

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Kristoff, Sandra

Original OA/ID Number:

1040

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
30	2	10	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Letter from President Jiang Zemin to President William J. Clinton. (2 pages)	03/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002. draft	Cable regarding Compensation. (3 pages)	03/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Decision Making. (2 pages)	c. 4/1995	P1/b(1)
004. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting, March 17, 1995. Record ID: 9520334. (1 page)	03/15/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Subject: Compensation (cover memo). (1 page)	02/13/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. memo	For Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Subject: Compensation. (3 pages)	02/09/1995	P1/b(1)
006. note	Handwritten notes from Meeting with Foreign Minister Gong. (2 pages)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Aoki. Subject: Presidential Letter. Record ID: 9500772. (1 page)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
007b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (1 page)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
007c. draft	Letter from President William J. Clinton. (1 page)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
008a. form	Joint Staff Action Processing Form regarding Military Exercises. (2 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F

vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. cable	re: Military Excercises. (2 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)
008c. form	Joint Staff Action Processing Form regarding Military Excercises. (3 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
009a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Aoki. Subject: Non-Proliferation Treaty. Record ID: 9500727. (3 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
009b. paper	Diplomatic Study paper. (2 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
009c. list	Non-Proliferation Treaty contact list. (3 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
010. list	[CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	01/18/1995	P3/b(3)

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FOLDER TITLE:

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2009-0528-F

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OK
8/2

95 MAR 14 P6:15

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

S/S #

Clear
No Changes
3/15/95

Message No. 018915 Classification CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2

From: Laurel Shea Gallivan S/S 647-8448 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description Cable to SEOUL: CHINESE PRESIDENT JIANG-ZEMIN'S LETTER
DECLINING INVITATION TO JOIN KEDO.

<u>To (Agency):</u>	<u>Deliver To:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>Nancy Soderberg</u>	<u>456-9461</u>	<u>WHSITRM</u>
	<u>Fred Doherty</u>		
	<u>Col. Rao</u>		
	<u>Executive Secretariat</u>		
	<u>Roth</u> <u>PONZAN</u>		
	<u>Summerson</u> <u>FOKI</u>		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: Wednesday, March 15, 1995

S/S Officer: Laurel Shea Gallivan
DCS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 7/2/02
2009-0524-F

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Letter from President Jiang Zemin to President William J. Clinton. (2 pages)	03/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
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003. paper	Decision Making. (2 pages)	c. 4/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

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2009-0528-F
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20334

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 15, 1995

File

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on North Korea

Attached is a proposed meeting notice and agenda for the Principals Meeting to be held on Friday, March 17 from 3:30 to 4:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

SR
Concurrence by: Stanley Roth

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RL* NARA, Date *7/20/2012*
2009-0524-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20334

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. KENNETH BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. McALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive
Secretariat
Department of Energy

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
U.S. Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on North Korea (S)

A Principals Committee Meeting on North Korea has been scheduled for Friday, March 17 from 3:30 to 4:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. State is circulating a discussion paper separately. (S)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NR NARA, Date 7/20/2012
2009-0528-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting, March 17, 1995. Record ID: 9520334. (1 page)	03/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

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Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

MAR -8 P7:43
S/S #

*Def. to
Poneman
informed S+R
on 3/8*

018612

Message No. _____ Classification **UNCLASSIFIED** No. Pages 4

From: Deborah E. Graze S/S 647-5302 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description Cable to USUN NEW YORK: Instructions for Voting on Kedo Resolutions

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Soderberg	456-9461	WHSITRM
	Fred Dohse		
	Executive Secretariat		
	<i>PONEMAN</i> <i>ROTH</i>		
	<i>AOKI</i> <i>SUETTINGER</i>		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: 3/8 * MUST GO * TONIGHT - INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOTING TONIGHT!

NSCS POC is Steve Aoki

S/S Officer: Deborah E. Graze

PSR

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

INITIALS

APPR: JDDRAFT: JDOTHER: JD/JPOTHER: JD/JPOTHER: JD/JPOTHER: JD/JP/JPOTHER: JD/JP/JP3/8
ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

L/PM:JKHERR:JAS
03/08/95 76902
S/AL:GSAMORE

L/PM:NHIGHSMITH
D:MFITZPATRICK
P:BHALL
JCS:KSANDKUHLER

NSC:SAOKI
S/RPP:MUSNICK
OSD:SLOEFFLER
ACDA:SDAVIS

L/LM: MBWEST
T:TBUCKLEY
EAP/K:JGOLDSTEIN
OMB:JNIX

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE SEOUL, TOKYO

PASS AMB GALLUCCI

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PARM, ENRG, KS, KN, JA

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOTING ON KEDO RESOLUTIONS

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION [KEDO] IN VOTING ON RESOLUTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF KEDO AT ITS INITIAL MEETING ON MARCH 9, 1995.

2. KEDO IS SCHEDULED TO BE FORMED ON MARCH 9, 1995, AND THE INITIAL MEETING OF THE KEDO EXECUTIVE BOARD WILL BE HELD ON THE SAME DAY. THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO KEDO WILL BE A MEMBER OF THE KEDO EXECUTIVE BOARD.

3. THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IS HEREBY AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED TO VOTE AT THE INITIAL MEETING OF THE KEDO EXECUTIVE BOARD IN FAVOR OF EXECUTIVE BOARD RESOLUTIONS ACCOMPLISHING, IN ALL MATERIAL RESPECTS, THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:

SELECTION OF CHAIR

ELECTION OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE

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UNCLASSIFIED

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EXECUTIVE BOARD AS CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR A TERM OF TWO [2] YEARS AND THEREAFTER UNTIL SUCH PERSON'S SUCCESSOR IS SELECTED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.

NEGOTIATIONS

AUTHORIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION [KEDO] THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA ON THE LIGHT-WATER REACTOR PROJECT SUPPLY AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN KEDO AND NORTH KOREA, WITH KEDO TO CARRY OUT ALL SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS MATTER, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.

KEDO OFFICERS

AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF KEDO, WITH CANDIDATES CONCERNING TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THE POSITION OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF KEDO AND THE TWO [2] POSITIONS OF DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF KEDO. THE APPOINTMENT OF ANY PERSON TO ANY SUCH POSITION AND THE TERMS OF SUCH PERSON'S EMPLOYMENT SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.

MEMBERSHIP

APPROVAL OF OTHER COUNTRIES AS MEMBERS OF KEDO, AND AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO RECEIVE EACH SUCH COUNTRY'S INSTRUMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF MEMBERSHIP IN KEDO, UNTIL THE EXECUTIVE BOARD HAS APPOINTED AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.

CONTRIBUTIONS

AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH ANY COUNTRY SEEKING TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO KEDO CONCERNING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SUCH CONTRIBUTION. THE EXECUTION OF ANY DOCUMENT EMBODYING SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.

BANK ACCOUNTS

AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH AN APPROPRIATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION CONCERNING THE OPENING OF AN ACCOUNT IN THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3

NAME OF KEDO, PROVIDED THAT THE OPENING OF ANY SUCH ACCOUNT SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.

INSURANCE

AUTHORIZATION OF CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO EXPLORE THE AVAILABILITY AND COST OF INSURANCE TO PROTECT OFFICIALS OF KEDO AND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FROM LIABILITY FOR ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, AS WELL AS SUCH OTHER INSURANCE AS HE MAY DEEM NECESSARY TO PROTECT KEDO AND ITS OPERATIONS.

REGISTRATION

AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS TO QUALIFY KEDO TO CONDUCT ITS ACTIVITIES IN SUCH JURISDICTIONS AS IT MAY REQUIRE.

AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO FILE A COMPLETED APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WITH THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ON BEHALF OF KEDO, IF REQUIRED.

AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE

AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO DELEGATE THE MINISTERIAL EXECUTION OF THE DUTIES ASSIGNED TO THE CHAIR BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO ONE OR MORE INDIVIDUALS CHOSEN BY THE CHAIR, UNTIL THE EXECUTIVE BOARD HAS APPOINTED THE OFFICERS OF KEDO.

BOARD ACTION

AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO ADOPT RESOLUTIONS BASED ON THE WRITTEN APPROVAL OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY WRITTEN APPROVAL SHOULD BE AS VALID AS IF ADOPTED AT A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AND WOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON THE RECEIPT BY THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF WRITTEN APPROVAL FROM ALL SUCH REPRESENTATIVES.

AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO MEET BY CONFERENCE TELEPHONE OR SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT BY MEANS OF WHICH ALL PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING CAN HEAR EACH OTHER, WITH PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A MEETING TO CONSTITUTE PRESENCE IN PERSON AT SUCH MEETING.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4

GENERAL AUTHORITY

AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO TAKE ANY ACTIONS HE DEEMS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE TO ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSES OF THE FOREGOING RESOLUTIONS.

4. THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD CONSULT WITH THE DEPARTMENT BEFORE VOTING ON ANY KEDO EXECUTIVE BOARD RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE MATERIALLY DIFFERENT IN SUBSTANCE FROM THE MATTERS COVERED ABOVE. YY

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOTING ON KEDO RESOLUTIONS

ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:

S/S: _____

S/S-O: _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	For Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Subject: Compensation. (3 pages)	02/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. note	Handwritten notes from Meeting with Foreign Minister Gong. (2 pages)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Aoki. Subject: Presidential Letter. Record ID: 9500772. (1 page)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (1 page)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F

vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. draft	Letter from President William J. Clinton. (1 page)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. form	Joint Staff Action Processing Form regarding Military Exercises. (2 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. cable	re: Military Excercises. (2 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008c. form	Joint Staff Action Processing Form regarding Military Exercises. (3 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Aoki. Subject: Non-Proliferation Treaty. Record ID: 9500727. (3 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F
vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. paper	Diplomatic Study paper. (2 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F

vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009c. list	Non-Proliferation Treaty contact list. (3 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F

vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500382
RECEIVED: 18 JAN 95 18

TO: PETERSON, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 27 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
NUCLEAR MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEFENSE TESTIMONY ON NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 21 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
DANVERS
EXECSEC
ROTH

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DRS DATE 1/30/95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9500382

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 AOKI	Z 95011818 PREPARE MEMO ITOH TO PETERSON
002 ITOH	Z 95012717 FOR SIGNATURE
003	X 95012717 REED SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 950127 PETERSON, R

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500382
RECEIVED: 18 JAN 95 18

TO: ITOH

FROM: PETERSON, R

DOC DATE: 18 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PROPOSED TESTIMONY ON NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ITOH TO PETERSON

DUE DATE: 21 JAN 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
AOKI

FOR CONCURRENCE
DANVERS
PONEMAN
ROTH

FOR INFO
WALES

COMMENTS: " URGENT DUE 9:30 AM THURSDAY 19 JAN 95 URGENT "

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0382
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG HA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>JWZ</u>	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>PR 4/27</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>PR 4/30</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


January 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD PETERSON

FROM: William H. Itoh

SUBJECT: Defense Testimony on the North Korea Nuclear Agreement

The National Security Council staff has no objection to the proposed testimony, subject to the changes indicated on the copy at Tab A. These changes were provided by telephone on January 18.



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Draft Testimony

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. list	[CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	01/18/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1995 [7]

2009-0528-F

vz1463

RESTRICTION CODES

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503-0001

LRM NO: 80

FILE NO: 41

1/18/95

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

Total Page(s):

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FROM: (for)

Ron Peterson

Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Annette ROONEY 395-7300
Legislative Assistant's line (for simple responses): 395-8194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Testimony on North Korea Nuclear Agreement

DEADLINE: 9:30 A.M. Thursday, January 19, 1995

In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

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DRAFT

(763) 575 2258

TESTIMONY FOR DR. ASHTON B. CARTER:
THE SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE
NORTH KOREA
19 JANUARY 1995

DRAFT

Background

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before your committee on the North Korea nuclear issue and the recently signed Agreed Framework. Secretary Perry will be appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee next week to discuss all of the implications of the agreement and the negotiations that led up to it. In my statement today, I plan to review briefly the history of the agreement but I will focus primarily on the implementation role of the Department of Defense.

Resolving the nuclear issue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a major focus of our foreign policy towards Northeast Asia over the past two years because of the grave consequences it holds for our broader security, economic and political interests in the region as well as its implications for a robust nonproliferation regime.

I'd like to review briefly with the Committee the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear program and the background of the dispute. Since the early 1980s, North Korea had been building and operating a nuclear complex at Yongbyon which we are confident had as its purpose the production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. The program consisted of a small 5MWe, graphite-moderated, gas cooled reactor, and substantially larger 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, a reprocessing facility which it was doubling in size and other related facilities. Prior to the signing of the Agreed Framework and the initial steps to implement the agreement, the DPRK nuclear program was poised to leap forward in terms of weapons grade plutonium production.

The burgeoning North Korean nuclear program clearly threatened US objectives in the region and globally:

- The development of nuclear weapons, along with other weapons of mass destruction, challenged the security of the Peninsula, to which the US has long been committed. While we were certainly worried about the status of the North Korean's nuclear capability as it stood over the summer, the magnitude of the problem likely would have increased exponentially in the future had it been left unchecked.
- The nuclear threat was not limited to the Peninsula, but rather risked unsettling the region's security as well. It could have threatened the peaceful development of relations among neighboring states and the economic prosperity of the region, a key source of trade for the United States.
- The DPRK's nuclear program also threatened to accelerate the flow of fissile material and other nuclear weapons aid to unstable regions where nonproliferation norms are not observed.
- Finally, the stand-off in Korea is being watched by the rest of the world as we collectively strive to develop a robust nonproliferation regime.

Faced with this threat, the United States became directly involved diplomatically in 1992 when the DPRK refused to comply with the International

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the UN Security Council requested that individual governments seek to resolve the nuclear issue, encouraging the US bilateral dialogue with the DPRK. (If you will recall, the DPRK signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, entered into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January, 1992 and also agreed with the ROK in 1992 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula).

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The controversy over North Korean non-compliance with its NPT and the IAEA safeguards obligations continued from 1992 to mid-1994. In the Spring of 1994, the North defueled its reactor and refused to allow the IAEA to take steps which could have helped to shed light on the disposition of the plutonium removed earlier. In light of this action, and the lack of progress in our bilateral talks, the US, in cooperation with ROK and other allies, took steps to obtain UN Security Council sanctions. ~~Because the North had said that it would regard sanctions as an act of war, we also began a series of measures to increase the readiness and combat power of US and ROK forces in Korea. We had already been modernizing our forces in Korea; in June 1994 we considered major plus-ups.~~

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As you know, negotiations resumed in the middle of 1994 after the US had taken a series of measures to increase the readiness and combat power of US and ROK forces in Korea and former President Carter traveled to North Korea. These steps resulted in the DPRK's agreement not to refuel the reactor or reprocess the spent fuel rods into plutonium and to allow IAEA inspectors to remain on the grounds of the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex.

Outline of the Agreement

On October 21, 1994, negotiators for the US and the DPRK signed an Agreed Framework in Geneva. Under this agreement, the North must halt and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons related program to ensure, in the long run, a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. In exchange for freezing and later dismantling its program and resolving past discrepancies, the DPRK will receive alternative energy sources, initially in the form of bunker oil for electric generators and later in the form of more proliferation-resistant light water reactor technology. The Agreed Framework will be implemented in a step-by-step fashion, with both the US and the DPRK taking required actions throughout the 10-to-14 year duration of the framework.

The following are the key elements of the agreement, most of which I am sure you are familiar with:

- First, it calls for halting North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor program including three nuclear reactors, facilities for separating weapons-grade plutonium, and all other nuclear fuel related facilities;
- Second, it requires the DPRK to return to full compliance with its obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreement;
- Third, it provides alternate energy in the form of annual shipments of heavy fuel oil which directly compensates for the 255 MW(e) of electrical power and thermal heat lost through shutdown of the three reactors;
- Fourth, it calls for the formation of an international consortium to provide two proliferation-resistant Light Water Reactors to replace the dangerous graphite-moderated facilities;
- Fifth, it neutralizes the threat posed by the spent nuclear fuel already in North Korea

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- Sixth, it requires dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities
- Seventh, it begins the process of normalizing diplomatic and trade relations between the DPRK and the rest of the world through small steps, taken as the Agreed Framework is implemented, to exchange diplomatic offices and relax trade and investment restrictions; and,
- Eighth, restoring dialogue between North and South Korea, together with the United States, with the objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and, eventually, reaching a peaceful conclusion of the Korean War.

The Importance of the Agreed Framework

Having reviewed the key elements of the Agreed Framework, I'd like to discuss the importance of the agreement to US national security and to touch on the Department of Defense's role in its implementation.

As I noted earlier in my remarks, the US was faced with a very serious threat to our national security in the region and globally. We had concerns not only with past discrepancies in the North's program and its present actions but also, and perhaps most importantly from a security perspective, about the nuclear program's future potential. We wanted to prevent the DPRK from increasing its plutonium production and from gaining a strategic nuclear capability.

ND The Agreed Framework provides the international community, and particularly the US, a means to address these problems. The Administration firmly believes that the benefits to the United States and to our allies of peacefully ending the North Korean nuclear weapons program far outweigh the costs of the benefits to be derived by Pyongyang -- ~~particularly when compared to the alternative, which would be a return to sanctions and the risk of war, or acquiescing to an unbridled nuclear program.~~

Regarding the present, the DPRK has agreed to halt its nuclear program and has already done so. Specifically, the DPRK has (1) shutdown and agreed not to refuel the 5MW(e) reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, (2) stopped all construction on the 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactors, (3) is cooperating in the program to place all spent fuel (which contains 5-6 nuclear weapons worth of plutonium) in long-term storage for eventual shipment out of the country, (4) agreed to seal the radio-chemical laboratory used to reprocess plutonium from the spent fuel, (5) and sealed the fuel storage, fuel fabrication and other facilities associated with its gas-graphite nuclear program. These actions are being verified by IAEA inspectors and comply with the Agreed Framework timetable. The critical initial stage of compliance has been accomplished -- a verified freeze on the North Korean nuclear program.

With regard to past problems with discrepancies in the amount of plutonium declared by the DPRK to the IAEA under its safeguards agreement, the Agreed Framework requires that all questions must be resolved to the satisfaction of the IAEA before any significant nuclear components for the new LWRs are delivered.

But perhaps most importantly from a security perspective, the Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to go well beyond its NPT obligations by eliminating, not just freezing

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or placing under international surveillance, the source of the concern --its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor program. The DPRK has agreed to dismantle its existing facilities and expatriate the spent fuel from the 5MWe reactor by the time the two LWRs are complete. The DPRK will also take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We have long believed that it would take more than enforcing what was required by the IAEA to solve the North Korean nuclear challenge. Indeed, it will require the elimination of its existing program.

I'd like to underscore the point that the Administration is not relying on trust to implement the agreement. Quite the contrary, we are relying upon the on-site presence of the IAEA inspectors as well as US national sources to monitor the DPRK's actions and to ensure that they are holding up their part of the bargain. We will be vigilant in monitoring compliance. If at any point North Korea is not complying, we and our allies will stop implementing the agreement. We could then return to the path of sanctions and military preparations, ~~if necessary~~.

And finally, the agreement provides an opening to address other outstanding security problems that trouble the Peninsula, for example, conventional force imbalances and missile proliferation. There will certainly not be a quick resolution to any of the issues which divide us. The agreement may, however, open a dialogue and serve to draw the DPRK out of its isolation, thereby increasing the likelihood that problems between our countries can be resolved.

The Department of Defense's Role: US provision of Bunker Fuel

I will now review the Department of Defense's role in implementing the agreement. The next milestone in the Agreed Framework is the initial delivery of bunker fuel, or what has been referred to as heavy fuel oil, by 21 January. The US performance on this obligation is a condition both of maintaining the freeze and continuing implementation of the agreement. It enables the next phase of the framework to proceed. The Department of Defense believes strongly that the success of the agreement is in the interest of our overall non-proliferation policy and very much in our national security interest.

North Korea, under the agreement, has been required to take, and has taken important steps, before getting any benefit from the US or other countries. To review the actions already taken by the North in more detail:

- It has kept the 8000 fuel rods in storage, instead of reprocessing them to extract the plutonium for some 3-to-5 bombs they contain. In the three months since the Agreement was signed, roughly 78% of these rods could have been run through the reprocessing facility.
- It has sealed the reprocessing facility and stopped construction on an additional reprocessing line that would double the reprocessing rate.
- It has refrained from refueling and restarting the 5MW(e) reactor from which the spent fuel was unloaded this spring. This reactor, run at the rate at which it was

running last year, would produce enough plutonium for one bomb each year it operates. This reactor is being sealed by the IAEA.

- It has stopped construction of two big new reactors with capacities of 50 and 200 MW(e) respectively. These reactors, when completed in 1995 and 1996 respectively, would have a capability to produce plutonium for [a significant number] dozens of bombs annually.
- It has permitted IAEA inspectors to remain permanently at Yongbyon to implement the freeze, and verify and monitor, on a daily basis, that the freeze remains in effect. The Director General of the IAEA reports good cooperation and compliance with the freeze by the DPRK. IAEA inspectors will remain in North Korea for the duration of the framework implementation.
- It has permitted a US technical team to visit Yongbyon to do a survey of measures necessary to stabilize the spent fuel so it can be stored until removed from North Korea, as required by the agreement. Removal will start when the first significant nuclear components for the LWRs begin to be delivered.
- Thus, the critical initial stage of compliance has been accomplished -- a verified freeze on the North Korean nuclear program. Accordingly, the US is in the process of doing its first delivery of fuel oil -- tankers are off loading now.

Specifically, as alternate energy for the loss of electrical power and thermal heat from the DPRK's reactors, the US agreed to arrange for shipments of heavy residual fuel oil in amounts equal to the thermal output of the three nuclear reactors, a total of 255MW(e) or 3.5% of North Korea's present electrical generation capacity.

The Department of Defense agreed to arrange and pay for delivery of the first tranche under license to meet the ninety-day deadline and provide incentive for DPRK compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation incentives of the framework. The total cost to DoD will be approximately \$5M including delivery. The fuel will be paid for under long-established statutory authority in the annual DoD Appropriations Act for DoD use funds, up to a specific limit for emergency and extraordinary expenses.

Fuel is in some sense fungible, but there is little potential for this fuel to be diverted from its intended use in power and heat generation. Very little high-fraction fuel, such as gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, can be extracted from heavy residual fuel oil (HFO), compared to crude and other refined petroleum products. Commonly called 'Bunker C', heavy residual fuel oil can be used to fire boilers, but it cannot be used as motor fuel for vehicles or military hardware. It is like tar.

The first tranche of 50Kmt of HFO is being delivered to the currently idle, oil-fired power plant in Sonbong, North Korea, where it will be used to produce electricity for North Hamgyong Province and thermal heat (steam) for the surrounding villages.

The total cost to DoD will be approximately \$5M including delivery. The fuel will be paid for under long-established statutory authority in the annual DoD Appropriations Act for DoD use funds, up to a specific limit for emergency and extraordinary expenses.

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Congress has been informed of the overall terms of the deal and of the specific obligations to provide fuel, and of the other details of delivery and payment as outlined here, by a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The second tranche agreed to in the framework is 100Kmt of HFO as alternate energy for both the 5 and 50MW(e) reactors. It is scheduled for delivery in October 1995 and will be paid for by the multinational consortium under the leadership of the US, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

The third tranche is 500Kmt of HFO provided under the framework to compensate for the total 255MW(e) electrical capacity of all three nuclear reactors under the freeze. Delivery will commence in October 1996 and be paid for by the international consortium. Deliveries will continue annually until the first LWR is on-line providing electricity in the DPRK.

Summary

In summary, the Department of Defense fully supports the Agreed Framework and the importance of implementing it in a timely fashion. The agreement takes a major step towards securing our goal of finding a peaceful way to halt and eventually dismantle the DPRK's nuclear program to ensure for the long run a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. It also will help to ease tensions on the Peninsula by encouraging dialogue with our ally South Korea and by drawing the DPRK out of its international isolation. I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have, particularly on the Department's contribution to implementing the agreement.

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Questions and Answers: Proliferation & NPT

Question: Do you believe the Agreed Framework sets a bad precedent for dealing with countries like Iran?

Answer: Absolutely not. The only precedent that should be drawn from the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework is one of continued U.S. resolve in preserving and upholding a robust Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime.

- It is important to recognize that the nonproliferation obligations assumed by the DPRK over the next several years exceed anything required by the NPT. The North must freeze its entire existing nuclear program and forego reprocessing permanently. Under the NPT, the DPRK would be able to operate its current facilities and conduct reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. No other country has assumed such an onerous set of restrictions on its nuclear activity.
- The goal of the NPT, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies, is complemented and reinforced by the results of our negotiations with North Korea, which seek to achieve full transparency of the DPRK's nuclear program past, present, and future.
- If any country doubts our commitment to the NPT regime, it should be remembered that we were prepared to move to sanctions in June when it appeared that the DPRK was unwilling to take measures to halt its nuclear weapons program; we would be willing to pursue firm measures with other countries if they were to disregard their NPT obligations.
- It is significant that the IAEA, which is responsible for monitoring compliance with fullscope safeguards, has accepted our agreement and will have a strong inspection presence at nuclear sites in the DPRK to monitor compliance with the agreement. The IAEA will also be permitted to resume ad hoc and routine inspections in the near future and will ultimately be permitted access to all information, including that contained in undeclared nuclear waste sites, that it deems necessary to resolve any questions about past DPRK nuclear activity.

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Question: The Agreed Framework does not address missiles. Are we going to raise this issue with the North Koreans?

Answer: Missile proliferation is a critical challenge that we confront worldwide and one that we are particularly concerned about within the context of North Korea.

- ~~The dialogue which has been established with the North Koreans through the Agreed Framework provides us with a forum to raise issues of concern, including the export of ballistic missiles.~~
- We have done so by raising our concerns during the negotiations and again at meetings held since the signing of the agreement. We will continue to do so.

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- While we have expressed a willingness to move toward normalized relations with the DPRK, the depth and pace of that movement will be conditioned on the North's cooperation in addressing regional security concerns in areas like missile proliferation.
- Current North Korean missile programs underscore the importance of talking to the DPRK about ways to curtail potentially destabilizing activity in this area.

Question: Can you make nuclear weapons with material from LWRs? Won't we run into the same problems with the LWRs as we are with the DPRK's existing facilities?

Answer: Light water reactors are more proliferation resistant than the graphite moderated reactors owned by the DPRK today for the following reasons: 1) LWRs require enriched, rather than natural, uranium which is supplied by only a handful of countries -- the US, Russia, a European consortium and China. All of these countries, with the exception of China require full-scope safeguards as a condition of sale; 2) the plutonium in spent LWR fuel is less desirable for use in nuclear weapons because it contains a higher concentration of PU-240 and PU-241 -- isotopes that make it more difficult to handle and incorporate the plutonium into a deliverable device; 3) LWRs must be shutdown for reloading operations which makes them easier to safeguard than reactors which require natural uranium fuel; 4) LWR fuel is clad with a zirconium alloy that is far more resistant to corrosion than "magnox fuel." As a result, LWR spent fuel can be stored indefinitely rather than needing to be reprocessed.

- In evaluating the wisdom of providing light water reactors to North Korea, we need to consider the alternative. Without the Agreed Framework, the US and its allies would have been faced with the DPRK's existing nuclear program which would have been capable of producing dozens of bombs a year.

Question: Why are we allowing the DPRK to defer special inspections for years? Doesn't this weaken the NPT?

Answer: When implemented, the Agreed Framework brings the DPRK back into compliance with the NPT, albeit after several years, and requires full transparency of the DPRK nuclear program.

- It is important to put the issue of special inspections into the broader context of the negotiations and the Agreed Framework. Ideally, we would have liked to have resolved any questions and remaining doubts about the DPRK's nuclear program immediately, but the long history of hostility and mistrust made it impossible to arrive at such an arrangement. We remained firm on the principle of requiring the DPRK to reconcile its past nuclear activity with the IAEA but flexible on its implementation. We did not walk away from the IAEA's concerns. If the DPRK does not cooperate with the IAEA, the nuclear deal does not go through. The DPRK will not receive significant nuclear components until the IAEA is satisfied and has declared the DPRK to be in full compliance with the NPT.

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- Further, and perhaps most importantly, the US objectives were broader than bringing the DPRK back into the NPT fold. We wanted to ensure that the DPRK did not increase its production of plutonium, to include reprocessing the spent fuel in the pond, nor gained a strategic nuclear capability. From a security perspective, these were the more pressing objectives, and I believe we achieved them with the Agreed Framework. In the near term, the DPRK's program is frozen and over time they will dismantle their nuclear weapons related program.

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Questions and Answers: Conventional Forces Issues

Question: Does the warming of relations between the U.S. and North Korea lay the groundwork for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the ROK?

Answer: The U.S. remains fully committed to its alliance with the ROK. Despite the signing of the Agreed Framework, the conventional array of forces on the peninsula has not changed and the DPRK still represents a significant military challenge. The sizable U.S. presence is a symbol of our unshakable commitment to the security of the ROK but also underscores our broader mutual concern for peace and stability in Asia. This latter bond will extend beyond the relaxation of tensions on the peninsula, resting as it does on shared values and not simply on shared threats.

Question: How does the U.S. propose to maintain readiness on the peninsula? What are the prospects for the Team Spirit exercise?

Answer: The ROK and U.S. will maintain the full complement of exercises necessary to ensure readiness on the peninsula. We are determined not to be lulled into a false sense of security and are fully aware that peace on the peninsula has been maintained over forty years by our vigilance and military preparedness.

- Team Spirit is on the training schedule for this year and preparations are being made for its execution; beyond that, I will have to defer comment at this time.

Question: How does the U.S. assess the current risk or probability of armed confrontation on the peninsula?

Answer: There is no immediate or near-term risk of a flare-up of hostilities on the peninsula. But the concentration and posture of DPRK forces is cause for concern and creates an environment in which the potential costs of miscalculation can be tragic, as we have recently seen with the helicopter shoot-down over North Korea. For this reason we have and will continue to urge the DPRK to engage in substantive dialogue with the ROK as a first step toward reducing tensions on the peninsula.

Question: The recent crossing of the DMZ by an American helicopter points out the potential for mistakes or misunderstandings to generate conflict and possibly even war on the Korean peninsula. What are we doing to defuse this potential?

Answer: The U.S. looks forward to the day when tensions and the potential for conflict on the Korean peninsula have been completely eliminated. The U.S. position is that peace on the peninsula will not be possible until South and North Korea have addressed the sources of tensions on the peninsula through substantive dialogue based on mutual respect and recognition. The impetus for lasting peace on the peninsula can only come from reconciliation of the two primary parties, the ROK and the DPRK.

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- In the meantime, the Military Armistice Commission, established at the end of the Korean War, serves as the appropriate forum for discussion of any military issues that arise between the UN Command in Korea and the DPRK.

Question: How does the U.S. reconcile the threatening military posture maintained by the North Koreans with recent success in concluding an Agreed Framework on the nuclear issue?

Answer: We take as our starting point that the situation on the Korean peninsula is very complicated and that resolution of all outstanding problems will not occur simultaneously. We also recognize that the nuclear activity of the DPRK represented the most serious threat to our security interests in the region and we therefore sought to remedy it at the outset of any process of engagement with the North. While the agreement signed with North Korea will not necessarily lead to a quick resolution of other points of contention, the opening provided by the agreement will increase the likelihood that these problems can be addressed in the near future.

Question: What enhancements have we made to the capabilities of U.S. forces in Korea?

Answer: We have enhanced the capabilities of US forces in Korea both through temporary deployments of specific assets and units and through planned modernization initiatives. The Republic of Korea has also improved the capabilities of its forces, and is accelerating modernization efforts in several key areas.

- Perhaps the most significant steps thus far have been in the areas of intelligence and command and control communications. We have deployed additional collection and assessment assets to Korea. We have also sent over communications gear to improve connections among command and force element. We have also enhanced fire support assets available to US forces with the modernization of attack helicopters with Apaches, additional Bradley Fighting Vehicles with TOW missiles and additional grenade launchers. Finally, we have improved the security of critical assets in rear areas by deploying a Patriot battalion to Korea.

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Questions and Answers: Criticism of the Agreement

Question: Does the U.S. fear being duped by the North Koreans? Is there a risk that the DPRK will simply pocket any material assistance provided by the U.S. and its allies without holding up its end of the bargain?

Answer: The current U.S. Administration harbors no illusions about the nature of the North Korean government and we are not leaving implementation of the agreement to trust. To monitor compliance, the US will be relying on the on-site presence of the IAEA inspectors and US national sources. In fact, the IAEA has been in intensive discussions with the North to agree on means to verify the nuclear freeze in the DPRK. These discussions have gone very well and the IAEA is confident in its ability to do its job. The U.S. also has technical experts in the DPRK at this moment to arrange for long-term storage of spent fuel rods. We are very confident that we can monitor the North's adherence to the agreement.

It is important to note that it is the DPRK who will be taking the first steps throughout the duration of the framework agreement. The DPRK has now frozen its nuclear program so we are moving ahead with the shipment of the fuel oil. The DPRK will not receive any significant nuclear items on the trigger list for the LWRs until they have come into full compliance with their safeguards obligations. The spent fuel will have to be shipped before the first LWR is complete and they will have to have dismantled the existing nuclear facilities before the second LWR is complete.

Question: Aren't you propping up the North Korean economy with the economic aid and heavy fuel oil? Aren't you delaying the fall of the regime by giving it aid and comfort?

Answer: Our interaction with the DPRK is not premised on any calculation of the longevity of the North's government. Many pundits have argued for years that the DPRK is on its last legs; other analysts assert that the North has significant staying power. In any case, the U.S. did not have the luxury of simply sitting back and waiting for the DPRK to implode or otherwise metamorphose because the nature of the security challenge we faced was immediate and unmistakable. We addressed that problem head-on with the present settlement and, in so doing, have potentially opened the door to a greater relaxation of tensions on the peninsula.

- The economic measures you mentioned, alternative energy (a substitute for energy foregone by the North's shutting down its current nuclear program), sanctions-lifting, and liaison offices, are all measures incorporated in the Agreed Framework and constitute part of the broader engagement process with the DPRK. The Administration does not believe that the small amount of oil being provided to the DPRK will alter the course of the North Korean economy or the fate of the regime. As you likely know, the shipments of heavy residual fuel oil will only be in amounts equal to the thermal output of the three nuclear

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reactors, a total of 255 MWe or 3.5% of North Korea's present electrical generation capacity.

Question: I understand that the allies are balking at paying for the obligations under the Agreed Framework. Is this true? How much is this agreement going to cost the United States' taxpayer?

Answer: The Republic of Korea has agreed to play a central role in financing the light water reactor project. We are looking to the Japanese and other governments to make up the balance along with financing the alternative energy. The US has already agreed to pay for the treatment of the spent fuel pond and the canning of the fuel as well as the first shipment of the heavy fuel oil. The Administration is in the process of working out with our allies the arrangements for establishing KEDO and the best way to meet KEDO's obligations under the Agreed Framework.

If pressed: We expect that the US will pay tens of millions of dollars each year. It is important to keep in perspective that this cost is a very small part of the overall nuclear deal which we expect to cost over \$4B. Most of the cost of this agreement will be paid for by our allies.

Question: Is the Agreed Framework legally binding? Why is the document not a treaty?

Answer:

Question: I understand that the Department of Defense had serious reservations about the agreement. Is this true? And do you think it is in the best interest of the US?

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Answer: The Department of Defense fully supports the Agreed Framework and the importance of implementing it in a timely fashion. The agreement takes a major step towards securing our goal of finding a peaceful way to halt and eventually dismantle the DPRK's nuclear program to ensure for the long run a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. It also will help to ease tensions on the Peninsula by encouraging dialogue with our ally South Korea and by drawing the DPRK out of its international isolation.

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- We, of course, will be vigilant in ensuring that the DPRK lives up to its side of the bargain and will be actively engaged in facilitating the implementation of the agreement.

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Question and Answers: The Department of Defense's Role

Question: What funding mechanism is the Department using to pay for the heavy fuel oil?

Answer: The fuel will be paid for under long-established statutory authority in the annual DoD Appropriations Act for DoD use of funds, up to a specific limit, for emergency and extraordinary expenses. The report of this expenditure will be included in our quarterly report to the Committee on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives. I would like to take any further questions you may have on the funding arrangements for the record. Thank you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*SUBJECT: Department of Defense's Testimony on the North
Korea Nuclear Agreement

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to OMB conveying
suggested changes on DOD's proposed testimony.

Concurrences by: William Danvers *WD*, Stanley Roth *SR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Ronald Peterson

Tab A Proposed Testimony