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Folder Title:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Re: Bosnia (2 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	Re: Bosnia (2 pages)	02/09/1996	P1/b(1)
001c. list	INR Documents Provided to SSCI on 4/16/96 (3 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/27/1996	P1/b(1)
001e. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/10/1996	P1/b(1)
001f. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/04/1996	P1/b(1)
001g. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/02/1996	P1/b(1)
001h. cable	Re: Iranians (1 page)	02/01/1996	P1/b(1)
001i. memo	Re: Iran/Bosnia (2 pages)	01/31/1996	P1/b(1)
001j. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update [duplicate of 001f] (2 pages)	02/04/1996	P1/b(1)
001k. memo	Iran and Bosnia (1 page)	01/19/1996	P1/b(1)
001l. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	01/18/1996	P1/b(1)
001m. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (3 pages)	01/07/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001n. memo	Re: Bosnia-Iran (3 pages)	01/05/1996	P1/b(1)
001o. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	12/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001p. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (3 pages)	12/22/1995	P1/b(1)

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Q Also, Vice President Gore talked about the President planning to veto the Dole lifting-of-the-embargo bill. Do you have any elaboration on that?

(I)

MS. SHELLY: No, I don't have anything further to say on that.

Q Can you say why Under Secretary Davis is meeting with the Israelis today?

MS. SHELLY: No; I don't have anything on that, but let me check.

Q Different topic.

MS. SHELLY: Sorry, one last question.

Q Richard Beattie will be visiting Cyprus on January 22. There seem to be a lot of hopes invested in his visit. What will Beattie be taking as a plan to Cyprus to resolve the issue, and what is he going to

SEARCHED SCREEN

Title: 1995 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING #6: TUESDAY, 1/10/95

Line 720 of 796

show some interest in engaging around the parameters of that proposal, and there has been interest expressed -- not sufficient interest to indicate any optimism about the likelihood of a peace settlement in Bosnia but at least enough to encourage the Contact Group experts to return to Sarajevo to re-engage with the parties and to see if they can make progress.

Bill.

Q Mike, I read today -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- that the President has stated that he does not expect that he will be able to keep the arms embargo in place, prevent a unilateral lifting. Could you comment on that?

And the second part of the question would be, how has the statement by our Government last week regarding the rescue of UNPROFOR troops, if required, and the other efforts to unify the UNPROFOR effort -- is that succeeding in quelling the jitters of those who have troops in Bosnia?

MR. McCURRY: Let me address the second question first, and it has also been addressed today by Secretary Perry enroute to Brussels. He indicated, based on his own meeting with the French Defense Minister yesterday and other discussions that he's had, that that commitment to carry out our responsibilities as a member of NATO has had an effect on other European allies who are troop contributors in Bosnia. So that has had that positive effect.

Now, on the first part of your question, I'll be honest with you. I don't recall President Clinton addressing himself to the question of whether or not a unilateral lift of the arms embargo is likely. I believe Senator Dole has addressed himself to that question and indicated that he does have the votes to proceed on that path as we go into the next session of Congress early next year.

Again, we would suggest -- as Secretary Christopher has suggested -- that it would be a dreadful mistake to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, because unilaterally lifting the arms embargo requires the United States unilaterally to accept the responsibilities and consequences of that action -- among them, (1), having to engage militarily with the Bosnian Serbs, who would likely take advantage of that situation; and then, once having commenced U.S. military action, to hold back the Serbs and thus committing our prestige. The likelihood that we would then be involved, sooner or later -- inevitably -- in the dispatch of ground forces to Bosnia.

It is the determination of this President and this Administration to honor our commitment to the American people and to continue to avoid sending U.S. ground troops to

Bosnia.

That is the consequence of a unilateral lift. That's why we have always proceeded on the basis that multilateral lift is the best way, if the arms embargo is to be lifted -- in fact, the only way that it should be lifted -- so that multilaterally the world community accepts the consequences for what would likely happen next. And what would likely happen next, of course, is a major escalation in the conflict.

Q Just to follow on my second question -- just this much more -- to ask if there are currently any indications coming to this Department of a withdrawal of UNPROFOR? Or, conversely, are there indications that UNPROFOR will stay on indefinitely now?

MR. McCURRY: No. The best indications are to the contrary, and they were addressed yesterday by Secretary Perry and the French Defense Minister.

Q In case of the U.N. peacekeeping force withdrawing from Bosnia, in most of these (inaudible) countries they pledge to send troops as playing a peace force role in Bosnia. But, yesterday, the French Defense Minister, he described that as the Islamic countries force will be replacing with other NATO forces; it must be a disaster. Do even they plan to go later this week, if not as early as tomorrow.

Q Mike, have you got any idea how long this refurbished Contact Group plan can be pushed before something else needs to be done?

MR. McCURRY: It can be pushed so long as the parties show some interest in engaging around the parameters of that proposal, and there has been interest expressed -- not sufficient interest to indicate any optimism about the likelihood of a peace settlement in Bosnia but at least enough to encourage the Contact Group experts to return to Sarajevo to re-engage with the parties and to see if they can make progress.

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Q In case of the U.N. peacekeeping force withdrawing

1994 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING #21: MONDAY, 2/7/94

Source: Secretary Christopher, Under Secretary
Lynn Davis, State Department Spokesman Michael
McCurry, and Craig Johnstone, Director of
Resources, Plans, and Policy
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Feb 7, 1994
Category: Briefings
Region: North America, Europe, South Asia,
Central Europe, East Asia
Country: United States, Glorioso Islands, Pakistan,
Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro,
Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: State Department,
Security Assistance and Sales,
Mideast Peace Process, Development/Relief Aid,
Trade/Economics, United Nations, Narcotics,
Military Affairs, Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Arms Control

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING SUMMARY
Monday, February 7, 1994

(A)

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Arms Embargo 25-27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1994, 12:57 P.M.

[EXCERPT]

Q Could you restate the current United States' position on lifting the embargo, the arms embargo? Has that been under discussion, and where is that?

MR. McCURRY: It has remained a preferred alternative of the United States, but one which we are not pursuing, given the opposition that exists to our closes allies on the U.N. Security Council; and since it involves lifting a U.N. Security Council resolution, that is a subject that would have to be addressed with some concurrence by the Security Council. We have not pursued it because of the clear opposition of other members.

However, as I think the President, the Secretary and others indicate, we are in a situation now where there's a review of Bosnia going on within the Alliance itself.

Q The Secretary didn't raise this again; just another trial balloon in his conversations the last couple --

MR. McCURRY: I think the Secretary was very careful

not to direct you to any of the substance of his discussions with his counterparts, and that's for the good reason that he wants to be in concert with them, and then he'll be in a position to describe it publicly.

Q Well, you said we're not pursuing it, so I am taking that to mean --

MR. McCURRY: I was asked to restate historically what our view has been. That's historically what our view has been.

Q As a result of an earlier Boutros-Ghali letter just a couple of weeks ago, the NAC got the go-ahead to do some things to open the airport at Tuzla and complete their rotation of troops at Srebrenica. Have either of those things happened, and has the North Atlantic Council taken action to open the airport at Tuzla?

MR. McCURRY: I think as I've indicated earlier, the rotation at Srebrenica is underway, and the opening of Tuzla airport is under discussion with the Bosnian Serbs. It has been our view that the likelihood of keeping Tuzla airport open for humanitarian purposes is far greater if there's an agreement on the part of the warring parties to allow the airport to operate; that certainly by no means has the Alliance ruled out opening the airport by other means.

Q Mike, you and other officials and the Secretary have made it pretty clear that nothing's being ruled out. That's a nice phrase to use periodically when you want to keep people guessing.

• Can we assume that when you say "nothing," you mean "nothing," and that even unilateral action by the United States in Bosnia has not been ruled out? Or are you talking in terms of a multilateral NATO contact --

MR. McCURRY: I think it is very clear from the Secretary's comments and from my description of his activity that he's determined to work cooperatively and closely with our European colleagues on this.

Q So you're ruling out unilateral action.

MR. McCURRY: I'm not the person who rules out unilateral action. It's our Commander in Chief who does that. I don't know that he's addressed himself to that question.

Q You either don't want to or can't discuss the other things that are going to be on the table at NATO, aside from what you've described and the Secretary's described as this narrow issue of responding to the Secretary General's remarks.

But are you able to say whether the U.S. and its allies at NATO will be discussing some NATO initiative or some NATO-wide event, or are you going to be discussing

perhaps using small groups of nations who happen to be members of NATO to respond in some way?

MR. McCURRY: That is an excellent question. I don't know the answer to that. I guess phrasing the question differently, it might be our prospect for perhaps using a combined joint task force here. I don't know the answer to that. I don't know that that formal process for carrying forward on some of those recent decisions by the NATO

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leaders are in a position to be implemented at that point, but it's something I'll raise and see if there's an answer to it.

Saul.

Q Mike, has the Secretary specifically talked to his colleagues about whether to hold a ministerial, and did the Secretary suggest that it was not necessary to hold it at the ministerial level, or how did that happen?

MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware that that came up as a point of discussion, as far as I know.

Q Juppe had called for a ministerial level meeting to --

Q The Dutch, too, at a Foreign Minister level.

Q -- and the Dutch and Belgians as well.

MR. McCURRY: Actually, my understanding was somewhat different from that. I thought that there had been some discussion about whether or not there should be a meeting of the United Nations Security Council convened, perhaps at the ministerial level. But my understanding is that the allies are in broad concurrence about how to proceed at this point.

Q Mike, did you receive any indication from Bulgaria and Romania that they would like to take similar action in Hungary in broadening relations?

MR. McCURRY: I don't know the answer to that. I can try to check on that and see what the --

Q And could you assess the implications of that for the U.S. position on the arms embargo, whether it would strengthen it from a preferred option into some advanced stage? These three countries which all border on Serbia, all of them are suffering heavily economically from the sanctions and now appear to be taking some action on their own to stop observing the sanctions as they have so far. How would that impinge on the U.S. position on the arms embargo?

MR. McCURRY: I don't know that those questions would at all be related. They involve enforcing existing Security

Council resolutions. But I'll see if we have any assessment on that.

Q Mike, when you say the allies are in broad concurrence about how to proceed at this point, you mean on the procedural matters of at what level to hold meetings. You don't mean about what to do about Bosnia, do you?

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MR. McCURRY: That was an answer on a procedural question involving what steps would they take later this week and what level would they meet, although obviously we have been working very closely with our European colleagues, and they have reached some consensus today, as you can tell from the statement by the EU Foreign Minister himself.

Q Do we know when the NAC will meet? The NAC ordinarily meets informally on Tuesday and formally on Wednesday. Do you know when?

MR. McCURRY: I haven't heard of anything that suggests a different schedule than that. I don't know that that's been announced or decided upon, but that certainly fits with our thinking.

Q Do you have anything on Haiti?

MR. McCURRY: No, nothing. Nothing newer than the statement of where they were still talking about sanctions.

Q North Korea -- have you done that?

MR. McCURRY: North Korea we didn't do. I didn't really have much new to add on it.

Q Other than the fact that the clock is ticking and --

MR. McCURRY: Right. I want to make clear on that, there was some press reporting here over the weekend. It's not up to the United States to set a deadline for North Korea to accept the inspections that the IAEA deems necessary to ensure -- to determine that there's been a continuity of safeguards.

The IAEA has made clear that the longer that these inspections are put off, the more concerned they are that the continuity of safeguards could be broken. As we've said repeatedly, if the IAEA declares the continuity of safeguards in North Korea broken, we'd have no choice but to return the issue to the U.N. Security Council for further action.

There is no deadline, but clearly the Board of Governors meeting by the IAEA will be a critical time for them to address whether there has been continuity of safeguards, and that's a date that is, as I think most of you

know, only several weeks off now.

Q But don't they know the expiration dates of these batteries and the cameras and that sort of thing?

MR. McCURRY: There are all sorts of things technically that go into their understanding of continuity of safeguards. We support their determination technically of what is required to establish safeguards continuity. That's not something independently that we try to judge, and I think that we made that very clear to North Korea.

Q Thank you.

MR. McCURRY: You're welcome. (###)

TAKEN QUESTIONS

As Posted in the Press Office, U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman
Feb. 7, 1994

1. Bosnia

Q: In light of the upcoming NAC on Bosnia, has NATO formed a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) for Bosnia and if so, whether such a mechanism can be used for Bosnia?

A: --NO. NATO HAS NOT FORMED A COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE FOR BOSNIA.

--THE NATO THEATER COMMAND (AFSOUTH), HAS BEEN COORDINATING WITH UNPROFOR ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES, INCLUDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT.

--IN ADDITION, ELEMENTS FROM A NATO HEADQUARTERS (NORTHAG), ARE ALREADY DEPLOYED WITH UNPROFOR.

2. BULGARIA/ROMANIA

Q: Have you received any indications that Bulgaria and Romania are interested in broadening relations with Serbia?

A: WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CHANGE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND SERBIA, OR ROMANIA AND SERBIA.

--BOTH THE GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA HAVE FREQUENTLY AFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO ENFORCE U.N.-MANDATED SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SERBIA/MONTENEGRO. (###)

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U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, Vol 5, No 33, August 15, 1994

Title: Foreign Ministers Contact Group Meeting on
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Source: Secretary Christopher
Description: Opening remarks at a press conference, Geneva,
Switzerland
Date: Jul 30, 1994
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central Europe
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Subject: Democratization, Military Affairs, EU
Page Number(s): 553 (Article 1A)

[TEXT]

We have just concluded a meeting to take action regarding the conflict in Bosnia. To begin, we reaffirmed our unity of purpose in pressing for a negotiated settlement, and we carried forward the step-by-step approach that we have undertaken in prior meetings. We made it clear that the settlement must preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single union within internationally recognized borders.

In regard to our prior action, we welcomed the response of the Bosnia Federation, which accepted the proposals of the Contact Ministers and the Contact Group unconditionally. We concluded that the Bosnian Serb response was tantamount to a rejection, and, against that background, we reaffirmed to show our determination to act together to carry out the agreements that we had previously reached.

In light of the Serb rejection, we moved forward with the implementation of the consequences we had defined at the July 5 meeting.

First, we agreed that we would put forward to the Security Council a new resolution that would extend sanctions against Serbia and tighten the enforcement of the existing sanctions. We will put forward a resolution at the UN within a week that would tighten sanctions and extend the enforcement of the sanctions. This is in furtherance of the agreement we reached on July 5 as to the first of the stated consequences.

Second, we also agreed that we would take steps to strengthen the protection of the safe areas, and we would go forward with a finalization of plans to permit extension of the safe areas and strict enforcement of the safe areas. The planning will involve the essential step of appropriate means to safeguard the safety and security of the UNPROFOR troops as we move forward with this process of stricter enforcement and extension of the safe zones. This is the second of the consequences we agreed to on July 5.

We intend to move quickly on them as well, and we have directed that the planning for that be done promptly--no later than during the month of August. We, I think, recognize the need to move forward with this program, and we expressed our common understanding that, if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the proposed plan, a decision in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo may become unavoidable. We agreed also to instruct the Contact Group to work further with the front-line states on sanctions enforcement.

Finally, if I could add a personal word for the United States: I stressed that, if this phased approach to the increased pressure on the Serbs was not successful, the United States would be under very strong, irresistible pressure to lift the arms embargo, as we have said at prior meetings. We are not prepared to see this process strung out indefinitely. While, of course, a negotiated settlement remains our firmest resolve, we cannot let the current situation continue, a situation in which the victim is penalized unfairly by the arms embargo and denied the right to defend itself.

This is certainly not an easy course to take, but we believe we will have no other choice if we are going to achieve our common goal of bringing a durable peace to Bosnia. To sum the matter up, we have today taken action to implement two of the consequences that were agreed on at the July 5 meeting--a tightening and extending of the sanctions against Serbia, and a stricter enforcement and extension of the safe areas. We have reiterated the fact that, if the Serbs do not--the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the plan--the lifting of the arms embargo may become unavoidable or irresistible. (###)

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1994 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING #136: THURSDAY, 9/22/94

Source: State Department Spokesman
Michael McCurry
Description: Briefing, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 22, 1994
Category: Briefings
Region: Caribbean, Central Europe, Europe
Country: Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cuba, Ireland,
Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: Military Affairs, Immigration,
Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid,
Refugees/Population/Migration

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING SUMMARY

BOSNIA

Prospects for Lifting Arms Embargo/Consequences .5-8
Serbia's Border Closing/UN Talks on Sanctions ...8-9

[EXCERPT]

MR. McCURRY: The analysis goes something like this: An effort to lift the arms embargo would result almost instantly in Bosnian Serbs attempting to take advantage of the disparity prior to any arms buildup on the part of the Bosnian Government. They might likely overrun certain positions; certainly, the Eastern areas like Srebrenica and Gorazda, and Zepa, that they would then face a real likelihood that some of the UNPROFOR contingents that are in outlying areas might well be overrun by Bosnian Serbs and being in need of evacuation.

That's the analysis. We are certainly aware of that type of analysis.

Q You're not aware of any planning within this Administration for that contingency?

MR. McCURRY: No. That planning is taking place already. That was ordered and instructed by the ministerial meeting in Geneva. The last Contact Group meeting said they needed to do urgent planning on what it would take to enforce the measures that were --

Q U.S. ground troops?

MR. McCURRY: U.S. ground troops -- I'm not aware of any planning or any options that involved U.S. ground troops in Bosnia. I think the President has made himself very clear on that subject.

Q The process for reviewing the embargo on Serbia Proper, where does that stand right now?

MR. McCURRY: The process on --

Q The deployment of the border guards was to trigger some review of the sanctions on Serbia Proper?

MR. McCURRY: I've got the world's greatest expert in the room here. Nod yes if I get it right; nod no if I get it wrong.

Those monitors have been deployed along the border, and they're beginning to provide reports on the status of the Belgrade Serbs commitment to closing the border. It does seem to be a commitment that appears to be holding. There have been signs that the border has been closed to all but humanitarian goods. There are provisions for humanitarian goods to transit back and forth across the border.

That has led to discussions at the United Nations Security Council about two separate resolutions concerning sanctions. One, which would tighten those existing sanctions and sanctions-enforcement as they pertain to the Bosnian Serbs; another which would ease some of the restrictions involving Belgrade. Principally, for things like sporting events, cultural events, and so forth.

Those discussions are underway. I believe they are well into the debate and that action may be taken soon in the United Nations on both of those resolutions. Jamie Ruben is looking at me and nodding. Good. That's close enough. Jamie happens to be here today. If anyone wants to talk to him, he can give a little more.

Q On Sarajevo, in particular. You haven't mentioned what was the specific trigger for these reported air strikes. Is there an accumulative process? In other words, a cutting-off of water, electricity, and other necessities of life? Is this part of the foundation of the decision-making?

MR. McCURRY: It's not. Those are questions that we've visited so often here. Those relate to the strangulation of Sarajevo. And at what point do you consider the city of Sarajevo strangled.

There are some reports today that the United Nations may be able to get out in the next 10 days and make some repairs on gas and electricity lines, which is one of the reasons why they're having trouble getting gas and electricity in. But water continues to be a water. Water is shut off, too.

All of these things have been discussed and raised by General Rose in meetings that he has had with Bosnian Serb leaders, Bosnian Serb military commanders. They remain of great concern to us. It's exactly why we continue very urgently the work that we're doing within the Contact Group that's designed to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into full acceptance of the Contact Group proposal.

①

September 1994
1994 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING #: TUESDAY, 9/27/94

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PRESS BRIEFING
BY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER

The Briefing Room
The White House

[TEXT]

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I'm going to give you brief comments on today's meetings. This is only halfway through, and so you'll be not surprised if many of the things are tentative, and in many instances, I can only give you subject matter without any agreements or particular indications as to how things went. In short, this is an intermediate report.

My own sense of it is that this was a good example of a day of a partnership that is working very effectively and a partnership between the two men is very effective. They began by a one-on-one discussion, which immediately they determined would last through the morning, rather than going into a delegations meeting, and the two Presidents went until 12:45 p.m.

My own impression, from seeing them together this afternoon bears out what I heard about this morning. These are two men who like each other. They speak quickly in an animated way. They've learned to communicate very effectively and they get right down to business.

This will, I think, eventuate in more than \$1 billion of commercial agreements being signed before this summit is finished in the Ex-Im area, in the OPIC area, and in the trade development area. They began this morning by reviewing the economic situations in both countries. In different ways there has been unusual progress since the last time the two of them were together; progress toward stability and effective operation in Russia and the progress toward economic recovery here in the United States.

President Yeltsin expressed appreciation for the President's decision on Jackson-Vanik to find Russia in compliance and make it no longer necessary for them to have annual reviews. President Yeltsin expressed the hope that they would be able to

go the next step; that is, to graduate them completely from the Jackson-Vanik requirements. That will require a congressional action, and President Yeltsin, in expressing appreciation for what was done this year, indicated that they hoped they could take that next step in the future.

There was both in the one-on-one meeting, as well as in the delegations meeting, which took place in parallel, discussions about the situation in Bosnia. I think there is appreciation that there is a new circumstance there in that the Bosnian government does not wish to have the arms embargo lifted and implemented -- I'm sorry -- the lifting of the arms embargo implemented at the present time, and has indicated that they feel that a six-month deferral of the lifting would be in their own interest. Both sides indicated that this six-month period ought to be used to try to bring the Bosnian Serbs into agreement. There was common ground that we should continue with the unity of the Contact Group, carrying out the incentives and disincentives, and making maximum use of the Serbian government's willingness to cooperate in putting pressure on the Bosnian Serbs.

A very interesting suggestion was made and President Clinton suggested that it would be very desirable if there was mutual recognition between Serbia and Bosnia of their borders and of their right to exist. And President Yeltsin recognized the importance of that idea and indicated that that was something that was desirable and they would try to pursue it.

I would say the discussion of Bosnia will probably continue into tomorrow, but this was an example of the need to maintain unity between the Contact Group and an indication here between the United States and Russia that they would be able to do so, aided by the deferrable with respect to the lifting of the arms embargo.

There was a discussion of COCOM and Russia's participation in COCOM. As you know, there's been an issue there about Russian arms sales to Iran. Without being able to be more explicit, I would say that I believe there's a resolution in sight on this very difficult issue. That will be discussed again tomorrow and perhaps we can have more details on that at the end of these meetings.

There was a discussion also of CFE, the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement. It was interesting that the parties seemed to be on common ground, that ways would be found to resolve that issue within the current limits. There was no sense of a determination to break out by any means.

In the delegation meeting -- and perhaps I should step back and explain that while the Presidents were having their one-on-one, the remainder of the delegations discussed the issues that they had before them. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, the Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets and, I believe, Defense Minister Grachev; and on our side, Secretary of Defense Perry from the United States side, and on the delegation the Vice President and myself and others.

We began the discussion in the delegation meeting by discussing

the many ways in which we worked effectively together in the course of the last year. We discussed at some length the Baltics and how the removal of the Russian troops on accordance with the timetable was a major step forward. And I pointed out that one of the positive benefits from the Russians handling this in the way they did was that the Baltic countries now seem to be very anxious to have maintained a good relationship with Russia, and they've come to us indicating a desire to make sure that their new relationships with Russia are sound ones.

We talked about the trilateral agreement between Russia, the United States and Ukraine that was regarded by all hands as a positive development. We discussed the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. And we discussed the progress in the Middle East where we're cosponsors, and we received some compliments from the Russian delegation about progress we had made there and the fact that we kept them fully informed.

This afternoon, President Yeltsin and President Clinton joined us after that very moving ceremony with respect to the World War II veterans. They summarized what they had done in their one-on-one conversations, and then we went through a number of additional topics. There was a good discussion of crime and corruption in both countries. Both Presidents indicated that their people had a high degree of interest in the resolution of these problems and it was agreed that there would be mutual efforts to cooperate on these matters.

There was the same kind of a discussion on nuclear smuggling, and it's hoped that perhaps even before this summit is concluded that there will be more details and more specificity on approaches to nuclear smuggling. But the parties clearly want to be forthcoming on this issue, to exchange vast amounts of information so that both parties are up to date or understand what the nuclear conditions are in each other's country.

North Korea -- there was a very preliminary discussion of North Korea in which views were exchanged and there was an agreement to stay in close touch on that.

Toward the end of the day there was a discussion of security issues, and I think that since that was preliminary and not conclusive that I will not try to brief on those issues, but simply for completeness sake, I wanted you to know that there was -- perhaps for the last half hour -- a discussion of security issues, which I think will be briefed to you tomorrow.

That's basically the outlines of the day. As you can see, a great many subjects were discussed. Discussions were very intense, despite the fact that time was taken out for a luncheon at the State Department in which President Yeltsin was the guest of Vice President Gore and the moving ceremony with respect to the veterans. Nevertheless, all these subjects were covered, and I think we're anticipating a very full day again tomorrow.

Q Were you hinting that Russia will halt its arms sales to Iran?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I'm hinting the resolution of this matter is within view. And since that was the core of the problem, obviously it would involve some approach of that kind.

Q Sir, do you have similar hopes for China's missile technology sales to Pakistan? You know the Chinese delegation is coming here next week and it is on the agenda. Is this going to be a good week for ending proliferation to unstable regimes?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Barry, it didn't take you very long to get beyond the summit today. I really would rather not characterize the prospects there. It is true that the Foreign Minister Qian Qichen is coming here to Washington next Monday to meet with me and also to meet with the President and that will be a topic of high importance on the issue. But I don't want to try to characterize the likely outcome. Q Mr. Secretary, did President Clinton comment in any way on President Yeltsin's speech at the United Nations yesterday; particularly the part where he talked about -- not using this term -- sphere of influence in the form of the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, they exchanged compliments on each other's speeches. An unusual thing that they spoke on the same day and in the prior years, there had been quite a studied effort to separate their speeches. And I think it's a reflection of the new partnership at work that they spoke on the same day. On the sphere of influence issue, there was certainly no reference to that, and I think neither party, neither of the sides recognized spheres of influence.

As you know, our efforts in Haiti were pursuant to United Nations resolutions. We expect that the efforts of Russia and the new independent states will be pursuant to international law and such international organizations as CSCE or the United Nations. So, no, I didn't hear any discussion on spheres of influence, and the reason is that the parties don't recognize such.

Q Can I just follow on that? Does the lack of a comment on that mean that the President endorses what Mr. Yeltsin said on that subject yesterday?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: You know, you have to tell me exactly what that was, but I'm sure if there was -- if that was implication of spheres of influence, the President does not endorse that.

Q He said, for one thing, basically that Russia is the chief guarantor of basically freedom in the old Soviet Union, sort of "our backyard" argument. Do you subscribe to that?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, we recognize that Russia naturally has a particular interest in countries on its borders just as we do, but I wouldn't agree with the characterization of a principal guarantor, because I think that's a matter for the international community as a whole, working through such organizations as United Nations and such regional organizations as CSCE.

Q He also said that there should be no double standard when it comes to securing human rights and for major countries to be the guarantor of human rights. It was no double standard that -- you know, it was sort of a clear implication with regard to Haiti, but you reject that, obviously?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, yes I do, and I think we're active in Haiti for the reasons the President has stated, and one of the important ones is because of the many atrocities there in Haiti, and that's one of the obviously American interests that bring those to an end.

Q To what extent does the United States encourage the Bosnian Muslims to accept the six-month postponement of the embargo? Did the Russians give you any indication today that they might be willing to accept a U.N. resolution stating that clearly?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, as you know, Doug, we've been hearing for some time that the Bosnian government might be taking a somewhat different position with respect to the timing of the lifting of the embargo. When Prime Minister Silajdzic came to see me last Friday and when President Izetbegovic met with the President on Sunday, they put forward in a formal way the idea of a postponement or a deferral of the lifting of the embargo.

That was spelled out in President Izetbegovic's speech at the U.N. today. When we heard that from the Bosnian government, it was an idea that seemed to us, since they came to us and explained the reasons for it, seemed to us to make good sense, and I think we're anxious to try to explore the modalities of carrying it out through a U.N. resolution.

What was said today in the meeting by the Russians that they welcome that thought because it would give us that much additional time to try to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the plan put forward by the Contact Group. The Russians place great store by the pressure being put on the Bosnian Serbs by the Serbian government, and so I think, giving that additional time for that to happen that they've regarded as a positive matter.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there going to be a new agreement designed to curb smuggling of nuclear material that you're going to announce tomorrow? Is that what you're hinting at?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: No, I'm not hinting that. I'm hinting we might have something more to say about it.

Barry, did you want to follow up?

Q I just wanted to follow up, please. The way you phrased the Bosnian situation opens to my head the possibility of going ahead with the resolution on the 15th but with a delayed effectiveness, a six month -- so you're not foreclosing, are you so you're not foreclosing, are you, the President keeping his commitment to Congress by presenting a resolution on the 15th, but its implementation being delayed for months, is that correct?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: On the contrary. I am saying the President will carry out his commitment to Congress, and will go forward with the presentation of a resolution with some kind of a delay in the implementation of it. Just how that's worked out will be, I think, negotiated fairly heavily over the course of the next month because there are some delicate issues to be worked through there. But the President will keep his commitment to Congress in going forward with such a resolution by about the first of November.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you be a little bit more specific on the kinds of things that the Contact Group can do to convince the Serbs to that which they haven't done for the past several months? And further, is there any more serious thought than in the past that we've given to the idea of a sort of multinational summit on this problem?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, with respect to the kinds of things -- as you know, the United States has long thought there ought to be a stricter enforcement of the exclusion zones, and perhaps an expansion of exclusion zones. And the six-month period would give us an opportunity to pursue that. I think that the United States intends to talk to the other members of the Contact Group about ways to do that.

As you also know, the United Nations has recently approved a resolution, or will be approving soon a resolution putting stricter sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs. And I think the enforcement of those stricter sanctions, especially the economic form of those, can put some additional pressure on.

There was a reference today by the Russians of the possibility of an international conference. Our feeling about that -- the United States' feeling about that is that such a conference may serve a purpose at some point, but it would be some distance in the future after we worked through the possibilities we have now to try to put additional pressure on the Bosnian Serbs.

Q Mr. Secretary, with the suggestion by President Clinton about the mutual recognition between Serbia and Bosnia of the borders -- would that be complicated at all by the map that is being discussed at this point? How would that work, exactly?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: No, because Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an entity, and Serbia would simply be recognizing the entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus recognizing the borders. Part of that discussion was that that might be accompanied by an additional relaxation of sanctions. I think our position would be that there should be no recognition -- there should be no talk about any additional suspension or relaxation until that kind of a commitment was forthcoming; that is, the Serbian government recognizing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia.

Thank you very much.

(###)

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Q Well, if I have access to him and I don't have access to you, can you say anything about the passing of October 15th, which was initially the promised date for the U.S. to do something in the U.N. about Bosnia and partially lifting of the arms embargo? Where is the U.S. now on this?

MS. SHELLY: O.K. The deadline of October 15th for the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan has passed, with no positive response from the Bosnian Serbs. We're working on a draft resolution to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. In accordance with the President's letter to Congress, we will submit our draft resolution to the Council within the next two weeks.

Q What kind of implementation date?

MS. SHELLY: As I think you know, in the context of our discussions on this we are both working to fulfill the

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MS. SHELLY: As I think you know, in the context of our discussions on this we are both working to fulfill the commitments to the U.S. Congress on lift and also to do that in a way which is consistent with the request of President Izetbegovic regarding a delay in the implementation of the lift, which, as you know, involved an approximate six-month deferral of implementation.

Q Can you tell us anything about the Contact Group meeting -- your expectations for the Contact Group meeting this week? Will Assistant Secretary Holbrooke be there, and what do you think about a French proposal for a Croatian-Serbia-Bosnian Summit Meeting?

MS. SHELLY: O.K. I don't have anything on the French proposal. I personally have not seen it, but I'll certainly check on that.

There are a number of Contact Group meetings which are

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Q Another subject. How goes the trial and error process up in New York with the Bosnian arms embargo resolution?

MR. McCURRY: I don't know what you mean, "trial and error."

Q Christine was saying that a draft was being floated. Is it flying?

MR. McCURRY: There are Contact Group meetings underway up there, and they've been augmented today, I believe, at the Political Directors' level. We've got Assistant Secretary Holbrooke up there.

They are exploring the question of what fashion an arms embargo resolution could take. As you know, it's our desire to introduce -- it's the President's commitment to introduce that resolution by the end of the month which we certainly expect to

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introduce -- it's the President's commitment to introduce that resolution by the end of the month which we certainly expect to do, and the discussions of how to shape that resolution and fashion it are ongoing.

Q And what has been the initial reaction of the other members?

MR. McCURRY: A predictable one, but I'll leave it up to those governments to address themselves to that.

Q Mike, does the Administration enthusiastically endorse lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government?

MR. McCURRY: As the Contact Group itself has so stated and each and every member of the Contact Group has indicated, we believe that lifting the arms embargo is a last resort that could be unavoidable. And, as you know, from President Izetbegovic's desire to delay the lift for a period of six

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could be unavoidable. And, as you know, from President Izetbegovic's desire to delay the lift for a period of six months, it might become unavoidable some time next spring, depending on events on the ground.

Obviously, our strong preference would be to see the Bosnian Serbs comply with the Contact Group proposal and the and to get along with the business of building peace. There doesn't seem to be a lot of movement in that direction at the moment.

Q Mike, yesterday you expressed, I guess, astonishment that the U.N. had not followed through on a request from the ground for close air support.

MR. McCURRY: No. I indicated I had no idea why they had not.

Q Well, that might have been attributed, at least by

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Q Anything new on the status of the border closing and the flow of arms back and forth?

MR. McCURRY: I heard a report earlier today and I frankly didn't get time to check it, but there had been another report from the international monitoring mission along the border, indicating that they were still seeing evidence that there were efforts to monitor the border by Serbian authorities and to alter shipments that were specifically exempted by the U.N. Resolution.

I think our own assessment is that it's difficult to monitor the full length of that border with a mission of the size of the one that is now deployed. And it's probably true that there are ways to evade some of the monitoring that is taking place.

Q As the Contact Group meets in New York to apply strategies to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign on, could you tell

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Clearly, I don't think that they want to box themselves in about whatever their ultimate response might be to any particular contingency. But certainly they have expressed very strong concern and indicated the pressures on them which exist to act.

But at this point, I think it is still their feeling at this juncture that they will exercise restraint.

Q As a follow-up on the discussion of what if the Congress were to vote to lift the arms embargo, would the President veto such legislation?

MS. SHELLY: Carol, that's just way too hypothetical at this point. I can't engage on that one.

Barrie.

Q Christine, I understand that Tony Lake is making a speech at Princeton today, and the advance billing on that speech is that he will

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DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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Wednesday, September 6, 1995

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DPB #133

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1995, 12:56 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. BURNS: Good afternoon. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Welcome back, Carol. Glad to see you. I'm prepared to go to your questions directly. You get the first question. It's your first day back.

Q What can you tell us about this Contact Group meeting in Paris Thursday? Who will go, and what do you expect to come out of it?

MR. BURNS: The French have called a meeting on Thursday on Bosnia -- the situation in Bosnia. I understand that it will include the Contact Group members: the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as Italy, Spain, and Canada. In addition, representatives of the OIC -- the Organization of Islamic countries -- will attend this meeting.

The United States will be represented by Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff. He'll be leaving Washington this afternoon to travel to Paris for this meeting.

I understand that Mr. Zotov will represent the Russian Federation. He is their normal Contact Group representative. I also understand that the Bosnian Foreign Minister, Minister Sacirbey, will be at this meeting.

From the OIC Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia, and Senegal will attend as well as Indonesia. That's what we have so far from the French authorities.

Q Could you repeat those?

MR. BURNS: Yes. Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia, Senegal, and Indonesia.

This is a very important group for us. You remember that Dick Holbrooke stopped in Geneva the other day -- Sunday, I believe -- and he met with the OIC Contact Group. The OIC has its own Contact Group for this because the

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Muslim countries have a great interest in Bosnia and some of them are troop-contributors to the U.N. mission. So it's understandable that we'd want to have a fuller exchange at the Contact Group level with them to talk about not only the military situation on the ground but prospects for peace.

So it's an important meeting. Under Secretary of State Tarnoff will be representing the United States at that meeting.

Yes, Judd.

Q Is Holbrooke going to be there? He's been doing the negotiations.

MR. BURNS: He will not be there. He'll be in Geneva. He plans to go to Geneva tomorrow to prepare for the Friday peace talks in Geneva. That will include, as you know, the three Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Serbia-Montenegro. He's going to be preparing for that.

If you'd like, I can go in a little bit to what his agenda has been over the last 24 hours since we last met.

Q Do that, and then we'll follow up. It doesn't matter. Either way. Go ahead.

MR. BURNS: Let me just say, as you know, on Bosnia in general, NATO air operations and the Rapid Reaction Force military operations continue today. This was necessary because the Bosnian Serb army has still not complied with the U.N. and NATO conditions.

Secretary Christopher is back in the Department. He had a series of meetings this morning, one of which was on Bosnia. He'll have another meeting on Bosnia with his advisors this afternoon. He is right now over at the White House with the President for the meetings with the Panamanian President.

Secretary Christopher was on the phone yesterday just before departing California with the NATO Secretary General, Willy Claes, and with the U.N. Under Secretary General, Kofi Annan, about the situation in Bosnia.

I can give you, if you would like, some information on the continued peripatetic diplomatic mission of Dick Holbrooke in Europe.

When we last left him, he had just traveled from Ankara to Belgrade for discussions last night with President Milosevic. This morning, he departed Belgrade for Zagreb in

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Croatia where he met with President Tudjman. He continued on from there to Rome for consultations with Italian Government officials. He is currently in a meeting in the Italian Foreign Ministry when I tried to reach him just a couple of minutes ago.

The stop in Rome is important because Italy is a valued ally and a partner in this process. Italy has been a member of this expanded Contact Group that has been meeting for some weeks now. As I said, Dick Holbrooke will arrive in Geneva tomorrow afternoon to prepare for the meeting that will take place at the U.S. Mission in Geneva on Friday. I expect that Dick will be returning to the United States some time over the weekend after the Geneva meeting is concluded.

Now, specifically on his meetings that took place over the last two days, he met with President Milosevic for several hours yesterday, Tuesday, September 5, in Belgrade. Of course, General Wes Clark from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as others in his delegation were with him.

The discussion with President Milosevic focused on the state of the on-going peace initiative of the United States in the run-up to Friday's meeting. Dick Holbrooke continued to explore ideas for what we hope will turn out to be a comprehensive peace at some point in the region consistent with the principles of the U.S. peace initiative which, as you know, is based on the Contact Group map and plan.

In his meeting with President Tudjman in Zagreb this morning, he had his fifth such meeting with President Tudjman in two weeks. Their discussion also focused on the peace initiative. It gave Dick Holbrooke an opportunity to brief President Tudjman on the meeting with Milosevic (and) on the forthcoming Geneva meeting where Croatia will be represented by its Foreign Minister, Mr. Granic; and they had a talk on the situation in eastern Slavonia, which is of particular interest to the Croatian Government.

That is a little bit of information on Dick's travels.

Pertaining to the Geneva meeting, as I said, it will be held at the U.S. Mission. The participants will be members of the Contact Group, the European Union negotiator, Carl Bildt, and of course the three Foreign Ministers from Croatia, Bosnia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro).

As Dick Holbrooke was quoted as saying -- I think when he was in Zagreb -- this is going to be a difficult meeting because this will be the first time that these three Foreign Ministers have met to discuss the fundamental issues that have divided them for a number of years. We're

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looking forward to this meeting, but we do so with a pragmatic sense that we have begun over the last two weeks a very important peace process that we think will be a long process, a complex process, a very important one, but one that will require a lot of work, a lot of patience, a lot of creativity and ingenuity to move forward. And we remain dedicated to that.

Q Do you have any word today -- any new word on whether the Bosnian Serbs intend to attend?

MR. BURNS: No, I don't, Barry. As we left it yesterday, we had no word that there is a specific individual that would appear in Geneva as a representative from the Bosnian Serb leadership. But as you know, following the agreement that President Milosevic worked out, there is a joint delegation. At times, it may be that officials from Belgrade, in fact, represent all the Serbs -- the Bosnian Serbs as well the Serbian Government. So we just don't know. If someone shows up, of course, that person would be most welcome to participate in these discussions.

Q But, philosophically, would you want Serbia to represent the Bosnian Serbs? Doesn't that sound sort of like a Greater Serbia in one form or another?

MR. BURNS: No. A Greater Serbia -- that dream is finished.

Q It is?

MR. BURNS: It's finished. I think it's clear to everybody as a result of the Croatian offensive and of the great losses that the Serbs suffered on the battlefield, as well as by the renewed Western initiative demonstrated by the display of military power from the United Nations and NATO, that the dream of a Greater Serbia is absolutely finished. It's over. They no longer -- "they," the Bosnian Serbs -- can achieve their objectives on the battlefield. They've got to turn to the peace table. That's what we've been trying to tell them. That is one of the messages.

Q The statement has been trying to draw a distinction between the Serbs in Belgrade who you find a little less noxious than the Serbs in Bosnia. In fact, you've sort of gotten fond of the Serbs in Belgrade lately and think you're getting some help from them on this initiative.

I just wonder if you -- wouldn't you rather that the Bosnian Serbs do attend; that there be Bosnian Serbs at the

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table so at least they can be eye-balled and talked to about an agreement that they may or may not eventually uphold?

MR. BURNS: Barry, I don't know if "fond" is the right word. But we certainly have had a lot of contact with them over the last couple of weeks. The Government in Belgrade is a very important part of this process.

I think the fact that they've formed the joint delegation was an important development because that was the first signal last Wednesday and Thursday that, in fact, during the resumption -- during the NATO and U.N. military activity -- they were interested in peace.

President Milosevic maintains that he will speak from time to time, as a part of this process, on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. That is positive because he has shown himself to be ready for peace discussions, and that is positive.

Steve.

Q The Bosnian Serb President said on television this morning that he couldn't move those guns anymore because they were needed to protect the Bosnian Serbs who live around the guns. Does the United States feel it could give assurances to him that those population areas would not be harmed by the Muslims or NATO airstrikes or Rapid Reaction Force guns?

MR. BURNS: All the guns will fall silent -- all of the guns from all sides -- when the Bosnian Serbs decide they're more interested in peace than war. We have called upon all sides of this conflict, particularly during the last two weeks, to show restraint.

Steve, I saw the interview this morning on CNN. What, of course, struck me was this cynical charade that somehow the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to withdraw their heavy weapons on Monday evening and they were prevented from doing on Tuesday morning by the resumption of the U.N. and NATO air campaign. That is cynicism at its highest. We've seen it before. We saw it in 1994, and now we've seen it again. They moved a few weapons around inside the 20-kilometer zone around Sarajevo. They didn't move any weapons outside of that zone.

They said they were complying when in fact they weren't complying. It is cynicism, and it is a charade. We were certainly not fooled by it.

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The West -- in this case the U.N. and NATO -- had every right and, indeed, an obligation to resume the air campaign because of that cynicism.

Q Does that put the lie to Karadzic's seemingly Al Haig-like statement that he was in charge? (Laughter)

MR. BURNS: Steve, as I've said before, it sometimes very difficult discern all of the behavior and statements of the Bosnian leadership and sometimes to even make sense of it.

We have seen a lot of conflicting and contradictory statements out of the Bosnian Serb leadership over the last 10 days. Again, words are cheap and words are easy; actions are much more important in this kind of situation. We're going to look at the actions and judge them accordingly.

Q Would you deal with the proposition head on, though -- can you? Can the State Department? Would the State Department entertain the notion of halting the bombardment, the NATO bombardment, to test whether the Bosnian Serbs indeed would use that hiatus to remove their weapons? Is there a point to doing that, or are you figuring they're so cynical, why even go through the exercise.

MR. BURNS: I have two things to say on that, Barry. Number one is the State Department will not make the decision as to when the bombing starts or ends. NATO and the U.N. will. Secondly, there was a pause in the NATO-U.N. bombing over the weekend. It lasted for four days.

During that four-day period, there was specific, very clear discussions between General Janvier and General Mladic. There were very clear messages sent to the Bosnian Serbs, privately as well as publicly. Here is the chance to prove by deeds that what you say in public will in fact happen; that you're interested in turning towards peace; that you will in fact move these weapons out of the zone as you have promised to do.

They had the chance for four days. At the 11th hour on Monday evening, as the ultimatum was set to expire, they moved a few weapons around within the 20-kilometer zone. They proudly proclaimed for everyone to see that they were moving them. They said they were moving them out of the zone. That was not true. Therefore, NATO and the U.N. had no recourse but to learn the lessons of history. And the lessons in this particular history are that this has happened before, that some people have been fooled in the past, and that that's no longer going to be the case. We weren't going to be fooled this time.

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Tom.

Q Admiral Smith said this morning in Naples that it is not his desire to inflict a lot of damage with these airstrikes. What if the Serbs decide that they can just -- if they realize that, that they're not going to be hurt militarily in the long run by these airstrikes and just make a political decision to sit them out, what options does that leave the West?

MR. BURNS: I have not seen all of Admiral Smith's interview. I have seen parts of it. I know that as part of that response he said that we have in fact, I think, inflicted certainly military damage on the Bosnian Serbs -- NATO and the United Nations -- and that is not inconsiderable damage; that they clearly are feeling the pain right now.

The decision as to when the bombing will stop is up to the Bosnian Serbs. It's up to them to decide this question. If they by their deeds prove that they're willing to meet the conditions that were laid out by the United Nations and by NATO, that they're willing to go to the peace table and leave behind them forever the prospect of gaining advantage by warfare, then it's very clear what's going to happen.

Of course the bombing will stop. But the bombing will not stop until the NATO and U.N. Commanders on the ground ascertain that Sarajevo is safe and ascertain that the conditions they have put forward have been met. And that's as clear as day.

Q May I follow-up on if they don't meet those conditions?

MR. BURNS: We'll just have to take things -- it's hard to look behind the horizon of a week or so in Bosnia, as you know very well. We'll have to take that situation as it comes. But I think that the Bosnian Serbs should not miss the very strong public message of the last eight or nine days -- and that is that they could once run amok in Bosnia, they could once rape and pillage cities, and they now cannot.

They now are on the defensive. They now are facing very intensive NATO air bombardment. They're facing the guns of the Rapid Reaction Force from Mt. Igman and other places around Sarajevo. It's a new day, it's certainly something different than they have felt in the past, and they ought to learn the lesson. This is not temporary. This is not illusory. It's not something that can be waited

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out, because there's a collective expression of international will here that the time has come to move to the peace table. That's what's important about what's happened over the last week.

We have a military process underway. There is a diplomatic process underway. Nobody believes that this situation can be resolved by air power alone. We certainly believe that it can only be settled at the peace table. We are offering the olive branch. We are offering the peace table to the Bosnian Serbs. They ought to take it. It's in their own self-interest to do so.

Charlie.

Q Speaking of the peace table you just referred to, I think a few moments ago you said Milosevic said he would speak for them -- the Bosnian Serbs -- from time to time. Does he speak for them from time to time and when it's presumably convenient, or does he speak for them at all times? And on the subject of Holbrooke's meetings with Milosevic, do you mean to say that the subject of -- that Dick Holbrooke doesn't know whether there's going to be a Bosnian Serb representative at the table on Friday in Geneva?

MR. BURNS: Charlie, on your second question, all I can tell you is that we have not heard an announcement from Belgrade or from Pale that a specific individual is going to be at the table in Geneva. We're awaiting any such announcement, if it is to come.

Q That doesn't answer my question. Has Holbrooke heard from Milosevic whether Bosnian Serbs would be there -- individuals' names?

MR. BURNS: I can't tell you everything that Dick knows. I mean, he is in five capitals a day most days. He's got a lot of information in his head.

Q (Inaudible) that one away. Now go back to the --

MR. BURNS: That's right. I skirted that question. Let me move on to the first question. Would you like to repeat that?

Q Does he speak for the Bosnian Serbs from time to time, or does he speak for them, period?

MR. BURNS: There's a joint negotiating team that has been formed, and that team is headed by President Milosevic. There will be times when President Milosevic meets alone with Western interlocutors, as he has done on a

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number of occasions over the last couple of weeks with Dick Holbrooke and his colleagues.

There will be times when the Serb Government leaders in Belgrade, along with Bosnian Serbs, meet together with Western interlocutors at Geneva and outside of Geneva. So it's not an exact science, and I think that's the best description that the Serbian Government gave it. But it's a joint delegation.

What's important about that is that Belgrade does have influence, we believe, among all the Serbs; that President Milosevic is a respected leader among the Serbs. And for him to come out and dedicate his government to a peace process is a positive sign. It's the beginning of a process that we hope can move forward.

Sid.

Q Can you shed any light on what Mr. Milosevic told Mr. Holbrooke about the bombing?

MR. BURNS: I cannot. I don't have any quotes to give you from President Milosevic about the bombing. I would note, though, Sid, that last Wednesday morning -- the morning that the bombing started and again just yesterday -- Dick Holbrooke had successful, lengthy, productive meetings with President Milosevic as the military activity was underway. I think that's in part the answer to your question.

Q He didn't object to the bombing then or at least there's nothing that you want to share with us along those lines?

MR. BURNS: I can't state categorically that he did not object to it. I don't know that he's pleased about it. But I think it's --

Q He didn't sort of pause?

MR. BURNS: I'm not aware that he did. But again I can't speak for all of the discussions that have taken place between Dick Holbrooke and President Milosevic. There are some parts of those discussions that we're going to leave off the public record, and there are other things that we would maybe like to put on the public record that we are not aware of right now.

I mean, these things take some time. But I think it is positive that the Government in Belgrade has decided that it's committed to a peace process. It's sending its Foreign

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Minister to the meeting in Geneva in two days' time, and we're going to build on that momentum.

Mark.

Q Nick, Holbrooke said on Sunday on a television interview that the bombing was irrelevant to the peace process; that it was related solely to the Serb behavior around Sarajevo, which he called outrageous. Today you made a direct link between the bombing and the peace process and came close to saying NATO was bombing the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table. Why the shift in policy?

MR. BURNS: I didn't say that. I didn't say that NATO was bombing the Serbs to the peace table and didn't mean it. Dick is absolutely correct in stating -- he was on Sunday and I think he restated this with a slightly different formulation earlier today in Zagreb -- in saying that we have in this very complex situation a couple of things happening here.

We have the decision by the U.N. and NATO to undertake air and conventional land operations against the Bosnian Serb military because of their transgressions and because of their failure to meet the clearly stated conditions that have been laid down by both the United Nations and NATO.

We also have happening a peace process which is just now developing; and there is no tight, exact, detailed linkage between the people responsible for these two actions. Dick Holbrooke, as I said, is in five countries a day some days -- today, three.

He is not talking minute-by-minute or even hour-by-hour with the NATO and U.N. military commanders. They have their own clear instructions and by their own authority began, paused and recommenced military action. Dick is operating under the authority of President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher. They have sent him to the region to take advantage of what we believe is a narrow window of opportunity for peace, and to try to use that opportunity to move forward.

So I think Dick was absolutely correct in putting it the way he did, and I would put it the same way.

Q What's the agenda for tomorrow's meeting, and does the presence of Iran pose any difficulties for this government?

MR. BURNS: The agenda for tomorrow's meeting is being established by the French Government, so I refer you

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to the French for a detailed explanation of the agenda. But, as I understand it, in general it is to be a meeting where the Islamic countries have a chance to meet and discuss these issues in some detail with the Contact Group countries and the Bosnian Government.

The meeting on Friday is intended, as we said yesterday, to be a meeting to establish the foundations of what we hope will be a comprehensive set of negotiations that will take place later on -- the principles that will be the foundations for a peace process among the major parties to this conflict. I really don't have a comment on the presence of Iran. It's an Islamic country. It's a part of this organization.

Q Will this be the highest level meeting between and American official and an Iranian in quite some time?

MR. BURNS: It's a very specific question, so let me try to give you a specific answer without trying to be too pedantic about it. I'm not trying to be too pedantic about it. It's not a meeting between the United States and Iran. It's an international meeting called by France, in which there will be an Iranian and an American participating among a lot of people. So it's in no sense a bilateral meeting, and we don't view it as such.

Q Nick, just about six months ago Dick Holbrooke himself said on the record that Iran is unwanted in Bosnia. It has no role and called them a bunch of terrorists. Is there a change of heart now?

MR. BURNS: The United States didn't -- we didn't sit back and cogitate for hours and hours about whether or not Iran should be invited to this meeting in Paris. The fact is that we were invited by the French Government. The French Government invited the OIC countries. Iran is a member of the OIC. It's really not a big deal. We didn't have to jump through hoops to decide what to do.

Peter Tarnoff will represent the United States. There will be many, many other people in the room. It's an international meeting. This is not intended by any grand or Machiavellian design to bring two people together in the room. It's simply a coincidence, actually.

Q If I could just follow up. Iran has also offered a division of troops for peacekeeping in Bosnia or something in Bosnia. Does Iran have a role to play on the ground in Bosnia, as far as the United States is concerned?

MR. BURNS: If Iran has offered a division of troops, I don't believe anyone has leapt forward to accept that offer.

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I don't think the United States would think that would be a wise thing to do.

Q Okay, but what about a role? It doesn't have to be a division. Maybe it could be a patrol. Does Iran have a role to play on the ground in Bosnia?

MR. BURNS: The OIC has a role to play, because the OIC does have troop-contributing nations, among them some Southeast Asian nations, and they have a very important role to play. The connection with the OIC is important, because there is very great concern in the Islamic world about this particular conflict. We are sensitive to that, as is the French Government, and that is the reason for this meeting.

The United States does not believe that Iran does or should have much of a role in this particular conflict. We've turned a corner in this conflict. We are at the beginning of what we hope will be a renewed peace process, and we're doing just fine, thank you, without the additions of the contributions of any other state like Iran.

Q (Inaudible) yesterday that it was Izetbegovic who was in Ankara for that meeting?

MR. BURNS: Yes. He was in Ankara.

Q What was he doing over there? That's not on his way anywhere right now.

MR. BURNS: I can't say exactly what he was doing. He did meet with Dick Holbrooke, which was, I think, an important part of his stop in Ankara.

Q Did he say what he was in Turkey about -- meeting Izetbegovic?

MR. BURNS: No, he didn't mention that to me when I talked to him, but they had a very good meeting there. As I said, Dick has moved around Europe fairly rapidly. He's really covered almost all of the countries that are directly influenced by this conflict or have influence on it, and we believe that we've touched the bases that we should in anticipation of the Friday meeting in Geneva.

Barry.

Q Russia has called the -- condemned the NATO strikes as illogical and punitive. Obviously, the U.S. favors the strikes. It had a lot to do with the strikes. What are you telling the Russians? How do you approach this? Is it a serious disagreement?

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MR. BURNS: It's certainly a tactical disagreement, there's no question about that. We have had, through the history of the Contact Group, dating back to the late winter, early spring of 1994 -- we've had a number of tactical disagreements in the Group, not just between the United States and Russia; sometimes between other of our European allies, some of them and us. That's not surprising, considering how complex the situation is.

We're confident that when the peace talks get going, as they will on Friday, the Russians will be there, the Russians will take part. The Russians have consistently said this is what they want to have happen. They want the situation to turn from war to peace. So do we, and Friday is the first step in that process, and the Russians will be there with us. We're not overly worried about this. We've had an extensive set of discussions with the Russians this week and last about our respective views, and I think it is what it is.

Carol first and then David.

Q Is the United States actually chairing those peace talks on Friday?

MR. BURNS: Yes. The meeting is going to be held at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, and it will be chaired by Dick Holbrooke. The Contact Group is a collegial organization, and the chair revolves, depending sometimes on geographic location and sometimes on who had the initiative to call the meeting.

In this case, the United States took the initiative to call this particular meeting, and so therefore Dick will be chairing it. I remember very well the Contact Group Ministers' meeting in Noordwijk that went until two or three in the morning. It was chaired by the French Foreign Minister, Minister De Charette. So the chair does revolve, and in this case it will be an American chair.

Q And tomorrow's meeting with the OIC countries -- how do you see that supporting what's going to happen on Friday?

MR. BURNS: We have felt for a long time -- Secretary Christopher, Dick Holbrooke and others in this building -- that the OIC does have a role to play here. It's an important source of moral support for the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian people who have been subjected to warfare.

They are among the leading troop-contributors to UNPROFOR Moslem nations, and so therefore, since they have

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organized themselves into their own Contact Group, it's a very important base to touch. It's a very important place to go to trade ideas, to brief on what the foundations of this peace process are, to get their sense of how they can contribute to it. The French have taken the initiative to pull this meeting together between the Contact Group countries and OIC. It's a good idea, and that's why we're going to be there tomorrow.

Q Can we -- just a little bit more. I know you've dealt with it to some extent. Will there be U.S.-Iranian contact? You said it's not a bilateral meeting, but it's not much of a secret that Iran provides weapons to the Bosnian Government, and I don't know that the U.S. is upset about that.

It sort of sounds like we're replaying the old U.S.-PLO contacts. Will there be social contact between the U.S. and the Iranians? Will there be occasions when a common purpose will be served -- the Iranian interest in supporting the Bosnian Government and your interest? Will there be any discourse between American and Iranian officials, because, you know, you've pretty much managed to steer clear of Iran for some years now.

MR. BURNS: I think, with all due respect, that we're probably making a little bit too much of this. We have not sat back over the last couple of days or weeks and said, "How can we manage to get ourselves in the same room with Iran?" It's not like that at all.

Q But you will be in the same room.

MR. BURNS: We got the invitation list. We received it from the French Government. We're on it. Under Secretary of State Tarnoff will be there. We notice that the Government of Iran will be there. We are going to be a good guest. The French have invited both countries; there's not much we can do about that. This is in no way, shape or form an attempt by the United States to talk to the Iranians through the back door.

I don't anticipate there will be any serious bilateral discussions there. It is a discussion on Bosnia. There will be more than 20 people in the room. There will be a lot of people to talk to. So we're not planning extensive contacts.

They're going to be in the same room, so I cannot promise you that they won't look at each other or perhaps even exchange a word or two. I just can't promise that. But I can tell you that this is not a way to get at a U.S.-Iranian dialogue. Not at all.

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Q (Inaudible) just how aloof you can be from the Iranians when the two governments have a common interest here.

MR. BURNS: We're fairly aloof in general. We're fairly aloof. (Laughter)

David.

Q One of the goals Friday, you said, was to build a foundation for future peace talks. Would one of those foundations be an understanding amongst the parties that each party can name its own negotiators to attend the peace talks, and that those persons named will be able to attend the talks without difficulty?

MR. BURNS: I'm not aware that that has come up in Dick Holbrooke's conversations. It could have come up, but I just haven't been apprised of that by him. It's been --

Q What I'm getting at is the Serbs have already named their six-man delegation, and there are two war criminals on the list, and I wonder whether they're going to be allowed to attend peace talks.

MR. BURNS: There are indeed two people indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal on that list -- absolutely correct. It hasn't been a question in our minds over the last week as to who would attend the peace meeting scheduled by the United States. It will be the three Foreign Ministers that we have mentioned, and so therefore this question hasn't come up.

Q Any discussion yet going on? Has Mr. Holbrooke had any about where peace talks should occur?

MR. BURNS: Do you mean peace talks that might occur after this first meeting?

Q Yes.

MR. BURNS: A comprehensive set of peace negotiations?

Q Right.

MR. BURNS: I don't know if he has gotten to that stage, frankly. The challenge of scheduling this meeting, of working through the substantive agenda for this meeting, of trying to contact all the parties to the meeting and work out a way that this meeting might be successful, that has been considerable.

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It's forced Dick Holbrooke to devote all of his considerable energies to it. He's been all over Europe talking about it, so I don't believe that he's really focused or we certainly have not focused back here on the logistics of any future peace meetings. You know, where would it be, in which hall, what city would it be in, or what the shape of the table would be -- that kind of thing.

Q Isn't it pretty fundamental that the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs have to be able to choose their representative, and that person has to be at such peace talks? Isn't it a fundamental problem, not just a logistical problem, that the two top leaders of the Bosnian Serbs can't travel without risk of arrest?

MR. BURNS: They certainly can't travel in most parts of the world in countries that belong to the International Court of Justice and in countries that support the War Crimes Tribunal. Among those countries is the United States. We support the War Crimes Tribunal. We helped to finance it, and we have even detailed and seconded American officials to support the activities of that.

We have supported the indictments and fully support the process that may or may not lead from indictments to convictions. It's very clear what the United States supports here. There may be ways, David, for some of these individuals to travel to countries that don't have a relationship with the International Court of Justice and with the United Nations in general. That is a possible avenue for them. I'm not advising them of that. I'm just noting that as a fact.

To take it back one step, David, I think the most important point to offer -- that we can offer -- is this: President Milosevic established a joint delegation, and he said that from time to time meetings could take place between one member of that joint delegation and the international community, namely, himself. That certainly happened over the last week and two weeks as he has met Dick Holbrooke.

So it may be that there's some flexibility for the Serbs in general and the way that they approach collectively any peace negotiations.

Bill.

Q Thanks. Nick, to revisit the military enforcement issue, a couple of questions. One, will the NATO-UNPROFOR military intercession be persistent? Is it intended, planned to be persistent through time? Is it going to be in effect? Is the United States going to

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continue to participate and support this to show that we have staying power, one. That's, you know, to prevent further Serb military gains. In other words, to keep them stalemated. Question number one.

MR. BURNS: It's going to be persistent and consistent and forceful, and NATO and the U.N. have made that clear. Again, without trying to be too simplistic about it, it's the Bosnian Serbs who will determine when this phase ends and when we can finally turn completely away from war towards peace. That's where the United States wants the situation to head.

Q And if I could follow, please.

MR. BURNS: Sure.

Q Then NATO and UNPROFOR are intended to be the only military actor in the theater, in the Bosnian theater -- the only one taking any military action. Is that --

MR. BURNS: We certainly hope so, and we certainly await the day when NATO and the U.N.'s military efforts will no longer be necessary because all parties will have devoted themselves to peace after four years of war. That's clearly not the case this week.

The Bosnian Serbs remain in some ways very active militarily, and they have not complied with one of the more important conditions laid down by General Janvier, and that is the withdrawal of the heavy weapons from in and around Sarajevo, a very important condition laid down by the United Nations.

Q They are stymied, though, are they not -- stalemated -- in that they cannot take offensive military action with this air power hanging over their heads.

MR. BURNS: They have not taken the kind of offensive action that they took to the great disadvantage of everybody in the region in July, but they have from time to time over the last eight or nine days engaged in some shelling of civilian parts of Sarajevo.

Q Understood. But in the respect that they cannot no longer go on the offensive, are they not in fact -- in this respect are they not defeated militarily?

MR. BURNS: They certainly have suffered a defeat, but they continue to represent -- their guns represent a threat to the citizens of Sarajevo, and the United Nations and NATO are taking this action to relieve the citizens of

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Sarajevo from this threat. We want to make Sarajevo a safe city this winter -- the fourth winter of war.

Mark.

Q Did Holbrooke have any success in persuading Tudjman not to send his troops into Eastern Slavonia?

MR. BURNS: I think I'll leave that for Dick. Dick feels very strongly, he doesn't want to publicize all aspects of his conversations. The subject of Eastern Slavonia was intensively discussed yesterday, as it has, I think, in all of the five meetings that Dick Holbrooke has had with President Tudjman over the last couple of weeks. It's a subject of great concern to all parties.

Q Is the Administration confident now that there will be no UNPROFOR withdrawal this fall?

MR. BURNS: I think the prospect of an UNPROFOR withdrawal has completely gone away. That was a question -- a very real question in July after the failure of the U.N. effort in Srebrenica and Zepa. There's nobody that I know of who is planning an UNPROFOR withdrawal this autumn or this winter.

There was some talk about that in July. There's no longer any talk about that, because the situation has changed, I think, principally because of the decisive nature of the London Conference, in renewing the will of the Western community, and by the Croatian offensive. The situation has changed.

Q When did Holbrooke meet Tudjman? Yesterday or today?

MR. BURNS: Today, in Zagreb. Yes.

Steve.

Q Given your aversion to hypothetical questions, I'll pose one at any rate. Should what is happening now in terms of airstrikes and artillery shelling from NATO and the United Nations not finally convince the Bosnian Serbs to move their guns, what does the United States have in mind as a next stage or step?

MR. BURNS: We have not looked down the road and prepared contingency plans for failure. We are preparing for success. We're preparing for a peace process. We're being very pragmatic about it. We know that it will be long and complicated, and we know that success in that will be elusive and may take a long time, but we are not preparing

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right now for the great efforts made by the international community over the last two weeks to fail.

We have every reason to think that at some point self-interest will dictate the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs.

Q Will the NATO bombing continue through the Friday meeting if the heavy forces aren't out of the exclusion zone, or is there any consideration being given to some type of pause during the Friday Geneva meeting?

MR. BURNS: The bombing will continue as long as the NATO and U.N. Commanders believe it is necessary, and ultimately it's up to the Bosnian Serbs. I can't forecast when this bombing will cease; when there may or may not be a pause. It's entirely possible that there will be a peace meeting that coexists -- that takes place simultaneously with the air campaign and the RRF campaign -- entirely possible for that to happen.

Betsy.

Q Is Switzerland one of those places where these Bosnian Serbs who are accused of war crimes travel without fear of being arrested for those crimes?

MR. BURNS: I missed the very beginning of the question. I'm sorry.

Q Is Switzerland one of the countries where these people can travel without fear of being arrested for those crimes?

MR. BURNS: Let me check on that for you.

Q Could we ask about those Russian reactors to Iran, reports of which you were skeptical yesterday.

Q One more on Bosnia.

MR. BURNS: Barry, we have another Bosnia question. Let me get to that in a minute. Yes, Tom.

Q Karadzic said this morning that it seems to him that the aim of this operation is to force the Muslims to give up all of Sarajevo. Can you clarify what is the U.S. view on what the status of Sarajevo should be, and is this, in your view, a negotiable issue in these peace meetings, whether Sarajevo can be divided along ethnic lines or not?

MR. BURNS: Tom, I'm just going to have to tell you up front that what we don't want to start doing is debating publicly our position on some of the very important issues

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that will be debated in Geneva on Friday and we hope after Friday. I have seen comments this morning from the Bosnian Government as well as the Bosnian Serbs on that issue.

I think the U.S. position on Sarajevo is well known. What we want to do right now is keep Sarajevo unified, safe and peaceful. I think the premium right now is on safety, is to relieve the military pressure from the big guns around Sarajevo -- the Bosnian Serb guns -- and that is one of the objectives of the NATO-U.N. operation.

Q Isn't that a little short of where you were -- the State Department was -- that Sarajevo is the capital of a sovereign country, a country that you wanted recognized by Milosevic, for instance; and, without going into what Holbrooke's game plan was for making trade-offs, which have fallen apart anyhow because of the Gorazde problem, you're not retreating from the notion that Sarajevo is the capital of Bosnia.

MR. BURNS: Not at all. In fact, one of the cornerstones of the U.S. peace effort is that Bosnia should remain a single state within its present territorial boundaries, that are internationally recognized. We have diplomatic relations with Bosnia. It has a capital in Sarajevo. We have an Ambassador in Sarajevo. I'm not retreating from that at all. I just didn't give a detailed, comprehensive answer.

Q When you're asked about 51/49, you say everything's negotiable when you get to the table. I mean, you know, it's awkward for the U.S. Government, I understand, to say what's negotiable and what isn't negotiable, but your position on Sarajevo is about as well known as your position on Jerusalem. You know, it leaves a lot ambiguous. (Laughter)

MR. BURNS: You know, Barry, you've made a very --

Q It's about as ambiguous as your position on Jerusalem.

MR. BURNS: -- you've made a very good suggestion. I think that for all further questions -- I mean, I think we can say, you know, it's such a sensitive issue and our position is so well known on Sarajevo.

Q Can I ask one about the reactor sales to Iran, reports of which --

Q (Multiple comments)

MR. BURNS: You've really opened up the box.

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Q You left out the word "multi-ethnic" in your definition of Sarajevo. Was that intended?

MR. BURNS: No. Generally, on issues like Jerusalem, Taiwan, Kashmir, I give theological responses. I will get you a theological response on this particular issue and give it at the briefing tomorrow. I was just very innocently --

Q (Multiple comments)

MR. BURNS: -- very innocently trying to reply to Tom's question by saying that we have a well known position on Sarajevo, but right now what's most important is the safety of the people within Sarajevo and all the international efforts are directed to that right now -- relieve the military pressure from Sarajevo.

Q I wonder if you --

MR. BURNS: Is this still on Bosnia?

Q No, it's on Jerusalem.

MR. BURNS: Okay. (Laughter) Is there a Kashmir question? Can we just make sure that we've totally exhausted the Bosnia question, and then Barry has reactors, then we'll go to Jerusalem, and we'll go Kashmir -- if anyone wants to go Kashmir -- and we'll do Taiwan as well.

Mark.

Q Will tomorrow's meeting and/or Friday's meeting discuss the question of a follow-on force to implement a peace agreement in Bosnia, and is it the United States position that that force should be under NATO command?

MR. BURNS: There has been discussion within our government and within the West -- contacts with the Europeans about this particular issue. There's been a lot of discussion about it. We are not yet at the stage, Mark, where I think that's going to be a primary issue on the agenda or perhaps even a secondary issue, either in the meeting in Paris or the principal meeting in Geneva on Friday.

At some point, if we get to that, we'll be able to tell ourselves we've made a lot of progress, because we're at the stage where we're talking about how to implement a peace agreement. We're clearly not at that point yet.

Q When you were asked --

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Q (Inaudible) under NATO command?

MR. BURNS: I think that decision just remains -- it's in the future. It needs to be decided at some point if we get to a peace agreement, but we're not there yet.

Q So that's not the American position.

MR. BURNS: What I don't want to do is to go into some of the conversations we've had on a confidential basis with our European partners, and I don't want to look, in this situation especially, ahead too far. We don't take success for granted in the peace process. We've just started it. We've just made a first few good steps.

Let's work on those steps. If we get to the point where there's a peace agreement and the question is, how do you enforce it on the ground, we'll give it all of our attention and we'll talk about it here at the briefing in as much detail as we've talked about other things today.

Q If you don't take success for granted, why aren't you planning for other contingencies militarily?

MR. BURNS: Because we've made a lot of good steps in the last two weeks, Charlie. The situation has come a long way, and we are dedicated to maintaining the momentum in this process.

Q What is the U.S. Government's official understanding of whether or not Russia intends to provide Iran with nuclear reactors?

Q (Inaudible)

MR. BURNS: David, let me answer this question and then we'll go back to -- I have to defer to the senior correspondent in the room here. Barry, MINATOM is the Ministry of the Russian Government.

Q (Inaudible) and now we have officials.

MR. BURNS: Do you want to answer the question?

Q No. I say you have officials. Have you heard otherwise from the Russian Government?

MR. BURNS: I just want to give a complete answer because I think people are looking for complete answers this morning, comprehensive answers to all questions. I want to give a complete answer. It will be very short.

We assume that the statements of the Russian leadership reflect official Russian Government policy.

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I understand that Minister Mikhailov, the Russian Minister who heads MINATOM, has said that Russia's January 1995 Protocol with Iran has called for the completion of one nuclear power unit at Bushehr and work on construction of several light-water research reactors. No information has been given to us on the locations of those reactors.

He stated on August 29 that the Bushehr Agreement provides for a total of four power reactors but that no timetable has been set for the construction of the additional units.

Our position has been with the Russian Government, as recently as this morning, that we're absolutely, unequivocally opposed to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran.

There have been conflicting statements from the Russian Government and press about this issue. We assume that what the Minister says represents official Russian Government policy.

Q What do you mean, "as of this morning?" You told it to them this morning?

MR. BURNS: We have been talking to the Russians --

Q In Moscow or here?

MR. BURNS: -- consistently on this issue in Moscow. We continuously raise this issue with the Russian Government. The President raised it with President Yeltsin in May. The Vice President raised it with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in June. The Secretary has raised it with Minister Kozyrev. We have established, as a result of the May Summit in Moscow, an expert level working group to trade information and views on this issue.

We are not yet, from a U.S. point of view, at the end of this discussion. Because we think, again, it ought to be in Russia's self-interest to reflect upon the fact that an Iran capable of designing and building nuclear weapons is not in Russia's interest. That's where we believe this type of civilian cooperation can lead -- to military purposes.

Q But even tougher than that, it's going to assist -- the Secretary has led a campaign to provide no sophisticated technology to Iran or to Iraq.

This man, head of the construction department of the Ministry, says the contract calls for shipping in two

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reactors. Have they told you they're not going to ship those reactors?

MR. BURNS: They have told us that they're going to help complete construction of one; that the total deal does call for four. But they have not told us that the construction of the other three is underway, as far as I know. We've had a very active diplomatic discourse with them on this.

Q Isn't completion of construction the kind of thing that was up in the air and to be discussed by the Gore-Chernomyrdin? It sounds like they've come to a conclusion.

MR. BURNS: We hope they haven't come to a conclusion. Sometimes in dealing with this government and other governments, it's hard to know -- because there are so many different statements -- what's up and what's down.

But on this one, I think the Russian leadership -- President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Minister Mikhailov -- cannot have failed to understand our position on this issue, which is, felt at the highest levels, to be a very serious issue in the U.S.-Russia relationship.

David, you had another question on Bosnia.

Q I want to ask you whether it is one of Mr. Holbrooke's goals at the meeting on Friday that he will chair to be able to announce a date and place for peace talks?

MR. BURNS: I don't believe so. As he said this morning and as he has said many times over the last couple of days, let's not get our hopes up too high. This is a meeting to discuss the principles that will lie at the heart of future negotiations. I don't believe that we are planning right now to announce anything specific at Geneva.

If we're in a position as a result of the meeting in Geneva to do that, that would be a great step forward. But we are not going into this meeting, as far as I know, with that kind of expectation.

Q There are reports which say that among the topics Mr. Holbrooke discussed in Ankara with President Izetbegovic and President Demirel is the deployment of Turkish troops to Bosnia once a peace treaty is signed. Could you comment on that?

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MR. BURNS: I really can't. I think it gets back to the question that Mark was asking about peace implementation. We have had some discussions, both within this government and with other governments, about this prospect.

But it is well down the road, and we're not at this time prepared to announced any kind of understandings or agreements or even discussions with other governments on this.

Q My question concerns what Mr. Holbrooke already discussed with the two Presidents?

MR. BURNS: I can't confirm that he specifically discussed that. Again, I wasn't in the meeting. I know, in general, what transpired. I can't account for every part of the discussion.

Carol.

Q Do you know anything about a meeting of the Iraqi Kurdish factions in Dublin on September 12?

MR. BURNS: In Dublin?

Q Yeah.

MR. BURNS: I'm not aware of that specific meeting.

Q How about another location?

MR. BURNS: No, I'm not aware of that. I do know that we are in contact with them fairly regularly, with the two major Kurdish organizations in northern Iraq. We have appealed to them to put aside their differences, to stop fighting, and to concentrate on peace and stability in northern Iraq which has been elusive for four years. I'm not aware of a Dublin meeting.

Q (Inaudible) special meeting --

MR. BURNS: I'll be glad to check.

Q I have another question. Apparently, Assistant Secretary Lord and some other U.S. officials had a hard time getting in to hear Hillary Clinton's speech. I was wondering how you felt about that?

MR. BURNS: As I understand it, Mrs. Clinton was to have given a speech to many thousands of people outdoors. It was raining very hard. At the last moment -- I think you understand how these events happen -- the speech was moved

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indoors to a facility that housed about 1,500 people. In the process of going outside to inside, it is true that Win Lord and I believe Secretary Shalala had some trouble getting into the hall. They did make it into the hall. They were able to hear Mrs. Clinton speak, and that's the important thing.

Q It was no big deal?

MR. BURNS: I don't think it was. I think Donna Shalala was quoted as saying that the women's movement has suffered much greater trials than this -- something to that effect. I thought that was the best comment on that.

Q You're dealing in relativities here. What's the important thing, and worse injustices. Were they treated improperly by the Chinese Government?

MR. BURNS: I don't know, Barry.

Q If there's some mild criticism, this is the opportunity for you to enunciate it.

MR. BURNS: Thank you. Thank you.

Q If you think it's just a matter of rain -- if rain was the problem, just say so, please?

MR. BURNS: Well, I just said so. I think the rain was the major --

Q -- but there are other considerations here.

MR. BURNS: I think that --

Q Don't be shy.

MR. BURNS: I'll try not to be shy, Barry. Thank you for the opportunity to make this statement on U.S.-Chinese relations.

I think we don't have a first-hand account from either Secretary Shalala or from Win on this. We understand by second hand what happened. We're not making a big deal about it. There's no reason to make a big deal about it. It's hard to move 15,000 people into 1,500 seats. That is, I think, the magnitude of the challenge this morning.

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The fact is, Mrs. Clinton gave a very fine speech. She once again represented the Administration very, very well in China. Assistant Secretary Lord has been with her throughout the trip. He was able to hear the speech. He was wet by the time he got inside, but it's not that big a deal.

Q (Inaudible) criticizing China?

MR. BURNS: No. Mrs. Clinton's statement yesterday and her statement today obviously stand on their own. They represent the Administration's policy towards China very well.

Q Did the Administration review her speech before she gave it?

MR. BURNS: I can absolutely and equivocally say yes, at the highest levels. Also, Assistant Secretary Lord, who has been with her throughout her trip, was involved in looking at this speech and talking to her about this speech before and after the speech.

Her speech represents the views that are largely felt in this Administration.

Q Nick, Terrance Hunt, an AP White House correspondent, was on the scene and reported --

MR. BURNS: Which scene?

Q On the scene in Huairou --

MR. BURNS: During the rain.

Q During the rain --

MR. BURNS: Did he get into the speech?

Q I don't know about that. I think he did get in. He said that security forces posted at the entrances with their arms locked shoved away Donna Shalala and Winston Lord. They were man-handled; they were physically abused by security guards. Could you check to see first-hand from them if they, indeed, they were?

MR. BURNS: They're 12 hours or so ahead of us. We haven't had a chance to talk to them personally. Secretary Shalala commented to the press that she had gone through a lot worse than this in the history of the struggle for women's rights. That was her comment. She's a senior official of the government. I think we should put her

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comment out on the record and say, "That's a comment from the U.S. Government on this."

Ambassador Albright spoke yesterday to the very serious problems that have been encountered by many of the women due to the overbearing security throughout the last six or seven days, particularly at the NGO forum outside of Beijing. Ambassador Albright was on the record. I reiterated her comments yesterday. I don't think there's a need to do so today. We're not pleased with many aspects of the way this conference has been run. There's nothing new in this.

Q The Chinese are reporting gritting their teeth about the speeches of Mrs. Albright, who told us what she was going to do here in this room and went and did it; and especially the bold speech of the President's wife, Mrs. Clinton. Are not the relations between China and the United States being strained?

MR. BURNS: We've made a good step forward in U.S.-China relations by virtue of the August 1 meeting in Brunei between the Vice Prime Minister, Qian Qichen, and Secretary Christopher; by Peter Tarnoff's discussions with him and with other Chinese officials two weeks ago in Beijing.

Secretary Christopher is going to be seeing the Vice Prime Minister in a couple of weeks in New York. U.S.-China relations had been in a state of some difficulty. We think we have now restored some stability to that relationship. We think there is a lot of common ground between the United States and China as well as issues that divide us. What's important is that we talk about those issues and move forward as best as we can. That's what we're determined to do in our relationship with China.

Q On Jerusalem?

MR. BURNS: On Jerusalem.

Q When the issue of moving the Embassy from Tel Avid to Jerusalem was raised, you mentioned the well-known position of the President as it was made public during the campaign. It's still the policy of the United States.

First, this time you said it's well known, and you compared it to Taiwan -- you compared Jerusalem to Taiwan --

MR. BURNS: Don't take that literally, by the way. It has no implications for visas or anything else.

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Q Anyhow, what I'm trying to understand --

MR. BURNS: Your visa or anyone else's visa.

Q If you can just, for the record, mention what is the policy towards Jerusalem and towards moving the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. That's one --

MR. BURNS: That's one question.

Q The second thing is, in the letter that you sent to the Senate on the issue of moving the Embassy, it is mentioned that Jerusalem is important for Israelis and it is a holy place for Christians and Moslems -- not for Jews. It was done by mistake?

MR. BURNS: Jerusalem is a holy city for Jews, Christians, and Moslems -- for all three monotheistic religions. There's no question about that.

There are people in this room who can recite the Jerusalem position even better than I can. It is so well known.

Our position is that it is such a sensitive issue in the politics and the history of the region that the parties have agreed to discuss it themselves -- Israel and the Palestinian Authority -- in the final status talks. That takes place in 1996; not in 1995.

It is not to anyone's advantage for the United States to make detailed pronouncements on this issue or to get involved in this issue in any way that would be political before the parties have a chance to do it themselves. That's what is important about Jerusalem.

Q So now the position which was presented by President Clinton during the campaign is not any more the policy of the United States?

MR. BURNS: President Clinton has enunciated at several junctures the American position on Jerusalem. The American position is well known to everybody involved -- the Israeli Government, the Palestinian Authority, others in the region.

What's really important, though, is that the problems of the area will finally be resolved, not by the United States --

Q Why is it so secret that you can't mention --

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MR. BURNS: If I could just finish. The problems of the Middle East are not going to be resolved by the United States. They're going to be resolved by Israel, the Palestinians, and Israel's neighbors.

The Israelis and Palestinians have decided not to talk about Jerusalem -- not to have their spokesmen stand up in Jerusalem, in Tel Aviv, in Gaza, and elsewhere and talk about a detailed position. That happens in 1996. So it doesn't make any sense for me to run contrary to the position and attitude of the Government of Israel or of the Palestinian Authority.

Q I'm not speaking of the spokesmen for the Israelis or the Palestinian Authority. I'm asking you as the Spokesman of the State Department -- what is the American position? "Well-known," -- if it's so obvious, why do you not just --

MR. BURNS: I'm doing my very best to give you my very best answer. I've given you, I think, the best answer I can to that question.

Q In a while -- maybe an hour -- the Secretary is going to meet with the "Seeds for Peace." Just back -- busy day -- he's talking about Bosnia; you've got Russia on the docket. He's just back from vacation.

Can you -- either here or maybe in some printed form, a couple of paragraphs -- explain how this came about? Because, obviously, having his picture taken with a group that has a particular position -- it's well known, by the way, on the Arab-Israeli dispute -- gives it a certain cachet, a certain publicity, certainly. I wonder how it all came about when the Secretary decided -- very unusually and at a very tough and a very busy time -- to go through this exercise and to bring all the cameras in? What brought that about?

MR. BURNS: The Secretary is busy today. He has had his Bosnia meetings. He's got another Bosnia meeting come up in five minutes which I have to attend. He's got a meeting with Senator Phil Gramm later on today. He's very busy.

"Seeds of Peace" is an organization that he and others in this building very much respect. It brings together young Israeli kids with young Palestinian kids and others to try to work together, to go to camp together in Maine.

When the Secretary was in Jerusalem in June, he met at the Larome Hotel with two of these young kids. I think

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they were 13-year old boys. They're going to present him with a T-shirt of the "Seeds of Peace" organization today, and the Secretary is going to make some remarks. He was impressed by them.

They were two kids from Jerusalem: one Israeli and one Palestinian. We stood on the balcony of the Larome Hotel. The Israeli kid was able to point out where the Palestinian kid lived. They had visited each other's homes. This is the kind of people-to-people contact that for many, many decades was not possible between Israelis and Palestinians. It's now possible.

The United States wants to encourage it. Secretary Christopher personally believes this is a very important thing to do, to produce generational change so that Israelis and Palestinians can learn to live with each other and trust each other and work with each other. "Seeds of Peace" is a very concrete expression of those sentiments. So he absolutely supports it and that's why he'll be there in an hour.

I would invite all of you to attend. This is not an interactive session with the press in the sense that he's going to go and have a presentation made to him. He's going to speak, and then he'll probably leave. But you're invited to come and to meet these kids.

Q He won't take questions? Is that what you're saying?

MR. BURNS: Not from the press.

Q Will he take them from kids, if we bring little children in, if he won't take questions from the press?

MR. BURNS: That's not in the spirit of "Seeds of Peace," Barry.

Q We're talking in the spirit of informing the public about his views on various matters.

MR. BURNS: You will have ample opportunity to talk to Secretary Christopher at some other time.

Q A little boy, he could ask a question?

MR. BURNS: Is this your son's --

Q He's gone.

MR. BURNS: That would have been different. If he had stayed, it would have been different. I think it's your

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opportunity, if you'd like -- there's no obligation here -- to come and witness this event.

Q One question about the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Are you hopeful that they will be able to come here by September 18, as the target date to make some kind of arrangement or announcement about the --

MR. BURNS: I don't know if there's a magic date. I do know that they're making progress. I believe there's an important meeting that takes place today between the Israelis and the Palestinians. We're hopeful they'll make progress. And if they would like to have a signing ceremony in Washington, we'd be very glad to host it. But we don't have an agreement yet. They don't have one, and there's no agreement on a date yet.

Q Did the Administration have any reaction to what Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said about the settlement in Hebron, if they cannot be removed?

MR. BURNS: I don't believe we've had a reaction to that.

Q Can you have a reaction to this?

MR. BURNS: No, but let me look into it for you.

Q The reaction today of the French nuclear test and the announcement that they may curtail some of the tests?

MR. BURNS: The White House issued a statement last evening. The statement essentially said that we regret very much the decision to undertake these tests. We hope very much that France will participate fully with us in the search for a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which we would like to conclude by 1996 -- by next year.

One more. The final question.

Q The tragic arrest and incarceration, the story of Harry Wu comes to mind in the context of forced labor and forced labor goods -- we'd like to know what the United States Government is doing to restrict its overseas purchases and acquisition of slave-made and forced labor-made goods?

MR. BURNS: We certainly don't support the practice. We certainly, many times in the past, have applauded the actions of Harry Wu to bring some of these practices to light. That's really as much as I can say right now.

^ Thank you.

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(Press briefing concluded at 2:02 p.m.)

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NATIONAL PRESS CLUPEAKER RICHARD HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB BALLROOM WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1996
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THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.

MS. WENDY KOCH: Good afternoon and welcome to the National Press
Club. My name is Wendy Koch. I'm a member of the Board of Governors
of the National Press Club and foreign-affairs writer for Hearst
Newspapers. I'd like to welcome club members and their guests in the
audience today, as well as those of you watching on C-SPAN or
listening to this program on National Public Radio or the Global
Internet Computer Network.

Before introducing our head-table guests, I would like to remind
members of upcoming speakers. On Wednesday, February 14th, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton will report on the state of the
Navy. On Wednesday, February 20th, Christine Todd Whitman, governor
of New Jersey, will address a press club luncheon. And on Thursday,
February 29th, White House Spokesman Mike McCurry will address a press
club breakfast.

Transcripts and audio- and videotapes of these luncheons are
available by calling 1-800-NPC-2334. If you have any questions for

speaker, please write them on the cards provided at your table and
turn them up to me. I will ask as many as time permits.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON SPEAKER RICHARD HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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I'd now like to introduce our head-table guests and ask them to
stand briefly when their names are called. From your right, Stan
Crock, Business Week; Chris Hampson, Reuters; Gilbert Lewthwaite,
Baltimore Sun and chairman of the Board of Governors of the National
Press Club; David Franklin, Washington bureau chief, The Economist;
Eleanor Clift, assistant -- contributing editor, Newsweek; Andy
Mosher, assistant foreign editor, the Washington Post; Pamela
Harriman, U.S. ambassador to France; our guest; and Peggy Roberson,
free-lance journalist and chair of the National Press Club's Speakers
Committee; Thomas Donilon, assistant secretary for public affairs,
U.S. Department of State; Jack Reynolds, Jack Reynolds Communications
and member of the National Press Club's Speakers Committee, who
arranged today's luncheon; Pete Hively, NBC News; Peter Slevin,
Knight-Ridder Newspapers; Tim Shorrock, Journal of Commerce.
(Applause.)

MORE

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON SPEAKER RICHARD HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB BALLROOM WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1996
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Our guest today is the chief negotiator of the current peace
accords in the Balkans, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke
-- a man who defies brief description.

Winston Churchill once described an acquaintance as a man, "a
modest man, with much to be modest about." In neither sense is that
true of our guest. (Laughter.) He has a lengthy, fast-track
Washington resumé that includes junior Foreign Service officer in
Vietnam; special assistant to several ambassadors; delegation member
at the Paris peace talks on Vietnam; Peace Corps director in Morocco;
editor of a foreign policy magazine; assistant secretary of state,
during the Carter administration, for East Asian and Pacific affairs;
Wall Street deal-maker, with international clients; ambassador to
Germany; and, finally, assistant secretary of state for European and
Canadian affairs, a post he will leave next month to return to the
private sector and the pursuit of profit. (Laughter.)

Those who know him well say he is charming, ambitious, energetic,
manipulative, and a brilliant overachiever who, during the course of
his career, has made as many enemies as friends.

For us in the press corps, he's been quite accessible.

Ambassador Holbrooke has lived through the highs and lows of
recent U.S. diplomacy. He witnessed firsthand the Vietnam debacle
and, years later, participated in President Carter's successful China
policy. More recently, our guest was the driving force behind the
Dayton accords, which required months of shuttle diplomacy between
Zagreb, Belgrade, Moscow, and Washington. He negotiated with people
he described as "killers" and, in one instance, as a "psychopath."
Had he not persuaded and bullied the warring factions, there would
still, no doubt, be war in the Balkans.

Yet there are unanswered questions. Will the war criminals be
brought to justice? Will a one-year commitment by U.S. and NATO
troops be enough? Will peace last?

We hope Ambassador Holbrooke, who will also talk today about the
recent military withdrawal he negotiated in the Aegean between Greece
and Turkey, will address some of these questions about the Balkans in
either his remarks or in the Q&A that follows.

Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome to the National Press Club
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. (Applause.)

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dest=police,forpolus,notvpol,france,europe,notvpol
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MR. HOLBROOKE: Thank you very much, Wendy, for that nice introduction. I am really honored to be here today, honored for many reasons. First, for the opportunity, the first in my life, to address this great institution in this room which has seen so many important meetings. Secondly, for the opportunity to explain to you what the administration has been doing. And third, to specially acknowledge some old and dear friends, and in one case, new family member.

If I could just start on a personal note, you have at the head table two people I want to single out. One needs no introduction -- our ambassador to France, Pamela Harriman, who is here for the extremely important visit of Chirac, which begins later this afternoon. Pam's late husband, Averell Harriman, was one of the people I worked for in the period Wendy mentioned in her introduction. And I'm very pleased Pam is here today.

The other person on the podium is being outed today. That is Mr. Iton. All of you have heard about -- everyone wants to know how State Department works. Well this is the secret, the man behind the man. And from now on in, I want you all to address all your complaints to Tom. (Laughter.) Those of you who don't already know Tom should understand that -- he was introduced as assistant secretary of State for public affairs, but he's also the chief of staff for the secretary of State, and the man who makes the building work on a daily basis. And he comes from a political background and he's trying desperately to gain legitimacy in the foreign policy community. (Laughter.) So we've asked him to come here today to see what it's like. (Laughter.)

I also have to mention my new parents-in-law, Andre and Elona Marton -- old members of this Club, great journalists. Both imprisoned in the 1950s by the Hungarian secret police, the Avo (sp). The historic coverage of the 1956 Revolution; the famous last message from Budapest was from Andre Marton, who with an ingenuity which all of us in this room as journalists, or would-be journalists in my case, should envy, found a land link to Vienna and got the last famous message out. And I wonder if I could just ask Andre and Elona just to stand for a moment and be acknowledged. (Applause.)

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dest=forpolus,bosherc,europe,yugo,islam,notvpol,notvpol
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Andre, as I think you all know, went on to become the senior
Associated Press correspondent at the State Department, and was
Wendy's teacher -- is that right? -- Wendy's teacher at Georgetown.

I wanted to talk to you today about Bosnia, but what happened
yesterday seemed to me to be such a microcosm of American foreign
policy in a moment of time that I thought I might just start with
that. Since it happened very late last night, the morning newspapers
are somewhat sketchy, although fundamentally accurate, at least the
late editions of the Times and Post. But what happened yesterday
illustrates in clear relief the emerging administration attitude
towards our foreign policy and our diplomacy, at least in so far as
the region I bear some responsibility for, and I believe for a larger
arena.

What happened was very simple. It sounds comic at first, but it
was very serious. A Turkish freighter ran aground on a very small
islet barely bigger than this room, but only three or four miles off
Turkish coast. A series of events then took place, including
perhaps a journalistic excess that even those of you in this room have
not been accused of by Jim Fallows. Some Turkish journalists planted
their country's flag on this islet, and the Greeks responded and put
armed coast guard personnel on the island. And all this, as you all
know, in a period when both governments in Ankara and Athens were in
transition, and in Ankara's case, still is.

And by yesterday morning, there were clear warnings that the
Turks were going to retake this islet by force, which would have been
easy to do.

The president made three phone calls immediately to President
Demirel and Prime Minister Ciller in Ankara and to the new Prime
Minister Simitis in Athens. Those calls did not remotely resolve the
crisis, but they established at the outset that the president was
personally involved and engaged, and therefore legitimized everything
that was to happen for the next eight hours.

And for the next eight hours, the secretary of State and Tom, the
secretary of Defense, General Shalikashvili, Tony Lake, myself, our
two ambassadors, Mark Grossman in Ankara and Tom Niles (ph) in Athens,
were fully engaged in an extraordinarily detailed and complicated
process which ended close to midnight last night with both countries
pulling their ships back, pulling their men off the islands.

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dest=nato, greece, europe, notvpol, dos, forpolus
data

By that time, the Turks, at around 9:00 last night, landed their own military forces on an adjoining uninhabited island to -- and we could see an escalatory situation in process. We had extreme agitation, to put it mildly, in both Athens and Ankara. Their governments were up all night, and about 11:00 in the evening, the foreign minister of Greece agreed to move on a mutual withdrawal in a conversation he had with -- Tom was on the phone, I was, Warren Christopher and General Shalikashvili. Tony Lake had been on a previous call. And the withdrawal started with American planes going into the area to monitor it.

I won't go into all the details, but I want to make two points about it: One was technical, and one is larger. It is not a secret that the Greeks and the Turks have historic conflicts and strains, and there's a lack of trust between the two, and that this has been contained during the Cold War by virtue of the Soviet threat, which no longer exists, and their mutual membership in NATO.

However, in an issue like this -- a tiny, trivial issue which suddenly spirals out of control and sets off a series possibility of the use of force -- I don't want to say war, but there was a real military threat of force situation here -- somebody has to step in. Now, Boutros-Boutros Gali, Javier Solana and other international officials all called for restraint. But it was to the United States that Athens and Ankara turned yesterday. And for eight hours yesterday, all senior members of the foreign policy establishment in this administration were fully engaged. Warren Christopher and Tom were working on Middle Eastern issues, but they were calling in every 30 minutes. The secretary talked to Panagelos at least twice and Ciller and Bical (ph) in Ankara at least twice.

And in the end, neither side would tell the -- would give the other a guarantee that they wouldn't do something again in the future. But -- and this is the point -- each side was willing to say to the United States that they wouldn't do something in the future, and then the United States would add its own personal assurance that they accepted the assurance of the other side. Ankara's assurances were to us. We conveyed them to Athens and said, "We take these seriously." Athens' assurances were to us, and we conveyed those to Ankara, and said the same thing. And with that device, in other words, the United States as more than an honest broker, as a kind -- holding in escrow these two agreements that they won't go back to the status quo ante, this mini drama was resolved.

This isn't even going to be in the history books.

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dest=slovk, europe, roman, nire, uk, nato, mideast, ire, hung, bosherc, yugo
dest+=islam, notvpol, notvpol
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It will be tomorrow's story. It's an interesting story. And it's important, but, you know, basically all we did yesterday was get back to where we were a few days earlier. However, it was the United States that did it, and it was the United States to which they turned.

We in this administration believe that that is the approach in the post-Cold War world to the dozens, maybe hundreds of issues, large and small, that have reemerged out of the -- as the Cold War thawed and out of the muck came all these ancient problems. And I mean ancient. Yesterday morning, I was being given lectures on the protocols of 1932, amending the treaty of 1923, referring to the agreements of Versailles by both countries. This is the same kind of issue that we have -- we are dealing with in regard to Hungary and its two neighbors, Slovakia on one side and Romania on the other. Some of the ambassadors from those countries are here today and know -- and they know, although it isn't well-reported in the American press, how heavily engaged we are in trying to solve these problems which also stem from the unresolved legacies of the Treaty of Trianon and Versailles. The president and the administration's heavily engaged effort in Northern Ireland which produced dramatic results in another ancient enmity which must be dealt with. And, of course, the secretary of state's own efforts, which I am not involved in but watch with great admiration, in the Middle East, which also, if you look at history, stem from boundaries decided in the wake of World War I.

In all of these issues, and the one that I have been asked to specifically address today, we see a continuing role from American leadership. Sometimes it will take resources. Sometimes, on very rare occasions, it will take putting Americans at risk, as we have in Bosnia, although I think the risk is somewhat lower than is widely understood, but it's a real risk and the 20,000 people there have to live with it daily.

But most of the time what it takes is moral and political and diplomatic leadership, sometimes, as in the Bosnia shuttle negotiation, backed up by the NATO bombing, which was absolutely critical. But presidential leadership, which we had in all of the issues I've just mentioned, including yesterday's mini-drama, plus the willingness to use force when and if it's necessary, which was a belated but essential part of our Bosnia policy, does make a difference.

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dest=wa,japan,asia,ecaaid,bosherc,yugo,islam,forcar,autom,notvpol
dest+=france,europe,notvpol
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Now, sometimes it takes resources beyond the military, and here of course we run into the most difficult aspect of our policy, which is the budget crunch. In the 1940s, the last period which I think can be reasonably compared to the one we're now living in, the United States was willing to put up a staggering amount of its GNP. In 1947-48, 16 percent of the federal budget went to foreign aid, and it was something like 5 percent of the GNP. And this was a time when the American public wanted domestic priorities. We can't do that any more today. And so we need the Europeans and the Japanese and others to play a larger role. But we do need more support for our policies from Congress than we've gotten, particularly in terms of non-military resources in places like Bosnia. But with or without them, we will remain a heavily engaged administration in terms of trying to do preventive, proactive diplomacy.

Now let me turn to Bosnia. Obviously, it was the most dramatic negotiation of its type in memory. And we were backed up, the five or six of us on the team -- one of whom is here today, Roberts Owen, our legal adviser, and also continuing as the chief arbitrator for problems between the Moslems and Croats and an absolutely indispensable part of our team -- Bob Owen and myself and one other member of our team, Rosemary Pauley Gekas (sp), who was also with us every inch of the way -- were backed up continually by the best support we could have gotten from Washington, from the president on down. Before the tragedy in Mount Igman August 19th, when Bob Frasure and Joe Kruzel and Nelson Drew died in an accident which was not a regular automobile accident but an accident of war, on a road we didn't want to be on, that we had asked -- told Milosevic we shouldn't be on, and the risks of driving over which we knew, before and after that horrible tragedy we had the full backing of Washington, and that was critical.

The results speak for themselves up to now, and I won't revisit it with war stories now, although I'll be happy to answer your questions about any detail of the Dayton agreements when the Q&A come. But I would like to give you a brief trip report -- not a trip report but a report card on the eve of Secretary's Christopher's trip to the region, which will begin on Friday morning as soon as the Chirac visit is over.

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dest=un,russia,cis,nato,bosherc,europe,yugo,islam,notvpol,dod,defense
data

The secretary will go to -- incidentally, to Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Tuzla, then go on to the Mideast in another example of engaged diplomacy, and then go on to Helsinki for his first formal one-on-one meeting with the Russian foreign minister, the new one, Yevgeni Primakov. So that also is an example of engaged diplomacy.

In regard to Bosnia, we are now roughly D plus -- D plus 40 from the agreements.

The military side of the agreements is going extremely well. You can give a score in the mid-90s for compliance. The -- all sides are pulling back, sometimes a little slower than they ought to, but they are pulling back. By and large, they're trying to help us identify where the land mines are, since that is self-evidently the greatest threat to the safety of the NATO and IFOR troops. And I do not anticipate significant trouble on the military side. The initial image the American public had -- that it was going to be like the U.N., and Americans would be hunkered down helplessly against mortars and artillery -- is obviously not true.

On the civilian side, it's a more complicated equation, and it's too early to offer you a firm report card. The key deadlines have not yet arrived. They only start arriving, in my view, in mid-March. But I want to stress to you that it is the civilian part of Dayton that is the test of our success or failure, not the military part, because while IFOR, while NATO is there, they're not going to be challenged. For Dayton to be termed a success, rather than a high-water mark of good intentions, the civilian implementation must succeed.

I mentioned earlier the resource crunch and congressional reluctance on this area. I understand Congress's concerns in a period of budgetary crunch.

But the United States' national interest is on the line in Bosnia. We must succeed. Not only must we succeed for peace in the region -- and peace has finally come to that troubled region, and people are beginning to come out of their shells and rebuild their houses, and they're starting, tentatively, to go home, and I think that's going to accelerate. But we must have a success for a much deeper set of reasons that go to the heart of America's national interests.

The future of NATO is heavily dependent on what happens in Bosnia.

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The future of U.S.-Russian relations is going to be deeply affected by it, because, for the first time in over 50 years, Russian troops are under a direct American command. And Secretary Perry and Russian Defense Minister Grachev had an important -- I would say historic -- negotiation that paralleled our shuttle diplomacy and reached an agreement which puts Russians directly under General Joulwan's command, but General Joulwan wearing an American, not a NATO, hat.

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dest=wa, serb, yugo, russia, cis, refugee, police, nato, japan, asia, germany
dest+=elecfor, croat, crime, bosherc, islam, notvpol, france, europe, notvpol
data

The Germans have put 4,000 troops into Croatia and moving in and out of Bosnia: another historic first since 1945 and one which we welcome. The Germans are not -- should no longer be regarded as people who can't be trusted. They themselves have deep self-doubt at this score. But we in the United States believe not only that they should be doing what they do, but we welcome it. We can't do peacekeeping without a German contribution. That also goes for Japan, I might add.

And the French under President Chirac have made a historic change in their attitudes towards NATO, coming back into the integrated command structure step by step and reversing a policy that began in 1966 under General DeGaulle. And they, too, have a critical component here.

Beyond that, beyond NATO, Russia, Germany, and France, we have the question of America's future role in the world in peacekeeping and future role of the American military. So an enormous amount hangs success in Bosnia. And yet the test will come, as I said earlier, not on the military side but on the civilian side. Will we hold elections successfully this summer as called for in the Dayton agreements? There have to be internationally supervised. Will the refugees be able to return? Will the War Crimes Tribunal be fully complied with?

We're off to a surprising start on this one. Our distinguished and brilliant Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, John Shattuck, has been to Srebrenica, as you all know, last week and with escort from the Serbs, from Milosevic and even from Karadzic. They were the ones who took him in as called for under the Dayton agreements.

If I had stood here in the summer of last year and said to you that Milosevic would escort -- would send an escort to Srebrenica with an American assistant secretary of state to visit the site of the worst war crime in Europe since 1945 you would have said I was drunk. And wouldn't have dared say it or predict it. But not only did it happen, but John Shattuck was able to visit where he wanted and as he wanted. So that's a critical issue.

The police, as described in a very, very good article in this morning's Washington Post by John Pomfret, is a big concern of ours. And I would say frankly to you that of all the 11 annexes we succeeded in negotiating in Dayton, the police annex is the weakest and the most troublesome to me. It is not strong enough, and it leaves a gap in

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the Bosnia food chain between the NATO IFOR forces and the local
police, who are not police at all in many cases. They're thugs and
crooks and soldiers who just put on police uniforms. And we've got to
find a way to strengthen the police.

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dest=ukra,cis,slovk,europe,russia,roman,germany,france,forpolus
dest+=bosherc,yugo,islam,notvpol,notvpol
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And our assistant secretary for that issue, Bob Gelbard, is just back from his third trip to the region, and he, too, is working actively on it. And a whole host of other issues which must succeed, because our deadlines are firm. The IFOR forces will withdraw in about a year. If we can't make peace come to the region in that time, staying on more years won't do much good either.

So that is where we stand; a strong, positive A report for the military; an incomplete, "to be determined later" for the civilians. But I wanted to share with you, before I take your questions, this sense, this absolute conviction of the importance of the civilian effort.

Let me conclude my somewhat unprepared remarks with a historical reach which I truly believe. I think that historians will look back on the fall of 1995 as a seminal period in the shaping of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War period because of the issues I mentioned earlier -- the French, the Russians, the Germans, IFOR, Bosnia, Dayton -- heavily engaged American policy. But unlike the historians who write about the last comparable period in American foreign policy, which was 1947 to 1949, today we don't know the ending to this movie. Historians writing now can all see that what the founding fathers of the Cold War era -- George Kennan, Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, and their colleagues, above all, President Truman and George Marshall, what they did we know succeeded.

What we're doing now is in place, but whether it works or not on the ground in Bosnia will shape far more than most people realize what happens elsewhere. A lot of people say, "Well, Bosnia is this and Europe is that." They're wrong. The Bosnia policy, because it now must, unfortunately, but unavoidably dominate our policy in Europe, must succeed. That doesn't mean we're going to ignore critical issues like the Hungarian-Slovakian issue, Hungarian-Romanian issue, Romania-Ukraine issue, and most importantly, our relations with Russia as they head towards a historic election.

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dest=tur,europe,mideast,nato,greece,cyprus,bosherc,yugo,islam,notvpol
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All those issues are important. But all of those issues will be indirectly or directly shaped by success or failure on the ground in Bosnia in the next year.

We believe the agreement was the best we could have gotten, although it is far from perfect. We are committed to it. We are asking the American public and the Congress for its full support, because it matters so much. And even if -- like Henry Kissinger -- you don't like the agreement, I think -- like Henry Kissinger, who now supports it for the reasons I just mentioned -- it needs the support of the whole nation on a bipartisan basis.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MS. KOCH: Ambassador Holbrooke, we'll first start with a couple of questions on the first topic you mentioned, which is Greece and Turkey. What is the impact on NATO when two of its members are threatening each other?

MR. HOLBROOKE: (Chuckles) -- not very good. (Laughter.) I'm always an optimist about these things. I think that yesterday was a cleansing event. It made people realize that you just can't fool around like this. You have to be more serious. And these things can slide out of control.

But we used the NATO factor continually in our discussions. I've said earlier how important NATO is. There's been this huge argument about whether NATO has a role in the post-Cold War era, since it was founded for a specific reason and that reason is now fulfilled.

But we have a strong affirmative policy for gradual and careful enlargement of NATO. We laid it out a year ago. It's moving forward steadily. We're not changing course. It will be one of the main topics in the secretary of State's meetings with Primakov in Helsinki on February 10th and 11th.

MS. KOCH: Given that there is a new government in Athens and a weak government in Ankara, are you concerned about potential for more flare-ups?

MR. HOLBROOKE: Well, I'd be concerned anyway, regardless of the political situation, because the eastern Aegean, the eastern Mediterranean, is an unresolved issue. And that's why I will go back to the region, at the request of both governments, after the

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secretary's trip. He will go to the Mideast; I will go to Ankara,
Athens and Nicosia, and will take with me Deputy Undersecretary Jan
Lodal, to have a joint State-Defense trip, in which we will focus not
on Cyprus, because it's not time yet to launch our Cyprus initiative
-- we can't do that yet because of the political situation -- but to
focus on trying to reduce tensions in the Aegean.

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dest=tur,europe,mideast,syria,serb,yugo,ny,kuwait,kurd,iraq,iran
dest+=greece,germany,france,envrmt,epa,cyprus,croat,crime,bulg,bosherc
dest+=islam,notvpol,notvpol
data

MS. KOCH: You mentioned Kuwait -- Cyprus. What do you expect
will happen this year with Cyprus?

MR. HOLBROOKE: We committed ourselves early last year to a major
effort on Cyprus. Now, all the old Cyprus hands, people of great
distinction, said this is hopeless, it's been going on for 30 years.
But the president decided to appoint a presidential emissary, the
first one since 1980, his name is Richard Beattie, he's a
distinguished lawyer in New York, as a presidential emissary, and we
agreed that we would launch an effort on Cyprus when the time was
right. It had to follow Bosnia for a lot of technical reasons and it
had to follow certain events in Turkish and Greek politics, all but
one of which have now taken place. But the last one, the formation of
a stable government in Turkey, which I believe will take another few
weeks, based on my conversations with the Turks last night, has to
come first.

We are committed to a Cyprus initiative this year. It's my own
view that this is an easy decision because if it doesn't succeed there
is really no harm in trying. And if you let this issue fester in the
post-Cold-War environment, unconstrained by the Soviet threat, it
could explode. If these little rocks nearly exploded last night,
think of a serious island with serious people and a Berlin-type wall
running down the middle of the island for 180 miles.

And secondly, because until Greece and Turkey normalize their
relations, by which I mean what Adenauer and De Gaulle did for Germany
and France in the 60s and what Venizelos and Ataturk did in the 30s
but then it eroded between Greece and Turkey; until that happens,
there's always going to be instability in that area, and these are two
important American treaty allies.

And beyond that, Turkey is and remains the front-line state of
the new Europe. Any country that has common borders with Syria, Iraq,
Iran, a lot of former Soviet republics, Bulgaria, plus its own
problems with Greece, plus its own problems with the Kurds, is a
country of critical importance. And so we are committed to a major
effort on Cyprus this year. We're not promising success. But we
can't start it quite yet.

MS. KOCH: We have a few questions on concerns about war crimes
Bosnia here. What leverage does the United States plan to use with
presidents of Croatia and Serbia to get them to cooperate with

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the War Crimes Tribunal?

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dest=yugo, safr, africa, serb, russia, cis, nato, elecfor, croat, crime
dest+=bosherc, islam, notvpol, france, europe, germany, notvpol
data

MR. HOLBROOKE: In the 50 years since the Nuremberg trials pioneered and established the concept of international war crimes, the Dayton agreement is the first ever to enshrine the concept in a signed agreement which was signed by both of the people that you just mentioned, Wendy; President Tudjman of Croatia, President Milosevic of Serbia, speaking for Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs, as well as President Izetbegovic. That agreement was witnessed in Paris on December 14th by President Clinton, President Chirac, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister Major and Chancellor Kohl. And as evidenced by my earlier comments about John Shattuck's trip, so far there are tentative signs that the Serbs are willing to cooperate.

I met with Justice Goldstone last week -- a great, great man from South Africa who is pursuing this. We never compromised this issue in Dayton -- never. There were many efforts made to compromise it and we said it was non-negotiable.

Now, okay, it's in the Dayton agreements. That's fine. But since the NATO forces will not enforce it, it's not part of their mission on a daily basis, the question is how do you get compliance? I don't have time to go through all the carrots and sticks we have in this, but I assure you we have continued leverage. It will be one of the three or four top subjects of the secretary of State's trip to the region next week, and we are not going to let go of this issue.

And in regard to the elections I mentioned earlier, I want to be clear. It is stated in these agreements, signed by the previously mentioned people, that indicted war criminals -- indicted, not convicted; and that includes Mladic and Karadzic -- cannot run for election in these elections that will take place this year.

MS. KOCH: We have read several accounts that some of the indicted war criminals are spotted having lunch across the table or across a cafe from NATO officers, and when it's brought to their attention they do nothing about it. Will that change?

MR. HOLBROOKE: I do not have confirmed reports of that. A Russian general went up to Pale and met with them without authority early on. And we spoke to the Russians and we were assured that would not happen again.

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dest=serb,yugo,europe,nato,elecus,elecfor,bosherc,islam,notvpol
dest+=notvpol
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The question of who arrests indicted war criminals and when is very tricky. To be very honest with you, the Pentagon and NATO is understandably concerned that that not -- that they not be assigned a search and capture mission along the lines of what happened with General Aideed in Mogadishu. That's a -- we do not have the forces in country for that. It would take a much larger force. It would put people at risk.

But I do not know of any such incident, and if anyone in the room does know, let Bob Owen or me know and we will pursue it immediately because that is not what they're supposed to do. And if it did happen, we will follow up on it and make damn well sure it doesn't happen again. It would be an absolute outrage if things like that happened other than inadvertently until we get the word out. I cannot tell you how strongly we feel on this issue.

And Wendy mentioned earlier about the amount of time that Bob and Rosemary and I and others spent with these two gentlemen. We spent nine hours with Karadzic and Mladic in September 14th to get a cease-fire in Sarajevo, and it was not the most enjoyable nine hours of our lives. We had to make a decision -- in Belgrade, on the spot -- whether to meet with these people, to stop the fighting, or refuse to meet with them. We all knew this moment was coming. We had talked about it in our delegation for a month. Each member of the delegation was given complete freedom by me to come or not come, shake Mladic's hand or not. But we made the decision -- based very much on the model of people like Raoul Wallenberg, who had negotiated with Eichmann to save people still alive even though he knew full well Eichmann was a murderer -- that we would meet with Mladic and Karadzic. And that's how we got the Sarajevo cease-fire.

But when the Serbs tried to bring them to the States for the Dayton agreement, we said, "You bring them to the states; we'll arrest them when they land." And we are not going to negotiate with these people.

Q You mentioned the firm one-year commitment that U.S. troops have there. How will we know if we succeed in Bosnia? Does the administration have a backup strategy?

MR. HOLBROOKE: We'll know. You'll know. You'll tell us whether we succeed. The American public will tell us. It could end up being part of the election campaign. It wouldn't surprise me at all. We come that. We're ready to defend it. But, you know, I mentioned

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earlier the issues. To me, frankly, Wendy, the big issue is the
elections. We need those elections to take place and to succeed. And
we need the political part of the settlement to work.

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dest=wa,ny,germany,europe,croat,yugo,canada,notvpol,dos,forpolus
data

We've been accused by our critics of partitioning the country at Dayton. Exactly the opposite is true. The Dayton agreements enshrine a single country with two entities. We'd like those entities to turn out to be like American states or Canadian provinces. Well, take that one back. (Laughter.) (Laughs.) American states. And the -- but whether it turns out to be prelude to division of the country -- which would be into three parts, mind you, not two, because of the Croatian factor -- or whether it is the binding together through a political process is the key test.

So you're all going to know whether it was a success or failure. We're not going to come out and spin this for you. You will report it, and you will figure it out.

MS. KOCH: Having achieved so much success, the question arises to why the United States did not get involved sooner. It would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

MR. HOLBROOKE: Well, I agree completely with that. (Laughter, pause.)

MS. KOCH: Why are you jumping ship? (Laughter.)

MR. HOLBROOKE: (Laughs.)

MS. KOCH: Any specific plans?

MR. HOLBROOKE: I introduced my parents-in-law, my new parents-in-law. They can tell you after the meeting. (Laughs.)

I -- this is a personal decision. It's not financial, although I heard a reference to the possibility that my income will go up, which is devoutly to be wished. (Laughter.) It's not political or anything else. I just -- I have a new family. They're in New York. They can't come to Washington.

When I came back from Germany in the summer of '94, thanks to a conspiracy Strobe Talbott and Tom Donilon arranged, I said I had a limited amount of time. I really would have left the government late last year, but entirely for personal reasons, and not for the reasons alluded to in some overheated journalism, if it were not for the fact that we had begun the diplomacy. And I have a personal commitment. It's a very difficult decision for me because I love public service, and we're at a very critical moment. But I could not finish the year

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out, and with the very strong support -- and, frankly, permission --
of the president and Warren Christopher, I will return to New York
with the clear understanding that if I can be of any help to them in
any capacity at all, I will be available.

We have a very good team that's staying behind. My senior
deputy, John Kornblum, is going to be nominated by the president to be
my successor.

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dest=wa,refugee,philip,skor,nkor,asia,japan,camb,bosherc,europe,yugo
dest+=islam,notvpol,notvpol
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The implementation of the Bosnia issue will be -- has been assigned to Bob Gallucci, whom many of you know from his splendid work on the North Korean account. And the people I mentioned earlier -- Shattuck, Gelbard, and a whole host of others -- are fully engaged. So I'm quite confident that it'll all work out. And that's the reason.

MS. KOCH: You have a reputation for being confrontational in your negotiating. Will this reputation disqualify you, perhaps, to be, say, secretary of state? (Laughter.)

MR. HOLBROOKE: The reputation isn't true, but I'm sure the answer to the question is yes. (Laughter.)

MS. KOCH: Would you accept the Nobel Peace Prize? (Laughter.)

MR. HOLBROOKE: Only if I don't have to share it with -- (laughs, laughter). I was going to say Le Duc Tho for those of you with very good memories of the -- (laughter) -- of the Kissinger Le Duc Tho.

The -- on the previous question, let me -- let me be clear on this famous confrontational issue. I spent 20 -- I spent almost 30 years of my career, because I came to Washington in 1962 working on Asia. I was assistant secretary for Asia. Not one article ever written during the four years I worked on this, negotiating normalization with the Chinese with Deng Xiaoping, the Philippine crisis with Aquino, the assassination of Park Chung Hee in Korea, the Indochinese refugee crisis of '78-'79 with a million refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border, the Micronesian negotiations, and a whole host of other issues, not once was this confrontational issue raised. Why did it come up now? You have to suit your negotiating style to the situation. And these people in the Balkans are in the -- were in the middle of a war when we started this negotiation. It was not like Camp David, which took place five years after the war had stopped. And their styles are very confrontational. And -- some of them are in the room here, so I exempt them. (Laughter.)

Our wonderful Bosnian ambassador here, Sven Alkalaj, is here, and he's not confrontational. But some of his colleagues and some of his adversaries are. And you've got to get the job done. So you employ whatever methods will work. And then somebody goes out and says you yelled a lot. Well, you never hear a Chinese or Japanese or Korean or Filipino I worked with say that. It was just the way you got the job done. And by the way, we didn't yell as much as was apparent, except, of course, my colleague, Bob Owen, who -- who was our

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designated yellor. (Laughter.) It's because he went to Harvard and
he does it so politely. (Laughter.)

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dest=un,tur,europe,mideast,nato,iran,greece,elecfor,crime,college
dest+=educ,bosherc,yugo,islam,notvpol,dos,forpolus
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MS. KOCH: Well perhaps you can put some of this confrontational myth to rest if you could describe in 25 words or less your theory of diplomatic persuasion. (Laughter.)

MR. HOLBROOKE: (Laughs.) Donilon, do you have my talking points on this?

THOMAS DONILON: You're on your own!

MR. HOLBROOKE: Twenty-five words or less? Diplomatic theory? Try to figure out what each side's real objectives and real needs are, and try to meet that while establishing in advance of that what America's national interests are.

Now, there are two types of things we negotiated at Dayton and the same thing happened last night between Greece and Turkey, and I want to make the distinction. Ninety percent of what's in the peace agreements did not affect the U.S. national interest. I don't care, President Clinton doesn't care whether there are two houses of the National Assembly or one, whether the election for the president is direct or indirect like our electoral college. Those were issues for the three parties to iron out, and we were there -- Warren Christopher and myself and my colleagues were in Dayton to make them reach an agreement, but we didn't care what it was, as long as it represented something mutually agreeable.

Then there were issues we were absolutely bedrock on; two above all -- well, three: the elections themselves, but the type is negotiable; the war crimes issue, which was non-negotiable to us; and the First Annex of the Dayton agreements which covered the use and deployment of the NATO and American forces. That is a national security interest of the United States. We were not going to put the troops under NATO -- under the U.N. We were not going to allow any constraint on our use of force to defend ourselves. So that was a national interest.

So you start out -- in answer -- this is more than 25 words, but you start out by defining your national interest, you then look at the parties and see what they want, and you find out how you can put it together. And by the way, that's what happened last night. The Greeks and the Turks had caught themselves in a bind, and the U.S. goal was simply the status quo ante, get this thing done with. But we had to work through two very complicated political situations.

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MS. KOCH: Going back to Bosnia a bit, how concerned are you
about the relationship between Bosnia's Muslims and Iran?

MR. HOLBROOKE: This is a serious problem, and it's another one
of the top four or five the secretary and I will take up in the next
three or four days. The Dayton agreements clearly call for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces.

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The secretary has spoken for all of us, particularly in his interview with Anthony Lewis in the New York Times -- about 10 days ago? -- about 10 days ago. And we have a commitment to assist the Bosnian government get equipment and training to create a military -- stable balance between them and the other sides so that the war does not resume. We have a senior Defense official who has been reassigned to my office to work on this issue. His name is Jim Pardew. He was a member of our negotiation team.

But it's very hard to do that if Iranians are still in the area, doing something similar. During the period of the arms embargo, a tragic period in which the United States tragically voted twice in 1992 in favor of the arms embargo, the Bosnians turned to the Iranians for help, among others. This -- everyone knew this. You all reported it. It was the only way they could survive.

We're now in a different ballgame. And we think full compliance this issue is vitally important.

MS. KOCH: Why do you think Slobodan Milosevic, who had been a rather aggressive person in this war, suddenly became so cooperative in the search for peace?

MR. HOLBROOKE: This is a really important question. We have spent, literally, hundreds of hours discussing it. I wouldn't phrase it quite that way.

President Milosevic does what he thinks is in his own interest; his own political or national interest; as we do. He bares an obvious direct responsibility for what happened in the early '90s.

Some time along the way, bit by bit, he apparently came to the conclusion that a military solution would not work, and he had to assist the search for a way out. He changed his policies; sometimes very dramatically, sometimes almost imperceptibly. This is not a question of a conversion on the road to Damascus; this is simply a question of his adaptation. He is a skillful, tough negotiator. And what he does is in his own interests.

For our part, the United States had to make a very basic decision last year. Do we negotiate with Belgrade or Pale; with Milosevic or Karadzic? You will recall that certain people, including a former president of the United States, went to Pale. We decided after one negotiation with that route, that it was a serious mistake and that we

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would negotiate with Belgrade.

Now, as President Clinton has repeatedly said, quoting Yitzhak
Rabin, "You can't negotiate peace with your friends." So we were
willing to negotiate with Milosevic.

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dest=un, serb, yugo, europe, france, croat, bosherc, islam, notvpol, notvpol
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I'm not here today to support or criticize him, but merely to point out that, as I think has been clearly implicit in many of my remarks, that so far the compliance record of Belgrade has been pretty good. We attach high importance to the fact that Milosevic got the French pilots out, got the Christian Science Monitor reporter out, let Shattuck go to Srebrenica. And we continue to expect full compliance from him. We will continue to push.

MS. KOCH: With his rehabilitation, so to speak, and also with the territorial gains won by the Bosnian Serbs under the Dayton accord, did the Serbs win the war?

MR. HOLBROOKE: The question is misconceived. There was no territorial gain for the Bosnian Serbs in Dayton. On the contrary, the prime negotiating goal of the Bosnian Moslems, an undivided Sarajevo, was achieved in Dayton. I repeat, the prime negotiating goal of the Bosnian Moslems, an undivided Sarajevo, was achieved. That is why you've seen all this publicity about the so-called suburbs, which are not suburbs at all, they're just part of the city of Sarajevo. The suburbs of Ilidza and Grbavica, the very areas from which the shelling took place, are going to be returned. There were areas of the country that the Moslems wanted to be moved into the federation, which they didn't quite get yet. But by and large, they did extraordinarily well. This was not a Serb victory, and they were not legitimized by it in any way, shape or form.

MS. KOCH: Was there a deal between Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Milosevic to allow Croatia to take back the Krajina?

MR. HOLBROOKE: I really don't think so. I think that what happened -- this is another issue we talked a lot about -- I think that, as I said earlier, President Milosevic decided that this war had no further value, and Tudjman, who had watched the U.N. preside over one-third of his country where ethnic cleansing had gone on by Serbs against Croats, decided he couldn't rely on the U.N. to bring the area back. So he took unilateral military action in three of the four U.N. sectors, and he took it in lightning strikes -- a very important part of the process that led to peace in Bosnia.

The fourth area, eastern Slavonia, representing 2 percent of the land mass of Croatia, remains in Serb hands. And Secretary Christopher and I negotiated in Dayton, in the eighth, ninth and tenth days, a transitional authority that will revert eastern Slavonia to Croatia over a limited period of time with an American diplomat, James Klein (ph), in charge of that process on behalf of the U.N.

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So what started as a logistical and financial decision, because we could use an existing Air Force infrastructure, Wright Patterson, turned out to be a tremendous achievement for other reasons.

MS. KOCH: Ambassador Holbrooke, before we move to our last question, we would like to present you with a certificate of appreciation and also a National Press Club mug. (Laughter.)

And now for our last question, and this will have to be brief -- 25 words or less -- how do you think future generations will think of you? Are you concerned about your place in history? (Light laughter.)

MR. HOLBROOKE: (Chuckles.) The only -- the issue -- leaving myself aside, the issue is whether this -- if we're talking about Bosnia, the issue is whether or not it succeeds, and that we'll know we'll know later this year. I'm an optimist about it, but as my marks have made clear, I think it's very important to recognize that we can't just sit back after Dayton. We have to do as much leadership and hands-on engagement now as we did to get Dayton.

In personal terms, I don't know. And I spent most of my career in Asia. This has been the most challenging assignment of my life. And I spent 19 years of my life in the government and a little less out of it, and I've never had a job I didn't find interesting. And I will leave it to other people to write their own equations, and maybe I'll get a chance to write something myself. (Applause.)

MS. KOCH: We'd like to thank staff members Melissa Bender, Chad Taylor, Melanie Abdow Dermott and Howard Rothman for organizing today's luncheon. And thank you for coming. (Applause.)

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That effort, which is critically important to success in Bosnia, we did not announce in Dayton because it had to be announced in the field. But it was a very -- it was a vital predecessor to the final Dayton accords.

And on the actual question, I think the answer's almost certainly no, although what passes between those two men is not something we always know everything about.

MS. KOCH: We have to ask you, why Dayton?

(Laughter.)

MR. HOLBROOKE: Well, I want to categorically deny that we chose it because it's Strobe Talbott's birthplace. (Laughter.) The process -- there were three elements of to the process: First, you have an international peace conference. Answer: The shuttle had run out of gas. It was -- you just couldn't do territorial issues. So that was yes.

The second one was: The U.S. or Europe? After an extended discussion within the administration, we all agreed that we wanted it in the U.S. so that we could put maximum American pressure to bear so that people like Warren Christopher and Bill Perry and others could come visit us regularly.

Then the question was a site. We turned that over to Tom and to Pat Kennedy, our assistant secretary for administrative affairs, who found that Dayton had the facilities. We got incredible support from the U.S. Air Force. It was fully securable. A perfect location. Tom, after his first trip, said you couldn't invent a better place. That was all logistics.

Then something interesting happened which none of us expected. Dayton turned out to have a intangible value: As you all know, Ohio is practically the capital of Central European America. The governor of the state is a Serbian-American. The publisher of the Cleveland Plain Dealer is Serbian-American. There's a very large Croatian-American community. We were picketed at Dayton by the Albanian-American community of Dayton. (Laughter.) This was -- and all the time, we were able to say to the people we had cooped up -- we had 800 people inside the high fence at Dayton, including a lot of security -- we were able to say, "Look, people come to the United States and work together, and you've got to try to do it."

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So in a funny sense, and the people of Dayton did a -- linked
hands around the fence and prayed for peace. Anytime anyone left the
base, there were people in vigils. There was a sense that could never
have come if we'd been in a big metropolitan area.

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TAGS: PREL, PARM, BK

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REF: USUN 811

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2. USUN should incorporate the following talking points in its response to Russian permrep Lavrov on the U.S.-initiated train and equip program.
3. Begin talking points:

-- The purpose of the Dayton Peace Agreement was to create a basis for a sustainable peace. Article III of Annex 1A, concerning withdrawal of foreign forces, provides an impetus for enduring stability.

-- The U.S.-led "train and equip" effort is designed to achieve a balance between Federation and Republika Srpska forces that will deter both from provoking a return to

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armed conflict. Specifically, it is intended to professionalize Federation forces and to provide certain military equipment, consistent with arms control provisions of Dayton. The core of our policy remains the successful implementation of the arms control and confidence-building measures contained in Dayton, but arms control alone cannot achieve military stability at this point.

-- The train and equip effort is designed to build stability inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit at lower levels of weapons holdings, which are currently being discussed in the Vienna Article IV talks.

-- The train and equip effort anticipates that training of Federation forces will be conducted by a private contractor selected by the Federation. This training raises no issue under Article III because the trainers will have no military capability and thus will not be "forces" as defined in Article II of that Annex.

-- The United States and other countries will implement the train and equip program in a transparent way and in accordance with arms control agreements negotiated under the provisions of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace agreement, thus not threatening any of the parties involved.

-- Neither IFOR nor U.S. military personnel will participate in training Federation forces.

End talking points

4. Follow-on points for use if asked:

-- Iranian Forces in Bosnia (including trainers) clearly come within the terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III and must be withdrawn. Paragraph 2 of Article III specifically states that "all foreign Forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with Article III, paragraph 1."

-- Bosnian Prime Minister Muratovic has said that Bosnia's relationship with Iran will be strictly limited to economics and trade and they have no interest in a military relationship with Iran. Thus, any Iranian forces

in Bosnia are there against the stated wishes of the Bosnian government.

-- More generally, Iran's support for international terrorism makes any Iranian military presence suspect and a potential threat to IFOR, including the Russian contingent. The discovery of the suspected terrorist training camp in Fojnica provides ample evidence of this threat.

-- While training provided to the Bosnian Serb Republic carried out in the same manner as that provided in the U.S.-led train and equip program would also be consistent with Article III, we believe that efforts to build-up Srpska capabilities would undermine the critical goal of achieving a stable balance between the parties. We want to work with you and the other Contact Group partners to ensure that this does not happen.

5. FYI Only:

-- While we believe that the reason given above to justify compliance of our train and equip program with Article III is sufficient for present purposes, we also note for background that Article III would not be applicable to the U.S. contractor trainers even if they were considered to be "forces."

-- Article III required the withdrawal within 30 days of all foreign Forces that were "in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the date this Annex enters into force." (Article II of Annex 1B called for the Parties to negotiate restraints on the reintroduction of foreign forces, and in the agreement of January 26, 1996, the Parties agreed that forces which are withdrawn in accordance with Article III shall not be reintroduced, and that the Parties shall provide periodic notification on the status of any foreign military personnel on their territory.)

-- The trainers in the U.S.-led train and equip program thus could not fall within the scope of the withdrawal requirement of Article III applying to forces that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time the Annex entered into force.

-- It should be noted that the FRY and Croatia, in side letters at Dayton, gave specific assurances to the UN and to NATO that, in order to facilitate the IFOR's mission,

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they would "strictly refrain from introducing into or otherwise maintaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina any armed forces or other personnel with military capability."

-- It should also be noted that, notwithstanding any other provision of Annex 1A, the IFOR has the right under Article IV, paragraph 6, to "compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and weapons from, and to order the cessation of any activities in, any location in Bosnia and Herzegovina whenever the IFOR determines such Forces, weapons or activities to constitute a threat or potential threat to either the IFOR or its mission, or to another Party."

6. For mission's information, representatives of the Russian government were involved in Contact Group meetings in Dayton on the wording of these provisions, and discussions among the Contact Group on their practical implications. Russian Deputy FM Ivanov did not accept Annex 1 when he initialed the Agreement in Dayton.

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IO, USUN/W, EUR, L

PRIORITY USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE UN SE. ANKARA, SARAJEVO, ZAGREB, BELGRADE

EO. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PARM, BK

SUBJECT: FOREIGN FORCES/US TRAINERS IN BOSNIA

REF: USUN 811

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

1. USUN should incorporate the following talking points in its response to Russian permrep Lavrov on the U.S.-initiated train and equip program.

2. Begin talking points:

-- Article III of Annex 1A of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) required the withdrawal within 30 days of all foreign forces that were "in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the date this Annex enters into force." Article II of Annex 1B called for the Parties to negotiate, as a confidence-building measure, restraints on the reintroduction of foreign forces.

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-- The major thrust of Dayton was to create a basis for peace. These provisions provide an opportunity for enduring stability by requiring the withdrawal of extremist forces.

-- Representatives of your government were involved in Contact Group meetings in Dayton on the wording of these provisions, and discussions among the Contact Group on their practical implications.

-- In the January 26, 1996 agreement that resulted from the negotiations conducted under Article II, Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed (in Measure VI) that foreign forces which are withdrawn in accordance with Article III of Annex 1A "shall not be reintroduced into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

-- Measure VI also includes a provision that the parties shall notify each other and the personal representative (of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office) on the first of each month on the status of any foreign military personnel that are physically present on their territory. Verification provisions also apply.

-- The U.S.-led "train and equip" effort anticipates that all training of Federation forces will be conducted by a private contractor selected by the Federation. The program envisioned is not precluded by Article III because the trainers will not fall within the scope of the withdrawal requirement applying to forces that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time Annex 1-A entered into force. (In fact, they will not even be "forces" at all as defined in that Annex, as they will have no military capability.)

-- The United States and other countries will implement the train and equip program in a transparent way and in accordance with arms control agreements negotiated under the provisions of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace agreement, thus not threatening any of the parties involved.

-- Neither IFOR nor U.S. military forces will participate in training Federation forces.

-- The train and equip effort is designed to build stability inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit at lower levels of weapons holdings as currently being discussed in

the Vienna Article IV talks.

End talking points

3. FYI (follow-on points):

-- Iranian forces (including trainers) were present in Bosnia at the time of the entry into force of the Dayton Agreement and those forces must leave in accordance with Article III. Article III, para 2 of Annex 1A provides that "in particular, all foreign Forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with Article III, paragraph 1." As indicated, the January 26 agreement specifically prohibits the reintroduction of forces that are withdrawn in accordance with Article III.

-- Bosnian Prime Minister Muratovic has said that Bosnia's relationship with Iran will be strictly limited to economics and trade and they have no interest in a military relationship with Iran. Thus, any Iranian forces in Bosnia are there against the stated wishes of the Bosnian government.

-- More generally, Iran's support for international terrorism makes any Iranian military presence suspect and a potential threat to IFOR, including the Russian contingent. The discovery of the suspected terrorist training camp in Fojnica provides ample evidence of this threat.

-- With respect to the Bosnian Serb Republic, Article III of Annex 1A would not preclude training by persons who did not fall within the scope of the withdrawal requirement applying to forces that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time Annex 1A entered into force.

-- It should be noted that the FRY and Croatia, in side letters at Dayton, gave specific assurances to the UN and to NATO that, in order to facilitate the IFOR's mission, they would "strictly refrain from introducing into or otherwise maintaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina any armed forces or other personnel with military capability."

-- It should also be noted that, notwithstanding any other provision of Annex 1A, the IFOR has the right under

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Article IV, paragraph 6, to "compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and weapons from, and to order the cessation of any activities in, any location in Bosnia and Herzegovina whenever the IFOR determines such Forces, weapons or activities to constitute a threat or potential threat to either the IFOR or its mission, or to another Party."

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DRAFTED BY: EUR/PA:

APPROVED BY: EUR/PA

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TO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
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PLEASE PASS TO ALL PACS USIA PLEASE PASS TO EU

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC

SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE - APRIL 5, 1996

PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD, ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN, USVIENNA
FOR USDEL CSCE

1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED AND
APPROVED BY THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
FOR THE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING. QUESTIONS SHOULD BE
REFERRED TO JIM HUTCHESON OR PAT ATKISSON, EUR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS.

2 BOSNIA, CROATIA, AND SERBIA. ACCOUNTING FOR PASSENGERS

Q. HOW MANY BODIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED?

A: -- THE REMAINS OF 35 PERSONS HAVE BEEN
RECOVERED. ACCOUNTING FOR ALL PERSONS ON THE
PLANE.

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-- THE LAST BODY WAS RECOVERED AT THE SITE TODAY,
AND COLLECTION OF REMAINS HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
ALL BODIES TRANSFERRED TO THE TEMPORARY MORGUE
IN DUBROVNIK. A MORTUARY TEAM IS CURRENTLY
WORKING IN DUBROVNIK AND WE EXPECT REMAINS
READY TO TRANSPORT TO A LOCATION FOR FORMAL
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION BY TOMORROW A.M.

-- (IF ASKED) FURTHER PROCESSING OF REMAINS
COLLECTED YESTERDAY INDICATES THEY COMPRISED
34 SETS, ALTHOUGH INITIALLY THEY APPEARED TO
BE 33 SETS.

-- THE ONLY BODY IDENTIFIED SO FAR IS SECRETARY
BROWN, AND IN ALL CASES FURTHER FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE FORMAL
CERTIFICATION OF IDENTITY.

(IF ASKED) COMMERCE DEPARTMENT ASSOCIATES OF
SECRETARY BROWN, INCLUDING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
TAFT, HAVE IDENTIFIED SECRETARY BROWN'S BODY.

Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS AT THE
CRASH SITE?

A: -- THE INTERIM AIR FORCE TEAM IS CONTINUING ITS
INVESTIGATIONS AT THE CRASH SITE. CROATIAN
OFFICIALS ARE ALSO PRESENT AND ASSISTING IN
THE INVESTIGATION.

-- A FORMAL AIRFORCE TEAM OF INVESTIGATORS,
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UNCLASSIFIED

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INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB) AND BOEING.
HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED AT RAMSTEIN AFB IN
GERMANY. THE TEAM HAS ALREADY BEGUN
RESEARCHING THE MAINTENANCE RECORDS OF THAT

PARTICULAR T-43 AIRCRAFT AND IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT DUBROVNIK TOMORROW MORNING. MAJOR GENERAL (SELECT) CHARLES COOLIDGE IS LEADING THE TEAM.

Q. WHAT IS THE LATEST UPDATE ON THE OPERATIONS IN DUBROVNIK AND AT THE CRASH SITE?

A: -- THE RECOVERY TEAM AT THE CRASH SITE HAS LOCATED ALL THIRTY FIVE SETS OF REMAINS. ALL BODIES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE TEMPORARY

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3. IRANIAN ARMS SHIPMENTS

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE LA TIMES STORY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION GAVE TACIT APPROVAL TO THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 05 STATE 072121 081840Z
IRAN-TO-BOSNIA ARMS PIPELINE, WHICH CONTINUED TO FUNCTION UNTIL JANUARY 1966?

A: -- WHILE THIS ADMINISTRATION OPPOSED THE ARMS EMBARGO AND SOUGHT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO LIFT IT MULTILATERALLY, WE ALWAYS ABIDED FULLY BY ITS TERMS.

-- WE DID NOT PROVIDE ARMS TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT OR TO CROATIA, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.

--- FROM NOVEMBER 1994, CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION MADE IT ILLEGAL FOR US TO ENFORCE THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES.

--- I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO DETAILS OF INTERNAL POLICY DELIBERATIONS OR CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE LA TIMES ARTICLE OR AT ANY OTHER TIME.

-- THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD DID LOOK INTO THIS MATTER AND FOUND NO EVIDENCE THAT U.S. LAWS GOVERNING COVERT ACTION WERE VIOLATED.

--- REGARDING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN BOSNIA, WE EXPECT THE BOSNIA GOVERNMENT AND ALL OTHER PARTIES TO ABIDE BY THE DAYTON AGREEMENT'S PROVISION ON WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

-- MOREOVER WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE BOSNIANS
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THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO LEADING AN
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AND OF COURSE WE WILL ALSO LOOK TO BOSNIA TO
RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE
LINKS WITH IRAN.

4. WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION

CAN YOU GIVE US AN UPDATE ON THE PROGRESS MADE BY
THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATORS ON THE
GROUND?

A: -- WE DO NOT COMMENT ON INVESTIGATIONS BY THE
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MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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DRAFTED BY: EUR/PA*
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E.O. 12958: N/A
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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 NEW DE 03888 01 OF 03 091508Z
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AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

USDOC WASHINGTON DC
FBIS BANGKOK TH
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888

USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW.

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STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
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PAGE 02 NEW DE 03888 01 OF 03 091508Z
USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 64
- APRIL 9, 1996

SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT

1. U.S. - RUSSIA: NATO ISSUES
2. IRAN-BOSNIA-CHINA
3. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CTBT

PAGE ONE STORIES

1. CONGRESS PARTY INITIATES DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST

PAGE 03 RUHPSGG6786 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
REBELS:

-- ALL MAJOR NATIONAL DAILIES HIGHLIGHTED REPORTS
STATING THAT THE RULING CONGRESS PARTY HAS BEGUN
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST REBELS BY EXPELLING FORMER
UNION MINISTERS MADHAVRAO SCINDIA, P. CHIDAMBARAM AND M.
ARUNACHALAM AND A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (MPS)
AND OTHER PARTYMEN FROM THE PRIMARY MEMBERSHIP OF THE
PARTY FOR SIX YEARS. THOSE EXPELLED INCLUDED EIGHT MPS
AND 20 STATE LEGISLATORS FROM TAMIL NADU AND
PONDICHERRY. REPORTS NOTED THAT VETERAN PARTY LEADER
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PAGE 03 NEW DE 03888 01 OF 03 091508Z
G.K. MOOPANAR, WHO LED THE REBELLION IN THE TAMIL NADU
CONGRESS UNIT, WAS, HOWEVER, LET OFF WITH A Milder
"PUNISHMENT" AS HE WAS ONLY SUSPENDED FROM THE PARTY.
THE PARTY HAS ALSO DIRECTED ALL THE PRADESH (STATE)
CONGRESS COMMITTEES TO IMMEDIATELY EXPEL ALL THOSE
PARTYMEN WHO ARE CONTESTING AGAINST OFFICIAL PARTY
CANDIDATES IN THE UPCOMING LOK SABHA (LOWER HOUSE OF
PARLIAMENT) AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS.
2. EMERGENCY CLAMPED IN SRI LANKA:
-- LEADING DAILIES FRONT-PAGED REPORTS FROM COLOMBO

PAGE 04 RUHPSGG6786 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
STATING THAT THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT ON MONDAY CLAMPED
A STATE OF EMERGENCY OVER THE COUNTRY ALLEGING THAT
TAMIL SEPARATIST REBELS WERE PLANNING TO COMMIT VIOLENCE
DURING LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS TO BE HELD SHORTLY.

1. U.S.-RUSSIA: NATO ISSUES

--"RUSSIA RELENTS ON NATO EXPANSION," ANALYSIS IN THE
HINDU BY BRUSSELS CORRESPONDENT BATUK GATHANI:
*SPECULATION ABOUT A POSSIBLE DEAL WITH RUSSIA ON
NATO'S PROPOSED EXPANSION IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE
HAS RECEIVED A NEW BOOST WITH THE LATEST STATEMENT OF
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV...THAT MOSCOW WAS
PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN EASTWARD EXPANSION OF NATO,
PROVIDED IT DID NOT ENTAIL INCREASE OF WESTERN ALLIES'
MILITARY FORCE NEAR RUSSIA'S BORDER. THIS IS
INTERPRETED HERE AS A MAJOR SHIFT IN RUSSIAN THINKING....
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"FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS MADE A CONCILIATORY PROPOSAL. AS THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT IS ALSO FULLY AWARE OF THIS

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REALITY. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT PRICE RUSSIA HOPES TO EXTRACT FOR ACCEPTING THE INEVITABLE.... THERE IS SPECULATION HERE THAT NATO MAY OFFER A DEAL TO MOSCOW THAT NATO EXPANSION MAY BE STOPPED AFTER TAKING IN POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND LEAVE THE OTHER APPLICANTS OUT--PARTICULARLY THE THREE BALTIC STATES WHICH BORDER WITH RUSSIA....

"A NEW MAP OF NATO IS BEING DRAWN WITH COVERT UNDERSTANDING WITH MOSCOW THAT NATO BORDERS WILL NOT GO BEYOND POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. AT THE SAME TIME, NATO WILL EXPLORE WAYS AND MEANS TO DEVELOP

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ACTION SA-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 INL-01
OASY-00 DODE-00 EAP-01 EB-01 EUR-01 INLB-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
PA-00 PM-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 T-00 SNIS-00
NISC-00 PMB-00 PRME-01 DRL-09 /030W
-----2C749E 091512Z /38

O 090909Z APR 96 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

USDOC WASHINGTON DC
FBIS BANGKOK TH
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888

USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW.

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STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
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STATE FOR NSC
STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 64
- APRIL 9, 1996
MORE INTIMATE MILITARY COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITHOUT BRINGING THEM INTO NATO'S
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE."

2. IRAN-BOSNIA-CHINA

--"SENATE PANEL TO PROBE ARMS SHIPMENTS," ANALYSIS IN
THE HINDU BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SRIDHAR
KRISHNASWAMI:
"WHEN POLITICAL BUSINESS RESUMES IN THE CAPITAL CITY

PAGE 03 RUHPGG6788 UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
AFTER THE EASTER RECESS, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION WILL
HAVE TO START EXPLAINING TO CONGRESS ITS BOSNIA POLICY
ESPECIALLY AS IT PERTAINED TO...BILL CLINTON'S PERSONAL
INVOLVEMENT IN THE DECISION TO ALLOW IRANIAN ARMS
SHIPMENTS TO THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS VIA CROATIA IN LATE
1994....
"THE PROBLEM WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPLANATION

IS THAT IT IS TRYING TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. FOR THE
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PAGE 03 NEW DE 03888 02 OF 03 091508Z
RECORD IT IS MAINTAINED THAT NO LAW HAS BEEN BROKEN; AND
FURTHERMORE THE POINT IS BEING MADE REPEATEDLY THAT IT
WAS CONGRESS THROUGH LEGISLATION IN LATE 1994 THAT
PROHIBITED THE ADMINISTRATION FROM ENFORCING THE UNITED
NATIONS ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES. WHAT IS
THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INFORM CONGRESS THAT A CONSCIOUS
DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO SHUT BOTH EYES TO THE
DELIBERATE SMUGGLING OF MILITARY HARDWARE FROM IRAN AND
OTHER SOURCES TO THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AROUND THE SAME
TIME CONGRESS HAD SUPPOSEDLY RESTRAINED THE
ADMINISTRATION IN LATE 1994....

"THE SUPREME IRONY IS THAT THE CLINTON

PAGE 04 RUHPSGG6788 UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
ADMINISTRATION AFTER MAKING ALL THE NOISES ABOUT IRAN
AND GOING ALL OVER THE WORLD TRYING TO FIND SO-CALLED
PARTNERS TO COMBAT THE IRANIAN MENACE OF TERRORISM WOULD
EVEN THINK OF ALLOWING TEHRAN TO KNOWINGLY GAIN A
FOOTHOLD IN THE HEART OF EUROPE. IT IS HARDLY LIKELY
THAT ANYONE IN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE
BELIEVED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE JUST GOING TO SHIP ARMS
AND NOT LOOK TO SEE WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO GAIN IN
TERMS OF A LARGER PACKAGE....

"EQUALLY IMPORTANT BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT TWO
MONTHS IS THE TOPIC OF THE RENEWAL OF THE MOST FAVORED
NATION STATUS TO CHINA.... THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
PROBLEM...HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT THE
UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE A POLICY TO DEAL WITH
BEIJING IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA.... THE ANTI-CHINA
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PAGE 04 NEW DE 03888 02 OF 03 091508Z
FEELING HAS BEEN BUILDING UP GRADUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF
TIME-- SOME OF THIS HAVING TO DO WITH THE CRUDE WAY IN
WHICH BEIJING HAS ATTEMPTED TO IMPOSE ITS VERSION ON
EMERGING SCHEME OF THINGS; AND SOME OF THE RESENTMENT
OVER THE PERCEIVED APPEASEMENT OF THE CLINTON

PAGE 05 RUHPSGG6788 UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
ADMINISTRATION."

3. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CTBT

--"CTBT & INDIA'S N-OPTION." EDIT-PAGE ANALYSIS IN THE
HINDU BY FORMER INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY MUCHKUND DUBEY:

"THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY...IS NOT EXPECTED
TO CONTAIN PROVISIONS ON HOW AND WHEN A TREATY FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED. IN
NONE OF THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON IT, WAS A
DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN TEST BAN AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
SOUGHT TO BE ESTABLISHED. TO DO SO NOW CAN AT BEST BE A
NEGOTIATING TACTIC. IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE

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ACTION SA-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 INL-01
OAS-00 DODE-00 EAP-01 EB-01 EUR-01 INLB-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
PA-00 PM-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 T-00 SNIS-00
NISC-00 PMB-00 PRME-01 DRL-09 /030W
-----2C7839 091530Z /45

O 090909Z APR 96 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHINGTON DC
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AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
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AMEMBASSY DHAKA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888

USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW,

PAGE 02 RUHPSGG6790 UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
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PAGE 02 NEW DE 03888 03 OF 03 091530Z
USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 64
- APRIL 9, 1996
CTBT NEGOTIATIONS TO GET THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWERS
COMMITTED, AS FIRMLY AS POSSIBLE, TO THE OBJECTIVE OF
AND UNDERTAKING NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A REFERENCE TO THIS OBJECTIVE IN THE
CTBT IS A MUST. THEREFORE, ALL EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE
TO ELICIT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES A
COMMITMENT...TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF A LINKAGE BETWEEN
THE CTBT AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. BUT THIS SHOULD NOT
BE MADE A BREAKING POINT....
*IF THE CTBT CANNOT PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW

PAGE 03 RUHPSGG6790 UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN THE EXISTING NUCLEAR
ARMS, IT WILL FAIL IN ONE OF ITS KEY PURPOSES AND WILL
SIMPLY BECOME A HANDMAIDEN OF THE NPT. INDIA,
THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT ACCEPT A DEFINITION OF ZERO YIELD
WHICH PROVIDES SCOPE FOR CARRYING OUT TESTS FOR
IMPROVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SUB-CRITICAL TESTS
PLANNED BY THE U.S. CLEARLY FALL IN THIS CATEGORY....
INDIA SHOULD, THEREFORE, INSIST ON ITS DEFINITION OF
NUCLEAR TESTS WHICH EXCLUDES SUB-CRITICAL TESTS, AND
SHOULD DECLARE THAT IT WILL STAY OUT OF THE CTBT WHICH
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PAGE 03 NEW DE 03888 03 OF 03 091530Z
WOULD PERMIT SUCH TESTS. A TREATY WHICH LEAVES SCOPE
FOR CARRYING OUT TESTS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PREVENT VERTICAL
PROLIFERATION. THUS IT WILL FAIL IN
THE ..NON-PROLIFERATION PURPOSE....

"THE U.S. IS UNLIKELY TO YIELD ON ITS DEFINITION OF ZERO YIELD AND WILL GO AHEAD WITH ITS PLANNED SUB-CRITICAL TESTS. IN THAT EVENT, INDIA SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE TREATY. HOW CAN ANY COUNTRY SIGN A TREATY OF WHICH IT IS THE PRINCIPAL TARGET AND WHICH SERVES NO

PAGE 04 RUHPSGG6790 UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003888
OTHER PURPOSE? THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION IN INDIA SEEKING TO ENSURE THAT THE BASIC PURPOSES OF THE CTBT ARE SERVED AND AT THE SAME TIME ADOPTING MEASURES TO BUILD ITS NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY INTEREST. IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES RETAINING THEIR FORMIDABLE NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND AT THE SAME TIME PURSUING THE CTBT, HOW CAN THERE BE AN OBJECTION TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON-CAPABLE STATE RETAINING ITS CAPABILITY AND AT THE SAME TIME WORKING FOR THE CTBT OR FOR THAT MATTER FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BY NO STRETCH OF IMAGINATION CAN IT BE REGARDED AS DEVIOUS OR DISHONEST." WILLS

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001c. list	INR Documents Provided to SSCI on 4/16/96 (3 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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001d. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/27/1996	P1/b(1)

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2017-0035-F
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001e. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/10/1996	P1/b(1)

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001f. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/04/1996	P1/b(1)

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Legal Advisor (James Baker)
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001g. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	02/02/1996	P1/b(1)

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001h. cable	Re: Iranians (1 page)	02/01/1996	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

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Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
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00li. memo	Re: Iran/Bosnia (2 pages)	01/31/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

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Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001j. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update [duplicate of 001f] (2 pages)	02/04/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001k. memo	Iran and Bosnia (1 page)	01/19/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0011. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	01/18/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001m. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (3 pages)	01/07/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001n. memo	Re: Bosnia-Iran (3 pages)	01/05/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001o. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (2 pages)	12/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
jn261

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001p. memo	Former Yugoslavia: Update (3 pages)	12/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legal Advisor (James Baker)
OA/Box Number: 999

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: [Department of] State Materials [binder] [2]

2017-0035-F
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