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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	President Kim Young Sam to President William J. Clinton. [English translation] (2 pages)	07/23/1996	P1/b(1)
001b. letter	President Kim Young Sam to President William J. Clinton. [Korean] (2 pages)	07/23/1996	P1/b(1)
001c. letter	President Kim Young Sam to President William J. Clinton. [Korean Embassy English translation] (2 pages)	07/23/1996	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9603870
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 96 14

TO: KIM SHEON CHONG

FROM: RANK, DAVID

DOC DATE: 10 JUL 96
SOURCE REF: 9609309

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
DEFENSE POLICY

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
INTELLIGENCE

PERSONS: CHUN DOO HWAN

WHICKHAM, JOHN

SUBJECT: STATE RESPONSE TO LTR FM KIM TO PRES RE KWANGJU UPRISING

ACTION: RECD S/S DIRECT REPLY

DUE DATE: 07 JUN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KRISTOFF

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9603870

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 KRISTOFF	Z 96060415 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
001	Z 96060619 ACTION TRANSFERRED
001 STATE	X 96060619 DIRECT REPLY
002	X 96072315 RECD S/S DIRECT REPLY

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 960514 STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9609309

Date July 16, 1996

FOR: Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bill Clinton

From: Dr. Kim Sheon Chong

Date: May 14, 1996

Subj: Kwangju Uprising

WH Referral Dated: 6/6/96
NSCS ID# (if any): 9603870

☐ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

☐ A draft reply is attached.

☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.

☐ A translation is attached.

☒ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

☐ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

☐ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

Andrew D. Sens
Director
Secretariat Staff



3870
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 10, 1996

Dr. Kim Sheon Chong
Co-Chair
Korean Professors' Solidarity for May 18 Kwangju Uprising
1632-2(#2)
Bongchunil-dong
Kwanak-ku
Seoul, Korea

Dear Professor Kim:

Thank you for your letter of May 14 to President Clinton. The President has asked that I respond to your letter on his behalf.

The United States stands by its June 19, 1989 statement on the May 1980 events in Kwangju. The nearly 3000 State Department documents which were recently declassified under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act reinforce the underlying conclusions of that statement. I have enclosed a copy of that statement, but please allow me to summarize some of its key conclusions:

- The United States did not initially know the full extent of the violence in Kwangju. When it became aware of the seriousness of the situation, the United States repeatedly urged restraint by ROK military forces and issued a public statement on May 22 expressing concern over the civil strife in Kwangju and calling for dialogue between the opposing sides.
- The United States was assured by Korean authorities that its May 22 statement calling for dialogue would be broadcast and distributed in the city. This never happened. Instead, official radio reports in Kwangju falsely asserted that the U.S. had approved the dispatch of SWC troops into the city.
- Neither the troops of the SWC nor elements of the 20th Division, employed by the Martial Law Command in Kwangju, were under CFC OPCON, either at the time they were deployed to the city or while operating there. None of the Korean forces deployed at Kwangju were, during that time, under the control of American authorities. The U.S. had neither prior knowledge of the deployment of SWC forces to Kwangju nor responsibility for their actions there.

- The 1978 Agreement establishing the Combined Forces Command preserved the sovereign right of both the United States and the ROK to assert OPCON over their respective forces at any time, without the consent of the other party. The United States could neither approve or disapprove the movement of elements of the 20th Division which had been removed from OPCON.
- The United States was informed that Korean military authorities were considering the use of elements of the 20th Division -- one of the few regular army units trained in riot control - to reenter Kwangju. U.S. officials, who had pressed for a political rather than military solution and continued to caution against the use of force to solve political problems, reluctantly accepted that, if negotiations failed, it would be preferable to replace SWC units with elements of the 20th Division.

As they have not been widely available in Korea, I assume that you have not had the opportunity to personally review the recently-declassified State Department documents concerning the events in Kwangju in May 1980. The State Department has recently made available to the Kwangju municipal government a complete set of these documents, on the condition that they be made available to the general public. I encourage you to take advantage of this. I am confident that a thorough and objective scholarly review of the documents will only serve to reinforce the conclusions in the U.S. government's 1989 statement.

I hope that this information is of some assistance to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. Rank', written over a horizontal line.

David H. Rank
Office of Korean Affairs

38070

June 19, 1989

United States Government Statement
on the
Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980

Introduction

The United States welcomes efforts to establish the facts about the events which occurred in Kwangju in May 1980. It recognizes that the lack of an accurate historical record has generated widespread misunderstanding. This Statement presents the facts about what the U.S. did and why, in the belief that this is in the best interests of the close friendship which exists between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

A clear understanding of U.S. views and actions requires that they be viewed in the context of events from the assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979 to and beyond the actual events in May, 1980 in Kwangju City. This Statement therefore begins with the assassination of President Park.

When the Special Committee on Investigation of the May 18th Kwangju Democratization Movement was established by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea in the summer of 1988, the U.S. agreed to cooperate with its investigation. On November 23, 1988, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea delivered to our Embassy in Seoul letters from the Committee addressed to Ambassador William Gleysteen and General John Wickham inviting their testimony before the Committee.

On December 2, 1988, after careful consideration of the relevant diplomatic precedents and legal principles with regard to such testimony, the Department determined that it would be inappropriate for Ambassador Gleysteen or General Wickham to testify before the Committee on matters related to their official duties as U.S. officials in the Republic of Korea. They were so advised and they concurred in this view. However, the Department agreed to answer written questions from the Committee. On March 17, 1989, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Washington conveyed to the Department of State forty-eight questions prepared by the Special Committee.

This Statement reflects those relevant events and actions as known to the U.S. Government, as can best be determined at this time. Answers to the Committee's questions are incorporated in the Appendix to this Statement, with references to the pertinent paragraphs in the Statement and, as appropriate, clarifying comment.

SUMMARY

-- The United States had no prior knowledge of the assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979. The United States was shocked by the assassination and alarmed that the North might see it as an opportunity to attack the South. The United States was also concerned that the prospects for democratization in the ROK might be undermined.

-- The United States had no advance warning of the December 12 (12/12) Incident, in which a group of ROK army officers led by Major General Chun Doo Hwan seized control of the military.

-- The United States was angered by the generals' use on December 12, without proper notification, of units under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), deeply concerned over the use of force to usurp power, and troubled at the prospect of instability if the principle of civilian authority was not quickly and firmly reasserted.

-- The United States protested repeatedly and vigorously to the Korean government, to Major General Chun, and to the Korean military about the misuse of forces under CFC OPCON.

-- The United States was deeply disturbed by the evidence, gradually accumulating after the 12/12 incident, that Korean military leaders did not intend to relinquish de facto control or set a timetable for democratization.

-- The United States repeatedly urged the Korean civilian and military authorities to resume the democratization process, warned against the repression -- specifically that any actions against politicians, such as arresting Kim Dae Jung would prove "incendiary" -- and forcefully protested when leading opposition figures were arrested.

-- The Korean authorities gave the United States two hours advance notice of the declaration of Full Martial Law, which began at 0001 on May 18. The United States had no prior knowledge of the Korean military authorities' intentions to arrest political leaders and close the universities and National Assembly. On May 18, in both Seoul and Washington, the United States sharply and vigorously protested the implementation of Martial Law.

-- The United States did not initially know the full extent of the violence in Kwangju. When it became aware of the seriousness of the situation, the United States repeatedly urged restraint by ROK military forces and issued a public statement on May 22 expressing concern over the civil strife in Kwangju and calling for dialogue between the opposing sides.

-- The United States was assured by Korean authorities that its May 22 statement calling for dialogue would be broadcast and distributed in the city. This never happened. Instead, official radio reports in Kwangju falsely asserted that the U.S. had approved the dispatch of SWC troops into the city.

-- Neither troops of the Special Warfare Command (SWC) nor elements of the 20th Division, employed by the Martial Law Command in Kwangju, were under CFC OPCON, either at the time they were deployed to the city or while operating there. None of the Korean forces deployed at Kwangju were, during that time, under the control of any American authorities. The United States had neither prior knowledge of the deployment of SWC forces to Kwangju nor responsibility for their actions there.

-- The 1978 Agreement establishing the Combined Forces Command preserved the sovereign right of both the United States and the Republic of Korea to assert OPCON over their respective forces at any time, without the consent of the other party. The United States could neither approve nor disapprove the movements of elements of the 20th Division which had been removed from OPCON.

-- The United States was informed that Korean military authorities were considering the use of elements of the 20th Division -- one of the few regular army units trained in riot control -- to reenter Kwangju. United States officials, who had pressed for a political rather than military solution and continued to caution against the use of military force to solve political problems, reluctantly accepted that, if negotiations failed, it would be preferable to replace SWC units with elements of the 20th Division.

-- The United States protested to the Korean government and Korean media over public distortions of United States' actions and policy which included claims that the U.S. knew in advance of the December 12 incident, of Chun's appointment to the KCIA, of the government's actions of May 17 and that the U.S. approved the SWC actions in Kwangju.

-- No information indicating a North Korean intention to attack was received by the United States during the period covered by this Statement, nor did United States officials regard the domestic situation in the South as being so serious as to justify either Full Martial Law or harsh repressive measures.

-- Throughout this period, however, the United States was concerned that the North might miscalculate the situation in the South and warned Pyongyang against trying to exploit it. Also, as a precaution, the United States deployed air and naval units to the area to demonstrate to North Korea the United States' resolve to stand by its security commitment to the ROK.

-- Despite strenuous efforts, the United States failed to persuade Major General Chun to restore civilian authority and to institute a timetable for democratization. The United States, however, was successful in drawing international attention to the charges against Kim Dae Jung, which it characterized as "far-fetched," and in obtaining a commutation of his death sentence.

Statement

The Combined Forces Command and Operational Control

1. To understand the responsibilities of the Combined Forces Commander, it is necessary to review the nature of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). The CFC is a binational military command comprised of both Korean and American officers. The CFC was established in 1978 by joint Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States to deter external aggression against the Republic of Korea and, if deterrence fails, to defeat the attack. Its sole mission is defense against external attack. The CFC, whose Commander is an American officer and whose Deputy Commander is a Korean officer, is subordinate to a binational Military Committee headed by the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Korea and the United States. Each nation places certain selected units under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the Commander-in-Chief (CINC/CFC), but retains the national right of command, including the right to remove units from CFC OPCON upon notification. In the event of notification, the CFC Commander can neither approve nor disapprove, but can only point out the effect such removal might have on the CFC's mission of external defense. Once forces are removed from CFC OPCON, the CFC Commander no longer has authority over them.

The Assassination of Park Chung Hee

2. The United States Government (USG) was surprised and shocked by the assassination of Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979. In light of the possible military threat from North Korea, the USG immediately warned Pyongyang not to try to take advantage of the assassination and issued the following statement:

The United States Government wishes to make it clear that it will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to the Republic of Korea to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea.

The United States followed up this statement by dispatching an aircraft carrier to the waters off the Korean coast and sent airborne warning and control aircraft to the region.

3. Immediately following the assassination, Korean military authorities, following appropriate agreed upon procedures, notified the CINC/CFC that the Korean Army would assume OPCON of a number of units, including the 20th Infantry Division, for deployment to Seoul as a precaution against possible disorders in the wake of the assassination. OPCON of the 20th division artillery and its three regiments reverted from CFC to the Korean Army at 0230 hours on October 27. The Korean Army returned the division artillery to CFC OPCON on 30 October and one of its three regiments on November 28. (There is no record that the other two regiments of the 20th Division were ever returned to CFC OPCON.)

4. Concerned about the domestic political situation in Korea, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, at a press conference on October 31 prior to his departure for President Park's funeral, stated:

We hope that political growth in the Republic of Korea will be commensurate with economic and social progress.

While in Seoul Secretary Vance met with President Choi Kyu Ha and urged him to release political prisoners and to consult with the National Assembly and the political opposition in drafting a new constitution that provided for direct election of the President.

The December 12, 1979 Incident (The "12/12 Incident")

5. The United States had no advance warning of the December 12 Incident, when a group of ROK army officers led by Major General Chun Doo Hwan forcibly removed the ROK military leadership. In late November 1979, Gen. Wickham became aware of some "unrest" among senior members of Korea Military Academy (KMA) classes 11 and 12. When he informed CFC Deputy Commander Gen. Lew Byong Hion and ROK Defense Minister Ro Jae Hyun, they regarded the reports as mere rumor.

American officials first became aware of the incident early the evening of December 12 when the Eighth Army command post at the Yongsan U.S. garrison (the "Bunker") began to report unusual troop movements. General Wickham and Ambassador Gleysteen went immediately to the bunker where they began to piece together fragmentary but alarming reports of troops moving around the city and of shots being fired. Almost from the beginning they suspected that a coup of some sort was underway. Later, they were joined by Defense Minister Ro and Kim Chong Hwan, Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, who established radio and telephone contact with some elements of the ROK military.

6. During that night, units under CFC OPCON were moved by their commanders without proper retrieval of OPCON or even the knowledge of the CFC. Seeing this as a weakening of the CFC's defensive capability, General Wickham that same night formally protested to Korean military leaders and urged the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to suspend until dawn movement of forces loyal to the MND to avoid clashes between army units. At the same time, word was sent to Chun Doo Hwan warning him of the dangerous implications of the conflict within the South Korean forces.

7. U.S. officials were concerned over the possibility of serious armed clashes between Korean Army units and the possibility that such a conflict could be seen by North Korea as an opportunity to attack. Ambassador Gleysteen sought to telephone President Choi to express his concern but was unable to reach him. The Ambassador was told that the fighting involved troops sent to arrest Army Chief of Staff General Chung Sung Hwa. Gen. Chung had refused an "invitation" by Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan, principal investigator of Park's assassination, to come in for questioning about the

assassination. Amb. Gleysteen also tried to contact the forces headed by Maj. Gen. Chun to warn them of the danger from North Korea of fighting within the ROK Army and the threat to political stability posed by their actions. They refused direct contact with USG officials until they had established effective control.

8. The U.S. Government was very concerned that the December 12 seizure of power would lead to an interruption of the democratization process, to which it attached great importance. Wanting both to caution North Korea and to deter civil conflict, the U.S. decided to issue a statement of warning to all concerned. The substance of this statement was brought to the attention of Blue House Secretary General Choi Kwang Soo and at least indirectly to the rebellious officers. The U.S. Department of State issued the following statement the next day:

During the past few weeks we had been encouraged by the orderly procedures adopted in the Republic of Korea to develop a broadly based government following the assassination of President Park. As a result of events today in Korea we have instructed our Ambassador and the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea to point out to all concerned that any forces within the Republic of Korea which disrupt this progress should bear in mind the seriously adverse impact their actions would have on the ROK's relations with the United States. At the same time, any forces outside the ROK which might seek to exploit the current situation in Seoul should bear in mind our warning of October 27.

The statement was written in Seoul on the night of December 12, 1979, but--as a practical matter--had to be issued from Washington because the Embassy lacked access to the Government controlled public media to disseminate it to the Korean people.

9. On December 13, Ambassador Gleysteen met with President Choi. He stressed that it was the view of the United States that Korea needed civilian control of the military and continuation of the program of political liberalization. Gleysteen concluded from his meeting, however, that it was unlikely that the weak administration under President Choi would ever be able to gain effective control of the Army. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke also that day, December 13, in Washington, underscored U.S. concern in a meeting with the Korean Ambassador.

10. On December 14, Ambassador Gleysteen met with Major General Chun Doo Hwan. The Ambassador strongly warned that disunity in the Korean Army invited North Korean attack and noted that the United States was very concerned. He also stressed to Chun the importance of maintaining constitutional order and of making progress towards political liberalization. Chun replied that the 12/12 Incident was an accidental outgrowth of a legitimate effort to carry out his investigation of the assassination of President Park. Chun said that he had no personal ambitions, that he supported President Choi's liberalization program, and that he expected unity in the military to be strengthened as a result of his changes in the command structure.

11. To demonstrate U.S. anger over the December 12 seizure of power, General Wickham refused to meet with Chun on the advice of the Ambassador. Instead, Wickham met with the Prime Minister, the new Defense Minister, and other officials; his message was stark and strong--the movement of ROK Army troops under CFC OPCON without prior notification to CFC ran an unacceptable risk that the CFC would not be able to defend against a North Korean attack. Gen. Wickham also conveyed this point in writing and emphasized it in numerous discussions with senior ROK military officers.

12. To deliver to the ROKG the message of U.S. displeasure with the events of December 12 as strongly as possible, President Jimmy Carter wrote a personal letter to President Choi on January 4, 1980. The U.S. Embassy disseminated the contents of this letter throughout the Korean government and military. President Carter applauded President Choi's plans for political reconciliation and constitutional change. He noted he was "deeply distressed" by the events of December 12 and warned that similar occurrences in the future "would have serious consequences for our close cooperation."

U.S. Policy Following 12/12

13. The White House, Department of State, and Department of Defense reviewed U.S. policy toward Korea following the 12/12 Incident and reaffirmed U.S. objectives:

- attempt to preserve momentum toward a broadly based democratic government under civilian leadership;
- continue to deter North Korean aggression;
- strive to keep the new ROK military leadership focused on its primary role of defending the country against attack.

14. USG officials recognized that their options were limited. Threats to lessen or remove U.S. military support would lack credibility and risk encouraging North Korean adventurism. Economic sanctions might aggravate South Korea's already serious economic situation, cause social unrest, and play into the hands of those advocating strongly authoritarian policies in the South.

15. The U.S. understood that U.S. actions would not be decisive in affecting the direction of Korea's domestic politics, although it hoped to promote democracy to the degree possible. U.S. officials believed that despite whatever actions were undertaken by the U.S., the outcome of Korea's political transition would ultimately be decided by how the system itself reconciled conflicting pressures.

16. From the beginning there was strong suspicion both in Washington and among U.S. officials in Seoul that the political trend was away from democracy toward authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, the U.S. did not accept as inevitable that General Chun's ascendancy in the army would preclude democratization in Korea. With few illusions about where the real locus of power lay or about Chun's ultimate objectives, the U.S. decided that its best and only feasible course would be to continue to express support for President Choi's civilian government while advocating, at every opportunity, that it implement a timetable for democratization. Also, the U.S. recognized the need to continue urging the young generals who had seized control of the Army on December 12 to refocus their attention away from intervention in politics and back to legitimate defense matters.

17. Thus, over the next few weeks, the U.S. coupled expressions of support for President Choi and for setting a timetable for democratization with warnings to military leaders of the dangers of upsetting the democratization process and of failing to focus on the continuing, genuine security threat posed by North Korea.

18. On February 14, 1980, General Wickham met with General Chun. This was their first meeting since the December 12 incident. The CFC Commander emphasized the importance of civilian government, democratization, and adhering to CFC OPCON procedures. Afterwards, Wickham reported to Washington that he was not certain he had been able to make any impression on Chun.

19. Still, there had been some favorable developments. The formal constitutional order was preserved, Kim Dae Jung's civil rights were fully restored, political prisoners were released, media censorship slackened, and there was a significant relaxation of constraints on student political activity on campus.

20. However, economic conditions continued to deteriorate. In March and April the military began to talk of "instability." Partial martial law and selective media censorship continued. USG officials were concerned that the ROK Government had still not committed itself to a specific timetable for democratization, including the lifting of martial law. Large-scale, but generally non-violent student protests reemerged over this issue.

21. Especially disturbing and surprising to the U.S. was Chun Doo Hwan's sudden appointment as KCIA Director on April 14, 1980. To show its disapproval, the United States announced to senior Korean officials the indefinite postponement of the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), which is held annually between the ROK Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense. The U.S. hoped that this would signal that Chun's move to consolidate his position could impair ROK-U.S. relations.

22. Among American officials in Washington as well as in Seoul, concern grew that Gen. Chun was seeking to manipulate the political

situation to further increase his power. Senior officials of the State Department, Department of Defense, and White House met in Washington on May 2 and reaffirmed U.S. policy to do what it could to promote constitutional reform and to encourage a political outcome acceptable to the Korean people.

23. U.S. officials were alarmed by reports of plans to use military units to back up the police in dealing with student demonstrations. On May 8 Ambassador Gleysteen was instructed to stress these U.S. concerns to Korean government officials. On May 9 Ambassador Gleysteen met with General Chun Doo Hwan, who blamed the unrest on "a small number" of student radicals, professors, and ambitious politicians. He said the situation was not critical, however, and that military force would be used only as a last resort. Ambassador Gleysteen expressed the U.S. view that real stability in Korea required that the people recognize that orderly progress was being made toward political liberalization. He added that it was important not to alienate moderate students and the populace in general; he specifically cautioned against repression of opposition politicians. Afterwards, amidst widespread speculation that martial law would be lifted and a political democratization schedule announced, Ambassador Gleysteen reported to Washington that there seemed a good possibility that upcoming student demonstrations would be treated with moderation.

24. Also on May 9, General Wickham met with the ROK Defense Minister and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to point out the dangers of escalation if troops were used against civilians. General Wickham told them that he was obliged to stress the importance of coordination with CFC before movement of any troops under CFC OPCON so as not to impair the ability of the CFC to fulfill its mission of deterring North Korean aggression.

Toward Full Martial Law

25. Within days, however, this optimism began to fade. During the second week of May, numerous reports began reaching the Embassy that hardline elements were calling for a crackdown on students. The Blue House informed Ambassador Gleysteen and the Korean army informed General Wickham that the Korean Government might take back OPCON of some units from the CFC.

26. General Wickham met Chun Doo Hwan on May 13. In contrast to what he had told Ambassador Gleysteen previously, General Chun now told General Wickham that North Korea was the hidden hand behind the student demonstrations and that the decisive moment for an attack on the South might be at hand. Wickham replied that the U.S. as always stood ready to defend Korea, but that there was no sign that a North Korean invasion was imminent. General Wickham asserted the U.S. view that movement toward political liberalization would bring stability to South Korea and that stability was the principal means of deterring North Korea. General Wickham reported that Chun's

pessimistic assessment of the domestic situation and his stress on the North Korean threat seemed only a pretext for a move into the Blue House.

27. On May 13, Washington reacted to reports from Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham and to rumors of North Korean activity then circulating in Seoul. The State Department press spokesman stated:

From our information we see no movement of troops in North Korea out of the usual and we see no movement which would lead us to believe that some sort of attack upon the South is imminent.

28. On May 14, Ambassador Gleysteen met with Blue House Secretary General Choi Kwang Soo and urged restraint. General Wickham was absent from Korea. Lieutenant General Rosencrans, Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, delivered the same message to the Defense Minister. Ambassador Gleysteen also appealed to Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam and other politicians to make every effort to head off confrontation. Although opposition leaders were clearly reluctant to appear to be serving the government's purpose by calling for restraint, the Ambassador reported that they were beginning to do what they could in this regard. He also told Washington that the censored press was not reporting calls for moderation by opposition politicians.

29. Although the student demonstrations had grown to massive proportions, the police, without the military, were able to contain them. U.S. observers reported that given the tremendous political tension and the numbers of those involved in the protests, there was considerable restraint from violence on both sides. However, Embassy officers were concerned that troops had been deployed in some areas to back up the police.

Events of May 16 - 17

30. There were no demonstrations in Seoul on May 16, and student leaders announced a suspension of further demonstrations until after a National Assembly session scheduled for May 20. The U.S. noted a widespread perception that the demonstrations had sobered the government, and that the National Assembly would demand the lifting of martial law and the publication of a timetable for democratization. ROK officials reinforced this impression by announcing that President Choi was cutting short his Middle East trip. He returned to Seoul on May 17.

31. Also on May 16, military authorities notified CFC officials of their intent to remove the 20th Division's artillery and its 60th regiment from CFC OPCON. The CFC received the Martial Law Command's OPCON retrieval notification while General Wickham was in the United States on official duties. CFC Deputy Commander, Korean four-star General Baek Sok Chu, responded for the CFC, acknowledging the OPCON release notification, but requesting that other forces be

provided to replace the 20th Division troops being transferred to control of the Martial Law Command.

(See para 3 above for account of removal of three of the Division's regiments plus artillery on October 27 and return to CFC OPCON of the artillery on October 30 and one of the three regiments on November 28.)

32. The discernible lull in demonstrations continued through Saturday, May 17. However, concerned over the hardline stance being taken within the government, Ambassador Gleysteen met Blue House Secretary General Choi Kwang Soo. Ambassador Gleysteen urged the Korean government not to let the military dictate hardline policies and specifically warned that any actions against politicians, such as arresting Kim Dae Jung, would prove "incendiary." The Ambassador was not told by Choi of the imminent decision to impose Full Martial Law.

Full Martial Law

33. Early in the evening of May 17, U.S. officials learned of the arrests of student leaders on one campus. The U.S. had no information about the impending arrests of opposition politicians or other repressive measures. Around 9:30 p.m. that night, U.S. officials were informed by the Blue House that Full Martial Law was to be imposed at 0001 hours on May 18. By then, reports of the arrests of Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, Kim Jong Pil and other political leaders were making clear the sweeping nature of the government's actions. Acting on instructions from Washington, Ambassador Gleysteen called on President Choi on May 18 to deliver a sharp U.S. protest, stating that the U.S. found the May 17 crackdown and the move to full martial law, "shocking and astounding." President Choi responded that his government had been forced to declare Full Martial Law because it feared it would be toppled by uncontrollable student demonstrations. Ambassador Gleysteen, acting on instructions, also called for the release of opposition leaders including Kim Dae Jung. He also made a forceful protest to Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seung.

34. At the Ambassador's instruction, his special adviser delivered the same strong U.S. protest directly to General Chun Doo Hwan. General Chun responded with the same argument as President Choi about uncontrollable demonstrations by students. He added that leadership of the demonstrations had been taken over by "radical" elements. Ambassador Gleysteen reported to Washington that he did not believe that justification. He felt the Full Martial Law order, the accompanying arrests, and the suspension of the National Assembly meant that "the military [had] all but formally taken over the country."

35. When Korean Ambassador Kim Yong Shik called upon Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke on Sunday morning, May 18, Holbrooke informed the Ambassador that the Department of State was issuing a public statement at 1 p.m. that day deploring the extension of complete martial law throughout Korea. Kim protested the U.S. statement, but Holbrooke said future statements would be even more critical if events "continued down the present path." He warned that relations between the U.S. and Korea would be endangered.

36. The State Department issued the following public statement in Washington on May 18 and again on May 19:

We are deeply disturbed by the extension of Martial Law throughout the Republic of Korea, the closing of universities, and the arrest of a number of political and student leaders.

Progress toward political liberalization must be accompanied by respect for the law. However, we are concerned that the actions which the Government has now taken will exacerbate problems in the Republic of Korea. We have made clear the seriousness of our concern to Korean leaders, and we have stressed our belief that progress toward constitutional reform and the election of a broadly based civilian government, as earlier outlined by President Choi, should be resumed promptly.

We urge all elements in Korean society to act with restraint at this difficult time. As we affirmed on October 26, 1979, the U.S. Government will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea.

37. On May 20, the new Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, addressed the situation in Korea in a press conference, stating:

I must say that my reaction to the Korean situation is one of deep concern that it is moving away from liberalization policies, which I think are essential to its long-term political health. I would hope that all elements of the society would exercise restraint in this transition period, and that those in authority will find it expedient and appropriate to move in the direction of political liberalization.

38. On May 21, the Department's spokesman stated, in response to a press inquiry:

The reports of escalating confrontation in Kwangju are most disturbing. The United States repeats its urgent call to all parties to exercise restraint. We have seen reports that military security forces are pulling out of the city to establish a cordon around it.

We have also been informed that efforts are underway to develop a conciliatory dialogue, but it is not clear at all whether this effort is going to be successful.

Events in Kwangju

39. To recapitulate, the Korean authorities gave the U.S. two hours advance notice of the declaration of Full Martial Law. Neither the CFC Commander nor the Ambassador anticipated the subsequent closing of campuses and the National Assembly, the arrests of political leaders and journalists or the intrusion of military officers into various civilian areas, including the media.

40. The Korean military units used for Full Martial Law fell into two categories -- those which had never been under CFC OPCON at the normal alert status prevailing in May, 1980, and those which had been removed from CFC OPCON. The brigades mobilized from the Special Warfare Command (SWC) and the 31st Division, based in Kwangju under the 2nd ROK Army, had not been under CFC OPCON. Elements of the 20th Infantry Division had been removed from CFC OPCON (See paras 3 and 31). None of the forces deployed at Kwangju were, during that time, under the control of any American authorities.

41. U.S. officials were caught up in a maelstrom of activity Sunday morning May 18, as they protested the imposition of Full Martial Law and attempted to ascertain its scope and meaning, especially the arrests of Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, Kim Jong Pil and other political leaders. U.S. observers reported that armed martial law troops were occupying college campuses and guarding key facilities throughout Seoul, but were unaware of any significant clashes.

42. Embassy officials did not know the situation in Kwangju was starkly different from that in Seoul. It was not until the morning of Monday, May 19, that the U.S. received its first fragmentary information on violence in Kwangju, when David Miller, American Cultural Center Director there, telephoned the Embassy. Miller said Kwangju citizens told him that serious rioting was taking place in the city and that Special Warfare troops were responsible for numerous casualties and even some deaths. A U.S. military official in Seoul received a similar telephone call on May 19 from an acquaintance in Kwangju.

43. Since the situation in Kwangju which these reports described contrasted so greatly with the sullen, repressed but non-violent atmosphere in Seoul, it was at first difficult for the Embassy to understand their full significance. It was believed that any disturbances in Kwangju would be brought under control without the loss of life, as had been generally the case with earlier demonstrations.

44. Korean media, strictly controlled by Martial Law censors, also reported nothing Sunday, May 18 or Monday, May 19 about the events in Kwangju. The U.S. Embassy's fragmentary knowledge of developments in Kwangju during May 19 and 20 was based on bits of information from American Cultural Center Director David Miller; on limited observations from U.S. Air Force officials at an Air Base some 12 miles outside the city; and, increasingly, on the reports of foreign journalists. However, Miller's information was scanty as he had been ordered by the Embassy to remain indoors for security reasons. Official Korean sources either denied there was any particular problem in Kwangju or downplayed the seriousness of events there.

45. General Wickham returned to Seoul from the United States on May 19. He realized that he would need continuous and accurate information on the serious situation in Kwangju, which could affect his mission of defending the Republic of Korea against external aggression.

46. All available channels were used to urge moderation and patience. The key channel was military, through General Wickham, whose primary contacts were General Lew Byong Hion and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gen. Wickham also remained in constant touch with Ambassador Gleysteen. The Ambassador urged civilian officials, including the President and Prime Minister, to work for restraint, to seek contact with the citizens of Kwangju and to seriously consider apologizing or expressing regret for the excessive use of military force. Ambassador Gleysteen also made contact with leaders of the Catholic Church, who were urging the same thing.

Troop Deployments: Special Warfare Units and the 20th Division

47. The U.S. had neither authority over nor prior knowledge of the movement of the Special Warfare Command (SWC) units to Kwangju. SWC forces were not under CFC OPCON. When the U.S. had finally pieced together a picture of what had happened in Kwangju, Ambassador Gleysteen concluded that overreaction by Special Warfare troops was the basic cause of the tragedy.

48. By May 20, U.S. officials had become aware that the ROK military authorities were considering use of 20th Division units in Kwangju. The 20th Division was one of the few regular army units trained in riot control. The Korean authorities asserted that the 20th Division would be perceived by the populace of Kwangju as less confrontational than the Special Warfare troops then in the city.

49. U.S. officials in Seoul agreed that use of the specially trained 20th Division -- if negotiations to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis failed -- would be preferable to continued deployment of the SWC against the citizens of Kwangju. General Wickham and Ambassador Gleysteen therefore responded to a query from the ROK authorities -- after consulting with their own superiors in Washington -- that they reluctantly accepted that it would be preferable to replace SWC units with elements of the 20th Division. (General Wickham asked that the 20th Division's heavy artillery remain near Seoul so it would be available in view of the continuing threat from the North, and this was done.)

50. Although the Martial Law Command was not required to notify the CFC of the movement to Kwangju of elements of the 20th Division as it was no longer under CFC OPCON, it did so on May 20. U.S. officials assumed this was done because following the unnotified movement of units under CFC OPCON on December 12, Gen. Wickham had protested repeatedly and forcefully. It was also a fact that the movement of the Division from its normal area of operations near Seoul would lessen its availability in case of a military emergency.

51. In subsequent publications and interviews Ambassador Gleysteen has stated that the U.S. "approved" the movement of the 20th Division, and a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman on May 23, 1980 stated that the U.S. had "agreed" to release from OPCON of the troops sent to Kwangju. Irrespective of the terminology, under the rights of national sovereignty, the ROKG had the authority to deploy the 20th Division as it saw fit, once it had OPCON, regardless of the views of the U.S. Government.

52. By the time the Special Forces were withdrawn to the perimeter of Kwangju on May 21, the U.S. Government was well aware of the extreme seriousness of the situation. The Korean government asked the U.S. Government to help deter North Korea from taking military advantage of unrest in the South. In response, the U.S. on May 21 dispatched two E-3A Early Warning Aircraft to the Far East to watch for any signs of North Korean activity. Some major U.S. naval units were also deployed near the peninsula.

53. On May 22, the U.S. made a public announcement, on Ambassador Gleysteen's advice, which both warned North Korea and called for dialogue between opposing sides in Kwangju:

We are deeply concerned by the civil strife in the southern city of Kwangju.

We urge all parties involved to exercise maximum restraint and undertake a dialogue in search of a peaceful settlement.

Continued unrest and an escalation of violence would risk dangerous miscalculation by external forces.

When calm has been restored, we will urge all parties to seek means to resume a program of political development as outlined by President Choi.

We reiterate that the U.S. Government will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the R.O.K.

Although this statement and subsequent ones were broadcast by the Voice of America, they were not carried by the Korean media. Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham were assured by Korean military authorities that the May 22 U.S. statement would be broadcast and airdropped into Kwangju. Leaflets containing the statement were printed, but U.S. authorities discovered later that they were never dropped or distributed. U.S. officials also discovered later that, on the contrary, the local government-controlled radio in Kwangju was reporting that the U.S. had approved the dispatch of the SWC forces into Kwangju. Ambassador Gleysteen protested this disinformation to the Korean Government and demanded an official retraction. It was never given.

54. On May 22 at a high level policy review meeting on Korea chaired by the Secretary of State, it was decided that U.S. policy toward Korea in the face of the Kwangju incident was to:

- advise the Korean Government to restore order in Kwangju through dialogue and minimum use of force in order to avoid sowing the seeds of wide disorder;
- after resolution of the problem in Kwangju, continue pressure for "responsive political structures and broadly based civilian government;"
- continue signals that the U.S. would defend South Korea from North Korean attack.

55. On May 23, Ambassador Gleysteen met with Acting Prime Minister Park Choong Hoon. Gleysteen told Park that the policy decisions of May 17 had staggered the U.S. The U.S. agreed that the ROKG had an obligation to maintain public order, but the accompanying political crackdown was political folly and clearly had contributed to the serious breakdown of order in Kwangju. Gleysteen stressed that political progress must resume when calm was restored; the situation would not stabilize unless the people had hope for the future. The same day, Ambassador Gleysteen had lunch with a bipartisan group of National Assemblymen and discussed U.S. views on Korea. The Korean language press reported that the Ambassador had expressed "understanding" or "approval" of the events of May 17. However, this was not true. At the luncheon, Gleysteen had expressed strong disapproval of the arrest of political leaders, the closing of the National Assembly and of the general political clampdown that began May 17.

The Kwangju Lull and Negotiations

56. As for Kwangju, both Wickham and Gleysteen encouraged martial law officials to enter into a dialogue with citizen groups in Kwangju to seek a non-violent end to the confrontation. Ambassador Gleysteen urged Korean authorities to talk to an ad hoc, informal Citizens' Committee comprised of concerned civic and religious leaders who were trying to restore peace to Kwangju. Gleysteen also maintained contact with the Catholic Church to support its efforts to promote dialogue. When David Miller, the Director of the American Cultural Center in Kwangju, left the city for Seoul on May 24, he carried a message from Bishop Yun in Kwangju for Cardinal Kim which stated that the ROK Government would have to apologize for the SWC's actions in order to defuse tensions in the city. Ambassador Gleysteen endorsed the concept of an official apology for the misconduct of the Special Warfare Units in Kwangju.

57. On May 24, General Lew Byong Hion told General Wickham that the Martial Law Command had finalized plans to reenter and retake Kwangju. General Wickham acknowledged he could not dictate to the Martial Law Command, but he pointed out to General Lew that using military force to solve political problems usually made the situation worse. Use of the military could erode popular support for the government and might raise the possibility of mutiny within the army. Gen. Wickham forcefully argued for restraint. He also urged that, if military units were sent to reoccupy the city, operational plans be carefully worked out to minimize the use of force and prevent needless casualties. Lew promised restraint. Wickham reported to Washington that the likelihood of Martial Law Command forces having to reenter Kwangju was low because both he and Gleysteen believed that the Citizens' Committee was having some success at calming the situation.

58. On May 25, however, the U.S. Government began receiving ominous signals. The Korean Foreign Ministry asked all foreigners to leave Kwangju, a step presumed to presage further military action and potential violence. The U.S. Embassy and other embassies collected the names of their nationals who had not yet left Kwangju. The U.S. Air Force unit at Kwangju Air Base, which was able to make local phone calls into the city, tried to contact the citizens of various countries. Ninety-one nationals of the United States, Canada, Italy, Great Britain and South Africa gathered at Kwangju Air Base. Twenty-three of them were evacuated by the U.S. Air Force on May 26; the rest stayed at the base. Several U.S. and other non-Korean citizens, including Peace Corps volunteers and missionaries, elected to stay in Kwangju.

59. Korean military authorities also began to tell the U.S. on May 25 that hard-core radical students had taken over the city, that their demands were excessive, and that they did not seem interested in good faith negotiations.

The Retaking of Kwangju

60. The next day, May 26, Blue House Secretary General Choi Kwang Soo informed Ambassador Gleysteen that the local ROK military commander in Kwangju had been given discretionary authority to reenter the city and the operation would begin soon. Gleysteen said he realized the Korean Government wanted the incident ended, but suggested that all non-military options be exhausted first. He also specifically said that it would be a mistake for the Special Warfare forces to be involved in the reoccupation of the city.

61. It was only a few hours before the beginning of the operation to retake Kwangju, when it was already common knowledge that an attack was imminent, that someone in the provincial capital building asked a journalist to relay to Ambassador Gleysteen a request that he act as a mediator. Gleysteen declined a telephoned request to mediate with the Martial Law Command because he believed such a role was inappropriate for the U.S. ambassador and would not be accepted by the ROK authorities.

62. After Martial Law forces entered the city in the early morning hours of May 27, the Martial Law Command informed the CFC Commander that the operation had been well-conducted and that, except for 30 persons killed after refusing to surrender their arms, casualties had been "light."

63. The bulk of forces used were from the 20th Division, not the SWC which had provoked the incident. However, SWC troops wearing regular army uniforms to disguise their identity, had conducted the final assault on the Provincial Capital building, and other places in Kwangju, and, only after the end of fighting, had turned over their responsibilities to 20th Division forces.

Kwangju Aftermath: U.S. Policy

64. In a May 28 evaluation for Washington, Ambassador Gleysteen concluded that a group of army officers had taken power step by step and that an atmosphere of military occupation now permeated the country. The United States had been "demonstrably unsuccessful in trying to stop the march of these self-appointed leaders or even to slow them down." He concluded that, in essence, these leaders had discounted U.S. reactions because they thought that Washington had no option but to acquiesce. Gleysteen predicted that if Chun Doo Hwan and his group continued on their course there was the definite possibility of long-term instability in Korea. -

65. On May 31, a high-level meeting in Washington considered the next steps the United States should take. Further meetings were held throughout June. To avoid signaling U.S. acceptance of the young generals, it was decided to take a "cool and aloof" public stance toward them. It was also decided to seek ways to encourage the new ROK power structure toward resumption of constitutional reform and elections. USG officials hoped that the generals, in the first stages of consolidating their power, would modify their actions to avoid public confrontation with the United States.

66. The United States decided not to threaten disruption of the ROK-U.S. security relationship (as opposed to taking political steps to demonstrate our displeasure, which was done) because of the North Korean military threat. U.S. policy makers, however, noted that dictatorship and instability in South Korea would eventually erode public and Congressional support in the United States for the security relationship. In a May 31 TV interview, President Carter declared that the two considerations that underlay U.S. policy in Korea -- South Korean security and human rights -- had not changed. Carter stated firmly that the security commitment had not been shaken, but he also noted that democratization had been "given a setback" and that the U.S. was urging the Koreans "to move as rapidly as possible toward a completely democratic government."

67. Upon instructions from Secretary of State Muskie, Ambassador Gleysteen met with Chun Doo Hwan on June 4 and told him that recent events in Korea since May 17 had caused serious concern in the USG. Gleysteen told Chun it was unfortunate that ROK special forces had been used in Kwangju. They had been very rough and were not intended for crowd control, but for use on North Korean invaders. They were too tough ever to be used against South Koreans. The Ambassador hoped this tragic aspect of the incident could be publicly acknowledged. Chun told Gleysteen that he regretted that they had to be used, but that they were used as a last resort to control the situation.

68. In a June 26 meeting with Chun, Ambassador Gleysteen laid out U.S. views. Gleysteen stressed the need for overall progress toward political liberalization and the difficulty of sustaining the basic security and economic relationship in the absence of such an evolution. He urged an end to martial law. Gleysteen also complained that many Koreans believed that the U.S. government was at fault for the Kwangju incident because of misinformation that had been broadcast. Chun responded that the U.S. should not worry about anti-Americanism in Korea because there were only a few who were using the issue for their own purposes.

69. Again, under instruction from Secretary of State Muskie, Gleysteen met with Chun Doo Hwan on July 8 to emphasize to him the Secretary's view that Chun had "abused" the U.S.-ROK security relationship. Gleysteen stressed to Chun that the long-term security relationship between the U.S. and Korea required that the Korean government have the support of the majority of its people.

Distortions of the U.S. Position

70. The U.S. policy of aloofness and public displeasure with the Chun takeover was known to the world, but not to the Korean people. The Chun regime used its control over the media under total martial law to distort the U.S. position, portraying it not as condemnation but as support. The distorted official radio reports of U.S. support for the actions of the Special Warfare forces in Kwangju and the authorities' reneging on their agreement to drop leaflets containing a U.S. statement supportive of a negotiated Kwangju settlement were only the first deceptions. On May 23, the Korean press distorted Ambassador Gleysteen's remarks to National Assemblymen as "understanding" or "approval" of the events of May 17 (as noted paras 54-55).

71. Immediately after the end of the Kwangju Incident, Chun Doo Hwan gathered a group of Korean publishers and editors and told them that the United States had been informed in advance of the December 12 seizure of power, of his appointment at the KCIA, and of the declaration of Full Martial Law on May 18. Ambassador Gleysteen sent the Embassy Press Attache to each of the media figures Chun had met with to set the record straight, but none reported the true U.S. position--nor, under martial law, could they. The Associated Press did quote the Embassy's denial which made explicit that Chun's statement "simply was not true and Chun knew it." The AP report, however, was not carried in the Korean media.

72. Under martial law, statements by U.S. officials on Korean developments were regularly ignored and distorted by the Korean media. Whenever a U.S. official mentioned support for the ROK-U.S. security arrangement, that statement was highlighted, but statements urging democratization and human rights were downplayed or not carried at all. On June 22, the U.S. Embassy took the highly unusual step of publishing its own compilation of statements by U.S. officials on Korea and mailing it out to over 3000 people in Korea. In response to Korean disinformation and to clarify U.S. policy, Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Armacost appeared before a House Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee on June 25 to discuss recent events and U.S. policy in Korea. On June 26, Gleysteen complained directly to Chun about misinformation on the U.S. role in Kwangju being broadcast.

73. Manipulation of the facts by the Korean media continued through the summer with the misquoting of President Jimmy Carter's strongly worded letter to Chun Doo Hwan upon his election to the presidency on August 27, 1980. Carter said that political liberalization must resume in Korea, but the controlled media reported it differently. Korean newspaper headlines read: "Carter: Personal Message to President Chun Expresses Support for Korea's New Government (Dong-a Ilbo) and "Security Commitment to Korea: The Major U.S. Policy" (Chungang Ilbo). A heavily censored wire service report of September 2 read (deleted material in parentheses):

"President Carter said today that South Korea's new President, Chun Doo Hwan, should move quickly to restore democracy (and complete freedom of expression) to his country. Mr. Carter urged the liberalization of South Korea's political life when he answered a question at a town meeting held as he campaigned for re-election in November. (He said he believed the South Korean government should move faster toward complete freedom of expression and of the news media and should eliminate imprisonment of political opponents.) "Mr. Carter said his views were clear and were well-known to President Chun. (He said he would continue to use his influence to persuade South Korea to move towards a democracy.) At the same time, reconfirming U.S. security commitments to South Korea, Mr. Carter said..."

The Kim Dae Jung Trial and Human Rights Issues

74. The United States was deeply concerned about the fate of Kim Dae Jung and others who had been arrested. On May 18, the day after Kim's arrest, it protested to the Korean authorities on his behalf. President Carter had met Kim a year earlier and took a personal interest in his case. Although ROK authorities were displeased, they acceded to strong Embassy demands that a U.S. official be allowed to attend Kim's trial. The U.S. went on record after the trial that the charges against Kim were "far-fetched" (a statement not carried by the controlled Korean media). These efforts helped to focus international attention on Kim's case. Some months after Kim Dae Jung had been condemned to death, the Chun Government made it clear to the U.S. that it linked Kim's fate to some degree of normalization in the frigid political relations between the two governments. After extensive discussions with Chun, Kim's death sentence was lifted, and Chun visited the United States early in the Reagan Administration.

Conclusion

75. As outlined in this Statement, the United States Government at the highest levels was extremely concerned at events in Korea from December 12, 1979 through the May, 1980 declaration of Full Martial Law and the ensuing Kwangju tragedy, and beyond, as military rule was consolidated and prospects for democracy receded. It is also apparent that despite persistent, strong remonstrances by both military and civilian officials, U.S. efforts had only a marginal impact on events. Human rights and civil liberties issues, nonetheless, remained significant areas of dispute between the U.S. and the Chun government throughout the Fifth Republic. The record reveals that the U.S. Government exerted its best efforts for Korean democratization and for restraint of ROK military actions against civilians during this troubled period. The U.S. Government only regrets that U.S. objectives were not achieved at the time: consolidation of civilian, constitutional rule and resumption of the democratization process.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9603870

REFERRAL

DATE: 06 JUN 96

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHRISTENSON

OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, STATE DPT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: KIM SHEON CHONG

DATE: 14 MAY 96

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FROM KOREA PROFESSORS SOLIDARITY FOR 5.18 KWANGJU
UPRISING

REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY

DUE DATE:

COMMENT: NSC STAFF POINT OF CONTACT: SANDY KRISTOFF (202) 456-9251

FOR


JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

6/7/96
[unclear]

(TRANSLATION OF A KOREAN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT)

May 14, 1996

To: President Clinton
(of The United States
The White House
Washington, DC)

From: The Korean Professors' Solidarity for the May 18 Kwangju Uprising
1632-2(#2), Bongchun 11-dong, Kwanak-ku, Seoul, Korea.

Dear Mr. President:

We would like to express our respect for your consistent efforts in promoting world peace and freedom.

As you are aware, Korea lost the precious lives of Kwangju citizens during an armed suppression by the military in May, 1980. In support of social justice and peace, we, members of the Korean Professors' Solidarity to Seek Justice for the May 18 Incident, have demanded investigation of the facts concerning the historical incident and due punishment of those responsible for the massacre.

Of course, the suppression of the Kwangju Uprising may be regarded as an internal affair of Korea, which is a sovereign state. However, it would be difficult to see it as an internal matter as long as your country held operational control over the Korean army, which mobilized its troops to commit the brutal killings in Kwangju. According to your government's recently declassified secret documents concerning the situation at that time, your country had a prior knowledge of General Chun Tu-hwan's plan to deploy troops to put down the May 18 Kwangju people's uprising by force, and later your government approved the military plan. We professors are shocked to learn that your country even considered a military intervention in case of a worsening situation.

Your country has maintained until now that it has no responsibility for the Kwangju issue. Your government has even sent a reply to a 1989 hearing on the Kwangju incident denying its knowledge of General Chun Tu-hwan's military mobilization plan. Moreover, General John Wickham, then commander of the US forces in Korea, seriously insulted the Korean people with a statement that Koreans are brats who unconditionally follow any leader. Even now, after the secret documents were made public, your

government maintains that there is nothing more to add to its 1989 statement. Our people are appalled at such an attitude of your country. How can you then explain the enormous discrepancies between the 1989 reply and the recently disclosed secret documents?

We, members of the Korean Professors' Solidarity for the May 18 Kwangju Uprising, are shocked at your persistent silence to the Korean people's demand that the United States reveal the truth and apologize to our people. As the secret documents (show the extent of your country's involvement), we believe that your country should reveal the truth and apologize for its support of the military forces which put down by force the Korean people who rose up against military dictatorship and in favor of democracy. This action will prevent reoccurrence of this kind of incident.

We Korean professors also note the fact that although peace time operational control has been returned (to the Korean military) as a result of the Korean people's tenuous demand, the United States still holds war time operational control.

We, upholding the will of the Korean people, make the following demands from your country:

First, we demand that (your government) provide an open and truthful explanation with regard to the recently disclosed documents which show US State Department's approval of the May 18 military suppression.

Second, we urge (your government) to apologize to the Korean people for the responsibility of its support for the military suppression by force.

Third, we urge (your government) to provide to our government and our organization more of the undisclosed materials about the truth.

We professors hope that your government will provide open responses to the our demands so that it can contribute to the establishment of a desirable bilateral relationship and that (the United States) will show its attitude as a responsible member of the international community.

Cochairmen: Kim Sang-ki (Kyongpuk University), Kim Sang-gon (Hanshin University), Kim Chong-sun (Sungkyunkwan University), Kim Young-ho (Inha University), Pak Chong-su (Chung-puk University), Pea Tong-in (Kangwon University), Yu Chae-ho (Chunpuk University), Yi Kwang-wu (Chunnam University), Cho Chae-hun (Kongju University), and Ha Il-min (Pusan University)

May 14, 1996

To: President Bill Clinton
White House
Washington DC, U.S.A.

From: Korea Professors' Solidarity for 5·18 Kwangju Uprising
1632-2(#2), Bongchun11-dong, Kwanak-ku, Seoul, Korea
Tel: (02)888-3683 Fax: (02)872-7588

Dear Mr. President:

We would like to express our deep gratitude and respect for your consistent efforts in promoting world peace and freedom.

As you are well aware, Korea has suffered a great sacrifice of numerous lives of citizens of Kwangju, during the military rule of 1980. We, Korean Professors' Solidarity for 5·18 Kwangju Uprising, feel the obligation to dedicate ourselves in eliciting the truth and punishing the wrong-doers under the rightful law of democracy.

This may be seen, to few eyes, as an internal matter within the territory of Korea. However, as United States of America held total control of Army Command during such time of tumult and confusion, the order of military move and its resulting massacre cannot be just a domestic issue. Even more, the secret files that have been recently unclassified show that U.S.A. Government was not only informed in advance of the military plans of General Chun Doo Hwan, but also approved of such use of the army against innocent civilians and gave promise of assistance to the military in case of difficulty. Such revelation has brought great shock and disappointment in Korea, especially to us, professors.

You have been maintaining that U.S.A. holds no responsibility for the Kwangju event. You have also given a fabricated reply to the Congressional Kwangju Hearing of 1989, that U.S.A. was not aware of the military plans of General Chun Doo Hwan. Moreover, Commander John Wickham stated that Koreans are like 'lemmings' succumbing to any leaders, thus insulting the people of Korea as an independent democratic nation. Even now, after your secret files have been publicized, the people of Korea are astonished to hear your claim that U.S.A. government has nothing else to reveal other than those publicized in 1989.

How can you explain the overwhelming discrepancies between the reply of 1989 and the secret files of today?

We, Korea Professors' Solidarity for 5.18 Kwangju Uprising, are shocked and disappointed at your silent attitude towards the desperate demand from the people of Korea to confess the truth, and apologize for the wrong deeds. We believe it is your duty and obligation to admit the embarrassing blunder of the past, by assisting and conforming to the military forces of General Chun in slaughtering the civilians who have come out and dedicated their lives for the advance of democracy and freedom we all long for. We are aware of, and resent, the fact that although 'peacetime' operational control' has been returned to Korean government, U.S.A. government still has control over 'wartime operational control'.

We, in behalf of the people of Korea, request the following:


First, we demand that you give truthful explanations to the secret files recently manifested regarding the approval of US government on military suppression of 5.18 Kwangju Uprising.

Secondly, we ask that you apologize to the people of Korea for your responsibility in assisting the army that has brutally suppressed civilians by military forces.

Thirdly, we demand that you provide us with more materials that will help eliciting the truth of 5.18 Kwangju Uprising.

Finally, we hope that the Government of the United States of America promptly reply to our ardent demand for truth, thus promoting a mutually beneficial relationship between the two nations, and thus showing responsibility of U.S.A. for international peace.

With best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sheon Chong Kim', written in a cursive style.

Kim Sheon Chong, Ph.D.

Co-chair

Korea Professors' Solidarity for 5.18 Kwangju Uprising

Professor

Sungkyunkwan University

3870

May 14, 1996

To: President Bill Clinton
White House
Washington DC, U.S.A.

From: Korea Professors' Solidarity for 5·18 Kwangju Uprising
1632-2(#2), Bongchun11-dong, Kwanak-ku, Seoul, Korea
Tel: (02)888-3683 Fax: (02)872-7588

Dear Mr. President:

We would like to express our deep gratitude and respect for your consistent efforts in promoting world peace and freedom.

As you are well aware, Korea has suffered a great sacrifice of numerous lives of citizens of Kwangju, during the military rule of 1980. We, Korean Professors' Solidarity for 5·18 Kwangju Uprising, feel the obligation to dedicate ourselves in eliciting the truth and punishing the wrong-doers under the rightful law of democracy.

This may be seen, to few eyes, as an internal matter within the territory of Korea. However, as United States of America held total control of Army Command during such time of tumult and confusion, the order of military move and its resulting massacre cannot be just a domestic issue. Even more, the secret files that have been recently unclassified show that U.S.A. Government was not only informed in advance of the military plans of General Chun Doo Hwan, but also approved of such use of the army against innocent civilians and gave promise of assistance to the military in case of difficulty. Such revelation has brought great shock and disappointment in Korea, especially to us, professors.

You have been maintaining that U.S.A. holds no responsibility for the Kwangju event. You have also given a fabricated reply to the Congressional Kwangju Hearing of 1989, that U.S.A. was not aware of the military plans of General Chun Doo Hwan. Moreover, Commander John Wickham stated that Koreans are like 'lemmings' succumbing to any leaders, thus insulting the people of Korea as an independent democratic nation. Even now, after your secret files have been publicized, the people of Korea are astonished to hear your claim that U.S.A. government has nothing else to reveal other than those publicized in 1989.

How can you explain the overwhelming discrepancies between the reply of 1989 and the secret files of today?

We, Korea Professors' Solidarity for 5.18 Kwangju Uprising, are shocked and disappointed at your silent attitude towards the desperate demand from the people of Korea to confess the truth, and apologize for the wrong deeds. We believe it is your duty and obligation to admit the embarrassing blunder of the past, by assisting and conforming to the military forces of General Chun in slaughtering the civilians who have come out and dedicated their lives for the advance of democracy and freedom we all long for. We are aware of, and resent, the fact that although 'peacetime' operational control' has been returned to Korean government, U.S.A. government still has control over 'wartime operational control'.

We, in behalf of the people of Korea, request the following:

First, we demand that you give truthful explanations to the secret files recently manifested regarding the approval of US government on military suppression of 5.18 Kwangju Uprising.

Secondly, we ask that you apologize to the people of Korea for your responsibility in assisting the army that has brutally suppressed civilians by military forces.

Thirdly, we demand that you provide us with more materials that will help eliciting the truth of 5.18 Kwangju Uprising.

Finally, we hope that the Government of the United States of America promptly reply to our ardent demand for truth, thus promoting a mutually beneficial relationship between the two nations, and thus showing responsibility of U.S.A. for international peace.

With best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sheon Chong Kim', with a horizontal line underneath.

Kim Sheon Chong, Ph.D.

Co-chair

Korea Professors' Solidarity for 5.18 Kwangju Uprising

Professor

Sungkyunkwan University

문 회 공
김상기(경북대), 김상균(한신대), 김성중(성균관대), 김영호(인하대), 김진곤(서종대),
남진수(충북대), 배동인(강원대), 유제호(전북대), 이광우(전남대), 조재훈(온주대), 하미(부산대)

5.18 내란자 구축 기초 및 특별법 제정을 촉구하는 전국 대학 서명교수 모임

1996. 5. 14

우리 교수들은 빠른 시일 내에 귀국 정부가 위의 요구들에 대해 공식적으로 답변해 줄 것으로 바
람직한 한·미 관계의 정립은 물론 국제사회의 책임있는 국가로서 태도를 보여줄 것을 기대합니다.

니다.

세계, 진상 규명을 위한 더 많은 미공개 자료를 우리 정부와 우리 단체에 넘겨줄 것을 촉구합

구합니다.

물론, 무력으로 진압한 군부세력을 지원한 귀국의 책임에 대해 한국 국민 앞에 사과할 것을 촉

구합니다.

첫째, 이번이 공개된 미 국무부의 5.18 무력진압 승인 문서에 대한 공개적인 정확한 해명을 요

이에 우리 교수들은 한국 국민의 뜻을 담아 귀국에 다음과 같이 요구하고자 합니다.

예의 주춧돌입니다.

고 아직도 전시 작전권 등 한국 군대에 대한 주요 통제권을 미국 정부가 쥐고 있는 상황에 대해

또한 우리 교수들은 한국 국민들의 충분한 요구에 의해 전시 작전권이 반환되었음에도 불구하고

를 밝히고 사과함으로써 이런 일들이 다시는 발생하지 않도록 해야 한다고 생각합니다.

주최의를 위해 나선 한국 국민들을 무력으로 진압한 군부세력을 지원한 책임에 대해 떼뻐이 진상

에 경악하지 않을 수 없습니다. 특히, 이번이 공개된 국비문서를 통하여 군사독재에 하가하고 민

우리 교수들은 진실을 밝히고 사과하라는 한국 국민의 요구에 원복으로 일관해 온 귀국의 태도

설명할 수 있다는 말입니까?

게 합니다. 그렇다면, 귀국의 1989년의 답변서와 이번이 공개된 국비문서의 엄청난 차이를 어떻게

공개한 설명서 외에는 더 이상 추가할 것이 없다."는 귀국의 태도는 우리 국민들을 더욱 분노하

까지 하여 하여 한국 국민들에게 심한 모욕을 주었습니다. 그리고 국비 문서가 공개된 지금도 "89년

권 당시 주한 미군 사령관은 한국인들은 어떤 지도자에게든 무조건 복종하는 '불복종'이라는 발언

회에 전두환 장군의 군명력 투입계획을 전혀 몰랐다는 답변서까지 보내 왔습니다. 더구나 중 위

귀국은 여태까지 광주문제에 책임이 없다는 주장으로 일관해 왔으며, 심지어 1989년 광주청문

우리 교수들은 충격을 금치 못하는 바입니다.

했음은 물론 이동을 승인하고, 사태가 악화될 경우 직접적인 군사적 개입까지 고려했다는 사실에

국이 80년 5월 광주민중항쟁을 무력으로 진압하기 위한 전두환 장군의 군특임 계획을 사전 인지

된 것이 엄연한 사실입니다. 특히, 귀국이 공개한 당시 상황에 관한 국비 문서를 살펴볼 때, 귀

전 지휘권을 쥐고 있기에 군 행동에 의한 파주의 참혹한 상황이 우리의 내정문제라고만 보기는

물론, 광주항쟁전망은 주권국가인 한국의 내정문제로 볼 수도 있겠지만, 귀국이 한국 군대의 자

니다.

광주민중항쟁의 역사적 사실에 대한 진상 규명과 화상자에 대한 엄정한 법적 처벌을 요구해 왔습

의 고귀한 생명들이 희생을 당했습니. 우리 한국의 대학 교수들은 사회정의와 평화를 위해서

귀하도 아시다시피 한국은 지난 1980년 5월에 전군부 세력이 자행한 무력진압으로 광주민중들

세계평화와 자유의 신장을 위해 평소에 애쓰고 계시는 귀하의 노력에 대해 경의를 표합니다.

클린턴 대통령 귀하

3970

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604610
RECEIVED: 02 JUL 96 17

TO: MCALEER, R

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 10 JUL 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
FOREIGN TRAVEL

JAPAN

PERSONS: PIRIE, R

SUBJECT: FORN TRAVEL APPROVAL FOR PIRIE

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 05 JUL 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

KRISTOFF

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

JMH

DATE

7.10.96

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH

CLOSED BY: NSTMH

DOC

3 OF

3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9604610

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 KRISTOFF	X 96070218 CONCURRENCE TO EXEC SECRETARY
001 STATE	Z 96070218 COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE
001	X 96071017 ACTION OFFICER CONCURS
001 BIERNACKI	X 96071017 PREPARE MEMO FOR SENS
002	X 96071007 RECD STATE APPROVAL
002 BIERNACKI	Z 96071007 APPROPRIATE ACTION
003	X 96071016 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001	960627	STATE
003	960710	MCALEER, R

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4610
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>7.10</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>2</u>	<u>JMA 7.10</u>	<u>B</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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CC:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604610
RECEIVED: 02 JUL 96 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: MCALEER, R

DOC DATE: 27 JUN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
FOREIGN TRAVEL

JAPAN

PERSONS: PIRIE, R

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF FORN TRAVEL BY PIRIE OF DOD TO SEOUL / PYONGTEK /
POHANG / CHINHAIE / YOKOSUKA / ATSUGI / FUJI 10 - 19 JUL 96

ACTION: CONCURRENCE TO EXEC SECRETARY

DUE DATE: 05 JUL 96 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
KRISTOFF

FOR CONCURRENCE
FAIRFAX
STATE

FOR INFO
BIERNACKI
LEE
PONEMAN
PRITCHARD
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS:

NSC concurs in this travel. SLK

DISPATCHED BY

JMH

DATE

7.2.96

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4610

July 10, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel Approval

This memorandum is to confirm that the following foreign travel request has been approved:

Robert B. Pirie, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy

July 10-19, 1996

Korea and Japan

Andrew D. Sens
Andrew D. Sens *for*
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9611409

Date July 9, 1996

FOR: Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: Anthony Lake
From: Robert P. McAleer, Colonel, USMC, Executive Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
Date: 27 June 1996
Subj: Foreign travel of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant Secretary
Navy (Installations and Environment), to Korea and
Japan, 10 July through 19 July 1996.

WH Referral Dated: 2 July 1996

NSCS ID# (if any): 9604610

☐ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☐ A draft reply is attached.
- ☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- ☐ A translation is attached.
- ☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- ☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- ☒ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- ☐ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED

Charles W. Hefner
for



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

4610



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

THROUGH: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE *RAMS*
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY *Richard D. Bazy* 27 June 1996

Subj: SENIOR OFFICIAL FOREIGN TRAVEL

The Honorable Robert B. Pirie Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment), plans to travel to Korea and Japan between 10 and 19 July 1996.

Mr. Pirie will view facilities and talk with officials regarding facility and environmental subjects, to include quality of life concerns that affect United States Naval personnel in the Far East.

Mr. Pirie will be accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Johnson, Military Assistant/Marine Aide. The itinerary is as follows

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>TIME</u>
10 July	Depart Washington, D.C.	0800
11 July	Arrive Korea (Visit Navy and Marine Corps facilities in Seoul, Pyongtek, Pohang, Chinhae)	1535
16 July	Depart Korea (Visit Navy and Marine Corps facilities in Yokosuka, Atsugi, Fuji)	1110
19 July	Depart Japan Arrive Washington, D.C.	1755 1756

NSC Approval _____



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9604610

REFERRAL

DATE: 02 JUL 96

MEMORANDUM FOR: BURNS, W

STATE SECRETARIAT

9011409

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: LAKE

SOURCE: MCALEER, R


DATE: 27 JUN 96

SUBJ: NOTIFICATION OF FORN TRAVEL BY PIRIE OF DOD TO SEOUL / PYONGTEK /
POHANG / CHINHAIE / YOKOSUKA / ATSUGI / FUJI 10 - 19 JUL 96

REQUIRED ACTION: COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE

DUE DATE: 05 JUL 96

COMMENT:


FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

96
JUL -3 AMO:EC
by W. W. M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE.

RECORD ID: 9605620
RECEIVED: 15 AUG 96 15

TO: SENS

FROM: BURNS, W

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 96
SOURCE REF: 9614329

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
HS

APEC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE TRANSMITTAL - RECOMS NO REPLY TO SOUTH KOREAN PRES KIM LTR TO
PRES RE APEC BUSINESS ADVISORY COUN / ABAC

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 19 AUG 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF: 9606176

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
PRITCHARD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/6/2012
2009-05287

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9605620

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 PRITCHARD
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 96081515 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
Z 96081613 NFAR PER KRISTOFF
X 96100118 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9614329

Date September 27, 1996

FOR: Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President
From: Republic of Korea President - Kim Young Sam
Date: July 23, 1996
Subj: Letter to President Clinton regarding APEC Meetings.

WH Referral Dated: _____
NSCS ID# (if any): 5620 ; 6176

☐ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☐ A draft reply is attached.
☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.
☐ A translation is attached.
☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
☒ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
☐ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
☐ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: The letter is in response to correspondence from President Clinton in May to all APEC Leaders. The letter does not raise any new issues but simply comments on initiatives highlighted in President Clinton's letter.

Jordan Sautin
Director
Secretariat Staff

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	President Kim Young Sam to President William J. Clinton. [English translation] (2 pages)	07/23/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

South Korea, 1996 [3]

2009-0528-F
vz1472

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

9614329

**EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

KAM 96/171

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and has the honor to request the latter to transmit the enclosed letter of July 23, 1996 from H.E. Kim Young Sam, President of the Republic of Korea, to H.E. William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America.

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

August 9, 1996

Washington, D.C.

Enclosure: as stated



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. letter	President Kim Young Sam to President William J. Clinton. [Korean] (2 pages)	07/23/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

South Korea, 1996 [3]

2009-0528-F

vz1472

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. letter	President Kim Young Sam to President William J. Clinton. [Korean Embassy English translation] (2 pages)	07/23/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

South Korea, 1996 [3]

2009-0528-F

vz1472

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9605622
RECEIVED: 15 AUG 96 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BURNS, W

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 96
SOURCE REF: 9614335

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CONDOLENCE MSG RE DAMAGE CAUSED BY RECENT TORRENTIAL RAINS
& FLOODING

ACTION: RECD STATE COMMENTS

DUE DATE: 19 AUG 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
PRITCHARD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/6/2012
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTMH

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9605622

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRITCHARD

Z 96081515 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

001

Z 96081616 NFAR PER KRISTOFF

002

X 96082816 RECD STATE COMMENTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9614335

Date August 27, 1996

FOR: Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President William J. Clinton
From: President Kim Young Sam
Date: August 7, 1996
Subj: Condolence message regarding the
damage caused by recent torrential rains
and flooding.

WH Referral Dated: _____
NSCS ID# (if any): _____

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
_____ A translation is attached.
_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 X We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
_____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

No response necessary. Incoming is a thank you for a
condolence message sent by President Clinton.

August 7, 1996

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your warm message of condolence regarding the casualties and damage caused by the recent torrential rains and subsequent flooding in Korea.

Our people are united in carrying out the necessary restoration work despite the heavy sufferings we are enduring from the natural disaster.

The Korean people cherish their old tradition of working at their maximum capability, especially when faced with adverse circumstances. We are trying our best to overcome these difficult times with our un-extinguishable spirit.

The friendly support and encouragement we have received from the American people has been of great help in our restoration efforts.

On behalf of the Korean people and the bereaved families, I once again express our gratitude for your kind words.

Sincerely,

/S/

Kim Young Sam
President of the
Republic of Korea

The Honorable
William J. Clinton
President of the
United States of America

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

KAM 96/151

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and has the honor to request that the enclosed letter from President Kim Young Sam, written in response to President William Clinton's message of condolence regarding Korea's recent flood, be conveyed to President Clinton at the earliest possible convenience.

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

August 7, 1996

Washington, D.C.

Enclosure: As stated





S/S 9614335

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 14, 1996


Memorandum for: Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

Subject: Alerting NSCS on Presidential Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Clinton from
SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM

which is transmitted for your information. This correspondence was received in the
Records Management Division of the Executive Secretariat on AUGUST 14, 1996.

A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Folk 
Chief, S/S-RMD
Records Management Division
Executive Secretariat
(202) 647-0053