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Folder Title:

Nunn-Laney Trip, July 20-22, 1997

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	Trip Objectives. (6 pages)	7/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. talking points	North Korea. (4 pages)	7/1997	P1/b(1)
001c. minutes	Confidential Minute. (3 pages)	10/21/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Senator Nunn and Ambassador Laney Visit P'Yongyang. (21 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)
003. memo	For the President from Sam Nunn and Jim Laney. Subject: Visit to North Korea. (2 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)
004. note	To Sandy Berger from Sandra Kristoff and Charles Pritchard. (4 pages)	06/13/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

Nunn-Laney Trip, July 20-22, 1997

2009-0528-F
vz1499

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Index

Itinerary	Tab A
Trip Objectives	Tab B
Trip Press Guidance	Tab C
Talking Points on North Korea's Economy	Tab D
USG Contribution to WFP/WFP News Release	Tab E
Agreed Framework	Tab F
South Korean Views	Tab G

Itinerary

Thursday, July 17

3:30 p.m. Meet with Sandy Berger
4:00 p.m. Situation Update Brief with Sandy Kristoff

Friday, July 18

11:25 a.m. Depart Washington/Dulles via ANA 1

Saturday, July 19

2:15 p.m. Arrive Tokyo International (Narita) Airport
Met by Embassy/US Forces Japan Representative
Ground transportation to near by Japanese
Military Facility; Helo to Yokota Air Base
(Alternate/Foul weather plan: ground
transportation to Yokota Air Base)

RON VIP Quarters, Yokota Air Base
Command Center: 81-3117-55-2456
Protocol: 81-3117-55-4142 (fax: x4144)
Embassy Operator: 81-3-3224-5000

Sunday, July 20

0600 a.m. Depart Yokota via Military Air
1005 a.m. Arrive P'yongyang
Local schedule to be provided by Host

Tuesday, July 22

0800 a.m. Depart P'yongyang via Military Air
TBD a.m. Arrive Osan Air Base; Helicopter transportation
to Yongsan; met by Embassy Representative; Ground
transportation to Embassy
TBD Embassy meeting with senior Embassy and
USFK officials

Embassy Telephone: 82-2-397-4114

TBD Calls on Foreign Minister Yoo Chong ha and
President Kim Young Sam (T)

Dinner Hosted by Charge'

RON Westin Chosun Hotel
Telephone: 82-2-771-0500

Wednesday, July 23

12:00 p.m. Embassy provides transportation to Airport

13:50 p.m. Depart Kimpo Airport

Thursday, July 24

TBD a.m. Ambassador Laney departs Seoul

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EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
JULY 14, 1997

KOREA: NUNN-LANEY VISIT

Q: Can you confirm that former Senator Nunn and former Ambassador Laney will visit North Korea?

A: -- YES, FORMER SENATOR SAM NUNN AND FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA JAMES LANEY PLAN TO PAY A PRIVATE VISIT TO NORTH KOREA JULY 20-22 AND SOUTH KOREA JULY 22-24 TO DISCUSS KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES.

Q: What is the status of the visit? Will Nunn and Laney convey a message from the U.S. Government to the North Koreans?

A: -- THE TRIP IS PRIVATE, AND IS OCCURRING AT THE INVITATION OF NORTH KOREA. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE BRIEFED SENATOR NUNN AND AMBASSADOR LANEY ON KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES. WE OF COURSE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THEIR IMPRESSIONS ON THEIR RETURN.

-- THEY ARE GOING FOR A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES. AS FORMER SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN MAKING OUR POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA, I EXPECT THEY WILL EXPLAIN TO THE NORTH KOREANS OUR POLICY, INCLUDING THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY THAT THE FOUR PARTY TALKS, TO WHICH NORTH KOREA HAS AGREED, REPRESENT TO BRING ABOUT LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA.

Q: Will they discuss food aid to North Korea?

A: -- THEY WILL HAVE A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN NORTH KOREA. I EXPECT THEY WILL DISCUSS ALL SALIENT ISSUES, OF WHICH FOOD IS OF COURSE ONE. I WOULD EMPHASIZE AGAIN, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS A PRIVATE VISIT. THEY ARE GOING FOR A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, NOT TO NEGOTIATE ANYTHING.

Q: Whom will Senator Nunn and Ambassador Laney meet in North and South Korea?

A: -- WE UNDERSTAND THAT SENATOR NUNN AND AMBASSADOR LANEY HAVE REQUESTED MEETINGS WITH SENIOR NORTH KOREAN FIGURES, BUT NORTH KOREAN PRACTICE IS NOT TO GIVE VISITORS A SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS UNTIL THEIR ARRIVAL IN THE COUNTRY.

Q: -- IN SOUTH KOREA, SENATOR NUNN AND AMBASSADOR LANEY HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES WITH SOUTH KOREAN OFFICIALS.

-MORE-

IF ASKED

Q: Will Senator Nunn and Ambassador Laney be accompanied by current U.S. Government officials?

A: -- SENATOR NUNN AND AMBASSADOR LANEY WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THREE PEOPLE: MR. SUKHAN ("sook-hahn") KIM, A PRIVATE ATTORNEY AND LONG-TIME ADVISOR TO BOTH MEN ON KOREAN ISSUES, WHO WILL BE ACTING AS A SENIOR ADVISOR DURING THE TRIP; AND TWO WORKING-LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS: MR. DAVID STRAUB, OF THE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, AND MR. RICHARD FINN, WHO WORKS ON KOREAN ISSUES IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. BOTH OFFICIALS WILL SERVE AS A RESOURCE FOR NUNN, LANEY, AND KIM.

Q: Has the South Korean government been informed of the visit to North Korea? What was its reaction?

A: -- SENATOR NUNN AND AMBASSADOR LANEY ARE VISITING BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA; BOTH COUNTRIES ARE FULLY INFORMED OF THE VISIT.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release

July 14, 1997

STATEMENT BY NICHOLAS BURNS, SPOKESMAN

NORTH KOREA: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

In response to the UN World Food Program's (WFP) announcement July 9 of an expanded appeal for humanitarian food aid for children in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the U.S. Government will provide humanitarian assistance in the amount of 100,000 metric tons of grain valued at approximately \$27 million. Chronic food production shortfalls, exacerbated by flooding in 1995 and 1996, have resulted in widespread malnutrition in the DPRK, and children are among the most vulnerable.

The U.S. Government assistance, in the form of PL 480 Title II Emergency Food Aid, will be provided to the WFP and monitored in two ways. 45,000 tons of grain will be monitored exclusively by WFP and used to feed children age six and under in nurseries, kindergartens, and orphanages. The distribution of the other 55,000 tons will be monitored by U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in cooperation with WFP. This aid will also be directed at the most vulnerable, chiefly children and the elderly.

WFP has a proven ability to monitor distribution to ensure that aid reaches those in need in the DPRK, and it has recently tripled its staff in that country to monitor increased donor contributions. Using U.S. PVOs to assist will further enhance the monitoring of food aid distribution in the DPRK.



World Food
Programme

PRC
Mi
de

Post-it FAX NOTE 7071		Date 15 July 1997
To MR Tom Deane	From Michael Ross	
C/O/DW	Office of Korea	Co. WFP
Phone #	NAPE-IPS	Phone 212 903 9650
Fax #	(202) 477-7388	Fax #

The Food Aid Organization of the United Nations

News Release

15 July 1997

RECORD RESPONSE TO WFP NORTH KOREA APPEAL

Donor countries have responded in record time to the World Food Programme's expanded emergency appeal for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched on 9 July. As a result, WFP has now begun drawing up plans for overseeing the distribution of even greater amounts of food.

"We are delighted donors responded so quickly," WFP Executive Director Catherine Bertini said. "It's unheard of for our appeals to be three-quarters met within the space of less than one week, it's a record. It also shows the seriousness with which the food crisis in North Korea is viewed. The bad news is that we still have a long way to go to meet the country's food needs."

The expanded appeal, launched in Geneva, was for an additional US\$45.7 million to double food rations for the 2.6 million North Korean children under age six. The money will be used to purchase 129,534 metric tons of food. Thanks to the prompt donor response, WFP has now met 74.5 per cent of the food target. Once completed, the expanded emergency appeal will bring to a total of 333,200 tons the assistance provided by WFP to North Korea this year.

Donors to the latest appeal include the United States US\$16.2 million; European Commission (DG8) US\$12.5 million; Archer Daniels Midland (the U.S. grain processor) \$700,000; OPEC US\$400,000; Ireland US\$300,000; Norway US\$250,000; and Concern Worldwide (the Irish NGO) US\$50,000.

Ms Bertini also commended the decision by some major donors including the United States and the European Union to provide additional food aid to North Korea on a bilateral basis.

At the same time, Bertini warned that larger amounts of food are urgently needed if North Korea is to avoid famine. Following a visit to North Korea in May, a joint WFP/FAO assessment team estimated the country would need over one million tons of grain to meet its basic food needs until the next harvest.

Until now, the focus of most donor countries has been to channel food through WFP in order to carry out narrowly targeted aid programs such as feeding children through kindergartens and nurseries. The aim has been to reach the most vulnerable groups including farmers whose land was destroyed by two years of devastating floods.

In view of the generous donor response, Bertini said the opportunity now exists for the international community to launch a dramatic new phase to deal with the North Korean food crisis. However, if a wider section of the increasingly hungry population is to be reached, then a more broad based distribution will have to be implemented.

Such large amounts of food, Bertini said, would probably have to be given bilaterally and funnelled through the North Korean Public Distribution System (PDS). This will mean that new monitoring methods will be required.

"WFP is studying new ways whereby larger amounts of food can be given directly to North Korea while at the same time ensuring there can be no diversion away from the targetted civilian population," Bertini said. "Through our current system, we are confident that all the food is reaching its intended recipients and can be accounted for. The challenge is to devise new systems to handle even greater amounts of food that will be provided on a government-to-government basis rather than through WFP."

Bertini appealed to donor countries to give even greater contributions warning that severe malnutrition is spreading and time is running out. "Every day that goes by, the window of opportunity grows smaller," Bertini said. "The international community cannot be seen to stand by as people starve to death or their minds and bodies are destroyed by hunger.

"Large amounts of food-aid are needed urgently. It's the only way of feeding the millions of hungry people who are suffering through no fault of their own. The photographs of starving children are a warning of an even greater calamity. I appeal to the international community to be even more generous and to help avert a major humanitarian catastrophe that could haunt generations to come."

For further information, please contact:

Trevor Rowe, Spokesman, WFP/Rome - Tel. 396-5228 2602

Michael Ross, Information Officer/New York - 212-963-5196

AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

- 1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
 - The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
 - The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
 - As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- 2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.
 - Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
 - Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.
- 3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.
 - The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.
 - Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
 - The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK

- 4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.
 - At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
 - At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

- 1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
- 2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.
- 3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

- 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
- 2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- 3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.


IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

- 1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.
- 2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.
- 3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.



Robert L. Gallucci

Head of the Delegation of
the United States of America,
Ambassador at Large of the
United States of America



Kang Sok Ju

Head of the Delegation of
the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea,
First Vice-Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the
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Suggested Talking Points

《Message to the DPRK on the Occasion of the Visit by Sen. Munn and Amb. Laney to the DPRK》

【Overall South-North Relations】

The ROK's policy toward the North has been expressed in various statements on many different occasions. As made clear by President Kim Young Sam in his National Liberation Day address on August 15 last year, the bedrock of the ROK's policy can be summed up as "peace and cooperation."

- In pursuing "peace on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean cooperation," our position is that ① we do not pursue instability in the North ② we do not wish the North's isolation ③ we do not seek unilateral reunification.

We hope that South-North cooperation will ease tension on the Korean Peninsula and that the North, by moving towards change and openness, will become a responsible member of the international community. To realize these hopes, we have steadily and sincerely addressed the issues concerning the North such as the Four Party talks, the light-water reactor project under the Geneva Agreed Framework and humanitarian food assistance towards the North. The change and opening-up of the North will fundamentally benefit the North itself while at the same time benefitting the South.

We want to make it clear that the ROK and the US are determined to deal with all issues concerning North Korea in a water-tight fashion based on the solid ROK-US security alliance.

If the North genuinely desires improvement of relations with the US, it must realize that the fastest way to achieve this is to improve relations with the South.

In the end, it all returns to the basic idea that improving relations between the two Koreas is the only guarantee for reducing tension and building confidence on the Korean Peninsula. Without tension reduction through inter-Korean dialogue, it will be difficult to have and substantial improvement in the US-DPRK relations.(It is expected that the US-DPRK relations will also improve in the process of the improvement of inter-Korean relations.)

【Four Party Talks】

We acknowledge as positive the agreement to hold a preparatory meeting where the four parties, including the PRC, will participate. We also hope that an agreement on the date of the plenary meeting will be reached as early as possible. The Four Party talks will not put the North at a disadvantage.

The ROK is the country that can provide substantial assistance and take effective measures.

In the Four Party Talks, tension-reduction and confidence-building measures, along with other topics such as South-North economic cooperation, will be broadly discussed. We are confident that the Four party talks will serve as the most beneficial forum to the North. The ROK is dedicated to ensure that the Four party talks will be successful, and we are studying various measures to realize this end.

【Food Issue】

As the ROK is well aware of the difficult food situation in the North, we have steadily provided humanitarian assistance to the North through international organizations such as the WFP and the Red Cross. The ROK will continue to respond positively to emergency relief efforts. Likewise, assistance at the non-governmental level through agencies such as the Red Cross will continue.

This stance is based on humanitarian considerations and the fact that the North Korean people are our compatriots. The ROK will support the humanitarian assistance as long as transparency in the food distribution process is assured.

As the food shortage in the North is a structural problem that will continue over the years, it cannot be resolved solely through international charity and relief efforts each time the need arises. Instead, fundamental solutions such as increasing agricultural productivity or enhancing the North's purchasing power are required.

It is our unwavering position that such solutions can be discussed within the framework of tension-reduction and confidence-building measures in the Four Party process. Indeed, through the Four Party talks, we hope to find solutions which enable the South and North to address these problems on our own.

If, following an agreement in the Four Party Talks, the ROK government is to provide large-scale assistance to the North with its own budget, the taxpayers must be convinced that such assistance will contribute to peace on the Korean Peninsula.

DPRK should understand that the ROK is the only country at this juncture with the capability and willingness to comprehensively address the DPRK's food shortage.

【Other Matters】

In view of the current economic situation in the North, the international community generally believes that efforts to revive the North's economy are urgently called for. In order for the North to overcome its current economic predicament, various measures are necessary to encourage foreign investment and trade.

In the Four party talks, the ROK intends to present a variety of economic cooperation measures. Considering the scale of the ROK's economy as well as the capacity of our private firms, the ROK has the requisite economic strength in the private sector to provide sufficient assistance to the DPRK. Furthermore, we can take a very positive approach regarding investment and trade with the North.

For reference, the ROK's total investment in the PRC and in Southeast Asia(seven ASEAN nations) by the end of 1996 amounts to 3 billion dollars each. The PRC and ASEAN are respectively the second and the third recipients of the ROK's investment. Approximately 3,000 companies have been established by the ROK investment in these to areas.

【END】

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	re: Senator Nunn and Ambassador Laney Visit P'Yongyang. (21 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

Nunn-Laney Trip, July 20-22, 1997

2009-0528-F
vz1499

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	For the President from Sam Nunn and Jim Laney. Subject: Visit to North Korea. (2 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

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Jack Pritchard

202-453-9250

Today's news

Futile political and military pressure

Pyongyang, July 25 (KCNA) – The U.S. conservative hardliners and south Korean puppets are these days trying to put pressure upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

They are alleging that they would "answer any provocation by the DPRK with military counteractions" and the "DPRK must take the road of reforms and opening instead of self-destruction through war".

There is no need to say that such a third-rate pressure racket can not work on the DPRK.

We cannot tolerate and pardon the fact that they intend to induce the DPRK to reforms and opening through a reckless and foolish political and military pressure.

What policy we take and how we carry out economic construction is a matter related to our sovereignty.

Their advertisement about "possible provocation" by the DPRK is nothing but a sophism to justify their forestalling attack on the northern half of Korea. Accordingly, "military counteraction" in essence can be said to be a pretext to attack the DPRK. It will only lead to their self-destruction.

They must clearly know that those who have resorted to a strong-arm policy toward the DPRK have never gone scotfree, their attempts proving to be ineffective.

Moreover, the "four-party talks" intended to ensure a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula is now put on the order of the day.

At this very juncture, they abused the political system of the DPRK, the other party to dialogue, and urged it to take the road of reforms and opening. This is a foolish act which can be done only by those who have no political and diplomatic knowledge.

There will be only one choice if the U.S. conservative hardliners and the south Korean puppets persistently try to lead the situation to the brink of war, extremely getting on the nerves of the DPRK. Needless to say, the choice will bring a fatal doom to the united states and the south Korean puppets.

They must stop acting rashly and control themselves.

They would be well advised to clearly know that our people will never pardon those who find faults with their dignified political system.

Our people and People's Army regard the anthropocentric socialism of their own choice as their life and soul. They are firmly determined to sacrifice themselves for the defence of their system.

If the U.S. conservative hardliners and the south Korean puppets persist in their hostile moves toward the DPRK, oblivious of this fact, they will be made to pay dearly for it.

Jack -
In case you haven't seen
this. Clearly the public response
to our work.
Jim Lewis



PRESS RELEASE

보도자료

U. S. Information Service, Seoul, Korea
駐韓美國公報院
Tel. 397-4389, 4368

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Press Statement

The Honorable Sam Nunn
The Honorable James T. Laney

Seoul, Korea
July 22, 1997

In a private, unofficial visit to Pyongyang July 20-22, we held frank -- sometimes tough -- but useful discussions with key officials of the DPRK Foreign Ministry and Korean People's Army about promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

DPRK officials expressed appreciation for the international community's response to the DPRK's food shortage, and appealed for continued humanitarian aid. They also asked for the removal of U.S. economic sanctions and for increased economic cooperation.

We urged early and full participation by the DPRK in the Four Party talks to bring about lasting peace and security. We also emphasized that Four Party talks were the best vehicle to address increased economic cooperation with the U.S., the ROK, and the world community, including long-term solutions to the DPRK's agricultural difficulties. In that regard, we discussed with DPRK officials the importance and urgency of economic and agricultural reforms. We also stressed to the DPRK the importance of the Agreed Framework and its full implementation, and the need for early resumption of high-level South-North dialogue.

DPRK officials raised the need to re-establish a channel of

communication to prevent and resolve problems and incidents along the DMZ. We emphasized our concern about ongoing tension along the DMZ, and stressed the need to address such tension and increase communication between the DPRK and the U.S. and ROK.

Reflecting on our trip to Pyongyang, we believe there is no more pressing problem than the establishment of lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, an issue we believe needs sustained, high-level attention by all parties involved.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release

July 14, 1997

STATEMENT BY NICHOLAS BURNS, SPOKESMAN

NORTH KOREA: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

In response to the UN World Food Program's (WFP) announcement July 9 of an expanded appeal for humanitarian food aid for children in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the U.S. Government will provide humanitarian assistance in the amount of 100,000 metric tons of grain valued at approximately \$27 million. Chronic food production shortfalls, exacerbated by flooding in 1995 and 1996, have resulted in widespread malnutrition in the DPRK, and children are among the most vulnerable.

The U.S. Government assistance, in the form of PL 480 Title II Emergency Food Aid, will be provided to the WFP and monitored in two ways. 45,000 tons of grain will be monitored exclusively by WFP and used to feed children age six and under in in nurseries, kindergartens, and orphanages. The distribution of the other 55,000 tons will be monitored by U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in cooperation with WFP. This aid will also be directed at the most vulnerable, chiefly children and the elderly.

WFP has a proven ability to monitor distribution to ensure that aid reaches those in need in the DPRK, and it has recently tripled its staff in that country to monitor increased donor contributions. Using U.S. PVOs to assist will further enhance the monitoring of food aid distribution in the DPRK.

EAP PRESS GUIDANCE--FINAL VERSION
July 12, 1997

NORTH KOREA -- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Q: Can you confirm that the United States will provide 100,000 metric tons of grain, valued at \$27.4 million, in humanitarian food assistance to North Korea?

A: -- YES, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO PROVIDE 100,000 TONS OF FOOD TO NORTH KOREA IN RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT FOOD CRISIS.

A: -- ON JULY 9, THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM OF THE UNITED NATIONS EXPANDED ITS OUTSTANDING APPEAL BY AN ADDITIONAL 130,000 MT, VALUED AT \$45.7 MILLION.

-- THIS EXPANDED APPEAL WILL CONTINUE THE WFP'S TARGETTING OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF SIX.

Q: Will food be provided directly to North Korea?

A: -- THE U.S. ASSISTANCE WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE WFP, WHICH HAS A MONITORING PROGRAM ALREADY IN PLACE IN NORTH KOREA AND WHICH HAS DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT ASSISTANCE REACHES THOSE MOST IN NEED.

-- 45,000 OUT OF THE 100,000 TONS WILL BE MONITORED BY WFP EXCLUSIVELY AS BEFORE.

-- IN ADDITION, THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE 55,000 TONS OF GRAIN THROUGH THE WFP IN A PROGRAM INVOLVING U.S. PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION (PVO) FOOD MONITORS. THIS PROGRAM WILL ALSO BE FOCUSED ON THE MOST VULNERABLE GROUPS, SUCH AS CHILDREN AGES 6-12 AND THE ELDERLY.

-- WE EXPECT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT TO BOTH ENHANCE MONITORING OF FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION IN THE DPRK AND TO FACILITATE DELIVERY OF AID TO REGIONS THAT HAVE RECEIVED LITTLE OR NO INTERNATIONAL AID SO FAR.

Q: Why is the United States Government providing more humanitarian assistance at this time? Why is the U.S. giving such a large percentage of the total appeal?

A: -- THE USG'S PURPOSE IN PROVIDING THIS ASSISTANCE IS TO RESPOND TO AN ONGOING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS.

- MORE -

- THE FOOD SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA REMAINS CRITICAL, AND YOUNG CHILDREN ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE. THE WFP APPEAL IS SPECIFICALLY FOR CHILDREN.
- WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD REPORTS OF DEATHS BY STARVATION. IF NO FURTHER OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WERE TO BE FORTHCOMING, MALNUTRITION AND MORE DEATHS WOULD BE INEVITABLE.
- OUR DECISION TO ACT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY WAS DRIVEN BY OUR DESIRE TO PREVENT A HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY.

Q: What is the legal justification for the provision of U.S. assistance to North Korea?

A: -- P.L. 480 PERMITS EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE "NOT WITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF LAW." THIS ALLOWS THE U.S. TO ASSIST NORTH KOREA, WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE.

Q: Will the South Koreans also contribute to the appeal?

A: -- I WOULD REFER YOU TO REPUBLIC OF KOREA OFFICIALS FOR THE ROK'S POSITION. I WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT SOUTH KOREA'S GOVERNMENT AND CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS HAVE PROVIDED A QUARTER OF A BILLION U.S. DOLLARS IN FOOD AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN GOODS TO THE DPRK SINCE SEPTEMBER 1995. THE ROK ALSO CONTRIBUTED \$6 MILLION IN FEBRUARY IN RESPONSE TO THE WFP'S FEBRUARY APPEAL FOR THE DPRK AND AN ADDITIONAL \$10 MILLION WHEN THAT APPEAL WAS EXPANDED IN APRIL. ROK PRIVATE SOURCES HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDING THE DPRK WITH HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID THROUGH THE SOUTH KOREAN RED CROSS, MOST RECENTLY, WITH 50,000 TONS OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS.

Q: Can you guarantee that assistance won't be diverted to the North Korean army?

A: -- WE BELIEVE CHANNELING ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE WFP PROVIDES THE BEST MEANS TO ENSURE THAT THE AID IS DELIVERED TO THOSE MOST IN NEED, PARTICULARLY TO VULNERABLE INFANTS AND YOUNG CHILDREN.

-- THE WFP, WHICH HAS AN OFFICE IN NORTH KOREA, IS WELL-POSITIONED TO MONITOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THIS CONTRIBUTION. RECENTLY, THE WFP HAS MORE THAN TRIPLED ITS STAFF TO MONITOR INCREASED DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS. STAFF FROM U.S. PVO'S WILL ALSO ASSIST IN MONITORING TO ENSURE THAT OUR ASSISTANCE REACHES ITS INTENDED POPULATION.

Q: Isn't this just propping up -- or appeasing -- a discredited government on its last legs?

- MORE -

A: -- THE WFP APPEAL IS BASED UPON HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA, WHO FACE SEVERE MALNUTRITION.

Q. Has the South Korean government been consulted about the U.S. contribution?

A: -- YES, WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND WITH OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES. THE U.S. AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENTS SHARE THE VIEW THAT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IS WARRANTED.

Q. Will Japan contribute to this latest appeal?

A: -- I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN.

Q. We have heard that the North Koreans have asked for a large commitment of food aid in return for their agreement to begin Four Party Talks. Is this why we are giving such a large contribution of food at this time?

A: -- NO. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY TOLD THE NORTH KOREANS THAT WE WILL NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS OF FOOD ASSISTANCE IN RETURN FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS.

-- AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, THIS CONTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE SOLELY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF NEED.

07/16/97 12:13
JUL-16-1997 12:27

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DPR KOREA TO UN

KOREAN AFFAIRS

→→→ ASIAN AFFAIRS

212 972 3154

P.03/03

001

OPTIONAL FORM 95 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages 1

To	Col. PRITCHARD	From	D. STRAUSS
Dept./Agency		Phone	647-7868
Fax #	in-fyiu	Fax	

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

(Translation)

Pyongyang, July 16, 1997

Mr. Charles Kartman
Acting assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of state
United states of America

Washington, D . C.

Dear Mr . Kartman,

I express Thanks to the Government of the united states for having decided again this time to provide the DPRK with 100,000 tons of food worth 27 million dollars as a humanitarian assistance following those in February and April last, concerning our food shortages caused by the flood damages.

I think the current step taken by the united states to provide food reflects the position of the U.S. Government to have smooth implementation of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework and advance a stage further the overall DPRK-U.S. relations.

I believe that the current step for food assistance by the United states will make a positive contribution towards seeking for the relations of understanding and trusting each other between the DPRK and the United States.

Yours sincerely

Kim Gye Kwan
Vice-Minister for U.S. Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. note	To Sandy Berger from Sandra Kristoff and Charles Pritchard. (4 pages)	06/13/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
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