

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Korea - North, 1998 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Pritchard, Charles

Original OA/ID Number:

1945

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
30	2	11	3	V

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9802988
RECEIVED: 27 APR 98 17

TO: GILMAN, BENJAMIN A
BEREUTER, DOUGLAS K

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 12 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
FOOD

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY RE CONCERN OVER DELIVERY OF US FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR NORTH KOREA

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 08 MAY 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ABERCROMBIE-WINSTANL
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
PRITCHARD
RAGAN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY TMAA DATE 5.14.98 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTMH

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9802988

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRITCHARD	Z 98042717 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 98050720 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002 STEIN, L	Z 98051117 FOR SIGNATURE
003 PRESIDENT	Z 98051217 FOR SIGNATURE
004	X 98051410 PRESIDENT SGD LTRS
004 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 98051410 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 980512	VICE PRESIDENT
003 980512	WH CHIEF OF STAFF
004 980512 GILMAN, BENJAMIN A	CIA
004 980512 BEREUTER, DOUGLAS K	DEFENSE
004 980512 WH STRIPPING DESK	STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2900
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM FRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG FR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>ES/13</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ES/13</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>TMA 5.14</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

DATE 5/12/98 ?



98 MAY 13 PM 5:42

Signed 5/12/98

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2988
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
 Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>5/7</u>	<u></u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2/4</u>	<u>5/7</u>	<u>5/11</u>
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u></u>	
Berger	<u>4</u>	<u></u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TS 5/11</u>	<u>STEIN</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

cc:

198 MAY 7 am 4:46

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9802988
RECEIVED: 27 APR 98 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: GILMAN, BENJAMIN A
BEREUTER, DOUGLAS K

DOC DATE: 23 APR 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
FOOD

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOOD AID TO NORTH KOREA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 08 MAY 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
PRITCHARD

FOR CONCURRENCE
KRISTOFF
RAGAN
RUDMAN
SIMON

FOR INFO
CLARKE
KYLE
MCCARTHY
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MARA RUDMAN'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: 727C-600

LOG NUMBER: 2980

DUE DATE: 8 MAY

DATE STAFFED: 27 APR

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: REP. GILMAN, REPEUTER

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

May 12, 1998

Thank you for your letter concerning the delivery of U.S. food assistance to North Korea. By most accounts, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) efforts in North Korea have made a visible difference in the lives of those most at risk of starvation, especially the children. I am proud of the role the United States has played in responding to this serious humanitarian crisis. At the same time, I recognize the requirement to ensure the generosity of the American people goes to its intended recipients and is not diverted for military use.

It is our policy that distribution of our food aid be adequately monitored. In this regard, we are guided by the recommendations of the WFP and our NGOs. The concerned NGOs recently reached agreement with representatives of North Korea for eight U.S. specialists to have the access necessary to monitor our food-for-work program over a five month period. While availability of Korean-language speaking monitors is an important consideration, it should not slow the delivery of our humanitarian assistance. The NGOs chose not to raise this issue with North Korea at this time.

The European Union (EU) has not chosen to support the WFP appeal to date, but it has recently committed 86,000 tons of food to North Korea on a bilateral basis. With respect to the EU's agricultural reform initiative, all actions on food aid to North Korea are closely coordinated between the United States and the EU. As you know, the EU has much more flexibility than we for dealing with the current crisis and providing agricultural inputs and development programs.

Again, thank you for writing and I appreciate your continued interest in our humanitarian assistance efforts in North Korea.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a stylized, sweeping flourish at the end.

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1998

Dear Representative Bereuter:

Thank you for your letter concerning the delivery of U.S. food assistance to North Korea. By most accounts, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) efforts in North Korea have made a visible difference in the lives of those most at risk of starvation, especially the children. I am proud of the role the United States has played in responding to this serious humanitarian crisis. At the same time, I recognize the requirement to ensure the generosity of the American people goes to its intended recipients and is not diverted for military use.

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Again, thank you for writing and I appreciate your continued interest in our humanitarian assistance efforts in North Korea.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a stylized flourish at the end.

The Honorable Douglas Bereuter
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2701

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9802988

REFERRAL

DATE: 14 MAY 98

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GILMAN, BENJAMIN A

SOURCE: PRESIDENT


DATE: 12 MAY 98

SUBJ: REPLY RE CONCERN OVER DELIVERY OF US FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR NORTH KOREA

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 15 MAY 98

COMMENT:


FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9802988
DATE 12 MAY 98

SUBJECT: REPLY RE CONCERN OVER DELIVERY OF US FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR NORTH KOREA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
WH STRIPPING DESK	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

158 MAY 12 1998

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1998


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER

LARRY STEIN



SUBJECT:

Response to Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman
Bereuter on Humanitarian Assistance to North
Korea

Purpose

To respond to a letter from House Committee on International
Relations Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman Bereuter.

Background

Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman Bereuter wrote you concerning
the delivery of U.S. food assistance to North Korea. They
believe our food-for-work program should have the full
involvement of the U.S. NGO consortium, include the
participation of Korean-language monitors and support the EU's
agricultural reform initiative. Your response makes clear our
policy of requiring adequate monitors to ensure food aid is
properly distributed to its intended recipients rather than
diverted for use by the military. You also describe our
involvement with NGOs and note that we are closely coordinating
on the EU's agricultural initiative.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman Bereuter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2988

May 4, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF

FROM: JACK PRITCHARD

SUBJECT: Response to Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman
Bereuter on Humanitarian Assistance to North
Korea

Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman Bereuter wrote the President expressing concern for the need for adequate NGO monitors to monitor our food-for-work program in North Korea. In the response we make clear our policy of requiring adequate monitors to ensure food aid is properly distributed to its intended recipients rather than diverted for use by the military. In the interim since their letter, our NGOs have concluded an agreement with North Korea which permits 8 monitors (up from last year's 5).

Concurrences by: Richard Ragan, Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Response to Representatives Gilman and Bereuter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
CHAIRMAN

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES A. LEACH, IOWA
HENRY J. HYDE, ILLINOIS
DOUG REREUTER, NEBRASKA
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY
DAN BURTON, INDIANA
ELTON GALLEGLY, CALIFORNIA
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, FLORIDA
CASS BALLENGER, NORTH CAROLINA
DAN A. ROHRBACH, CALIFORNIA
DONALD A. MANZULLO, ILLINOIS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, CALIFORNIA
PETER T. KING, NEW YORK
JAY KIM, CALIFORNIA
STEVEN J. CHABOT, OHIO
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, SOUTH CAROLINA
MATT SALMON, ARIZONA
AMO HOUGHTON, NEW YORK
TOM CAMPBELL, CALIFORNIA
JON FOX, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN M. MC HUGH, NEW YORK
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI
KEVIN BRADY, TEXAS

RICHARD J. GARON
CHIEF OF STAFF

LEE H. HAMILTON, INDIANA
RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

TELEPHONE: (202) 225-5021

SAM GEJDENSON, CONNECTICUT
TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA
GARY L. ACKERMAN, NEW YORK
ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, SAMOA
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, CALIFORNIA
DONALD M. PAYNE, NEW JERSEY
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, NEW JERSEY
ROBERT MENENDEZ, NEW JERSEY
SHERROD BROWN, OHIO
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, GEORGIA
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA
PAT DANNER, MISSOURI
EARL F. HILLIARD, ALABAMA
BRAD SHERMAN, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT WEXLER, FLORIDA
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, NEW JERSEY
BOB CLEMENT, TENNESSEE
BILL LUTHER, MINNESOTA
JIM DAVIS, FLORIDA

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN
DEMOCRATIC CHIEF OF STAFF

262302

April 23, 1998

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

APR 24 1998

Re: Food Aid for North Korea

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing concerning the delivery of U.S. food assistance to North Korea through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP).

In response to the WFP's appeal for North Korean food aid, the United States pledged to deliver 200,000 tons of basic grains and other foodstuffs. This contribution is by far the largest of any donor to the U.N.'s North Korea program. At the request of the United States, WFP contracted to place 75,000 tons of the U.S. food committed under the technical direction of a consortium of U.S. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to support Food-For-Work projects in North Korea. While these organizations would normally dedicate over 50 people to monitor the delivery of such a large amount of food aid, the consortium recognized the limitations of North Korea and proposed 10 American NGO monitors to ensure the proper delivery of the food for the duration of the program.

After meeting with representatives of North Korea's Flood Damage Relief Committee, we are concerned that the minimum requirements of the consortium will not be met. The North Koreans offered to allow only five monitors in the country for very short visits (two weeks). We believe that if the minimum requirements of the consortium are not met, the United States should reduce the amount of food delivered to North Korea by the 75,000 tons intended for the U.S. NGO consortium.

We understand that representatives of the European Union chose not to support the WFP North Korean appeal. They have asked the North Koreans for progress on agricultural reform including private lands and free markets to improve North Korea's domestic harvest. We support that

MAY 5 12:39

emphasis (although we certainly are not insistent that the apparently sensitive word "reform" be used) and urge you to work closely with the EU to support their initiative.

We remain adamant that the food aid monitors for the WFP and NGO-consortium program speak the Korean language. Monitors for the NGO-consortium should also include Korean-Americans. Their participation will ensure a minimum level of qualifications necessary to ensure that assistance delivered by the United State to feed starving people in North Korea is not diverted to the Communist Party or Military.

While we support the U.S.'s humanitarian goals in North Korea, we believe that three key policies are essential to the future success of the program: 1) the full involvement of the U.S. NGO consortium, 2) the participation of Korean-language (especially Korean American) monitors, and 3) support for the E.U.'s agricultural reform initiative.



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman

Sincerely,



DOUG BEREUTER
Vice Chairman

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 24, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN DAVIES

NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA 
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call Chris Walker at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH), concerning the Middle East Peace Process,
- 2) Rep. Martin T. Meehan (D-MA), concerning peace negotiations in Northern Ireland,
- 3) Rep. Thomas J. Manton (D-NY), concerning peace negotiations in Northern Ireland,
- 4) Rep. Jim McDermott (D-WA), concerning U.S. trade with Africa,
- 5) Rep. Collin C. Peterson (D-MN), concerning the President's upcoming trip to China,
- 6) Rep. James A. Traficant, Jr. (D-OH), concerning the General System of Preferences,
- 7) Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA), concerning arms negotiations with China,
- 8) Rep. Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA), concerning the President's upcoming trip to China,
- 9) Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO) and others, concerning American made encryption products; and,

APR 24 18:01

- 10) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY) and others,
concerning food aid to North Korea.

Enclosures

2455
ID# 262302
S RTIC 20THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 04, 1998

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN REGARDING THE DELIVERY OF
U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA THROUGH
THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME
(WFP)

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	98/04/24		C 98/04/24
SAMUEL R. "SANDY" BERGER		RSA	98/04/24		
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 1 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R NY (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*TYPE RESP-INITIALS	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*OF SIGNER	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*CODE - A	*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*COMPLETED - DATE OF	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		*OUTGOING	*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

MAY 5 12:39

Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6128

Official Business

UNITED STATES MAIL
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20541

John C. Gilman
M.C.

1998 APR 24 PM 2:34

Hon. William Jefferson
The President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

|||||

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman
Bereuter on Humanitarian Assistance to North
Korea

Purpose

To respond to a letter from House Committee on International
Relations Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman Bereuter.

Background

Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman Bereuter wrote you ~~expressing~~
~~concern for the need for adequate NGO monitors to monitor our~~
~~food-for-work program in North Korea. The proposed response~~
makes clear our policy of requiring adequate monitors to ensure
food aid is properly distributed to its intended recipients
rather than diverted for use by the military. In the interim
~~since their letter, our NGOs have concluded an agreement with~~
~~North Korea which permits 8 monitors (up from last year's 5).~~

*concerning the delivery of U.S. food
assistance to North Korea.**

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

** They believe our food-for-work program should
have the full involvement of the U.S. NGO consortium,
include the participation of Korean language monitors and
support the E.U.'s agricultural reform initiative.*

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Chairman Gilman and Vice Chairman Bereuter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

*You also describe our involvement with NGOs and note
that we are closely coordinating on the E.U.'s agricultural
initiative.*

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Bereuter:

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It is our policy that distribution of our food aid be adequately monitored. In this regard, we are guided by the recommendations of the WFP and our NGOs. The concerned NGOs recently reached agreement with representatives of North Korea for eight U.S. specialists to have the access necessary to monitor our food-for-work program over a five month period. While availability of Korean-language speaking monitors is an important consideration, it should not ^{slow} hold up the delivery of our humanitarian assistance. The NGOs chose not to raise this issue with North Korea at this time.

The European Union (EU) ^H has not chosen to support the WFP appeal to date, but it has recently committed \$6,000 tons of food to North Korea on a bilateral basis. With respect to the EU's agricultural reform initiative, all actions on food aid to North Korea are closely coordinated between the United States and the EU. As you know, the EU has much more flexibility than we for dealing with the current crisis and providing agricultural inputs and development programs.

Again, thank you for writing and I appreciate your continued interest in our humanitarian assistance efforts in North Korea.

Sincerely,

↑
The Honorable Douglas Bereuter
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2701

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Again, thank you for writing and I appreciate your continued interest in our humanitarian assistance efforts in North Korea.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9804090
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 98 06

TO: SIGAL, LEON

FROM: PRITCHARD

DOC DATE: 11 JUN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPOSE OBO APNSA RE NORTH KOREA POLICY

ACTION: PRITCHARD SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 16 JUN 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
PRITCHARD

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9804090

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRITCHARD
002

Z 98060407 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
X 98061810 PRITCHARD SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: Pritchard

LOG NUMBER: 4090

DUE DATE: 16 June

DATE STAFFED: 4 June

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:

☐

PRESIDENT

☒

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: Sigal, Leon

*NFAR - Response sent by Asian Affairs
- Pritchard*

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FROM: SIGAL, LEON

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SUBJECT: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL RE SECURITY COOPERATION W/ NORTH
KOREA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 16 JUN 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 11, 1998

Dear Mr. Sigal:

Sandy Berger passed me your paper *Advancing Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula* and asked that I review your suggestions for enlarging the scope of our engagement policy with North Korea.

As you know, the President met with President Kim Dae-jung June 9, and had an opportunity to discuss at length our common approach to North Korea. President Kim explained his policy of separating economic and political issues. He noted that in the three months of his presidency business contact with North Korea has increased by 20 percent.

I have provided Harry Barnes a detailed readout of the June 9 meeting.

Thank you for providing Mr. Berger with a copy of your work and Robert Scalapino's assessment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ch L Pritchard', written in a cursive style.

Charles L. Pritchard
Director for Asian Affairs

Mr. Leon Sigal
Social Science Research Council
810 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019



Staff

Sandy -

I hope you find the enclosed of use. Don't
hesitate to have people call me or the others
involved in our track II effort if you need
more information.

All the best,

Lee Sigal



2 June 1998

MEMORANDUM

To: Samuel R. Berger, National Security Adviser
Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of State

From: Leon V. Sigal, Social Science Research Council ^{LS}

Re: Security Cooperation with North Korea

As you may know, I have been involved, along with Don Gregg and Harry Barnes and a handful of other former U.S. officials, in Track II discussions with North Korean officials for the past three years. (I have attached a recent paper summarizing some of the positions they took in these Track II discussions and an assessment by a participant, Professor Robert Scalapino.) These discussions lead me to the following two conclusions:

Unless top-level U.S. officials become involved, we are in danger of losing another critical round in the fight against proliferation. The freezing of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, an important administration success, is at risk unless the administration can move expeditiously toward much more thoroughgoing political and economic engagement with North Korea.

We are also in danger of missing an important opportunity to negotiate mutual and reciprocal steps to reduce the risk of unintended war on the Korean Peninsula and end North Korea's missile exports and even its missile development and tests.

I appreciate all too well the political risks of engagement with the North. But North Korea's recent reaction to our slowness in delivering heavy fuel oil and the delay in the start of construction of the replacement reactor underscore the geopolitical risks of inaction.

One understandable impulse has been to let Seoul take the lead in dealing with Pyongyang. As Ambassador Bosworth has put it, "We are both in the front seat of the car, and it is probably time for you to take the wheel for a while." That may make sense in the short term, but the North will not move far or fast with the South unless normalization with the United States is also progressing. This is, as you know, the view of Kim Dae Jung.

With 37,000 troops and their dependents potentially in harm's way in Korea, we also have a considerable stake in moving the four-party talks forward. We have entered into these talks with the aim of getting the North to accept some minor CBMs in return for modest economic inducements. The North, I believe, has something much more far-reaching in mind. In seeking to talk

about the "disposition" of American troops in Korea, their aim is not to arrange for their withdrawal, but to redefine their role. One senior DPRK official in a track II discussion on August 29, 1996 spoke of the United States standing "in a neutral position on the DMZ, listening with one ear toward Pyongyang and the other ear toward Seoul." When American interlocutors noted that this could imply an end to the U.S.-ROK Security Treaty and accompanying command relationships, the official replied that having the U.S. troops as peacekeepers between North and South can be compatible with continuation of the U.S.-ROK alliance: "You can have two allies, why just one." An aide to the official said that such a peacekeeping force could occupy the DMZ, which could be enlarged to accommodate all of the troops.

If the DMZ were widened sufficiently, U.S. peacekeepers could "capture" the North's artillery within range of the South, the major source of military instability on the peninsula. Yet such an arrangement is conceivable only after much greater economic and political normalization with the North.

Similarly, in the case of ballistic missiles, the North's representatives have been saying since 1991 that its exports are strictly a "commercial" matter, strongly implying that they could be ended for a price. Even more significantly, the DPRK has prepared for, but has not conducted any ballistic missile tests since May 1993, which suggests it appreciates the critical importance of no tests as a verifiable basis for a deal to halt missile development. Such a deal is likely only after the establishment of much closer economic and political ties.

In my opinion, we have been too preoccupied with husbanding every bit of economic and political engagement as a quid pro quo for obtaining our objectives in missile and four-party talks. By doing so, we are losing sight of the larger import of engagement: thoroughgoing American political, economic, and social ties with the DPRK are a necessary precursor for constructing cooperative security arrangements that are needed to end the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.

While these ties are more substantial than those currently being contemplated in Washington, I perceive that the DPRK is willing to pay a high price in return for them. I also believe that it is in our geopolitical interest to stabilize the peninsula, help North Korea move toward a market economy, and help decentralize power in the North to foster the rudiments of a civil society. This is potentially a win-win situation and a major success for the administration's security strategy.

The April 9-10 Meetings in Berkeley

On April 9 and 10, afternoon and morning sessions were held to discuss issues pertaining to U.S.-DPRK relations on an informal, off the record basis. Three North Koreans were present, namely, Ambassador Li Gun, Deputy Permanent Representative of the DPRK UN Mission, and two younger associates, Hong Je Ryong and Ri Kwang Nam, First Secretaries. The Americans present included Ambassador Harry Barnes, Mr. William Fuller (Asia Foundation), Ambassador Donald Gregg, Professor Hong Yung Lee (Chairman, Center for Korean Studies, Berkeley), Ambassador James Lilley, Dr. Anthony Namkung, Kenneth Quinones, Robert Park (U.S Energy Dept.), Mr. Leon Sigal, Gordon Flake and myself.

On the first afternoon, Leon Sigal set forth a detailed analysis of principal issues, covering a wide range of economic, political and security matters, with background data and his interpretation of key events. A lengthy discussion followed in which Li Gun participated, with diverse emphases and views. At one point, Li indicated that the U.S. has not been able to fulfill its commitments with regard to providing heavy fuel oil, and if the situation continued, it could raise questions about the DPRK need to observe its commitments.

Similarly, at the morning session of April 10, Li Gun advanced his views on key matters in an informal presentation, with an extensive discussion following.

On the two evenings after the sessions, participants attended informal dinner parties at the homes of the Scalapinos and Lees. Private conversations with the North Koreans took place on those occasions.

At the sessions, there was no tension. All participants including the North Koreans, exchanged views without polemics or superfluous rhetoric. Li Gun did almost all of the talking on the DPRK side (Hong spoke only once, when requested by Li, and Ri did not speak). Several Americans found it interesting that Li seemed to convey a desire for some degree of accommodation without in any sense abandoning basic DPRK positions. For example, on the issue of U.S. forces, he asserted that the DPRK felt that it was important to have the disposition of forces on the agenda as a legitimate topic for discussion. He declined to use the term "withdrawal of troops" nor voice an insistence for such action.

There was some indication on the North Korean side that primary interest lay in different bilateral combinations, depending upon the issue, or in the case of CBMs and similar military issues, a trilateral (U.S.-ROK-DPRK) framework, with the Four Party Talks accommodating to such formulae. Li seemed to suggest that the Four Party Talks had thus far been unproductive

because the U.S. had been unwilling to move to a broader, more flexible agenda. He declined to get into a substantive discussion of CBMs.

Clearly, economic concerns are uppermost in the mind of the DPRK representatives at this time, as is to be expected. That they would like to separate "humanitarian aid" from political and security issues is also clear, as the recent South-North talks in Beijing make manifest. Yet if the Berkeley meetings are a reflection of the current scene, they are prepared to talk about virtually all issues at the Track II level.

The months ahead may well be very important with respect to the Korean issue in its multiple facets. The Kim Dae-jung administration has taken a number of initiatives--reducing the economic restrictions on South Korean firms with respect to investment in the North; resumption of divided family visits, starting with elders; a possible summit meeting; and other ideas.

Meanwhile, the North has cautiously moved forward with initiatives relating to economic development: small teams being sent to the U.S. specializing in energy and agriculture as well as a group seeking some training in business administration going to Australia. Solicitation of investment continues, with some expansion of Special Economic Zones. Tourism is also being sought.

While the precise political situation in the DPRK cannot be ascertained by outsiders, the evidence available suggests that Kim Jong-il is firmly in control at this point, with military support central, and the emergence of civilians, some family members or long-time acquaintances, approximately his age. Certain individuals within that group clearly accept change providing taboo words such as "reform" are not used, at a pace still to be determined. Further, the North is without fully trusted allies at present. Even China, an official ally, is regarded with some suspicion, and Russia has not yet been able to reestablish good relations despite ongoing efforts.

In this situation, it would seem important for the United States to give firm backing to the Kim Dae-jung administration, encouraging it to pursue the initiatives thus far set forth, and interacting closely with it, demonstrating full support for the U.S.-ROK security treaty.


Given our huge stake in the Korean issue, it is also important that we have a continuous dialogue with our ally, Japan, on this matter, and also with China. Moreover, it can be useful to solicit Russian views on the situation, given the lengthy contacts that some Russians have had with the North.

It would also seem advantageous for the U.S. to encourage Track II contacts so that the fullest range of issues could be probed in this transitional period, with clues obtained when

possible as to on-going currents of thought and nuances that might not be available in more formal settings.

Full interaction between Track II participants and the U.S. government, notably the Department of State, would be essential, both before and after meetings.

It is also important that Track II operations be regularized since a first meeting can set the stage for acquaintanceship and somewhat deeper exchanges at a later point. Further, the American participants should be of a level, degree of understanding of issues, and diversity to receive the appropriate response from the DPRK side.

Robert A. Scialapino


ADVANCING COOPERATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Leon V. Sigal

April 8-9, 1998

ADVANCING COOPERATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

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[Not for distribution without the author's express permission.]

The purpose of this paper is to set out what DPRK representatives have said about various issues in formal talks, in public, and in track II discussions with the aim of clarifying areas of possible agreement with the United States and drawing up a detailed roadmap for defusing the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.

This paper has two premises: first, that a significant unwinding of the military confrontation is unlikely in the absence of a comprehensive program of political and economic cooperation with the DPRK by the United States, and second, that specific steps to reduce the risk of unintended war must be mutual and reciprocal.

The paper focuses on the five most difficult issues currently on the agenda: the American troop presence on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's ballistic missile exports, economic reconstruction of the North, serious North-South engagement, and North Korean terrorism. On all five, there is some evidence, as yet inconclusive, of change in North Korea's stance that suggest these issues are potentially negotiable.

Each section of the paper summarizes the current state of play on an issue, cites North Korean, South Korean, American, and where relevant, Japanese and Chinese views, and poses questions for U.S. and DPRK consideration. Some of the North Korean views expressed by senior DPRK officials in track II discussions have anticipated changes in the official DPRK stance.

I. The presence of U.S. forces in Korea

A. The DPRK long characterized American forces in the South as an army of "occupation." A persistent feature of all DPRK troop cut proposals has been the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Korea and the region. In the four-party talks, North Korean negotiators have tried to include the American troop presence among the issues to be negotiated, a position rejected by the United States. A careful look at North Korean statements reveals signs of change.

B. DPRK Views

1. A benchmark for evaluating the current DPRK stance is the eight-point proposal for unification put forth by Foreign Minister Ho Tam in April 1971. It

had three relevant points: withdrawal of U.S. forces, subsequent reduction of DPRK and ROK troop levels to 100,000, and abrogation of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and the ROK-Japan accord on normalization.

2. The DPRK has made a series of proposals since -- in 1987, 1988, and 1990 -- to reduce forces on the Korean Peninsula. With increasing specificity, these proposals envisioned cuts in DPRK and ROK forces in three stages over a three- or four-year period, with U.S. forces to be **phased out** by end of the third stage (i.e., U.S. troops would **remain** in the interim). At the end of stage one, North and South Korea would reduce their troop levels to 300,000. The U.S. would pull back its ground forces to a line running between Pusan and Chinhae near the southern coast. A second stage would reduce military manpower in the North and South to 200,000 and U.S. ground forces would withdraw from the peninsula. By the end of the third stage, troop levels would be down to 100,000 and all U.S. air and naval forces would withdraw from Korea and surrounding waters.¹
3. In this connection Article V of the 1972 DPRK constitution said, "The DPRK strives to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half, drive out foreign forces on a nationwide scale, reunify the country on a peaceful basis, and attain complete national independence." The 1992 constitution replaces "drive out foreign forces on a nationwide scale" with "struggling for the realization of the unification of the fatherland on the principles of independence, peaceful unification, and grand national unity."
4. Kim Il Sung in an April 16, 1994 NHK interview stated, "[I] have never insisted on the immediate withdrawal of American forces from Korea. What I said was that the American forces could withdraw in stages when and if the phased reduction of forces is achieved and when self-defense becomes feasible for the Korean Peninsula."²
5. A July 31, 1997 press release by the DPRK mission to the United Nations, issued before the August 5 US-DPRK-ROK preliminary talks prior to the four-party talks, hints at a significant variation on that theme. It reads, "At the preliminary talks, the issues of replacing the armistice agreement with a peace agreement in conformity with the

purpose of the proposed four-party talks and of withdrawing the U.S. troops from South Korea should be decided as the main agenda items to be deliberated at the four-party talks." The word "**withdrawing**" was crossed out and "**disposition** of" the U.S. troops "stationed in" South Korea handwritten into the text.

6. In a track II discussion on August 30, 1996, a senior DPRK official hinted at the possibility of a residual U.S. troop presence "when the situation is calm and we can talk. [Bilateral] military-to-military talks could promote these things."
7. DPRK representatives have repeatedly stated in track II discussions that the DPRK may drop its demand for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Korea if their role were redefined.
 - a. One role is stabilizing the regional balance of power. A senior DPRK official was explicit in a track II discussion on August 30, 1996: "The DPRK believes the U.S. troops have two missions: to protect the South against the North and the balance of power in Northeast Asia. The DPRK stresses the first reason but a peace treaty could change that and focus on the second."
 - b. Another role for American troops is that of peacekeepers, assuming agreement with the U.S. on a peace mechanism. For example, in a track II discussion on May 4, 1996, a senior DPRK official spoke of the possibility of an American troops remaining in Korea in the role of "peacekeepers."
 - c. A senior DPRK official in a track II discussion on August 29, 1996 spoke of the US standing "in a neutral position on the DMZ, listening with one ear toward Pyongyang and the other ear toward Seoul." When American interlocutors noted that this implied putting an end to the U.S.-ROK Security Treaty and accompanying command relationships, the official implied that having the U.S. troops as peacekeepers between North and South is not incompatible with continuation of the U.S.-ROK alliance: "You can have two allies, why just one."
 - d. At one point he acknowledged the restraining

role of the U.S. presence on the ROK by saying that the DPRK wanted to talk to the U.S. about a peace mechanism because a U.S. general was commander of U.S.-ROK combined forces. At another point in the discussion, the official seemed to suggest that the combined command would have to be disbanded once U.S. troops assumed a peacekeeping role, which begged the question of how the U.S. would exercise its restraining influence. Asked whether his model for a peacekeeping role was the U.S. force in the Sinai or the interposition of the 7th Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland at the start of the Korean War, he was noncommittal.

- e. In later discussion one of the official's aides said that the peacekeeping force could occupy the DMZ, which could be enlarged to accommodate all of the troops.

C. ROK views

- 1. Kim Dae Jung's "three-stage approach" calls for "the reduction of American forces in Korea and the readjustment of their role...in tandem with inter-Korean arms control."³

D. Questions

- 1. How does the DPRK view the U.S. troops presence? How would U.S. troops function as peacekeepers? How could their peacekeeping role be reconciled with American command of combined forces in Korea?
- 2. Widening the DMZ could be a profoundly stabilizing step, allowing peacekeepers to monitor DPRK artillery to assure that it was not being readied to fire and to prevent inadvertent use, or else to provide early warning of a potential breach of the ceasefire. How wide is the DPRK prepared to make the DMZ? What reciprocal measures would the DPRK want from the U.S. and ROK?
- 3. Alternatively, is the DPRK prepared to withdraw its forward-deployed artillery, and if so, what does it want in return?
- 4. DPRK artillery is capable of launching chemical rounds. Is the DPRK prepared to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and get rid of its chemical weapons in a verifiable way? If not, why not? If

so, what does it want in return?

II. The DPRK's ballistic missile program

- A. The DPRK is known to have produced and sold versions of the Soviet SCUD-B missile. The SCUD-B has a reported range of about 300 kilometers with a 1000-kilogram payload. Its development is said to have been funded by Iran for use against Iraq during the 1980s war.⁴ North Korea is also reported to have built a longer-range version, the SCUD-C, capable of hurling a 700-kilogram payload some 500 kilometers, but its CEP of one mile makes it incapable of striking pinpoint targets. The DPRK began selling this missile to Iran and Syria in 1991 and some 400 are reported to have been sold to Middle Eastern countries since then.⁵ A newer missile, the Rodong, is said to be capable of a range of 1000 kilometers with a one-ton payload, long enough to reach Japan. Reportedly its development began in 1988 or 1989 and it is now assessed as "operational," but so far the Rodong has been **flight-tested just once**, in May 1993, and at half its full range or about 500 kilometers.⁶ In the spring of 1997 Japanese press reports claimed that several Rodongs had been deployed.⁷ Admiral Joseph Prueher subsequently stated that trucks and troops believed to be missile-related had been detected, but no Nodong missiles.⁸ The DPRK is said to have two other missiles under development. February 1994 press reports said the U.S. had detected two "missile simulators," mock-ups of two-stage missiles, at the Sanum-dong missile research center near Taepodong. The smaller of the two, dubbed the Taepodong I, is said to have a range of 1500-2000 kilometers with a one-ton payload. The other, the Taepodong II, is estimated to have a range of 3500-6000 kilometers.⁹ The longer range would make it capable of reaching Alaska. Neither has yet been tested and the technical hurdles are high. Preparations for a missile test were detected in the spring of 1994, shortly after Israel, at American request, called off a missile deal with the DPRK, and again in October 1996, shortly after the U.S. cancelled a second round of missile talks with the DPRK. No tests took place on either occasion. This pattern is consistent with one that the North exhibited in its nuclear program: attracting American attention but exercising some self-restraint in an effort to negotiate a deal. The fact that the DPRK prepared for, but did not conduct a ballistic missile test in nearly five years suggests that it appreciates the critical importance of no tests as a verifiable basis for a deal.

B. DPRK Views

1. In a track II discussion on May 4, 1996, a senior DPRK official characterized the missile sales as strictly a "commercial" matter, driven by the DPRK's need for hard currency. A DPRK official told the U.S. that in 1991 just after the U.S. tried and failed to intercept a ship believed to be bound for Syria with a cargo of SCUD-Cs.

C. U.S. Views

1. In the second round of ballistic missile talks, the U.S. did offer some easing of sanctions in return for a halt to DPRK missile sales and even more substantial easing for an end to missile tests. The DPRK did not respond to the offer in that round.

D. Questions

1. If DPRK missile sales are purely "commercial" transactions, can the U.S. purchase an exclusive right to buy?
2. Would that right extend to missile components? To the marketing of its missile expertise?
3. Are the missile development programs also "for sale" and if so, what is the asking price?
4. Is the DPRK willing to join the Missile Technology Control Regime and abide by its rules?

III. Serious North-South engagement

- A. North and South Korea are about to resume direct bilateral talks, probably in Beijing. In his inaugural address Kim Dae Jung invited direct talks. The DPRK was notably circumspect about criticizing that address, as well as his subsequent statement about the need for U.S. forces to remain in Korea. In the March round of four-party talks, a DPRK representative approached his ROK counterpart at a social function at the Chinese consulate in Geneva and asked, whether South Korea would still be interested in four-party talks once North-South talks resume. The implication was that they will resume. Areas of convergence between the DPRK and Kim Dae Jung suggest that this dialogue has the possibility of leading to serious engagement:

B. A pre-confederal period of peaceful coexistence

1. DPRK Views

- a. The DPRK's position had been that unification would occur by 1995. Yet since January 1, 1996, when a joint editorial in the party and military newspapers made no reference to this date, the timetable for unification has **disappeared** from DPRK commentary. Instead the DPRK has focused on a interim period of peaceful coexistence between North and South.
- b. In an August 30, 1996 track II discussion, a senior DPRK official said that confederation might take time. The official did not dispute an American interlocutor's comment that the DPRK now favored a "pre-confederal period of indefinite duration."
- c. Most recently, on February 24, 1998 the DPRK party newspaper called for North and South Korea "to improve relations and achieve reconciliation and unity." Improved relations and reconciliation is the immediate aim, and reunification, the longer-term one.

2. South Korean Views

- a. Kim Dae Jung, as part of his "three-stage" approach to Korean unification, has spoken of an initial decade-long confederal stage characterized by peaceful coexistence.

C. The December 13, 1991 North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation as the basis for North-South dialogue

1. DPRK Views

- a. At the conclusion of the preparatory talks preceding the opening of the four-way talks, Ambassador Kim Gye Gwan spoke of willingness to implement the North-South accords in direct talks with the ROK outside the four-party framework.
- b. In letters sent to Kim Dae Jung and 70 others February 19, 1998, DPRK party and civic organizations sought dialogue with their South Korean counterparts. KWP Secretary Kim Yong Sun said, "We make it clear we are

willing to have a dialogue and negotiation with anyone in South Korea, including political parties and organizations."

2. ROK Views

- a. Kim Dae Jung said in his inaugural address: "The path toward the resolution of South-North problems is already open. It lies in the implementation of the North-South Basic Agreement, adopted December 13, 1991."
- b. In the interregnum, Kim Dae Jung reportedly had indications from Pyongyang that it would welcome a "personal" envoy but he insisted that any contacts be official, albeit not necessarily public. He proposed an exchange of special envoys to promote implementation of the accord. Rather than seek an immediate summit meeting, he said on March 1, "we are prepared to respond to proposals for dialogue at any level."

D. Reuniting divided families

1. DPRK Views

- a. On February 15, 1998, the DPRK announced its intention to establish an information center to disclose the fate of members of divided families, supply their addresses, and arrange reunions, as well as to serve as a meeting site.¹⁰

2. ROK Views

- a. In his "three-stage" approach to unification, Kim Dae Jung proposed starting with an exchange of addresses and other information, followed by exchange of mail, reunions in the DMZ, home visits, and resettlement.¹¹
- b. In his inaugural address, Kim Dae Jung said, "We must let those separated from their families...meet and communicate with each other as soon as possible" and took note of "some positive signs North Korea has shown of late."

E. Easing legal restrictions on personal contact

1. DPRK Views

- a. The DPRK has called for the abolition of the National Security Law and dismantling of the National Security Planning Agency in order to facilitate contact. Interviewed by a South Korean weekly on March 12, 1998, Li Gun eased that stance, "Even if these are not abolished at once, the ROK should try to do so."¹²

2. ROK Views

- a. In his "three-stage" approach, Kim Dae Jung saw "the need to change or abolish various restrictions that have so far impeded inter-Korean exchanges. For instance, despite the alleged intent, the existing 'Law for the North-South Exchange and Cooperation' actually makes it very difficult for the inter-Korean exchanges to go forward because of the extra complex system of the government recognition and permission processes, and excessive penalty provisions."¹³

F. A "peace mechanism" to replace the Military Armistice Commission," which had been set up along with the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission under the July 27, 1953 Armistice Agreement to observe, inspect, and investigate implementation of the armistice.

1. DPRK Views

- a. In the December 13, 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, the DPRK agreed with the ROK to "endeavor together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace" and to "abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace has been realized."
- b. The DPRK had campaigned for an end to the M.A.C. ever since March 25, 1991, when an ROK general was named senior representative from the U.N. Command to the M.A.C.
- c. The DPRK first proposed a peace mechanism to implement an "interim agreement," as distinct from a peace treaty, on April 28, 1994, in announcing its intention to withdraw from the

M.A.C. The DPRK called for the U.S. to conclude an "interim agreement" with it to deter armed conflict and reduce the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula and maintain the armistice. To implement that agreement it called for "a DPRK-U.S. joint military body to be organized and operated in Panmunjom in place of the M.A.C."

- d. As elaborated as recently as February 22, 1996, the interim agreement was to cover, among other things, "management of the Military Demarcation Line and the DMZ; ways to resolve armed conflict and accidents; the composition, duty, and authority of a joint military body."
- e. The DPRK renewed its proposal for a peace mechanism in talks with the U.S. after it shot down a stray American helicopter over its territory on December 18, 1994.
- f. On the eve of four-party preparatory talks, the DPRK officially agreed to respect the Military Armistice Agreement "until a new institutional mechanism is established to replace the present armistice body."
- g. In track II discussions, DPRK officials have hinted at ROK participation in the peace mechanism. As a senior DPRK official put it on May 4, 1996, "We are not saying South Korea cannot participate. We [the U.S. and DPRK] will discuss what the South Korean role will be." Another senior DPRK official was more forthcoming on August 30, 1996: "We are not just going to talk with the U.S., but we are considering how we would allow a South Korean role." The DPRK told the U.S. that ROK participation was inherent in the February 22, 1996 proposal.
- h. In a recent exchange of letters with U.S. officers and lower-level meetings at Panmunjom, the DPRK has shown interest in resuming general officers' meetings, broken off after an ROK general was named U.N. representative to the M.A.C. Generals from, the ROK, U.S., Britain, and a fourth U.N. member would represent the U.N. Command.

2. ROK Views

- a. The ROK objected to a meeting between a U.S. and a DPRK general in the M.A.C. just after the December 1994 helicopter incident.

3. US Views

- a. In September 1974 Secretary of State Kissinger had suggested replacing the M.A.C. with a "more fundamental arrangement."
- b. At the time of the helicopter incident, the U.S. and DPRK held talks under M.A.C. auspices in which only a U.S. general and a DPRK general took part. The U.S. turned down a DPRK request to institutionalize that arrangement.

4. Questions

- a. Will the DPRK respect the M.A.C.? Unconditionally?
- b. What role does the DPRK envision for the ROK in talks about the peace mechanism? In the operation of such a mechanism?

G. Confidence-building measures -- The North-South agreement of December 13, 1991 provided for a North-South Joint Military Commission "to discuss and carry out steps to building mutual confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of ... attack capabilities, and verification thereof."

1. DPRK Views

- a. The DPRK's position had long been that force reductions had to **precede** CBMs. The ROK took the opposite tack.
- b. The DPRK did propose a CBM of sorts on July 29, 1985, deep cuts in military personnel and removal of all heavy and automatic weapons from the M.A.C. headquarters area at Panmunjom to reduce risks of a repetition of the firefight that broke out in November 1984

when a Soviet defector ran across the Military Demarcation Line.¹⁴

- c. On March 11, 1997, at the time of the joint briefing, a senior DPRK official asked an American involved in track II to convey an offer to discuss CBMs, including a troop withdrawal along the DMZ, in three-party talks with the ROK and the U.S. in return for official food aid from the South. About a week later, another senior DPRK official, Han Song Ryol in an interview in a ROK newspaper, Hangyore Shinmun, hinted at such an offer.
- d. A DPRK delegation visited the Sandia Cooperative Monitoring Center on June 16, 1997 and discussed monitoring for conventional arms control.

2. ROK Views

- a. In his "three-stage approach," Kim Dae Jung proposes a "phased exchange of military information," including military deployments above a designated level, weaponry, defense spending, and the status of defense industries; a direct, stable communications link between the military authorities of the two sides; advance notice of military maneuvers with observers from the other side; exchanges of military personnel; agreement "against surprise attacks and accidental military incidents"; the withdrawal of forces from the DMZ, creation of a "limited deployment zone" beyond the DMZ that bars deployment of offensive forces.¹⁵
3. Hot lines -- The December 13, 1991 North-South accord provided for installation of a "telephone hot line" between the "military authorities" of the two sides "to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation." The hot line has yet to be installed. An earlier hot line proved to be abortive. As a result of the North-South accord of July 4, 1972 signed by Lee Hu-rak of the KCIA and Kim Yong-ju, younger brother of Kim Il Sung and director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the KWP Central Committee, a direct telephone line was established between their offices. It eventually expanded to 23 circuits during the Red Cross talks of 1972. The so-called hot line was unilaterally cut off by the DPRK

shortly after the ax-murder incident in the DMZ in August 1976.

4. Regulation of military exercises

- a. On May 31, 1988 the DPRK called for an end to exercises of division-size and above. At the same time it called for an end to joint US-ROK exercises without specifying what it would do in return.
- b. The DPRK has continued to call for an end to joint U.S.-ROK exercises like Team Spirit and more recently Focus Lens. It has had little to say officially about forms of regulation, which would allow exercises, undercutting demands for an outright ban.
- c. After an armed clash in the DMZ on July 16, 1997, the North Koreans began broadcasting **in advance** when "a certain number of their soldiers will go out for routine reconnaissance at a certain time and a certain location in the DMZ."¹⁶
- d. In a track II effort, Li Hyong Chol, head of the DPRK delegation to the missile talks, was briefed on monitoring and verification technologies applicable to the DMZ when he visited the Sandia Cooperative Monitoring Center on June 16, 1997. Senator Sam Nunn and Ambassador James Laney got a conditionally positive response from DPRK representatives whom they briefed on a military-to-military hot line and advanced notification of exercises in Pyongyang on July 21, 1997.

5. Questions

- a. What significance should we attach to DPRK broadcasts about reconnaissance in the DMZ?
- b. What confidence-building measures does the DPRK consider useful?
- c. Is the DPRK prepared to reestablish hot lines, and if so, between what entities?
- d. Would a track II dialogue among retired DPRK and US military officers be useful?

H. The role of the U.S. in North-South dialogue

1. DPRK Views

- a. The DPRK has repeatedly described the North-South dialogue as the exclusive province of the two countries.
- b. In track II discussion on August 29, 1996 a senior DPRK official spoke of the US standing "in a neutral position on the DMZ, listening with one ear toward Pyongyang and the other ear toward Seoul."

2. ROK Views

- a. The ROK has often said that internal Korean matters should be left to the North and South to resolve.
- b. Some senior officials in the Kim Young Sam administration have spoken privately of the need for American involvement for the North-South dialogue to make progress.

I. Questions

1. Is the DPRK now prepared to resume the North-South dialogue?
2. Which subjects addressed in the North-South accord top the DPRK's agenda for dialogue?
3. Do recent DPRK formulations about an American role mean that, in view of the difficulties that the two sides have had in sustaining their dialogue, the DPRK believes that the U.S. can play a useful role as honest broker?

IV. Economic reconstruction of North Korea

- A. The DPRK has long sought an end to the U.S. economic embargo. From its standpoint, perhaps the most important aspect of the October 1994 Agreed Framework was its hope that the American role in organizing a consortium to supply replacement reactors and heavy fuel oil marked the start of economic cooperation. The DPRK subsequently negotiated legal protocols with KEDO that are readily adaptable for private firms seeking to operate in the DPRK. The DPRK continues to express disappointment at the pace of further easing of the

embargo and to complain that the U.S. is using food aid as a lever. The U.S., for its part, has considered licenses on a case-by-case basis and has sought to ease the embargo in phase with reciprocal steps by the DPRK, culminating in a complete lifting. In an important sign that it did not seek to compel North Korea's collapse, the U.S. has committed itself to meeting its share of the DPRK's food needs and has become the second largest provider of food to the DPRK. American officials have also stressed that without changes in the DPRK economy, substantial trade and investment was unlikely, embargo or no embargo. Some want to withhold trade and investment until North Korea reforms. Yet there are indications that the DPRK is introducing important changes in its economy and is open to, indeed welcomes, foreign investment and technical assistance in selected sectors of its economy. A strategy of facilitating the economic reconstruction of North Korea by easing impediments to trade and investment might encourage the DPRK to make adjustments that would enable its economy to function more efficiently and might also improve the political environment for more far-reaching confidence-building measures and force reductions that would bring the military confrontation to an end on the peninsula. A comprehensive program of economic engagement might include:

- B. Foreign trade and investment -- Investment in mining, light manufacturing, and other key sectors would enable the DPRK to boost exports and obtain the hard currency it needs to pay for imports of its own food, energy, and other necessities. The DPRK's external debt poses a considerable problem, although the market for its debt has shown modest signs of life recently: the price has risen from 18 cents on the dollar to nearly 20 cents. Since 1992 DPRK officials in track II discussions have acknowledged the need to address the debt issue. Private investors have been deterred not only by the economic embargo, but also by concern about the political risks and impediments to doing business in the North, as well as dim prospects for profitability. Over the past two years, some of the concerns about DPRK inhospitality to private investment have eased somewhat, yet many remain. One way to ease these concerns further would be to open the Asian Development Bank and other multilateral institutions to membership by the DPRK.

1. DPRK Views

- a. The Tokyo-based Korea-Japan Export-Import Co. announced that a free-trade zone would be set

up in Rajin-Sambong in which "private businesses are permitted," including wholly foreign-owned ones; in which state- and locally-owned enterprises can be converted into "independent economic entities, responsible for their own management"; and in which the currency will be the brown won (which is exchanged for hard currency at a lower value than the purple won).

- b. A joint editorial by the party and military newspapers on January 1, 1998 set as the "most cardinal task" to "boost agriculture, the coal industry, electric power industry, railway transport, and metal industry" and "to implement the party's light industry-first policy."
- c. In a track II discussion on August 29, 1996, a senior DPRK official noted that the land area of the Rajin-Sambong enterprise zone was about 10 percent of the total living space of the DPRK, said with unusual directness, "So we can say that 10 percent of North Korea has gone capitalist already."
- d. Starting in 1995, the DPRK tried to negotiate an agreement with the International Civil Aviation Organization opening its air space to civil flights from the ROK. After a period of ROK resistance, that agreement was finally concluded on October 7, 1997.
- e. DPRK and World Bank officials have exchanged visits this year.
- f. The DPRK has assigned a dozen economists to prepare a meeting with the U.N. Development Program in Geneva currently scheduled for April 30 to talk about restructuring its economy.
- g. The DPRK accepted a joint economic commission with the Council on Foreign Relations on how to open up its economy. The Council has yet to agree.

2. ROK Views

- a. In January 1989 Hyundai signed an agreement to manufacture rail cars in the DPRK. The first four cars were shipped into South Korea

on March 4, 1998. Hyundai also has agreements to construct a marine container factory, to scrap and repair ships, and to manufacture clothing in North Korea.

- b. In his "three-stage" approach, Kim Dae Jung discusses how to facilitate the shift from indirect to direct North-South trade. To ease the DPRK's chronic balance of payments deficit and lack of foreign exchange, "we ought to consider long-term interest free loans to North Korea to cover their deficits arising from inter-Korean exchanges as well as institutionalizing a mechanism by which long-term loans can be provided to enable the North to purchase South Korean goods."¹⁷
- c. Kim Dae Jung, in his "three-stage" approach writes, "The joint development of resources has been proposed by both sides since the first North-South Economic Conference in 1984. ...For South Korea, the development of mineral resources in North Korea will save a lot in transportation costs; for the North, it will mean a significant development of minerals as well as the means for acquiring foreign exchange."¹⁸
- d. The Kim Dae Jung government has decided to raise the limit on investment by private firms to \$10 million, from \$5 million. It also plans to abolish the \$1-million ceiling on the value of materials each South Korean firm can send to the North and wants to open more direct land and sea routes to the North than via China.
- e. The March 23 guidelines on policy toward the DPRK state, "The government will pursue the policy of separating politics from the economy with the aim of promoting South-North Korean economic and business cooperation."
- f. The ROK in 1997 declared its willingness to open the Asian Development Bank to DPRK membership.

3. Japanese Views

- a. Japan continues to oppose DPRK entry into the Asian Development Bank.

- b. The Japanese government has established several study groups on various aspects of DPRK development needs, including trade, investment, finance, and North Korean indebtedness.
- C. Agriculture -- The U.S. and South Korea have moved to satisfy DPRK short-term needs for food, medicine, and other vital supplies with humanitarian aid, without linkage to other issues. They have yet to provide much technical assistance, or to give the DPRK what it needs to grow and process food, including the supply and production of fertilizer, supply of new seed stock, and training and experiments in new planting techniques. While the word "reform" remains taboo in the North, "modernization" and "change" are not. Visitors have noted such changes as private farm plots for produce, tobacco, and other cash crops; farmers' markets; and especially on the east coast, an informal sector of itinerant vendors who buy and sell food and other wares apparently unimpeded by internal travel restrictions. The International Fund for Agricultural Development has made the first loan to the DPRK by an international agency -- for the raising of livestock by households on cooperative, not collective farms. Experiments in new forms of organization in agriculture include direct trading between cooperatives and micro-credit loans funded by I.F.A.D. to "cooperatives" as small as seven or eight people (i.e., the size of an extended family).

1. DPRK Views

- a. DPRK officials have welcomed "training" by outsiders: the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization has trained 65 North Korean agricultural scientists in new farming techniques and the U.N.D.P. has sent 34 North Koreans to Australia for training in market economics. With help from the Carter Center, the DPRK began double-cropping rice fields in the northern part of the country, growing vegetables and other grains before planting rice in mid-June.
- b. As of mid-1997, farmers may "freely dispose of" -- i.e., **sell** -- surplus agricultural goods in excess of their state quota.
- c. In March 1997, the DPRK proposed joint farming with the ROK in which the ROK would provide equipment, seeds, fertilizer, and manpower and the DPRK would provide the land

and the harvest would be split fifty-fifty.

2. ROK Views

- a. The ROK has already allowed at least a dozen new varieties of rice to be exported to the DPRK.
- b. In an April 11, 1997 speech to the National Press Club in Washington, Kim Dae Jung said that "the U.S. and South Korea have to work together and do their best to help North Korea avoid a collapse course." At that time the South was insisting that the North engage in dialogue before it would give substantial food aid, but he noted, "South Korea should transcend diplomatic formalities to expedite food aid to the North in cooperation with the U.S., Japan, and other western nations."
- c. In his "three-stage" approach, Kim Dae Jung includes among "specific plans to address the agricultural problems through inter-Korean cooperation" the following: "the supply of fertilizers and other farm materials, joint preventive measures against blight and harmful insects, the development and exchange of grains similar to consignment processing in the manufacturing sector, soil testing for major grains, agricultural technology training for farmers, and others." He also would look at "the indefinite lease of farm land and tools/machines, and contract farming." He also writes, "South Korea should seek ways to assist North Korean agriculture in technology assistance and cooperation through the United Nations and other international bodies," as well as through North-South mechanisms.¹⁹
- d. The Kim Dae Jung government has authorized shipment of 50,000 tons of grain to the DPRK, substantially less than the 150,000 tons sent by the Kim Young Sam government, but it said private humanitarian groups would be allowed to provide as much food aid as they wish, not necessarily through the ROK Red Cross, and travel to the DPRK to deliver it. Private fund-raising events in the ROK will now be encouraged.

3. Japanese Views

- a. Japan has developed a number of seeds that would thrive in North Korea but has yet to provide any.

D. Energy -- KEDO has been providing the DPRK with heavy fuel oil and is scheduled to begin construction of the first of two nuclear power plants soon. North Korea could benefit from institutional capacity-building and technical assistance and external investment in the fields of renewable energy, energy efficiency, and the development of non-nuclear energy. Institutional capacity-building could include development of state regulatory agencies, environmental organizations, power companies, and other institutions; a legal framework and other regulatory arrangements; and the training of administrators. Projects to facilitate the introduction of new renewable energy technologies could harness wind, solar, and hydro (for instance, selectively sited small dams for power generation in rural areas, which would also be useful in flood control and irrigation). Reforestation projects, if expanded, could eventually replace dwindling charcoal supplies, as well as offer environmental benefits, such as retarding topsoil erosion and fixing carbon (the DPRK has one of the world's highest per capita rates of carbon emissions). Improving energy efficiency from power generation to final use could involve the refurbishing of the DPRK's electrical grid, the supply of safety equipment for coal mines, the introduction and manufacture of energy efficient lighting, improving the energy efficiency of factories (for instance, bakeries and food-processing plants), insulating apartment buildings, exploitation of indigenous, environmentally appropriate fuels, even construction of a natural gas pipeline from Russia.

1. DPRK Views

- a. In track II discussions this year, senior DPRK officials have expressed exasperation over delays in the LWR project and have alluded to the possibility of non-nuclear alternatives, specifically thermal energy.
- b. The DPRK has approved a Nautilus Institute renewable energy project, using windmills.

2. ROK Views

- a. Kim Dae Jung, in his "three-stage" approach says, "South Korea ought to cooperate in the

upgrading of North Korea's facilities for power transmission, distribution, and wiring." Specifically, "In order to alleviate North Korea's energy crisis, South Korea must consider first the supply of South Korean electric power to the North. The difference in voltage can be fixed by building the necessary transformer substations." He also notes that "it would be vital for South Korea to cooperate with the North in the task of renovating and improving the existing electric power stations."²⁰

3. Chinese Views

- a. In track II channels, Chinese officials have expressed increasing interest in multilateral economic assistance projects in the field of energy.

E. Environment -- Both North and South are adversely affected by pollution caused by their own economic development. Joint projects may be desirable; they surely are necessary. For instance, under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, it would pay for South Korea to improve energy efficiency in North Korea, where the cost of reducing emissions is relatively low, and get partial or full credit for reductions against their emissions target. Priority projects might include technical manuals and training for the State Environmental Commission and the Research Center for Nature Protection and Resource Management of the DPRK Academy of Sciences; use of remote sensing; reforestation; and joint DPRK-ROK management of the wildlife refuge in the DMZ.

1. DPRK Views

- a. The DPRK is a signatory of many international treaties on the environment, among them, the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the Biodiversity Convention, and the Climate Change Convention.
- b. Kim Il Sung is said to have "set forth the principle that the problem of environmental protection should be taken first into account ahead of socioeconomic development and that every possible measure should be taken for environmental protection ahead of production ...," implying that environmental protection

and socioeconomic development are tradeoffs, not integrated as in sustainable development. In practice, environmental regulation is lax.

- c. DPRK officials have privately expressed interest in obtaining acid-rain monitoring equipment.

2. ROK Views

- a. Kim Dae Jung, in his "three-stage" approach, says, "We ought to hurry an inter-Korean agreement for environmental cooperation," including exchange of data on pollution, an ecological study of the DMZ, transfer of purification technology, and setting up a joint policy-making body.²¹

F. Tourism -- Areas of the North have considerable cultural and historic interest to Koreans. Some are also suitable to be developed as resort areas. Asian tourists have been travelling there for several years.

1. DPRK Views

- a. In 1990 the DPRK signed an agreement with Hyundai of South Korea for joint development of the tourism potential of the Kumgangsam (Diamond Mountains) region.

2. ROK Views

- a. Kim Dae Jung's "three-stage" approach notes, "The most desirable joint project that the two Koreas could pursue in the earliest stage of confederation is the development of tourist areas [in the North]."²²

G. Culture -- The common culture of Koreans, North and South, is a longstanding feature of both DPRK and ROK approaches to unification.

H. Questions

- 1. Which, if any, of these areas of economic reconstruction are of particular interest to the DPRK?
- 2. What is the DPRK view of cooperating with the U.S. and the ROK on non-nuclear energy alternatives? Would it permit an energy assessment by the World

Bank?

3. What would the DPRK think about a consortium, modeled on KEDO, to undertake joint projects on the environment?
4. Would the DPRK be interested in a joint DPRK-ROK archeological exhibition of cultural artifacts that travels to Seoul, Pyongyang, and Washington?

V. Terrorism

- A. The DPRK was responsible for some of the most heinous acts of terrorism in Northeast Asia until the mid-1980s. As part of the "five-point policy" of the Reagan Administration, one of the five preconditions for improving government-to-government relations with the DPRK was to obtain credible assurances that the DPRK had ceased its support of terrorism. The DPRK did so to the Bush Administration's satisfaction. There have been no credible reports of DPRK terrorism since 1990, although leaflets threatening to bomb Chosun Ilbo discovered and attributed to the North revived concern last July. A related issue that impedes DPRK political and economic relations with Japan is the dispute over abduction of Japanese nationals in Japan. The two sides are currently negotiating the matter. One way to resolve the issue is to establish a body to investigate and resolve the individual cases, modelled on the joint U.S.-DPRK military commission looking into the issue of American missing-in-action from the Korean War.

1. DPRK Views

- a. Kim Yong Sun, at the conclusion of an October 1997 visit by members of Japan's ruling coalition, expressed willingness to look into the "missing persons" issue.

2. Japanese Views

- a. The Japanese government has submitted a list of ten missing persons and asked for DPRK assistance in ascertaining their whereabouts. The DPRK has replied by identifying the names of three Japanese nationals not on the list whose whereabouts were known.

NOTES

¹Statement of DPRK Government, July 23, 1987; "On Easing the Tensions on the Korean Peninsula and Creating a Peaceful Climate for National Reunification," proposal adopted at a joint meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, and the Administrative Council of the DPRK, May 31, 1988. Cf., Ralph Clough, Embattled Korea, pp. 102-21.

²Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach to Korean Reunification (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies, 1997), p. 103n.

³Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, p. 103.

⁴Joseph Bermudez, "Ballistic Missiles Ascendant," Jane's Defense Weekly, April 10, 1993, p. 10.

⁵Sam Jameson, "North Korea tests missile able to reach Japan," Washington Times, June 12, 1993, p. A-13; "N. Korea said capable of making 100 missiles a year," Asian Political News, September 30, 1996; Greg Girardi and Joseph Bermudez, "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, VII, 4 (April 1995), pp. 184-90.

⁶Jameson, "North Korea tests missile"; "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 test successful," Yonhap (Seoul), June 24, 1993, in FBIS, June 24, 1993, p. 19.

⁷"South Korea: DPRK Reportedly Deploys Nodong Missiles Along East Coast," KBS-1 Radio (Seoul), April 10, 1997, in FBIS, April 10, 1997; "Tokyo 'Seriously Concerned' Over DPRK Missiles," Kyodo (Tokyo), April 11, 1997, in FBIS, April 11, 1997; "Japan says North Korea may have deployed missiles," Reuters, April 14, 1997.

⁸Bill Gertz, "North Korea cited for missile activity," Washington Times, September 27, 1997, p. 3. Cf., "Defense Source Doubts US Reports on Nodong Missiles," Kyodo (Tokyo), May 6, 1997, in FBIS-EAS, May 7, 1997.

⁹"N Korea casts a longer shadow with TD-2," Jane's Defense Weekly, April 30, 1997, p. 5. Cf., James Asker, "Missile Threats," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 11, 1997, p. 23.

¹⁰Interview with Li Gun, Sisa Journal, March 12, 1998, pp. 56-57.

¹¹Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, pp. 274-76.

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¹²Interview with Li Gun, Sisa Journal, March 12, 1998, pp. 56-57.

¹³Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, p. 250.

¹⁴Ralph Clough, Embattled Korea, p. 199.

¹⁵Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, pp. 64, 96.

¹⁶Spokesman for the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff quoted in "N.K. gives prior notice for DMZ reconnaissance," Korea Herald, September 8, 1997, p. 3.

¹⁷Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, pp. 158-59.

¹⁸Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, pp. 180.

¹⁹Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, p. 174.

²⁰Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, p. 177.

²¹Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, p. 198.

²²Kim Dae Jung, "Three-Stage" Approach, p. 172.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9804270
RECEIVED: 11 JUN 98 14

TO: ALBRIGHT, M

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 19 JUN 98
SOURCE REF: 98-31

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
PD

OIL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PD 98-31 ON US ASSISTANCE TO KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
ORGAN - KEDO

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD PD 98-31

DUE DATE: 17 JUN 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ABERCROMBIE-WINSTANL
HIGHSMITH
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
PRITCHARD
SAMORE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY TMA DATE 6.19.98 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY: NSTMH

DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9804270

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRITCHARD	Z 98061114 PREPARE MEMO FOR DAVIES
001 OMB	Z 98061116 COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE
002	Z 98061619 RECD OMB CONCURRENCE
002 SAMORE	Z 98061619 APPROPRIATE ACTION
003 BERGER	Z 98061812 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
004 PRESIDENT	Z 98061822 FOR SIGNATURE
005	X 98061914 PRESIDENT SGD PD 98-31

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

004 980618	VICE PRESIDENT
004 980618	WH CHIEF OF STAFF
005 980619 ALBRIGHT, M	KENNEY, K
005 980619	CONROY, R
005 980619	DUSAULT, P
005 980619	SAUNDERS, T

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4270
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>d</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>② 4/17</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>② 6/18</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>SWD 6/18</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 6-19</u>	<u>D</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>TMA 6-19</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: *Per Lael B. Inkson does not need to chug.*

'98 JUN 17 04:14:07

Exec Sec Office has diskette ✓

Frankenick - ②
You should sign. This follows through on a decision that has already been made.

e2

TO: DAVIES

FROM: KENNEY, K

DOC DATE: 10 JUN 98
SOURCE REF: 9810174

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
PD

OIL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT PD TO USE 5 MILLION IN FY 1997 ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS FOR US
CONTRIBUTION TO KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORG

ACTION: COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE

DUE DATE: 17 JUN 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SAMORE

FOR CONCURRENCE
BAKER
KRISTOFF
LEE
OMB

FOR INFO
BOONE
CARAVELLI
CLARKE
JONES, K
PRITCHARD

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COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1998

Presidential Determination
No. 98-31

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on U.S. Assistance to
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO)

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a)(1) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish up to \$5 million in funds made available under Chapter IV, Part II of the Act for a U.S. contribution to KEDO without regard to any provision of law within the scope of section 614(a)(1). I hereby authorize this contribution.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.

William J. Clinton

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9804270
DATE 19 JUN 98

SUBJECT: PD 98-31 ON US ASSISTANCE TO KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>
MS. RYAN CONROY ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523 AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>
MR. PHILIP DUSAULT INTL SECURITY AFFAIRS ROOM 10002 NEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>
MR. TIM SAUNDERS ROOM 5 OEOB WH EXECUTIVE CLERK	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1998

~~98 JUN 19 11:55~~ACTION

98 JUN 19 09:45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK *J*

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *(K) R*

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on U.S. Assistance to
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO)

Purpose

To invoke Presidential waiver authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act in order to provide reprogrammed FY97 Economic Support Funds for a contribution of \$5 million to KEDO.

Background

On May 5, 1998, you authorized the Department of State to consult with, and provide written justification to, the appropriate committees of Congress as required under Section 614. On June 10, 1998, the Department of State notified the NSC that these Congressional consultations had identified no opposition to the use of the 614 waiver for this purpose (Tab B). By signing the attached Presidential Determination at Tab A, you will invoke section 614 to authorize the use of \$5 million in reprogrammed FY97 Economic Support Funds for a contribution to KEDO. These funds are part of the overall plan to fully fund Heavy Fuel Oil purchases for the remainder of the year and to reduce KEDO's outstanding debt.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Presidential Determination at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Presidential 614 Determination
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1998

ACTIONPresident sgd per WH
Executive Clerk TMA 6.19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER (K) SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on U.S. Assistance to
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO)Purpose

To invoke Presidential waiver authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act in order to provide reprogrammed FY97 Economic Support Funds for a contribution of \$5 million to KEDO.

Background

On May 5, 1998, you authorized the Department of State to consult with, and provide written justification to, the appropriate committees of Congress as required under Section 614. On June 10, 1998, the Department of State notified the NSC that these Congressional consultations had identified no opposition to the use of the 614 waiver for this purpose (Tab B). By signing the attached Presidential Determination at Tab A, you will invoke section 614 to authorize the use of \$5 million in reprogrammed FY97 Economic Support Funds for a contribution to KEDO. These funds are part of the overall plan to fully fund Heavy Fuel Oil purchases for the remainder of the year and to reduce KEDO's outstanding debt.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Presidential Determination at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Presidential 614 Determination
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4270

June 15, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER (10) R
THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRSTOFF 3
FROM: JACK PRITCHARD 3
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on U.S. Assistance to
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization

On May 5, 1998 the President authorized the Department of State to consult with, and provide written justification to, the appropriate committees of Congress prior to making his decision whether to exercise his authority under section 614 (a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to permit a contribution of \$5 million in reprogrammed FY97 Economic Support Funds to KEDO. This action has been accomplished. State has identified no opposition to the President's proposed determination under section 614.

The \$5 million in reprogrammed funds is part of the overall plan the President approved to seek an additional \$32 million for KEDO in FY 1998 beyond the \$30 million we already have obligated. As soon as the President signs the Determination, KEDO can borrow funds to provide another shipment of Heavy Fuel Oil to North Korea.

Concurrences by: Newell Highsmith, Gina Abercrombie- } P
Winstanley, Gary Samore

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Presidential Determination to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Determination
Tab B Incoming Correspondence



4270
S/S 9810174
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 10, 1998

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Action Required to Use \$5 Million in
FY 1997 Economic Support Funds to make a U.S.
Contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO)

This memorandum requests that the President sign the Determination required to make available FY 1997 Economic Support Funds for a contribution of \$5 million to KEDO in order to provide heavy fuel oil to North Korea. On May 5, 1998, the President authorized the Department of State to consult with, and provide a written justification to, the appropriate committees of Congress prior to making his decision whether to exercise his authority under section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), to permit this U.S. contribution to KEDO.


The State Department has held formal consultations with, and provided the written policy justification to, the relevant Congressional committees as required under Section 614. Specifically, we presented briefings to staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees. Our consultations have identified no opposition to the President's proposed determination under section 614.

JUN 14 1998
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

Accordingly, we recommend that the President exercise his authority under section 614(a)(1) of the FAA and sign the attached Presidential determination that "it is important to the security interests of the United States" to furnish \$5 million in reprogrammed prior year ESF funds to KEDO.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Kristie A. Kenny".

Kristie A. Kenny
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft Presidential determination under section 614

UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 614(a)(1) OF
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

The White House
Washington, DC
Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Use of \$5 million in Economic Support Funds
 for a Supplementary U.S. Contribution to the
 Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO)

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a)(1) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish up to \$5 million in funds made available under Chapter IV, Part II of the Act for a United States contribution to KEDO without regard to any provision of law within the scope of section 614(a)(1). I hereby authorize this contribution.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this Determination to the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 JUN 98

MEMORANDUM FOR: OMB

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: DAVIES

SOURCE: KENNEY, K

DATE: 10 JUN 98

SUBJ: DRAFT PD TO USE 5 MILLION IN FY 1997 ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS FOR US
CONTRIBUTION TO KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORG

REQUIRED ACTION: COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE

DUE DATE: 13 JUN 98

COMMENT:


FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

Hasman, Thomas M.

From: Hasman, Thomas M.
Sent: Friday, June 19, 1998 3:13 PM
To: Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.; Kristoff, Sandra J.; Samore, Gary S.; Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.; Highsmith, Newell L.
Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @WWD - West Wing Desk; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @CROSS - Cross Hatches; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Subject: Package 4270 - PD 98-31 - U.S. Assistance to KEDO [UNCLASSIFIED]

Package 4270 was signed by the President today (June 19, 1998), per The White House Executive Clerk.

Records Management has sent this PD to the Sitroom for the State Courier to pickup.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9805683
RECEIVED: 11 AUG 98 13

TO: ATWOOD, J
GLICKMAN, D

FROM: HALL, RALPH M

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
AGRICULTURE

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR NORTH KOREA TO RECEIVE FOOD ASSISTANCE

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 17 AUG 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BADER
PRITCHARD
RAGAN
RUDMAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9805683

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 98081113 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

UNCLASSIFIED

TONY P. HALL
THIRD DISTRICT OHIO

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RULES
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES AND
ORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE
CHAIRMAN
DEMOCRATIC TASK FORCE ON HUNGER

JMH

5683

U.S. Capitol Police
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1501
(202) 225-6465

501 FEDERAL BUILDING
200 WEST SECOND STREET
DAYTON, OH 45402
(937) 275-2843

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

August 6, 1998

Hon. J. Brian Atwood
Administrator
U.S. Agency for International Development
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Suite 609
Washington, DC 20523

Hon. Dan Glickman
Secretary
U.S. Department of Agriculture
14th Street and Independence
Washington, DC 20250

Dear Brian and Dan:

Thank you for moving ahead quickly on the President's initiative to purchase surplus American wheat and provide it to people in need of humanitarian aid. Your immediate action, and the profile that President Clinton gave to the terrible need that exists in the world, sent an important message both to our people, and to those to whom this food may well mean life itself.

I was troubled to learn that North Korea was not on the list of initial countries who will receive this food. This glaring omission ignores a famine that threatens a greater number of people than any other crisis in the world today. Early reports indicated that North Korea would be included in this donation, and that decisions would be based on need, instead of on politics. The initial list falls short of what is otherwise a noble initiative in our best humanitarian tradition.

I have seen for myself what a difference our food is making in North Korea, as have many other Americans working inside a country that has remained more closed to us than any other. Our food not only saves lives, it also puts the lie to propaganda that tries to call the United States an enemy of North Korea's people.

Children who scampered away on my first visit to rural areas there reacted to the sight of my delegation quite differently just a year later. Our American faces say it all, aid workers explain. I had hoped that American food would let them continue work that is overwhelming all expectations -- and building bridges that have eluded political leaders for decades.

I urge you to revisit your decision to include North Korea on the list of those participating in President Clinton's generous initiative. American food would help us

AUG 11 1998


Hon. J. Brian Atwood
Hon. Dan Glickman
August 6, 1998
Page 2

continue the work toward better relations that we have begun -- work still being done at great cost, and risk, by American soldiers working to keep peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Neglecting to include North Korea on this list confounds the spirit of our ally's effort to reach out to their neighbor. It sends the wrong signal just as North Koreans begin the hungriest months of this difficult and long year. And it costs us an opportunity to extend a policy in which the United States already has invested a great deal. Denying North Koreans food will not hurt the military and political elites in that country; it will only hurt innocent civilians and our own national interests.

Thank you for your consideration, and for your continuing efforts on behalf of hungry people. I would be honored to work with you to overcome any obstacles you may see in including North Korea in this donation.

Sincerely,



Tony P. Hall
Member of Congress

cc: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
Secretary of Defense William Cohen
National Security Adviser Samuel Berger