He is tall with blue eyes and shaved head, and he is wearing a little square hat and loose-fitting rapper clothes, a few rings and a few ethnic necklaces. "We're not from the 'hood. We know that. We're not interested in being political like American rap or Russian rock; we don't want to sing about the unavailability of sausages in the shops. We rap mostly in English, because rap in Russian sounds stupid. I kind of make up a language. English words and Russian grammar. People mostly don't even know what our lyrics are."

Pavlov's music is danceable, with strong rhythms and good mixes. He has a kind of plausible funkiness that is not often found in Russia. "I guess if we have some concerns to get across, they're spiritual rather than political. We're vegetarian, antiviolence, antidrugs, antidrink, into pure souls. We follow the teachings of Buddha. People from the West worry about Russian politics, but we're not up to that yet. First teach the people to be human, then maybe you can start on politics."

That night, I have dinner with the Moscow painter Sergei Volkov. "You know this has no roots at all in our culture," he says, "and it makes no sense here. To see these young people trying to imitate American rappers — it's as incredible to me as it would be to you if you went up to Harlem one day and found everyone there dressed as Ukrainian dancers and strumming on balalaikas."

THE GAY 90'S

GAY LIFE IN RUSSIA IS SOMEWHAT better than it was. Even without sodomy laws, "only those creepy activists actually go and talk about their sexuality all over the place," a gay friend says. "And they do it only for

Katsuba, a St. Petersburg journalist, says. "I know that's the fashion in the West, but though I may choose to sleep mostly with gay men, that doesn't mean I want to socialize primarily with them."

This year, James Baldwin's "Giovanni's Room" was published in Russia. The film "Longtime Companion" was shown on television, paid for by a private sponsor. "I was visiting my family in the small town in Belarus where I grew up," says Katsuba. "And we were watching television, and suddenly this film came on. 'Look,' my mother said, 'it's about homosexuals.' I was surprised she even knew the word. I asked her what she thought, and she said, 'If they're happy, it's all right with me.' Ten years ago, no one would have said that."

"Most people here," some straight and gay friends agree, "have bigger questions on their minds. Is the Russian Federation about to fall apart? Is the mafia running the whole country? Will I be able to pay for food next month? Whether other men are sleeping with men — really, no one could care less."

I spend an afternoon with Kevin Gardner, an American AIDS activist in Moscow. "There are many gay groups," he says, "a special body of gay hearing-impaired, several gay dating services, lots of gay newspapers. You see gay personal ads even in mainstream newspapers. There's a gay theater group, and there's something called the Rainbow Foundation for the Social Rehabilitation of Gays and Lesbians. Pamyat" — a neo-fascist group — "is still very antigay, but the tide is definitely toward liberalization, at least in the big cities. And gays do come flooding into Moscow. There's still a lot of self-hatred, a lot of depression, a lot of suicide. I've been trying to build a community center, but gays here are still too involved in their other life definitions."

A friend says: "I get my sense of community elsewhere. Russians are very romantic people, but we're not really very sexual. Intolerance drives people to suicide, but tolerance isn't going to draw us into this Western fantasy of gay subculture and life style."

KEEPING THE FAITH

I GO TO CHURCH IN ST. PETERSBURG, TO Izmailovsky Cathedral, which was used as a silo by the Soviet Government. It has been cleaned and restored, and services take place again. The congregation includes a small grouping of young people. "I come for esthetic reasons," one tells me. "I think our Orthodox religion is very beautiful, but of course I don't believe in it."

Others do believe. In Moscow, I spend an afternoon with Masha Ovchinnikova, an artist in her late 20's whose work has great religious meaning. "The church is my life," she says. "The only important thing there is. We have lost the purity we had in the pre-glasnost period. Then you had to suffer to belong to the church; only true believers came. Now people are joining the church in huge numbers. A few are really inspired with faith, but most come because they mistake the philosophy of the church for ideology. They expected ideology as children, knew it from their parents, and in our system, in which all ideology has been damaged and compromised, they turn to the church. But they come without understanding, hoping only to be given absolute dictates. It is the tragedy of our church. These people have confused doctrine with totalitarianism." Such people also have been the first to be won by the tides of American evangelists who have been sweeping across Russia lately, running large, vulgar advertisements, promising answers to the questions of a sick society.


The Orthodox Church excluded itself from Russian politics and life during the Communist period. "I was baptized at 19," Ovchinnikova explains. "I had always seen myself as outside of my society: it was like a kind of autism. The people within the church had never adapted themselves to social interaction. The new people who have come to the church are



the attention they get from the West; activism occurs here because Westerners put Russians up to it. My good friends know that I'm gay, but it's my private business. I'm not interested in telling everyone that I like to sleep with men."

This seems to be the general view. Even celebrities who are obviously gay do not admit it in public contexts. Timur Novikov has worked on gay subjects for years. Privately, he says that part of the pleasure of homosexuality is its secrecy; interviewed on television, he denies any suggestion that he might be gay. Sergei Penkin, a pop singer who is sometimes called the Russian Boy George, has performed often in Moscow's one gay club; but he, too, on television, says he is straight.

"I don't want to be part of a subculture," Valera



EDITORIAL VOICES

The intellectuals who put out the journal Kabinet meet in an 18th-century palace, above. In the doorway, from left: Viktor Mazin, Irina Kuksinaite, Oleissa Turkhina and Afrika.

TRUE BELIEVER

"The church is my life," says the artist Masha Ovchinnikova, left, "the only important thing there is."

MARILYN, MY MARILYN

Vladik Mamyshev-Monroe as Marilyn Monroe, right, at a party in Moscow. Remember how he looked in St. Petersburg? See page 20.



mostly those with no economic satisfaction or pleasure in their private lives. They come to the church because the church does not value these things, without understanding what the church does value."

Some new members of the church have made it a cornerstone of a very unattractive right-wing nationalism. "The church must not involve itself in worldly questions," says Ovchinnikova. "It is not a political body." The church encourages the Russian habit of passivity. "A good life is a gift from God," says Ovchinnikova. "It is folly to reach for this yourself." The church has also bred intolerance and bigotry. "You will not be saved," Ovchinnikova says to me pityingly, "because you are not part of our church."

YOUNG BUSINESSMEN

THE NEW CAPITALISTS, THE YOUNG businessmen, bankers and stockbrokers, are visible everywhere; you see them in suits and ties, with their hair neatly cut, looking respectable but nonbureaucratic. It is a new look in Moscow. Few of these yuppies are involved in production, which is still state-dominated and tan-

gled in bureaucracy. "We only trade and invest," says Yaroslav Pachugin, 25, an expert financial adviser at the private, profit-oriented Foundation for the Privatization of State Industry Through International Investment, "moving what already exists from one set of hands to another."

"I earn much more than my parents," he says. "That embarrasses me; they are both accomplished professional people. But members of that generation cannot now learn what is necessary to function in capitalist terms. The basic structures of capitalism are no problem for us. We've all caught on about that." He pauses. "What we still don't understand, of course, is democracy." I talk to Igor Gerasimov, who, at 24, is general director of the Inkomtrust, a division of the vast Inkombank. He is responsible for the investment of private funds, which he places in real estate and foreign currency. "I usually get money to invest for between one and three months," he says. "No one trusts the economy enough to let go of their money for longer. So investment in industry and construction is impossible. Also our inflation is paralyzing."

"What I am doing is important," he says. "I have a moral duty to continue as (Continued on page 37)



left the White House to head the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. That was the last I heard of it until the 1991 Pennsylvania Senate race, when Harris Wofford ran against Dick Thornburgh on the slogan, 'If a criminal has the right to see a lawyer, Americans have a right to see a doctor when they're sick.' The Republicans were in an extremely vulnerable position because they didn't have a plan, and there was panic. The plan they developed was last-minute and half-hearted, and the President obviously had no personal commitment to it. That was a serious mistake, because a solid health plan would have given him a domestic policy."

Democrats, particularly conservative Democrats, did indeed turn out to be more receptive to Enthoven's ideas than Republicans were. Conservative Democrats like Representative Jim Cooper of Tennessee were looking for an alternative to a Canadian-style health plan, in which the Government takes over health care. Cooper's aides read the Jackson Hole report, and when Cooper saw it, he recalls: "It was like lightning had struck. Here was this incredibly sophisticated plan that puts the consumer in the driver's seat and limits the role of Government." Cooper is still lobbying on behalf of managed competition.

Early this year, the 13-member Task Force on National Health Care Reform took Enthoven's ideas and went behind closed doors to thrash out a health plan for America. Powerful lobbying groups like the American Medical Association were left in the hall when the doors closed — and so, surprisingly, was Enthoven. "I'm not feeling left out," he insists. "I'm sure when they want more of my views in Washington, they'll ask."

His colleague Paul Ellwood is characteristically more outspoken: "They're afraid of Alain. He's just too damn strong, he knows too much. He's a threat to any lesser person who would like to be influential."

Enthoven's plan relies on competition to hold prices down and a uniform benefits package for which all Americans would eventually be eligible. According to a White House source, the latest version of the Clinton plan aspires to a comprehensive

benefits package and relies on budgets as well as competition to control costs. But "budgets" sounds suspiciously like price controls. "I don't know what to think of the President," Enthoven says. "He baffles me. He's going to have to make a number of gut-wrenching decisions. The task force has raised expectations by including things in the basic package like dental care. Somebody is going to have to go back and get something we can afford. And they're going to have to decide about price controls, which don't work."

According to Cooper, the fight over health-care reform is shaping up as "a battle for the soul of the Democratic Party." On one side are members of the Conservative Democratic Forum, who hate price controls as much as Enthoven does. Opposing them are Democrats like Pete Stark who want the Government to manage health care and impose price controls. "It's untested," Stark says of managed competition. "It's kind of like buying Edward Teller's Star Wars."

Cooper counters: "Managed competition is an exciting opportunity for Bill Clinton to prove that he is a new Democrat, not an L.B.J. Democrat. He has the opportunity to lead the Democratic Party into a very bright future, and he has the courage to make this work. He can't duck it — nobody in politics can."

While the battle is taking shape, Enthoven is playing host at brown-bag lunches for his students. Probably sometime soon, when the health-care-reform package reaches Congress's finance committees, he will enter the battle. But whether that happens or not, the professor sees himself as presenting an exam. Not to a classroom full of M.B.A. candidates: this time, the professor is testing Government's ability to respond. "Managed competition is a test of whether our society can develop rational and fair solutions to a problem," Enthoven says. "Health-care policy is choked by an aristocracy of special interests. If we don't take these groups on and rein in costs, health care will continue to bleed our economy white, our standard of living will continue to slide and we will never be able to extend care to the millions who need it." ■

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RUSSIA

(Continued from page 23)

a businessman, to help Russia to grow. I could not now choose another way. Of course, I do this also for myself; I'd like a nice apartment, a dacha, a car, maybe even a Lincoln Town Car. But the more I take for myself, the more I help Russia."

RUSSIA'S RICH: DIFFERENT, TOO

WHILE THESE businessmen make up a yuppie class, others form a financial aristocracy, the dollar millionaires, the nouveaux riches. There is a continuum, like a time line, at one end of which lie the pure businesses; toward the middle, businesses dominated by the mafia; farther up, mafia activity based on business; and at the far end, pure mafia activity. Many of the very rich are at the mafia end of the spectrum, but not all of them. To succeed at the honest end of the spectrum takes an ability

to deal with mafia threats, however, since these cannot be avoided.

I go to see Yuri Begalov, director of Kvant International. Five years ago, Begalov was studying piano at the conservatory. Now he owns, with two partners, a company whose turnover last year, I am told, was \$1 billion. He is 30; I have heard that he is a brilliant businessman, honest and quite sophisticated. I stop by his office in Profsoyuznaya, a modest enough location. He is wearing a cashmere blazer, flannel trousers, an Hermès tie and a Patek Philippe watch. His Porsche is parked outside. Initially, we sit in a cramped Soviet-looking room to talk; then we move down the hall to a conference room where we sit at a large table laid with crisp linen and set with bone china and heavy silver. The staff serves a five-course lunch of exquisite Georgian food, complete with various wines. Begalov is Armenian, but grew up in Georgia; he has imported an entire Georgian kitchen, housed in the office complex.

"In the early days of perestroika," Begalov says, "I decided to enter business. I joined with two old friends.

To start a business in this country, you need connections more than you need anything else. So because my partners were both physicists, we set up a firm to specialize in business uses for scientific research. We went wherever our connections led us; any work was O.K. if it was profitable." When the Moscow Exchange opened, Begalov saw that this was the next wave of opportunity, and he immediately took out a bank loan (loans were then very new) and purchased a seat. The Moscow Exchange works according to arcane and bizarre rules. "It was incredibly high risk," he says, "and my only real advantage was that I had taken the time to understand Russian business practice and Russian law. I kept up with it all the time, which almost no one else bothered to do."

Begalov followed the move toward privatization within Siberia, and when he heard that a commodities exchange would open in Tyumen, he bought a seat. Oil was a vastly inefficient state-run industry: state-run wells passed oil to state-run refineries that sold it to state-run

RUSSIA

(Continued from page 39)

rich, counselor to the President of Russia on political affairs.

Andrei Golovin seems never to have learned the language of bureaucracy that haunts the older, gray-suited administrators. Golovin holds to what he calls a centrist line. Russian politics tends to function in extremist terms, and I am intrigued by the idea of a centrist party. "Those who call themselves democrats," he says, "are radicals, left-wing radicals. Your Government supports them because you think that if you don't, the right will take over. But we are really closer to you and to your national interests than are those radicals. When Clinton was elected, I assumed he would see this and understand it; it's so disappointing to us that he continues the paranoid foreign policies of President Bush. Doesn't he see that Russian, American and international interests all lie with the center, with something mediated and controlled? The danger does not come from the red or the blue, but from the fact of extremes locked in battle."

Golovin, in his mid-30's, has an arrogant manner that sometimes borders on condescension, but his arguments are compelling. Five years ago he was a physicist at a research institute. With perestroika, he moved toward government service. He sketches out military, economic and civil policy; his centrism reminds me more of Swedish socialism than of anything else. "You talk in your country about a stable government that represents the middle class," he says. "We at Smena are the government of the middle class."

I ask him: "But is there really a Russian middle class? Do people in this country want compromise? Who are your constituents?"

Golovin says: "If we were in power, there would be a middle class, and they would want compromise. If we come to power, we'll have support everywhere. And we'll get rid of most of these ruinous economic reforms, to permit the re-emergence of a middle class."

I point out to Golovin that within democratic systems this is not the usual se-

quence of events, that you are supposed to have support before you get elected. "Well," he says, "there is no freedom of the press in this country. The left-wing press is underwritten by our Government; and so is the right-wing press, because fear of the right wing drives support to the left. We don't get that kind of media play. It's hard to do dramatic P.R. for a centrist position; it's not eye-catching."

"The radicals, Communists and fascists used to be in the same party, and they all have a Bolshevik mentality," Golovin says. "We're clean. We were never part of the Soviet bureaucracy. The power of these extremes is sustained with base propaganda. I'm frightened by the movement here toward a sort of Latin American situation, in which power comes from the mob and the Government is beholden to illicit special interests."

Golovin's expression softens. "This is a great civilization," he says, gesturing out the window. "We can interact in a civilized fashion. We of the center try not to lie, like the extremists, which is why we have trouble getting votes and support. Why should people vote for us? Because we're honest, intelligent and honorable. Print my photo and my biography next to Yeltsin's photo and his biography, and ask yourself who has led a good life, with a commitment to public service, and who is an old Communist, steeped in misguided ideology and corruption? We want to establish reasonable laws. In 15 years, when I am president, Bolshevism, extremism, will be dead."

GOLOVIN IS ELOQUENT and moving, but he evinces a curious disdain for the realities of his own country. He seems not to understand that you cannot impose civility on an entire society. He talks a lot about pragmatism replacing ideology, but fails to recognize the essential ideological basis for his pragmatism, which was designed to create a pragmatic society where one does not now exist. "It will take a long time to de-ideologize this society," he says, apparently unaware that a program to de-ideologize a society is finally very ideological.

It is with Golovin's description of the "radicals" as "Bolsheviks" ringing in my

ears that I go to see Aleksandr A. Kiselev. Kiselev's ardent belief in democracy is unaffected. But there can be little question that if Kiselev had been active 30 years ago, he would with equal conviction have defended the cause of Communism; indeed, he was a big wheel in the Komsomol (the youth organization of the Communist Party) when he was an adolescent in Volgograd, and the Communist Party was still the Communist Party. When we meet, Kiselev is wearing a powder-blue suit that, 11 sizes larger, might have belonged to Brezhnev; he looks like "a typical bureaucrat." He continually answers concrete questions by saying, "We must have democracy in order for the people to be strong" or "We must ask the people in what kind of state they wish to live and build accordingly."

He is still working part time as a scientific researcher of practical problems, at what had been his full-time work before he entered Moscow politics. He is also on the Organization Committee for the Referendum, which will take place in a few days. The Movement

for Democratic Reform, which he leads, is the remains of the political machine that propelled Yeltsin into power, and is as close to a political party as anything gets right now in Russia. Kiselev's answers to my questions, especially after Golovin's passionate clarity, feel inauthentic and banal. He batters me with statistics. I ask him whether the majority of the Russian people want democracy at all, of any kind, and he looks puzzled and plunges into the details of last week's parliamentary debate. He is a man without any impulse toward abstract thinking or large questions.

Kiselev is one of the advocates of a new constitution; indeed a new constitution is really the movement's raison d'être. "We will impose this democratic constitution on the Parliament and on the people," says Kiselev. "And then Yeltsin will explain it to the people, and when they hear him explain it, they will understand that it is good." I comment that this agenda does not accord with existing laws. "Well," says Kiselev, "criticize Yeltsin for breaking the laws if you want, but in fact every-

one breaks them. The current constitution is so bad that most people don't bother with it."

I spend the afternoon before the referendum with Sergei B. Stankevich. Russian politics are, of course, unpredictable, but character is distinctive; of these three men, this is the only one who could conceivably run a country. In fact, he is at the moment unpopular, and has severed his ties to various movements that might have helped him to greater success; but unpopular in Russia turns to popular in hours, and Stankevich has had moments of great popularity. He has elements of George Stephanopoulos and James Carville; he is a high-level strategist of the new generation who has a masterly ability to shape Russian and international news media responses. Recently he has distanced himself from Yeltsin, though he has kept his Kremlin office and official position. In the past, when Yeltsin has acted strangely and unpredictably, Stankevich has been the one to explain.

Stankevich has neither Golovin's pragmatic ideal-

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and he is not free of Communist-type language. He has been accused often of dirty politics, and was at the center of a small scandal last year when a great deal of government money went to an almost nonexistent music festival. He is said to have used his influence to get apartments for family members and to arrange other special favors. "You're seeing Stankevich?" asked a friend from the old underground. "Make sure you take a bath afterwards."

But what Stankevich has is a quality of immense competence. In the current Russian situation, this is perhaps the most important thing of all. Stankevich wears his enormous and all-encompassing intelligence on his sleeve. He is the only man I have met who is able to construct a neat and orderly picture out of the momentous events that have shaken Russia in the last 10 years. Sitting in his large Kremlin office, you are lulled into a sense that politics is a straightforward business. Stankevich's liberalism feels more self-conceived than Kiselev's; he both believes in reform and understands it. But he is at the same time a man who knows well on which side his bread is buttered; he pursues his political vision with the clear knowledge that his kind of democracy will benefit not only Russia, but also himself.

"The reforms in this country have come in waves," he says. "The first was Gorbachev's wave, which began in 1985, peaked with perestroika, and began its downward turn with the election of Boris Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation. The goals were to introduce controlled elections and controlled free speech while preserving the system and retaining Communist Party control. These goals were accomplished. But the leaders of the first wave failed to introduce a new political or intellectual paradigm, and so they had to fall."

"The second wave was Yeltsin's wave, which included such men as Andrei Sakharov, and the goal was to remove Communist ideology from its predominance, and to establish basic freedoms: free speech, a free press and a parliamentary system. These goals were accomplished. This wave peaked during the coup in 1991. In 1992, the second wave broke when state control was in large part lifted from the economy. The second wave failed to invent a new Russia, to balance this country's racial and ethnic and religious mix, to achieve the crucial joint goals of being market-oriented and socially responsible. The second wave has been heading downward for a year and a half."

"Now it's time for the third wave, the base for which is already in place. It will begin in earnest with the elections and with the adoption of constitutional reform. The first goal of the third wave will be to establish a constitution and system

'We do provide structure,' says a 32-year-old mafia member. 'When we take over a business, that business works. It's noble work.'

of rule which allows for cooperation rather than competition among the branches of government. We will create a representative government, so that the republics now acting semiautonomously will feel that they have a decisive voice in Moscow, that their representatives are involved in establishing national laws, and that they are therefore bound by those laws. We will remain socially responsible, because that is absolutely crucial in this country, but we will take reasonable steps toward economic reform. I think we will accomplish these goals with moderate, conciliatory behavior, to create a single, strong united Russia. We have passed the time when you can rule this country by standing on top of a tank."

This seems a surprising line from someone who is still a presidential advisor — Yeltsin is, of course, the one who stood on top of a tank — and I press him on it. Stankevich implies that Yeltsin is undependable, a people's hero but not a professional. "Some of the politicians of the second wave may be able to carry over," he explains. "I couldn't predict that now. Stankevich could conceivably be at the helm for the third wave if he accepts the idea of it and its conditions. But I think that the third wave must belong at least in large part to my generation." And this is perhaps the case. The new Russian politics are younger politics.

Unlike many younger politicians, Stankevich has built his career slowly. He started off as an academic in political science, and wrote his dissertation on Western parliaments. "I had no thought of entering politics," Stankevich says. "My generation were not heroic dissidents, and I did not think that it was possible to work in the old system. But when I saw that Gorbachev was serious about reforms, in 1987, I joined the Communist Party; along with many others I organized the Moscow Popular Front and supported Yeltsin from the beginning." Stankevich was a great favorite of Gorbachev's,

and later headed the strategic staff for Yeltsin's political campaigns. When the coup was declared, he flew home from a holiday, went to the White House and stayed with Yeltsin for all three days.

At the moment Stankevich is veering toward the right-wing Russian Patriotic movement, which is perhaps foolish; he has a non-Russian last name and an extremely intellectual delivery, which will not go down well there. "He's always been the dark horse," one Moscow political columnist says to me. "It's impossible to know exactly how much power he's wielding behind the scenes."

Stankevich says: "There is not at this moment a single democratic thing in Russia. Nor can there be until the third wave comes in, and constitutional reform is enacted." What does it mean for a top presidential adviser to the "democratic" President to speak in this way? "It's time for the renewal of the political class," Stankevich continues. "There's no question but that the political class will be renewed. Different kinds of people are entering. There was a moment for radicals, including men like Gaidar: they served their function, and helped with their radicalism to break down the thick wall of Communism. But now that those walls have been broken, we do not need such men. When the next parliamentary elections take place — and I hope that will be soon — then there must be new faces, the faces of skilled politicians representing particular interest groups, rather than the faces of individual cowboy politicians pursuing individual goals. They will have to learn to be masters of compromise."

Stankevich looks to constitutional reform. "We're in the most dreadful Catch-22," he says — it's comical to hear that phrase in a Kremlin office — "in which the country can func-

tion only when we have a new constitution which changes the role and definition of the Parliament; and such a constitution can be passed only by this Parliament, which it will destroy." So what now? "Perhaps it will be necessary to proceed outside current laws. Could the leaders of the American Revolution have won by sticking to the laws of the colonies? Yeltsin will win this referendum; it will prove his strength; and I hope he will use that strength to bring in a new constitution, which we will all be able to work with even after he is gone."

If Golovin had in hand the heartening rhetoric of what is right, then Stankevich has the language of what is necessary. It may be that the real originality of this generation will be to insure pragmatically that some more authentic democracy becomes inevitable, and so to become the most electable candidates in that democracy. How much, I finally asked him, can you change the course of events in Russia, and how much have they taken on a momentum of their own which no elected or appointed official can control? "Government in this country," Stankevich says, "now and for the foreseeable future — it's without power. All we have is influence. Our goal must be to recognize that, to stop pretending that we have absolute power and to use our influence soundly. And our goal must be to gain power again. We will accomplish that goal."

At one point, in the middle of our conversation, the telephone rings. On a desk in the farthest corner of Stankevich's office, there is a collection of a dozen telephones, of different colors and designs, each connected to a different line. Stankevich walks across the room to answer one of the phones and speaks in the

(Continued on page 51)

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RUSSIA

(Continued from page 42)

me voice of calm authority for about five minutes. Step by step, he instructs someone — I think it is a relative — on how to fix his car. Again, he has that lulling tone in his voice. Try this. If it doesn't work, try that. It is the day before the referendum, and Stankevich is not — as are some others in the Kremlin — hysterical. His manner says clearly that what will happen at the polling stations in 16 hours cannot injure him.


THESE ARE THE YOUNGER MEN AND women who are finding a way other than despair in the new Russia, and they are a remarkable group of people. The most important new skill they have is adaptability: they figure out how to get for themselves what they want faster and better than anyone else. What they do not have is any framework in which to place themselves or their own successes; nor do they have a clear sense of the responsibilities that success may carry. The Soviet Union was dominated by the rhetoric of ideology, until finally ideology itself lost its meaning. When you discuss democracy with the empowered members of the younger generation, they seem to understand it is a euphemism for capitalism, and capitalism they take to be a system in which everyone grabs for himself whatever will be most useful to him. Fifteen years ago, many of these people might have been battling against an establishment that they would have seen as evil. "Those heroic days are over," Artyom Troitsky says to me, rather bitterly. "I wouldn't be living heroically if I were part of today's younger generation."

On my last day in Moscow, I spend the afternoon with Vasily N. Istratsov, director of parliamentary relations for the foreign ministry. He is a singularly sage man in his mid-30's who has been pulled from his position as a professor at Moscow University into this high office. Ironical, witty, charming, he has more the bearing of the worldly diplomats in Tolstoy than of the self-promoting men and women I have met. He and I talk about the politicians I have interviewed, many of whom he knows. "You know," he says, "the traditional structure of Russian politics is like a football game. Everyone is on one of two teams, and they are interested in winning by attacking each other. The only thing that changes is the subject of division: this week, pro-Yeltsin is facing anti-Yeltsin, but last week it was something else and next week it will be something else again. I am a civil servant, a close-up spectator at the game. I watch as the sides align and realign themselves, as the teams re-form, the way they've been re-forming in this country for years. These members of the younger generation, the people you've been talking to — they're not spectators. They're out on the field, playing the game. But they don't have on uniforms. You ask yourself, are they with black or with white. And very soon you understand that they are playing not on the side of black, not on the side of white, but on the side of the ball."

That is true of the politicians; it is true, indeed, of the entire generation. The real source of the chaos of the new Russia is not the weakness of the police, the dominance of the mafia, the difficulty of constitutional reform, the unavailability of Yeltsin, the spiraling inflation, the naive policies of Western Governments in their distribution of aid, the shortage of food, or the inefficiency of state-run factories. It is the ascendancy, in a society in which everyone was once asked to work for the common good, of a system of values whereby everyone has an eye only on his own progress, a country now run on the chance alignments and misalignments of hundreds of thousands of different, singular, individual agendas. ■

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
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
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