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Gephardt on the Fast Track

The White House
Office of Communications Research

November 13, 1993

From: Dan Meyer
To: Ann Walker
Re: Gephardt on the Fast Track

- Representative Gephardt's remarks on Roll Calls 114, 115, and 116 were confined to an extension of his remarks on the last day of deliberation. He did join Representative Matsui in a letter to USTR that clarified their collective views on the goals to be sought while operating under the fast track authority.

- When a motion was made to scuttle the fast track (Roll Call 115), Gephardt supported President Bush and voted against it.

- Attachments:

  'Fast Track' Trade Procedures Extended, 1991 CQ Almanac at 118.
  House Votes 114, 115, 116, 1991 CQ Almanac at 28-H.
  Extension of Remarks, Gephardt, May 23, 1991, 137 Cong. Rec H 3597.
  Extension of Remarks, Letter to USTR, May 10, 1991.

'Fast Track' Trade Procedures Extended

After intense White House lobbying, the Bush administration won a two-year renewal of special "fast track" procedures governing congressional consideration of trade agreements.

President Bush argued that the renewal was necessary if the administration was to continue multilateral trade talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and begin talks on a U.S.-Mexico free-trade pact. Fast-track procedures gave Congress 60 days to act once a trade agreement was submitted, and required an up or down vote without amendments.

The renewal process turned into a referendum on the controversial U.S.-Mexico trade talks, as Democrats charged that removing trade and investment barriers would take jobs from U.S. workers and that businesses would head south to take advantage of inexpensive labor and lax environmental laws.

Bush and Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gotari had agreed in June 1990 to negotiate a free-trade agreement.

The plan was accelerated by a stalemate in global trade talks under GATT and by Salinas' decision in the spring of 1990 that more open trade with the United States was the best route to economic development for Mexico.

Bush formally notified Congress of his plans to negotiate such a pact in September 1990. After months of high-level talks, he announced in early 1991 that Canada — which already had a free-trade agreement with the United States — would join the U.S.-Mexico talks. The goal would be a North American Free Trade Agreement.

BOXSCORE

➧ Fast-Track Disapproval (S Res 78, H Res 101). The legislation would have barred extension of fast-track procedures to bills implementing trade agreements entered into after May 31, 1991. Under the fast-track procedures, Congress had to approve or disapprove a trade agreement without amendments. The U.S.-Mexico trade agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were covered under this bill.

Reports: S Rept 102-56, H Rept 102-63

KEY ACTION

May 1 — The administration submitted its "action plan" on the U.S.-Mexico free-trade pact to Congress.

May 14 — The **House** Ways and Means Committee voted 9-27 to reject the measure, H Res 101, to deny a two-year extension of fast-track authority.

May 14 — The **Senate** Finance Committee reported the measure, S Res 78, unfavorably, 15-3.

May 23 — The **House** voted 192-231 to reject H Res 101.

May 24 — The **Senate** voted 36-59 to reject S Res 78.

June 1 — The extension went into effect.

Central to the White House victory on the fast track was an "action plan" issued May 1 addressing concerns about the U.S.-Mexico pact. The administration pledged to reject any weakening of U.S. environmental laws, to provide for worker adjustment assistance and to provide some industries threatened by the free-trade pact with long transition periods.

Congress had until June 1 to block the fast track extension; after that, fast track procedures would have continued automatically for two more years.

Opponents in both the House and Senate tried but failed to win support for resolutions barring the extension.

If either chamber had voted for the resolution, the procedure would have been blocked.

The House defeated the effort 192-231 on May 23. *(Vote 115, p. 28-H)*

The Senate followed suit on May 24, 36-59 *(Vote 86, p. 12-S)*.

Three Months of Debate

Bush's request March 1 for an extension of the fast track set off three months of debate, in which a loose but vocal coalition of labor and environmental groups opposed to a U.S.-Mexico pact teamed up to fight the White House, and Democrats struggled to find a common stand on the issue.

The AFL-CIO, which strongly opposed the U.S.-Mexico talks, made defeat of the fast track a top priority for the year. Labor officials argued that the Bush administration was using free trade with Mexico as a substitute for foreign aid — and that U.S. workers would pay the price in the form of lost jobs.

Environmental groups warned that a U.S.-Mexico free-trade agreement would exacerbate pollution along the border, while creating pressure to loosen U.S. environmental laws as businesses moved south to take advantage of weak Mexican enforcement of its pollution controls.

Human rights advocates worried about working conditions in Mexico. And U.S. fruit and vegetable growers voiced concern about added competition.

But the opponents found it difficult to devise a common strategy. The fast track was key to both the U.S.-Mexico talks and the GATT negotiations. Some members, particularly those from farm and textile-producing states, wanted to kill the GATT talks. But a larger group, mainly lawmakers from the Rust Belt, wanted to focus on the Mexico talks. There was no easy way to stop one set of negotiations without bringing down the other.

The opposition also lacked leadership from the top. Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., came under intense pressure from organized labor and some environmental groups to lead the charge, turning a procedural issue into a major political confrontation with Bush. But, while he spoke frequently in support of their concerns, Gephardt ultimately backed the extension.

Most of the Democratic leadership cautiously supported extension of the fast track. That included Speaker Thomas S. Foley of Washington and the heads of the two committees that oversaw trade, Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski of Illinois and Finance Chairman Lloyd Bentsen of Texas. In part, their leanings reflected a traditional free-trade position. But Democrats also feared that if they campaigned against a U.S.-Mexico free-trade pact, Bush would be able to portray them as protectionist

"My incliniation is to be supportive" Rostenkowski said in March. "But I see the storm brewing out there."

Test of Presidential Authority

For its part, the White House saw the fast-track vote as a major test of presidential authority. "I am going to work tirelessly," Bush said April 7, after a meeting with Salinas. "The credibility of the United States as a trading partner is on the line here." By early May, U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills had met individually with about 150 members of Congress, including two-thirds of the Senate, according to her office. Members of Ways and Means got the personal touch. Rufus Yerxa, a former top committee aide who was serving as Bush's chief negotiator at the GATT talks, was brought back to spend several months selling the fast track on Capitol Hill.

The administration's chief lobbyist in the House, Nicholas E. Calio, devoted almost all of his time to the issue and postponed plans to leave the administration for the private sector until after the House vote. "We've not left a lot to chance here," Calio said.

Bush met with key Democrats Rostenkowski, Bentsen and Gephardt to discuss the issue and pressed Republicans to hold firm.

The administration argued that a free-trade agreement would stimulate Mexican development, lessening pressure on workers to cross the Rio Grande in search of work in the United States. It would lock in reforms by Salinas' government that had transformed Mexico's economy from one of the world's most protected to one of the more open. And it would provide U.S. companies with a vast labor pool and a more stable investment climate.

"We as a country will become more of a world-class competitor," U.S. Trade Representative Hills said.

Hills discounted the possibility of "wholesale migration" of industries and jobs to Mexico, saying that most tariffs on trade between Mexico and the United States had decreased in recent years, and that U.S. industries already would have left if there were an advantage to doing so.

"Companies have stayed located in the United States for good reasons," Hills said, citing a well-educated work force, superior infrastructure and the availability of capital.

A study by the U.S. International Trade Commission released Feb. 7 concluded that the overall benefits to the U.S. economy of a free-trade agreement with Mexico would be small "in the near to medium term" but that liberalized trade probably would increase Mexican growth, making it better able to buy U.S. goods and services.

Action Plan on Mexico Trade Pact

The turning point came May 1, when the White House released its action plan. Bentsen and Rostenkowski had written to Bush in early March requesting such a plan to allay congressional fears about a U.S.-Mexico pact. Gephardt had made a similar request.

Throughout the 80-page document, the administration avoided making ironclad pledges and reiterated its contentions that the agreement would not threaten jobs and would help the environment. But, at virtually every step, it also conceded that the doomsayers had legitimate concerns. The highlights:

- Most Mexican and U.S. tariff and import barriers would be reduced gradually.
- The administration would seek a provision allowing a temporary restoration of duties or other barriers if imports from Mexico or Canada "are a substantial cause of serious injury to a domestic industry."
- The agreement would include rules to prevent third countries from funneling their goods through Mexico to evade U.S. tariffs. The administration said it would seek a domestic-content rule of more than 50 percent for automotive imports.
- The administration promised to work with Congress to craft a program to provide services to workers who lost their jobs as a result of the U.S.-Mexico pact.
- The Labor Department would sign an agreement with the Mexican government providing for cooperation in the areas of occupational health and safety, work conditions, child labor and labor statistics. Enforcement would also be reviewed.
- The administration vowed not to negotiate lower standards than were currently in law in the areas of pesticides, energy conservation, toxic waste, and health and safety. And it maintained the right to bar entry to products that did not meet those standards.

With the action plan, the administration succeeded in driving a wedge between organized labor and some environmental organizations. Among the groups that expressed cautious support were the National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon Society, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund. Opposed to the fast track were the Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and Public Citizen, a consumer group.

The administration won the most plaudits for promising to include officials of environmental organizations on panels that advised Hills. Organized labor conceded that

What 'Fast Track' Means

Congress initiated the fast track as part of the 1974 Trade Act, partly to avoid becoming mired in the nitty-gritty of negotiating trade agreements. The procedure gave lawmakers 60 days from the submission of a trade agreement to vote the measure up or down; amendments were not allowed.

In the 1988 omnibus trade act, Congress reauthorized the procedure until 1991. A two-year extension until 1993 was permitted if neither the House nor the Senate objected. The hope was that the short time frame would spur negotiators to complete the Uruguay Round of GATT talks. *(1974 Almanac, p. 553; 1988 Almanac, p. 222)*

Once a trade agreement was reached, the administration and Congress informally negotiated legislative language to implement it, after which the bill was formally introduced and the fast track kicked in.

The fast track provided that:

- Committees had 45 days to consider the bill; they could not amend it.
- Each chamber had to vote on the bill within 15 days after the committee deadline.
- A motion to proceed to the bill in either chamber had to be acted on without delay or debate.
- Debate in each chamber was limited to 20 hours, and amendments were not in order. In the House, the time was divided equally between those who favored the bill and those who opposed it. In the Senate, debate time was divided equally between the majority and minority leaders.

losing environmental support was a blow. Said AFL-CIO lobbyist William J. Cunningham, "A lot of members have expressed concern about the environment. This just provides them some cover."

The plan received quick endorsement from key Democrats. Rostenkowski held a news conference to urge support for an extension. A statement from Bentsen said Bush had made "significant concessions" that "will give some comfort" to undecided lawmakers.

Indeed, Rostenkowski, Bentsen and others helped shape Bush's plan in the weeks leading up to its release. At their insistence, for example, the administration softened its stance against promising government benefits for workers who lost their jobs as a result of a free-trade agreement.

On May 9, Gephardt announced that he would support Bush's request for a fast-track extension, although he reiterated his position that Congress could still reject the agreement outright or simply suspend the fast track and permit amendments after the pact had been negotiated.

"I am prepared to support an extension of fast-track authority for trade treaties," Gephardt said. "But I do so with this caveat: If the administration sends to this Congress a trade treaty that trades away American jobs, or tolerates pollution of the environment or abuse of workers, we can, and we will, amend it or reject it."

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

With the fight against the fast track unraveling, the Ways and Means Committee met May 14 to consider a bill (HR 101) to revoke the procedure. Although Rostenkowski opposed the bill, he had promised sponsor Byron L. Dorgan, D-N.D., that he would get a vote in committee and a later vote on the floor. Dorgan, who sought to kill the fast track because he opposed administration efforts to reduce agriculture subsidies under GATT, had introduced the bill on March 6.

The committee rejected Dorgan's resolution 9-27 and reported it unfavorably by voice vote. Then, by voice vote, it approved a resolution (H Res 146) emphasizing that Congress could suspend the fast track if the administration did not keep its promise to include adequate protections for U.S. workers, industries and the environment in the U.S.-Mexico agreement. Rostenkowski and Gephardt sponsored the non-binding resolution to give cover to the rank and file.

"There are members on both sides of the aisle who want to vote for something satisfying, as much as they can, labor's demands," Rostenkowski said.

The House Rules Committee voted May 14 to send both the resolution of disapproval and the Rostenkowski-Gephardt measure to the floor.

In a private caucus the day after the Ways and Means vote, some Democrats criticized their leaders, especially Gephardt, for locking arms with the administration. Yet the decision reflected the calculation — partly political, partly philosophical — that it was not wise to oppose Bush's trade policy and risk being branded a protectionist.

The House on May 23 voted 192-231 to reject HR 101. The non-binding resolution passed easily, 329-85.

On the same day Ways and Means acted, the Senate Finance Committee met and voted 15-3 to report S Res 78 unfavorably to the floor. The measure disapproving the fast track had been introduced on March 6 by Ernest F. Hollings, D-S.C. Like Dorgan, Hollings wanted to block a GATT agreement; he was opposed to administration efforts to phase out textile import quotas as part of the accord.

The committee votes foreshadowed a robust margin of victory for the administration on the floor. "This was a pretty good indication of the support there is for fast track," said Tom Daschle, D-S.D., who voted against the extension along with fellow Finance Committee members Donald W. Riegle Jr., D-Mich., and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y.

The full Senate voted May 24, rejecting Hollings' resolution 36-59. The vote gave Bush a congressional endorsement to continue GATT negotiations and to begin talks on the proposed U.S.-Mexico free-trade agreement.

Bentsen, a crucial Bush ally in the trade fight, called the vote a "momentous occasion for the Senate," determining whether the United States chooses to "move forward or backward as a country."

Defeat for Labor

The Senate and House votes were a blow to organized labor. Labor lobbyists and their supporters were hampered by the fact that they could find no way to promote a vote on Mexico without also sinking the GATT talks. Democratic leaders, principally Bentsen and Rostenkowski, strongly opposed efforts to change the rules to permit a separate vote on Mexico.

Lobbyists for the AFL-CIO discarded efforts to promote a separate vote in the House when it became clear in the days before the vote that the leadership would not support such a move. Their vote count showed only 140 lawmakers solidly committed to voting against the fast-track extension, well short of the majority needed to pass the Dorgan resolution of disapproval.

So labor scaled back: It supported a plan by Sander M. Levin, D-Mich., which called on the Bush administration to report on the progress of the Mexico negotiations by May 1, 1992. Basically, labor sought to keep the issue on Congress' agenda, in hope of creating sufficient pressure for a vote on withdrawing the fast track for the Mexico talks sometime in 1992.

According to top House leadership aides, Gephardt, seeking to satisfy as many of labor's demands as possible, floated the idea of amending the fast-track extension to provide for such a midterm review. But the idea was quashed by Rostenkowski, who strongly backed the administration's desire for an unamended endorsement of its negotiating authority.

In a last-ditch effort, the AFL-CIO tried to persuade House lawmakers to reject the rule governing floor debate. When that failed, even opponents conceded that a House majority vote in favor of extending the fast track had become a foregone conclusion.

In the Senate, Riegle wanted to offer his own plan which would have extended the fast track for one year rather than two, and permitted amendments to the Mexico agreement in several areas, including labor standards, adjustment assistance and the environment. Riegle feared the Mexico talks would lead his state's automobile and auto parts manufacturers to move assembly plants south. But under Senate rules, the Hollings resolution could not be amended.

Riegle vowed to try to bring up his bill in the Senate later in the year, either as a free-standing measure or by attaching it to a must-pass bill. But such a measure would have been a target for a filibuster. And once the extension had been approved, the steam went out of efforts to block the fast track.

HOUSE VOTES 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116

109. HR 2100. Fiscal 1992 Defense Authorization/ Abortion. AuCoin, D-Ore., amendment to provide servicemen and their dependents stationed overseas with reproductive health services, including privately paid abortions, at military hospitals. Adopted 220-208: R 35-129; D 184-79 (ND 129-51, SD 55-28); 1-0, May 22, 1991. A "nay" was a vote supporting the president's position.

110. HR 2100. Fiscal 1992 Defense Authorization/ Passage. Passage of the bill to authorize appropriations of $291 billion for the Defense Department and defense-related programs for fiscal 1992. The bill would terminate new production of the B-2 Stealth bomber and funding for early deployment of SDI programs as well as remove the prohibition against women flying combat missions. Passed 268-161: R 26-138; D 242-22 (ND 160-20, SD 82-2); I 0-1, May 22, 1991. A "nay" was a vote supporting the president's position.

111. H Con Res 121. Fiscal 1992 Budget Resolution/Rule. Adoption of the rule (H Res 157) to waive all points of order against and provide for House floor consideration of the conference report on the resolution to set binding budget levels for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1992: budget authority, $1.590 trillion; outlays, $1.448 trillion; revenues, $1.169.2 trillion; deficit, $278.8 billion. Adopted 257-164: R 0-164; D 256-0 (ND 174-0, SD 82-0); I 1-0, May 22, 1991.

112. H Con Res 121. Fiscal 1992 Budget Resolution/ Conference Report. Adoption of the conference report on the resolution to set binding budget levels for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1992: budget authority, $1.59 trillion; outlays, $1.448 trillion; revenues, $1.169 trillion; deficit, $278.8 billion. The conference report conforms with the spending caps for defense, international and domestic discretionary spending and with the pay-as-you-go requirements established by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (PL 101-508). Adopted 239-181: R 8-155; D 231-25 (ND 154-19, SD 77-6); I 0-1, May 22, 1991.

113. HR 2251. Gulf War Refugee Supplemental Appropriations/Conference Report. Adoption of the conference report to appropriate $572 million in fiscal 1991, consisting of $235.5 million in humanitarian aid to Iraqi refugees and international peacekeeping operation, $320.5 million for the incremental costs of the Defense Department's humanitarian relief operations, and $16 million for military service organizations providing financial aid to U.S. military personnel and their families. Adopted 387-33: R 143-18; D 243-15 (ND 166-10, SD 77-5); I 1-0, May 22, 1991.

114. H Res 101 & H Res 146. Fast-Track Resolutions/ Rule. Adoption of the rule (H Res 158) to provide for House floor consideration of the resolution to disapprove a two-year extension of fast-track procedures that would require legislation implementing trade agreements to be considered within 60 days of introduction under limited debate and with no amendments permitted. Adopted 274-148: R 144-17; D 129-131 (ND 73-105, SD 56-26); I 1-0, May 23, 1991.

115. H Res 101. Disapproval of Fast-Track Procedures/ Adoption. Adoption of the resolution to disapprove the president's request to extend for two more years fast-track procedures that would require legislation implementing trade agreements to be considered within 60 days of introduction under limited debate and with no amendments permitted. Rejected 192-231: R 21-140; D 170-91 (ND 128-50, SD 42-41); I 1-0, May 23, 1991. A "nay" was a vote supporting the president's position.

116. H Res 146. Grant Fast-Track Procedures/Adoption. Adoption of the resolution to express the sense of the House that fast-track procedures should be extended and that a variety of objectives should be achieved in trade agreements negotiated by the United States. Adopted 329-85: R 156-4; D 173-80 (ND 105-67, SD 68-13); I 0-1, May 23, 1991.

KEY

- Y Voted for (yea).
- # Paired for.
- + Announced for.
- N Voted against (nay).
- X Paired against.
- \- Announced against.
- P Voted "present."
- C Voted "present" to avoid possible conflict of interest.
- ? Did not vote or otherwise make a position known.

Democrats *Republicans*
Independent

	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116
ALABAMA								
1 *Callahan*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 *Dickinson*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
3 Browder	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	#	X
4 Bevill	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5 Cramer	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
6 Erdreich	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Harris	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
ALASKA								
AL *Young*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
ARIZONA								
1 *Rhodes*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Vacancy								
3 *Stump*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
4 *Kyl*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
5 *Kolbe*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
ARKANSAS								
1 Alexander	Y	Y	Y	+	Y	N	Y	N
2 Thornton	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
3 *Hammerschmidt*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
4 Anthony	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
CALIFORNIA								
1 *Riggs*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 *Herger*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
3 Matsui	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?
4 Fazio	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
5 Pelosi	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
6 Boxer	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Miller	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
8 Dellums	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
9 Stark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
10 Edwards	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
11 Lantos	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12 *Campbell*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
13 Mineta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
14 *Doolittle*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
15 Condit	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
16 Panetta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
17 Dooley	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
18 Lehman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
19 *Lagomarsino*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
20 *Thomas*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
21 *Gallegly*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
22 *Moorhead*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
23 Beilenson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
24 Waxman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	?
25 Roybal	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
26 Berman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
27 Levine	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	?
28 Dixon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
29 Waters	Y	N	Y	?	Y	N	Y	N
30 Martinez	N	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	?
31 Dymally	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
32 Anderson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
33 *Dreier*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
34 Torres	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
35 *Lewis*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
36 Brown	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
37 *McCandless*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
38 *Dornan*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	X	Y
39 *Dannemeyer*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
40 *Cox*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
41 *Lowery*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
42 *Rohrabacher*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
43 *Packard*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
44 *Cunningham*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
45 *Hunter*	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
COLORADO								
1 Schroeder	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Skaggs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
3 Campbell	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
4 *Allard*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
5 *Hefley*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
6 *Schaefer*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
CONNECTICUT								
1 Kennelly	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Gejdenson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
3 DeLauro	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
4 *Shays*	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
5 *Franks*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
6 *Johnson*	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
DELAWARE								
AL Carper	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
FLORIDA								
1 Hutto	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Peterson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Bennett	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
4 *James*	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
5 *McCollum*	N	N	N	N	?	?	X	?
6 *Stearns*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
7 Gibbons	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
8 *Young*	N	N	N	N	Y	?	N	Y
9 *Bilirakis*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
10 *Ireland*	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
11 Bacchus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
12 *Lewis*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
13 *Goss*	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
14 Johnston	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
15 *Shaw*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
16 Smith	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
17 Lehman	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
18 *Ros-Lehtinen*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
19 Fascell	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
GEORGIA								
1 Thomas	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 Hatcher	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y
3 Ray	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
4 Jones	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Lewis	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
6 *Gingrich*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
7 Darden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8 Rowland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9 Jenkins	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
10 Barnard	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
HAWAII								
1 Abercrombie	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
2 Mink	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
IDAHO								
1 LaRocco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Stallings	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
ILLINOIS								
1 Hayes	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
2 Savage	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
3 Russo	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
4 Sangmeister	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
5 Lipinski	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
6 *Hyde*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
7 Collins	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
8 Rostenkowski	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
9 Yates	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
10 *Porter*	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
11 Annunzio	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
12 *Crane*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
13 *Fawell*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
14 *Hastert*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
15 Vacancy								
16 Cox	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
17 Evans	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
18 *Michel*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
19 Bruce	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
20 Durbin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
21 Costello	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
22 Poshard	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
INDIANA								
1 Visclosky	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
2 Sharp	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
3 Roemer	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y

ND Northern Democrats SD Southern Democrats

	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116
ong	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
ontz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Burton	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Myers	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
McCloskey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Hamilton	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Jacobs	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
A								
Leach	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Nussle	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
Nagle	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Smith	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Lightfoot	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Grandy	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
NSAS								
Roberts	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Slattery	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Meyers	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Glickman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nichols	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
NTUCKY								
Hubbard	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Natcher	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mazzoli	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Bunning	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	?
Rogers	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Hopkins	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Perkins	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
UISIANA								
Livingston	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Jefferson	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Tauzin	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
McCrery	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Huckaby	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Baker	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Hayes	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Holloway	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
INE								
Andrews	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Snowe	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
RYLAND								
Gilchrest	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Bentley	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
Cardin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
McMillen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Hoyer	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Byron	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Mfume	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Morella	Y	Y	N	Y	+	Y	N	Y
SSACHUSETTS								
Vacancy								
Neal	N	Y	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Early	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
Frank	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Atkins	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Mavroules	N	Y	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Markey	Y	Y	Y	?	?	Y	Y	Y
Kennedy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Moakley	N	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Studds	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Donnelly	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
CHIGAN								
Conyers	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Pursell	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	?
Wolpe	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Upton	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Henry	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Carr	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Kildee	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Traxler	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Vander Jagt	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Camp	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Davis	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Bonior	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Collins	Y	N	Y	+	Y	N	Y	N
Hertel	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Ford	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Dingell	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Levin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Broomfield	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
NNESOTA								
Penny	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Weber	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Ramstad	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Vento	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116
5 Sabo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
6 Sikorski	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
7 Peterson	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
8 Oberstar	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
MISSISSIPPI								
1 Whitten	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 Espy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
3 Montgomery	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?
4 Parker	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
5 Taylor	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
MISSOURI								
1 Clay	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
2 Horn	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
3 Gephardt	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
4 Skelton	N	Y	?	?	?	?	N	Y
5 Wheat	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6 *Coleman*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
7 *Hancock*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
8 *Emerson*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
9 Volkmer	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
MONTANA								
1 Williams	Y	Y	Y	N	N	?	#	#
2 *Marlenee*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
NEBRASKA								
1 *Bereuter*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Hoagland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
3 *Barrett*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
NEVADA								
1 Bilbray	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
2 *Vucanovich*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	-	Y
NEW HAMPSHIRE								
1 *Zeliff*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Swett	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
NEW JERSEY								
1 Andrews	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Hughes	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y
3 Pallone	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
4 *Smith*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
5 *Roukema*	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
6 Dwyer	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?
7 *Rinaldo*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
8 Roe	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
9 Torricelli	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
10 Payne	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
11 *Gallo*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
12 *Zimmer*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
13 *Saxton*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
14 Guarini	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
NEW MEXICO								
1 *Schiff*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 *Skeen*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
3 Richardson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
NEW YORK								
1 Hochbrueckner	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 Downey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
3 Mrazek	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
4 *Lent*	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
5 *McGrath*	N	Y	N	N	Y	?	N	Y
6 Flake	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Ackerman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
8 Scheuer	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
9 Manton	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
10 Schumer	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
11 Towns	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	X
12 Owens	Y	N	Y	#	Y	N	Y	N
13 Solarz	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
14 *Molinari*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
15 *Green*	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
16 Rangel	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
17 Weiss	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
18 Serrano	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
19 Engel	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
20 Lowey	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	N	Y	Y
21 *Fish*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
22 *Gilman*	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
23 McNulty	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
24 *Solomon*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
25 *Boehlert*	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
26 *Martin*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
27 *Walsh*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
28 McHugh	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
29 *Horton*	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
30 Slaughter	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
31 *Paxon*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y

	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116
32 LaFalce	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
33 Nowak	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
34 *Houghton*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
NORTH CAROLINA								
1 Jones	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 Valentine	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
3 Lancaster	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Price	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
5 Neal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
6 *Coble*	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
7 Rose	N	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	N
8 Hefner	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9 *McMillan*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
10 *Ballenger*	N	N	N	N	+	Y	Y	Y
11 *Taylor*	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
NORTH DAKOTA								
AL Dorgan	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
OHIO								
1 Luken	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
2 *Gradison*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	?
3 Hall	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
4 *Oxley*	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
5 *Gillmor*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
6 *McEwen*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
7 *Hobson*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
8 *Boehner*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
9 Kaptur	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
10 *Miller*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
11 Eckart	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12 *Kasich*	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
13 Pease	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
14 Sawyer	Y	Y	Y	?	?	N	N	Y
15 *Wylie*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
16 *Regula*	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
17 Traficant	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
18 Applegate	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
19 Feighan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
20 Oakar	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
21 Stokes	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
OKLAHOMA								
1 *Inhofe*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Synar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	#
3 Brewster	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
4 McCurdy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
5 *Edwards*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
6 English	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
OREGON								
1 AuCoin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
2 *Smith*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
3 Wyden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
4 DeFazio	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Kopetski	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
PENNSYLVANIA								
1 Foglietta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 Gray	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	Y
3 Borski	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Kolter	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
5 *Schulze*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
6 Yatron	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
7 *Weldon*	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
8 Kostmayer	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
9 *Shuster*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
10 *McDade*	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
11 Kanjorski	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
12 Murtha	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
13 *Coughlin*	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
14 Coyne	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
15 *Ritter*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
16 *Walker*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
17 *Gekas*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
18 *Santorum*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
19 *Goodling*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
20 Gaydos	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?
21 *Ridge*	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
22 Murphy	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
23 *Clinger*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
RHODE ISLAND								
1 *Machtley*	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Reed	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SOUTH CAROLINA								
1 *Ravenel*	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 *Spence*	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Derrick	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
4 Patterson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5 Spratt	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
6 Tallon	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116
SOUTH DAKOTA								
AL Johnson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
TENNESSEE								
1 *Quillen*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
2 *Duncan*	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
3 Lloyd	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
4 Cooper	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
5 Clement	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
6 Gordon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
7 *Sundquist*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
8 Tanner	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
9 Ford	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N
TEXAS								
1 Chapman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Wilson	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
3 *Johnson*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
4 Hall	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
5 Bryant	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y
6 *Barton*	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
7 *Archer*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
8 *Fields*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
9 Brooks	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
10 Pickle	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
11 Edwards	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
12 Geren	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
13 Sarpalius	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
14 Laughlin	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
15 de la Garza	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
16 Coleman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
17 Stenholm	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
18 Washington	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
19 *Combest*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
20 Gonzalez	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
21 *Smith*	N	N	N	X	Y	Y	N	Y
22 *DeLay*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
23 Bustamante	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
24 Frost	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
25 Andrews	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
26 *Armey*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
27 Ortiz	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
UTAH								
1 *Hansen*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Owens	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
3 Orton	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y
VERMONT								
AL *Sanders*	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
VIRGINIA								
1 *Bateman*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Pickett	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	N	Y
3 *Bliley*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
4 Sisisky	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Payne	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6 Olin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
7 *Slaughter*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
8 Moran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
9 Boucher	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
10 *Wolf*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
WASHINGTON								
1 *Miller*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
2 Swift	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
3 Unsoeld	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
4 *Morrison*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
5 Foley								
6 Dicks	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
7 McDermott	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
8 *Chandler*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
WEST VIRGINIA								
1 Mollohan	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Staggers	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Wise	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Rahall	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
WISCONSIN								
1 Aspin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
2 *Klug*	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
3 *Gunderson*	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
4 Kleczka	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
5 Moody	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
6 *Petri*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
7 Obey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
8 *Roth*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
9 *Sensenbrenner*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
WYOMING								
AL *Thomas*	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y

...ern states - Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Miss., N.C., Okla., S.C., Tenn., Texas, Va.
...ted votes are quorum calls, which CQ does not include in its vote charts.

Congressional Record -- House
Thursday, May 23, 1991
102nd Cong. 1st Sess.
137 Cong Rec H 3597

REFERENCE: Vol. 137 No. 79; Continuation of Senate Proceedings of May 22, 1991, Issue No. 78; and Proceedings of May 23, 1991, Issue No. 79.

TITLE: EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. OBJECTIVES THAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS

SPEAKER: Mr. APPLEGATE; Mr. ARCHER; MR. BARRETT; Mr. BOEHLERT; Mr. CAMPBELL of California; Mr. CARPER; MR. CLEMENT; Mr. CLINGER; MR. COYNE; Mr. CUNNINGHAM; Mr. de la GARZA; Mr. DORNAN of California; Mr. DREIER of California; Mr. EDWARDS of Texas; Mr. GEPHARDT; Mr. GREEN of New York; Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut; Mrs. KENNELLY; Mr. LEACH; Mr. LEWIS of Florida; MR. MATSUI; MR. MILLER OF OHIO; MR. PENNY; Mr. RITTER; Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI; Mr. ROYBAL; Mr. SARPALIUS; Mr. SCHUMER; Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York

TEXT:

Text that appears in UPPER CASE identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the House on the floor.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, this House -- like this Nation -- faces a fundamental choice. If you believe in your heart that no matter what our negotiators do, it is simply impossible to negotiate a trade treaty with Mexico that would be in America's economic interests, you have to vote to reject the President's request for fast-track authority.

But if you believe, as I do, that if we open closed markets today we can open closed factories tomorrow; if you think the right kind of treaty can be strong enough to create new American jobs, and tough enough to protect the environment and Mexican workers; if you think more trade can mean more jobs and better wages, then I urge you to allow this negotiation to go forward. Vote yes. All we are saying is give trade a chance.

The President would like everyone to believe that support for fast track is synonymous with support for a North American Free-Trade Agreement. That simply is not the case. But, the President indicates that neither he nor the Mexican Government is prepared to proceed with negotiations without fast track. He has chosen the vote today on fast track as a symbol of support for these negotiations.

[*H3608] The resolution which Chairman Rostenkowski and I have introduced presents another course -- conditional fast track. Our resolution conditions the continuation of fast track authority on the President living up to commitments: commitments to develop strong rules of origin, enhanced environmental protection, enforcement of worker rights, transition mechanisms for workers and businesses and other important provisions.

If the President presents us with a perfect agreement, he deserves not only an up or down vote, but our support. But, if he presents us with an imperfect agreement, Congress has two choices -- either defeat it or amend it.

My willingness to support the request for fast-track is based on the strongly held view that if the President sends to this Congress a trade treaty that trades away American jobs; or tolerates pollution of the environment or abuse of workers, we can and will amend it or reject it. I am serving notice both to the Bush administration and to the Mexican Government: I intend to do just that.

But, I think the potential is there -- that the rewards are worth the risk. But we'll never know unless we try. I think we should try to gain greater access to the Mexican market. There is a $30 billion traffic in commerce already between our two countries; it is relatively balanced. We have reason to belive that with the lowering of the 10 percent tariff Mexico places on American goods, there will be room to send more American goods -- more manufactured, high valued goods -- to that nation. And we must look at the composition of trade, not only its aggregates.

With the right kind of treaty, we'll end discriminatory practices which prevent us from increasing our export opportunities with Mexico. The car manufacturers say that under a free trade agreement with Mexico we would be able to boost exports of American-made Jeeps, vans, cars and trucks. It stands to reason that we would, because the Mexican Government has a balance of trade requirement for certain sectors. That is, for every dollar of exports sold to Mexico, a dollar of Mexican exports must be shipped to America. Another example of trade restrictions is the Mexican Government's 10 percent average tariff on American goods, while the United States charges only 4 percent on Mexican goods. Add to those obstructions the barriers of infrastructure, transportation and the differences in culture and legal systems, and there is ample room for improvement.

The right kind of free trade treaty with Mexico could create more than a quarter-million new American jobs, reduce our global trade deficit by $8 to $9 billion, and help stem the flood of illegal workers streaming into the United States from Mexico.

But the right kind of treaty requires closer scrutiny. Under the maquiladora, the Japanese and other Pacific Rim nations currently locate screwdriver plants on the United States-Mexican border and enjoy duty-free importation of their products into the United States. a properly negotiated treaty would limit the ability of other countries to use Mexico as an export platform.

What's more, a properly drawn treaty will ensure that there are good jobs, on both sides of the border and thereby reduce the incentive that Mexicans have to cross the border illegally into the United States in search of work.

Finally, a properly drawn treaty will improve the quality of life for workers and citizens on both sides of the border. Environmental laws and worker rights, properly enforced, can mean everything to the people who live there; cause should be our cause, and we can best represent their cause by pursuing this kind of treaty.0

I understand those who are concerned that we will not get the right kind of treaty. The working men and women in my hometown of St. Louis are greatly concerned -- as are the loyal, patriotic Americans who organize and represent them in the labor movement. I understand their concern and I frankly share their skepticism. After 10 years of relentless assault on family incomes -- higher taxes and lower wages for middle-class families, while the wealthy have gotten lower taxes and higher incomes -- I'm angry too. We've seen too many attacks on the right to organize, a misguided trade policy, yanking the rugs out from under an entire community overnight, and too many negotiations which cost hard-won health benefits.

Of course, people are scared, and they know the last two administrations have done nothing to stop the flood of jobs from the United States. So uppermost in our minds must be playing the kind of constructive role, the oversight role, that Congress can and should play to ensure the goals of this negotiation are carried out.

But the answer is not to kill a treaty that hasn't even been written -- or even negotiated yet. The answer is to keep the pressure on. I am serving notice today that Congress will do that. Chairman Rostenkowski, Senator Bentsen, and I will sound like the song by the police that goes, "Every breath you take, every step you take, every move you make, we'll be watching you." Trust but verify: that will be our policy.

And if the President brings back a treaty that fails to match assurances he provided in the action plan, we're going to amend it, or reject, and I will help lead the fight to do that.

One of the most important victories to emerge from this issue is that from it we are having the beginnings of a long-overdue national debate on trade. What a contrast with the almost non-existent public debate on the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. During this debate, the treaty was front page news in Canada and was the centerpiece issue in a national election campaign. In our country, it was hard to find anyone who even knew we were negotiating.

There is no more vital issue than developing good paying jobs for our families, Because this issue is about jobs, it is about our national destiny. This is about the productive capacity of the Nation to employ people, boost their standards of living, raise their expectations, and compete with their rivals in the international marketplace.

In democracies we need these kinds of rational debates on so many issues, and we have them on so few of them. This is the issue of the future, this is our future. I say let's pass fast track, let's keep careful watch on our negotiators, and let's bring back a treaty that will ensure that there's room at the table for labor, Mexico, and all of us. And that we will have the high-skill, high-paying jobs that will put more bread on the table for families on both sides of the Rio Grande.

Congressional Record -- Extension of Remarks
Tuesday, June 4, 1991
102nd Cong. 1st Sess.
137 Cong Rec E 2008

REFERENCE: Vol. 137 No. 84

TITLE: DISAPPROVING THE EXTENSION OF FAST-TRACK PROCEDURES TO BILLS TO IMPLEMENT TRADE AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO AFTER MAY 31, 1991

SPEAKER: HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TEXT:
Text that appears in UPPER CASE identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the House on the floor.

[*E2008] MR. WAXMAN. MR. SPEAKER, TWO LETTERS SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED MY REMARKS IN THE MAY 23 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD IN SUPPORT OF [*E2009] HOUSE RESOLUTION 101, DISAPPROVAL OF THE FAST-TRACK PROCEDURE. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE LETTERS WERE NOT INCLUDED, AND I REQUEST THAT THEY APPEAR IN TODAY'S CONGRESSIONAL RECORD AND BE MADE PART OF THE PERMANENT MAY 23 RECORD. THE FIRST IS A LETTER I SENT WITH REPRESENTATIVES GEPHARDT, WYDEN, SIKORSKI, AND MATSUI TO U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE CARLA HILLS REQUESTING ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF U.S. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS WOULD BE PROTECTED IN GATT AND NAFTA TRADE TALKS. THE SECOND IS THE TRADE REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE TO US.

Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, May 10, 1991.

Hon. Carla Hills,
U.S. Trade Representative
Washington, DC.

Dear Ambassador Hill: We are writing to express our serious concern regarding the impact the GATT trade agreement currently being negotiated could have on our domestic health and safety laws. There are several provisions that are apparently being considered, and in many cases promoted, by our negotiators that would have a serious detrimental effect on U.S. health and safety laws if adopted in the final agreement. With respect to each of the issues that is raised below, please state the Administration's position, and provide any concrete, written assurances that you can to address the concerns raised.

1. Under the draft language, health and safety laws (such as those banning pesticides, food additives, unapproved medical devices and unapproved drugs) are presumed not to be trade barriers so long as they meet international standards. However, if they are not consistent with international standards, then the country defending the law must bear the burden of supporting its law. In many instances, our laws are far stronger and more protective than the Codex and other international standards. In our view, any health and safety law that is stronger than international standards should be presumed to be valid, and the burden of proof of its invalidity should be on the country challenging it.

What assurances can you give us that the burden of proof will always be on the country challenging U.S. health and safety laws, even when the U.S. laws contain more stringent requirements than international standards?

2. The draft contains various standards that would be applied to determine the validity of a U.S. law challenged under GATT. The most common standard appears to be "scientific justification" or "reasonable scientific basis." However, there have been instances where the Administration has urged the repeal of laws on the ground that the laws have no scientific justification (the Delaney clause banning carcinogenic food and color additives is an example). In other cases, Congress may act where the Executive Branch has found no scientific justification for banning a product (for example, there is currently a bill pending in the House which would ban silicon gel breast implants because of safety concerns).

We do not believe that any of the U.S. health and safety laws was designed to discriminate against international trade. Therefore, we would have serious objections to any agreement that allows another country to challenge U.S. health and safety laws.

Does the Administration regard the full range of U.S. health and environmental laws as being supported by a reasonable scientific basis? Will the Administration vigorously defend every such law against any international challenge?

What assurances can you provide us that U.S. health and safety laws will not be declared trade barriers under this standard?

3. The draft also appears to cover labeling of products. For example, requirements of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 might be subject to challenge. Health and safety warnings required by U.S. law could also be subject to challenge. In our view, labeling requirements that are applied equally to domestic and imported goods should never be treated as trade barriers.

What assurance can you give us that U.S. labeling laws will not be subject to challenge under GATT or the Mexico agreement?

4. In the draft agreement, there is considerable discussion of risk assessment techniques, and there is at least a suggestion that international standards could override

the methods used by a particular country. Risk assessment is the method by which some federal agencies determine the risk of particular hazards. What assurance can you give us that the U.S. will be free to devise its own methods of measuring the risk of pesticides, food additives and other hazards?

5. We are also concerned about the procedures that would be used to determine whether a U.S. law is a trade barrier. Apparently, decisions regarding the validity of U.S. laws would be made by a panel selected by GATT. The proceedings are conducted in secret. If our government did not defend a law adopted by Congress, there would be no opportunity for Congress or any U.S. citizen to defend the law.

What assurances can you give us that the process for challenging U.S. laws will be open and fair?

6. The draft contains proposals to extend GATT to state and local laws. This would subject a huge, unknown number of additional laws to challenge. For example, California's Proposition 65 (which contains warning labels on certain products that contain carcinogens) could apparently be challenged on the ground that it is a trade barrier. In addition, the draftagreement contains language which would obligate the U.S. government to require states and localities to comply with GATT.

What assurances can you give us that GATT will not be extended to state and local laws?

We look forward to receiving your response before the House of Representatives votes on extending fast-track authority for the GATT negotiations.

Sincerely yours,
Richard A. Gephardt.
Robert T. Matsui.
Henry A. Waxman.
Ron Wyden.
Gerry Sikorski.

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U.S. Trade Representative,
Washington, DC, May 22, 1991.

Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
House of Representatives Washington, DC

Dear Congressman Waxman: Thank you for the letter you and your colleagues sent to me regarding sanitary and phytosanitary issues. I am happy to respond to the six questions you posed which relate to the negotiations in the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (S&P) Regulations and Barriers being conducted under the auspices of the Agricultural Negotiating Group (ANG).

Before addressing your questions, let me emphasize that the agreement being developed by the S&P Working Group is essential for allowing effective challenges to illegitimate measures in the area of food safety, animal health, and plant health. S&P measures are often misused as a means to bar entry of competitive agricultural products, block opportunities for market development, and register dissatisfaction over other, unrelated trade grievances. In the future, improved liberalization of agricultural markets could significantly increase incentives to misuse S&P measures. Countries could see health-related measures as a way to continue blocking imports when other means are no longer available. We need improved multilateral rules to prevent such abuse.

It is important to note that the current S&P text has NOT been accepted by any country, including the United States. However, it is the position of both the interagency group studying the S&P issue and the Administration that the S&P text reflects a successful implementation of the objectives of the Mid-term

Agreement and a suitable basis for a negotiation. At present, brackets remain on several important provisions, indicating that country positions continue to differ. Despite these outstanding issues, we believe that with adequate attention these areas of divergence can be narrowed and ultimately resolved to the satisfaction of the United States.

Turning now to the specific issues you raised, in the order posed:

1. The placement of the burden of proof in GATT challenges of health-related measures more stringent than international measures.

The current draft text is specific in protecting the right to take science-based measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant health, including, when appropriate, measures more stringent than international standards. The United States will NOT give up its sovereign right to determine the measures appropriate to protect health, safety, or environment.

It is important to note that in a GATT challenge under the proposed agreement, there would be no presumption against, or special burden on, the party maintaining measures more stringent than the international standard. The question in this context would be whether the measure is science-based. A GATT challenge is NOT to second-guess countries' scientific determinations, but only to ascertain whether the measures were based on scientific information that indicates a public health or environmental threat and were evaluated using recognized scientific approaches. This does not require absolute scientific certainty, or even consensus within the entire scientific community. Rather, it would require that there be trustworthy information -- such as human epidemiological data, or medical histories -- that supports the risk assessment.

2. Administration regard and support for the full range of U.S. health and environmental laws.

We have great confidence in the processes used to develop U.S. food safety laws and regulations. More specifically, we believe that our processes conform to the criteria of the S&P draft agreement, and we certainly stand ready to defend our laws and regulations in the event of a challenge by another GATT country. In fact, the United States has been in full compliance with its obligations under the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade which established disciplines to prevent standards-related barriers for a broad range of agricultural and industrial products. (Title IV of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 implemented those obligations under U.S. law.)

3. U.S. labeling laws under the GATT or a North American Free Trade Agreement.

The GATT S&P draft text covers labeling requirements which are "directly related to food safety." Therefore it is doubtful, for example, that nutritional labeling or other [*E2010] labeling of a general educational nature would be covered by an S&P agreement. Regarding food safety labeling, there would be no concern unless another country could reasonably claim that our requirements acted as an unjustified trade barrier, which seems unlikely. We do believe, however, that food safety labeling should be subject to the general disciplines of an S&P agreement, e.g., it should be science-based and nondiscriminatory regarding imports. Product labeling requirements are covered by the broad disciplines under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and again I note that we have been in full compliance with our international obligations. These disciplines should also be relevant to any agreement signed with Mexico, though it is difficult to determine what will be covered in the agreement as formal negotiations have yet to begin.

4. Continuance of national sovereignty in measuring risks to health.

The United States feels strongly that each country has the right to undertake its own risk assessment. The draft S&P agreement would not require any particular method of risk assessment to be used, but rather would call for a country's method to be science-based, transparent and consistently applied. We believe that the U.S. approach to risk assessment meets these criteria.

5. The openness and fairness of the WATT process for challenging health-related measures that impact agricultural trade.

Our view is that the only approach for adequately addressing the unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary trade barriers facing U.S. agricultural exports is the development of an effective GATT process in this area. However, as I noted above, we certainly are confident and ready to defend any U.S. law or regulation in the sanitary and phytosanitary area that might be challenged in GATT.

6. The extension of GATT rules to state and local laws.

The issue of a national government's degree of obligation in seeing that its subnational (state and local) governments are in compliance with the GATT is a complicated and difficult "horizontal" issue, i.e., it is important for all GATT rules and not just the sanitary and phytosanitary agreement. The U.S. position is that, in the event of a finding of subnational nonconformity with the GATT, the national government can only be expected to make "reasonable efforts" within its existing system to bring its subnational governments into compliance with the GATT. The sanitary and phytosanitary agreement clearly will allow states to adopt standards stricter than national standards as long as they comply with the provisions of the agreement, e.g., they are science-based, transparent, and nondiscriminatory. On the other hand, it is important to note that no GATT agreement, including a sanitary and phytosanitary agreement, can be effective if the measures of subnational jurisdictions cannot be subject to scrutiny according to GATT rules. The obligation to take such "reasonable measures" was embodied in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and implemented in our domestic legislation under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.

Again, I thank you for taking the time to elaborate your concerns. I hope that we can continue to have a productive dialogue on these issues.

Sincerely,
Carla A. Hills.