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Folder Title:

[South Korea]-Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. note	Handwritten notes from Samuel Berger's meeting with Lim Dong-won. (7 pages)	01/28/1999	P1/b(1)
002. talking points	Points for Meeting, January 28, 1999. (4 pages)	1/1999	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Kenneth Lieberthal. Subject: Background Information. Record ID: 9900552. (3 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	A Comprehensive Approach. (10 pages)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)
004. list	South Koreans for Meeting. [annotated] [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1999	P6/b(6)
005. talking points	Duplicate of 002. (2 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Duplicate of 003b. (11 pages)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)
007. draft	Talking Points. Points for Use with ROK. (1 page)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Talking Points. Points for Use with ROK. (1 page)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)
009. email	From Richard Christenson to Eric John at 10:07pm. Subject: Briefers for meeting. (2 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)
010. email	From White House Situation Room to Alexander Arvizu at 11:52am. Subject: ROK National Security Advisor. (4 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)
011. note	Handwritten note from Meeting with Lim Dong-won. (1 page)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
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FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F

vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. email	From White House Situation Room to Jeffery Bader, Joseph Bouchard, Valerie Guarnieri et al at 7:38am. Subject: ROK National Security Advisor. (5 pages)	01/24/1999	P1/b(1)
013. note	From Jack to Ken. Subject: Some thoughts in preparation for Lim Dong-won's visit. (2 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)

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Date: 1/28/99

To: Ken Liebertthal
NSC

Subject:

Ken:

Nice job on the NY Talk to the
Taiwan Group. We are thinking almost
unanimously — See pp. 11-15

All the best,

Mike

Pages: 18 (including this cover sheet)

(DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION)

Recent U.S. Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations

By

David M. Lampton

Prepared for:

Fourth Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations

New York City, January 25-27, 1999

Introduction

The topic of this brief essay is "Recent U.S. Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations." While I will seek to briefly describe the range of views that exist within America, I will describe principally my own views, leaving it for the discussion to make clear where my views fall within the broader range of American perspectives.

The beginning of wisdom concerning American views on cross-Strait relations is to recognize that most Americans have very little information and only the vaguest inclinations. When it comes to preferences among specific policy alternatives in non-crisis periods, these are esoteric debates conducted by people such as those around this table. This, however, is not to say American public opinion is not important in the final analysis—au contraire. Americans have general inclinations and opinions concerning broad issues (e.g. rights of self-determination) that incline them in certain directions, principally in crisis. Ironically, therefore, most Americans don't have policy relevant views as we seek to manage cross-Strait relations to avoid crisis, though they might very well have views that would almost dictate Washington's policy once a crisis is upon us.

This brief paper addresses three broad issues: 1) What has happened and what has not happened that is of consequence to cross-Strait relations in the last seven months (June 1998-January 1999)? Put alternatively, what developments have had the most effect on the capacity of all sides to manage the relationship and what developments have had the greatest implication for American interests? 2) What are the respective strategies of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan (as they pertain to cross-Strait relations) that have the greatest bearing on U.S. interests and consequences for regional peace? 3)

What are (or may be) the implications of the preceding for the policies and behavior of all three interested parties?

What Has Happened and What Has Not Happened Over the Last Seven Months?

Several developments constitute the major landmarks in cross-Strait relations in the June 1998-January 1999 period.

"The Three No's". As we discussed at our last meeting, President Clinton's articulation of the "Three No's" in Shanghai was a statement to which great importance was attached in all three capitals. Beijing said that the statement marked a step forward in U.S. policy. Taipei asserted that it was an unwelcome break with past policy. And, on Capitol Hill where opponents of the president's China policy were ready to find fault, there was a brief clamor resulting in two congressional resolutions (92-0 and 390-1). In fact, two of the "Three No's" had substantively been discussed with Beijing by Dr. Kissinger twenty-seven years earlier in July 1971. Each element of the policy had been stated publicly or privately by U.S. officials in the intervening period. Nonetheless, the presidential statement in Shanghai was important. Its importance lay in several dimensions: First, the statement, and the attendant trips by private American citizens to Taipei in the period leading up to the 1998 summit, seemed to introduce a bit more caution into the internal Taiwan debate concerning how far Washington would support behavior some might consider provocative. The subsequent election results were encouraging to Americans who had (and have) such anxieties.

Second, because Taiwan was anxious about "The Three No's", it sought to mobilize its friends in Congress to reaffirm U.S. commitments under the TRA and ultimately to express support for the possible transfer of defensive technologies to Taipei

in the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 1999 (See Attachment). Congressional reaction represented not only Taiwan lobbying, it also represented spontaneous congressional desires.

Finally, the formulation of "The Three No's" in Shanghai was not a comprehensive expression of American policy, in my view. From my perspective it failed to express the American hope that the two sides would find ways (as the two sides did with respect to ADB, APEC, and the Olympics) for the people of Taiwan to participate in global affairs with dignity and constructively. Nor did the president's formulation express the degree to which Americans would like to see broadened and deepened cross-Strait interaction.

The C.F. Koo Trip and the Wang-Koo Meetings, October 1998. This trip was welcome by Americans whose only clear policy preferences are for cross-Strait dialogue and a peaceful resolution of issues between the two sides. Americans also welcomed the four-point consensus that boiled down to: continuing dialogue; agreeing to broaden the discussion agenda in the direction of political issues ("including political and economic issues"); agreeing to try to protect the welfare and interests of people from both areas; and agreeing that Wang Daohan would travel to Taiwan ("if there is an appropriate time"). The structure of the talks in Shanghai was interesting and seemed conducive to better mutual understanding. But, having said all that, it appears that little headway was made on fundamental issues, that is, issues pertaining to "One China," Taiwan's status, and use of force.

In the aftermath of the talks there has been some discussion about cross-Strait navigation talks, but there is nothing to report in terms of forward movement as of this

writing. One can hope that the number of ports that are "indirectly" connected can increase over time. And, as Ralph Clough points out in his contribution to this meeting, there have been a range of cooperative activities in the economic and personnel exchange areas that are encouraging to Americans.

November 10, 1998, Secretary of Energy Richardson Travels to Taipei. This trip broke no new conceptual or policy ground, following as it did the prior trips of Ambassador Carla Hills in the Bush Administration and Secretary Pena earlier in the Clinton Administration. The trip had several objectives, one of which was to reassure elements of Congress that wondered whether or not somehow American policy was changing fundamentally. This was a signal that it was not. Of course, this visit also was part of the ongoing U.S. effort to pursue its own economic objectives everywhere in the face of stiff international competition.

The December 1998, Three-in-One Elections. On balance these elections were encouraging to Americans along a number of dimensions, including the observation that they seemed to be relatively devoid of violence, though not of vote buying. As to the election's implications for cross-Strait relations, it is important not to over interpret the results or draw incorrect conclusions. The election results tend to confirm those analysts who have said that the people of Taiwan want stable, productive cross-Strait relations and while they will support bold and innovative politicians with respect to domestic issues, they want a relatively steady hand on the tiller of cross-Strait relations. At the same time, however, it is important not to conclude that the DPP has been severely weakened and that the KMT can rest easy with respect to the year 2000 presidential contest.

For example, Chen Shui-bian received a higher percentage of the vote in 1998 than he did in his previous election (almost 46% vs. 43.6%) and it was simply the movement of New Party votes disproportionately toward Ma Ying-jeou that produced Ma's victory in Taipei. Also, Chen Shui-bian is by no means out of the running for the year 2000; indeed, he is a formidable potential candidate. With respect to the DPP, its 29.6% of the vote in the legislative elections was down from the previous election (by a little more than 3%); the KMT's 55% of the Legislative Yuan election seats was up only about 3% over the prior election results. Further, the DPP candidate (Frank Hsieh) won the mayoral race in Kaohsiung.

And finally, the KMT has potential problems in terms of various presidential contenders (e.g. Lien Chan and James Soong Chu-yu) that could fragment the KMT and provide an opening for the DPP in the year 2,000 presidential contest. To further cloud the picture, it is not clear how President Lee Teng-hui will define his role in the upcoming presidential elections. As Andrew Nathan put it, it is premature to throw out your aspirin tablets!

The central points are: the political party with the clearest pro-unification stance (The New Party) suffered the biggest proportional erosion in its position from the previous election in Taipei and the DPP is still a very potent political force.

The DPP Has Not Fundamentally Revised Its Charter. Though A Debate Is Underway in the Party. In the wake of what the DPP interpreted as a setback, its leadership met to consider whether or not to revise its charter to distance the Party from the image of a rash, independent minded-force insensitive to the risks. This debate continues as of this writing, it appears that a small group will propose alternative draft

charters for the central committee's consideration soon, and that a decision may not be made on this issue until sometime in mid-year when the Central Committee meets. At this point what can be said is that there is opposition to changing the DPP charter in a way that would reassure the mainland. Many DPP members apparently believe that the predominant reason for the electoral setback had more to do with the way in which the Party sought to get its message across rather than with the message itself. Despite this sentiment, however, I would guess that the charter will be altered to some degree. In his farewell speech in Taipei, Chen Shui-bian signaled what I take to be the general direction of movement – whether or not the mainland finds reassurance in such formulations is another question.

Taiwan and China do not exercise sovereignty over the other and, in fact, are independent ethnic Chinese states. We are willing to base a possibly special relationship on our shared history and culture. But this special relationship must have as preconditions reciprocal benefit, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and self-determination... Let us engage in a peaceful competition across the Straits. In this competition, let the stronger economically respect the weaker, and the one in a less strong military position has the same security as the stronger one. In this competition, let influence come from what people think themselves and their way of life, not from doctrinaire positions or the use of force.¹

Missile Buildup in the Strait Area and TMD. While no firm decisions have been made in either Taipei or Washington, in 1998 Congress mandated (in the National Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1999) that the Department of Defense study "the architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system in the Asia Region" in order to protect "key regional allies." This is, I believe, a straw in the wind, if suitable technology can be developed, if its cost is not prohibitive, and if other (e.g. arms control) means are not found to limit the perceived missile threat in the region, particularly from North Korea.

The case for TMD (in the Taiwan Strait) may well become progressively stronger from an American perspective. This is so because of what is widely believed to be a missile buildup along China's coast, not to mention a much broader American concern about its own vulnerability (and the vulnerability of our troops abroad, as well as friends) to missile attack by even relatively small and backward nations (a la the Rumsfeld Report of mid-1998). The U.S. commitment to provide defensive weapons to Taipei (as expressed in the TRA and elsewhere) makes anti-missile defenses a "natural." And finally, because the costs of developing these systems is so high, budget considerations are likely to argue for spreading the R & D costs across as many "customers" as possible.

Having said all this, the dangers and uncertainties of moving in this direction are substantial. With respect to uncertainties, no one knows when such systems may actually be deployable (perhaps a decade would be one guess) nor what they will cost. With respect to dangers, spending money on a defense system that can be easily overcome (and will not prevent one's economy from being destabilized) may not be the best use of scarce defense resources by Taipei. As well, such defenses may simply prompt the PRC to create a yet bigger inventory of offensive capability. One should ask whether or not the "exchange ratio" is not likely to remain greatly in favor of the offense. It may well be that everyone will be less secure at a higher level of armament and cost if this occurs. Having said this, if the PRC buildup continues (and the North Korean programs of concern), a simple law of political gravity will probably prevail on Taiwan and in the U.S. Congress—politicians will wish to be seen as trying to defend their people from threat, irrespective of the above considerations.

Public Opinion Trends in Taiwan: Toward Separate Identity. The final development that I consider significant concerns the ongoing deepening of separate Taiwan identity. This increasingly strong identity is seen along two major dimensions. First, President Lee Teng-hui's and Mayor Ma Ying-jeou's successful use of the "new Taiwanese" concept is indicative. It represents a way to break down what was becoming an increasingly sharp division between "mainlanders" and "Taiwanese" on the island. Moreover, public opinion data show a continuing (though slight) decline in the percentage of Taiwan's population that is willing to say, "I am Chinese" (19% in May 1998 and 16.7% in September 1998). Even if one says – with some justification – that recent polling numbers are statistically insignificant, the long-term downward trend since 1993 is unmistakable. If Taiwan people view themselves as increasingly distinct from the mainland population, it is not obvious why "reunification" would become progressively more attractive.

What Appear to Be the Central Strategies of Beijing and Taipei Dealing With Each Other – and Washington?

How do at least some Americans understand Beijing's strategy toward Taipei, and vice versa. I would welcome clarification from both sides of the Strait where my understanding of each side's behavior may be in error. If this understanding is broadly correct, then it presents certain policy challenges to the United States.

The elements of Beijing's strategy as it relates to Taiwan appears to be as follows:

- Induce the United States and Japan (and Russia) to make ever clearer and more binding commitments to the One China Policy. If this can be accomplished, there

will be a big power fence built around Taiwan that realistically makes de jure independence aspirations infeasible;

- Try to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan, particularly as it relates to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, unless Tokyo and Washington specifically exclude Taiwan from the region of coverage;
 - Over time, unless there is some negotiated understanding with Taipei, gradually reduce the number of states that recognize Taipei, reaching single digit levels of recognition of Taipei in the foreseeable future—what people in Taiwan refer to as “strangulation.” In 1998, Taipei had a net loss of three recognitions (with South Africa, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, and Tonga as losses and the Marshall Islands as a gain);
 - Focus limited PLA modernization on creating the capabilities to inflict heavy costs on Taiwan for pursuing an independence course—this need not necessarily involve invasion. The destabilization of the economy is probably sufficient. As well, while it is not possible to defeat the U.S. military, raising the costs of any possible U.S. intervention may have a deterrent value on Washington, in Beijing’s view;
 - Work to discourage Japan (and certainly Taiwan) from falling under TMD coverage;
 - Make the PRC a progressively more attractive economic partner to Taiwan business and demonstrate that the PRC is a reliable engine of regional economic growth that Taiwan people need to maintain and increase their standard of living; And,
 - Promise Taipei preferential policies even when compared to those applied to Hong Kong under the wide umbrella of “One Country, Two Systems.”
- Taipei’s apparent strategy in dealing with the PRC and Washington.

- Seek functional talks with Beijing that avoid issues that would imply any political subordination to the PRC. Pursue functional talks that make progressively clearer the separation of control and delineate zones of responsibility;
- Talk about eventual reunification, but fashion preconditions (democracy and equalization of wealth) that are sufficiently remote that they, in fact, nullify any possibility of "reunification" in any meaningful time frame;
- Continue to seek expanded breathing space internationally. Even when achievements in this regard may be unlikely, proceed with the effort because it meets popular expectations and makes it clear to the people of Taiwan that Beijing is hostile to their aspirations;
- Use the PRC's limited military modernization (and the more immediate missile buildup) to justify more weapons purchases, particularly those that get the United States progressively more entangled in the island's security;
- Keep a vigorous business relationship with the PRC so that Beijing will be reticent to forego the benefits of Taiwan investment, but do not permit economic dependence on the mainland to become so substantial that one's own freedom of maneuver is greatly diminished; And,
- Make it clear to the U.S. Executive Branch that if it goes too far in accommodating Beijing's concerns, that Taipei can and will play the "Congress Card."

Implications For the Parties' Policies?

What are some of the implications of the preceding for the policies of the three parties from this American's view? How might the three interested parties make some

progress in reducing the danger of future crises/conflict and increasing both sides' benefits from cross-Strait interaction?

First, cross-Strait tension and volatility is not a problem that is going to go away with generational change or simply through unofficial interaction. The Taiwan Strait is one of the few areas of the world where a spiral of crisis and possible conflict could unfold very quickly. The combination of rising PRC military capabilities (and possibly impatience), an increasingly distinct identity on Taiwan, and a U.S. obligated under its own law to provide defensive capability to Taipei is a dangerous brew. The combination of possible misunderstanding, possible miscalculation, and passion is dangerous, as everyone saw in March 1996. To reduce the danger, I believe some affirmative steps by all the parties might be helpful.

One of the mid-term goals of these steps should be to reach at least an interim political understanding that: reduces Beijing's fear of a unilateral declaration of independence for a long period of time; reassures the people of Taiwan that they will not be attacked; and permits the people of Taiwan to play a dignified role in the global community. To accomplish even this will require much more trust and mutual understanding across the Strait than currently exists. Building such trust and mutual understanding should be the objective of the next steps.

To start, the cross-Strait interaction at the economic, communication, and exchange of personnel levels is extremely important. Such interactions provide a basis for building trust and they enlarge areas of common interest. Both sides should take those steps that promote enhanced, regular, and direct cross-Strait interaction, I believe that cross-Strait discussions over how to implement something along the lines of the "Three

Links" would be salutary. I would like to see both private and official Americans more actively promote progress in this area, while not injecting ourselves into the particulars.

Second, the Sino-American policy of "cooperative strategic partnership" has to be given progressively more tangible content, whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the UN Security Council, or as it relates to WTO. More (and more meaningful) bilateral strategic cooperation would improve the climate for considering cross-Strait issues on all sides. It is not realistic to think that lack of Sino-American cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, heightened disagreement over policy toward Iraq or the former Yugoslavia, or interminable wrangling over WTO, will translate into more cooperation in the Taiwan Strait. For example, in its dialogue with Pyongyang, Beijing could be more forceful in its encouragement of the DPRK to halt its destabilizing weapons and delivery activities in order to reduce anxiety in Japan and elsewhere. This might be helpful not only in its own right, but in the TMD debate as well.

With the forthcoming trip to the United States of Premier Zhu Rongji, there is a great opportunity. The trip should have at least three objectives: a) Give content to "cooperative strategic partnership"; b) Make progress on some of the outstanding economic problems in the relationship (e.g. WTO and the trade deficit); and c), speak directly to the American people to enhance mutual understanding.

Third, it is quite clear that Beijing's current policy of "strangulation" of Taiwan is not winning the hearts and minds of people on Taiwan. What needs to be demonstrated to the people of Taiwan is that Beijing is interested in their welfare. This is particularly evident in the issue of WTO entry. I do not know when the PRC may accede to WTO, but it is clear that Taiwan is rather close to meeting the conditions. I would think a far-

sighted policy by Beijing that indicated it hopes that all Chinese people are prosperous and that it is flexible in accommodating the different circumstances in different parts of China (as it did in Hong Kong) would be a more powerful, and attractive, statement than all the promises that could be made to the people of Taiwan. Chinese sponsorship of Taiwan's accession as a "customs territory" would be a move that would demonstrate flexibility and understanding that would be quite popular in Taiwan—and elsewhere. Conversely a policy that seems to hold Taiwan's economic progress hostage to face in Beijing is understandably not too attractive to the people of Taiwan. It is clear, however, if Beijing wishes to keep Taiwan from entering WTO first, it can do so in all likelihood.

Fourth, the two sides of the Strait should seek to find areas where military-to-military (or security specialist) exchanges and confidence building can occur. For example, maybe there is something for the two sides to talk about in the PRC's desire not to see missile defenses in the Strait area and Taipei's desire not to be presented with ever more missiles on the mainland.

Fifth, if the United States moves in the direction of TMD in Asia, Washington might be well advised to develop naval platforms that remain under its own control. More fundamentally, however, before moving in this direction an assessment of TMD's effects on regional arms races should be made and an effort should be made to see whether or not some stabilization of missiles in the Strait can be secured by other means.

Sixth, the United States must continually engage in dialogue with the new and emerging leaders of Taiwan, including those in the DPP, so that they do not develop policies in the absence of full knowledge of U.S. positions and American interests.

Washington should continue to make it clear that reckless behavior by either side of the Strait will not find American support or acquiescence.

¹ Chen Shui-bian, "Let the Dream Go On, Let the Historic Dialogue Begin," December 25, 1998.

Congress response to Clinton's tour to China

- 6/19/98 H. Con. Res. 270 by a vote of 411-0
1. the US abides by all previous understandings of a "One China" policy and its abiding interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Straits issue
 2. the President should seek, at the June summit meeting this year in Beijing, a public renunciation by the PRC of any use of force, or threat to use force, against Taiwan
- 7/10/98 S. Con. Res. 30 by unanimous consent
1. it should be US policy to support changes to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Charter that would allow Taiwan and other qualified economies to become members of the IMF
 2. it should be US policy to support Taiwan's admission to membership in other international economic organizations for which it is qualified, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- 7/10/98 S. Con. Res. 107 by a vote of 92-0
1. the Congress affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act
 2. the Congress affirms its expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means and that it considers any effort to determine Taiwan's future by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the US
 3. the Congress affirms its commitment to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability
 4. the Congress affirms its commitment that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of the defense articles and services needed by Taiwan. Urges the President to seek a public renunciation by the PRC of any use of force, or threat to use force, against democratic Taiwan.
- 7/20/98 H. Con. Res. 301 by a vote of 390-1
1. the Congress affirms its longstanding commitment to Taiwan in accordance with Taiwan Relations Act
 2. the Congress affirms its expectation that the future status of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, that the people of both sides of the Taiwan Strait should determine their own future, and that it considers any effort to determine or influence Taiwan's future status by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of grave concern to the US
 3. the Congress affirms its commitment to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services, including appropriate ballistic missile defense, as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability
 4. the Congress affirms that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles and services needed by Taiwan
 5. the Congress affirms its strong support of appropriate membership for Taiwan in international financial institutions and other international organizations. Urges the President to seek a public renunciation by the PRC of any use of force, or threat to use force, against the free people of Taiwan.

9/24 H.R. 3616 passed in the House by a vote of 375-50
10/1 H.R. 3616 passed in the Senate by 96-2
10/17 H.R. 3616 signed by the President (P.L. 105-261)
Title XV
Section 1533
Directs the President to study and report to the defense committees on the
architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic missile
defense system in the Asia-Pacific region capable of protecting key US regional allies.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Kenneth Lieberthal. Subject: Background Information. Record ID: 9900552. (3 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F
vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	A Comprehensive Approach. (10 pages)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F
vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. list	South Koreans for Meeting. [annotated] [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1999	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
O/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F
vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

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Ken. FYI - Mr. Yu called you several times yesterday. In case they complain about number for Sandy's mtg. on Thurs, Jeff & I decided to eliminate Lee - see below.

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 25, 1999

(2 pages)

To: Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal

Ms. Choi - 939-6486 -

Fm: Counselor Lee Soo-hyuck
Political Section, Korean Embassy

Ref: Mr. Lim Dong-won, Senior Secretary to the President
for National Security and Foreign Affairs

This is to confirm Mr. Lim's meeting with Mr. Samuel Berger at his office on Thursday, January 28, 1999 at 1:00 P.M.
Dr. Lim will be accompanied by myself and four others:

NAME

D.O.B.

Mr. LIM Dong-won

* Mr. SONG Min-soon - *Asst Sec. to Lim*

* Mr. YU Myung-hwan - *DCM*

Mr. LEE Soo-hyuck - *Pol. Couns.* - *eliminated*

* Mr. WI Sung-lac - *Asst Sec. to Lim - notetaker*

Mr. PARK Jong-dae - *Emb interpreter*

* *Delegation from Seoul*

DWD480(Cadillac Black) JUNG Dong-gi

DWD002(Town Car Black) JEONG Hae-ju

encl: Mr. Lim's C.V.



PG(b)(6)

[004]

LIM DONG-WON

**Senior Secretary to the President
for National Security and Foreign Affairs
The Blue House
Seoul, the Republic of Korea**

DOB: July 25, 1934

EDUCATION:

**1957 Korean Military Academy
1961 Seoul National University
1964 Graduate School of Public Administration, SNU**

PRESENT POSITION:

**Feb. 1998- Senior Secretary to the President for
National Security and Foreign Affairs**

CAREER:

**1964-69 Assistant Professor, KMA
1980 Retired Maj. General, ROK Army
1981 Ambassador to Nigeria
1984 Ambassador to Australia
1988-92 Cancellor, Institute of Foreign Affairs &
National Security
1990 Chairman, Presidential Committee on Arms Control
1990 Delegate, South-North High-Level Talks
1992 Vice Minister, National Unification Board
1993 Chairman, Association of National Unification of
Korea
1993- Member, Unification Policy Evaluation Committee
1995 Secretary-General, Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation**

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. talking points	Duplicate of 002. (2 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F

vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Duplicate of 003b. (11 pages)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F
vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. draft	Talking Points. Points for Use with ROK. (1 page)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Talking Points. Points for Use with ROK. (1 page)	c. 1/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F

vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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009. email	From Richard Christenson to Eric John at 10:07pm. Subject: Briefers for meeting. (2 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F

vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. email	From White House Situation Room to Alexander Arvizu at 11:52am. Subject: ROK National Security Advisor. (4 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. note	Handwritten note from Meeting with Lim Dong-won. (1 page)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F
vz1474

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. email	From White House Situation Room to Jeffery Bader, Joseph Bouchard, Valerie Guarnieri et al at 7:38am. Subject: ROK National Security Advisor. (5 pages)	01/24/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F
vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. note	From Jack to Ken. Subject: Some thoughts in preparation for Lim Dong-won's visit. (2 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Ken Lieberthal)
OA/Box Number: 2425

FOLDER TITLE:

[South Korea] - Lim Dong-won Visit, January 28, 1999

2009-0528-F

vz1474

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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