

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	From: Jodi Kessinger, To: Gwyn Parker, Re: Draft Lake Confirmation Q & A (24 pages)	02/21/1997	P1/b(1)
002. email	From: Jodi Kessinger, To: James Gibney, Re: For Nancy's 4 PM (68 pages)	02/26/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Lake, Bosnia])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1997-02/26/1997]

2017-0035-F

in274

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 February 97 11:39
FROM Baker, James E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: NOTE FROM NANCY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Vershbow, Alexander R.
CARBON_COPY Kessinger, Jodi
TEXT_BODY

Sandy: You should also clear the 2d and 3d Qs and As on Bosnia.
Particularly how the dilemma posed by Tadjman's question is phrased. Can
you please cc me on any edits. Thanks.

From: Kessinger, Jodi
To: Baker, James E.; Beers, Rand R; Danvers, William C.; Kreczko, Alan J.;
Moffett, Julia; Sonenshine, Tara D.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @LEGAL -
Legal
Advisor; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @CROSS - Cross Hatches;
@INTEL -
Intelligence Programs
Subject: NOTE FROM NANCY [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Saturday, February 01, 1997 06:00 PM

[[TLQANEW.DOC : 2859 in TLQANEW.DOC]][TLCONFPT.DOC : 2860 in
TLCONFPT.DOC]]

These are the Qs and As and slighted shorter talking points. Please review
by noon
Monday.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 1 February 97 17:40

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** TLQANEW.DOC
As of 2/1/97 5:30 P.M.

DRAFT LAKE CONFIRMATION Q & A
for internal use only

Q: Doesn't Lake have a history of poor congressional consultations and a lack of bipartisanship?

No. In fact, Lake has a long history of just the opposite.

For those who have followed his writings and policy work, Lake is a pragmatist, a realist and someone who understands bipartisanship. Over a decade ago, Lake wrote in *Our Own Worst Enemy* about recapturing a spirit of bipartisanship in foreign policy and for what he called "a centrist political force that can help the country stay on a steadier and publicly supportable policy course."

During his tenure as National Security Advisor, Lake regularly consulted with Congress. Majority Leaders Bob Dole, Trent Lott and Richard Armey have all publicly noted Lake's efforts to consult them, most recently on the crisis in Zaire.

Q: Wasn't the decision to give a green light to Iran in Bosnia a colossal -- and illegal -- mistake? Doesn't it show Lake is unfit for DCI?

A: No. When asked in 1994 by the Croatian Government our position on third country arms shipments to Bosnia through Croatia, the Administration, weighing the need to keep the Bosnian State and Federation alive, the arms embargo in force, and with allied forces on the ground, instructed our Ambassador to respond he had no instructions on the issue. This was not a covert activity. It was not illegal. It was a secret diplomatic exchange.

Subsequent events show we did the right thing: the Bosnians survived and began to counterattack, Iranian and radical Islamic influence has been dramatically reduced following Dayton, and cooperation on Bosnia has become a source of strength, not crisis, for the NATO Alliance. There is peace in Bosnia today -- our policy worked.

In addition, six months after the 1994 exchange, Congress passed legislation requiring us not to enforce the arms embargo, which had, in practical terms, the same result as the Administration's decision. And although the Congress was aware at the time Iran was involved in arms shipments to Bosnia, it did not exempt Iranian shipments from the law.

Mr. Lake and the President have both said that in retrospect, it would have been better to have informed key Members of Congress at the time the "no instructions" instruction was given to our Ambassador in Croatia. Mr. Lake has made it clear that

he wanted the information closely held within the Administration to avoid a rift with the NATO allies (i.e., not a desire to keep the matter specifically from Congress, others in the Administration or cover it up.)

Q: Referral to Justice of Select Subcommittee Report on Bosnia:

In October, the Republican majority of the Select Subcommittee announced that they would be making a referral to the Department of Justice. Representative Lee Hamilton and the Democratic members of the Subcommittee strongly criticized this action at the time stating:

"We have looked at the facts. We have reviewed the evidence. It is our believe that no laws were broken, no wrongdoing occurred, no covert actions took place, no false statements given, no U.S. interests were harmed. When the results of this investigation are released, it will be obvious that this was not a criminal matter, it was a dispute about policy."

One month later, on November 7, the Republican majority in fact referred their majority report to the Department of Justice. This action was again strongly criticized by the minority members of the subcommittee.

"The Select Subcommittee has conducted a thorough investigation. Based on testimony we have heard and the documents we have reviewed, we found no evidence of wrongdoing. No witness has given false testimony. There are no discrepancies on any of the key facts in the case."

More recently, in a January 28, 1997 statement, Congressman Lee Hamilton, ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee and its Select Subcommittee on the U.S. role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia said:

"Now that the Select Subcommittee's final report has been declassified and will soon be publicly available the American people will know what members of the subcommittee have known for several months: Despite the allegations made by the majority members of the subcommittee, the Clinton Administration did not act improperly or illegally in this matter."

"In short, while some may disagree with U.S. policy in Bosnia, it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn a policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage. It should also be noted that the SSCI itself conducted a thorough review of this matter without resort

to criminal accusations."

"I strongly disagree with the Majority's decision to refer some aspects of this matter to the Justice Department for possible prosecution.... There were no discrepancies about the essential facts in this case. A few witnesses disagreed about inconsequential details. That does not in my judgment constitute making false statements to Congress."

The matter is currently under review by the Justice Department.

Q: Doesn't Lake's role in the formulation of policy over the last four years impede his ability to give impartial intelligence and assessments?

A: No. Throughout his tenure as the National Security Advisor, Tony Lake has always insisted on unvarnished intelligence assessments. He has had to rely on this straight information himself as he advised the President and understands its value as a result. Lake considers it an act of loyalty to the President and the country to provide the objective facts.

In fact, Lake's experience as National Security Advisor gives him unique qualifications to do this job well. The knowledge he brings from the previous job enables him to anticipate problems that may be "around the corner" and to provide the President with the most useful and effective intelligence that Lake knows he needs.

Q: What is Lake's personal history and record on integrity?

A: Mr. Lake has repeatedly stood up for what he believes. He volunteered to go to Vietnam as a foreign service officer, served with courage and distinction there, returned to Washington for many years of service, including time as a White House aide and senior State Department official (Director of Policy Planning) before moving to Massachusetts to farm and teach international relations, encouraging his students to enter public service.

In 1970, he resigned from the White House staff on the day of the invasion of Cambodia, believing that it was wrong to escalate the war at that time. He felt it was inappropriate to serve defending a policy which he could not in good conscience defend.

In addition, Mr. Lake ran a widely respected voluntary organization, International Voluntary Services, that provided assistance to developing nations on a grass roots level.

For over thirty years, Mr. Lake has worked tirelessly in public service or in promoting core American values in which he believes. He is ideally suited to lead the intelligence community with determination and the highest standards of integrity.

IF ASKED: He worked on the 1971-72 campaign of Edmund Muskie, not George McGovern, did not help found the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) affiliate Center for National Security (he delivered a single lecture to IPS on Washington's government institutions), nor did he work for the Church Committee--as some have alleged.

Q: Does Lake's lack of management experience present a problem?

A: It is because of Lake's experience at the NSC that he knows how to coordinate and manage the activities of different agencies, as the DCI must do, and as he has done for the President's foreign policy team. He is qualified and prepared to provide hands on, supportive, but very firm management and to work closely with Congress. He will pursue personnel reforms, vigorous counter-intelligence efforts, further improvements in fiscal accountability, and clearer data bases for making tough resource allocation decisions.

Q: Is it true that, under Lake's tenure as the National Security Advisor, CIA resources have been massively diverted from monitoring military threats to addressing environmental issues irrelevant to our national security.

Lake's intelligence priorities are consistent with those laid out by the President after Lake initiated an NSC review in 1995. In addition to support for military operations involving U.S. forces, priorities include political, economic and military intelligence about countries hostile to the U.S. and intelligence about transnational issues -- weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking -- that affect national security. In fact, the agency's program on the environment, initiated during the Bush administration, is a modest but important element of our programs tracking population migration, environmental degradation and other natural events that affect our interests and resources.

Q: Did Lake meet with campaign contributors who were foreign nationals -- in his office or in the Oval Office? If not, did he know about it?

To the best of Lake's recollect and the files that have been reviewed to date, Mr. Lake has not met with John Huang, James Riady or other fundraising figures that are the subject of current investigation. [CK]

Q: What role did the NSC have in screening persons who called on the President?

A: The NSC would from time to time be asked whether we were aware of any information that might bear on whether the President should meet with a particular person or not. In almost all cases, the question would be raised in the context of a meeting or event the President might attend with foreign persons. As asked, the NSC would review the available information regarding the name in question with the appropriate directorates and, in most cases, and on an informal basis, with the State Department and CIA.

Q: Would the NSC recommend, did the NSC recommend, against the President seeing a particular individual?

A: We would make it clear where we thought it important that the President meet with a foreign person, if for example, it would serve a foreign policy purpose as well as when we thought it better that he not do so from a foreign policy perspective. I should note, however, that in many if not the majority of cases we would in fact not have pertinent information, or the information we did have would be inconclusive.

Q: What you are saying is the White House had no formal process for vetting persons. Shouldn't you have had such a process?

A: As you know, the Chief of Staff has recently directed that such a formal process for reviewing names be implemented. The details of how this will be done are under review.

Q: Wasn't it Mr. Lake's responsibility to ensure that foreign visitors were vetted before they met with the President?

A: It is not within the duties of the NSC to set the President's schedule or determine whom he sees. Nor is it the NSC's responsibility to determine who comes into the White House complex. The NSC does make recommendations to the President and schedulers on official foreign visitors, and as noted above, when asked has responded to questions regarding unofficial

foreign visitors.

The President and Mr. Lake understood that he would not get involved in domestic politics; Mr. Lake did not become involved in the 1996 campaign. [Alan ck re: groups]

Q: Did Lake's belated sale of stocks violate any federal conflict-of-interest laws?

A: Mr. Lake had been advised to sell his energy stock to avoid any possible conflicts of interest with his national security responsibilities. He thought this had been accomplished. When made aware that the stock had not been sold, he immediately sold the stock.

Since the law requires referral to Justice of any information raising a question of compliance with the conflict of interest statute, former White House Counsel Abner Mikva referred the matter to Justice. In doing so, he made clear that he had no reason to believe Mr. Lake's failure to divest had been intentional or motivated by personal gain [and that he did so out of an abundance of caution.CK]

The matter is currently under review by the Justice Department.

Q: What about new stories that Tony Lake held energy stock as late as January of this year, even though he was already under investigation for having held such stock earlier?

A: The stock was purchased in Sept '96 and sold in January '97 when Mr. Lake's financial manager realized the stock had been purchased in error. It was purchased without Mr. Lake's knowledge, and sold without Mr. Lake's knowledge.

The fact that Mr. Lake held stock in Williams Company, a natural gas pipeline company, was brought to Mr. Lake's attention when our lawyers noticed the stock on Mr. Lake's most recent financial disclosure form. Mr. Lake said that he was unaware such a stock had been purchased.

Q: What kind of a message does Lake's ambivalence over Alger Hiss' guilt (Meet the Press) send to the Agency that he would be expected to not only run, but inspire?

A: Lake believes that Hiss was guilty and has believed so for

quite some time.

Second, in this time of great change, what is needed is vision, a strong agenda and sense of purpose, good management, a strong dedication to counter-intelligence, and a commitment to the community -- all of which Lake has demonstrated he has.

IF ASKED: Lake did not feel it was appropriate to convict Hiss, shortly after his death, on national television.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

1 February 97 17:38

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

TLCONFPT.DOC

The President's Choice for Director of Central Intelligence, Anthony Lake, is the Right Man for the Job

As we head into the 21st century, the intelligence community must be run by someone who understands the challenges that both the United States and the Community face, and who brings a record of integrity, competence, vision, and bipartisanship to the job. Anthony Lake has such a record.

☐ This nomination is too important to become a partisan issue.

Lake has the trust and confidence of the President. The President of the United States must be in a position to appoint a person he is close to, has confidence in, and believes can best handle this important job.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has a long and respected bipartisan history. It is important that this continue -- for the good of the Congress, the Agency and the country. Lake has a strong commitment to and a strong record of a bipartisan approach.

It is not in the best interest of the intelligence community, or the country, to let this nomination get mired down in partisan politics. This nomination should be judged solely on its merits -- any other course can do damage to an agency at a crossroads in its history.

There are many important issues that must be addressed in Lake's confirmation hearings that deal with the future of the intelligence community. The Select Committee on Intelligence has set Mr. Lake's hearings for February 25. The Administration is looking forward to expeditious and fair hearings.

As former DCI Robert Gates wrote, "Mr. Lake's confirmation ought not become a matter of partisan conflict, an opportunity to attack the administration's foreign policy. There are other, more appropriate forums for that...hard questions should be asked of Mr. Lake, and then he should be confirmed expeditiously with broad bipartisan support. This would be in the best interests of the country and of the intelligence community."

☐ Lake understands the important role of the CIA and the entire intelligence community.

As President Clinton's National Security Advisor (NSA) for the past four years, Anthony Lake has a unique understanding of what the President needs to create a safer and more prosperous world. Lake knows first-hand the critical role of the CIA and the entire Intelligence community in providing the President and his advisors the best information and analysis to formulate policies that serve the nation's interests.

Together with his extensive and wide-ranging knowledge of foreign affairs, his work over the last four years makes him uniquely qualified to anticipate problems around the corner, analyze complex issues and know what questions need to be asked. Lake has been a consumer of intelligence on a daily basis. He knows its successes and its shortcomings. He understands what is relevant and what isn't.

☐ Lake is committed to providing a long-term commitment to the community.

Lake, if confirmed, is committed to staying at least four years, providing continuity to an organization that needs strong, sustained leadership and the enthusiasm he brings to his tasks.

☐ Lake knows the priorities of the intelligence community for the 21st century.

Over the past few years, Lake helped develop the main priorities of the intelligence community: (a) providing critical support for military operations involving U.S. forces; (b) political, economic and military intelligence about countries hostile to the United States and U.S. citizens; and (c) intelligence about transnational issues -- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking -- that affect national security and the lives of Americans.

☐ Lake is committed to giving the President "unvarnished facts."

Lake's close relationship with the President will enable him to "tell it like he sees it." Lake has stated repeatedly that the CIA must present views that reflect facts not policy preferences or anticipated policy decisions -- nor, conversely, should intelligence agencies actively participate in setting policy. As NSA, Lake has championed the integrity of the process of intelligence collection and analysis. As Lake said when the President nominated him, he is committed to "giving the President the unvarnished facts." Lake's record is evidence of this commitment. He insisted at Principals Committee meetings that the line between intelligence and policy be clearly and unequivocally drawn.

☐ Lake has a solid record of managing and coordinating the work of multiple agencies -- experience that is tailor-made for the diverse entities that makes up the Intelligence Community.

As he has done for the President's foreign policy team, Lake also knows how to coordinate and manage the activities of different agencies, as the DCI must do. He is qualified and prepared to provide hands on, supportive, but very firm management. He is committed to pursuing personnel reforms, vigorous counter-intelligence efforts, further improvements in fiscal accountability, and clearer data bases for making tough resource allocation decisions.
February 3, 1997

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 February 97 16:15
FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Edits to Lake Documents [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Biernacki, Eileen V.
Friedrich, M. K.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Moffett, Julia

CARBON_COPY Baker, James E.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Leary, William H.
Sparks, John E.

TEXT_BODY An edit (non-substantive) to Q and A.

From: Baker, James E.
To: Kessinger, Jodi; Moffett, Julia; Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Leary, William H.; Vershbow, Alexander R.;
@LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: Edits to Lake Documents [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, February 03, 1997 03:51 PM

[[TLQANEW.DOC : 4174 in TLQANEW.DOC]][[TLCONFPT.DOC : 4175 in
TLCONFPT.DOC]]

Here are Legal's edits to latest draft of Q and A and statement. Please
note that Sandy Vershbow still needs to clear the Bosnia questions. Thank
you.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 3 February 97 16:13

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

TLQANNEW.DOC
As of 2/1/97 5:30 P.M.

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for internal use only

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I strongly disagree with the Majority's decision to refer some aspects of this matter to the Justice Department for possible prosecution.... There were no discrepancies about the essential facts in this case. A few witnesses disagreed about inconsequential details. That does not in my judgment constitute making false statements to Congress."

The matter is currently under review by the Justice Department.

From the Administration's perspective, while we understand that some may disagree with U.S. policy in Bosnia, it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn a policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage. It should also be noted that the SSCI itself conducted a thorough review of this matter without resort to criminal accusations. [EDIT NOTE: THIS IS NOT A QUOTE BUT RATHER THE ADMINISTRATION SPEAKING.]

Q: Doesn't Lake's role in the formulation of policy over the last four years impede his ability to give impartial intelligence and assessments?

A: No. Throughout his tenure as the National Security Advisor, Tony Lake has always insisted on unvarnished intelligence assessments. He has had to rely on this straight information himself as he advised the President and understands its value as a result. Lake considers it an act of loyalty to the President and the country to provide the objective facts.

In fact, Lake's experience as National Security Advisor gives him unique qualifications to do this job well. The knowledge he brings from the previous job enables him to anticipate problems that may be "around the corner" and to provide the President with the most useful and effective intelligence that Lake knows he needs.

Q: What is Lake's personal history and record on integrity?

A: Mr. Lake has repeatedly stood up for what he believes. He volunteered to go to Vietnam as a foreign service officer, served with courage and distinction there, returned to

Washington for many years of service, including time as a White House aide and senior State Department official (Director of Policy Planning) before moving to Massachusetts to farm and teach international relations, encouraging his students to enter public service.

In 1970, he resigned from the White House staff on the day of the invasion of Cambodia, believing that it was wrong to escalate the war at that time. He felt it was inappropriate to serve defending a policy which he could not in good conscience defend. [EDIT NOTE: WE MAY WELL BE ASKED FOR A COPY OF LETTER OF RESIGNATION TO SEE HOW HE MADE THE POINT AT THAT TIME. DO WE HAVE? AND IS MR. LAKE PREPARED/WILLING TO RELEASE IT.]

In addition, Mr. Lake ran a widely respected voluntary organization, International Voluntary Services, that provided assistance to developing nations on a grass roots level.

For over thirty years, Mr. Lake has worked tirelessly in public service or in promoting core American values in which he believes. He is ideally suited to lead the intelligence community with determination and the highest standards of integrity.

IF ASKED: He worked on the 1971-72 campaign of Edmund Muskie, not George McGovern, did not help found the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) affiliate Center for National Security (he delivered a single lecture to IPS on Washington's government institutions), nor did he work for the Church Committee--as some have alleged.

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Q: What role did the NSC have in screening persons who called on the President?

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of any information that might bear on whether the President should meet with a particular person or not. In almost all cases, the question would be raised in the context of a meeting or event the President might attend with foreign persons. As asked, the NSC would review the available information regarding the name in question with the appropriate directorates and, in most cases, and on an informal basis, with the State Department and CIA.

Q: Would the NSC recommend, did the NSC recommend, against the President seeing a particular individual?

A: We would pass along any information and give our views on whether there were any foreign policy advantages or disadvantages from meeting. I should note, however, that in many if not the majority of cases we would in fact not have pertinent information, or the information we did have would be inconclusive.

Q: What you are saying is the White House had no formal process for vetting persons. Shouldn't you have had such a process?

A: As you know, the Chief of Staff has recently directed that such a formal process for reviewing names be implemented. The details of how this will be done are under review.

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foreign visitors.

The President and Mr. Lake understood that he would not get involved in domestic politics; We don't know.

Q: Did Lake's belated sale of stocks violate any federal conflict-of-interest laws?

A: Mr. Lake had been advised to sell his energy stock to avoid any possible conflicts of interest with his national security responsibilities. He thought this had been accomplished. When made aware that the stock had not been sold, he immediately sold the stock.

Since the law requires referral to Justice of any information raising a question of compliance with the conflict of interest statute, former White House Counsel Abner Mikva referred the matter to Justice. In doing so, he made clear that he had no reason to believe Mr. Lake's failure to divest had been intentional or motivated by personal gain and that he did so out of an abundance of caution. ok

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A: The stock was purchased in Sept '96 and sold in January '97 when Mr. Lake's financial manager realized the stock had been purchased in error. It was purchased without Mr. Lake's knowledge, and sold without Mr. Lake's knowledge.

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**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

3 February 97 15:46

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

TLCONFPT.DOC

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☐ This nomination is too important to become a partisan issue.

Lake has the trust and confidence of the President. The President of the United States must be in a position to appoint a person he is close to, has confidence in, and believes can best handle this important job.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has a long and respected bipartisan history. It is important that this

continue -- for the good of the Congress, the Agency and the country. Lake has a strong commitment to and a strong record of a bipartisan approach.

It is not in the best interest of the intelligence community, or the country, to let this nomination get mired down in partisan politics. This nomination should be judged solely on its merits -- any other course can do damage to an agency at a crossroads in its history.

There are many important issues that must be addressed in Lake's confirmation hearings that deal with the future of the intelligence community. The Select Committee on Intelligence has set Mr. Lake's hearings for February 25. The Administration is looking forward to expeditious and fair hearings.

As former DCI Robert Gates wrote, "Mr. Lake's confirmation ought not become a matter of partisan conflict, an opportunity to attack the administration's foreign policy. There are other, more appropriate forums for that...hard questions should be asked of Mr. Lake, and then he should be confirmed expeditiously with broad bipartisan support. This would be in the best interests of the country and of the intelligence community."

☐ Lake understands the important role of the CIA and the entire intelligence community.

As President Clinton's National Security Advisor (NSA) for the past four years, Anthony Lake has a unique understanding of what the President needs to create a safer and more prosperous world. Lake knows first-hand the critical role of the CIA and the entire Intelligence community in providing the President and his advisors the best information and analysis to formulate policies that serve the nation's interests.

Together with his extensive and wide-ranging knowledge of foreign affairs, his work over the last four years makes him uniquely qualified to anticipate problems around the corner, analyze complex issues and know what questions need to be asked. Lake has been a consumer of intelligence on a daily basis. He knows its successes and its shortcomings. He understands what is relevant and what isn't.

☐ Lake is committed to providing a long-term commitment to the

community.

Lake, if confirmed, is committed to staying [OTHERWISE RAISES MORE QUESTIONS]four years, providing continuity to an organization that needs strong, sustained leadership and the enthusiasm he brings to his tasks.

☐ Lake knows the priorities of the intelligence community for the 21st century.

Over the past few years, Lake helped develop the main priorities of the intelligence community: (a) providing critical support for military operations involving U.S. forces; (b) political, economic and military intelligence about countries hostile to the United States and U.S. citizens; and (c) intelligence about transnational issues -- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking -- that affect national security and the lives of Americans.

☐ Lake is committed to giving the President "unvarnished facts."

Lake's close relationship with the President will enable him to "tell it like he sees it." Lake has stated repeatedly that the CIA must present views that reflect facts not policy preferences or anticipated policy decisions -- nor, conversely, should intelligence agencies actively participate in setting policy. As NSA, Lake has championed the integrity of the process of intelligence collection and analysis. As Lake said when the President nominated him, he is committed to "giving the President the unvarnished facts." Lake's record is evidence of this commitment. He insisted at Principals Committee meetings that the line between intelligence and policy be clearly and unequivocally drawn.

☐ Lake has a solid record of managing and coordinating the work of multiple agencies -- experience that is tailor-made for the diverse entities that makes up the Intelligence Community.

As he has done for the President's foreign policy team, Lake also knows how to coordinate and manage the activities of different agencies, as the DCI must do. He is qualified and prepared to provide hands on, supportive, but very firm management. He is committed to pursuing personnel reforms, vigorous

counter-intelligence efforts, further improvements in fiscal accountability, and clearer data bases for making tough resource allocation decisions.
February 3, 1997

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 February 97 16:45
FROM Kreczko, Alan J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Lake Nomination [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Brown, Nancy E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Helweg, M. Diana
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Kerrick, Donald L.

TEXT_BODY

Please substitute this E-mail for the nearly identical one I transmitted at 4:30.

For SRB:

I talked through with Chuck Ruff the four options for legal representation of NSC staff who appear before the SSCI -- NSC legal; Justice Department attorney; Justice-paid for private attorney; private attorney. We talked through implications of each, primarily in terms of degree of privilege attached to communications. Chuck's preference was for NSC legal to provide "official" representation but he asked me to lay it out for Bob Suettinger and Sandy Kristoff. I did so with Bob (sandy being out of town). Bob said his preference was for NSC legal to assist him.

Meanwhile, SSCI staff has expanded its request to include interviews of Kyle, Soderberg and Roth as well as Kristoff and Suettinger. Moreover, it is clear their questions go beyond the documents already provided. I am meeting again with Chuck at 8:30 AM to go over this, prior to a 10:30 meeting with the SSCI on their request. I intend to be use that meeting to learn what the scope of their interest is and how they propose to proceed

(e.g. interviews, briefing). I intend to be primarily in listening mode, while laying down some markers concerning fairness. I'll report back to you and Chuck for decision-making.

This is clearly going to be a continuing issue, with more document searches on their way, helping NSC staff with testimony, and press inquiries. To staff it properly, I need another lawyer, at least for several months. (Counsel's office is bringing on several people to handle the fundraiser issue.) I would like to bring on one immediately. There is an attorney at DOD/GC with whom Jamie and I have worked on both Bosnia/Iran and Haiti investigations; we both think she is very good. She is from Arnold & Porter and Jack QUinn is very high on her. It would also provide some useful continuity in the event there is transition here within the Legal Directorate, which I expect will occur. I would like to discuss this with you as soon as possible, as I am supposed to be on travel from this Saturday to Thursday of next week.

From: Danvers, William C.

To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @ASIA - Asian Affairs;

@LEGAL - Legal Advisor

Subject: Lake Nomination [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Tuesday, February 18, 1997 03:47 PM

I received a call from the Deputy Staff Director of the SSCI asking that SSCI staff be able to interview Bob Suettinger and Sandy Kristoff as part of the Tony Lake nomination process. They would like to do so this week.

If at all possible, it would be helpful to be able to fulfill their request.

Please advise as to how I should handle.

Thanks.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	From: Jodi Kessinger, To: Gwyn Parker, Re: Draft Lake Confirmation Q & A (24 pages)	02/21/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Lake, Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1997-02/26/1997]

2017-0035-F
jn274

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	From: Jodi Kessinger, To: James Gibney, Re: For Nancy's 4 PM (68 pages)	02/26/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Lake, Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1997-02/26/1997]

2017-0035-F
jn274

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