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DoT
in Room 10234
in the Nassif Bldg-

Trini-
Do you want to
look at this?
Paul

Maritime Security: Alien Migrant Interdiction Mission
Meeting Description
26 April 1999, DoT Building, Room 10234

Purpose:

- Examine the national context, current and future demand and potential issues for Coast Guard alien migrant interdiction services.
- Review recent trip experiences, time permitting.

Desired Outcome:

- ITF consensus on recommendations for selected issues – or – specific guidance to the analytical team for further analyses.

Background

CNA will have completed their baseline analysis of the Alien Migrant Interdiction mission of the Coast Guard, and will have generated potential issues for ITF consideration.

The ITF will have reviewed background materials with an eye towards selecting the few most critical issues for the ITF's consideration. Following this down-selection, CNA will generate more fully developed issue papers on these selected issues.

This meeting will be focused to allow the ITF to begin reaching some conclusions on the issues presented to them by the CNA analyses.

Welcome

(20 minutes)

Purpose: Review the minutes of the last full ITF meeting (April 8) and review what's to be covered in today's session. Also, discuss the relevant AMIO findings from Mr. Castello's recent trip to the Southern California area as a prelude to today's discussions.

Desired Outcome: Approval of the minutes from the last session; Understanding of the day's topics and expected accomplishments.

CNA: Alien Migrant Interdiction Overview / Baseline / Pertinent Issues

(15 minutes)

Purpose: This discussion will set the pattern for ITF discussion on selected issues throughout the course of this meeting.

Desired Outcome: Common understanding of the issues upon which the ITF will be offering their recommendations, and general appreciation for the Coast Guard's broader Maritime Security roles, missions and functions as context for the ITF's deliberations.

Preparation: Review CNA Alien Migrant Interdiction paper (approximately 20 minutes) that includes

- A brief discussion of what roles, missions and functions are included in the Maritime Security arena and are not being considered in today's discussion.
- Pertinent findings of the 1982 Roles and Missions study
 - To include salient study recommendations and the Coast Guard response
- What's changed since then (specifically the changes in mandate (legislative or policy directive) as well as Coast Guard resource allocation decisions based on perception of perceived national need)
- Pertinent historical trends of demand and resource availability

Concept of Brief: The presentation will briefly review:

- Baseline and changes since 1982 Roles and Missions Study
- Trend projections into the future and their limitations
- Possible ITF issues

Expert Testimony: Immigration and Naturalization Service

(30 minutes)

Background: The 1980 Cuban exodus (frequently referred to as the Mariel boatlift) resulted in the interdiction of nearly 125,000 illegal migrant flowing towards Florida. In 1990-91, Coast Guard assets responded to another mass migration—this time from Haiti. And yet again in 1994, migrants from both Haiti and Cuba sought the economic and political opportunities of the United States by setting out in large numbers, frequently in unseaworthy watercraft. Increasingly, illegal migrants from the People's Republic of China are finding their way to American soil via maritime methods. And today's headlines routinely contain news on alien smuggling efforts, significant loss of life and the political overtones associated with these efforts to circumvent US immigration laws.

Purpose: Discuss illegal migrant policy and the federal enforcement agencies, review current and projected trends in illegal maritime migration and resource implications on the agencies involved.

Preparation: Review background materials provided earlier. Specifically:

A National Security Strategy for a New Century

“Threats to U.S. Interests”, pages 6 and 7 (approximately 2 minutes)

Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020

Executive Summary and pages II-3 to II-18. (approximately 15 minutes)

Coast Guard 2020

“Maritime Law Enforcer”, page 15 (approximately 1 minute)

Desired Outcome: Develop a common appreciation for the national framework for enforcing our seaward border (migration) laws; Understand the pertinent demand projections; Understand asset allocation trends.

Concept of Brief:

- National illegal migration policy, strategies and goals
 - PDD-9 and its implications for the Coast Guard
 - Undocumented migrant hazards and costs
- Growth of smuggler's connection to illegal migration
- Migrant flow projections
- Agencies involved
 - Coordination of agencies' efforts
- Resource requirements (capability and availability)
 - Deterrence value / costs
 - Surge implications for mass migrations

ITF Issue Discussion

(30 minutes for CNA-facilitated discussion)

Purpose: With the INS briefing as background, this time is set aside for the ITF to discuss AMIO issues and reach some conclusions about possible further study towards developing recommendations in this mission area.

Desired Outcome: Specific guidance to the analytical team for further effort to finalize issues and recommendations in this mission area.

Concept of Discussion: CNA will restate the issue(s) at hand, and facilitate the discussion, providing requested details if available, but with the intent of reaching ITF consensus on a specific recommendation or the guidance for further work.

CNA: Quicklook at Future Issues

(10 minutes)

Purpose: This session gives ITF members an opportunity to consider the next two sessions and appreciate the issues that CNA is developing for future consideration. Members can provide guidance for specific approaches to analyses, suggest additional issues or recommend subject matter experts to invite.

Desired Outcome: ITF concurrence with future issues to be developed.

Preparation: Review the draft meeting agenda for the next meetings.

Concept of Brief: CNA will present the issues they've identified to-date for the next two ITF sessions, giving brief (not to exceed one minute) synopses of potential issues for those sessions.

Field Visit Report


(10 Minutes)

Time permitting, the recent trips to Pacific area, Baltimore, and Norfolk area units will be presented.

Preparation: Review the draft trip reports if you haven't done so already.

Meeting wrap-up

(5 Minutes)



Alien Migrant Interdiction

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As the primary maritime law enforcement agency, the Coast Guard is tasked with enforcing immigration law at sea. The Coast Guard conducts patrols and coordinates with other federal agencies and foreign countries to interdict undocumented migrants at sea, denying them entry via maritime routes to the U.S., its territories and possessions. Interdicting migrants at sea means they can be quickly returned to their countries of origin without the costly processes required if they successfully enter the United States.

When successful, illegal immigration can potentially cost U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars each year in social services. In addition to relieving this financial burden on our citizens, the Coast Guard maintains its humanitarian responsibility to prevent the loss of life at sea. The majority of migrant vessels are dangerously overloaded, unseaworthy or otherwise unsafe.

The Coast Guard's role in migrant interdiction has been a part of our history since the service's inception (see History of Coast Guard in Illegal Immigration). The first mass migration emergency facing the United States occurred between April 21 and September 28, 1980. Fidel Castro permitted any person who wanted to leave Cuba free access to depart from the port of Mariel, Cuba. Known as the Mariel Boatlift, approximately 124,000 undocumented Cuban migrants entered the United States by a flotilla of mostly U.S. vessels in violation of U.S. law. The Coast Guard interdicted vessels en route to Mariel Harbor, as well as provided search and rescue assistance to vessels bound for the United States. The Coast Guard also provided assistance to other federal agencies in the processing, investigation and prosecution of boat owners suspected of violating U.S. law.


On September 29, 1981, President Reagan issued Presidential Proclamation 4865, which suspended the entry of undocumented migrants to the U.S. from the high seas and directing the interdiction the vessels at sea.

In 1992, President Bush issued Executive Order 12807 directing the Coast Guard to enforce the suspension of the entry of undocumented migrants by interdicting them at sea, and return them to their country of origin or departure.

Between 1991 and 1995, there was a dramatic increase in the number of undocumented migrants interdicted by the Coast Guard. During this period, over 120,000 migrants from 23 countries were interdicted. In 1994, the Coast Guard was involved in its largest peacetime operation since the Vietnam war, responding to two mass migrations at the same time—first from Haiti, then from Cuba. Over 63,000 migrants were rescued and prevented from illegally entering the U.S. in Operations ABLE MANNER and ABLE VIGIL. At its height, Operation ABLE MANNER involved 17 U.S. Coast Guard vessels, patrolling the coast of Haiti while Operation ABLE VIGIL involved 38 Coast Guard cutters patrolling the Straits of Florida.

In addition to the migrant threat from these Caribbean countries, there has been an alarming increase in the number of migrants from Asia, most of whom are from the People's Republic of China. Very often Chinese migrants rely on well-organized, extremely violent, alien smugglers to gain entry into the United States. The living conditions on the vessels used to smuggle migrants are appalling, with overcrowded holds and unsafe sanitary conditions. In many cases, migrants are transferred to smaller pick up vessels offshore for the final ride to the U.S., or they're taken to Central American countries and smuggled across the U.S. land border.

Undocumented migrants continue to pose a threat to the U.S. today. While the primary threat comes from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba, the Coast Guard has interdicted migrants from 23 other countries throughout the world.



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Various Statistics

- Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions, Fiscal Year 1982-1999
- [FY 99 Flow Statistics](#)
- [FY 98 Flow Statistics](#)
- [FY 97 Flow Statistics](#)
- [Calendar Year Interdictions - District Seven](#) (Note: this link lists the number of migrant interdicted within the District Seven Area of Responsibility)

For more information, contact gimagee@comdt.uscg.mil

Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions At Sea Fiscal Year 1982 – 1999

As of 01 April 1999
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	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99
Haiti	358	511	1581	3721	3422	2866	4262	4902	871	2065	37618	4270	25302	909	2295	288	1369	932
Dominican Republic	0	6	181	122	189	40	254	664	1426	1007	588	873	232	3388	6273	1200	1097	167
Cuba	0	44	7	53	28	46	60	257	443	1722	2066	2882	38560	519	411	421	903	526
People's Republic of China	0	0	0	12	11	0	0	5	0	138	607	2517	288	504	66	240	212	117
Other																	67	222
Total	358	561	1769	3908	3650	2952	4576	5828	2740	4932	40879	10542	64382	5320	9045	2149	3648	1964

FY 99 Flow Statistics (As of 01 Mar 99)

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FY-99 MONTHLY INTERDICTIONS (As of 31 Apr 99)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
Haitians	477	80	10	34	320	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dominicans	0	150	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cubans	84	72	127	70	76	17	0	0	0	0	0	0
PRC	0	0	0	60	0	57	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	11	9	12	0	0	162	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals:	572	311	149	164	396	325	0	0	0	0	0	0

DOMINICAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 99 As of 01 Mar 99)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
OTR US LE	63	30	46	191	59	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	389
USCG	0	150	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	167
OTHER COUNTRY	0	0	36	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	58
EST LANDINGS	85	63	70	173	161	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	552
Totals:	148	243	152	364	259	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1166

CUBAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 99 As of 01 Mar 99)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
OTR US LE	63	64	237	216	85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	665
USCG	84	72	127	70	78	95	0	0	0	0	0	0	526
OTHER COUNTRY	56	0	3	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	84
EST LANDINGS	4	7	41	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	64
Totals:	207	143	408	288	198	95	0	0	0	0	0	0	1339

HAITIAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 99 As of 01 Mar 99)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
OTR US LE	78	37	217	61	51	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	444
USCG	477	80	10	34	320	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	932
OTHER COUNTRY	0	0	28	0	92	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	120
EST LANDINGS	0	0	3	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18
Totals:	555	117	258	95	478	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	1514

PRC INTERDICTIONS (FY 99 As of 01 Jan 99)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
OTR US LE	0	0	0	27	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
USCG	0	0	0	60	0	57	0	0	0	0	0	0	117
OTHER COUNTRY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EST LANDINGS	0	30	285	14	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	342
Totals:	0	30	285	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	520

FY 98 Flow Statistics

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FY-98 MONTHLY INTERDICTIONS

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
Haitians	1	421	77	0	80	10	55	90	115	22	70	428
Dominicans	145	57	214	310	92	128	85	61	0	5	0	0
Cubans	10	23	35	50	20	43	67	100	235	122	108	90
PRC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	0	163	22
Other	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	25	13	23
Totals:	156	501	326	360	198	181	207	251	377	174	354	563

DOMINICAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 98)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	35	36	102	94	119	119	28	47	15	58	61	67	781
USCG	145	57	214	310	92	128	85	61	0	5	0	0	1097
OTHER COUNTRY	9	27	0	98	31	34	0	47	0	0	0	2	248
EST LANDINGS	108	185	249	140	202	274	35	113	53	34	113	40	1546
Totals:	297	305	565	642	444	555	148	268	68	97	174	109	3672

CUBAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 98)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	19	10	56	13	48	5	52	48	81	87	58	38	515
USCG	10	23	35	50	20	43	67	100	235	122	108	90	903
OTHER COUNTRY	0	0	8	18	8	42	0	8	0	17	7	20	128
EST LANDINGS	2	3	0	7	16	2	9	0	21	10	6	3	79
Totals:	31	36	99	88	92	92	128	156	337	236	179	151	1625

HAITIAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 98)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	0	3	1	3	4	1	0	156	48	26	101	21	364
USCG	1	421	77	0	80	10	55	90	115	22	70	428	1369
OTHER COUNTRY	177	96	57	59	37	26	133	144	35	0	50	155	969
EST LANDINGS	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	114	2	6	11	11	157
Totals:	178	520	135	62	121	50	188	504	200	54	232	615	2859

PRC INTERDICTIONS (FY 98)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	0	0	0	16	0	0	11	88	43	20	46	28	252
USCG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	0	163	22	212
EST LANDINGS	0	0	0	16	0	0	47	27	0	0	0	21	111
Totals:	0	0	0	32	0	0	58	115	70	20	209	71	575

FY 97 Flow Statistics

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FY-97 MONTHLY INTERDICTIONS

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
Haitians	0	13	0	0	109	0	0	0	0	19	147	0
Dominicans	89	277	107	374	105	95	0	19	61	0	40	33
Cubans	40	3	52	5	16	35	10	39	18	98	36	69
PRC	128	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	69	0
Other	0	0	17	1	5	0	2	0	8	12	0	0
Totals:	257	293	176	423	235	130	12	58	87	129	292	102

DOMINICAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 97)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	128	76	94	93	23	84	23	5	66	9	42	22	665
USCG	89	277	107	374	105	95	0	19	61	0	40	33	1200
OTHER COUNTRY	145	179	74	292	49	114	0	42	0	23	0	0	918
EST LANDINGS	284	292	93	221	46	49	0	0	0	39	114	26	1164
Totals:	646	824	368	980	223	342	23	66	127	71	196	81	3947

CUBAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 97)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USCG	40	3	52	5	16	35	10	39	18	98	36	69	421
OTHER COUNTRY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EST LANDINGS	23	2	18	0	0	0	22	1	11	44	19	31	171
Totals:	63	5	70	5	16	35	32	40	29	142	55	100	592

HAITIAN INTERDICTIONS (FY 97)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	0	0	4	0	1	0	0	9	0	1	0	0	15
USCG	0	13	0	0	109	0	0	0	0	19	147	0	288
OTHER COUNTRY	18	100	639	0	61	150	0	105	0	309	234	43	1659
EST LANDINGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Totals:	18	113	643	0	171	150	0	114	0	329	382	43	1963



PRC INTERDICTIONS (FY 97)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	TOTAL
USBP	11	1	0	0	0	6	14	13	13	0	0	0	58
USCG	128	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	69	0	240
EST LANDINGS	116	177	0	0	0	0	14	21	0	0	50	0	378
Totals:	255	178	0	43	0	6	28	34	13	0	119	0	676

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 For more information, contact gmagee@comdt.uscg.mil

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
A Haitian Freighter interdicted by USCGC SENECA on 01 Oct 98 with 463 Haitians on board.



A stateless PRC migrant smuggling vessel interdicted by CGC GALVESTON ISLAND off of Guam in June 1998.



POINT BARNES, an '82 patrol boat interdicts a freighter with Haitian migrants on board.



PRC Migrants aboard the Fishing Vessel CHIH YUNG. This vessel was interdicted with 172 migrants in Sept, 1998.




The hold of a vessel smuggling PRC migrants.



A stateless PRC migrant smuggling vessel interdicted by CGC GALVESTON ISLAND south of Guam in Oct 1998.



A 110' Patrol Boat delivers Cuban migrants to a US Navy LSD during Operation ABLE VIGIL in 1994.




The LAPAS III, a PRC migrant smuggling vessel interdicted in 1997.




Assisting a Haitian child during Operation ABLE MANNER.



A Coast Guardsman hands out life jackets to 420 Haitian migrants aboard an 80' freighter off Miami Beach on November 20, 1997.



The LAPAS III.



A 110' Patrol Boat carrying Cuban migrants during Operation ABLE VIGIL in 1994.



Haitian migrants interdicted by a 210' Medium Endurance cutter.



Dominican migrants interdicted attempting to enter Puerto Rico



Haitians aboard a sailing vessel.



PRC migrants from M/V GOLDEN VENTURE that landed in NY in 1993.

DRAFT CNA Issue Paper

Interagency Task Force

on the Roles and Missions of the United States Coast Guard

Issue Paper

Operations against Illegal Maritime Immigration

[PRE-DECISIONAL, FOR INTERNAL TASK FORCE USE ONLY]

Prepared by: Drs. Robert P. Trost and Michael M.H. Ye

22 April 1999

Draft CNA Issue Paper

Outline

1. Overview

- Changes since the 1982 Roles and Mission Study
- Legal authorities
- Background of operations and duties
- Activity level, budget and cost

2. Trends and Features

- Mass migration surges
- Day to day flows
- Professional smugglers

3. Policy Issues and Recommendations

Policy issue 1 Role of Coast Guard vis-a-vis Other Government Agencies

Policy issue 2 Migrant detention and processing

Policy issue 3 International Cooperation

Appendix A Legal Documents

Appendix B Data

Appendix C Technical Issues

- Technical issue 1 Estimating and projecting flows
- Technical issue 2 Estimating and projecting costs and benefits

Bibliography

Draft CNA Issue Paper

1. Overview

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime interdiction of illegal immigrants. The Coast Guard enforces U. S. laws and policies intended to reduce the number of undocumented migrants entering the U. S. by sea. To accomplish this mission the Coast Guard conducts patrols, boards suspect craft, and coordinates with other federal (and sometimes state and local government) agencies and foreign countries.

This paper addresses issues in planning for, budgeting, and conducting the USCG's operations against illegal maritime migrants. We will briefly cite what has changed since the 1982 roles and missions study, the USCG's legal authorities, and its reported budgets in this mission area. Then, the USCG's operations and duties in terms of prevention, deterrence, and interdiction are discussed. In the next section, trends and features of day to day flows, mass migration surges, professional smuggling, as well as the USCG's costs are described. A series of potential policy issues are then addressed and followed by possible recommendations. Finally, technical issues involving relationships between estimating and projecting flows, costs, and benefits are discussed and econometric models are proposed in appendices, along with other relevant data.

Changes since the 1982 Roles and Mission Study

The 1982 Roles and Mission Study recommended that the Coast Guard remain the primary maritime law enforcement agency and therefore maintain an Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT) fleet capable of being responsive to changing demands in the maritime region.

While there has been no change in this primary role, the capabilities and requirements have fluctuated considerably. For example, the Coast Guard must now deal with a Peoples Republic of China (PRC) illegal immigration problem much greater than existed in 1982. The Coast Guard also now takes a more proactive role in deterring migrations at their source by of training the appropriate maritime law enforcement organizations in some major source countries. There is also more migrant interdiction taking place on the high seas away from US shores as a result of the 1992 Executive Order 12807 and Presidential Decision Directive 9 (PDD-9) in 1993. Additionally, there are now well-organized professional smuggling rings that were not present in 1982.

The 1982 Roles and Mission study also recommended that no other agencies such as DEA, the FBI or INS develop independent maritime capabilities for the purpose of enforcing Federal law in the maritime region beyond the 12-mile customs zone, and that the Coast Guard should continue to provide services to other agencies to the extent that resources are reasonably available. While some other agencies are in fact now operating beyond the 12-mile zone for other types of maritime law enforcement, interdicting migrants in these waters remains almost exclusively a Coast Guard function.

Illegal maritime migration is quite small compared to air and land routes where the INS and Department of State dominate.

Draft CNA Issue Paper

Legal Authorities

The Coast Guard relies primarily on the powers conferred to it by 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 89, in supporting national policy goals of stemming the flow of illegal aliens into the U.S. More specifically, its mission is to enforce U. S. laws and policies that reduce the number of undocumented migrants entering the U. S. by sea.¹ It is not an initiator of national immigration policy.

In 1992, President Bush issued Executive Order (E.O.) 12807 directing the Secretary of Transportation to issue appropriate instructions to the USCG to enforce the suspension of the entry of undocumented aliens into the U. S. by sea, and to interdict any vessel carrying them. This E.O. is only applicable beyond the territorial sea of the U.S.

In June 1993, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 9 (PDD-9). The key elements are:

- a. To coordinate and strengthen law enforcement efforts and support legislation to increase criminal and civil penalties for alien smuggling;
- b. To combat smuggling operations at the source both through Department of State efforts with the flag States of smuggling vessels, as well as source nations;
- c. To use the U. S. intelligence community to locate and interdict smuggling vessels on the high seas and escort these vessels either to the flag state, or the nearest non-U.S. port, assuming host nation concurrence; and
- d. To modify/expedite procedures for processing of entry of claims into the U.S., as well as the return of smuggled economic migrants to their country of origin.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) added a single streamlined removal proceeding known as expedited removal. This proceeding is for arriving aliens attempting to gain admission to the United States without valid travel documents or with fraudulent documents.

Background of Operations and Duties

The Coast Guard's functions in this mission area include three types of operations: interdiction, deterrence, and prevention. These efforts are coordinated with other federal agencies and foreign countries, thereby attempting to deny illegal migrants and smugglers the usefulness of maritime routes to the U. S. territories and possessions. Note that interdiction is only one of three operations available to the Coast Guard. Limiting the analysis to simply the interdiction mission does not adequately capture all the services the Coast Guard provides. Moreover, each operation requires different manpower and other resources.

First, the USCG's interdiction of illegal maritime migrants is conventionally called AMIO - Alien Migration Interdiction Operation. AMIO interdicts illegal maritime

¹ For related international and domestic laws, see Appendix A.

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immigrants before they enter the country. These interdicted immigrants can frequently be returned quickly to their countries of origin without the costly processing required if they enter the U. S.

Secondly, proactive patrols and surveillance in assigned areas help deter both the normal flows of “amateur” illegal maritime migrants and the more recent growth in professional smuggling. Other deterrent activities include programs such as joint training and joint actions with source countries and other destination countries such as Canada. Also, providing evidence and witnesses to source countries helps to bring criminals to justice and has a deterrent effect.

Finally, while prevention activities are mainly handled by the Department of State (DOS) through programs such as financial aid to underdeveloped countries, there are also important roles for the Coast Guard to play. These include, but are not limited: (1) coordination with the appropriate maritime law enforcement agencies in source countries in order to produce documentaries for the citizens of the source countries that show the dangers of travelling on the high seas; and (2) collect, share, and exchange intelligence information with source countries so smugglers can be stopped before they actually leave.

The USCG's duties of enforcement of laws against illegal maritime immigration can be summarized as follows:²

- Protecting the safety of life at sea, regardless of immigration status;
- Preventing the entry of illegal maritime migrants into the U.S. through at sea interdiction;
- Facilitating enforcement of U.S. laws, or enforcement by another nations with criminal jurisdiction in the matter, when interdicted aliens are found committing criminal acts at sea;
- Seizing and detaining conveyances, arresting and retaining alien smugglers, and gathering evidence in alien smuggling cases to help ensure a successful criminal prosecution of, or civil action against, those involved;
- Proactive patrolling and monitoring in assigned areas to deter both the normal flows of maritime illegal migrants and the more recent professional smuggling of maritime illegal immigrants;
- Inspecting vessels and facilities subject to U. S. jurisdiction in cooperation with INS to ensure that any aliens being employed are engaged in activities consistent with their immigration status;
- Detaining aliens encountered on vessels subject to U. S. jurisdiction after having already entered the U.S. illegally until disposition instructions are received from INS;
- Complying with appropriate procedures for handling claims to refugee status and requests for political asylum made during the course of Coast Guard operations.
- Cooperate with the law enforcement agencies of other migrant destination countries, such as Canada and Mexico, in the form of training, joint operations, and the general passing of intelligence information; and

² See Palmer (1997).

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- Cooperate with the law enforcement agencies of the major migrant source countries of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Peoples Republic of China in the form of training, joint operations and the general passing of intelligence information.

Activity Level, Budget and Costs

The USCG's operating expenses, and acquisition, construction, & improvement costs, including drug interdiction and operations against illegal maritime immigration can be found in Appendix B.1.

The Coast Guard AMIO operating budget over the last several fiscal years is presented in the table below.³

Fiscal Years	AMIO Operating Budget (\$ million)
1999	172.4
1998	117.2
1997	125.0
1996	165.2
1995	165.0
1994 (Surge operation)	353.1

Operation costs can also be inferred from the helicopter, fixed-wing, and ship hours devoted to AMIO, in the following tables.⁴ Note however that hours reportedly devoted to this (or any other) mission result from management decisions on how to prioritize demands and allocate available assets to competing missions and are not reliable indicators of total mission “demand”.

For 1994 to 1998, the following table shows the flight hours of various types of aircraft reportedly devoted to AMIO operations

AIRCRAFT TYPE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
HC130H (long-range patrol)	5115	3290	3458	2375	1831
HH60J (Helo)	1182	192	846	398	608
HH65A (Helo)	5961	2972	3141	1692	1273
HU25C (Falcon)	2446	1738	1601	1047	1560

³ For example, this accounts for 6% of the Coast Guard Operating Expenses Budget. Note that this \$172.4 million does not include the depreciation cost of fixed assets but does include military pay. For example, the cost of operating a 378-foot cutter is given in COMDTINST 7310.1F as \$5,464/hr, which includes military pay and fuel.

⁴ The authors of this paper would like to thank Dr. Ronald Filadelfo at CNA for providing us with data in this table.

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For 1995 to 1998, the following table shows the ship hours of various classes of cutter. As may be seen, AMIO operations are dominated by medium endurance cutters and patrol boats. As noted above, historical operating hours may not be a good indicator of total demand for any single mission.

CUTTER CLASS	1995	1996	1997	1998
WHEC	3768	314	637	561
WLB	1470	287	329	524
WMEC	15160	18341	14276	13802
WPB	19829	26151	16259	15796

2. Trends and Features

There are three distinct types of illegal maritime migrant problems that have vastly different features. The first type is the normal day to day relatively steady state flow of illegal immigrants. The second type is the mass migration surge of illegal immigrants, for example, the surge periods of 1980 and 1994 from Cuba and the surge periods of early 1980s, 1991 and 1994 from Haiti. The third type is the professional smuggling of illegal immigrants. Due to the different features in each type of illegal maritime immigration, manpower and asset requirement may differ significantly, despite of the fact that there will be overlapping use of resources. The goals set for each type should be different as well.

As also noted above, the interdiction rates reported in the following tables reflect both the level of illegal immigration activities and the effort level of the USCG.⁵ In other words, in low interdiction rate may be due to the lack of USCG resource, a slow down of illegal maritime migration activities, or both.

The following table presents the total Coast Guard migrant interdictions from FY94 to FY98:

Fiscal Year	Total Number Interdicted
1998	3,648
1997	2,149
1996	9,080
1995	5,345
1994	64,383

Trend and Feature 1

The mass migration periods

The Mariel Boat Lift in 1980 brought over 124,000 Cubans to the U.S. The flood of aliens from Haiti - first following the collapse of the Duvalier regime in the early 1980s and then following a military coup in 1991. During the six months after October 1991,

⁵ The authors would like to thank Mr. Michael Deich for pointing this out.

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the Coast Guard interdicted over 34,000 Haitians. Operation ABLE MANNER in 1993-1994 involved units home-ported up and down the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico and Pacific Coasts to control the influx of Haitian immigrants. Operation ABLE VIGIL, another exodus of Cubans in 1994, resulted in the interdiction of 38, 560 Cubans during FY94.⁶

Trend and Feature 2 Normal day to day steady state flows

The day to day flow is tracked by number of illegal maritime migrants interdicted, the number of events, by source countries, and by various routes. The major source countries with day to day flows are Haiti, Dominican Republic, and PRC.⁷ For example, a summary of FY 1999 interdiction by major source country, as of March 23, is given in the following table:

Country	Number Interdicted
Cuba	508
Dominican Republic	167
Haiti	924
PRC	117
Others	185
Total	1901

Dealing with normal day to day flow may also involve the search and rescue mission. Many interdictions become rescues, with attendant demands for medical and subsistence care.

Trend and Feature 3 Professional smugglers

There is a general trend toward more professional smuggling of aliens in recent years, but trend data are not readily available. Furthermore such smuggling is increasingly intertwined with narcotics smuggling.

In FY 1999, there is an increase in Cuban migrant smuggling: more Cuban migrants are turning to smugglers rather than rafts to enter the U.S. These hired smugglers use high-speed boats to drop them off directly ashore or to rafts off shore. Migrants from the Peoples Republic of China have raised new concerns over the availability of Coast Guard resources for other missions when cutters are tied to the typically long-term alien interdiction operations in the western Pacific. Since 1991, the Coast Guard has interdicted 4500 migrants from China.

Smuggling's flexible operations and criminal nature further complicate this category. For example, smugglers may know that there are limited assets available, so they may send 2-

⁶ Cubans receive more favorable treatment once inside the U.S. as a result of the application of the Cuban Refugee Adjustment act, which permitted the Attorney General to grant permanent status to Cuban citizens present in the U.S. for at least one year. This legal boost for Cubans arguably encouraged their flight from Cuba.

⁷ Data are available both by fiscal year and by calendar year, see Appendix B.2.

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3 loads of contraband to tie up resources. Chinese illegal alien smuggling often involves violent, highly organized Asian criminal syndicates.

Another strategy that smugglers often adopt is to use some weak spot as a transit point. For example, the Bahamas has been used as a transit point. More Cubans and Haitians are using the Bahamas as a transit point, establishing contacts with smugglers or waiting to be picked up by friends or relatives. The large, well established, Bahamian Haitian population means more large boat loads travel to the Bahamas, then transfer to small high speed boats for the transit to the U.S.

Another example is the increase of entry into Guam. More Chinese migrants are entering Guam, being smuggled aboard vessels departing China. Guam is becoming a “wormhole” to the continental US. After arriving in Guam undetected, it is not difficult for an illegal migrant to get on a US flight with fraudulent documents. Those migrants interdicted by the Coast Guard or INS are usually flown to the US, where they go through more adequate processing in detention facilities. After the initial processing by INS, the migrants are usually paroled into the community, where they integrate into society or go underground.

Fighting against professional smuggling of illegal maritime immigrants is strictly a law enforcement function, similar to the drug interdiction mission, and involves the use of, source-country intelligence, sophisticated sensors, and boarding at sea. In addition, at-sea interdiction of migrants frequently entails unique requirements for emergency health care, large-scale subsistence activities, and forcible detention of large numbers of people for indeterminable periods,

The geography of the Pacific Ocean makes it a particular challenge to interdict smuggling and prosecute those individuals involved in coordinating this trafficking of illegal aliens. Interdicting these vessels comes at a high price. In the 1995 case of the M/V Jung Sheng 8, three Coast Guard cutters, a C130 aircraft, an H65 helicopter and numerous land based support personnel dedicated forty-five days and logged over 6,000 miles interdicting this vessel with 147 migrants. The estimated cost of the operation exceeded \$4 million. A similar 1998 case, the M/V CHIH YUNG, cost about the same.

3. Potential Issues and Recommendations:

The potential issue of removing migrant interdiction from the Coast Guard portfolio would call into question the Coast Guard’s fundamental role as the Nation’s primary maritime law enforcement agency is not being addressed in the absence of contrary direction from the Task Force.

In this section we will address illegal maritime migration policy issues falling into three broad areas: The role of other federal agencies, detention facilities, and international cooperation.

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Policy issue 1. Role of Coast Guard vis-a-vis Other Government Agencies

The DOJ and its INS have overall responsibility for setting and supporting U.S. law enforcement policy and associated operational goals. The DOS and its USAID, and other federal, state and local government agencies are routinely involved in migrant matters mostly on an operational level. The Department of Defense usually becomes substantially involved only during unusual surges that threaten to overwhelm the primary agencies.

Currently there is no federal agency or organization that establishes targets for activity levels or Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) with respect to the interdiction and deterrence of illegal maritime migrants. In the absence of such policy-driven standards, the Coast Guard has attempted to develop its own performance goals.

At issue is the need for DOJ/INS to establish such targets and support their funding in the Administration's budgets, much as the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) does for counter-drug programs. This would require the INS to establish a formal strategy and a methodology for setting affordable targets that can be used to help set USCG asset requirements for the next decade or more. Such goals would be presumably be based on forecasts of future maritime migration flows or geographic areas to be patrolled at certain rates or both. Such goals should also help govern the Department of State managed international cooperation activities discussed in Policy Issue 3 below.

Possible Recommendations

- 1. That the Coast Guard's role as the Nation's primary enforcer of US immigration law outside the 12-mile customs zone be reaffirmed.***
- 2. That the President direct the Attorney General to establish procedures for setting future targets for the prevention of illegal maritime immigration, along with the required activity levels of each supporting law enforcement agency (in this case, the Coast Guard), to be supported in the annual development of the Administration's budget request, as well as in long range spending plans. Procedures for setting future goals should include an appropriate mix of geographic targeting and overall level of effort, in consideration of PDD-9 and other policy goals.***
- 3. That the charter of the US Interdiction Coordinator be expanded to include oversight and direction of the Nation's efforts to prevent illegal maritime immigration.***
- 4. That the intelligence functions of the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) be expanded to explicitly provide for improved intelligence support to the Coast Guard's migrant interdiction efforts.***
- 4. That the Secretary of Defense be directed to ensure that contingency plans are established and maintained (in coordination with the Coast Guard) for the timely employment of all relevant DoD migrant interdiction and detention assets should an unexpected mass migration occur.***

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Policy Issue 2: Migrant detention and processing

When Coast Guard cutters interdict illegal maritime migrants, they frequently must bring the migrants aboard the cutter for safety and processing. Ideally, the cutter would be able to promptly offload the migrants in a convenient port for either repatriation or asylum processing. This would minimize the period of diversion from the cutter's primary patrol functions. However, because repatriation of aliens from shore facilities has proven to be more complex and costly than from ships, recent practices have resulted in some cutters spending weeks away from their primary duties while they "warehouse" detainees. Such practices, if extended over time, could become very costly in terms of the need to provide additional cutter assets to accommodate such diversions. It should be considerably more efficient for INS to establish a "standby" capability to adequately house reasonably expectable numbers of detainees during the processing period, thereby freeing the cutters to resume their primary duties. Such "standby" capabilities could include portable facilities ashore, and/or specialty barges afloat.

Potential Recommendations

That the President direct the Attorney General and the INS to acquire the capability to promptly relieve the Coast Guard of responsibility for detained migrants by establishing standby arrangements at appropriate ports.

That DOJ/INS establish procedures to forward-fund or reimburse the Coast Guard for the cost of supporting detained migrants during the period they are in Coast Guard custody.

Policy Issue 3: International Cooperation

International cooperation in dealing with illegal maritime migration includes cooperation activities with major source countries, major destination countries, and other countries that may be involved in various ways.

The USCG International Affairs Office regularly trains third world nation's Coast Guards or comparable organization using State Department funding. This training can bolster a source or transit country's ability to combat illegal immigration.

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There are also ongoing bilateral agreements with PRC and VZ on illegal migration interdictions, as well as the proposed Mexican Multilateral Framework.

More generally, discouraging or preventing potential illegal migrants from setting out by sea for the US can be much more efficient than searching out and detaining such migrants on the high seas. Although the Coast Guard is currently engaged in some cooperative international migration prevention activities, such as in Haiti, additional effort could have a high payoff. This may be particularly true as interdiction at land borders increases, thereby potentially shifting historic illegal immigration routes seaward.

Possible Recommendations

That the Coast Guard be directed to increase its level of international activities in source and transit countries in support of the prevention of illegal maritime migration to the US to meet standards that are to be established by the INS, in coordination with the Department of State. Such activities may include training programs, asset transfer, information sharing, joint/coordinated patrols, and/or direct involvement in interdiction assistance, etc.

Appendix A Legal Documents

There is a substantial body of international and domestic law and practice relevant to the Coast Guard's operations against maritime illegal immigrants. The following is a brief overview of the more important international and domestic law considerations relating to immigration law enforcement in the maritime realm.

A.1 International Law Considerations

Both customary and treaty international law principles give a coastal State sovereign authority over its territorial seas, including the right to regulate admission of aliens. Under international law, a sovereign nation may exercise control over who enters the nation, in what circumstances, and subject to what conditions. Accordingly, the U.S. has a right to refuse entry to any particular individual except in rare circumstances. It follows then, that coastal nation authorization must be sought prior to bringing an individual into that nation. There are generally three restrictions on a nation's authority to exclude individuals: (1) nearest safe port for mariners in peril at sea; (2) asylum claims; and (3) agreements committing the nation to receive individuals meeting specific criteria.

Asylum/U.N. Refugee Protocol (1967)

Article 33 of the 1967 Refugee Protocol sets forth the principle known as "non-refoulement" or "no return". This principle holds that a nation may not forcibly return an individual to another nation where the individual would face persecution for political, religious, ethnic, or racial reasons. Individuals who allege such persecution have made an asylum claim, which the U.S. by reason of international law has an obligation to evaluate. The U.S. does not grant asylum to individuals fleeing their homeland on the

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basis of economic or personal reasons. In *Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.*, -US-, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) the Supreme Court upheld the assertion of E.O. 12807 that neither Article 33 of the U.N. Refugee Protocol nor the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1253, applied on the high seas. The U.S. government screens migrants from nations with a history of persecution for possible asylum claims.

Convention against Torture

Under article 3 of the Convention against torture, the U.S. has agreed not to expel, return, or extradite a person to another state where the person would be tortured. The U.S. government applies the same jurisdictional standard to the torture convention as the refugee convention; i.e. the convention is not legally binding on the high seas. The U.S. government screens migrants from nations with a history of torture for possible asylum claims.

A.2 Domestic Law Concerns

Applicable federal law is found in the Immigration and Nationality Act in Title 8, U.S. Code, and Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations. In brief, except for individuals claiming asylum, aliens may lawfully enter the U.S. only after having passed through an U.S. immigration inspection station at which their compliance with various U.S. entry or admission requirements has been checked.

A.3 IIRAIRA

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) added a single streamlined removal proceeding known as expedited removal. This proceeding is for arriving aliens attempting to gain admission to the United States without valid travel documents or with fraudulent documents. Aliens who previously obtained an immigration benefit through misrepresentation or obtained a benefit under federal or state law by falsely claiming to be an U.S. citizen can also face an expedited removal proceeding. Under the proceeding, the removal order issued by an immigration officer has the same weight as one issued by an immigration judge. The removal order is issued by the immigration officer must be reviewed by the immigration officer's supervisor before being executed. Under the new proceeding, which streamlines the old exclusion process, aliens subject to such orders will be removed from the United States by the first available means of transportation. Aliens found by an asylum officer to have a credible fear of persecution will be served with a Notice to Appear and detained for removal proceedings. They also are eligible to be considered for parole. The term "credible fear of persecution" means that there is a significant possibility that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum, taking into account the credibility of the alien's statements in support of his claim and such other facts known to the officer.

The expedited removal process was expected to have great benefits for the Coast Guard. Migrants interdicted at sea could be brought to the U.S., greatly reducing the time and expense of holding them at sea and repatriating them. While expedited removal has

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worked well in airports, it has not worked for migrants interdicted at sea, in particular PRC migrants. The standards for credible fear are minimal, and almost all PRC migrants are moved to regular removal proceedings. All PRC migrants interdicted in Guam in 1998 were removed from expedited removal proceedings. Until this problem is addressed, expedited removal will not be a regular option for most migrants interdicted at sea.

A.4. Bilateral Country Agreements

Haiti

In 1981 the U.S. and Haiti entered into a bilateral agreement in which Haiti gave the U.S. permission to board vessels suspected of carrying migrants and determine their registry, condition, destination and the status of those on board. The Haitian government abrogated this agreement in 1994.

Cuba

In 1994, the U.S. agreed to admit 20,000 Cubans a year legally to the U.S. Further negotiations resulted in the 1995 Cuban Migration accords. Announced on 02 May 1995, they formalized the process for annual legal migration of Cubans and established procedures/requirements for repatriating Cuban migrants interdicted at sea.

Dominican Republic

Efforts to establish an AMIO agreement with the Dominican Republic have not been successful, but temporary over-flight agreements for AMIO purposes have been established and renewed on an annual basis.

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Appendix B Data


Unless indicated, the following data are provided to us by USCG. Their sources are yet to be identified, and more complete sets may be identified. Appendix B.1 gives data on USCG budget. Appendix B.2 includes various interdiction rates. Information on success rates, disposition and other detailed records of USCG's AMIOs is also available but omitted here.

Appendix B.1 USCG Budget in Brief⁸

Operating Expenses

Operating Expenses (Then-year M\$)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Search and Rescue	384.100	349.800	348.000	328.600	328.300	337.900	342.400
Marine Safety	291.100	340.900	362.500	347.300	376.100	389.100	400.200
Marine Env. Protection	232.600	265.300	279.100	268.000	288.300	299.500	306.900
Fisheries & Sanctuaries	374.300	365.700	453.000	455.900	387.400	434.700	442.700
Aids to Navigation	465.700	483.800	482.400	457.000	438.600	455.400	463.300
Ice Ops	85.800	84.400	83.000	92.100	63.200	66.600	72.200
Drugs and Aliens	639.700	609.000	534.500	555.800	706.900	663.600	675.000




⁸ The authors of this paper would like to thank Dr. Ronald Filadelfo at CNA for providing us with these numbers and graphs.

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Acquisition, Construction, & Improvement Costs

Acquisition, Construction, & Improvement (FY-99 M\$)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Search and Rescue	37.483	27.977	45.001	30.180	42.859	51.048	41.300
Marine Safety	27.661	29.414	26.433	31.892	23.520	37.524	23.200
Marine Env. Protection	40.306	25.544	38.775	41.738	20.593	27.253	21.600
Fisheries & Sanctuaries	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	52.267	63.149	70.000
Aids to Navigation	86.144	78.733	145.162	176.903	167.462	122.333	148.500
Ice Ops	24.612	14.044	39.758	31.571	19.861	19.728	17.400
Drugs and Aliens	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	53.207	78.301	115.200



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Appendix B.2 Interdiction Rates⁹

Monthly Interdiction Rate of Maritime Illegal Immigrants

	All	HA	DomRep	PRC	CU	Other
CY 1980					124776	
CY 1982						
Jan	129	129	0	0	0	-
Feb	0	0	0	0	0	-
Mar	21	21	0	0	0	-
Apr	0	0	0	0	0	-
May	13	13	0	0	0	-
Jun	0	0	0	0	0	-
Jul	8	8	0	0	0	-
Aug	0	0	0	0	0	-
Sep	0	0	0	0	0	-
Oct	0	0	0	0	0	-
Nov	0	0	0	0	0	-
Dec	22	22	0	0	0	-
Total	193	193	0	0	0	5
CY 1983						
Jan	0	0	0	0	0	-
Feb	5	5	0	0	0	-
Mar	17	17	0	0	0	-
Apr	145	145	0	0	0	-
May	41	41	0	0	0	-
Jun	158	158	0	0	0	-
Jul	124	90	5	0	29	-
Aug	18	8	0	0	10	-
Sep	31	25	1	0	5	-
Oct	140	140	0	0	0	-
Nov	87	55	29	0	3	-
Dec	119	78	41	0	0	-
Total	885	762	76	0	47	39
CY 1984						
Jan	44	25	19	0	0	-
Feb	318	318	0	0	0	-
Mar	114	84	30	0	0	-
Apr	76	75	1	0	0	-
May	136	134	0	0	2	-

⁹ Interdiction rates are also available in fiscal years

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Jun	193	191	0	0	2	-
Jul	43	43	0	0	0	-
Aug	67	58	9	0	0	-
Sep	432	380	52	0	0	-
Oct	141	141	0	0	0	-
Nov	981	953	28	0	0	-
Dec	562	540	7	0	15	-
Total	3107	2942	146	0	19	177

CY 1985

Jan	112	104	0	0	8	-
Feb	34	34	0	0	0	-
Mar	64	37	9	12	6	-
Apr	758	750	0	0	8	-
May	242	197	43	0	2	-
Jun	53	25	18	0	10	-
Jul	20	0	17	0	3	-
Aug	288	288	0	0	0	-
Sep	653	652	0	0	1	-
Oct	47	44	0	0	3	-
Nov	36	32	2	0	2	-
Dec	291	248	43	0	0	-
Total	2598	2411	132	12	43	63

CY 1986

Jan	258	258	0	0	0	-
Feb	453	453	0	0	0	-
Mar	166	158	0	0	8	-
Apr	566	550	0	11	5	-
May	205	200	0	0	5	-
Jun	143	92	51	0	0	-
Jul	133	133	0	0	0	-
Aug	1305	1248	56	0	1	-
Sep	47	6	37	0	4	-
Oct	27	8	19	0	0	-
Nov	24	24	0	0	0	-
Dec	265	258	3	0	4	-
Total	3592	3388	166	11	27	28

CY 1987

Jan	192	192	0	0	0	-
Feb	9	9	0	0	0	-
Mar	279	252	6	0	21	-

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Apr	113	101	12	0	0	-
May	209	206	0	0	3	-
Jun	161	159	0	0	2	-
Jul	613	604	0	0	9	-
Aug	511	506	0	0	5	-
Sep	549	547	0	0	2	-
Oct	368	368	0	0	0	-
Nov	429	429	0	0	0	-
Dec	223	168	53	0	2	-
Total	3656	3541	71	0	44	24
CY 1988						
Jan	512	503	9	0	0	-
Feb	9	0	9	0	0	-
Mar	744	741	3	0	0	-
Apr	376	329	46	0	1	-
May	555	540	15	0	0	-
Jun	402	400	0	0	2	-
Jul	424	402	5	0	17	-
Aug	228	173	49	0	6	-
Sep	306	209	65	0	32	-
Oct	457	452	0	0	5	-
Nov	471	431	40	0	0	-
Dec	593	434	159	0	0	-
Total	5077	4614	400	0	63	35
CY 1989						
Jan	444	438	6	0	0	-
Feb	141	141	0	0	0	-
Mar	1598	1535	59	0	4	-
Apr	694	687	0	0	7	-
May	87	0	61	0	26	-
Jun	392	135	237	0	20	-
Jul	189	150	2	0	37	-
Aug	226	70	84	5	67	-
Sep	536	429	16	0	91	-
Oct	205	115	13	0	77	-
Nov	30	0	0	0	30	-
Dec	269	37	223	0	9	-
Total	4811	3737	701	5	368	91
CY 1990						
Jan	86	54	0	0	32	-
Feb	116	90	3	0	23	-

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Mar	164	0	146	0	18	-
Apr	294	113	134	0	47	-
May	148	1	105	0	42	-
Jun	184	99	62	0	23	-
Jul	291	206	65	0	20	-
Aug	460	0	409	0	51	-
Sep	493	156	266	0	71	-
Oct	254	191	37	0	26	-
Nov	6	0	0	0	6	-
Dec	304	214	19	0	71	-
Total	2800	1124	1246	0	430	58
CY 1991						
Jan	371	309	0	0	62	-
Feb	7	0	0	0	7	-
Mar	311	0	203	0	108	-
Apr	1027	758	6	20	243	-
May	510	70	146	0	294	-
Jun	529	127	100	0	302	-
Jul	437	196	67	0	174	-
Aug	467	43	115	118	191	-
Sep	709	157	314	0	238	-
Oct	301	68	56	0	177	-
Nov	6233	6023	161	0	49	-
Dec	2714	2336	287	0	91	-
Total	13616	10087	1455	138	1936	36
CY 1992						
Jan	6727	6663	0	0	64	-
Feb	1457	1223	0	181	53	-
Mar	1266	1141	0	0	125	-
Apr	6356	6158	48	0	150	-
May	13306	13103	21	0	182	-
Jun	475	366	0	0	109	-
Jul	415	150	11	0	254	-
Aug	648	246	0	0	402	-
Sep	555	141	4	0	410	-
Oct	1110	737	110	0	263	-
Nov	1327	1016	120	0	191	-
Dec	749	494	122	0	133	-
Total	34391	31438	436	181	2336	41
CY 1993						
Jan	1620	1354	83	0	183	-

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Feb	733	9	0	588	136	-
Mar	169	11	0	0	158	-
Apr	479	0	70	237	172	-
May	683	1	0	439	243	-
Jun	939	109	44	598	188	-
Jul	1132	91	170	631	240	-
Aug	596	77	69	6	444	-
Sep	999	371	85	12	531	-
Oct	706	95	2	0	609	-
Nov	547	60	62	0	425	-
Dec	599	226	15	0	358	-
Total	9202	2404	600	2511	3687	37
CY 1994						
Jan	314	63	0	3	248	-
Feb	788	347	25	29	387	-
Mar	748	274	0	0	474	-
Apr	1473	613	21	113	726	-
May	2253	1459	30	0	764	-
Jun	6886	5603	0	110	1173	-
Jul	17201	16086	68	36	1011	-
Aug	21645	345	0	0	21300	-
Sep	11225	131	9	0	11085	-
Oct	390	0	318	52	20	0
Nov	316	110	203	0	3	0
Dec	165	16	136	10	0	3
Total	63404	25047	810	353	37191	235
CY 1995						
Jan	303	36	254	5	3	5
Feb	184	0	61	0	123	0
Mar	515	0	384	106	25	0
Apr	1179	252	551	178	189	9
May	634	1	572	0	58	3
Jun	324	41	235	0	42	6
Jul	503	8	324	158	11	2
Aug	661	423	201	0	35	2
Sep	171	0	149	0	16	6
Oct	706	11	668	0	13	14
Nov	2065	1549	462	0	54	0
Dec	255	15	186	0	48	6
Total	7500	2336	4047	447	617	53
CY 1996						
	6780					

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Jan	527	195	318	0	14	0
Feb	1507	194	1247	38	27	1
Mar	962	265	648	0	49	0
Apr	394	0	393	0	1	0
May	848	0	802	0	46	0
Jun	646	66	559	0	17	4
Jul	212	0	186	0	26	0
Aug	740	0	693	0	47	0
Sep	218	0	111	23	69	15
Oct	257	0	89	128	40	0
Nov	293	13	277	0	3	0
Dec	176	0	107	0	52	17
Total	6780	733	5430	189	391	37
CY 1997						
Jan	423	0	374	43	5	1
Feb	235	109	105	0	16	5
Mar	130	0	95	0	35	0
Apr	12	0	0	0	10	2
May	58	0	19	0	39	0
Jun	87	0	61	0	18	8
Jul	129	19	0	0	98	12
Aug	292	147	40	69	36	0
Sep	102	0	33	0	69	0
Oct	155	1	144	0	10	0
Nov	502	421	58	0	23	0
Dec	326	77	214	0	35	0
Total	2451	774	1143	112	394	28
CY 1998						
Jan	360	0	310	0	50	0
Feb	198	80	92	0	20	6
Mar	181	10	128	0	43	0
Apr	207	55	85	0	67	0
May	251	90	61	0	100	0
Jun	377	115	0	27	235	0
Jul	174	22	5	0	122	25
Aug	354	70	0	163	108	13
Sep	563	428	0	22	90	23
Oct	572	477	0	0	84	11
Nov	311	80	150	0	72	9
Dec	149	10	0	0	127	12
Total	3697	1437	831	212	1118	99

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CY 1999

Jan	192	34	0	60	70	28
Feb	415	320	17	0	78	0
Mar	325	11	0	57	94	163
Apr	0	0	0	0	0	0
May	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jul	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aug	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sep	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oct	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nov	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dec	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	932	365	17	117	242	191

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Quarterly Interdiction Rate of Maritime Illegal Immigration Events

	Total	HA	DomRep	PRC	CU	Other
FY94	64382	25302	232	288	38560	0
FY95						
Migrants	5345	887	3388	509	525	36
Events	136	14	56	8	50	8
1st Qtr:						
Migrants	871	126	657	62	23	3
Events	23	4	11	3	4	1
2nd Qtr:						
Migrants	1002	36	699	111	151	5
Events	21	1	10	2	7	1
3rd Qtr:	2137	294	1358	178	289	18
Migrants	61	5	23	2	28	3
Events						
4th Qtr:						
Migrants	1335	431	674	158	62	10
Events	31	4	12	1	11	3
FY96						
Migrants	9080	2295	6273	61	411	40
Events	171	16	97	3	48	7
1st Qtr:						
Migrants	3026	1575	1316	0	115	20
Events	46	8	21	0	13	4
2nd Qtr:						
Migrants	2996	654	2213	38	90	1
Events	50	7	31	1	10	1
3rd Qtr:						
Migrants	1888	66	1754	0	64	4
Events	37	1	26	0	9	1
4th Qtr:						
Migrants	1169	0	989	23	142	15

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Events	36	0	18	1	16	1
FY97						
Migrants	2194	288	1200	240	421	45
Events	239	20	56	7	142	14
1st Qtr:						
Migrants	726	13	473	128	95	17
Events	23	1	9	2	9	2
2nd Qtr:						
Migrants	788	109	574	43	56	6
Events	23	2	10	1	8	2
3rd Qtr:						
Migrants	157	0	80	0	67	10
Events	15	0	2	0	11	2
4th Qtr:						
Migrants	523	166	73	69	203	12
Events	29	2	3	1	22	1
FY98						
Migrants	3648	1369	1097	212	903	67
Events	148	15	31	3	92	7
1st Qtr:						
Migrants	983	499	416	0	68	0
Events	25	4	12	0	9	0
2nd Qtr:						
Migrants	739	90	530	0	113	6
3rd Qtr:						
Migrants	835	260	146	27	402	0
Events	52	5	6	1	40	0
4th Qtr:						
Migrants	1091	520	5	185	320	61
Events	48	4	1	2	35	6
FY99						
Migrants	1964	932	167	117	525	223
Events	93	15	5	2	60	11

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1st Qtr:						
Migrants	1032	567	150	0	283	32
Events	46	7	4	0	30	5
2nd Qtr:						
Migrants	932	365	17	117	242	191
Events	47	8	1	2	30	6
3rd Qtr:						
Migrants	0	0	0	0	0	0
Events	0	0	0	0	0	0
4th Qtr:						
Migrants	0	0	0	0	0	0
Events	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Appendix C: Technical Issues

There are three technical issues that are essential for making policy decisions: (1) projected future flows, (2) projected USCG related costs, and (3) the benefits the nation derives from the services provided by USCG in this area. In the end, one wants to know the effect of the USCG's operations in prevention, deterrence, and interdiction in each of the three types of illegal maritime immigration – normal day to day flow, mass migration surges, and professional smuggling. It is particularly useful in terms of cost-benefit analysis to calculate the marginal cost and marginal benefit with respect to each operation and each type of illegal maritime migrants. However, often these operations cannot be totally separated. Interdiction, deterrence and prevention interact with each other in a certain way, which may warrant some sophisticated mathematical and statistical techniques. This section proposes a framework to facilitate these potential studies of technical issues.

Technical Issue 1 Estimating and Projecting Flows

Based on the three categories of illegal maritime immigration - day to day flows, mass migration surges, and professional smuggling - it is clear that we need to develop three somewhat different models to derive improved policy recommendations.

The following econometric models, if developed, could help explain past maritime illegal immigration and, in theory, at least, help predict several future scenarios of illegal immigration flow. Such models could be employed using available data, to be described below.

A model of demand during normal day to day flow periods

We ultimately want to predict normal day to day flows of illegal maritime migrants. Although the INS does make estimates of these flows, they are largely unobserved. For this reason, we will focus our attention on measuring the determinants of the number of migrants interdicted by the Coast Guard, since these data are readily available. Once this equation is estimated, one can infer the number of individuals who actually attempted illegal immigration by sea.

The features of this type of day to day flow of maritime illegal immigration are the following. There is usually a well-defined population in a source country where potential illegal maritime immigrants exist. Due to differences in overall economic and/or political conditions such as lower standard of living or lack of personal freedom, a portion of this population will attempt to take an illegal approach over high seas to reach the U.S. Attempts made by these potential illegal maritime migrants may show certain seasonal pattern such as lower attempts during the hurricane season. Those who attempt may succeed, be lost at sea, may turn back, or be captured by the USCG.

Therefore we can model the level of USCG interdictions as follows:

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$$(1) \quad Y_i = P_i * m_i * \pi_i$$

where

Y_i = level of monthly USCG apprehensions from source country i

P_i = Population at risk of immigrating in undocumented status from source country i to the US

m_i = monthly rate of undocumented immigration from source country i to the US by sea

π_i = probability that an illegal immigrant from source country i is apprehended by the USCG.

Note that only Y_i is directly observed. However, one can identify certain determinants of P_i , m_i and π_i , which in turn will determine Y_i . Determinants of P_i may include, for example, the number and economic well being of 18 to 35 year-old males, and the political or individual freedom of the major source countries (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti and other countries nearby). Determinants of m_i include the impact of seasonality, US law and policy, and law enforcement efforts. The primary determinants of π_i , for a given level of maritime illegal immigration activities, are the Coast Guard resources allocated to the AMIO mission, including both manpower and hard assets such as patrol boats and cutters.

To analyze the policy implications of the model, we can derive the following equation from Equation (1) to see how each component will affect the end result. We have, with some mathematical manipulations,

$$(2) \quad \Delta Y_i / Y_i = \Delta P_i / P_i + \Delta m_i / m_i + \Delta \pi_i / \pi_i.$$

It is clear that resources devoted to prevention are aimed at lowering P_i , resources devoted to deterrence are aimed at lowering m_i ,¹⁰ and resources devoted to interdiction are aimed at raising π_i . From Equation (2), we can see that decreasing the population at risk of immigration in undocumented status from a source country decreases the demand for USCG resources. Similarly, a decrease in the portion of this population that actually attempts an illegal immigration over the high seas to reach the U.S. also decreases the demand for USCG's resources in the AMIO mission. The further complication is that a higher interdiction rate, which requires more resources, as well as more active prevention measures, can deter and thus lower the portion of the population at risk who actually take the illegal trip (m_i).

¹⁰ For example, the most visible routine USCG AMIO patrolling in the Mona Passage deters the otherwise prospectively high rate of immigration from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. Unfortunately, there is no clear requirement as how much patrolling should be carried out overall.

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Thus, there exist obvious tradeoffs between the three operations of prevention, deterrence, and interdiction. We plan to address this issue when we carry out the cost and benefit analyses.¹¹

Mass migration surge periods

A massive migration period usually has its clear defined beginning, duration, and end. It is triggered by either drastic deterioration of economic conditions, sudden political instability that creates unsafe living condition, or a switch of source country's border policy from closed to more permissive, as in China. Massive illegal maritime immigration may last varying lengths of time, depending on how quickly the source country's economic condition, political condition, or border policy is stabilize, and/or how quickly and how effective some measures are taken by the bilateral countries involved, or by the international community.

The general policy implications are obvious. First, effort should be made to prevent this type of situation from ever taking place. Second, as soon as it happens, effort should be made to bring it to an end as soon as possible. Third, the USCG, Navy and U.S. Air Force should play a role in dealing with the situation, although is less clear which Agency should take the lead role and bear the bulk of the expense.

It is generally agreed that the USCG should size its future AMIO effort for the expected normal day to day flow, not for surges.¹² We assume that this understanding is well shared with everyone and thus omit the model building effort here. In general terms, it may be obvious that the cost to size USCG to deal with surges is too high to be efficient.

A model of demand for activities against smugglers

The features of illegal maritime immigrant smuggling are very similar to maritime drug smuggling. First, both involve international crime, operated by criminal organizations. Secondly, these operations can cover a long distance over both oceans to bring illegal immigrants/drugs from far away. The third feature is the variation of routes – from a source country directly to the U.S., from a source country to a third country and then transfer to the US, directly from the high seas, or from high seas to land and then to the US.

The model to study this case will be identical in format to the one expressed with Equations (1) and (2). However, the source countries may be quite different. For this reason we will introduce the subscript j to denote smuggling from source country j . Moreover, the interpretation of each term in equations (1) and (2) will be somewhat different. P_j is now the population at risk of seeking the smuggler's service from the j th country, m_j is the portion of the population at risk actually taking the smuggler's services, and π_j is the fraction of smuggled migrants captured.

¹¹ For example, The USCG Office of Law Enforcement (OPL) has a deterrence model.

¹² An example is the recent success of the Southwest Border Initiative (SBI) in San Diego.

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Again, the USCG has three types of operations to combat professional smugglers: prevention, deterrence, and interdiction. These operations will affect P_j , m_j , and π_j in ways similar to the model dealing with the day to day flow of maritime illegal immigrants. The specific USCG activities involved in prevention, deterrence and interdiction, however, may be quite different.

USCG may be the only suitable agency to be in charge, or take the lead role, of the operations against this type of illegal maritime immigration. The demand for the USCG's services in this area may well require different manpower, training, skill, and assets. It may also require a particular organizational structure of relevant USCG's units. For example, the USCG may want to designate one mission as the "drug and migrant law enforcement" (DMLE) mission, all coming under the same command.

Data available issues

We can collect monthly data on Y_i from the USCG's and INS's records. The USCG can provide the number of monthly illegal maritime migrants interdicted and number of events by source country and by route.

We should be able to collect data from INS records on immigrants who were legalized but were originally illegal maritime migrants. This should help us get a handle on the size of π_i . Events occurring after the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 should provide a valuable source of information on these legalized aliens.

We should also identify data from INS records on those that were deported and were originally illegal maritime migrants. This should also help us get a handle on the size of π_i . The USCG/INS also has estimated monthly "success rates."

Data on successes of illegal maritime immigration, disposition information and other detailed records can be obtained from the Coast Guard.

We will also need data on source countries' characteristics, including the projected "at risk" population. Although the relevant at risk population will not in general be the whole population of the source country, it is noteworthy that the projected population of the PRC will be 1.4 billion in 2020. The populations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic are projected to be 11 million in 2020.

Technical Issue 2 Estimating and Projecting Costs and Benefits

In this section we will address the cost and benefit issues associated with the USCG's operations against illegal maritime immigration and the benefits the nation, or the taxpayers, derive from the services the USCG provides.

Cost studies

To obtain a quantitative measure of the total costs in fighting against maritime illegal immigration, the best approach would be to utilize a modern activity-based cost

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accounting system. Unfortunately the Coast Guard, along with most of the rest of the Federal Government, is at least two years away from having such a system in place. At present the best that can be done is to decompose the total budget into its major components. Based on our previous analyses, a natural decomposition is to consider costs associated operations against day to day flow of maritime illegal immigration, costs associated with the operations during mass migration periods, and costs associated with operations against professional smugglers. Then, operation costs in each situation can be further decomposed into costs associated with the prevention operation, deterrent operation, and interdiction operation respectively. Finally, it may help to further decompose each operation into various personnel costs and costs of various required assets.¹³

For example, when conducting AMIO, both proactive and reactive, assets must be capable of sustained presence. They must have the capability to rescue a large number of people in the event that the typical unseaworthy or overloaded migrant craft sinks or capsizes during the attempted voyage. They should be able to provide humanitarian services (food, water, etc.) as well as be able to detain the rescued/interdicted migrants for varying periods. Finally, proactive patrols require surveillance, boarding teams, and escort capability.

Benefit studies

There are immediate, or direct, benefits the nation derives from the USCG's operation against illegal maritime immigration. There are also extended, or indirect, benefits that can be traced back to the contributions made by USCG's efforts in this aspect.

The direct benefit is the saving from legal process cost associated with each illegal immigrant landed in the US soil. This cost was estimated by the Coast Guard to be \$30,000 per person in 1996¹⁴

While indirect benefits can be easily recognized, it may be hard to put a dollar figure on these benefits. They include, but are not limited to, the effect on the U.S. labor market, the effect on welfare programs, the deterrent effect on the future of illegal maritime immigration from a source country, and the deterrence effect on other potential source countries. Finally, illegal immigration may potentially engage in other illegal activities after they landed in the U.S. soil. So, there are savings from further law enforcement costs.

In the end, the general principle of cost-benefit analysis is that the marginal cost of any action should not exceed the marginal benefit by a very wide margin. More specifically, one needs to forecast the likely flow of illegal immigrants in each of the three categories from all the major source countries. Second, one must estimate the expected benefits

¹³ USCG Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) may provide us with the data needed for the study.

¹⁴ INS may provide us with the data needed for the study. Another USCG study estimated that all illegal immigrants cost U.S. taxpayers 24 billion in 1996.

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derived from each of the Coast Guard's three operations of prevention, deterrence and interdiction. Third, one needs to compute the cost of each of these three operations. Given a fixed Coast Guard budget, it then becomes an optimization problem to see what combination of potential recommendations maximizes benefits net of cost. Thus, optimal goals can be set for each operation and the cost to implement these goals can be computed.¹⁵

¹⁵ For example, PDD-9 specifically directs the USCG to interdict illegal aliens as far from US shores as possible. It would be useful to know the added cost of this approach, if any, compared to an "optimum" approach.

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April 8, 1999**Meeting Minutes**

A meeting of the Interagency Task Force on the Roles and Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard was called to order at 3:20 p.m. on April 8, 1999.

Introductory Matters

The meeting opened with the announcement that Executive Order 13115 was signed by the President on March 25, 1999. The EO identified this group as the Interagency Task Force on the Roles and Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Chair advised the Task Force of several changes in membership. Mr. Houley has left the Department of Defense and will no longer be serving on the Task Force. A replacement from DOD will be named. Mr. Downey has received a detailed out-brief from Mr. Houley. The Task Force will also be losing its Vice Chair, Ms. Higgins, who will be leaving the Department of Labor to become Vice President of the National Trust for Historic Preservation. In addition, the Task Force will be adding members from the Department of Treasury and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The representative from the Department of Treasury is expected to be Mr. James Johnson.

The meeting had originally been planned as a discussion on Drug Interdiction, but scheduling conflicts forced a postponement of that discussion. Instead, the topic for the meeting will be the Deepwater Acquisition Project and a discussion of the "cost drivers" behind this project.

A field trip will take place on April 12 and 13 to Coast Guard units in the area of Portsmouth, Virginia. The trip will include meeting with forces in the Department of Defense and discussions of the relationship between DOD and the Coast Guard. A field trip to San Diego is on schedule for the following weekend.

The Coast Guard has provided responses to many of the questions raised at earlier meetings. A complete set of the materials has been provided to each member.

Deepwater Acquisition Project Brief - Captain Craig Schnappinger (Project Manager)**□ Introduction.**

Admiral Loy introduced Captain Craig Schnappinger as the briefer on Deepwater explaining that the Coast Guard put together a brief that gives the Task Force a contextual understanding of the Deepwater Project and how costs are determined in this procurement.

Captain Schnappinger provided the following materials:

- Briefing Slides (Attachment 1 -- See Deepwater Briefing Book)

- Deepwater System Performance Specification Potential Cost Driver Matrix
- Whitepaper on Potential Deepwater SPS Cost Drivers
- DTCG23-98-R-ADW001; Solicitation
- PRF-ADW-001 REV A; Attachment 0001 - System Performance Specification (SPS) for the Integrated Deepwater System
- Video Tape

□ **Presentation.**

The Coast Guard initially conducted a Mission Analysis Report (MAR) that was followed by a Mission Needs Statement (MNS). A draft SPS was then prepared. OMB and DOD provided additional input. DOD provided the Naval Operational Capabilities (NOC), in light of the Coast Guard's responsibility under 14 USC §§1-3 to augment the Navy during time of war. The Coast Guard integrated these requirements into the SPS.

The SPS addresses fourteen (14) statutory deepwater missions assigned to the Coast Guard falling within four (4) major mission areas: Maritime Safety, National Defense, Maritime Law Enforcement and Maritime Environmental Protection. Five core processes are required for execution of these missions: surveillance, detection, identification, classification and prosecution. These five core processes are imbedded in the System Performance Specifications (SPS) for the Deepwater Project.

Traditionally, costs are associated with the design process of new assets or systems. This is a platform-centric approach. Legacy system cost drivers impact Coast Guard life cycle operating and support costs. The two primary cost drivers for this type of project are personnel and the platform-centric system.

The legacy assets of the Coast Guard were acquired incrementally. A platform replaced a platform. Each platform was designed to be self-sufficient in terms of being able to accomplish its missions. This approach made sense given the available technology. But the technology has changed.

A schematic of the 378' multi-mission platform was used to explain how various systems on a cutter determine the cost/performance trade-offs. The traditional vessel cost drivers are speed/endurance, trade space, sensor suites and weapons. The missions of the Coast Guard each rely on having the capacity to employ some mix of these cost drivers during its operations. The Deepwater SPS anticipates a solution that mitigates the impact of cost drivers.

The report provided by the Task Force is expected to provide input into the SPS. The recommendations will be used to revise the Mission Analysis Report and Mission Needs Statement. If the Task Force, for example, eliminates the need to perform Search and Rescue, the requirements dealing with response to distress calls will be removed.

□ **Discussion.**

During Qs & As, many questions were asked in a desire to understand the costs of capabilities identified in the SPS. The Coast Guard explanations indicated the position that capabilities did not exist until an Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) was proposed by industry. Industry's proposals were to be evaluated against their effectiveness in meeting performance standards vs cost. The Coast Guard specifically believes that personnel as well as Maintenance & Repair (M&R) costs are to be mitigated through use of the SPS. Nevertheless, members indicated a desire to conduct sensitivity analyses and desired an understanding of the variables relevant to the acquisition that may drive up cost. Defense operations were assumed to be a mission cost driver. The brief was described as qualitative and not quantitative.

A spirited discussion ensued regarding whether this focus indicated the Task Force was a budget body or a Policy body. Countering the probing for cost drivers were observations made pertaining to future needs, current gaps, national requirements, and significant mission areas such as national defense. Two approaches emerged. The one termed the Budget Body asks: What are current capabilities? What are Deepwater capabilities? Which enhancements are the most costly? What missions do the most costly enhancements contribute to? The one termed the Policy Body asks: What is the CG doing now? What are potential new requirements? Should the CG be filling these requirements? What are the variables that drive up costs in those areas?

A summary of remarks is attached.

□ **The following members were present:**

Mortimer Downey, Chair
Kathryn Higgins, Vice Chair
Rand Beers
Richard Clarke
James Castello
Michael Deich
James Baker
Timothy Fields
Sally Ericsson
Ronald Minsk
Admiral James Loy

Attachment 2 -- Summary of Qs and As

TF Mbr: *Have you looked at a need for monitoring the ocean bottom?*

CG: *This was discussed, but was not a requirement.*

TF Mbr: *What about rocket platforms or launchers?*

CG: *We ask Task Force members to add these types of things into the Roles & Missions product of the Task Force. Deepwater is not the only operating environment for the Coast Guard.*

TF Mbr: *DOT is having a futuristic look also. They asked me what the world will look like in 20 years. Have futurists looked at this? The Mega-ship of the future is much bigger than the National Capitol Building.*

TF Mbr: *The Office of Naval Intelligence Report is a good document for looking at the future.*

CG: *8,000 person cruise ships are on the drawing board. Cargo ships currently go to Nova Scotia to offload cargo so they can enter the port of New York at less draft. This plays into the requirements set.*

TF Mbr: *It is easy to say rescue cruise ship passengers as a requirement, but how do we translate into a more meaningful statement.*

CG: *SPS addresses that. This group has an opportunity to validate that. We must also look at the present. Can't presume today's assets meet the current need.*

TF Mbr: *If focusing on requirements, should we say, in affirming that we need to rescue passengers on ships, that we should add a requirement for mega ships. Should we say cruise ships are getting bigger, therefore the requirement has changed?*

TF Mbr: *We must also factor in support facilities and training.*

CG: *We've told the consortia to challenge the way we support our platforms. Industry will be evaluated on total ownership costs plus operational effectiveness. Total ownership costs include housing, medical, training, etc. They are looking at all these areas. They are looking at multiple crews, civilian technicians on vessels. We have trouble retaining people due to their marketability.*

CG: *Some of these tasks may be accomplished by contract employees. We spend 66 cents of every OE dollar on personnel costs.*

TF Mbr: *How does it affect the total system costs?*

CG: *The reality is that we can prove the value of spending more up front.*

TF Mbr: *The Deepwater Contract is a thoughtful, flexible document, but we have received qualitative information. We still don't have cost/capability trade-offs. How will the contractor evaluate this. What kind of cost/capability trade-offs do you expect? I'm looking for some kind of evaluation of marginal capabilities. This will affect how we decide what to do. Until we know marginal costs of the different functions, we cannot do what we want to do. For naval operations, certain things are required. If we do not meet the Navy needs, how much is saved. We should be asking what are the capabilities of the current fleet, what are the capabilities of the future fleet, and then look at what aspects of the capabilities are costly.*

CG: *CNA has done a paper close to this issue. There is a huge difference in cost depending upon what capabilities are allowed for.*

TF Mbr: *The Coast Guard could buy something that has limited capacity or much greater. Could we identify the checks on the matrix with a huge variability in cost? These are probably aircraft, ships, C3I, things like that.*

TF Mbr: *Exactly. Do we want the \$8M or \$100M enhancement. We have to determine what those enhancements will be and how much they will cost.*

TF Mbr: *I participated in the review of a NASA \$20B system. When we explored what was behind the request, we often discovered there were no documents. In some cases, the requirement, evaporated. You must be able to show what's behind each check.*

TF Mbr: *We need a sensitivity analysis. We need to know top dollar drivers among those that have variability.*

CG: *This is doable from a platform-centric perspective, but consortia are doing something different.*

TF Mbr: *How are consortia doing that? The contract is good, but are they being told \$5M or \$20M?*

TF Mbr: *How are the satellites included?*

CG: *Satellites may be integrated into their solutions. We then have a process of checking performance against the specifications, and also checking total ownership costs.*

CG: *Each industry member is looking at alternatives whether rehabbing assets or new assets. They plug into their model the design and get cost.*

TF Mbr: *Take as an example p. 26, the speed requirement. We need to know the current speed, what is being sought and the effect of the incremental change on cost.*

CG: *We have given them scenario-based information, this is what we've done in the last 5 years in deep water mission areas. We want a system with the highest operational effectiveness and lowest ownership costs.*

TF Mbr: *Why a 2 hour response time in SAR?*

TF Mbr: *Should be looking at how the specifications differ from the current system. We will all agree that the Coast Guard will keep doing what it does. The existing base versus the add-ons need to be pulled out from this. How do the specifications change the current performance and why?*

TF Mbr: *We may have to adjust performance.*

TF Mbr: *We are not supposed to be budgeteers. There are 14 statutory missions. Are there any we do not want to do? Are there any costs drivers? Do we want a convoy escort from the Coast Guard? We are a national requirements examiner. We must look at these. We may want to say DOD made a mistake in doing away with frigates. National Defense means 5 or 6 things to the Coast Guard. Is this a perversion or is the Coast Guard well suited to accomplish these things. Or should we say that the Navy should do these?*

TF Mbr: *We should be looking at what Coast Guard is doing now, what Deepwater has, and looking at subset of missions with most variable cost drivers.*

TF Mbr: *We should also be looking at the changes since the last Roles & Missions Study.*

TF Mbr: *Isn't DOD the real cost-driver? I looked at a DOD Roles & Mission study in which the Coast Guard is shooting down missiles while sitting offshore.*

TF Mbr: *Have we tasked contractors to look at satellites.*

CG: *This will be addressed by the consortia which includes all segments of industry.*

TF Mbr: *That's the difference between a budget group versus Roles & Missions. Our focus is on what missions to do.*

TF Mbr: *You can't let specifications force you into specific technology.*

CG: *The SPS should avoid that. For example, one requirement is to identify small targets. This is required under 13 or 14 missions. This is now done with manned aerial platforms with associated costs. The consortia can look into satellites as a less costly way of accomplishing this requirement.*

TF Mbr: *The things the Coast Guard does relate to other areas involving other agencies. Nationally, we need the most effective response. How do we put together all agencies, (e.g. NOAA, Coast Guard, NMFS on fisheries) DOD, Customs and the Coast Guard are doing detection and monitoring.*

TF Mbr: *Mission-specific briefings will allow further discussions on this. Define the pie and then figure out shares.*

TF Mbr: *Question to us is what share of the pie belongs to the Coast Guard.*

TF Mbr: *Need to know what percentage of time can the Coast Guard find a target as small as a person. How expensive is it to get to that point. I would like to see another briefing on 1) the Coast Guard's current capabilities, 2) how are those capabilities enhanced by Deepwater, 3) which enhancements are expensive and 4) what missions are involved*

TF Mbr: *This will lead to technology substitutes for people.*

TF Mbr: *Is Deepwater replacing current capabilities or more than that?*

TF Mbr: *We are the Roles and Missions Council. We should be taking each mission and stating 1) what is the Coast Guard doing now, 2) what are others doing 3) should we expand or contract 4) are there any new requirements, 5) should the Coast Guard be doing them and 6) what are the variables that drive up cost?*

TF Mbr: *We are a budget commission. The Executive Order says so. How will we decide which mission to keep depends on how expensive they are. We must consider cost. This must be tied into 1) what does the Coast Guard do now, 2) what does Deepwater have the Coast Guard do*

and 3) how does Deepwater enhance the Coast Guard's current capabilities.

TF Mbr: *How can we answer questions when we don't know what Deepwater will produce?*

TF Mbr: *But we do. That's the beauty of the contract.*

TF Mbr: *Deepwater's purpose is to do things just like today.*

TF Mbr: *We have to know does this world in the SPS differ from what's done today. The process is: 1) what do we have today, 2) what capabilities are in Deepwater and 3) are those the enhancements we should be looking for or are demands changing.*

TF Mbr: *As long as we are not dictating speeds, hours. We should be saying contract out the ice patrol and add something else to drug interdiction.*

TF Mbr: *We have to go through that analysis with a budget emphasis.*

TF Mbr: *1) What are current capabilities, 2) what are the extra capabilities in Deepwater, 3) what capabilities are changes and 4) are they appropriate.*

CG: *We must look at what other agencies are doing and the national requirements set.*

TF Mbr: *I would add that in order to achieve missions, which capabilities do we add, and which do we reduce. The focus is: 1) current capabilities, 2) how changed under Deepwater, 3) national goals, 4) how do enhancements fit into goals and 5) are capabilities contained in Deepwater appropriate.*

CG: *The idea is to meet national requirements.*

TF Mbr: *The specifications do not say what percentage of a mission the Coast Guard should do. They don't say do 100% of the drug mission. If we change the percentage, that will change how much we buy.*

CG: *We are forging a process, but it may be unrealistic.*

CG: *The SPS equates to what we are required to do today. The Deepwater Cost will equal the SPS plus how operationally effective a*

proposal is under the Maritime Operation Simulation (MarOpsSim). This model will allow the Coast Guard to evaluate how well we meet the SPS.

CG: *We have a fourth unbiased entity developing the same thing as the three consortia bidders. The starting point is validating the existing missions. In a future involving regional conflicts, who will do the littoral operations. If you can meet low-end defense mission and do the other 13 missions, then this is true stewardship.*

TF Mbr: *I think we are getting there. The brief and information provided are enormously helpful.*

Next Sessions for the ITF

Drug Interdiction

4 May 1999

2:30 to 6:30 p.m.

at the
Office of National Drug Control Policy
750 17TH Street NW
Washington DC

ONDCP is currently scheduled to provide a brief on :

- National Drug Control goals and strategies
- Supply reduction organization and strategies
- Integration of interdiction efforts and capability requirements within both the Source, Transit and Arrival Zones
- Interdiction mission and asset requirements and any identified gaps
- Comparison of resource requirements vs. actual resource allocation amongst agencies
- Host Nation initiatives: Engagement, and other HN support requirements
- New technology initiatives and potential impacts on supply reduction efforts

FOR ITF MEMBERS:

Can you recommend any other subject matter experts who may appropriately contribute to the discussion and should be invited to either brief the ITF or be present at the meeting?

Do you have any additional topics that should be considered in this session?

National Defense

Late May

1:30 to 5:30 p.m.

at the Center for Naval Analyses (tentatively)

The Secretary of Defense has been asked to provide a briefing on:

- "Military Contingency Requirements: The nature of modern warfare demands that maritime forces be prepared to meet a broadening spectrum of threats to national security. In order to protect our vital national interests, the Coast Guard must be prepared to meet all missions and tasks anticipated in the low threat maritime environment. The "National Fleet" Concept, recently instituted by the Commandant and the CNO, helps to ensure that Coast Guard capabilities match Defense expectations. Of particular interest to the Task Force is the potential use of Coast Guard capabilities to complement Naval assets in a spectrum of contingencies. The Task Force is also very interested in examining emerging requirements for new roles and missions .
- "Engagement: Both the National Military Strategy and the U.S. Strategic Plan for International Affairs depict an expanding portfolio of peacetime engagements intended to shape regional security. Because the Coast Guard has expertise that appeals to non-naval maritime missions, it is important that the Task Force understand the value and contributions which the Coast Guard can bring to CinC engagement strategies and the development of stable maritime services in emerging democratic states. We further seek the insights of principal offices within your Department, as well as the Geographic CinCs, in balancing the Coast Guard contribution to this expanding mission in light of future DOD force levels, composition and core competencies."¹

The brief will be provided by senior representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The individuals will be identified by the Secretary of Defense shortly.

FOR ITF MEMBERS:

Can you recommend any other subject matter experts who may appropriately contribute to the discussion and should be invited to either brief the ITF or be present at the meeting?

Do you have any additional topics that should be considered in this session?

¹ Quoted from ITF letter to SecDef dated 20 April 1999. Further information on specific briefing topics will be provided to the individuals selected by SecDef to meet with the Council.