

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Korea - Miscellaneous, 1996 [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Kristoff, Sandra

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30	3	11	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Your Trip to Korea. (1 page)	04/13/1996	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	For the President from Warren Christopher. Subject: Your Meeting with South Korean President. (2 pages)	04/11/1996	P1/b(1)
001c. briefing paper	Meeting with Kim Young Sam. (4 pages)	04/11/1996	P1/b(1)
001d. talking points	Points to be Made. (4 pages)	04/11/1996	P1/b(1)
001e. talking points	Points for Working Lunch. (2 pages)	04/11/1996	P1/b(1)
002a. cover sheet	Baier to Sandra Kristoff. (1 page)	04/12/1996	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	re: Announcement. (4 pages)	04/12/1996	P1/b(1)
003a. cover sheet	Robinson to Lake. (1 page)	04/29/1996	P1/b(1)
003b. letter	From Yoo Chung Ha to Anthony Lake. (3 pages)	04/29/1996	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: North Korean (4 pages)	10/01/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Korea - Miscellaneous, 1996 [5]

2009-0528-F

vz1456

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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001b. memo	For the President from Warren Christopher. Subject: Your Meeting with South Korean President. (2 pages)	04/11/1996	P1/b(1)

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001d. talking points	Points to be Made. (4 pages)	04/11/1996	P1/b(1)

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ROK-U.S. Joint Announcement
Proposal to Hold a Four Party Meeting to
Promote Peace on the Korean Peninsula

1. The President of the Republic of Korea, Kim Young Sam, and the President of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, held a summit meeting at Cheju Island, Korea on April 16, 1996. They had an in-depth exchange of views regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula and on ways to promote dialogue and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

2. President Clinton pledged the steadfast U.S. commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea and reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.-Korea security alliance. Both Presidents agreed that the present Armistice arrangement should be maintained until it is succeeded by a permanent peace agreement.

3. The two Presidents expressed their shared desire to foster a stable, permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, where tensions remain high. They agreed to work positively and with an open mind to encourage a process for reconciliation and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

4. The two Presidents confirmed the fundamental principle that establishment of a stable, permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula is the task of the Korean people. Both Presidents agreed that South and North Korea should take the lead in a renewed search for a permanent peace arrangement and that separate negotiations between the United States and North Korea on peace-related issues cannot be considered.

5. President Kim affirmed the Republic of Korea is willing to meet without preconditions at the governmental level with representatives of the DPRK. President Clinton affirmed that the U.S. is prepared to play an active and cooperative role in support of this effort. Both Presidents agreed that China's cooperation would be extremely helpful.

6. Accordingly, the two Presidents proposed to convene a Four Party Meeting of representatives of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's of Korea, the People's Republic of China and the United States as soon as possible and without preconditions. The purpose would be to initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement.

7. The two Presidents agreed that this peace process also should address a wide range of tension reduction measures.

8. President Clinton praised the South Korean initiative as a positive and important step in easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. President Kim acknowledged the importance of continued American support.

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH
PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM
CHEJU ISLAND

OPENING STATEMENT: [To be provided by Speechwriters]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q: Did you come to Korea because of the recent incidents on the DMZ? Are you concerned about possibility of new outbreak of war?

A: Came here at invitation of President Kim for two purposes: To reiterate the importance of the U.S.-ROK security relationship and to jointly announce the proposal for a peace process we just made available to you.

We are concerned by North Korean incursions into Joint Security Area of DMZ. All countries in region agree that Armistice should be maintained until it is replaced by permanent peace agreement. Urge North Korea to fulfill its responsibilities.

Q: Aren't you rewarding North Korea's provocative behavior at the DMZ with this offer? Shouldn't our response be tougher? Are you appeasing the North?

A: Certainly not. Let there be no mistake. The U.S. is fully and unalterably committed to the defense of South Korea. There should be no doubts on that score. We are strong, prepared, and united with our South Korean ally.

U.S. forces in Korea are performing their assigned roles with great honor and distinction, and I have told our commander, General Luck, how proud I am of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces stationed here.

Q: Why do you think this joint proposal will have any more success than previous efforts? It seems a rehash of old ideas.

A: It has been 43 years since Armistice was signed. Tensions have persisted ever since, at varying levels. Current tensions are high, but not alarmingly so.

Believe time is right for a new effort toward establishing a permanent peace. North Korea has said it wants new peace agreement. This is our own, joint proposal on a way to achieve this. Hope P'yongyang will take it seriously, take steps to move process forward.

Q: Will China cooperate in Four-Party talks? How important is its role?

A: Since China was signatory of 1953 Armistice, have included it in proposals for new peace agreement. Welcome whatever role it wishes to play.

China has made positive public statements about need for peace agreement, maintaining Armistice until process is complete. Look forward to working with China further on this issue. Believe it has a positive role to play in process.

Q: Have you worked with North Korea on this? Does it already know about this plan?

A: Both sides have been in communication with North Korea about the plan.

Q: What if North Korea rejects this offer?

A: We hope it will not do so, as this process is intended to achieve the same goal as North has proposed.

Main difference is that North wants to negotiate only with the U.S. That is not feasible. As statement indicates clearly, establishing permanent peace is the responsibility of the Korean people -- North and South. U.S. will support the process in whatever way we can.

Decision is up to North Korea. This is a very positive offer, and it will remain open.

Q: Is the North's economic crisis a factor in this proposal? Will U.S. and ROK provide aid as an incentive to peace talks?

A: We see this as a process just beginning. Goal is permanent peace agreement, but improvement of overall relations between South and North Korea, U.S. and North Korea will be part of process. Too early to say what might be specific details of that might be.

Key point is U.S. and ROK will be involved in cooperation with each other, willing to work flexibly with North Korea.

Q: Who initiated this process -- U.S. or South Korea?

A: President Kim initiated. Our two governments have been working together privately to develop the plan.

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UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE

**EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Seoul, Korea

*Forwarded to SR. 5.14
Copy to SK.*

May 14, 1996

Mr. Stanley Roth
Institute for Peace
Washington D.C.
Fax: 202-456-9250

Dear Mr. Roth:

You may have seen media accounts of the speech Ambassador James T. Laney delivered at a meeting of the Asia Society on May 11. In this speech, Ambassador Laney outlines a vision of the future of relations with the DPRK.

Because of your interest in U.S.-Korea relations, Ambassador Laney asked that I send you the full text of his remarks. I hope you find it useful.

Sincerely,

William H. Maurer, Jr.
Public Affairs Officer

Attachment: A/S

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA: BEYOND DETERRENCE

James T. Laney, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

Asia Society Corporate Conference

May 11, 1996

(As delivered)

As participants in this conference, you probably understand as well as any group in the world how the U.S. came to Korea to disarm a defeated foe, how the peninsula was divided in a way that continues to this day, and how we came to the aid of the Republic of Korea only to have that bitter fight end in an Armistice that did not resolve that division. Since then, for nearly half a century, relations between North and South Korea and U.S. policy toward the peninsula have been based on the principle of deterrence. Renewed conflict here as in the larger global Cold War standoff was averted because both Korean governments, and their outside allies, knew that an attack by either on the other would produce catastrophic consequences for the aggressor as well as the victim.

This deterrent relationship has proven remarkably stable. It has endured severe crises, including the attack on the Blue House, the Rangoon bombing, and other terrorist atrocities, the Pueblo seizure and, most recently, the confrontation over North Korea's nuclear program in 1993-94. It successfully provided a shelter from war under which both parts of Korea were able to recover from the devastation of the Korean conflict and rebuild their countries. More dramatically, it provided a shield for the astonishing economic and democratic development of the ROK in recent years. It is simple common sense that any policy that has achieved so much should be modified only with great care and for the most pressing reasons.

Deterrence provides stability in the absence of trust and is most effective in a state of equilibrium. It requires a rough balance of power -- not necessarily an equality of military strength -- but a balance by which each side realizes that it cannot act with impunity because the costs of aggression would far outweigh any possible benefits.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the equilibrium on the peninsula has become less stable. North Korea lost its chief sponsor, ally, and trading partner when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Both Russia and China virtually ended the aid programs on which the North Korean economy had relied. This threw it into a steep decline and dramatically widened the already large gap between Southern and Northern economies.

While this shift was in its early stages, however, another destabilizing factor emerged, namely the revelation that North Korea was on the brink of developing a nuclear weapons capability. Had that program continued, it would have had profound consequences for deterrence on the peninsula, as well as for security in the Northeast Asian region and beyond. Fortunately, a tense and arduous series of negotiations, leading to the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994, effectively removed DPRK nuclearization as a threat to regional stability.

Resolution of the nuclear crisis, however, brought the North's steady economic decline back into

- 2 -

focus. By late 1995 it was clear that the balance was again unstable. The problem this time, however, was not North Korea's strength, but its eroding power, based on its lack of reliable friends and its refusal or inability to adapt to the post-Cold War world. This was in stark contrast to South Korea's remarkable economic and diplomatic success, which have produced an objective strength of unprecedented level.

Today, North Korea is in serious trouble. Its critical shortages of food, energy and foreign exchange all are mutually reinforcing, driving the economy downward and potentially creating enormous social problems. Its government appears to realize that its current course unchecked can lead only to irreversible decline. But fear of the consequences of change -- the fate of East Germany, Romania and the Soviet Union -- makes it wary of taking the kind of steps needed to reverse that decline. And its recognition of the overwhelming advantages enjoyed by South Korea -- a booming economy, steadfast allies and technologically advanced defense capabilities -- makes it reluctant to engage seriously with an adversary it suspects of wanting to humiliate it or planning to absorb it.

There are serious risks in this situation. People here are conscious of the fact that, in the absence of other tools with which to change its circumstances, the North may look for other ways of using the only remaining asset it possesses which commands international respect -- its military might. Even though its conventional military capability has declined relative to that of the combined forces of the ROK and U.S., it is still formidable. And though the common view is that it can have no hope of successfully prosecuting a war with the South, the unpalatability of other alternatives could increase the relative attractiveness of military options. For instance, DPRK leaders might be tempted to divert attention from their own problems by staging an escalating series of provocative border incidents. There is also the risk that further economic and social deterioration in the North could lead to factional conflict that could spill over beyond the DPRK borders.

Deterrence, while it may prevent intentional armed conflict, does little to reduce hostility or provide a basis for a relationship. In an atmosphere of enmity and suspicion, communication tends to consist primarily of warnings. But warnings only work when deterrence is effective. It is the erosion of the effectiveness of our warnings that requires us now to look for new ways of communication and interaction between North and South, and to convince Pyongyang it has better options than its military one.

For some years, North Korea has proposed talks leading to a permanent peace treaty to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement. However, it has been willing to talk only with the U.S. The U.S. agrees that the Armistice should be replaced, but both our policy and common sense rule out negotiations that exclude the ROK.

The Four Party Meeting proposed at the Cheju-do summit reflects the judgment of Presidents Clinton and Kim that this negotiating architecture offers the best prospect for success. It meets the demand of the North that it have the U.S. as a participant, while preserving the fundamental

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ROK/U.S. principle that the future of the Korean peninsula must be shaped primarily by the Korean people. We believe it offers North Korea the best chance it will have to escape from the downward path it is on -- not a guarantee of success, certainly, but at least a reason to hope -- and we will continue to urge it to accept the proposal.

In order to maintain stability on the peninsula, we need to begin now to build an edifice of positive relationships that can complement and take us beyond deterrence. One part of this edifice, the Agreed Framework, is already being implemented. Work on another large part can begin as soon as North Korea accepts the Four Party proposal. Along the way, it should be possible for North and South to work out interim and side arrangements that meet important needs of both sides. And as confidence is built, little by little, there will be openings to establish the kind of sustained economic and social interaction that provides the real underpinning for peace.

If this process is to succeed, we in the ROK and U.S. will need to be willing to rethink the approach we have historically taken toward the DPRK. We should tone down our rhetoric and the lurid language we have used to characterize the North. For purposes of policy formulation, it does not matter whether we trust the intentions or "sincerity" of North Korean leaders. If we listen closely to their rhetoric -- however bellicose and offensive it may be -- and carefully analyze their actions -- even provocative ones like the recent incidents on the DMZ -- we will realize that they are driven not by arrogance but by insecurity. DPRK leaders are unlikely to play the negotiating game seriously as long as they see no way to survive except by repeatedly playing their military card.

For our part, we do not need to act strong because we are strong. South Korea has grown so fast and achieved so much that there is inevitably a lag between reality and perception. A hard-eyed, realistic analysis would leave no doubt that the ROK is strong enough and important enough to be magnanimous without risk. The notion that today's South Korea could be "isolated" or "marginalized" is not taken seriously by anyone outside the Korean peninsula. We should, of course, avoid complacency. But a little realistic confidence would go a long way in clearing away the psychological underbrush that impedes our view of the real situation.

In evaluating policy options, when one is unquestionably strong, one should judge them not on the basis of whether they are "tough" or "soft," the conventional cliches, but whether they are "smart" or "dumb." If a policy is in U.S. and South Korean interests, we should pursue it; if it also accords with North Korea's interests, so much the better. This should no longer be a "zero-sum game." It is not in our interests for the DPRK to lash out militarily, or to descend into chaos. Everyone's interests are served by economic assistance to the North, reduction of tensions, and comprehensive North-South engagement.

If we subscribe to these principles, then the implications for our policy are clear: we should focus our efforts on persuading North Korea not only that its current path is a dead end, but also that there is a better alternative. We should foster its confidence that it can survive, compete, and even prosper if it picks up the offer now on the table. We should strive to demonstrate that we

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have no desire to invade or destroy the DPRK, and that we have no interest in unification through any means other than negotiation and agreement between the South and the North.

By the criteria we have traditionally used, our deterrent strategy has been working just fine. And it has by no means outlived its usefulness; as long as there is a military threat from the North, it must and will remain in place. But the main challenges to stability now are North Korean weakness and despair, and these cannot be overcome by simply doing more of what we have been doing. Deterrence is not an end in itself, but one means of achieving stability. Since deterrence alone does not address the factors that most threaten stability on the peninsula today, it must be augmented with -- not replaced by -- confidence-building assurances and positive inducements to cooperation.

This was the underlying message of our Presidents on Cheju-do. We now await a sign that the leaders in Pyongyang understand the message, and accept it as a means to address the North's needs. I hope they will.

Thank you.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. cover sheet	Robinson to Lake. (1 page)	04/29/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea - Miscellaneous, 1996 [5]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. letter	From Yoo Chung Ha to Anthony Lake. (3 pages)	04/29/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

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RESTRICTION CODES

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File
Kane

NEC DEPUTIES MEETING OF AUGUST 8, 1996

TRADE POLICY CRITERIA
FOR CASE-BY-CASE REVIEW OF CERTAIN FCC LICENSING ACTIONS

Issues for Decision

1. What criteria should the Executive Branch use in determining whether to ask the FCC to delay action or deny applications for Section 214 licenses and waivers of the Section 310 foreign ownership limitations in order to further U.S. trade policy objectives? Or for other communications to the FCC prompted by trade policy concerns?
2. Based on that criteria, on which pending applications should the Executive Branch immediately request delay?

Background

In April 1995, in response to a FCC request for comments "In the Matter of Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated Entities," the Executive Branch (DOC/NTIA on behalf of Commerce, Defense, Justice, State, Treasury and USTR) filed public comments stating that the FCC should defer to the Executive Branch on certain matters, including trade, foreign policy, national security and domestic law enforcement issues, in making decisions on applications for Section 214 (facilities-based international service) licenses and waivers of the Section 310 foreign ownership limitations of the Communications Act. In its Report and Order, the FCC stated it would accord deference to input from the Executive Branch on issues relating to trade, foreign policy, national security and domestic law enforcement. Absent input from the Executive Branch, the Order framed an "effective competitive opportunities" (ECO) test for analysis of these Section 214 and Section 310 applications.¹

¹ International Section 214 (facilities-based) licenses:

The ECO analysis will be applied only to the destination markets in which the foreign carrier has market power. The Commission will first examine the legal barriers to entry by U.S. carriers to provide international voice telephone services in those markets. If no legal barriers exist, then the FCC will examine: 1) interconnection rules, 2) competition safeguards, and 3) the regulatory framework in the relevant market. The FCC will look

As a result, FCC staff regularly notify Executive Branch agencies responsible for "trade, foreign policy, national security and domestic law enforcement issues" of relevant applications and set dates after which the FCC may act failing any notification of Executive Branch interest. Competent Executive Branch agencies coordinate in advance any comments presented to the FCC.

Criteria are proposed below with respect to the trade policy area of Executive Branch competence. The criteria are not exhaustive but should cover most situations that arise from applications to the FCC for foreign-affiliated companies to provide international service to and from the United States, or to exceed the 25% indirect foreign investment benchmark under Section 310. These criteria will have to be revised if there is a successful conclusion to the current WTO basic telecom services negotiations.

The criteria differ from the ECO analysis in examining Section 214 applications for services where the applicant's foreign affiliate may not be found by the FCC to have market power; and, in framing other instances in which trade policy objectives could be served by Executive Branch input. The purpose of delaying or denying certain applications would be not to cede incrementally greater access in the United States telecommunications services market to negotiating partners whose markets for telecommunications goods, services, or other goods and services do not match the openness of the U.S. market (currently or

not only at the current state of the market but also at changes proposed to be implemented in the near future. Criteria for applications for resale licenses are slightly different.

Section 310(b) waivers for common carrier radio licenses:

The ECO analysis will be applied only to the home market of the foreign applicant. The Commission will first examine the legal barriers to entry by U.S. carriers to provide the specific wireless service which the applicant is proposing to provide in the United States (e.g., PCS to PCS). If no legal barriers exist, then the FCC will examine: 1) interconnection rules, 2) competitive safeguards, and 3) the regulatory framework in the relevant market. The FCC will look specifically at the current state of the market.

prospectively,) in instances where the use of such leverage can be expected to have market-opening effects.

**TRADE POLICY CRITERIA
FOR CASE-BY-CASE REVIEW OF CERTAIN FCC LICENSING ACTIONS**

Telecommunications goods and services trade

1. Home country market access

-- Does the applicant's home country currently provide market access and national treatment to U.S. telecommunications services suppliers, in particular for the service that is the subject of the application?

-- Has the home country of the applicant made an acceptable offer in the WTO telecom services negotiations?

-- Is the home country forthcoming in bilateral negotiations on market access for telecommunications services and products, both in the government and private sectors?

-- Does the home country protect intellectual property rights of U.S. telecommunications products and services or impose other unfair trade practices that distort international trade in telecommunications goods and services?

IF NO TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS,

2. Monopolist, former monopolist or new entrant -- Is the applicant a new entrant in its home country, or is it affiliated with a monopolist or former monopolist (a dominant carrier) at home?

IF NOT A NEW ENTRANT,

3. Useful leverage -- Would denial of a license, delay in licensing or other action provide leverage in resolving the home country market access problem?

IF YES, CRITERIA ARE SATISFIED;

IF NOT, WOULD DELAY OR DENIAL SERVE

A need to inhibit certain discriminatory policies -- Does the home country employ discriminatory policies that set unwelcome precedents and therefore should be discouraged actively, e.g., surcharges on incoming international

traffic?

IF YES, CRITERIA ARE SATISFIED. IF NOT, NO ACTION RECOMMENDED.

Enforcement of existing bilateral trade agreements

1. Is the home country in compliance with existing bilateral trade agreements, whether or not telecommunications-related?

IF NOT,

2. Useful leverage -- Would denial of a license, delay in licensing or other action provide leverage in resolving the home country market access problem?

IF YES, CRITERIA ARE SATISFIED. IF NOT, NO ACTION RECOMMENDED.

**List of Three Pending Applications to FCC
Which Should Be Delayed
In Support of U.S. Trade Policy Interests²**

ITC-96-345 Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc.'s (TLD) application for global authority to provide international facilities-based and resale services between the U.S. and the points for which TLD qualifies for non-dominant regulation (i.e., unaffiliated points).

Justification for delay:

1. The applicant's parent, Telefonica de Espana, is a monopolist in its home country, Spain.
2. The Spanish telecom minister announced in June that Spain would not permit full market access until 2003. Notwithstanding that announcement, the European Commission had previously given private assurances that the E.U.'s WTO offer could be improved to start competition in Spain in 1998, and to end a 25% limit on foreign investment in Spain. The U.S. has requested in the WTO telecom negotiations that Spain open its market to full competition in 1998.
3. Telefonica de Espana is the largest overseas investor in privatized Latin American telecom monopolies or former monopolies, including companies in Argentina, Chile and Peru, among others.
4. Delaying grant of the application will give the U.S. leverage in the WTO negotiations.

² Not included are pending Section 214 applications by affiliates of the Japanese carriers KDD and ITJ. USTR, by previous inter-agency agreement, has requested that the FCC delay action on these applications due to an ongoing dispute over enforcement by Japan of a bilateral trade agreement on insurance.

ITC-96-410

Teleglobe USA Inc's application to acquire and operate facilities for the provision of switched, private line and other authorized services from U.S. to Canada.

Justification for delay:

1. Teleglobe Canada, the parent of the applicant, has monopoly control over non-satellite facilities for the supply of international services to and from its home country, Canada to all international points, other than the U.S.
2. Canada's WTO offer contemplates an end to the Teleglobe monopoly on January 1, 1998. However, the offer does not allow for anything but "Canadian control in fact" of telecommunications facilities, notwithstanding a 46.7% limit on foreign investment. The U.S. has requested that Canada allow 100% foreign investment in telecom service providers.
3. Delaying grant of the application will provide leverage in the WTO negotiations.

ITC-96-411

Teleglobe USA Inc's application to acquire and operate facilities on CANUS-1 cable system for the provision of switched, private line, and other authorized services from U.S. to all destination countries except Canada.

Optel and Teleglobe Canada each owns 50% of CANUS-1 cable. Optel is 80% owned by U.S. citizens and 20% owned by Teleglobe Canada. Teleglobe USA is affiliated with Teleglobe Canada.

Justification for delay:

Same as above, and also:

4. Canada's WTO offer does not provide any right to acquire and operate submarine cables landing in Canada.
5. Delaying grant of the application will provide leverage in the WTO negotiations.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	re: North Korean (4 pages)	10/01/1996	P1/b(1)

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