

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	From: Sean Tarver, To: Multiple Recipients, Re: WHSR [White House Situation Room] Log 18 July 1999 (8 pages)	07/18/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	From: Sean Tarver, To: Multiple Recipients, Re: WHSR [White House Situation Room] Call Log 17 July 1999 (5 pages)	07/18/1999	P1/b(1)
003. email	From: Sean Tarver, To: Multiple Recipients, Re: WHSR [White House Situation Room] Log 17 July 1999 (8 pages)	07/18/1999	P1/b(1)
004. email	From: Bruce Riedel, To: Multiple Recipients, Re: Presidential Call to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee (3 pages)	07/20/1999	P1/b(1)
005. email	From: Donald Camp, To: Felicia Jones, Re: Draft Memcon: POTUS - Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee (6 pages)	07/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([JFK, Jr])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1997 - 07/21/1999]

2017-0713-F

jn239

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/19/97 10:27:06 AM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CTBT UN Kick Off [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gray, Wendy E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Naplan, Steven J.

CARBON_COPY Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowski, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY Tony --

Below is the "communications plan" you folks had put together for our initial roll-out paper, recognizing that scenario is significantly different than the one we are now on. I've also cannibalized what might be relevant portions from that paper, just in case they are helpful to you all today (i.e., draft Op-Ed, Support Group Candidates, Congressional Call List, and Reporters). As I mentioned, it might make sense to announce Monday at the UN we are transmitting "this week," then have an "event" where the President would sign the transmittal package later in the week, with some validators present.

Communication's
Plan for Kick Off Event (as drafted).

1. Op/Ed by Senior Administration Official (See Tab D).
2. CTBT Support Group (plus other "influentials") briefing by APNSA Berger, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary Pena, Director Tenet, others tbd.

3. Briefing for key reporters, columnists and pundits by APNSA Berger, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary Pena, Director Tenet, others tbd. (See Tab E).
4. Mailing of cover letter, fact sheets to editorial boards.
5. Post-event press briefing by APNSA Berger, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary Pena, Director Tenet, others tbd.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Op Ed.doc
Op Ed

6/20/97 4:35 p.m.
CTBT OP-ED
BY "SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL"
[TITLE]

Last September, at the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that have declared possession of nuclear weapons -- all followed suit, and over 140 nations of the world are now signatories. With this accord, we take a giant step toward a safer day, when no nuclear weapons will be detonated anywhere on the face of the earth.

For more than 35 years, American leaders of both parties have sought a ban on nuclear tests. Dwight Eisenhower was the first President to recognize that such a ban would put a powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapons and clear the way to a reduction of the nuclear threat. Indeed, President Eisenhower hoped that a test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country," as historian Stephen E. Ambrose has written. But this dream was dashed by the U-2 affair of 1960 and the increase in East-West tensions.

President John Kennedy took up the cause of a test ban. In 1963, his Administration negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space -- as the first step toward a comprehensive ban. The effort to conclude that ban continued under President Carter but was interrupted by another escalation of Cold War hostility.

President Clinton restarted talks on the test ban. In July 1993 he extended the moratorium on testing begun at the insistence of Congress the year before. Energized by this U.S. initiative, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began work on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. When negotiations reached impasse over the scope of the treaty's prohibition on testing, President Clinton broke the deadlock by announcing U.S. support for a true zero yield ban -- one that would forbid any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The President's decision turned the corner for the treaty, giving new momentum to the negotiations and signaling to the world America's resolve to achieve a truly comprehensive test ban. Last September -- 32 months after the negotiations began -- the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. Few major international agreements have enjoyed such extraordinary support.

Indeed, few treaties have had the profound, positive impact on global security that the Comprehensive Test Ban promises. The signatures of the world's declared nuclear powers -- the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom -- along with the vast majority of nations will constrain efforts to improve existing nuclear weapons and create a formidable barrier to the development of

new generations of weapons. This quest is all the more urgent because of the efforts of rogue states and terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

For the five nuclear weapon states, there will be no way to test more advanced and more destructive devices. For states that do not possess nuclear weapons, the ban on testing will make it more difficult to develop reliable weapons and fit them for sophisticated missiles and bombers. There is no guarantee that a country determined to possess nuclear weapons will not be able to fashion a crude bomb. But the test ban makes it difficult to do more than that.

By helping prevent proliferation and future arms races, the Test Ban Treaty will increase security for the United States and the world in the 21st century. In a more stable, predictable environment prospects will improve for additional reductions in nuclear forces and further advances in nonproliferation.

The Clinton Administration recognizes, however, that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons will remain with us for years to come. That is why, as part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces. The President directed in 1993 that a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program be implemented to help maintain our nuclear deterrent under a test ban.

Along with the Stockpile Stewardship program, President Clinton announced in August 1995 the establishment of concrete safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a test ban treaty. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments and capabilities in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories and test readiness.

Thirty-four years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited

Test Ban Treaty "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the Cold War. Now, with the Comprehensive Test Ban, that light grows brighter. This treaty can bring to an end the era that began in 1945 with a mushroom cloud at Alamogordo; it heralds a new era in which the cloud of nuclear danger can finally be lifted.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents.doc
CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents

I. SUPPORT GROUP CANDIDATES

A. Former Executive/Defense

1. Eisenhower Administration

Christian Herter
Harold Stassen

2. Kennedy/Johnson Administration

Robert McNamara
Clark Clifford
Walt Rostow
Paul Nitze
Paul Warnke
Carl Kaysen (MIT)

3. Nixon/Ford Administration

Henry Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft
Melvin Laird
Donald Rumsfeld
William Rogers
Elliot Richardson

4. Carter Administration

Cyrus Vance
Harold Brown
Brzezinski
Jim Schlesinger
Andrew Young

5. Reagan Administration

Alexander Haig Jr.
George Schultz
John Whitehead
Richard Allen
William Clarke
Robert McFarlane
Frank Carlucci
Kenneth Adelman
Roz Ridgeway
Max Kampelman
William Burns

6. Bush Administration

James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
Arnold Kanter
Robert Zoellick
Robert Kimmit

7. Clinton Administration

Warren Christopher
William Perry
Anthony Lake
John Deutch
Hazel O'Leary
Charles Curtis

B. Former Military

1. Eisenhower
General Andrew Goodpaster

2. Kennedy/Johnson

3. Nixon/Ford
Admiral Bud Zumwalt

4. Carter
General David Jones
General Lew Allen

5. Reagan
General John Vessey
Admiral William Crowe
General John Galvin

6. Bush
General Collin Powell

7. Clinton
General Lee Butler

C. Former Legislative

Senator Dole
Senator Hatfield
Senator Exon
Senator Mitchell
Senator Kassebaum
Senator Baker
Senator Nunn
Senator Rudman
Senator Bradley
Senator Bentsen

D. Scientific

Hans Bethe (Cornell)
Glenn Seaborg (UC Berkeley)
Herb York (UC San Diego)
Sidney Drell (Stanford)
Freeman Dyson (Princeton)
Wolfgang Panofsky (Stanford)
Marshall Rosenbluth (UC San Diego)
Richard Garwin (IBM)
Henry Kendall (MIT)
Val Fitch (Princeton)
Harold Agnew (San Diego)

E. Citizens

Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
George Bush
John F. Kennedy, Jr.
Caroline Kennedy
David Eisenhower, Jr.

II. LIKELY OPPONENTS

Casper Weinberger

Jeanne Kirkpatrick
Richard Perle
Richard Cheney

3

3

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Congressional Call List.doc
CTBT Congressional Call List

Democrats Republicans

Senator Daschle Senator Lott
Senator Biden Senator Helms
Senator Levin Senator Thurmond
Senator Kerry Senator Shelby

Senator Bingaman Senator Domenici
Senator Harkin Senator Lugar
Senator Durbin Senator McCain
Senator Reed Senator Hagel
Senator Feingold Senator Smith (Oregon)
Senator Feinstein Senator Jeffords
Senator Boxer Senator Stevens
Senator Bryan Senator Murkowski
Senator Reid Senator Smith (NH)

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBTReporters.doc
Reporters, Columnists and Pundits

Associated Press

Barry Schwied

New York Times

Steve Myers
Tim Weiner
Tom Friedman

Wall Street Journal

Carla Anne Robbins

Washington Post

Jeffrey Smith
Tom Lippman

Los Angeles Times

Tyler Marshall

Washington Times

Warren Strobel

Reuters

Carol Giacomo

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/10/98 11:38:26 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Eisenhower Quote on CTBT Fact Paper [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Blinken, Antony J.
Bell, Robert G.
Farrar, Jay C.

CARBON_COPY Leavy, David C.

TEXT_BODY My recollection is that, when JFK Jr. said "no" last fall, we decided not to pursue David Eisenhower on his own at that time. But, in the words of a great Minnesotan, times, they are a changing, and I think we should consider pursuing a David Eisenhower Op Ed on its own merits, in particular, given our suspicions that Treaty opponents might challenge the "Ike legacy." Let me find out where he is...

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.
Sent: Tuesday,
March 10, 1998 10:36 AM
To: Bell, Robert G.; Andreassen, Steven P.;
Farrar, Jay C.
Cc: Leavy, David C.
Subject: RE: Eisenhower Quote
on CTBT Fact Paper [UNCLASSIFIED]

JFK Jr. said no. Someone else
was working David Eisenhower...

-----Original Message-----

From: Bell,
Robert G.
Sent: Monday, March 09, 1998 5:56 PM
To: Andreassen,
Steven P.; Farrar, Jay C.
Cc: Blinken, Antony J.; Leavy, David C.
Subject: RE:
Eisenhower Quote on CTBT Fact Paper [UNCLASSIFIED]

Your email

reminds me: where are we (anywhere?) in getting a Joe Kennedy, Jr/David Eisenhower op-ed? That would be a great complement to the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchel

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op-ed for the late April time frame. Who knows either of these gentlemen on a personal/working professional level?

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.

Sent: Monday, March 09, 1998 5:53 PM

To: Farrar, Jay
C.

Cc: Bell, Robert G.

Subject: RE: Eisenhower Quote on CTBT Fact
Paper [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Jay -- There is no question that Ike supported a comprehensive test ban...the record is filled with information and quotes to that effect, and there is absolutely no way the Republicans can change that fact...THAT SAID, as Bob pointed out, Ike conducted experiments with nuclear yields during the 1958-61 moratorium, so one could claim that he might have supported a CTBT that permitted such experiments...THAT SAID, I would LOVE for the Republicans to try and make the case that Eisenhower did not support a test ban, or the hypothetical case that he would not have supported a test ban without "provision x or y" in the Treaty, as we could bury them in an avalanche of historical "big picture" quotes to repudiate that argument, and perhaps even generate an Op Ed from his biographer, Stephen Ambrose, or his son/grandson/granddaughter.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Farrar, Jay C.

Sent: Monday, March 09, 1998
5:27 PM

To: Andreassen, Steven P.

Subject: RE: Eisenhower Quote
on CTBT Fact Paper [UNCLASSIFIED]

Steve, on your suspicions -
you are on the money - they are looking for anything to poke holes in Administration positions. Especially any printed material used to support CTBT. BUT, I'm assuming all of the material was thoroughly researched and will stand up to scrutiny.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.

Sent: Monday, March 09, 1998 3:13 PM
To: Farrar, Jay
C.
Cc: Bell, Robert G.; Naplan, Steven J.; Blinken, Antony J.
Subject: RE:
Eisenhower Quote on CTBT Fact Paper [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Jay

--

Our "glossy print" CTBT fact sheets that we have been handing out on the Hill include on each page a set of quotes from Clinton, Kennedy and Ike. The Ike quote reads:

* "[not achieving a nuclear test ban] would have to be classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration -- of any decade -- of any time and of any party...".

In addition (although less likely as a source for Ralski's interest), we have previously circulated to the press and others a broader set of quotes from Clinton, Kennedy and Ike. The Ike quotes in this two-pager were:

* "I am of the belief that, if you could have a ban on all [nuclear] testing that everybody could have confidence in, it would be a very, very fine thing to stop this." and "With both sides of this divided world in possession of unbelievably destructive weapons, mankind approaches a state where mutual annihilation becomes a possibility. No other fact of today's world equals this in importance... We must strive to break the calamitous cycle... which, if unchecked, could spiral into nuclear disaster; the ultimate insanity... we must find somewhere to begin... Another avenue may be through the reopening... of negotiations looking to a controlled ban on the testing of nuclear weapons."

Steve Naplan might be able to provide a more specific cite (Steve -- let me know what it is, so we know what the Republicans are working with). FYI -- My suspicion here is that there are Republican staffers who will attempt to challenge whether Eisenhower was indeed a supporter of a CTBT -- or, less ambitious in terms of rewriting the historical record, make the case that Ike would not have supported a "zero yield" CTBT. It would not surprise me if Kugler et al attempt to challenge the Ike pedigree next week during the Cochran-Holum CTBT hearing.

Steve

-----Original

Message-----

From: Farrar, Jay C.

Sent: Monday, March 09, 1998
2:31 PM

To: Andreasen, Steven P.

Subject: Eisenhower Quote on CTBT
Fact Paper [UNCLASSIFIED]

Steve,

Michael Ralski - one of Mitch

Kugler's protege's called asking about a CTBT fact sheet containing a quote from Eisenhower - I'm not sure which paper he was quoting from and haven't seen. Anyway, he's looking for the full text the quote came from - any help here?

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Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([JFK, Jr])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1997 - 07/21/1999]

2017-0713-F
jn239

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/20/99 11:25:08 AM

FROM Sanborn, Daniel W. (Press)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT July 20 NSC Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Sanborn, Daniel W. (Press)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Boulton, Darrien D. (VP)
Brody, Richard J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H.
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Hilty, Joanne M. (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT jul20gui_.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

July 20, 1999

EUROPE / RUSSIA

Sarajevo Conference (updated)
Trip Announcement

Northern Ireland

Kosovo (updated)
Unexploded Ordinances
Who is Running Kosovo?
Dissent
Incidents
KLA Activities

NEAR EAST / SOUTH ASIA

India-Pakistan (updated)
POTUS Call to PM Vajpayee

Iran (new)

ASIA

China/Taiwan / One China Policy (updated)
President Jiang Call
WTO Accession

INTERAMERICAN

Colombia / Suspension of Peace Talks (updated)

NONPROLIFERATION

CTBT (new)

SARAJEVO CONFERENCE

July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: The President will attend a Summit in Sarajevo on July 30, accompanied by Secretary Albright and other senior Administration officials. The President and German Chancellor Schroeder announced on June 21 at the U.S.-EU Summit their desire to convene such a conference to give "strong dynamism" to the Stability Pact and to "get the people of the region to work together to define their own future." The conference is scheduled to begin July 29 with preliminary sessions for the countries of the region.

What do you hope to accomplish next week in Sarajevo?

* The Sarajevo Summit should:

* launch Stability Pact in highly visible and symbolic way;

* promote vision of region founded on cooperation and integration with Europe;

* encourage SEE countries to cooperate in developing shared strategy for stability and growth;

* demonstrate Serbia's isolation under Milosevic;

* advance Dayton implementation.

* The nations of southeast Europe have expressed their commitment to leave behind

a century filled with violence and division to join a stable, democratic Europe with the hope of enduring peace and prosperity in the new millennium. Last month, the European Union adopted a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe to assist them with that commitment. Along with the leaders of the European Union and the G-8, the President will meet with regional leaders in Sarajevo later this month to show concrete support for these initiatives.

* We have emphasized that NATO's success in Kosovo is a first step towards creating a Europe that is undivided and at peace, one that is founded on democracy and cooperation and that rejects nationalism and strife. The President is going to encourage this shared vision of Europe united and free.

* The Balkans conferences of Europe's past led to "Balkanization". By contrast, this conference will respond to the climate of cooperation and to the initiatives the countries of the region themselves bring to the table. For that reason, the U.S., EU and G-8 leaders will come to the table to hear what the countries of southeast Europe plan in order to improve the climate for outside investment, strengthen democracy, and bring about true cooperation in the region.

* Milosevic shares none of these goals and for that reason Serbia cannot participate.
Are you still determined that Serbia won't get a dime of aid until Milosevic resigns?

* No aid for reconstruction.

* We have always said that Serbia will receive humanitarian aid but not "one red cent" for reconstruction.

* Looking at ways to support democratic opposition, including at the local level.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 19, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton's Trip to Southeast Europe

President Clinton will travel to Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina on Friday, July 30 to participate in the Southeast Europe Stability Pact Summit. The Summit, sponsored by the European Union and hosted by the Bosnian Presidency, will gather over thirty heads of state and government from Europe and North America committed to southeast Europe's political and economic recovery and integration into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream.

The leaders will discuss ways to strengthen peace and stability, deepen democracy and civil society, and promote economic reforms throughout southeast Europe. Spreading democracy and encouraging trade and investment in the region will be two important points of discussion. The meeting will also provide an opportunity to assess progress in Bosnia's peaceful transformation to a democratic, multi-ethnic state through implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.

All the leaders of southeast Europe will be invited to participate, with the exception of President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The United States is committed to assist in the FRY's reintegration into Europe, but only after there is a government in Belgrade that is committed to democracy, human rights and international cooperation.

30-30-30

NORTHERN IRELAND
July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Prime Ministers Blair and Ahern meet with Senator Mitchell in London today to decide the timing and structure of a review of implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, following last week's impasse over IRA decommissioning. The review is expected to take place in early fall.

What do you expect to come out of today's summit in London?

* We anticipate the Irish and British governments will decide when to hold their review of implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, and how best to structure that review in order to achieve its goal of full implementation of the Agreement. We welcome Senator Mitchell's involvement in these discussions, and hope they will lead to speedy implementation of the accord.

Does this mean Senator Mitchell is now fully involved in the talks again for the long-term?

* You would have to ask Senator Mitchell and the two governments that question. Certainly he has indicated his willingness to be helpful in facilitating the review, but it is premature to speculate on how long his involvement will last.

Isn't it unrealistic to think that the IRA will complete the disarmament (decommissioning) process by May 2000, as spelled out in the Agreement?

* Decommissioning is one of many key components of the Good Friday Agreement, along with power sharing, constitutional reform, human rights, policing, etc. We urge all the parties to implement the Agreement in all its aspects within the timeframe spelled out in the accord.

Who do you expect to replace Mo Mowlam as Northern Secretary in the cabinet reshuffle expected late this month?

* Refer to British government. Mowlam has done excellent job.

KOSOVO

July 20, 1999

How is KFOR deployment going?

* KFOR deployment is over 34000 from 21 nations.

* It includes: 8000 British

5300 American

5000 French

4700 Italians

4300 Germans

1500 Russians

1500 Dutch

900 Spanish

720 Polish (in U.S. sector)

1000 Turkish (in German sector)

530 Canadians (in U.K. sector)

525 Greek (in U.S. sector)

and others.

* There are an additional 8000 other troops in FYROM under General Jackson's command.

* In recent days troops from the United Arab Emirates, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, and Denmark have arrived.

* Now that U.S. Army forces have relieved them, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit is beginning to withdrawal from Kosovo.

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCES (July 20, 1999)

Context: A Washington Post story appeared July 19 highlighting the problem of the unexploded ordnance from the air campaign, particularly cluster bomblets.

* The U.S. government believes unexploded ordnance and land mines are a serious threat in Kosovo, and is contributing to a vigorous public information campaign to warn Kosovars to take precautions. It is also working with contractors and NGOs to provide for mine and ordnance clearance.

* Before the conflict in Kosovo ended, the U.S. awarded a grant of almost \$350000 to UNICEF for mine awareness education in the refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia, so that refugees would fully understand the danger landmines and UXO present.

* On specifics, we refer you to the Department of Defense.
"WHO'S RUNNING KOSOVO?" (July 20, 1999)

A Washington Post article of July 16 asks "who's running Kosovo?" It alleges a power vacuum as KFOR defers to UNMIK which the KLA and local populace do not take seriously.

* As dictated by UNSCR 1244, UNMIK is in charge.

* KFOR is provided interim security as UNMIK is fully established. The reasoning behind KFOR's immediate entry into Kosovo concurrent with Serb departure was to fill the power vacuum. KFOR will continue to serve this purpose until UNMIK is fully established.

* The Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, arrived last week, accompanied by his principal deputy, American Jock Covey, and other personnel. Kouchner announced a comprehensive agenda on arrival which prioritized humanitarian needs and the restoration of public functions and law and order.

* Interim SRSG de Mello has continued to meet with prominent Albanians and Serbs, most recent Ibrahim Rugova on his return to Kosovo and Serbian Orthodox leaders.

* There are now 172 UN police in Kosovo. The plan is for 1000 to be deployed by the end of July. Almost 2500 civil police have already been pledged by nations to the UN, of a target of 3100, and deployment will begin next week.

- * These UN police have begun to join patrols.
- * The OSCE is beginning to recruit members of new Kosovo Police Force and is planning first intake of recruits to the police academy at Vucitrn in mid-August. The first five-week course will comprise 150 students. OSCE has started to select trainers.
- * On June 28, the UN de Mello took significant steps towards establishing interim police and justice systems, appointing legal experts to select judges and deploying first international police. These judges have begun addresses the cases of those KFOR has detained and charged with wrongdoing.
- * Meanwhile, the KLA is showing signs of full compliance with its undertaking to demilitarize. For example, few KLA members wear their uniforms or insignia anymore though they allowed to do so until September.
- * We are confident that the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the international community, working with the people of Kosovo, will work through many of the difficult issues raised in the article. It is noteworthy that this was an article about implementation of peace, not the continuation of Mr. Milosevic's campaign of ethnic terror.

DISSENT (July 19, 1999)

CONTEXT: In the first protest organized by his Serbian Renewal Party, Vuk Draskovic led a rally in Kragujevac in central Serbia attended by 20,000. He called for Milosevic to step down and for a transitional government to end Western sanctions and prepare free elections. He also counseled against violent change. "Civil-war wounds last the longest and heal the hardest," Draskovic warned. "Serbia must avoid the danger of civil war."

There is mounting criticism of Milosevic within Serbia as demonstrations increase

and opposition leaders speak out. Are you encouraged by this? Do you think Milosevic will be forced to step down? What are you doing to promote this movement?

* We are heartened that the Serb people are coming to grips with what happened in Kosovo.

* As the full extent of Milosevic's self-destructive policies come to light, the Serb people are beginning to express their wish for an end to nationalist agitation. As a result, Milosevic has promised the integration into the European mainstream. Unfortunately this can only happen with Milosevic out of office.

* We have always opposed the cynical manipulation of nationalist sentiment and stated many times our support for Serbia's democratization.

* It is too early to predict how long Milosevic can maintain his control.

* We are taking many steps to encourage democratization in Serbia but no one has provided more incentives for political change in Serbia than President Milosevic himself. Serbia will receive no reconstruction aid from the United States with Milosevic in power.

* NATO's airstrikes implied no quarrel with the Serbian people.

* The goal of our policy is a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and at peace.

INCIDENTS (July 19, 1999)

How were the U.S. servicemen killed?

* Two U.S. KFOR members were killed and three injured as the result of an accident near Domorovce. The injured were evacuated to Camp Bondsteel for treatment. The accident was tragic. It occurred when the armed personnel carrier in which the soldiers were travelling overturned. The incident is under investigation.

* We offer heartfelt condolences to the families of the deceased.

Do these events signal an absence of security?

- * We continue to receive reports of some incidents but they are exceptional. As KFOR deployments have risen their coverage is more complete and their response is more comprehensive.

- * On June 28, the UN Acting SRSG de Mello took significant steps towards establishing interim police and justice systems, appointing legal experts to select judges and deploying first international police.

- * There are now 172 UN police in Kosovo. The plan is for 1000 to be deployed by the end of July. Almost 2500 civil police have already been pledged by nations to the UN, of a target of 3100, and deployment will begin next week.

- * The OSCE is planning first intake of recruits to the police academy at Vucitrn in mid-August. The first five-week course will comprise 150 students. OSCE has started to select trainers.

KLA ACTIVITIES (July 12, 1999)

What is the status on KLA demilitarization?

- * The KLA committed that as of the midnight deadline Monday its members would not carry automatic small arms outside authorized assembly areas and would establish verifiable and secure weapons storage sites.

- * Leadership and the great bulk of the KLA continue to show broad compliance with the terms of the undertaking.

- * The wearing of military uniforms and insignia (due to end in September) has already generally ceased.

- * We see no signs of intentional non-compliance among leadership.

- * We recognize that the KLA may have problems transmitting instructions to all its members dispersed throughout Kosovo. Even so, many KLA personnel have vacated fighting positions, and have moved to assembly areas, dropped weapons and uniforms, and left.

- * The KLA is also assisting KFOR with mine clearance.

- * KFOR will be as rigorous in its enforcement of the KLA undertaking as it was in enforcing Serb forces' withdrawal from Kosovo.

- * The KLA's next deadline is July 20.

The military has said very clearly that they need to accelerate the KFOR deployment. Have you pushed the deployment timetable forward so that more resources get to Kosovo to avoid a vacuum on the ground?

- * US deployment is on track.

- * KFOR numbers continue to rise everyday and are approaching 25000 in Kosovo.

- * As KFOR coverage becomes more comprehensive, we are not seeing violence and reprisals of the kind we saw in the first days after the air strikes ended.

- * Additional American forces from Germany are currently arriving.

- * NATO is looking at ways to accelerate allied deployments.

It appears that the refugees refused to wait for UN help and went home anyway. Has this caused any problems on the ground and is this a sign that, like Bosnia, those responsible for civilian implementation will fail to act quickly enough, causing civilian implementation to lag behind what is needed?

- * Albanians have returned rapidly and against the advice of UNHCR and NATO. As a result, there have been some injuries due to landmines and booby-traps because

areas were not secured in advance.

* There were some traffic jams and road congestion in the first days of return but these problems have dissipated.

* Daily returns are proceeding now at a manageable level.

* Civil implementation for Kosovo is a large task; there is a big job ahead. However, we are encouraged at the speedy response that we have seen thus far from the UN, the EU, and the OSCE.

* We expect steady progress to be made over the next several months as these organizations expand their capacity within Kosovo.

* US is doing its part. Secretary Albright has announced commitment of 450 police to the UN civil police force.

* Even with the rapid returns into Kosovo, there are no people starving and we are doing everything we can to ensure that the returnees will have adequate shelter this winter.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Pakistani-supported infiltrators have departed the Indian side of the Line of Control and India has declared the crisis in Kargil to be over. Artillery fire continues along the Line in Kashmir, as has been normal over the last several years. The President has written to the Pakistani prime minister and is calling Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee today, urging both to return to the Lahore Process. .

Has Prime Minister Sharif fulfilled his commitment to President Clinton to

restore the Line of Control in Kashmir?

* Indian officials reported over the weekend that the Line of Control in the Kargil region has been restored, with infiltrators gone from the Indian side. We welcome this development. Both India and Pakistan deserve credit for their cooperation in ending this crisis.

Is the U.S. now prepared to mediate the Kashmir dispute?

* The United States is not mediating this issue. The President committed to Prime Minister Sharif to take a personal interest in encouraging a resumption and intensification of the Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue. In that context, we would hope for an early return to the Lahore process in which both countries would discuss all issues dividing them, including Kashmir.

Is there a Presidential trip to South Asia in the works?

* In his July 4 joint statement with Prime Minister Sharif, the President stated his intent to travel to South Asia, but a date for a visit has not been set.

POTUS CALL TO PM VAJPAYEE

CONTEXT: The President called the Indian Prime Minister this morning in order to offer his appreciation for India's restraint during the crisis in Kargil, and to express his pleasure that respect for the Line of Control had been restored in the Kargil area.

* He stressed his view that a strong bilateral dialogue (the Lahore process) between India and Pakistan was important for long-term peace in the region. The President also reaffirmed his intention to visit South Asia.

* At the end of the cordial, 15-minute conversation, PM Vajpayee offered his condolences for the death of JFK Jr. which he described as a loss to his many friends around the world, including in India.

IRAN: UNREST AND CLAIMS OF US INVOLVEMENT

July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Iranian Press are reporting that at least one of those arrested in last week's crackdown on pro-democracy protests has confessed to links with US and Israeli intelligence.

Do you have any comment on the Iranian claims that the US incited the pro-democracy protests in Iran last week?

* The assertion is ludicrous and we reject such accusations.

* We have made clear that we are concerned by any use of violence to put down demonstrations in support of freedom of expression and the rule of law anywhere in the world, including Iran.

* We call on Iran to respect international human rights standards, including the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.

What about the charge that at least one of those arrested has admitted to ties to the US government? Isn't it true that some of those arrested have traveled to the United States to promote their political agendas?

* I don't know where these individuals traveled or whom they met.

* All I can tell you is that the US government had nothing whatsoever to do with these demonstrations.

CHINA/TAIWAN: ONE CHINA POLICY

July 20, 1999

Has Taiwan abandoned the "one China" policy?

- * President Lee Teng-hui has issued a statement indicating that Taiwan's cross-Strait policy is unchanged despite his introduction of the idea of "state-to-state" basis for cross-Strait discussion. The Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council has also reaffirmed Taiwan's goal of eventual reunification.

- * Refer you to Taiwan authorities for elaboration.

Does Lee Teng-hui's statement today resolve the cross-Strait situation?

- * Have seen press reports; refer you to Taiwan for authoritative statement.

- * Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui reportedly explained that he was not seeking independence by calling for state-to-state relations in cross-Strait dialogue. He reportedly said "one China" is still possible, but only one that has a democratic system of government. Until then, he indicates there are two Chinese states that should have equal status.

- * American policy is clear: we have a one-China policy, we expect a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait issues, and we strongly encourage dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.

Has the USG communicated with the Taiwan and PRC authorities?

- * Outgoing Director of American Institute in Taiwan Darryl Johnson met with President Lee. Stressed continuing U.S. commitment to "one China" policy and strong support for productive cross-Strait dialogue.

- * Frequent communication with both sides. Have urged PRC to advance cross-Strait dialogue as the best means to resolve differences with Taipei.

FYI: Taiwan's position on reunification preceding Lee's July 9 statement has four key points:

- * there exists currently one, divided China

- * the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are two equal political entities
- * China's sovereignty is "shared" by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
- * There will be no reunification with the PRC until the mainland becomes fully democratic.

PRESIDENT JIANG CALL

Can you characterize the POTUS's call with Chinese President Jiang? Did he threaten to use military force to resolve the Taiwan issue?

- * The POTUS called Jiang to express his concern about developments in cross-Strait situation, to urge that the door to cross-Strait dialogue remain open, and to affirm America's long-standing "one China" policy.
- * Jiang assured him that the PRC's fundamental approach to resolving the Taiwan question remains peaceful reunification.
- * Refusal to renounce the use of force is part of PRC's long-standing position. That hasn't changed, and the PRC has made that clear.
- * His message to Jiang was that deterioration of the atmosphere in the Strait serves no one's interest.
- * We will continue discussions with Taipei and Beijing over the coming week to urge that next round of dialogue be scheduled. Direct discussion between Taipei and Beijing is the key to resolving issues between them.

WTO ACCESSION

CONTEXT: Responding to NYT (p.A6) article "U.S. to Resume Trade Talks with Beijing"

Is China ready to re-engage in negotiations on its WTO accession?

* There is no change in China's position. We remain prepared to resume our talks with the Chinese when they are prepared to do so. We believe China's entry into the WTO on strong commercial terms is in both countries' interest.

Is Commerce Under Secretary Aaron going to Beijing this week to resume WTO talks?

* No. The purpose of this visit is to prepare for an annual meeting between our Secretary of Commerce and China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) that focuses on our commercial relationship. This meeting usually occurs in the fall. (There is no date set yet).

Do you take this as a good sign?

* We support resumption of normal contacts between our officials.

COLOMBIA: SUSPENSION OF PEACE TALKS

July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Progress in the Colombian peace process has been painfully slow over the past several months. A fresh round of talks was due to start yesterday but were postponed indefinitely late Saturday after the FARC and the government failed to agree on the creation of a team of international observers to monitor the talks. The peace process in Colombia, as in many countries, will be protracted and have its shares of ups and downs. We will continue to support Pastrana's efforts without becoming involved in every twist and turn.

Any comment on the indefinite postponement of substantive talks between the Colombian government and the FARC?

* We continue to support the Colombian peace process and are disappointed by the postponement of the talks. Given Colombia's 40-year history of civil conflict, the peace process is bound to take time and to encounter many obstacles.

* We remain convinced that a negotiated settlement is the best way to end Colombia's long-running conflict. A purely military solution is simply not viable, given Colombia's vast size, the limited infrastructure in its interior, and the complex factors that have allowed a guerrilla presence for two generations.

* We also remain convinced that the peace process is also integral to long-run prospects for fighting narcotics trafficking, reducing kidnappings, restoring respect for human rights, and putting the Colombian economy back on a sustainable, high-growth trajectory.

* However, in order for the peace process to succeed, all parties must participate fully and in good faith. We regret that the FARC continues to engage in kidnappings and attacks that result in civilian casualties. We remain hopeful that the composition and mandate of the international observer teams can be agreed upon soon and that the substantive talks will begin.

Does this latest setback indicate that Pastrana is pursuing a mistaken strategy and giving up too much for too little?

* We strongly support President Pastrana's efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end Colombia's civil conflict. He was elected on a peace platform and won by the widest margin of victory in recent Colombian history.

* We never expected that a peace settlement with the guerrilla groups could be achieved quickly. Lessons from similar disputes elsewhere suggest that the start-up phase of talks is particularly prone to violence as groups position themselves for the negotiations.

(IF ASKED): Any comment on reports that General McCaffrey is requesting \$1 billion in emergency assistance to bolster Colombia's anti-drug efforts?

* The Administration has been and remains strongly committed to providing assistance to the Colombian government, particularly for their counter-drug and related law enforcement programs.

* However, we have no comment at this stage on any proposal to provide additional assistance to Colombia for counter-drug or other purposes.

CTBT
July 20, 1999

Why are you adding this event on quickly and making a big push on this treaty now?

- * Top foreign policy priority of this administration. President signed treaty in Sept. '96 and listed in State of the Union as important to our national security interests.

- * Treaty's importance has recently been highlighted by fighting in Kashmir, where tensions between two states with nuclear weapons capabilities rose threatening our interests.

- * Concerns over nuclear espionage have led many to draw the right conclusion that this Treaty can constrain states from developing advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.

- * Fourth, a conference of states that have ratified the Treaty will take place this October if the Treaty has not entered into force; for America to be a full participant at that conference, and we need to ratify ourselves to do so.

- * Finally, the American public overwhelmingly supports ratification.

What about Senator Helms' demand that you first submit the Kyoto Treaty and certain ABM and START-related accords?

- * We have made our position on Kyoto clear: we will not submit that Treaty until developing nations have agreed to meaningful participation in this important environmental regime.

- * With respect to the ABM agreements, the President has made clear that he will submit that package as soon as the Russian Duma ratifies the START II Treaty, a goal to which President Yeltsin recommitted himself earlier this month.

- * So the time for the Senate to act on the CTBT is now.

What will happen if the Treaty remains stalled in the Foreign Relations Committee?

* The U.S. leadership role in the world on arms control and nonproliferation issues will be weakened, and we will miss an opportunity to enhance our own national security.

Are you confident we can maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent absent actual nuclear tests?

* Yes.

* The President has been assured by the directors of our nuclear labs that we can meet this challenge.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/21/99 8:08:22 AM

FROM Camp, Donald A. (NESA)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: UPDATES for NSC Guidance (7/21) [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Sanborn, Daniel W. (Press)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K. (NESA)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Katulis, Brian M. (NESA/INTERN)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

TEXT_BODY

Added a contingency q and a: Will there be a corresponding call to Prime Minister Sharif?

* We remain in close touch with Islamabad.

Also
in the Vajpayee call section, the sentence you have under "context"
describing the purpose of the call could equally well be used as
a talking point, if you want to be more informative; that's what
we intended when we provided it yesterday.

-----Original Message-----

From: Sanborn,
Daniel W. (Press)
Sent: Tuesday, July 20, 1999 6:27 PM
To: @ALLNSC
- NSC Staff
Subject: UPDATES for NSC Guidance (7/21) [UNCLASSIFIED]

Please
send your 7/21 NSC Press Guidance updates to @PRESS by 10am. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

jul20gui_.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

July 20, 1999

EUROPE / RUSSIA

Sarajevo Conference (updated)
Trip Announcement

Northern Ireland

Kosovo (updated)
China Compensation (new)
Unexploded Ordinances
Who is Running Kosovo?
Dissent
Incidents
KLA Activities

NEAR EAST / SOUTH ASIA

India-Pakistan (updated)
POTUS Call to PM Vajpayee

Iran (new)

ASIA

China/Taiwan / One China Policy (updated)
President Jiang Call
WTO Accession

INTERAMERICAN

Colombia / Suspension of Peace Talks (updated)

NONPROLIFERATION

CTBT (new)

SARAJEVO CONFERENCE
July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: The President will attend a Summit in Sarajevo on July 30, accompanied by Secretary Albright and other senior Administration officials. The President and German Chancellor Schroeder announced on June 21 at the U.S.-EU Summit their desire to convene such a conference to give "strong dynamism" to the Stability Pact and to "get the people of the region to work together to define their own future." The conference is scheduled to begin July 29 with preliminary sessions for the countries of the region.

What do you hope to accomplish next week in Sarajevo?

- * The Sarajevo Summit should:
 - * launch Stability Pact in highly visible and symbolic way;
 - * promote vision of region founded on cooperation and integration with Europe;
 - * encourage SEE countries to cooperate in developing shared strategy for stability and growth;
 - * demonstrate Serbia's isolation under Milosevic;
 - * advance Dayton implementation.
- * The nations of southeast Europe have expressed their commitment to leave behind a century filled with violence and division to join a stable, democratic Europe with the hope of enduring peace and prosperity in the new millennium. Last month, the European Union adopted a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe to assist them with that commitment. Along with the leaders of the European Union and the G-8, the President will meet with regional leaders in Sarajevo later this month to show concrete support for these initiatives.
- * We have emphasized that NATO's success in Kosovo is a first step towards creating a Europe that is undivided and at peace, one that is founded on democracy and cooperation and that rejects nationalism and strife. The President is going to encourage this shared vision of Europe united and free.

* The Balkans conferences of Europe's past led to "Balkanization". By contrast, this conference will respond to the climate of cooperation and to the initiatives the countries of the region themselves bring to the table. For that reason, the U.S., EU and G-8 leaders will come to the table to hear what the countries of southeast Europe plan in order to improve the climate for outside investment, strengthen democracy, and bring about true cooperation in the region.

* Milosevic shares none of these goals and for that reason Serbia cannot participate.
Are you still determined that Serbia won't get a dime of aid until Milosevic resigns?

* No aid for reconstruction.

* We have always said that Serbia will receive humanitarian aid but not "one red cent" for reconstruction.

* Looking at ways to support democratic opposition, including at the local level.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 19, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton's Trip to Southeast Europe

President Clinton will travel to Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina on Friday, July 30 to participate in the Southeast Europe Stability Pact Summit. The Summit, sponsored by the European Union and hosted by the Bosnian Presidency, will gather

over thirty heads of state and government from Europe and North America committed to southeast Europe's political and economic recovery and integration into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream.

The leaders will discuss ways to strengthen peace and stability, deepen democracy and civil society, and promote economic reforms throughout southeast Europe. Spreading democracy and encouraging trade and investment in the region will be two important points of discussion. The meeting will also provide an opportunity to assess progress in Bosnia's peaceful transformation to a democratic, multi-ethnic state through implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.

All the leaders of southeast Europe will be invited to participate, with the exception of President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The United States is committed to assist in the FRY's reintegration into Europe, but only after there is a government in Belgrade that is committed to democracy, human rights and international cooperation.

30-30-30

NORTHERN IRELAND
July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Prime Ministers Blair and Ahern meet with Senator Mitchell in London today to decide the timing and structure of a review of implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, following last week's impasse over IRA decommissioning. The review is expected to take place in early fall.

What do you expect to come out of today's summit in London?

* We anticipate the Irish and British governments will decide when to hold their review of implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, and how best to structure that review in order to achieve its goal of full implementation of the Agreement. We welcome Senator Mitchell's involvement in these discussions, and hope they will lead to speedy implementation of the accord.

Does this mean Senator Mitchell is now fully involved in the talks again for the long-term?

* You would have to ask Senator Mitchell and the two governments that question. Certainly he has indicated his willingness to be helpful in facilitating the review, but it is premature to speculate on how long his involvement will last.

Isn't it unrealistic to think that the IRA will complete the disarmament (decommissioning) process by May 2000, as spelled out in the Agreement?

* Decommissioning is one of many key components of the Good Friday Agreement, along with power sharing, constitutional reform, human rights, policing, etc. We urge all the parties to implement the Agreement in all its aspects within the timeframe spelled out in the accord.

Who do you expect to replace Mo Mowlam as Northern Secretary in the cabinet reshuffle expected late this month?

* Refer to British government. Mowlam has done excellent job.

KOSOVO
July 20, 1999

How is KFOR deployment going?

* KFOR deployment is over 34000 from 21 nations.

* It includes: 8000 British
5300 American
5000 French

4700 Italians
4300 Germans
1500 Russians
1500 Dutch
900 Spanish
720 Polish (in U.S. sector)
1000 Turkish (in German sector)
530 Canadians (in U.K. sector)
525 Greek (in U.S. sector)
and others.

* There are an additional 8000 other troops in FYROM under General Jackson's command.

* In recent days troops from the United Arab Emirates, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, and Denmark have arrived.

* Now that U.S. Army forces have relieved them, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit is beginning to withdrawal from Kosovo.

CHINA COMPENSATION (July 20, 1999)

How did talks on payments to Chinese victims of the accidental bombing go?

* We have had discussions with the Chinese on this subject and anticipate further and more detailed discussions. We hope to reach agreement very soon on payments to the injured individuals and the families of those killed as a humanitarian gesture.

* Other, more complex, property-related payments issues, either to the U.S. or to the Chinese, are being addressed.

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCES (July 20, 1999)

Context: A Washington Post story appeared July 19 highlighting the problem of the unexploded ordnance from the air campaign, particularly cluster bomblets.

- * The U.S. government believes unexploded ordnance and land mines are a serious threat in Kosovo, and is contributing to a vigorous public information campaign to warn Kosovars to take precautions. It is also working with contractors and NGOs to provide for mine and ordnance clearance.

- * Before the conflict in Kosovo ended, the U.S. awarded a grant of almost \$350000 to UNICEF for mine awareness education in the refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia, so that refugees would fully understand the danger landmines and UXO present.

- * On specifics, we refer you to the Department of Defense.

"WHO'S RUNNING KOSOVO?" (July 20, 1999)

A Washington Post article of July 16 asks "who's running Kosovo?" It alleges a power vacuum as KFOR defers to UNMIK which the KLA and local populace do not take seriously.

- * As dictated by UNSCR 1244, UNMIK is in charge.

- * KFOR is provided interim security as UNMIK is fully established. The reasoning behind KFOR's immediate entry into Kosovo concurrent with Serb departure was to fill the power vacuum. KFOR will continue to serve this purpose until UNMIK is fully established.

- * The Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, arrived last week, accompanied by his principal deputy, American Jock Covey, and other personnel. Kouchner announced a comprehensive agenda on arrive which prioritized humanitarian needs and the restoration of public functions and law and order.

* Interim SRSG de Mello has continued to meet with prominent Albanians and Serbs, most recent Ibrahim Rugova on his return to Kosovo and Serbian Orthodox leaders.

* There are now 172 UN police in Kosovo. The plan is for 1000 to be deployed by the end of July. Almost 2500 civil police have already been pledged by nations to the UN, of a target of 3100, and deployment will begin next week.

* These UN police have begun to join patrols.

* The OSCE is beginning to recruit members of new Kosovo Police Force and is planning first intake of recruits to the police academy at Vucitrn in mid-August. The first five-week course will comprise 150 students. OSCE has started to select trainers.

* On June 28, the UN de Mello took significant steps towards establishing interim police and justice systems, appointing legal experts to select judges and deploying first international police. These judges have begun addresses the cases of those KFOR has detained and charged with wrongdoing.

* Meanwhile, the KLA is showing signs of full compliance with its undertaking to demilitarize. For example, few KLA members wear their uniforms or insignia anymore though they allowed to do so until September.

* We are confident that the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the international community, working with the people of Kosovo, will work through many of the difficult issues raised in the article. It is noteworthy that this was an article about implementation of peace, not the continuation of Mr. Milosevic's campaign of ethnic terror.

DISSENT (July 19, 1999)

CONTEXT: In the first protest organized by his Serbian Renewal Party, Vuk Draskovic led a rally in Kragujevac in central Serbia attended by 20,000. He called for Milosevic to step down and for a transitional government to end Western sanctions and prepare free elections. He also counseled against violent change. "Civil-war wounds last the longest and heal the hardest," Draskovic

warned. "Serbia must avoid the danger of civil war."

There is mounting criticism of Milosevic within Serbia as demonstrations increase and opposition leaders speak out. Are you encouraged by this? Do you think Milosevic will be forced to step down? What are you doing to promote this movement?

* We are heartened that the Serb people are coming to grips with what happened in Kosovo.

* As the full extent of Milosevic's self-destructive policies come to light, the Serb people are beginning to express their wish for an end to nationalist agitation. As a result, Milosevic has promised the integration into the European mainstream. Unfortunately this can only happen with Milosevic out of office.

* We have always opposed the cynical manipulation of nationalist sentiment and stated many times our support for Serbia's democratization.

* It is too early to predict how long Milosevic can maintain his control.

* We are taking many steps to encourage democratization in Serbia but no one has provided more incentives for political change in Serbia than President Milosevic himself. Serbia will receive no reconstruction aid from the United States with Milosevic in power.

* NATO's airstrikes implied no quarrel with the Serbian people.

* The goal of our policy is a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and at peace.
INCIDENTS (July 19, 1999)

How were the U.S. servicemen killed?

* Two U.S. KFOR members were killed and three injured as the result of an accident near Domorovce. The injured were evacuated to Camp Bondsteel for treatment. The accident was tragic. It occurred when the armed personnel carrier in which the soldiers were travelling overturned. The incident is under investigation.

* We offer heartfelt condolences to the families of the deceased.

Do these events signal an absence of security?

* We continue to receive reports of some incidents but they are exceptional. As KFOR deployments have risen their coverage is more complete and their response is more comprehensive.

* On June 28, the UN Acting SRSG de Mello took significant steps towards establishing interim police and justice systems, appointing legal experts to select judges and deploying first international police.

* There are now 172 UN police in Kosovo. The plan is for 1000 to be deployed by the end of July. Almost 2500 civil police have already been pledged by nations to the UN, of a target of 3100, and deployment will begin next week.

* The OSCE is planning first intake of recruits to the police academy at Vucitrm in mid-August. The first five-week course will comprise 150 students. OSCE has started to select trainers.

KLA ACTIVITIES (July 12, 1999)

What is the status on KLA demilitarization?

* The KLA committed that as of the midnight deadline Monday its members would not carry automatic small arms outside authorized assembly areas and would establish verifiable and secure weapons storage sites.

* Leadership and the great bulk of the KLA continue to show broad compliance with the terms of the undertaking.

* The wearing of military uniforms and insignia (due to end in September) has already generally ceased.

- * We see no signs of intentional non-compliance among leadership.
- * We recognize that the KLA may have problems transmitting instructions to all its members dispersed throughout Kosovo. Even so, many KLA personnel have vacated fighting positions, and have moved to assembly areas, dropped weapons and uniforms, and left.
- * The KLA is also assisting KFOR with mine clearance.
- * KFOR will be as rigorous in its enforcement of the KLA undertaking as it was in enforcing Serb forces' withdrawal from Kosovo.
- * The KLA's next deadline is July 20.

The military has said very clearly that they need to accelerate the KFOR deployment. Have you pushed the deployment timetable forward so that more resources get to Kosovo to avoid a vacuum on the ground?

- * US deployment is on track.
- * KFOR numbers continue to rise everyday and are approaching 25000 in Kosovo.
- * As KFOR coverage becomes more comprehensive, we are not seeing violence and reprisals of the kind we saw in the first days after the air strikes ended.
- * Additional American forces from Germany are currently arriving.
- * NATO is looking at ways to accelerate allied deployments.

It appears that the refugees refused to wait for UN help and went home anyway. Has this caused any problems on the ground and is this a sign that, like Bosnia, those responsible for civilian implementation will fail to act quickly enough, causing civilian implementation to lag behind what is needed?

- * Albanians have returned rapidly and against the advice of UNHCR and NATO. As a

result, there have been some injuries due to landmines and booby-traps because areas were not secured in advance.

* There were some traffic jams and road congestion in the first days of return but these problems have dissipated.

* Daily returns are proceeding now at a manageable level.

* Civil implementation for Kosovo is a large task; there is a big job ahead. However, we are encouraged at the speedy response that we have seen thus far from the UN, the EU, and the OSCE.

* We expect steady progress to be made over the next several months as these organizations expand their capacity within Kosovo.

* US is doing its part. Secretary Albright has announced commitment of 450 police to the UN civil police force.

* Even with the rapid returns into Kosovo, there are no people starving and we are doing everything we can to ensure that the returnees will have adequate shelter this winter.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Pakistani-supported infiltrators have departed the Indian side of the Line of Control and India has declared the crisis in Kargil to be over. Artillery fire continues along the Line in Kashmir, as has been normal over the last several years. The President has written to the Pakistani prime minister and is calling Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee today, urging both to return to the Lahore Process.

Has Prime Minister Sharif fulfilled his commitment to President Clinton to restore the Line of Control in Kashmir?

* Indian officials reported over the weekend that the Line of Control in the Kargil region has been restored, with infiltrators gone from the Indian side. We welcome this development. Both India and Pakistan deserve credit for their cooperation in ending this crisis.

Is the U.S. now prepared to mediate the Kashmir dispute?

* The United States is not mediating this issue. The President committed to Prime Minister Sharif to take a personal interest in encouraging a resumption and intensification of the Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue. In that context, we would hope for an early return to the Lahore process in which both countries would discuss all issues dividing them, including Kashmir.

Is there a Presidential trip to South Asia in the works?

* In his July 4 joint statement with Prime Minister Sharif, the President stated his intent to travel to South Asia, but a date for a visit has not been set.

POTUS CALL TO PM VAJPAYEE

CONTEXT: The President called the Indian Prime Minister July 20 in order to offer his appreciation for India's restraint during the crisis in Kargil, and to express his pleasure that respect for the Line of Control had been restored in the Kargil area.

* He stressed his view that a strong bilateral dialogue (the Lahore process) between India and Pakistan was important for long-term peace in the region. The President also reaffirmed his intention to visit South Asia.

* At the end of the cordial, 15-minute conversation, PM Vajpayee offered his condolences for the death of JFK Jr. which he described as a loss to his many

friends around the world, including in India.
Will there be a corresponding call to Prime Minister Sharif?

* We remain in close touch with Islamabad.

IRAN: UNREST AND CLAIMS OF US INVOLVEMENT
July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Iranian Press are reporting that at least one of those arrested in last week's crackdown on pro-democracy protests has confessed to links with US and Israeli intelligence.

Do you have any comment on the Iranian claims that the US incited the pro-democracy protests in Iran last week?

* The assertion is ludicrous and we reject such accusations.

* We have made clear that we are concerned by any use of violence to put down demonstrations in support of freedom of expression and the rule of law anywhere in the world, including Iran.

* We call on Iran to respect international human rights standards, including the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.

What about the charge that at least one of those arrested has admitted to ties to the US government? Isn't it true that some of those arrested have traveled to the United States to promote their political agendas?

* I don't know where these individuals traveled or whom they met.

* All I can tell you is that the US government had nothing whatsoever to do with these demonstrations.

CHINA/TAIWAN: ONE CHINA POLICY

July 20, 1999

Has Taiwan abandoned the "one China" policy?

* President Lee Teng-hui has issued a statement indicating that Taiwan's cross-Strait policy is unchanged despite his introduction of the idea of "state-to-state" basis for cross-Strait discussion. The Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council has also reaffirmed Taiwan's goal of eventual reunification.

* Refer you to Taiwan authorities for elaboration.

Does Lee Teng-hui's statement today resolve the cross-Strait situation?

* Have seen press reports; refer you to Taiwan for authoritative statement.

* Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui reportedly explained that he was not seeking independence by calling for state-to-state relations in cross-Strait dialogue. He reportedly said "one China" is still possible, but only one that has a democratic system of government. Until then, he indicates there are two Chinese states that should have equal status.

* American policy is clear: we have a one-China policy, we expect a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait issues, and we strongly encourage dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.

Has the USG communicated with the Taiwan and PRC authorities?

* Outgoing Director of American Institute in Taiwan Darryl Johnson met with President Lee. Stressed continuing U.S. commitment to "one China" policy and strong support for productive cross-Strait dialogue.

* Frequent communication with both sides. Have urged PRC to advance cross-Strait dialogue as the best means to resolve differences with Taipei.

FYI: Taiwan's position on reunification preceding Lee's July 9 statement has four key points:

- * there exists currently one, divided China
- * the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are two equal political entities
- * China's sovereignty is "shared" by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
- * There will be no reunification with the PRC until the mainland becomes fully democratic.

PRESIDENT JIANG CALL

Can you characterize the POTUS's call with Chinese President Jiang? Did he threaten to use military force to resolve the Taiwan issue?

- * The POTUS called Jiang to express his concern about developments in cross-Strait situation, to urge that the door to cross-Strait dialogue remain open, and to affirm America's long-standing "one China" policy.
- * Jiang assured him that the PRC's fundamental approach to resolving the Taiwan question remains peaceful reunification.
- * Refusal to renounce the use of force is part of PRC's long-standing position. That hasn't changed, and the PRC has made that clear.
- * His message to Jiang was that deterioration of the atmosphere in the Strait serves no one's interest.
- * We will continue discussions with Taipei and Beijing over the coming week to urge that next round of dialogue be scheduled. Direct discussion between Taipei and Beijing is the key to resolving issues between them.

WTO ACCESSION

CONTEXT: Responding to NYT (p.A6) article "U.S. to Resume Trade Talks with Beijing"

Is China ready to re-engage in negotiations on its WTO accession?

* There is no change in China's position. We remain prepared to resume our talks with the Chinese when they are prepared to do so. We believe China's entry into the WTO on strong commercial terms is in both countries' interest.

Is Commerce Under Secretary Aaron going to Beijing this week to resume WTO talks?

* No. The purpose of this visit is to prepare for an annual meeting between our Secretary of Commerce and China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) that focuses on our commercial relationship. This meeting usually occurs in the fall. (There is no date set yet).

Do you take this as a good sign?

* We support resumption of normal contacts between our officials.

COLOMBIA: SUSPENSION OF PEACE TALKS

July 20, 1999

CONTEXT: Progress in the Colombian peace process has been painfully slow over the past several months. A fresh round of talks was due to start yesterday but were postponed indefinitely late Saturday after the FARC and the government failed to agree on the creation of a team of international observers to monitor the talks. The peace process in Colombia, as in many countries, will be protracted and have its shares of ups and downs. We will continue to support Pastrana's efforts without becoming involved in every twist and turn.

Any comment on the indefinite postponement of substantive talks between the Colombian government and the FARC?

* We continue to support the Colombian peace process and are disappointed by the postponement of the talks. Given Colombia's 40-year history of civil conflict, the peace process is bound to take time and to encounter many obstacles.

* We remain convinced that a negotiated settlement is the best way to end Colombia's long-running conflict. A purely military solution is simply not viable, given Colombia's vast size, the limited infrastructure in its interior, and the complex factors that have allowed a guerrilla presence for two generations.

* We also remain convinced that the peace process is also integral to long-run prospects for fighting narcotics trafficking, reducing kidnappings, restoring respect for human rights, and putting the Colombian economy back on a sustainable, high-growth trajectory.

* However, in order for the peace process to succeed, all parties must participate fully and in good faith. We regret that the FARC continues to engage in kidnappings and attacks that result in civilian casualties. We remain hopeful that the composition and mandate of the international observer teams can be agreed upon soon and that the substantive talks will begin.

Does this latest setback indicate that Pastrana is pursuing a mistaken strategy and giving up too much for too little?

* We strongly support President Pastrana's efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end Colombia's civil conflict. He was elected on a peace platform and won by the widest margin of victory in recent Colombian history.

* We never expected that a peace settlement with the guerrilla groups could be achieved quickly. Lessons from similar disputes elsewhere suggest that the start-up phase of talks is particularly prone to violence as groups position themselves for the negotiations.

(IF ASKED): Any comment on reports that General McCaffrey is requesting \$1 billion in emergency assistance to bolster Colombia's anti-drug efforts?

* The Administration has been and remains strongly committed to providing assistance to the Colombian government, particularly for their counter-drug and related law enforcement programs.

* However, we have no comment at this stage on any proposal to provide additional assistance to Colombia for counter-drug or other purposes.

CTBT

July 20, 1999

Why are you adding this event on quickly and making a big push on this treaty now?

- * Top foreign policy priority of this administration. President signed treaty in Sept. '96 and listed in State of the Union as important to our national security interests.

- * Treaty's importance has recently been highlighted by fighting in Kashmir, where tensions between two states with nuclear weapons capabilities rose threatening our interests.

- * Concerns over nuclear espionage have led many to draw the right conclusion that this Treaty can constrain states from developing advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.

- * Fourth, a conference of states that have ratified the Treaty will take place this October if the Treaty has not entered into force; for America to be a full participant at that conference, and we need to ratify ourselves to do so.

- * Finally, the American public overwhelmingly supports ratification.

What about Senator Helms' demand that you first submit the Kyoto Treaty and certain ABM and START-related accords?

- * We have made our position on Kyoto clear: we will not submit that Treaty until developing nations have agreed to meaningful participation in this important environmental regime.

- * With respect to the ABM agreements, the President has made clear that he will submit that package as soon as the Russian Duma ratifies the START II Treaty, a goal to which President Yeltsin recommitted himself earlier this month.

* So the time for the Senate to act on the CTBT is now.

What will happen if the Treaty remains stalled in the Foreign Relations Committee?

* The U.S. leadership role in the world on arms control and nonproliferation issues will be weakened, and we will miss an opportunity to enhance our own national security.

Are you confident we can maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent absent actual nuclear tests?

* Yes.

* The President has been assured by the directors of our nuclear labs that we can meet this challenge.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	From: Donald Camp, To: Felicia Jones, Re: Draft Memcon: POTUS - Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee (6 pages)	07/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([JFK, Jr])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1997 - 07/21/1999]

2017-0713-F
jn239

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/21/99 6:51:50 PM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: SRB Kosovo Speeches [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Sanborn, Daniel W. (Press)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

TEXT_BODY

Thank you for the quick turnaround!

-----Original Message-----

From: Sutphen,
Mona K. (NSA)
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 1999 6:47 PM
To: Gobush,
Matthew N. (PRESS); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @PRESS - Public
Affairs; @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @RUDMAN; @KOSOVO;
@LEGAL -
Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive
Secretary
Subject: RE: SRB Kosovo Speeches [UNCLASSIFIED]

sandy
approved the media advisory w/out change. m

-----Original Message-----

From: Gobush,
Matthew N. (PRESS)
Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 1999 6:13 PM
To: Gobush,
Matthew N. (PRESS); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @PRESS - Public
Affairs; @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @RUDMAN; @KOSOVO;
@LEGAL -

Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: SRB Kosovo Speeches [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI:
SRB gave Leavy the audible OK on Hagel. CFR approaching him now.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)

Sent: Wednesday,

July 21, 1999 3:02 PM

To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Cc: @PRESS

- Public Affairs; @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @RUDMAN; @KOSOVO;

@LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @EXECSEC

- Executive Secretary

Subject: SRB Kosovo Speeches [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mona

- Please include in SRB's afternoon take. Decision on Hagel for introduction at CFR is time sensitive. Thanks.

FOR SRB

Re: Kosovo
Speeches

Scenarios for your two upcoming speeches on Kosovo, with outstanding issues for your decision:

Remarks at Kosovo Relief
Fund Dinner

You are set to give brief remarks at the National Albanian American Council's Kosovo Relief Fund dinner tomorrow (Thursday) evening at 7:30 PM at the Grand Hyatt Hotel. The NAAC had slated you to give the "keynote address"; we pushed back and insisted that this be changed to reflect the fact that you will only be speaking for approximately 5 minutes. Regardless, you are the highest profile speaker on the program and the senior Administration official in the room.

Note that Cokie Roberts is the Master of Ceremonies for the dinner and will introduce you. Bob Dole, Rep. Eliot Engel, and Dr. Vjosa Doburna (prominent Kosovar relief worker) will be honored by the NAAC at the dinner. The hosts plan to seat you at the head table with Cokie and the honorees.

Although the event is open to the press, we do not anticipate extensive media coverage, given

the late hour, the current news environment (JFK, Jr.), and the NAAC's relatively low profile. The NAAC has arranged for live coverage of the event on the Internet, for broadcast in Albania, Kosovo, and elsewhere. They have also reached out to CSPAN and CNN, but have not secured a commitment to cover from either network yet. You are not expected to take questions.

Kosovo Speech at Council on Foreign Relations

Your speech at CFR is scheduled for Monday, July 26 at 11:30 AM. CFR plans to host a luncheon around your speech, and hold it in the Elihu Root Room on the 2nd Floor of the Carnegie Building (1779 Massachusetts Ave.) They are building an audience of approximately 120, to include prominent members of the Council, representatives of the diplomatic community, and Members of Congress. A brief, on-the-record Q&A period will follow your remarks.

The event is open press, and the morning slot is conducive to coverage. The President is down for the morning, so we do not expect competition for the WH Press Corps' attention. CFR is reaching out to C-SPAN and CNN, and faxblasting specialty media to generate coverage. We have drafted a White House Media Advisory (for your approval below), which we plan to release on Friday. We also plan to amplify your speech by faxblasting the transcript to influentials and opinion leaders, and by mailing it to Members of Congress. USIA also plans to post the speech on its website, as do we.

Unfortunately, Les Gelb will not be on hand to introduce you. CFR will ask another its members to do the honors, and is considering one of the following. Your preference? We recommend Senator Hagel, who was very supportive throughout the Kosovo conflict and would echo your bipartisan call to action (Miles, Mara, David and Tom concur). Jeane Kirkpatrick would make a good second choice.

_____ Senator Chuck Hagel [NSC
staff recommendation]

_____ Jeane Kirkpatrick

_____ Zbigniew
Brzezinski

_____ Other: _____

Please
approve the attached Media Advisory for release Friday. Note that

we suggest entitling the speech "Winning the Peace in Kosovo".

<< File: SRB CFR Speech Media Advisory 7-23-99.doc >>