

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea/PDD-56, Pol-Mil Collapse Plan [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Pritchard, Charles

Original OA/ID Number:

3058

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
30	3	1	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Samuel Berger from Len Hawley and Jack Pritchard. Subject: North Korea. Record ID: 9708506. (5 pages)	12/18/1997	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Global-Asia Working Group from Len Hawley and Jack Pritchard. Subject: Instructions. (13 pages)	11/20/1997	P1/b(1)
003a. agenda	Global-Asia Steering Group Meeting, November 14, 1997. (1 page)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	Discussion Paper. (3 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)
003c. fax cover sheet	phone number, name. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	11/13/1997	P3/b(3), b(7)(C)
004a. memo	For Global-Asia Steering Group from Len Hawley and Jack Pritchard. Subject: Working Group Progress Report #01. (2 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	For Members, Asia-Pacific Interagency from Richard Clarke. Subject: Interagency Training Program. (1 page)	10/31/1997	P1/b(1)
005. agenda	Duplicate of 003a. (1 page)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Duplicate of 003b. (3 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)
007. diagram	Deliberate Planning Process. (1 page)	11/1997	P1/b(1)
008. memo	Duplicate of 004a. (2 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

001. memo	For Samuel Berger from Len Hawley and Jack Pritchard. Subject: North Korea. Record ID: 9708506. (5 pages)	12/18/1997	P1/b(1)
-----------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For Global-Asia Working Group from Len Hawlet and Jack Pritchard. Subject: Instructions. (13 pages)	11/20/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. agenda	Global-Asia Steering Group Meeting, November 14, 1997. (1 page)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	Discussion Paper. (3 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. fax cover sheet	phone number, name. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	11/13/1997	P3/b(3), b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION:

RELEASER: _____

IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

DATE/TIME: **11-13-97 6:38PM**

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: **RICHARD A. CCLARKE** PH: **456-9351** ROOM: **302**
SUBJECT: **GLOBAL-ASIA STEERING GROUP MEETING - AGENDA FOR THE
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1997 AT 1:30PM - WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM** PAGES: **5**

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>ROOM</u>	<u>PHONE</u>
STATE/PM	Michael Lemmon		(202) 647-8698
STATE/EAP	Charles Kartman		(202) 736-4393
U.S. AID	Len Rogers		(202) 712-0770
DOD/OSD	Edward Warner		(703) 697-7728
DOD/ISA	Frank Kramer		(703)695-4351
JCS/J-5	BGEN t. Michael Moseley		(703)697-3011
CIA			
NSC	Sandy Kristoff		Handcarried

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Please Deliver ASAP Upon Receipt. Thanks for your cooperation in advance.

Unclassified upon removal of
classified attachments.

VZ 8/17/2012 2009-0528-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	For Global-Asia Steering Group from Len Hawley and Jack Pritchard. Subject: Working Group Progress Report #01. (2 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	For Members, Asia-Pacific Interagency from Richard Clarke. Subject: Interagency Training Program. (1 page)	10/31/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE CHOSIN FEW
POW/MIA Committee

13 November 1997

In October, North Korea invited one representative each from The Chosin Few, VFW, American Legion and the Korean/Cold War Family Assn. of the Missing to observe the third joint recovery operation of remains at Unsan, N. Korea. As co-chairman of the POW/MIA Committee, I was designated to participate in this unprecedented trip. After a briefing on October 9 at the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, Arlington, VA we departed for Pyongyang, North Korea via Beijing, China, accompanied by a CBS television crew and a USA TODAY journalist. We were escorted by DPMO official, LTC Greg Man, USA. Ken Stradman, Executive Director, represented the VFW; "Chic" Ciccolella, Asst. Dir. Nat'l. Sec., represented The American Legion and Pat Dunton, Pres., represented the Family Assn. of the Missing.

On 14 October we arrived in Pyongyang and on 16 October proceeded 125 miles north to Unsan. It was here at dusk on 1 November 1950 that the full fury of the Chinese Communist Force of two divisions (20,000 men) hit the 8th Regiment (about 2,000 men) of the 1st Cavalry Division. The fighting by 5 November around Unsan cost more than 600 officers and men. Surrounded and ordered to fall back to the south, the 8th was forced to leave it's dead and some wounded behind. At a hase camp in these rugged hills and ridge lines we met up with the Department of Defense team working with Korean People's Army (KPA) soldiers in joint recovery operations. The American group of about 10 is composed of specialists from the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, HI (CILHI) and from the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. In addition to research with available charts and maps, they have been conducting interviews with military officials and local residents to locate burial sites of American soldiers.

Because of the manner in which the North Koreans, on prior occasions, collected and curated remains many have not been identified. If remains are recovered by proper collection techniques then identification by CILHI becomes a lot more probable. After much negotiations this is what finally lead to the agreement this year to conduct joint recovery operations.

When remains are recovered they are repatriated in formal military ceremonies across the DMZ at Panmunjom. Once identified at CILHI the remains may be returned to the family for burial with full military honors. At Unsan working with about 70 KPA soldiers they have recovered seven sets of remains under the most difficult conditions. The American group is very professional and very serious about what they are doing. One comes away impressed with their devotion and by the dignity of their mission. They have surveyed over thousands of square kilometers of former fighting positions in the mud and rain. With "pick and shovel" they carefully work with an anthropologist and archeologist to obtain every scrap of evidence that could help identify a fallen soldier. Carefully sifting surrounding soil through wire screens, a careful eye is kept for any tell-tale signs such as a button, belt buckle, insignia device, dog tags, etc

The cooperation level between the Americans and KPA is good, but some issues are still to be worked out. Things are not completely smooth because, as the KPA Senior Colonel at the site questioned, "Do your soldiers come here to recover remains or to conduct reconnaissance?" The KPA has limited any equipment to shovels and metal detectors. So far, no ground-penetrating radar has been allowed. We saw dozens of shallow holes dug about 3 feet square that have yielded mostly rusted remains of spent cartridges, grenade pins, C-Ration cans, etc. The American team will work the area for 20 days and then conclude this operation. Meetings will then be scheduled to arrange for joint recovery operations in 1998. In the meantime the Americans work with armed KPA stationed at their tent camp, ostensibly for protection from "angry natives," but really to keep a close eye on them. The Americans are carefully warned not to stray from designated areas.

In addition to observing recovery operations we were among the first to visit the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in Pyongyang. Under strict escort we were allowed to view selected exhibits including large photographs of American POW's and stacks of M-1 rifles and BAR's with captured American and South Korean colors. Other exhibits in the basement of the Museum included the burned remains of a score of USAF planes together with tanks, vehicles and artillery pieces. A special exhibit held photos and personnel items from their capture of the USS PUEBLO. The remains of a U.S. helicopter shot down in 1994 is on display. Other exhibits included the ID cards of Americans that the POW/Missing personnel Office had previously been permitted to copy.

On the third of our four days in country we were given an escorted visit to the DMZ. Few have viewed this historic demarcation line from the North. We drove 100 miles south of Pyongyang on a 6 lane road, named ironically, the Reunification Highway, with its last exit sign, albeit inoperative, directing one to Seoul. We saw little of any North Korean military preparations but the picture is deceptive. It is reported that their bunkers are well camouflaged with land mines strategically placed together with missile silos. We were sternly instructed by a Senior Colonel, KPA, that the North Korean people believe that Americans are still the enemy and that if hostile relations by the U.S. continue it will be difficult to normalize relations.

Our trip provided rare insights into a country where everyone wears a small metal badge with the face of the "Great Leader", Kim Il Sung, (who died in 1994) on it surrounded by a color coded rim indicating the wearer's position. There are no badges for his son "Dear Leader," Kim Jong Il, yet. Electricity is rationed and there are few vehicles around, except for trucks, mostly Army, some run on charcoal engines. Few bicycles are seen and no mechanical equipment evident in the fields as all harvesting is done by hand. The streets are deserted at night.

The food crisis is not as wide spread as believed and does not affect the entire population. Distribution of food in this highly stratified nation benefits the communist party elite and its 1.1 million-man army but leaves regions suffering from famine and malnutrition. It's economic decline combined with drought and flooding bodes for a bleak new year. Despite its food problems the country still devotes substantial resources to erecting and maintaining grandiose statues, monuments and portraits of its leaders.

The government rigidly controlled television mostly shows stories of contented workers, loyal soldiers and extraordinary feats of the Kim Il Sung. No foreign news broadcasts or publications are allowed. No advertising can be seen. The people are told they are ethnically

superior and their country is the best in the world. No religion is allowed. The expectation of any change in North Korea was challenged by statements from the all-powerful Worker's Party, which had just named Kim Jong Il as its leader on the eve of our arrival. There could be no wavering in its hard line policies as announced by the official North Korean Central News Agency.

Despite the haggling over how much should be paid by the U.S. for recovery operations, this opportunity by veterans groups to observe such operations first hand was unprecedented. However there are over 8,100 American servicemen still unaccounted for including, 389 personnel allegedly in North Korean hands at the time of the Armistice in 1953. Despite our requests no arrangements were made for us to meet with North Korean veterans or American military defectors.

In closing, at our last meeting with North Korean Government officials we renewed all our requests including access to records of aircraft shoot downs and film archives of POW's. We also requested all information and documents in reference to removal of POW's to China and Russia. These requests were received without response, but we were told that our coming back may depend on how we describe our visit when returning home.

Hopefully, this humanitarian mission was a foundation for more comprehensive visits and success in the goal of achieving the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIA.

J. ROBERT LUNNEY
Co-chairman, POW/MIA
Committee

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. agenda	Duplicate of 003a. (1 page)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Duplicate of 003b. (3 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CURRENT NEWS **EARLY BIRD**

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

22/7

NEW YORK TIMES

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 1

Iraq Carries Out Threat to Expel U.S. Inspectors

By STEVEN LEE MYERS

WASHINGTON -- Iraq carried out its threat to expel American weapons inspectors Thursday, rebuffing every diplomatic attempt to resolve the impasse and propelling the Clinton administration closer to a military response.

President Clinton denounced Iraq's action, but he stopped short once again of ordering military retaliation despite repeated warnings to Iraq not to defy the United Nations. In fact, after days of rumblings, the administration played down the possibility of an immediate response.

Iraq's expulsion of the Americans, which Saddam Hussein put into force within a day of a unanimous Security Council vote aimed at compelling him to back down, forced the administration to scramble to build support that it does not yet have among its allies for punishing Iraq further. A senior administration official said the United States planned to continue its diplomatic efforts for "many days or even weeks" before resorting to force.

The diplomacy is taking place as military strategists at the Pentagon prepared for the possibility of an attack that, if needed, could be larger than previous strikes to include suspected weapons sites in Iraq, according to officials who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The expulsion of the American inspectors brought much of the U.N. weapons inspection effort in Iraq to an indefinite halt. Unwilling to accept Iraqi conditions that on-site inspections could continue without the American members of the team, the U.N. official in charge of the effort, Richard Butler, announced in New York that he would withdraw the entire team of inspectors on Friday.

Senior administration officials -- including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen -- continued to lobby their counterparts among the allies in Europe and the Middle East. Albright left Thursday night, as scheduled, for a trip that will take her to the Middle East for an economic confer-

ence in Qatar and at the same time give her opportunities to solidify allied support.

Albright has already altered her schedule to include a meeting in Edinburgh on Friday with Britain's foreign secretary, Robin Cook, and her aides suggested other meetings could be added to the itinerary, including in France, which has shown the least willingness among America's European allies for a strong strike.

The officials emphasized that any attack would be proportional to Iraq's defiance, but as one official at the Pentagon put it Thursday: "Proportional doesn't mean small. In this building at least we view the weapons of mass destruction threat as very serious."

One senior military official said that the Pentagon was now considering a much larger strike than the one last year that targeted air-defense systems in southern Iraq.

Despite the planning, there were no signs that any military retaliation by the United States was imminent, though the Pentagon did announce that flights

by U-2 spy planes on behalf of the U.N. inspection teams would resume as soon as Sunday.

"We're not talking attacks now," the Pentagon's spokesman, Kenneth H. Bacon, said at a news conference Thursday. "We're talking diplomacy."

Iraq notified the United Nations of its intention to expel the six Americans now on the inspection team early Thursday morning. Hours later, as he announced the withdrawal of the entire U.N. team, Butler called on Iraq to allow the American inspectors to leave with the others on Friday. But Iraq insisted they leave Iraq Thursday. At 11 p.m. in Baghdad, the Americans and a few others from the team climbed into a caravan of three vehicles and in the darkness began the long drive toward Jordan.

After meeting with his senior foreign policies advisors Thursday morning at the White House, Clinton vowed to "pursue this matter in a very determined way."

"Iraq's announcement this morning to expel the Americans

Latest Defiance May Call for Different Reaction

Top Army woman apologizes for calling Marines 'extremists'

Veterans, Gingrich, others on Hill demand she be fired

WASHINGTON TIMES...See Pg. 5

WASHINGTON POST...
See Pg. 2

NATO: U.S. Erred on Cost Of Expansion

Figure Is \$2 Billion, Not \$30 Billion, It Says

WASHINGTON POST...See Pg. 3



This publication is prepared by American Forces Information Service (AFIS/OASD-PA) to bring to the attention of key personnel news items of interest to them in their official capacities. It is not intended to substitute for newspapers and periodicals as a means of keeping informed about the meaning and impact of news developments. Use of these articles does not reflect official endorsement. Further reproduction for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. Please pass this copy on to someone else who needs current news information, then...



FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

from the inspection team is clearly unacceptable and a challenge to the international community," he said, speaking in the East Room before signing legislation that kept alive his proposal for national education testing standards.

Iraq's expulsion of the Americans came a day after the Security Council unanimously voted to tighten the sanctions imposed on Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war in 1991, barring international travel by senior Iraqi officials. In defying this measure, Hussein's government appeared to be challenging the United States and its allies to make good on their threats of retaliation.

At the request of the U.S. representative, Bill Richardson, the Security Council met Thursday afternoon to consider ways to respond.

Before the meeting, Richardson warned -- without elaborating -- that "there are going to be some serious consequences" to the expulsion of the Americans from the inspection teams.

His statement echoed the mood in Congress, where there were calls for stiffer action to compel Iraq to cooperate with the U.N. inspections. Even before Thursday's expulsion, Sen. Trent Lott of Mississippi, the Republican majority leader, said in a television interview on Wednesday night that the new sanctions contained in the Security Council resolution were not strong enough.

The House's Committee on International Relations Thursday passed a resolution calling on Iraq to comply. "Saddam must know that, if necessary, force will be used to ensure compliance with the U.N. resolutions," the committee's Republican chairman, Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman of New York, said.

The House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, said he would support the president's decisions, but he also said that the coalition built by President Bush to defeat Iraq in 1991 had been allowed to fray under Clinton, and that the battery of sanctions had done little to change

Hussein's behavior even after six years.

"We also frankly have now had the great extended test of the liberal fantasy of foreign policy without force," Gingrich said.

However much the administration would like more time for diplomacy, there is a possibility of escalation Sunday or another day early next week, when U-2 spy plane flights resume. Military officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that any attempt to fire on the U-2's, which Iraq has threatened to do, would be met with force.

Iraq has missiles that, theoretically, could hit the U-2, which can fly at altitudes exceeding 70,000 feet, but that is not considered very likely. Iraq did not act on its threat when a U-2 cruised over Iraq earlier this week.

At the Pentagon, there is a sense among at least some military planners that last year's strike against Iraq, which followed Hussein's incursion into the Kurdish region in northern

Iraq, did not significantly punish Iraq. In that case, the United States fired Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Persian Gulf.

The problem for the administration is that a more sustained retaliation would require the use of more aircraft, including those stationed in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and those countries have been reluctant to support further punishment against Iraq.

A senior military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the United States already had enough forces in the region -- including 17 warships in the Persian Gulf and more than 200 aircraft -- to strike Iraq if needed. "We practice for this," the official said.

The United States does need time to build up its forces, the official said, as much as it needs time to shore up diplomatic support. "There are no cowboys over here just itching to go do it," the official said. "We'd all prefer to see a diplomatic solution."

WASHINGTON POST

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 34

Latest Defiance May Call for Different Reaction

Limited Strikes on Iraq Worked in Past, but Possible Targets Now Aren't So Clear

By Bradley Graham

Washington Post Staff Writer

While U.S. military action has succeeded before in thwarting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein when diplomacy has failed, the challenges raised by Saddam's defiance this time make the use of force more problematic, administration officials and outside specialists said yesterday.

Amid signs of growing public and congressional support for military force to resolve the latest standoff, defense experts cautioned that the extent of armed action required this time could differ significantly from the relatively quick actions taken to compel Iraq's compliance with the terms that ended the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

For one thing, the dilemma now is not as straightforward as Iraq's massing of conventional forces along a foreign border in 1994 and 1995. The United Nations in this case is attempting to uncover and dismantle Iraq's clandestine biological and chemical

weapons programs. As a military matter, the storage and production sites for these agents are more difficult to locate and destroy than such past U.S. targets as Iraqi troop formations, missile launchers and air defense systems.

For another, the Clinton administration's stated objective is not simply to punish Iraq for something it has done, as was the case after the 1993 alleged assassination plot on former president George Bush or last year's assault on Kurdish enclaves in northern Iraq, both of which drew U.S. air attacks. Instead, the aim is to push Saddam into reversing course and dropping his interference with United Nations weapons inspections.

"The purpose would not be punitive but coercive," said Richard Haas, a senior National Security Council official under Bush. "You would be using force to achieve the resumption of unconditional inspections."

To this end, a number of specialists said, military action may have to extend

well beyond the one- or two-day missile strikes and bombing runs that have characterized the U.S. attacks launched against Iraq since the end of the war.

If the objective is to get Saddam to

NOTICE TO READERS

The Current News *Early Bird*, *Supplement*, and *Radio-TV Defense Dialog* are now available at www.dtic.mil/ebird. Read detailed instructions on the *Early Bird* "home page" or call (703) 695-2884 or DSN 225-2884. These electronic publications are intended only for DoD and .mil sites and cannot be made available to any other addresses.

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

"Comply with inspections," said Zalmay Khalilzad, a senior defense official under Bush, "then it's possible limited strikes won't work. That means the military action will have to be large and sustained enough until he does comply."

Such a prolonged military campaign could tax public patience in the United States, experts said. It also would compound the evident difficulties that U.S. officials are having in garnering support for military action among those European and Arab allies that joined in the 1991 war to oust Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

"In some ways, this is a more serious military challenge than we've faced before in that it is not the imminent use of force against Kuwait or northern Iraq," said a senior Pentagon officer involved in the military planning. "It involves the potential use of much more damaging military weaponry, namely weapons of mass destruction. That's what this is all about."

Defense officials have reported no plans in recent days to move additional U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf region. The roughly 200 land- and sea-based aircraft in the area, along with dozens of Tomahawk cruise missiles aboard several ships and one submarine, are sufficient to respond to any attack on U.S. forces in the region, officials said.

At a Pentagon briefing yesterday, spokesman Kenneth H. Bacon provided graphic descriptions of the lethal effects of several germ agents that Iraq is said to possess, including anthrax and botulinum toxin.

"The inhalation of just one-ninth of a millionth of a gram of anthrax is fatal within five to seven days 100 percent of the time. And anthrax is a very long-lasting, shelf-stable biological agent that can be stored for long periods of time," he said. As for botulinum toxin, "that kills people within 36 hours by paralyzing respiratory muscles."

The risk that air strikes on suspected storage or production sites could end up releasing the agents and killing thousands suggests that any U.S. military campaign would target other locations, even if the ultimate objective is to root out Saddam's stockpiles and prevent the manufacture of more. Further complicating the targeting of such sites is that the agents and related equipment may be easily movable. Moreover, the sites sometimes can have a benign, dual civilian use.

"The ability to target and destroy, you don't do that in these cases from the air," said retired Gen. J.H. Binford

Peay, who stepped down earlier this year as head of the military's Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf region. "You have to go in there and physically capture them. Otherwise, you can never satisfy yourself that you've taken them all out."

Since the prospect of sending U.S. ground troops into Iraq seems especially remote, the discussion among specialists of viable military options tends to center around possible air strikes.

Ordering military action against Iraq in response to violations of U.N. inspection activities is not unprecedented. The United States, aided by France and Britain, hit the country with a series of cruise missile strikes in January 1993 after repeated Iraqi interference with U.N. inspection teams. Iraq quickly complied with U.N. requirements, but

only for a time.

Any use of force, senior Defense Department officials said, would be governed by a sense of "proportionality," which they said does not necessarily mean small or limited action but rather action that is relevant to the stated objective of ensuring Iraq's compliance with U.N. sanctions. Some advocates of force, though, also see a sustained bombing campaign as a means of ousting Saddam, but this scenario has many skeptics given the Iraqi leader's ability to retain power.

"Hard-liners who advocate a robust military response to attack Saddam's military and support groups feel it would weaken him and might trigger action to remove him," said Phoebe Marr of the National Defense University. "This would weaken him but it's questionable whether it would remove him."

WASHINGTON POST

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 1

NATO: U.S. Erred on Cost Of Expansion

*Figure Is \$2 Billion,
Not \$30 Billion, It Says*

By William Drozdiak
Washington Post Foreign Service

BRUSSELS, Nov. 13—A NATO study on the cost of absorbing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the Western military alliance has concluded that Clinton administration estimates of about \$30 billion were much too high and that any extra burden for NATO budgets will be less than \$2 billion over the next decade.

The NATO study, prepared in advance of next month's meetings of the alliance's defense and foreign ministers, vindicated the "enlargement on the cheap" views of European governments. Faced with the need to cut budget deficits to qualify for a single European currency system, they have objected to U.S. demands that Europeans bear most of the costs of expansion.

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana welcomed the lowered cost assessment as a "very positive devel-

opment" that should eliminate the financial factor as a source of concern in the U.S. Senate and other legislatures that must ratify the alliance expansion treaties in the coming year.

"A month ago, I was very worried that this issue could mean serious trouble for transatlantic relations," Solana said in an interview. "Now I am very much relieved to learn that, in the judgment of our best military minds, the cost of enlargement should not pose any problems."

Solana and other senior alliance officials said a detailed review by NATO's top military commanders found the defense infrastructure of new members in much better condition than previously assumed. They said airfields and rail lines in the former Warsaw Pact states have been well maintained and will not require expensive refurbishing to meet NATO standards.

The NATO study also concludes that European allies, notably Britain, France and Germany, are making good progress in equipping their armed forces for rapid mobility and tasks required to support their future military partners in the east.

After careful scrutiny, NATO's two top commanders, U.S. Gen. Wesley Clark and U.S. Adm. Harold W. Gehman Jr., have pegged the current and foreseeable threats to the alliance at a much lower level than in earlier studies. They envision a maximum mobilization of 20 NATO divisions in a worst-case scenario, about one-third the number estimated by the

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

Pentagon in a study issued in February.

NATO officials said that given the rapidly diminishing threat from Russia, for example, they have concluded that Poland can be defended easily with existing allied forces and equipment now protecting Germany. "Poland is flat and presents no geographic barriers to extending our collective defense eastward from Germany," a senior NATO official said. "It's a lot harder, and a lot more expensive, to defend Turkey [a current NATO member] than it is to reinforce Germany's neighbors."

The Clinton administration estimated early this year that NATO expansion would cost \$27 billion to \$35 billion through 2009. But several European allies objected to that assessment, contending that it exaggerated the alliance's threat environment and placed too much of a

financial burden on European governments that were being asked to pick up more than 90 percent of the bill.

The bickering between the U.S. and European allies reached a crescendo at a meeting of NATO defense ministers last month in Maastricht, Netherlands. Several ministers argued that the U.S. approach to expansion seemed to be predicated on finding new markets for costly high-tech weapons exports that new and existing members could ill afford.

But in recent weeks, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and other senior officials have started backing away from the administration's estimate of expansion costs. They noted that the American study was carried out for four potential new members, not three. They also have acknowledged that the defense posture of

new and existing European members is better suited for post-Cold War missions than the earlier Pentagon study postulated.

Senior NATO officials said a detailed military review shows that the alliance as a whole may need to spend only \$1.3 billion over the next 10 years to ensure that the military forces of the new eastern members can operate compatibly within NATO's integrated command.

They said such money added to the alliance's commonly funded budgets would cover improvement of command, control and communications facilities among the new members, upgrading their air defense systems, bolstering their ability to accept reinforcements from other allies, and conducting training and other exercises so they can operate on the same basis as the rest of the alliance.

WASHINGTON TIMES

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 17

Hungarian voters expected to say yes to NATO

By Michael Roddy
REUTERS NEWS AGENCY

BUDAPEST — Hungary votes Sunday on NATO membership, which the government says is crucial to the nation's future but opponents charge is too costly.

Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn appealed to voters to approve plans for the country to join NATO, saying the world would be watching the referendum results.

"Don't cause disappointment. Say yes," Mr. Horn told a gathering of Budapest citizens.

If the referendum is voted down, the issue can be kicked back to the pro-NATO parliament for a decision. But the government worries about the message this would send to the U.S. Senate, which must approve Hungary's accession.

According to the most recent opinion polls, 60 percent of the population intend to vote for NATO membership and 22 percent against. Turnout is expected to be around 50 percent, according to

polls published Oct. 31.

The government released the text of a letter sent to Mr. Horn yesterday by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, in which Mr. Solana said he was expecting a favorable outcome to the vote.

"I am looking forward to receive the letter, after the Nov. 16 referendum, officially confirming Hungary's intention to join NATO," the letter said.

About 8 million people are eligible to vote on whether Hungary, once a member of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization along with Poland and the Czech Republic in a first round of eastward expansion in 1999.

Of the three, only Hungary has chosen to hold a referendum, although all of the parties represented in parliament support NATO and NATO does not require a referendum for membership.

"Our accession to NATO is our first step on our way to the Euro-Atlantic community and the sec-

ond will be the EU," Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said in an interview, referring to the 15-nation European Union.

"If the majority says yes to NATO, then Hungary will... leave the tragedies of the past 10 centuries behind and join the community of the more fortunate nations," he said.

The vote stems from a 1994 campaign pledge by the governing Socialists that has injected an element of uncertainty into what might otherwise be a done deal.

Slightly more than 25 percent of the electorate must vote one way, yes or no, for the referendum to be binding. Polls this month showed support for NATO firm, but pro-NATO activists feared the turnout could be too low for a valid outcome.

The government is taking no chances. It is spending upwards of \$1 million, including bankrolling the appearance of a pro-NATO character in a television sitcom, to get out the vote.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
Nov. 14, 1997
Pg. 1

A Pakistani group claimed responsibility for Wednesday's slaying of five employees of a U.S. oil firm, and warned of more killings if Mir Aimal Kasi is ordered executed for killing two CIA workers in 1993. In Virginia, the heavily guarded jury began deliberations in the trial's penalty phase.

Israel's foreign minister said he won't attend a Mideast economic summit in Qatar Sunday, another blow to U.S. efforts to foster regional ties. A lower-level delegation plans to attend. Separately, Arafat said he intends to declare Palestinian statehood, unilaterally if necessary, in May 1999.

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

BUSINESS WEEK

Nov. 24, 1997

A WAR ON FAT AT PENTAGON INC.

Can Bill Cohen run the military efficiently?

It has been nearly 40 years and dozens of whiz kids since Pentagon management was fundamentally overhauled. But now, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, a military reform specialist when he served in the Senate, is staking his reputation on a plan to put the Pentagon on a more business-like footing. His model: IBM and other corporate giants that were forced to reinvent themselves to face the rigors of competition.

Unlike Louis Gerstner, IBM's reigning turnaround artist, Cohen has to worry about unique competitive challenges such as a potential military confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq—not to mention political minefields inside the Beltway. But with no hope of raising his department's \$250 billion budget, the Defense chief worries he'll lack the funds needed to maintain a modern arsenal. "We need to get the money to pay for the revolution in military affairs," says Cohen.

BLOATED. One answer: free up \$6 billion a year by slashing the home office's bloated overhead costs. The strategy, unveiled on Nov. 10, would cut 31,000 jobs, replace many paper transactions with electronic commerce, outsource work, and launch a new round of military base closings.

Base closings will face congressional flak, but Cohen can adopt other changes on his own—and may have lawmakers' support. Indeed, House National Security Committee Chairman Floyd D. Spence (R-S.C.) praised Cohen for "acknowledging that Pentagon reform is long overdue."

There's little doubt about that. The last management overhaul was engineered by President Kennedy's Defense chief, Robert S. McNamara, who adopted ideas based on his experience as Ford Motor Co. president. Today, those results would produce guffaws in a B-school management course. For every \$1 spent on travel, the military shells out an additional 30 cents on trip-related paperwork. A just-in-case logistics mentality has produced \$103 billion in inventory, but Cohen thinks a just-in-time system can slice that in half.

"REVOLUTION." Before becoming the sole Republican in the Clinton Cabinet, Cohen had penned several government acquisition-reform laws during his three terms as a senator from Maine. Now that he has the chance to act on those ideas, he's moving ahead with what he says is nothing short of a "revolution" in how the Pentagon does business.

Even so, critics gripe that Cohen is too timid. Lawrence J. Korb, a former Pentagon offi-

cial now at the Brookings Institution, says Cohen should eliminate the civilian heads of the individual uniformed services and put all procurement powers under one roof. "Those steps would be significant," he says.

Others question whether Cohen will take seriously the new CEO mantra: focus on core competencies. Unlike his counterparts in Corporate America, Cohen's is fighting wars. Retired Lieutenant General Thomas G. McInerney, head of Washington advocacy group Business Executives for National Security, thinks Cohen should divest entirely such commercial functions as business travel, data processing, and housing. "You don't need people doing things that are in

the Yellow Pages," he says.

But Cohen has decided to allow the units to compete against private companies for many of those services. Why? Congress would balk at the military job losses. "It would be desirable to outsource as much as we can, but that isn't the way this company can function," he acknowledges.

As a student of the Pentagon, Cohen is also keenly aware that his is just the latest of several reform plans over the decades. Most sit on shelves gathering dust. But the Defense chief insists his plans for such reforms as paperless contracting will succeed. CEOs get the job done, he says, by conveying a "unified vision." Now the question is whether his determination can subdue a system that has shot past reform efforts down in flames.

By Stan Crock in Washington

The Cohen Business Plan

DOWNSIZING He plans to slash 31,000 jobs out of 141,000 in the Office of the Secretary, various defense agencies, and field offices.

COMPETITION Private companies will be able to compete with military units to provide commercial services, from handling payrolls and managing leased property to drug testing and selling surplus property.

REENGINEERING Cohen will push for paperless processes for contracts, travel, and weapons support. Just-in-case logistics, which create huge, unneeded inventories, will move toward businesslike just-in-time systems.

RESTRUCTURING Cohen's most controversial proposal is for two more rounds of base closings, which would yield an estimated \$2.8 billion in annual savings.

DATA: DEFENSE DEPT.

WASHINGTON TIMES

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 1

Top Army woman apologizes for calling Marines 'extremists'

Veterans, Gingrich, others on Hill demand she be fired

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Assistant Army Secretary Sara E. Lister yesterday apologized to "all current and former Marines" for calling them "extremists," a remark that angered the entire military chain of command and

prompted the House to call for her immediate firing.

Mrs. Lister, assistant Army secretary for manpower and reserve affairs, penned her extraordinary apology in a letter to Gen. Charles Krulak, the Marine Corps commandant.

She conceded her description of

the 222-year-old Corps at a public forum last month was "inappropriate and wrong" but continued to insist that her comments had been "misinterpreted."

Gen. Krulak accepted Mrs. Lister's apology in a three-paragraph letter.

"I accept your personal apology

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

for the disparaging remarks you made about our institution," the general wrote. "Marines have always been, and will continue to be, honorable men and women — dedicated to the principles and ideals of this nation, and one with the American people."

Mrs. Lister is due to leave the Pentagon this month after being appointed to the post in 1994 by President Clinton. Before this week's flare-up, she was considered a serious candidate for secretary of the Army, once the current secretary, Togo West, leaves to head the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The angry reaction to Mrs. Lister's remarks — first reported yesterday in *The Washington Times* — reached the House late yesterday, with members staging a lively 45-minute floor debate, then passing on a voice vote a resolution demanding President Clinton fire her.

House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Georgia Republican, sent a letter to the president demanding her "immediate dismissal."

"As commander-in-chief you undoubtedly agree that morale is a paramount issue for continued troop cohesion," Mr. Gingrich said. "Mrs. Lister's comments, if allowed to stand, put that morale in serious peril."

During the floor debate, Rep. Paul McHale, Pennsylvania Democrat and a Marine reserve lieutenant colonel, said, "The comments attributed, I think accurately, to Assistant Secretary Lister were irresponsibly caustic. They were not taken out of context. They were not misinterpreted. They were simply wrong. Unfortunately for [Mrs. Lister], she was simultaneously articulate and foolish."

White House spokesman Michael McCurry declined to comment yesterday. Mr. West, the Army secretary, to whom Mrs. Lister is a close adviser, also would not comment.

A spokesman for Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said he considers the issue closed now that Mrs. Lister has apologized.

Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon told reporters, "The facts in this case speak for themselves."

"She apologized directly to the commandant of the Marine Corps," he said. "The commandant has received the apology. And I believe that this issue has passed. She said that the remark was inappropriate and wrong. The secretary of defense agrees that the remark was inappropriate and wrong. He thinks the apology was the proper

way to proceed on her part."

Former Marines expressed shock yesterday that such a high-ranking Pentagon civilian would use emotionally charged language to disparage the Marine Corps.

"It's outrageous that this woman has not resigned," retired Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, a Vietnam veteran, said. "The false apology she sent to the commandant today is wholly inadequate. ... She has insulted not only the Marine Corps, but everyone who's served."

Veterans groups also weighed in. The Veterans of Foreign Wars said it was "shocked by such totally inappropriate and untrue comments by a senior official" and called for her dismissal.

Yesterday, Mrs. Lister wrote, "I apologize to the Marine Corps and all current and former Marines for my remarks. ... I regret that the use of this term during an academic discussion has generated a controversy that does not represent my views or those of the Army. I am well aware of the close and mutually supportive relationship between the Army and the Marine Corps, both in war and in peace. Again, my remarks were not intended to denigrate the Marine Corps in any way. It is unfortunate that they were misinterpreted."

Mrs. Lister claimed, as the Army did on Wednesday, that the statements attributed to her were taken out of context. Mrs. Lister's comments were made at an Oct. 26 forum in Baltimore.

A tape recording of the session shows that during opening remarks to a group of academics and military personnel, Mrs. Lister hopscotched over topics on civilian-military relations.

At one point she said, "I think the Army is much more connected to society than the Marines are. The Marines are extremists. Wherever you have extremists you've got some risks of total disconnection with society. And that's a little dangerous."

Sen. Daniel R. Coats, Indiana Republican and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, listened to the tape. He then said, "Her excuse simply doesn't hold water. There's no way to misinterpret what she said and there's no context that explains or qualifies her remarks. They stand as she said them."

Mrs. Lister is a strong supporter of expanding combat roles for women — a change the Marines adamantly oppose.

The Marine Corps is the most tradition-minded of the four military branches. For example, unlike

the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Marines still train men and women separately in boot camp, a policy Mrs. Lister opposes.

The Corps is also extremely popular on Capitol Hill, where members of Congress leapt to its defense and launched a barrage of attacks on Mrs. Lister.

Two Republican senators, Conrad Burns of Montana and Paul Coverdell of Georgia, demanded her firing.

"This is not an incident that should be brushed aside," Mr. Coverdell said in a letter to Mr. Clinton.

Sen. Charles S. Robb, Virginia Democrat, commanded an infantry company in Vietnam as a young Marine captain.

"This one kind of got my juices flowing," Mr. Robb said, referring to *The Times*' story.

"I hope that Togo West and Assistant Secretary Lister and others will clarify [her remarks]," he said. "Those who represent official public policy have a higher obligation to be especially careful about using emotionally charged words that could be misconstrued."

Sen. John Glenn, Ohio Democrat and a Marine pilot in World War II and the Korean War, said, "That the Marine Corps has functioned as the 911 force of this country has been a matter of record for the past 222 years. That record speaks eloquently for itself. No comment from anyone can detract from or diminish this record, which is fact, not fiction."

Few wear their ex-Marine status more proudly than Mr. North, who signs off his daily radio show with "semper fidelis," the Corps motto, which means "always faithful" in Latin.

Mr. North devoted much of yesterday's show to Mrs. Lister's remarks.

BALTIMORE SUN

Nov. 14, 1997 Pg. 17

Bosnian Muslims attack U.N. bus during protest

TUZLA, Bosnia — Bosnian Muslim refugees stopped a United Nations bus on its way back from Bosnian Serb territory, smashing its windows with stones, a U.N. official said yesterday.

Three of the 50 passengers, two Bosnian Serb men and a Muslim woman, were slightly injured in the melee Wednesday in a Tuzla suburb. Three local civilians also were slightly injured, sources said.

The refugees had blocked traf-

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

fic throughout the day to protest having their electricity cut for unpaid bills. Since Bosnian Serbs expelled them during the 1992-1995 war from territory now in the Bosnian Serb republic, the refugees have had to live in temporary housing without resources or jobs.

RICHMOND
TIMES-
DISPATCH
Nov. 14,
1997
Pg. 2

Croat gets prison term in torturing of inmates

ZAGREB, Croatia — A Bosnian Croat who worked as a guard in a Serb-run detention camp in northern Bosnia during the war was sentenced to 18 months in prison for cruel treatment of inmates, a

newspaper reported yesterday. Mario Maler, 30, is a Croat from the Serb-controlled city of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia. He was convicted Wednesday of violating the 1949 Geneva conventions while working as a guard in Stara Gradiska camp in 1991-92, the Vercernji List newspaper reported.

Lister's 'feminist agenda' shook Army

Consistently pushed to lift restrictions on women in combat

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Sara E. Lister, who apologized for labeling Marines as "extremists," arrived at the Pentagon at a pivotal time for women in the military. And Mrs. Lister, Army sources say, took advantage of it.

In fact, they said, during her 3½ years as assistant Army secretary for manpower and reserve affairs, Mrs. Lister's main goal was to let Army women do more. The year she arrived, the Pentagon knocked down some longtime barriers to women in combat, ushering in a new era of sex integration, from boot camps to field tents overseas.

Her agenda was perhaps best illustrated by Army Secretary Togo West's decision in 1994 to allow women in field artillery units and combat engineers.

The problem was, Mr. West had failed to first consult with Gen. Gordon Sullivan, the chief of staff. Once Gen. Sullivan learned of the move, a red-faced Army headquarters quickly retracted Mr. West's decision.

Army officers at the Pentagon, who asked not to be named, said Mr. West's action had been urged by Mrs. Lister.

It was not the last time she would shake up headquarters over women's issues. The media reported in 1995 that an Army research institute in Massachusetts was conducting a novel strength test: Women would lift weights regularly to see if they could grow as strong as men.

Army sources said the report angered Mrs. Lister, who believed the results could be used to mock the idea of women being assigned to combat. The sources said she even attempted to cut funding for such research.

U.S. News and World Report quoted her as saying she didn't want the Army talking about women's strength or pregnancy be-

cause conservatives would use the issues to argue against women in combat.

"Those that know her closely feel that she has a heavy feminist agenda," said an Army colonel. "Having said that, I think that people feel that she has been good for the Army in terms of getting a grip on sexual harassment."

Army officials said Mrs. Lister also made her mark by putting Army civilian workers under her control, not under the authority of the deputy chief of staff for personnel.

"There are those in the senior leadership who feel she is distrustful of the uniformed force and she feels the Army needs more, and not less, civilian oversight," the colonel said.

WASHINGTON
TIMES
Nov. 14, 1997
Pg. 11

A graduate of George Washington University law school, Mrs. Lister held several posts in President Jimmy Carter's Pentagon, including Navy deputy general counsel and Army general counsel.

The married mother of two daughters was general counsel to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority from 1985 to 1989. She lived in London for two years before returning to the United States. She taught college courses and consulted for the Smithsonian Institution.

Rep. John P. Murtha, Pennsylvania Democrat, spoke to her yesterday.

"She is shattered by what has happened," he said on the House floor. "She has the highest regard for the Marine Corps."

WALL STREET JOURNAL

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 8

Boeing, Sundstrand, AlliedSignal Reviewed In Defense Audits

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON — The Defense Department is conducting special audits of the prices charged by Boeing Co., Sundstrand Corp. and AlliedSignal Inc. for supplying spare parts to the military, a Pentagon spokeswoman said.

The inspector general's office is conducting the audits in response to complaints that revamped Pentagon rules, designed to streamline purchasing decisions by moving closer to commercial practices, have ended up raising rather than lowering the prices for various parts for aircraft and other weapons systems.

The scrutiny comes as the Pentagon

moves to increasingly purchase parts on a sole-source basis, as many airlines do, instead of an often unwieldy and time-consuming bidding system.

Details of the scope and the focus of the audits weren't available. But according to Mr. Kennett and others in the aerospace industry, the primary issue is covering storage charges for certain parts that manufacturers typically include in catalog prices for spare parts.

Formerly, the parts were ordered and stored by the government, but the carrying costs "were never accounted for," says Don Fuqua, president of the Aerospace Industries Association. He described the transition to commercial-style buying as a "cultural change" that requires more education of Pentagon officials.

An AlliedSignal spokesman said his company is "aware" of the audit, but didn't know its objective or methodology and thus couldn't comment further. Sundstrand couldn't be reached for comment.

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

WASHINGTON POST

November 14, 1997

Pg. 35

Egypt Urges Diplomacy, Not Force, in U.S.-Iraq Dispute

By John Lancaster

Washington Post Foreign Service

CAIRO, Nov. 13—As tensions escalate between Washington and Baghdad, Egypt and other Arab states are counseling restraint, warning that U.S. missile strikes on Iraq would do little more than strengthen the hand of President Saddam Hussein.

Instead, they are calling on the United States to exhaust every possible diplomatic avenue in its effort to end the crisis over Iraq's refusal to admit American members of U.N. weapons inspection teams. Some Arab officials also suggest that Washington's long-cherished goal of toppling Saddam Hussein has become counterproductive, since the Iraqi leader now believes he has nothing to lose by defying the Security Council's resolutions.

"The Iraqi regime seems to hold the view that no matter what they do, they will be targeted by the United States," Osama Baz, political adviser to President Hosni Mubarak, said in an interview today. "So they say, 'If the game is to topple us, then we'd be crazy to cooperate with this scheme any further.'"

Baz said the United States can help blunt this argument by dropping "certain hints that the goal is not to topple the regime but to persuade the Iraqi regime to change its policy in certain areas."

Such attitudes may seem puzzling to those who recall the role of such countries as Egypt and Syria in backing the U.S.-led coalition that drove Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991. But Arabs are angry over what they regard as Washington's indifference to the suffering of Iraqis under international trade sanctions imposed a few days after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. And they are skeptical of American claims that Iraq still poses a major threat to its Arab neighbors.

Given the deadlock in Middle East peace negotiations, which many Arabs blame on U.S. reluctance to put pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Arab leaders are unwilling to swim against the tide of public opinion.

"Many people in the Arab world... believe that while the U.S. is not exerting any real effort to persuade

Israel to comply with its own signature and carry out its obligations [to the Palestinians],... another kind of policy is pursued toward the Arab peoples, in which the United States does not tolerate... any deviation from its dictates," Baz said. "The United States is being accused of double standards."

Egypt has backed the American demand—reiterated in a U.N. Security Council resolution passed Wednesday with its support—that Iraq rescind its expulsion of American members of U.N. teams combing the country for evidence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. That also is the position of important U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Officials in several gulf countries suggested that while their public statements might seem equivocal or even supportive of Iraq, gulf leaders would be delighted to be rid of Saddam Hussein, whom they regard as a major threat to stability in the region.

"If you're going to slap him on the wrist, we'd rather not be involved," said a Persian Gulf official who insisted that neither he nor his country be identified. "But if you're going to take serious action against him, by all means do so. ... If you have an opportunity to punish Saddam, use it, because this doesn't come along very often."

"With regard to the Saudis, they have no disagreement with the United States in this matter," said a Saudi official contacted in Riyadh tonight. "There is complete distrust of Saddam Hussein."

But the general impression is that if the Clinton administration does resort to force in its latest confrontation with Baghdad, as it has on several previous occasions, it will do so without any help from such Arab friends as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. As the most populous Arab country, and one with close U.S. ties, Egypt plays a central role in the politics of the region. Its statements on Iraq thus in some measure represent official views throughout the Arab world.

Egyptian officials have been openly sympathetic to Iraqi charges that the United States is manipulating the U.N. inspection effort with the aim of prolonging the trade sanctions and eventually toppling the government.

And U.S. military strikes, they warn, will only bolster Saddam Hussein's rule.

"Experience has shown that military action in such situations is counterproductive," Baz said. "Why? Because it is very hard for anyone to oppose his government and work against it if his country is under siege by a foreign power."

When Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis, Baz noted, they did so partly with the aim of toppling President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The plan backfired. "Nasser emerged stronger than ever," Baz said. "Why? Because he resisted foreign aggression. ... Even though his success was more political than military, he was seen as a hero."

As outlined by Baz, Egypt's prescription for winning Iraqi compliance with Wednesday's U.N. resolution relies largely on the power of persuasion. As a starting point, he said, France and Russia should use their influence to remind the Iraqis, "in unequivocal terms, of the benefits of compliance."

That, he said, should be followed by assurances from the United States that it no longer seeks Saddam Hussein's downfall but merely compliance with U.N. resolutions stemming from the Persian Gulf War. "The most important thing is that the people of the region shouldn't feel that the United States is targeting Iraq no matter how it behaves," he said.

Baz declined to comment directly on whether Egypt would rethink its opposition to military force if diplomacy fails to produce a change of heart in Baghdad. "It is hard to answer this question," he said. "You cannot base your policy on absolute positions."

WASHINGTON TIMES
Nov. 14, 1997 Pg. 14

Iraq suspected of stockpiling biological arms

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Pentagon said yesterday it suspects that Iraq is continuing to hide deadly bio-

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

logical and chemical weapons, including highly lethal toxins and nerve agents that pose a major threat to the region.

"I think this is a real and present danger," Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon told reporters. "And that's why this current dispute between Iraq and the United Nations has such strong and dramatic consequences. And that's why the U.N. is taking it so seriously."

Speaking at a briefing for reporters at the Pentagon, Mr. Bacon also said the United

States is not taking any immediate steps to move additional troops, warplanes or ships to the Persian Gulf after the departure of U.N. inspectors from Iraq yesterday.

Iraq claims to have destroyed stockpiles of biological agents after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, he said.

"We have absolutely no confirmation that that's happened," he said. "We assume that they do have some stockpiles of biological weapons. One, for instance, is anthrax.

Anthrax spores, when turned into weapons, are so deadly that minute quantities, if inhaled, will kill a person within five to seven days "100 percent of the time," Mr. Bacon said.

Since the agent can be stored for long periods, "I think it's quite possible that they do have some of that stored," he said.

The Iraqis also are believed to have stores of botulinum toxin, which can kill a person

in 36 hours by paralyzing breathing muscles, he said.

Also, Baghdad has produced an extremely lethal nerve agent known as VX.

"If you had a drop of VX on your finger, you'd be twitching to death probably within three to five minutes," he said. "You would be wracked by seizures and would die nearly instantly."

Other poison gas stockpiled in the past by Baghdad include sarin nerve gas and the blistering agent mustard.

WASHINGTON TIMES

November 14, 1997

Pg. 14

No deal with Iraq, Czechs assure U.S.

Pentagon foresees no anti-stealth sales

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The government of the Czech Republic has assured the United States it will not allow the sale of anti-stealth electronic warfare systems to Iraq, the Pentagon said yesterday.

Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon, commenting on a report in The Washington Times, confirmed that Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus gave the assurances to Vice President Al Gore during a White House meeting Wednesday.

"Vice President Gore discussed this issue with Prime Minister Klaus," Mr. Bacon told reporters. "They assured us that they will do everything they can to prevent this from taking place."

Earlier, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, asked about The Times' report on ABC's "Good Morning America," declined to comment directly but said: "It's no secret that Saddam Hussein has been seeking to acquire whatever weapons he can in order to threaten his neighbors and also build the kind of systems that can threaten countries all the way to Europe, from Baghdad to Paris.

"I think it's no secret that what he's up to is to try to build a military capability to threaten a variety of countries," Mr. Cohen said Tuesday.

The Pentagon was responding to a report in The Times, quoting U.S. intelligence officials, that a group of Bulgarian arms dealers was working with Czech government and military officials to sell five Tamara electronic warfare systems to Baghdad for \$375 million.

The systems were to be shipped by air to Turkey from a warehouse in the Czech Republic and then

sent overland by truck to Iraq, said officials speaking on the condition of anonymity.

A White House official said the illicit Tamara deal appeared to be the result of covert arms sales involving cash-strapped businesses that have been involved in black marketeering outside of official government channels.

The systems would give Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein a new capability that could be used against U.S. and allied aircraft. Saddam has threatened to shoot down unarmed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in a standoff with the United States over weapons inspections.

Mr. Bacon said the Prague government has denied the sale had taken place but would not say if the Pentagon or other U.S. government agencies are cooperating with Czech authorities in probing the weapons sale, which is banned under U.N. sanctions against Iraq.

The Czech intelligence service BIS announced on Wednesday that it opened an investigation of the Tamara deal and would report on its findings to the Czech government and parliament.

Mr. Bacon said Bulgaria's trade minister also has been quoted in press reports as denying the Sofia government was linked to the illicit

radar deal.

He said The Times' report "did not deal with the Bulgarian government, it dealt with private Bulgarian arms dealers who might be working as middlemen in this."

The manufacturer of the system, Tesla-Paradubice, has claimed the Tamara system can detect radar-evading stealth aircraft, which were used effectively to bomb Iraqi targets in the early stages of the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

Asked about the claims, Mr. Bacon said the Tamara is not a radar system but a "family of passive collection devices that collect a variety of signals."

The equipment can pick up aircraft electronic signals "but fighter aircraft don't fly with those on, on combat missions," he said.

"There have been claims made by the manufacturer Tesla, a company that I believe is either in, or very close to, bankruptcy right now, that it can in fact defeat stealth systems, but we don't have any evidence that that's the case," Mr. Bacon said.

"We don't have independent verification that this system can, in fact, defeat the purpose of the stealth system, which is to evade detection," he added.

LONDON TIMES Nov. 14, 1997 Pg. 18

Saddam exploits the collapse of US-led alliance

By MICHAEL BINTON
DIPLOMATIC EDITOR

THE Iraqi leader's confrontation with the West has been calculated to wring maximum advantage from the collapse of the Arab coalition that supported the American-led attack on Iraq in 1991.

President Saddam Hussein

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

has pointedly staged his challenge to America at a time when neighbouring Arab countries are deeply embittered about the stalemate in the Middle East peace process and disillusioned with US policies in the region. The diplomatic support Washington enjoyed in spearheading the liberation of Kuwait has virtually disappeared.

ANALYSIS

Syria and Egypt, the two main Arab allies in the Gulf War, have expressed opposition to any American-led military action. Even other Gulf countries are distancing themselves. Western diplomacy is trying to maintain the semblance of Arab unity against Iraq by settling for weaker

United Nations resolutions than the West would like and publicly pursuing a policy of restraint.

But frantic Western efforts are now being made in Arab capitals to persuade governments that the threat posed by Saddam has nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli peace process. This will not persuade Arab opinion. There is criticism of US "hypocrisy" in cracking down on Iraqi violations of UN resolutions while doing little about what Arabs see as Israeli violations of the Oslo peace accords.

The rift with America was underlined by the decision of leading Arab countries to boycott next week's American-backed Middle East economic summit in Qatar, to which Israel has been invited. Only a handful of Arab states will be

represented, by low-level delegations. Yesterday David Levy, the Israeli Foreign Minister, said that he would not attend, though an Israeli delegation would go, headed by Natan Sharansky, the Trade Minister.

King Hussein of Jordan has again been put in a difficult spot by Iraq. Since the Gulf War, Jordan has reversed its costly diplomatic support for Saddam.

Although Iraq uses Jordan as its main foreign diplomatic base, King Hussein has given political asylum to Iraqi exiles and denounced the Baghdad Government. But there is still strong support among Jordanians for Iraq, coupled with deepening disillusion over Jordan's peace agreement with Israel.

The King paid dearly in the

Gulf and Saudi Arabia for his attempts at diplomatic mediation before the Gulf War. He has now mended his fences, but is again calling for a time limit to Western sanctions and underlining the sufferings of the Iraqi people.

No Arab state has rallied to Iraq's side, however, as all know that America is certain to win any military confrontation. The Arabs are also embarrassed by Saddam's continuing internal oppression, his military threat to his neighbours and his open flouting of UN resolutions on weapons destruction.

Egypt and Syria have urged Baghdad to avoid a military confrontation with America. Newspapers are saying that an attack on Iraq would be tantamount to an attack on the whole Arab nation.

INSIDE THE AIR FORCE

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 1

Cash-starved programs eye funds earmarked for proposal

PENTAGON PLANS LAST-DITCH JSTARS PITCH BUT DOUBTS NATO WILL ANTE UP

In the wake of NATO's decision last week to delay until next spring a decision on the United States' proposal to provide the alliance up to six Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft, Pentagon and industry officials were regrouping this week for what one source claimed would be their final effort to meet NATO's requirement for an Airborne Ground Surveillance system.

As of press time, Air Force officials were also eagerly awaiting a new NATO JSTARS program budget decision slated to be completed by the Office of Secretary of Defense comptroller late this week or early next week, according to a Pentagon source. In light of the postponement and the lack of an indication that NATO will ever accept the JSTARS proposal, PBD No. 705 "recommends that funds will be made available for offsets," the source said.

To be pursued only if the NATO JSTARS deal falls through, this "fall back" clause in the new PBD will allow the defense secretary to evaluate other requirements for the almost \$1 billion the U.S. was projected to spend for the program between fiscal year 1999 and FY-03. As for the \$26 million already appropriated for the program for the current fiscal year, steps to reallocate these funds have not yet been made, sources said. Air Force acquisition officials, however, hope and anticipate that OSD will propose to Congress that the funds be reallocated to the Air Force's own JSTARS program, sources said.

The decision to spell out a fall back scenario for funds previously earmarked for the NATO JSTARS program sheds light on the Pentagon's declining optimism that an agreement with NATO can be reached. Pentagon officials are running out of patience with NATO and its seemingly perpetual postponement in deciding how to meet its AGS requirement, one source said.

"We're not throwing in the towel," the source said. "We'll give it a real push, but there's only so much frustration you can handle until you say, 'OK, you are not interested.'"

Over the next few months, NATO will sit down with JSTARS manufacturer Northrop Grumman once again to see how the proposed purchase can be reworked to meet all of NATO's requirements, an Air Force source said. But unless NATO spreads out its delivery schedule, increases funding, or reduces its AGS requirement, Pentagon officials doubt an agreement can be consummated, the source said. And over the next six months, the program is not about to become suddenly viable nor will dramatic changes in NATO's funding stream or its AGS requirement surface overnight, the source projected.

"[NATO] just can't afford it, [it] just can't afford a huge piece of hardware," the source said. "I think if there is a brilliant solution, we would have [already] hit upon it."

Production of NATO's first JSTARS aircraft under the U.S. proposal is already well underway and it is expected to come off the assembly line early next fiscal year. The Pentagon could theoretically wait until the very last minute before designating this "white tail" aircraft as an Air Force or NATO plane, an Air Force official said. The Pentagon, however, is tired of keeping the JSTARS production schedule up in the air, and will likely assign this aircraft to the Air Force next spring if NATO's Council of National Armaments Directors does not accept the U.S. proposal, the official said.

Such a move could jeopardize the entire "fast track" option, in which NATO would quickly receive two

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

JSTARS already in production that would otherwise be delivered to the Air Force, and shatter any remaining hopes that NATO will purchase JSTARS for its AGS requirement. It would also lead to a lot of scrambling between and within the military services because there are plenty of programs that would be "more than willing" to grab the extra funds, according to a senior defense official.

On the top of the list for reallocated funds could be the Air Force's JSTARS program, according to Air Force officials. Although the Air Force's JSTARS program is still executable, program officials have been forced to defer several long-lead purchases because of congressional cuts. The program could put to good use the \$26 million appropriated for FY-98 for NATO JSTARS, money that can be reprogrammed with the approval of congressional defense committees (*Inside the Air Force*, Sept. 26, p5).

Air Force officials also told *ITAF* that they would lobby for at least some of the out year funds now earmarked for NATO JSTARS to be transferred to their own JSTARS account. As justification, the officials said their JSTARS account would have been better funded in the first place if JSTARS was never an option for NATO. -- *Drendun Sobie*

WALL STREET JOURNAL

Nov. 14, 1997 Pg. 18

Cohen Decides Pentagon Needs Fewer Good Men

Americans don't go to sleep at night worrying about how we'll win the next war. But Andrew Marshall does, which is why Americans ought to worry that he's being banished to outer Siberia by a witless and bureaucratic Pentagon.

If ours were a healthier culture, Mr. Marshall would be better known. Instead he's merely a legend inside the Pentagon. For six presidencies he's run the Office of Net Assessment, which is a rare place in the U.S. military that dares to challenge conventions about the future. Many of his heresies during the Cold War helped our side win it. But now in a monumental, if too typical, act of short-sightedness, Defense brass are sending him into exile in the name of saving a few bucks.

This story is about more than one man's fate, though, because it also shows how poorly democracies confront problems that aren't immediate. Today America faces no real military threat, save for biological or nuclear terror from the likes of a Saddam Hussein. No nation since Britain in the 19th century has had such a unilateral global advantage. But that fact breeds complacency, and an even greater than usual preoccupation with the present.

For Congress, the Pentagon budget is now mostly pork barrel. For the armed services, it's about keeping their share of a shrinking pie. And for the Clinton team, which is supposed to be thinking bigger, defense strategy is mainly about getting past the next political crisis, whether a



Andrew Marshall

Potomac Watch

By Paul A. Gigot

Bosnia deadline or the latest agitation to put women in foxholes. President Clinton's real "don't ask, don't tell" policy is about the future.

All the more reason to have Mr. Marshall and his office around to focus a few strategic wide-angle lenses. In the 1970s, his shop produced a study that helped turn President Carter around on withdrawing troops from Korea. In the 1980s, Mr. Marshall was among the few who bucked the joint chiefs' reluctance to send Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan rebels. The Stingers did so much damage that they helped convince Mikhail Gorbachev the war was a mistake—the beginning of the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

More important still, Mr. Marshall challenged U.S. intelligence agency views of Soviet economic power. He commissioned studies by Charles Wolf and Henry Rowen, among others, that foresaw Soviet decline. The CIA, which listened mainly to itself, didn't get it. But Mr. Marshall, who was reading Soviet sources, saw how much the Russians feared American technological advances.

At 76 years old, Mr. Marshall is as quietly acute as ever. His recent achievement has been to anticipate the "revolution in military affairs" that is now almost a cliché at the Pentagon. Long before others, he saw that the same information technologies reshaping the rest of our lives will also change warfare—and in ways that could make America more vulnerable.

The nature of the new technology means it will spread throughout the world faster than we think. A rising economic power—say, China—could buy technology that neutralizes U.S.

tanks and carriers. Facing space sensors and "brilliant" weapons that can hit a bull's-eye from hundreds of miles, a U.S. deployment like the Gulf War's would be a disaster.

Mr. Marshall likes to say our era resembles the 1920s and 1930s. Those were also largely peaceful decades but also periods of change and debate in military technology and strategy. Japan had just 15% of America's GDP but still built a navy capable of raiding Pearl Harbor. The U.S. Navy's decision to build aircraft carriers proved critical once war began. Britain stuck with battleships and paid for it. In the same way, decisions made today may determine whether we win or lose a war 20 years from now.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen gets the concept; he barely gives a speech without mentioning the "military revolution." Yet he is purging the concept's developer even as he mouths its importance. Mr. Marshall's exile to the backwater of National Defense University is supposed to take place as part of an overall civilian Defense downsizing that is otherwise much needed. But sacrificing Mr. Marshall's 13-person office is like a dieter trying to lose weight by having a lobotomy.

Some Pentagon watchers detect bureaucratic revenge at work here. Some of Mr. Marshall's protégés (though not Mr. Marshall) in the defense world have been publicly critical of the Clinton team's lack of strategic thinking, and so perhaps this is payback. Mr. Marshall won't comment.

Those who understand Mr. Marshall's worth, Democrats and Republicans alike, are lobbying to reverse the decision. Their sentiment is summed up in a "Dear Bill" letter sent to Mr. Cohen by former Defense official Phil Merrill, who worked with Mr. Marshall over 15 years:

"You will be left as the one who eviscerated the conscience, the corporate history, and the most forward-thinking element of the entire Department—at the very time the Congress and the American people want a longer-range security perspective."



William Cohen

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

NEW YORK TIMES

Nov. 14, 1997

An Ultimatum for Iraq

By ROBERT M. GATES

LOS ANGELES — Perhaps the most important of the United Nations Security Council's decisions after the Persian Gulf war in 1991 was its resolution that Iraq's program to build weapons of mass destruction must be eliminated.

Before the war, Iraq had significant stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and programs to develop even more sinister weapons, including nuclear ones.

As a result of the war and the subsequent intensive inspections carried out by international teams, many of these weapons have been destroyed.

But far from all. And now -- in part because of our own indecisiveness and inattention -- we find ourselves in a stare-down with Iraq. If this continues for more than a few days, we should address Saddam Hussein in the only language he understands: force.

Since the end of the war, the Iraqis, trying to preserve their programs for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, have lied to United Nations inspectors and engaged in a deadly game of hide-and-seek. For diplomatic reasons, the United Nations has never fully revealed the extent of physical abuse and mistreatment of its inspectors in Iraq. Nor has it fully revealed the extraordinary deception, subterfuge, trickery and other obstructionism used by the Iraqis.

Over the years, the weapons inspectors and the Security Council have shown remarkable patience and persistence in dealing with Mr. Hussein's efforts to thwart the will of the United Nations.

And the inspectors exposed and destroyed many of these fearsome weapons and the associated equipment.

Then, last month, the Iraqi dictator issued an ultimatum: if Americans were included in the inspection teams, the teams would be barred from doing their work.

When Mr. Hussein first made those threats, Kofi An-

nan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, sent a diplomatic mission to Baghdad to urge reconsideration. (He must have forgotten about the stream of similarly feckless missions before the 1991 war). After that mission failed, the Security Council tightened economic sanctions somewhat. But the inspectors are still blocked from doing their work -- yesterday, they began leaving Iraq -- and it seems clear that Mr. Hussein is moving or hiding his weapons or equipment. So what now?

The Clinton Administration has worked to maintain the Security Council's strong support for the sanctions as long as Mr. Hussein refuses to comply with all the resolutions, including his refusal to allow the inspections. That effort, over time, has become more challenging as Russia and France, in particular, have pursued oil and other contracts with Iraq worth billions of dollars, to take effect once the sanctions are lifted.

However, it appears that President Clinton has failed to make an effort, both personally and through senior advisers, month after month and year after year, to maintain and nurture the coalition that defeated Mr. Hussein.

Maintaining a core of support within such a fragile alliance requires constant attention. The diplomats of both the Soviet Union and France continuously tried to undermine the coalition in 1990 and 1991, and only frequent telephone calls from President George Bush to Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and François Mitterrand kept them on board. At its highest levels, the Clinton Administration must remind Russia, France and others that Mr. Hussein must fully comply with the United Nations resolutions. Mr. Clinton should point out to these nations that if the desire for unilateral political and economic gain in the Middle East causes them to lose their resolve, their relations with the United States will suffer.

Further, Mr. Hussein

probably has begun to question long-term American resolve as well (a question that perhaps began to form when the war ended with him still in power). In 1994, when he rushed tens of thousands of troops to the Kuwaiti border, the Administration quite laudably sent reinforcements to the region and made clear that it was ready to deal with any new aggression. However, when the Iraqi forces were pulled back, our own were quietly withdrawn, and Mr. Hussein paid no price for his bluff. This was a military opportunity missed. Similarly, when Mr. Hussein last year violated the "no-fly zone" in northern Iraq and re-established his position there, the United States threatened retaliation, but then never acted.

By this fall, Mr. Hussein presumably had concluded that fissures in the coalition and the American failure to respond forcefully to his maneuverings in the past had created an environment in which he could challenge both the United States and the United Nations Security Council over the inspections.

He must not be allowed to succeed. The minimum acceptable outcome of this confrontation must be both the new, tightened sanctions just adopted by the Security Council and a complete reversal by Iraq on weapons inspections -- allowing inspectors to proceed unhindered regardless of their nationalities. Moreover, there must be an aggressive push to find out what Mr. Hussein has been doing in the absence of the inspectors. Failing this, the United States -- preferably with the full support of the Security Council, but at least with whatever coalition support it can muster, or alone if necessary -- must act forcibly to remind the Iraqi military that it will pay a heavy price for Mr. Hussein's

obduracy, arrogance and defiance. A few dozen missiles launched against Iraq would be an inadequate response. Mr. Hussein has easily absorbed such attacks before and then boasted to his people and his neighbors that he can take whatever the Americans dish out.

No, the next strike should be a powerful air and missile campaign targeted on the Republican Guard divisions that sustain Mr. Hussein's regime. That campaign, focused on military targets, should continue until he relents on inspections. In addition, Iraq's generals must be reminded by our actions -- again and again, if necessary -- that their forces will pay a terrible price when Mr. Hussein takes on the United States and the United Nations. This not only would weaken the regime, but it may also eventually induce the Iraqi army to remove this man, who imposes such awful sacrifices on his own people even as he builds new palaces for himself.

Surely, we know now that force is the only thing Mr. Hussein understands. We have known since 1990 that faint-heartedness disguised as reasonableness in dealing with him is an invitation to further depredations.

If Mr. Hussein fails to reverse course on inspections within a few days, the United States must act, and it must deliver a message understandable not just by him, but by his army. Insistence upon full compliance with all United Nations resolutions and enforcement of those resolutions is the only acceptable path. The alternative is a megalomaniac with weapons of mass destruction.

Robert M. Gates was Director of Central Intelligence from 1991 to 1993.

BUSINESS WEEK

Nov. 24, 1997

A RETREAT ON TROOP CUTS?

-- A congressional commission asked to analyze U.S. troop needs 20 years out may soon wave the white flag. The commission was set up because the Pentagon can't afford to maintain a modern 1.5 million-member force. But the panel is balking at cutbacks, saying it can't predict what the military's needs might be in two decades.

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

WASHINGTON POST

Nov. 14, 1997

Lally Weymouth

Same Old Saddam

In 1981 I traveled to Baghdad to conduct a rare interview with Saddam Hussein. I was fully briefed ahead of time by U.S. officials, who told me they believed that Saddam had become a member of the so-called "moderate" Arab world. I should expect, U.S. officials said, to find a ruler who resembled King Hussein of Jordan instead of the tyrant who had ruled over Iraq.

In his palace, I sat face to face with Saddam, who informed me he had just signed a five-year agreement, which included heavy arms purchases, with the Soviet Union. In a lengthy interview, he proceeded to extol the virtues of the Soviet Union but had little that was friendly to say about the West. The experts were entirely wrong in their expectations.

In July 1990 the Middle East expert Bernard Lewis called me and said he believed that Saddam might soon invade Kuwait. I called some high-level sources in the State Department to check out the tip, and they explained that things were going well with Saddam. There was no threat of invasion. Three weeks later Iraq invaded Kuwait.

These personal experiences are of interest for one reason only—they show that Saddam has not changed in years, no matter what people might want to think of him: He remains the same bully today as he was back in '84—a ruthless tyrant who has ceaselessly terrorized his people. There is no secret to dealing with him: The only language he understands is the use of force.

Thus it's hard to understand why the Clinton administration believes that a U.N. resolution that merely bans the travel of Iraqi military officers and civilian personnel who have been involved in keeping American UNSCOM arms inspectors from entering key sites stands the slightest chance of forcing Saddam to mend his ways. At best this resolution might be a minor inconvenience for a man who has himself traveled outside of his country only once. After all, Saddam is playing a long-term game for big stakes: money and power.

Indeed, if the Clinton administration rests content with this feeble resolution, then Saddam Hussein has gained by his recent provocative action—threatening to expel American members of the UNSCOM team. Worse still, even if Saddam backs down and allows the American inspectors to remain in Iraq and act in concert with the UNSCOM team, U.S. officials admit that there is a lot of

pressure on Washington to reward him for compliance.

Behind the scenes, French and Russian diplomats are suggesting to Washington that Saddam receive incentives to induce him to back down—to give him what they describe as "a light at the end of the tunnel." There are two key ideas as to how to reward Saddam: (1) create a timetable for ending sanctions or (2) come to an agreement to close out some of UNSCOM's investigative files on missiles or other weapons of mass destruction.

The United States must hold the line and not reward Saddam for agreeing to abide by U.N. resolutions. But one American official bleakly admits that if Saddam backs down, members of the Security Council are favorable to moving on to what they describe as the next phase: lifting certain economic sanctions and watering down the long-term monitoring regime that has been in place for almost six years and has helped prevent Saddam from building weapons of mass destruction.

Under one proposal, UNSCOM would—in the future—enter Iraq every 60 days instead of having a headquarters in Baghdad and conducting inspections at will. Under such a new regime, U-2 flights would take place every other week, whereas they now are made at least every week and often more frequently.

Thus, in essence, Saddam would have succeeded in breaking out of the sanctions regime. Then the Iraqi leader would be free to build weapons of mass destruction. He still has the base and know-how to make biological weapons, and Baghdad is known to possess chemical weapons. At least one senior Israeli official believes that Iraq could get a nuclear bomb before Iran.

A worried UNSCOM official notes that the Iraqis conducted a lot of research and development between 1988 and 1990 in chemical weapons: They produced massive amounts of VX—a sophisticated nerve agent with a long shelf life because they manufactured it in a binary form. Then, too, the Iraqis have a better technical base to build missiles than the Iranians. If the inspection regime is downgraded, the international monitoring capability will become as ineffective as were the inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency before the Gulf War, which failed to discover the Iraqi nuclear program.

The result will be that biological weap-

Pg. 27

ons will be back in Iraqi hands in significant amounts in months. In one to two years, Baghdad will possess long-range missiles capable of reaching Tehran and Tel Aviv. David Kaye, an expert on Iraq, predicts that in two to five years, Saddam will be producing missiles capable of reaching Europe.

The result, in all likelihood, will be accommodation on the part of Saudi Arabia and other countries surrounding Iraq. Our Gulf allies have decided in the post Gulf War era that they have no choice but to live with Saddam. Although the Bush administration won a brilliant victory, it did not succeed in removing Saddam or destroying his weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam's stockpiles of offensive biological weapons were disclosed after the defection in August 1995 of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law. Among other things, he revealed an extensive biological weapons program.

Recently UNSCOM has found its inspectors having increasing problems in Iraq. The UNSCOM report cites what it terms "multiple delays and violations" during inspections in June and September 1997. Then, on Oct. 29, Saddam threatened to expel U.S. members of UNSCOM teams. This was widely regarded as the beginning of the end of UNSCOM.

President Clinton would be wise to learn something from President Reagan's strike against Libya. Now the use of massive military force is the only course available to the Clinton administration. This must entail massive air strikes against meaningful targets—including Saddam's security force headquarters and perhaps some of the palaces he has built for himself. Moreover, a long-term plan to get rid of Saddam and support the Iraqi opposition is needed.

For the moment, Saddam has lost his fear of the United States. He believes that America won't act unilaterally and will not strike heavily at Iraq. Let's hope his gamble doesn't turn out to be correct.

WASHINGTON POST

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 26

For the Record

From a prepared statement by James A. Baker III before the Senate Committee on the Budget Wednesday:

As secretary of state from 1989 to 1992, I see NATO enlargement as a logical if overdue extension of the Bush administration's outreach to the former Warsaw Pact countries embodied by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

And as a private citizen still keenly interested in foreign policy, I view en-

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

largement as an historic opportunity to advance America's interests and values in Europe.

Let me begin with three short propositions: (1) Enlarging NATO is good for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; (2) It is good for our allies in Western Europe; (3) And, most importantly, it is good for the United States.

From the point of view of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO membership confers important advantage.

es. Most obviously, it protects them from foreign aggression. True, these countries today do not confront any direct external threat. But such a threat, notably from a resurgent Russian, may arise in the future.

... In a real sense, NATO membership represents an insurance policy for the countries of Central Europe—one that can be acquired today at far lower financial and political cost than later.

But NATO membership represents

much more than a security guarantee for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It also serves an important political function. Opponents to NATO enlargement consistently ignore the decisive political role that the alliance has played from the very beginning. NATO was instrumental, for instance, in the emergence of a prosperous, democratic Germany at peace with her neighbors.

NATO can play a similar role in Central Europe.

Bulgarian government is not selling arms to Iraq

WASHINGTON

TIMES

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 22

Your Nov. 11 article "Iraq set to buy anti-stealth radar systems" contains allegations and inaccuracies that may tarnish the good name and reputation of the Republic of Bulgaria.

I would particularly like to draw your attention to the fact that Gen. Petar Barbalov, repeatedly named in the article as the mastermind of the illegal deal, has never been Bulgaria's ambassador to Iraq—or to any other country, for that matter. He has never held a diplomatic post in a Bulgarian mission abroad.

The Republic of Bulgaria has attained remarkable progress in its

political, economic and financial stabilization, in its observance of human rights and in rejoining the community of civilized nations. The country's bids for membership in NATO and the European Union are further evidence of the government's commitment to democracy and reform.

The Bulgarian Cabinet has stood firmly by all measures imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations. It has not licensed any sales or re-export of military and dual-use equipment and technologies to Iraq and has cooperated fully with the U.S. government in that regard. American officials have repeatedly

expressed their general satisfaction with the efforts of the Republic of Bulgaria for the establishment and functioning of an effective exports-control system.

The Washington Times' coverage of Bulgaria has helped keep the American public informed of these positive developments and of the good news coming from my country. It is indeed my hope that this would continue to be the case.

SNEZHANA BOTUSHAROVA

Ambassador

Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria
Washington

Editor's Note: The article referred to appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, November 12, 1997, Pg. 15.

WASHINGTON POST

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 30

DIPLOMATIC DISPATCHES

From Almost Ambassador to Svengali?

By Nora Boustany

Washington Post Foreign Service

How to catch... an ambassador? The nomination of Jovan Zametica to head Bosnia's diplomatic mission here appears to have gone down in flames. The diminutive and poker-faced man, born to a Serb father and a Muslim mother, was nominated as the result of a delicate parcelling out of ambassadorships among Bosnia's Muslim, Serb and Croat communities. But instead he probably will go down in history as the Svengali to Bosnia's most wanted war criminals. According to U.N. officials, he counseled Radovan Karadzic, the political leader of Bosnia's Serbs during the 1992-95 war, through some of his darkest chapters.

Karadzic has been indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide. Surprise: The suggestion that Zametica should become ambassador here drew fire from senior politicians at home and from State Department officials, according to Bosnia's deputy chief of mission, Malik Skaljic.

"It was an option. Now it is no longer an option," Skaljic said with strained passivity.

Worse than that, Zametica was denounced in a letter addressed to him by one of his former professors at the London School of Economics and circulated on the Internet, Skaljic added. The letter bears the signature of Donald Cameron Watt, professor emeritus of international history at the London graduate school. It blasts Zametica and tells him never to return to the university, according to Bosnian diplomats here who provided a copy of it yesterday.

"We did not teach you to preach hatred for your neighbors as a basis for unity among Serbs; to enlist their guilt and horror at the crimes they have committed to be a bond between them; to tell blatant lies openly and in the knowledge that your very audience will know them to be lies," the letter says. "You can look forward to years of contempt and loathing. Stay where you are and rot in the realization of what you have become. But do not, repeat not, expect to us to forget or welcome you. Do not come back."

Never giving up the clipped British accent refined at illustrious academic establishments such as

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

Oxford and the London School, Zametica slipped into Bosnia as a British journalist during the war and stayed there. His family is believed to hail from Banja Luka, the largest city in the Serb-held part of Bosnia.

According to U.N. sources, Zametica served as adviser to Karadzic during the kidnapping of hundreds of U.N. peacekeeping troops by the Serbs in 1994 and during the Serbs' 1995 takeover of the U.N. "safe area" of Srebrenica, which was followed by the execution of up to 7,000 Muslims. The Muslim community in eastern Bosnia, which once made up more than 70 percent of the population there, has been reduced to nearly none.

Outgoing ambassador Sven Alkalaj, a Bosnian Jew, is expected back in Washington this weekend after consultations at home.

A Czech Yes for NATO

Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus made it plain

during a luncheon with Washington Post editors and reporters Monday that there will be no referendum at home on his government's now formally submitted bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He said, however: "We are in favor of a referendum for joining the European Union, because it is a sovereignty issue." A referendum on NATO membership, he explained, would trigger "unnecessary destabilizing debates by the Communist Party and rightwing nationalists."

An economist who served as the last finance minister of Czechoslovakia before it split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Klaus said it is going to be difficult to "slow down an overheated economy in a country that is in the catching-up process" to achieve parity in purchasing power with its West European neighbors.

Ms. Lister goes to war

WASHINGTON TIMES

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 22

"I have only two men out of my company and 20 out of some other company. We need support, but it is almost suicide to try to get it here as we are swept by machine gun fire and a constant barrage is on us. I have no one my left and only a few on my right. I will hold."

So said First Marine Lt. Clifton Cates in a desperate World War I battle near the French town of Soissons. And so the Allies held. The Germans had a word for Marines like that. An entire Marine Brigade earned the epithet *Teufelhunde* or "Devil Dogs" at the Battle of Belleau Wood. What greater honor for the Marines than the enmity of a foe?

It will therefore please the Marines to learn that they have earned the loathing of a brand new foe, one right here at home. This newspaper's Rowan Scarborough reports Sara Lister, the Army's top personnel official, recently belittled the Corps as "extremists" who are a "little dangerous."

"I think the Army is much more connected to society than the Marines are," she told an Oct. 26 seminar. "The Marines are extremists. Wherever you have extremists, you've got some risks of total disconnection with society. And that's a little dangerous." She went on to complain about their "checkerboard fancy uniforms and stuff."

The Army subsequently issued a statement defending Ms. Lister's comments as an "honest, intellectual exchange of ideas" and accused Mr. Scarborough, who obtained a tape of her remarks, of taking them out of context. What she meant, the

statement said, is that the Marines have a "unique" relationship with society. This kind of socio-babble doesn't quite do justice to the sacrifice made over the years by Marines now buried under plain white crosses and Stars of David in cemeteries far from home.

Ms. Lister is put out with the Marines because they have pointedly refused to take part in the social-engineering experiment she is running on the Army these days. As long as you don't fight anybody, there's no problem. But the Marines aren't willing to take any chances, and by Ms. Lister's standards, that makes them "extremists."

Still, it could have been worse. Ms. Lister might actually have praised the Marines. What greater insult could there be to a military unit? What greater commendation than her criticism? The Marines should wear it like a badge of honor.

It would not be the first time, by the way, that U.S. military officials have gotten something less than appreciation from Mr. Clinton and his administration. Readers may recall the lengths to which a young Mr. Clinton went to avoid serving in Vietnam, so great was his "loathing" of the military.

Ms. Lister's comments are all of a piece with an administration whose loathing for things military has shown through since Day 1. Ms. Lister should resign promptly, the better to find someone with a greater appreciation for what makes the military genuinely unique — a willingness to lay down its lives in the defense of the country.

NEW YORK TIMES

Nov. 12, 1997

Pg. 34

A Reckless Demand

To the Editor:

Thomas L. Friedman's clever "Head Shot" (column, Nov. 6), about the desirability of a shot to the head of Saddam Hussein, points up the drawback of reading columnists who were still in short pants when the most recent assassination of an

American President occurred.

There was much talk, and some action, in the early 1960's about taking out Fidel Castro. What it may have contributed to, through the impressionable mind of one pathetic Castro supporter, was the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Have we learned nothing since Nov. 22, 1963?

Yes, Saddam Hussein is a bad man. International politics is full of bad men. But there is still a law against murder. STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN
New York, Nov. 7, 1997

Editor's Note: The column referred to appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, Nov. 6, 1997, Pg. 14.

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 3

Between Iraq & a hard place

WASHINGTON — Knock off Saddam Hussein? It's an attractive slogan, but it has two drawbacks: We might fail. We might succeed.

Failure would make the United States seem like an ineffectual bully and enhance Saddam's stature in the Middle East.

But success would be even worse: Killing Saddam Hussein risks creating turmoil inside Iraq and the kind of vacuum that would leave terror-sponsoring Iran as the unchallenged power in the Persian Gulf.

This dilemma accounts for the timidity in responding to Iraq's latest defiance of world demands to surrender its stock of nuclear and chemical weapons.

President Clinton has an additional problem: He must lead the rest of the world against Iraq while preventing the dispute from becoming a U.S.-Iraqi quarrel that other nations can watch from a distance.

So far the United Nations has backed him — apart from threatening the use of force. But force in this situation is especially dangerous.

"It's in U.S. interests to preserve Iraq as an intact state," says former George Bush aide Richard Haass of the Brookings Institution. "We don't want to obliterate Iraq and turn it into another Lebanon, a battlefield for Syria, the Kurds, Turkey and Iran."

And it is not possible to bomb the immediate cause of the current crisis: Iraq's stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

First, we don't know where they are. Second, bombing risks releasing deadly poisons, like anthrax bacilli, into the air.

LARS-ERIK NELSON

"Anthrax is notoriously resilient," says Dorothy Preslar, an expert on chemical and biological warfare for the Federation of American Scientists. "It can survive in the soil for years. The heat from an explosion could possibly burn it all out, but if it escapes into the atmosphere, the spores rise with the dust and the wind could carry them anywhere. I'm not sure I would take the risk of putting a weapon into a biological warfare facility."

Haass believes any air raids against Iraq should be confined to military bases and hardware, to pressure Saddam into backing down. "We can't use force to solve the problem of weapons of mass destruction," he said.

Sweden's Rolf Ekeus, who spent five years tracking Iraq's hidden weapons stockpiles, believes that Saddam — despite the apparent madness of taking on the entire world — is basically rational.

"His primary aim for keeping these weapons is that he sees himself as a gatekeeper against Iran," said Ekeus, now the Swedish ambassador to the U.S.

"But Iran would overwhelm him in any renewed war. It has not suffered so badly from a strict regime of arms embargoes. This is why he is pursuing these weapons of mass destruction. They could be the great equalizer."

"Saddam can be made to back down," Ekeus said. "He has backed down before. He has to understand that if he does the right thing, there will be a lifting of the economic sanctions. But at the moment, he sees this in grand strategic terms, like a Napoleon, and he is prepared to see his people suffer."

Why do U.S. allies of the 1991 Gulf War seem so reluctant this time? Arab nations that are most threatened by Iraq's stockpiles of anthrax, botulism and nerve gas have two bigger grievances: failure of the Israeli-Arab peace talks and fears of Iran.

Russia wants Iraq to resume oil sales so Iraq can repay its debts to Moscow. France sees the prospect of profits from Iraq's potential oil sales of \$60 million a day. China sees Iraq as a potentially wealthy weapons customer.

Given these conflicting motives, Clinton has not done badly in holding the alliance together.

"U.S. leadership is essential," Ekeus said. "But there is not total agreement on the tactics for solving this. It demands some diplomatic footwork."

BALTIMORE SUN

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 18

Provocations by Iraq

■ **U.S. goals:** Prevent mass weapons, keep world together, isolate dictator.

SADDAM HUSSEIN keeps his eye on the prize, looks for opportunities, forgets nothing and maintains endless patience. The United States, and the United Nations, should do no less.

He apparently wants to maintain Iraq's core ability to produce disease and nerve gas and missiles capable of transporting them hundreds or thousands of miles. The U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with dismantling such capabilities suspects so and is unable to recommend an end to its mission.

Saddam's objective also includes isolating

the U.S. from allies and from moderate Islamic states and driving wedges between them. And he wants to restore Iraq's sovereign right to sell as much oil as world markets will absorb. Thus, he was quick to note the desire of France and Russia to participate in joint oil ventures.

The opposition of France, Russia, China and Egypt to minor ratchets of the sanctions emboldened Iraq's tyrant to throw U.S. personnel of UNSCOM out of his country. This has closed the operation and put Iraq in rogue-state status. UNSCOM has asked the U.S. to continue flying U-2 spy plane flights. If Saddam Hussein makes good his threat to shoot at U-2 planes, U.S. planes will respond.

The time is past when the U.S. alone can dictate U.N. policy on Iraq. The U.S. is no longer paying dues, maintaining forces or otherwise behaving as the world's policeman. U.S. willingness to dilute Wednesday's Security Council resolution in order to keep the coalition alive

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

was proper. This country should not allow itself to be outsmarted by Saddam Hussein.

UNSCOM showed solidarity with its U.S. personnel. The challenge to the Security Coun-

cil is to get UNSCOM back on the job inside Iraq. The U.S. must show the patience of a great power. The object of the exercise is to isolate Iraq, not the U.S.

DEFENSE DAILY

November 14, 1997

Pg. 4

AF SPACE UNITS MAKE MAJOR COMMAND AND CONTROL CHANGES

By Tom Breen

In a big step toward its oft-stated goal of creating a powerful air and space force, the U.S. Air Force today will place all space command and control functions under one umbrella.

Command and control refers to the way the actions of troops and equipment are coordinated. "All of our space units have done great work, but the work has not been done in an integrated way as we make the transition to an air and space force," Air Force Maj. Gen. Gerald Perryman, the head of the 14th Air Force, told sister publication *Space Business News* in a telephone interview.

Previously, space command and control functions had been decentralized, with information flowing from space units at Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., and from other staff and wing command posts under the U.S. and Air Force Space commands at Colorado Springs, Colo.

All space information now will flow through a new operations center at the 14th Air Force's headquarters at Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

As commander, Perryman said he will issue commands to all space forces through a Space Tasking Order (STO), a process recently developed during a space exercise called Guardian Tiger. The STO will be similar to the Air Tasking Order that was used to control command and control assets during the Persian Gulf War. "One of the things that I am seeking to do is to make certain that the space tasking order provides all the space information that the theater commands need," Perryman said. He added that a vital part of his job in the next few months will be to plan for possible attacks on U.S. military and commercial space systems and their ground stations.

New system keeps close track of U.S. military trucks, trains

By RICH ROESLER

Stripes Taegu Bureau Chief

SEOUL — Using equipment designed for commercial trucking companies, U.S. forces in South Korea are experimenting with a high-tech way to communicate with military trains, convoys and individual vehicles.

On the rigs, it looks like a laptop computer connected to a domed satellite transmitter the size of a dinner plate. Called the "movement tracking system," it allows soldiers to transmit their status directly to command centers and other vehicles. The messages resemble e-mail.

The satellites also pinpoint the vehicle's position on a computer map at a command post — a valuable thing in an Army

or Korean phone cards and a pay phone.

"Radios don't work as well, because you've got to be in close proximity, especially with the (mountainous) terrain we've got here," said Maj. Brian Clark, with U.S. Forces Korea's transportation division. "It'd be nice to know when that bridge goes down or when that tunnel closes."

He said the cost ranges from \$3,500 to \$5,000 per vehicle. The system also includes a "panic button," so vehicles can send a top-priority signal if they're gassed or wounded.

Another unexpected test of the system happened during a recent military exercise, when

where, as an old joke has it, the most dangerous thing is a second lieutenant with a map.

The Army's 25th Transportation Battalion started trials with the gear about three weeks ago. Battalion officials say it quickly proved its worth.

"You immediately know at all times where everyone is," said Staff Sgt. Kelli Blair, who works with the system.

When an Army truck flipped over in a rice paddy recently, for example, the driver suffered a gash on his head. The vehicle behind it quickly beamed out a call for help, its location and medical information on the injured soldier.

Without the system, someone would have needed a cell phone

an extended hydraulic arm on a military train flatbed car slammed into a train tunnel. Within minutes, soldiers on the train transmitted their coordinates and the name of the tunnel. In the command center, officials immediately dispatched a crane, diverted other trains and told the GIs to photograph the damage.

The system also kept the stranded troops' spirits up as they waited for help.

"We damn sure don't want to spend Foal Eagle (exercise) on a train," read one message from the train, "but if we do, send newspapers and care packages to Train 3, care of Jak Won Gwang Bridge."

PACIFIC STARS
& STRIPES

Nov. 15, 1997

Pg. 1/3.

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

BANGOR (ME) DAILY NEWS

Nov. 11, 1997

Cohen's yesterdays bump up against today

By John S. Day

Bill Cohen, the Republican Yankee in Bill Clinton's Democratic Court, often must reconcile his 24 years in Congress with the realities of his current post as Secretary of Defense.

Sometimes the contradictions jump out at you.

Cohen, a staunch opponent of the congressional base-closing mechanism during the years when that process threatened Maine military installations, on Monday called for two new rounds of shutdowns. The proposal is part of a streamlining plan Cohen said could trim as much as \$ 6 billion annually from the Pentagon budget.

It goes without saying that his former colleagues in Maine's congressional delegation will fight the proposed base-closing plan, to paraphrase the words of Sir Winston Churchill, "on the seas and oceans in the air and in the streets."

As a U.S. senator, Cohen was skeptical of presidential free trade agreements. He beat up on Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George Bush for selling out Maine's shoe and textile industries to offshore competitors. That's water over the dam now. As a member of the Clinton Cabinet, Cohen reportedly lobbied Sen. Susan Collins, who once worked as his staffer, to vote for the "fast track" resolution that would permit the White House to expand NAFTA to as many as 26 other nations without congressional meddling.

During last fall's campaign, Collins said she would have voted for NAFTA had she been a member of Senate when the original treaty came before Congress. Collins' Maine political base is anchored in Aroostook County, however, where anti-NAFTA sentiment is strongest because of competition from subsidized Canadian potato farmers.

The political hit to Collins may be long forgotten by the time she runs for re-election in

the year 2002. That's because Clinton pulled fast track rather than face a defeat in the House. Should the economy of northern Maine continue to take hits from Canada, Collins' decision to back NAFTA fast track will likely be used by potential challengers. Reps. John Baldacci or Tom Allen as a shoe horn to separate Aroostook County voters from their hometown senator.

Many of the endearing aspects of Sen. William S. Cohen remain on display at the Pentagon. Cohen was a strong backer of military action against Saddam Hussein during the period when many Democrats, including former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, wanted to settle for economic sanctions. Cohen remains the administration's strongest advocate for not letting up on Iraq. At Monday's press conference he warned Saddam it would be a "big mistake" to shoot down the U-2 spy plane used by the U.N. to track Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War disarmament sanctions.

During his Senate years Cohen submerged himself in intelligence issues and wrote spy novels in his spare time. Last week the defense secretary engineered a coup reminiscent of Tom Clancy's best seller, "The Hunt for Red October." In Clancy's book the U.S. Navy teamed up with a defecting

Russian captain to gain possession of the former U.S.S.R.'s most modern nuclear submarine thanks to the efforts of Jack Ryan, a brilliant CIA operative. Cohen, who turned down the job of CIA director and is physically fit enough to play the role of Jack Ryan, spirited 21 of Russia's advanced MiG-29 jet fighters out from under the noses of Iranian government buyers.

The MiGs, which were said to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, had been mothballed by the government of Moldova after the breakup of the Soviet empire. Moldova is nestled between the Ukraine and Romania and can no longer afford to maintain an air force. Cohen did not disclose how much the Pentagon paid for the MiG-29s, but told reporters, "It seems to me it is in our interest to see that [such dangerous airplanes] don't fall into [Iranian] hands."

Many of Bill Cohen's yesterdays are evidenced in the \$ 6 billion Pentagon streamlining budget plan. While in Congress, Cohen was one of the most persistent critics of Pentagon wasteful spending. It was his legislation that compelled the Navy to more widely employ competitive bidding in its shipbuilding program.

Through Senate hearings, Cohen focused public attention on the massive inefficiencies in the Pentagon bureaucracy,

which included outmoded computers, a sinkhole of paperwork and procurement absurdities like the \$ 1,600 hammer and \$ 600 toilet that became the staple of military-waste critics.

For nearly a year Bill Cohen has lived in the belly of the Pentagon bureaucratic beast. His \$ 6 billion streamlining plan will eliminate 30,000 of the Defense Department's 140,000 headquarters jobs. Large cost savings would come from authorizing the private sector to compete with government employees for many routine administrative functions.

Cohen said the plan would enable the Pentagon to operate as efficiently as a corporation. The secretary faces an uphill fight, though. Large bureaucracies traditionally resist change.

That was evident in a Pentagon press release about Cohen's presentation of the "Hammer Award," a trophy given to government workers who come up with tax-dollar-saving ideas. A DOD press release explained, "The award symbolizes the dramatic change in acquisition and development practices from the days when the government paid a bit more for hammers."

"A bit more?"

Admit it, guys.

You forked out \$ 1,600 for that damn hammer.

PACIFIC STARS & STRIPES Nov. 15, 1997 Pg. 4

Arizona woman picked to head DACOWITS

Stripes Seoul Bureau

SEOUL — Elizabeth Bilby has been named chairwoman of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services effective Jan. 1.

A statement issued by the Defense Department said Bilby was appointed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to suc-

ceed Judith Youngman in the nonsalaried, one-year assignment. Bilby is president of L&C Gourmet Products Inc. and is on the board of the Tucson (Ariz.) Airport Authority, the National Alumni Board of Directors of the University of Arizona and is a member of the Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Technical Adviso-

ry Committee, the statement said.

She also has served as DACOWITS vice chairwoman since last January and previously served on the organization's Forces Development and Utilization Subcommittee.

DACOWITS was established in 1951 to advise the secretary of defense on policies and matters relating to women in the armed forces, the statement said. It consists of 30 to 40 civilian members selected for their achievements in business, professional fields and civic service and by geographic location.

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

DEFENSE DAILY

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 3

SENATE ACTS ON DOD NOMINEES, INCLUDING GANSLER

As Congress nears adjournment for the year, the Senate has confirmed several important DoD nominations, including that of Jacques Gansler as under secretary of defense for acquisition and technology.

Gansler replaces Paul Kaminski as Pentagon acquisition czar.

The Senate also has confirmed the three candidates for service under secretary positions: Robert Walker as under secretary of the Army; Jerry Hultin as under secretary of the Navy; and Whitten Peters as under secretary of the Air Force.

But some DoD nominees will have to wait for confirmation until Congress returns next year. The Senate Armed Services Committee has not held a confirmation hearing for Daryl Jones, a Florida state senator, as secretary of the Air Force. The committee has also not scheduled a hearing on the nomination of Paul Hooper, a DoD under secretary, for Army acquisition chief.

Peters, who was sworn in yesterday as Air Force under secretary, will act as secretary until a candidate is confirmed, an Air Force spokesman said.

Kenneth Oscar is acting as Army acquisition executive.

Skelton calls for more military supportKANSAS CITY STAR
Nov. 12, 1997 Pg.15By RASHEEDA CRAYTON,
Staff Writer

The U.S. military needs more money and public support to be prepared for a sudden crisis, such as the one the country faces now with Iraq, U.S. Rep. Ike Skelton said Tuesday night.

"Because of the perception that military threats have been all but eliminated, the area of defense is often the first place budget cutters look," said Skelton, who spoke to the Business Executives for National Security at the Kansas City Marriott Downtown.

"If our nation, as the world's only superpower, chooses to go without a strong

military, we are inviting global instability and conflict," said the Missouri Democrat. "As Harry S. Truman said: 'We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price for war.'"

Skelton said before the dinner that Iraq's refusal to let U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq check facilities shows the importance of a strong military.

"Saddam Hussein is not following the rules," said Skelton.

"You have to hit Saddam very hard.

If you don't hit him hard, he won't stop. They don't understand talk."

He added that some other countries have not been supportive enough of America's tough stance.

"Russia, France are not as helpful as they should be," Skelton said. "If they crawlfish on us, we may just have to go in there alone."

One reason people are willing to cut corners on defense is because people have less contact with the military, Skelton said.

"I have detected a growing cultural gap between military and civilian America," Skelton said. "Fewer people today have direct contact with the military. I can tell you that as fewer sons and daughters wear

the uniforms of our country, members of Congress receive less encouragement from voters in their districts to support a substantial military for our nation."

To improve the country's military forces, Skelton suggests that veterans, active-duty military members and Congress work harder at exposing the public to the day-to-day importance of the armed forces.

"It is time for the nation to develop a mature and sensible relationship of trust and solidarity with our military - to close the civilian-military gap," Skelton said. "In truth, our national security depends on it."

BALTIMORE SUN Nov. 14, 1997 Pg. 1

**My Lai still causes
Army to flinch,
delaying a medal****Soldier's effort to stop
'68 massacre brings
painful recognition**By TOM BOWMAN
SUN NATIONAL STAFF

WASHINGTON — On the morning of March 16, 1968, Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson Jr. skipped his helicopter along the tree line in Vietnam's Quang Ngai province and saw a hellish scene below: a massacre at a village called My Lai.

Thompson set down his chopper, angrily confronted

a fellow American soldier and saved more than a dozen villagers cowering in a bunker. He then plucked an injured child from a body-filled trench before heading back to headquarters. Throwing down his helmet, he told commanders what he saw. They ordered a cease-fire, and the killing ended.

Now, nearly 30 years later, an effort to finally recognize Thompson's heroics is being stalled by Army politics. Approved for the Soldier's Medal in August 1996 — thanks largely to a nine-year effort by a Clemson University pro-

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

fessor — Thompson has not yet received the decoration or even been officially notified by the Army that it has been granted.

Amid this unusually long delay, Army officials are debating whether to award the medal in a private or public setting. Some argue a public ceremony would rekindle interest in one of the Army's most sordid episodes, sources said. "It's really disappointing," said one Defense Department official involved in the effort to approve the decoration. "The whole intent was to present a medal to a guy who was truly a hero."

Said Lt. Col. Peter Dagnes, an aide to Assistant Army Secretary Sara E. Lister, the top personnel official: "The award was approved and the Army is just trying to figure out how to make a presentation." But Dagnes could not explain why nearly 15 months later Thompson has yet to be notified of the award.

Lt. Col. Bill Harkey, an Army spokesman, could not explain the delay either. But he dismissed the notion that it resulted from a dispute over whether Thompson should be given the award publicly or privately. "We're just trying to come up with a proper location," he said.

The setting doesn't matter, he said, since any ceremony would dredge up memories of the My Lai atrocities.

Thompson's efforts are not in dispute. W. R. Peers, a three-star Army general who spearheaded the official inquiry at My Lai in 1969, later wrote of Thompson: "He was the only American who cared enough to take action to protect the Vietnamese noncombatants. ... If there was a hero at My Lai, he was it."

Those who have championed Thompson's cause are dumbfounded that the Army would not want to publicize his actions, accounts of which have been woven into cadet ethics courses at the U.S. Air Force Academy and in a mock My Lai trial at West Point.

"If the Army had any sense they'd call attention to it," said retired Army Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., a decorated Vietnam veteran and syndicated columnist who has written about Thompson.

Thompson, now an official with the Department of Veterans Af-

fairs in Louisiana, was traveling and could not be reached. But Larry Colburn, who was his 18-year-old door gunner that morning, vividly recalls that day.

Flying a reconnaissance mission on a clear March morning with Thompson and Glenn Andreotta, another crew member from Chicago, Colburn suddenly saw the trench full of bodies.

"I think we were all shocked to see that many kids and women and old men," said Colburn, now a manager for a medical supply company in Atlanta, "and not see any [arms] fire, no captured weapons."

Thompson set down his chopper and approached the more senior Lt. William L. Calley. He got into a bitter argument with Calley about what was occurring, according to "Four Hours in My Lai," a 1992 book by Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim. Calley would become the only soldier convicted at My Lai.

Taking off again, the crew soon saw other soldiers running toward a bunker where villagers had fled. "I remember he [Thompson] said, 'This is not right, what's going on here,'" recalled Colburn. Thompson set down the helicopter.

"He said, 'If they fire on those people, shoot them,'" Colburn remembered. "He wanted me to cover him." After telling another officer not to fire at the civilians, the muscular 25-year-old Georgia native walked to the bunker, as a dozen U.S. soldiers stood by.

"I remember thinking to myself, 'He's crazy. He could die right here.' Then [the villagers] all came out of there like he's their cousin," Colburn said.

Climbing back into his chopper, Thompson hovered above the irrigation ditch, dropping down once more to pick up a toddler, who was covered in blood and slime but not seriously hurt. By now, Thompson was overcome. "He was in tears," said Colburn.

Colburn is not surprised that the Army seems reluctant to publicly celebrate Thompson for his actions.

Both men testified in court-martial against the soldiers charged with complicity in My Lai, and at Pentagon and congressional investigations. "We're not popular," said Colburn. "The Army doesn't admit mistakes."

"For the past 30 years no one has wanted to admit that actually happened," Colburn continued. "A lot of Europeans have done docu-

mentaries. They've shown more interest than the United States."

It was in 1988, while watching a My Lai documentary produced by the British Broadcasting Corp. on the 20th anniversary, that David Egan, a professor emeritus of architecture at Clemson, heard the story of Thompson and his crew.

Egan remembers thinking: "Wow, this guy really did something extraordinarily brave. When he came home, did he get a pat on the back?"

He found that Thompson had been awarded a lesser decoration, the Distinguished Flying Cross, for his actions. That medal recognizes "heroism or extraordinary achievement in aerial flight," but fails to reflect the risks Thompson took that day.

Although he never spoke with Thompson until years later, Egan wrote more than a hundred letters to officials pressing for a higher award for him.

"I thought it was something that ought to be done," said Egan, a former Army officer who served in France during the early 1960s. "I kind of felt each time I did something it would be the end."

His efforts paid off last year, when the Army agreed to award Thompson the more coveted Soldier's Medal, for heroism and risking his life. The citation — which Egan obtained unofficially — says Thompson not only personally saved lives but led commanders to order a cease-fire.

Egan is also pushing for a Meritorious Service Medal for Colburn, along with a posthumous one for Andreotta, who was killed in Vietnam a month later. "I don't know anything about those," said Harkey, the Army spokesman.

WASHINGTON TIMES

Nov. 14, 1997 Pg. 10

Inside Politics

Compiled by Greg Pierce

Sgt. Clinton

White House officials are getting a little nervous that it has been quite some time since President Clinton has been seen in the company of U.S. troops, either at a base here or overseas.

What with a crisis in Iraq that could involve U.S. firepower and a decision pending on keeping U.S. troops in Bosnia, Mr. Clinton will be exercising his commander-in-chief role several times this fall.

Thus, a visit with cameras capturing him chatting and laughing

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

with soldiers, sailors or airmen may be in the cards, particularly as the holidays approach.

"There may have to be something fairly soon," a White House official said.

Options are being studied, as they say.

NATO

The price of expansion

WASHINGTON, DC

In two articles, we look at the costs of NATO's expansion—the only thing which might block it—and Hungary's worries about joining

BY CHRISTMAS, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should have negotiated their way to NATO's front door. But they will not be able to enter unless each of the 16 countries already in the alliance ratifies the North Atlantic Treaty's revision. America's Senate could yet stymie enlargement; Jesse Helms, chairman of its Foreign Relations Committee, says he supports enlargement in principle, but only if Europeans are prepared to pay a fair share of the costs. European governments, however, have made it clear that they do not intend to fork out much extra. Stalemate and the failure of the alliance to widen to the east? Probably not.

The Euro-American row is about both the aggregate cost of enlargement and who pays what share. The Pentagon's position, explained in a document presented to Congress in February, splits the bill for enlargement into three. The first cost is that of improving current members' forces, to enable them to help new members in case of attack. This is a cost for West Europeans, says the Pentagon, since they, unlike the Americans, have not made much effort to make their troops and equipment more mobile. The second cost is that of modernising the forces of the East Europeans, and they should be responsible for that. The third is the direct cost to NATO's own budget of enabling forces to operate together and of investing in infrastructure that should fall to all NATO members, in line with current budget shares.

The Pentagon reckons that the total cost—spread roughly equally among the three categories—would be \$27 billion to \$35 billion over 12 years. America, says the Pentagon, should contribute to only the third part of the bill and would thus have to cough up just \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion.

Britain, France and Germany regard the Pentagon figures as ridiculously high. They complain that America is using NATO enlargement as an excuse to rehash old arguments about burden-sharing. They argue that, politically, they cannot increase their defence budgets. And militarily, since NATO was able to defend West Germany against the Warsaw Pact, protecting Poland in a much costlier climate should not require huge improvements to their forces.

In any event, Britain, France and Germany are already making their forces more mobile. Britain's current defence review is likely to lead to more spending on transport planes and ships for its rapid-reaction forces. Germany is putting money into its

THE ECONOMIST

Nov. 15-21, 1997 Pg. 51

crisis-reaction forces, an elite formation that will be trained to serve abroad. France's military reforms are creating an all-professional army with a longer reach.

The modernisation of new members' forces, the second element of the bill, is less contentious. Everyone agrees that most of this charge is for the East Europeans. As a NATO official puts it, entering the alliance is rather like joining a tennis club. Once a new member has paid his entry fee, he has to choose his own equipment. Hard-up members have to make do with old wooden racquets. Newcomers will have to replace Warsaw Pact arsenals with modern gear sooner or later, regardless of membership. But NATO itself—as opposed to western defence contractors—is not pressing them to buy high-tech weapons soon.

And there may not in the end be too much argument about the third cost, the impact on NATO's own budgets, which now add up to \$1.8 billion a year. Money will have to be spent on making the new members' forces compatible with the alliance's command, control and communication systems, and on sprucing up airfields, ports and so on. NATO's own studies, due out in December, suggest that an extra \$5 billion should be spent over ten years; divided among 19 countries, that would hardly strain defence budgets.

Some people in Mr Clinton's circle are starting to realise that the Pentagon's estimates, based on cold-war assumptions that Russia's armoured divisions could roll into Eastern Europe at breakneck speed, are both annoying the Europeans and making the Senate more reluctant to give its approval. "The Europeans may be right that we have overestimated," said William Cohen, the defence secretary, on October 22nd. The military infrastructures of the applicants are in much better shape than predicted, he added. Hungary, for example, can already handle NATO aircraft.

Still, the Europeans need to try harder to placate the Americans. Instead of saying, like Jacques Chirac, France's president, that they will not spend a centime on enlargement, Europeans should be telling the Senate how they are already improving their own rapid-reaction forces. One of Mr Helms's people says that, unless the Europeans are more persuasive, the Senate might put conditions on its approval of enlargement: for instance, by limiting America's financial contribution, or sticking a minimum figure on Europe's contribution.

If only Germany, for example, declared

that its crisis-reaction forces were certain to spring to Poland's defence, congressional opinion, says an American diplomat, would be swayed. But so far the Europeans have not found the right words.

Hungarian doubt

BUDAPEST

THE Hungarian government has been doing its damndest to make people vote Yes on November 16th in a referendum on whether their country should join NATO. Reassuring characters singing NATO's praises have been written into Hungary's leading television soap opera and a popular children's programme; a CD-ROM featuring a jolly game called Natopoly has been dished out to all secondary schools and public libraries; television and newspapers have been awash with pro-NATO documentaries and articles purporting to be the work of independent journalists but obviously sponsored by the government.

Yet the government has not had things all its own way. The main stick with which opponents of NATO membership have been beating the government is the cost of joining. On this, the ruling (ex-communist) Socialists have been shifty. Their propaganda emphasises that Hungary's annual contribution to the alliance's budget will be a modest \$11.7m—but ignores a promise to raise defence spending by 0.1% of GDP annually in the run-up to accession and possibly beyond. And the government has put off an awkward decision whether to buy new fighter planes from Sweden, France or America at a cost of up to \$1.5 billion.

Still, a No vote is pretty unlikely. Opinion polls suggest a solid majority in favour of joining. But the fear, for the government, is a decisively low turnout. At least a quarter of the electorate must say Yes to make a referendum valid. And a low turnout would do little to inspire wavering senators in America's Congress, who themselves have to vote to widen the alliance.

In theory, all the main parties in Hungary's parliament stand to be hurt by a lack of enthusiasm for joining. The antis, whom the polls put at between a fifth and a quarter of the voters, are a rum and leaderless bunch of extreme nationalists and former hardline communists, plus a pacifist group called the Alba Circle. But the main parties, though supposedly at one on NATO, are already busily rubbishising each other in advance of the vote.

The government says that the opposition, in the shape of the Smallholders' Party and Fidesz (a rather erratic centre-right group), have sown confusion among voters by calling for a second, unrelated, referendum on whether foreigners should be al-

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

lowed to own farmland (most Hungarians apparently think not). The opposition, in any event, says the government was foolish to hold a referendum at all. But it was back in 1994, when out of power, that the Socialists promised a referendum to pander to neutralist sentiment. The opposition has had fun, too, reminding voters of what

some members of the government said in their communist days of yore. The present defence minister once described NATO as "aggressive and militarist".

That is hardly likely to sway the voters, either this month or next summer, when a general election is due. The economy is do-

ing well. The opposition is divided. The government is riding high in the polls. At present, two things could hurt them: another corruption scandal; or a verdict on NATO that is embarrassingly grudging—let alone an outright No.

PACIFIC STARS & STRIPES

Nov. 15, 1997

Pg. 4

U.S. may sell missile system for ROK frigates

Stripes Tokyo Bureau

TOKYO — The Department of Defense has announced the possible sale of \$109 million in military equipment to South Korea and a \$287 million dollar

sale to Singapore.

The proposed sale to South Korea involves three MK-41 vertical launch missile systems as defense armament for new frigates. The Singapore sale involves services and support for

F-16C/D aircraft, 12 M-61A1 20 mm guns and related parts and supplies.

South Korea will require three contractor personnel for about 39 months to install the missile launchers.

WASHINGTON POST

Nov. 14, 1997

Pg. 36

Netanyahu Warns of Russia-Iran Tie

LONDON—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu told British legislators that Russia is still supplying Iran with ballistic-missile technology and that the Islamic republic is now only a year away from acquiring long-range nuclear missile capability.

"If the supply of Russian technology is not stopped, then within a year Iran would become self-sufficient and would be able to create those missiles on its own," he said during a meeting with members of the House of Commons.

The Israeli leader said the flow of Russian technology to Iran continues despite a direct appeal he made to President Boris Yeltsin, backed by a message from President Clinton. He said British Prime Minister Tony Blair has made a similar appeal to Yeltsin.

"It is very important that Russia receives appeals from all members of the international community, because we are all at risk," Netanyahu added. "The Iranians could fire a nuclear missile at will, at any of us."

—Reuters

At Presstime

Clinton vetoes bill to restore military projects

WASHINGTON, Nov 13 (Reuters) - President Clinton last night vetoed a bill that would have restored 38 items that he had cut out of a military construction bill earlier this year.

"I do not endorse restoration of all 38 projects," Clinton said in the veto message to Congress. He had used his line-item veto authority originally to strike the items from the construction bill.

"The projects in this bill would not substantially improve the quality of life of military service members and their families," Clinton said.

Clinton acknowledged some of the projects originally eliminated were

based on inaccurate data supplied by the Defense Department.

"The administration remains committed to working with the Congress to restore funding for those projects that were canceled as a result of data ... that was out of date," he said.

In passing the measure to restore funding, Republicans had criticized Clinton's use of his veto to strike the military projects, with Rep. Ron Packard, a California Republican, accusing the president of acting "carelessly and casually."

Expelled U.S. inspectors leave Iraq

KARAMEH, Jordan-Iraq Border, Nov 14 (Reuters) - Six American arms inspectors crossed into Jordan at dawn, just hours after authorities in Baghdad ordered them out of Iraq.

A Reuters correspondent said the in-

spectors entered a VIP lounge on the Jordanian side of the remote desert border post and then left for the Jordanian capital Amman.

They declined to speak to reporters.

Diplomats said one Briton and an Australian had travelled with the convoy of six U.S. weapons inspectors, who crossed into Jordan at around 0530 a.m., a little over 12 hours after Baghdad announced their immediate expulsion.

India minister dies in helicopter crash

NEW DELHI, Nov 14 (Reuters) - Indian junior Defense Minister N.V.N. Somu was killed today when his helicopter crashed in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, the United News of India (UNI) news agency said.

(Complete wire copy available at CNARS)

CURRENT NEWS ANALYSIS & RESEARCH SERVICE
ROOM 4C881, PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-7500
Tel: (703)695-2884 / 697-8765 Fax: (703)695-6822/7260

CHIEF: Richard Oleszewski

Goff, Meredith Johnson, Editors

ADMINISTRATION: Wendy Powers

CURRENT NEWS BRANCH: Taft Phoebus, Chief

RESEARCH BRANCH: Denise Brown, Chief

PRODUCTION: Defense Automated Printing Service (Room 3A1037)

Linda Lee, Early Bird Editor

Alice Boyd Editor

SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR: Carol Rippe

Elmer Christian, Erik Erickson, Janice

CU

Instructions for retrieving Supplement articles: Note the code assigned to each set of articles. Using a touch-tone telephone attached to your fax machine, call either AV 227-6812 or AV 227-3464 or commercial (703) 697-6812 or 697-3464. After the three second tone, key in your access code, key in one asterisk (*), key in the number 9 key in another asterisk, then the code assigned to the article, and two asterisks. A dual tone will sound; tilt the start button on your fax and hang up phone. The Current News Supplement is available for retrieval after 10 A.M.

IT



This publication is prepared by American Forces Information Service (AFIS/OASD-PA) to bring to the attention of key personnel news items of interest to them in their official capacities. It is not intended to substitute for newspapers and periodicals as a means of keeping informed about the meaning and impact of news developments. Use of these articles does not reflect official endorsement. Further reproduction for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions.

CURRENT NEWS ANALYSIS & RESEARCH SERVICE
Rm. 4C881, Pentagon
Washington, D.C.
20301-7500

Chief:
Richard Oleszewski
(703-695-2884)

CURRENT NEWS BRANCH:
Chief:
Taft Phoebus
(703-697-8765)

Early Bird Editor:
Linda Lee

Editors:
Elmer Christian
Erik Erickson
Janice Goff
Meredith Johnson

RESEARCH BRANCH:
Chief:
Denise Brown
(703-695-2884)

Editor:
Alice Boyd

SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR:
Carol Rippe
(703)697-8765

ADMINISTRATION:
Wendy Powers
(703-695-2884)

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

**NEWS/OPINION

411141

PENTAGON PONDERING MERGING AIRBORNE RECCE, C3 AND DUSD SPACE OVERSIGHT
(Inside the Air Force)....Gigi Whitley

#A1

C-5 USERS REPORT PROBLEMS WITH ENGINES EVEN AFTER DEPOT OVERHAUL
(Inside the Air Force)....Jim Snyder

#A2

HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE MEMBER REP. PAUL MCMALE (D-PA)...
(Defense Daily)....Unattributed

#A2

AF KEEPS \$15 MILLION BONUS FROM F-22 TEAM DUE TO LATE FIRST FLIGHT
(Defense Daily)....Greg Caires & John Robinson

#A3

LOCKHEED VYING FOR VEHICLE CONTRACT
(Fort Worth Star-Telegram)....Michael D. Towle

#A4

LOCKHEED, TRACTOR TO SHARE WORK ON DRONE PLANES
(Dallas Morning News)....Andy Dworkin

#A5

LOCKHEED'S WORKERS WANT MORE MONEY
(Jacksonville Florida Times-Union)....John Fritz

#A5

SEAWOLF SUBMARINE LIVING UP TO ITS BILLING
(Defense Daily)....Bryan Bender

#A6

PORK IS SAFE FROM THIS PRESIDENT'S LINE-ITEM VETOES
(Wall Street Journal)....Timothy J. Penny

#A7

MINE DISPOSAL HQ PROPOSED
(Jane's Defence Weekly)....Unattributed

#A7

PENTAGON BUDGET CUTS
(Durham (NC) Herald Sun)....Editorial

#A8

DYNACORP DIVISION WINS \$322 MILLION U.S. CONTRACT
(Washington Post)....Mark Leibovich

#A8

SMART SMALL BOMB DEVELOPMENT SLOWS
(Jane's Defence Weekly)....Stacey Evers

#A9

NOTICE TO READERS

The Current News *Early Bird*, *Supplement*, and *Radio-TV Defense Dialog* are now available at www.dtic.mil/ebird. Read detailed instructions on the *Early Bird* home page or call (703) 695-2884 or DSN 225-2884. These electronic publications are intended only for DoD and .mil sites and cannot be made available to any other addresses.



SUPPLEMENT: Friday, November 14, 1997

COHEN COMES OUT AGAINST THAAD, DESPITE MISSILE THREAT
(Jane's Defence Weekly)....Unattributed

#A9

PROGRAM TO BUILD 'KILLER' LASER GETS PENTAGON OK
(Dallas Morning News)....Unattributed

#A9

THE ARM TREATY
(Arizona Republic)....Editorial

#A10

NUCLEAR MISSILES 'ON BLACK MARKET'
(London Evening Standard)....Jeremy Campbell

#A10

OFFICER WHO ORDERED VIETNAM BOMBING, VICTIM RECONCILED
(Minneapolis Star Tribune)....Geoff Williams

#A11

MILITARY CARE HAS CHANGE IN SPOTLIGHT
(Dayton Daily News)....Editorial

#A12

LETTER TO THE EDITOR: FORT BRAGG'S HEALTH
(Raleigh (NC) News and Observer)....Brig. Gen. John R. Vines, USA

#A12

NAVY FACES LOW-TECH, HIGH-RISK ADVERSARIES
(Norfolk Virginian-Pilot)....Dale Eisman

#A13

DEFENSE SUPPLY CENTER CHIEF GETS TOP HONOR
(Richmond Times-Dispatch)....Unattributed

#A16

NAVY OF '90s TURN RECRUIT FRIENDLY
(Chicago Tribune)....Dave Newbart

#A17

IT'S GETTING TOUGHER TO BE A MARINE
(Honolulu Advertiser)....Walter Wright

#A18

CHINA SEEMS TO RELAX STANCE AGAINST TAIWAN
(Baltimore Sun)....Unattributed

#A18

VIEW FROM THE TOP...
(Armed Forces Journal International)....John G. Ross

#A19

WHAT GENERAL REIMER REALLY MEANT
(Armed Forces Journal International)....Maj. Gen. Edward J. Philbin, USAF(Ret.)

#A20

U.N. ASSEMBLY CITIES ISRAEL IN HOUSING DISPUTE
(Washington Post)....Reuters

#A20

AMERICANS ON ALERT IN PAKISTAN
(Washington Post)....Kenneth J. Cooper & Kamran Khan

#A21

NO EVIDENCE OF TRIAL TIE, U.S. INSISTS
(Washington Post)....Thomas W. Lippman

#A22

THE KARACHI KILLINGS
(Wall Street Journal)....Editorial

#A22

SUPPLEMENT: Friday, November 14, 1997

LEBANON ARMY TO CONTROL AREA OF HEZBOLLAH'S BASE (Boston Globe)....Sultan Sleiman	#A23
THE ARITHMETIC OF TERRORISM (Washington Post)....Editorial	#A24
THE PROBLEM WITH BIBI (New York Times)....A.M. Rosenthal	#A24
TARGET IRAQ'S ARSENAL (London Times)....Editorial	#A25
US WEIGHS MILITARY RESPONSE TO IRAQ (Christian Science Monitor)....Jonathan S. Landay	#A26
U.S. MUST EITHER GET SADDAM-OR FORGET HIM (New York Daily News)....Fouad Ajami	#A27
COULD SADDAM TOPPLE THE UNITED NATIONS? (Christian Science Monitor)....Richard C. Hottel	#A28
SADDAM'S SITUATION (Boston Globe)....Steve Yetiv	#A29
MEETING NO-SHOWS A SLAP AT ALBRIGHT (Washington Times)....Martin Sieff	#A30
SHORTSIGHTED ARAB DIPLOMACY (New York Times)....Editorial	#A30
U.S. HAS TO OUTMANEUVER HUSSEIN (Long Island Newsday)....Richard N. Haass	#A31
AMERICA SHOULD BACK OFF THE BULLYING (Los Angeles Times (Wash. Ed.))....Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr.	#A32
DEADLY SECRETS (Providence Journal-Bulletin)....Editorial	#A32
THE CONFRONTATION WITH SADDAM (Detroit News)....Editorial	#A33
ALLIES TO A POINT (Philadelphia Inquirer)....Editorial	#A33
U.N. VICTORY MAY BE HOLLOW FOR U.S. (USA Today)....Lee Michael Katz	#A34
SIDING WITH SADDAM WON'T HELP PALESTINIAN CAUSE (Houston Chronicle)....Editorial	#A34
KEEP PRESSURE ON IRAQ (Montreal (Quebec) Gazette)....Editorial	#A35

SUPPLEMENT: Friday, November 14, 1997

ONE SMALL STEP AGAINST SADDAM (Boston Globe)....Editorial	#A35
NAUGHTY, NAUGHTY SADDAM (Los Angeles Times (Wash. Ed.))....Editorial	#A36
SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE (Dallas Morning News)....Editorial	#A36
BOSNIA... (Jacksonville Florida Times-Union)....Editorial	#A37
A NEW MOSQUE STANDS ALONE IN SERB HALF OF BOSNIA (Los Angeles Times (Wash. Ed.))....Tracy Wilkinson	#A37
A FIGHT AGAINST VIRUSES MAY HELP FIGHT AGAINST BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (Minneapolis Star Tribune)....Newsday	#A38
LETTER TO THE EDITOR: RUSSIA'S 'CLAN' WARS (Wall Street Journal)....Paul Saunders	#A39
TO ENLISTED MEN, ITS 'A SLAP IN THE FACE' (Washington Times)....Brett Marcy	#A39
EU PLAN TO OPEN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES GAINS SUPPORT (Journal of Commerce)....Chris Johnstone	#A40
FOAL EAGLE GIS END EXERCISE RIDING TRAIN TO PUSAN (Pacific Stars & Stripes)....Rich Roesler	#A40
DMZ DUTY: DANGEROUS BUT HIGHLY PRIZED BY U.S. SOLDIERS (International Herald Tribune)....Velisarios Kattoulas	#A41
THE FEDERAL DIARY: INVESTMENT DECISIONS (Washington Post)....Mike Causey	#A42
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION COMPLETES WARFIGHTER EXPERIMENT (Killeen (TX) Daily Herald)....Elke Hutto	#A43
FORT LEWIS BRIGADE TRAINS FOR REAL COMBAT (Seattle Post-Intelligence)....Ed Offley	#A43
CONFEREES DROP 'WHISTLEBLOWER' PROVISION (Washington Post)....Walter Pincus	#B1
JOB SURGE LEAVES FOREIGN POLICY OUTDATED (Los Angeles Times)....Jim Mann	#B1
'KABILA OR CHAOS' (Washington Post)....David Aronson	#B2
HIGHEST-RANKING U.S. OFFICIAL IN LAOS SINCE '75 CHECKS BOMBS (Baltimore Sun)....Associated Press	#B3

4111410

SUPPLEMENT: Friday, November 14, 1997

DON'T TURN OUR BACK ON MILITARY
(Orlando Sentinel)....Dennis Freytes

#B3

**ARMS CONTROL ISSUES 4111411

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
(Jane's Defence Weekly)

USA MOVES TO BLOCK WEAPONS DANGER....Barbara Starr

#B4

NUCLEAR DETERRENT MAY NOT BE RELEVANT....Nick Cook

#B6

US CONCEPTS TARGET COUNTERFORCE MISSION....Unattributed

#B7

ARMY MISSILE ADOPTS A RADICAL TRAJECTORY....Duncan Lennox

#B9

BLOWING AWAY MINES
(Toronto Star)....Editorial

#B10

ON THE BRINK: THE LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS....
(Tampa Tribune)....Kurt Loft

#B10

NUCLEAR TREATY
(Minneapolis Star Tribune)....Editorial

#B11

**MILITARY LIFE 4111412

FEMALE PERSIAN GULF VETERAN SHARES MILITARY VIEWS IN DAY HONORING WOMEN
(Anchorage Daily News)....Donna Freedman

#B12

KEEP PROMISES TO VETS
(Orlando Sentinel)....Editorial

#B12

THE FORGOTTEN U.S. MIAS OF VIETNAM
(Indianapolis Star)....Steve Salerno

#B13

SADLY, TODAY WE HAVE TO REMIND AMERICANS TO RESPECT VETERANS
(Orlando Sentinel)....Charley Reese

#B13

VETERAN, 100, RECALLS WORLD WAR I, AND HOW THE WAR TO END ALL WARS
DIDN'T
(New York Times)....James Barron

#B14

FEMALE AVIATOR URGES WOMEN: BE PERSISTENT
(St. Petersburg Times)....Geoff Dougherty

#B15

ARMED FORCES POSTURE ON COUNSELING DECRIED
(Raleigh (NC) News & Observer)....Todd Richissin

#B16

A&M RESEARCHERS COOK UP A BETTER-TASTING STEW FOR GIS
(Birmingham (AL) News)....Kent Faulk

#B16

SUPPLEMENT: Friday, November 14, 1997

**EUROPE 4111413

C41: GOING MOBILE WITH AIR OPERATIONS BASE
(Jane's Defence Weekly)....Joris Janssen Lok

#B17

SPY FILES OF COMMUNISTS STILL PUT HUNGARY ON EDGE
(Christian Science Monitor)....Michael J. Jordan

#B18

RUSSIA-TO-CHINA NATURAL-GAS PIPELINE IS AGREED UPON AT YELTSIN-JIANG
SUMMIT
(Wall Street Journal)....Steve Liesman

#B20

LEADERS MARCH BELARUS INTO THE PAST
(Washington Post)....Daniel Williams

#B20

**FRIDAY BOOK REVIEWS 4111414

GIS' TRIUMPH IN EUROPE COMPLETES AUTHOR'S QUEST: CITIZEN SOLDIERS:
THE U.S. ARMY FROM THE NORMANDY BEACHES TO THE BULGE TO THE
SURRENDER OF GERMANY BY STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
(USA Today)....Deirdre Donahue

#B22

A GENERAL HISTORY OF AN ARMY'S COMPLEX EVOLUTION: WARRIORS OF THE RISING
SUN: A HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY BY ROBERT B. EDGERTON
(Army)....Col. Stanley L. Falk (Ret.)

#B23

UNCHECKED SPENDING: DEFENSE ADDICTION: CAN AMERICA KICK THE HABIT?
BY SANFORD GOTTLIEB
(The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)....Walter C. Uhler

#B24

RADIO-TV DEFENSE DIALOG



This publication is prepared by American Forces Information Service (AFIS/OASD-PA) to bring to the attention of key personnel news items of interest to them in their official capacities. It is not intended to substitute for newspapers and periodicals as a means of keeping informed about the meaning and impact of news developments. Use of these articles does not reflect official endorsement. Further reproduction for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions.

CURRENT NEWS ANALYSIS & RESEARCH SERVICE
Rm. 4C881, Pentagon
Washington, D.C.
20301-7500

Chief:
Richard Oleszewski
(703-695-2884)

CURRENT NEWS BRANCH:
Chief:
Taft Phoebus
(703-697-8765)

Early Bird Editor:
Linda Lee

Editors:
Elmer Christian
Erik Erickson
Janice Goff
Meredith Johnson

RESEARCH BRANCH:
Chief:
Denise Brown
(703-695-2884)

Editor:
Alice Boyd

SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR
Carol Rippe
(703)697-8765

ADMINISTRATION:
Wendy Powers
(703-695-2884)

FRIDAY, November 14, 1997

Federal News Service
Summary not to be quoted.

4111420

(Broadcasts of Thursday, November 13, 1997)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS STORIES IN THIS ISSUE

SHOWDOWN WITH IRAQ: Saddam Hussein has ordered the expulsion of American weapons inspectors from Iraq. In response, the Chief of UNSCOM has ordered all U.N. weapons inspectors to leave Iraq until the present crisis is resolved. Jim Lehrer, Charles Krauss, PBS; Peter Jennings, John McWethy, ABC; Tom Brokaw, David Bloom, NBC; Dan Rather, Tom Fenton, Allen Pizzey, David Martin, CBS; Bernard Shaw, Brent Sadler, CNN; Corva Coleman, Marcia Brandwynn Ted Clark, NPR.

INTERVIEW WITH IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ: PBS "News Maker" interview with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz about the current stand-off between Iraq and the U.N. Jim Lehrer, PBS.

INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT BUTLER, U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTION CHIEF: Interview with Robert Butler about the current crisis in Iraq and the decision to expel six American inspectors. Peter Jennings, ABC.

IRAQ'S MILITARY BUILD-UP: Evidence continues to mount that Saddam Hussein is using the current period of confusion and confrontation to build up his defenses. Tom Brokaw, Jim Miklaszewski, NBC.

HOUSE CALLS FOR UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION: The International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives has passed a resolution calling on the Clinton Administration to take unilateral military action against Iraq if all other efforts fail to force Saddam Hussein to comply with U.N. demands. Corva Coleman, Elizabeth Arnold, NPR.

PEACE PROSPECTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: The government of North Korea now says it is ready to negotiate a peace with South Korea. Judy Woodruff, Ralph Begleiter, CNN.

NOTICE TO READERS

The Current News *Early Bird*, *Supplement*, and *Radio-TV Defense Dialog* are now available at www.dtic.mil/ebird. Read detailed instructions on the *Early Bird* home page or call (703) 695-2884 or DSN 225-2884. These electronic publications are intended only for DoD and .mil sites and cannot be made available to any other addresses.



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. diagram	Deliberate Planning Process. (1 page)	11/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	Duplicate of 004a. (2 pages)	11/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Charles Pritchard)
OA/Box Number: 3058

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea / PDD-56 Pol.-Mil. Collapse Plan [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]