

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Korea - Miscellaneous, 1996 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Kristoff, Sandra

Original OA/ID Number:

1048

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30	3	11	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Remains Meeting. (1 page)	04/17/1996	P1/b(1)
002a. cover sheet	Annotated. (1 page)	03/27/1996	P1/b(1)
002b. note	To Sandy Kristoff from I. O. Lee. (1 page)	03/27/1996	P1/b(1)
002c. cable	re: North Korea. (2 pages)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)
002d. cable	re: North Korea. (4 pages)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)
002e. cable	re: North Korea (3 pages)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)
002f. cable	Page 11. (1 page)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Defectors. (3 pages)	10/17/1996	P1/b(1)
004a. note	For Anthony Lake from Sandra Kristoff. (1 page)	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)
004b. letter	To Anthony Lake from James Laney. (3 pages)	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Agency
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea - Miscellaneous, 1996 [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1452

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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DDI Press Guidance

FILE ~~NOT~~ ~~FOR~~ ~~POW/MIAs~~

DIRECTORATE FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

DATE: June 14, 1996

TIME:

PA REP:

QUERY FROM: Response to Query
PHONE:

QUESTION: Does the Department of Defense have any comment on reports there are 10-15 live POW/MIAs in North Korea who want to come home?

ANSWER: The Department of Defense has received numerous reports concerning Americans living in North Korea following the prisoner exchanges in North Korea in 1953, but the lack of corroborating evidence often hindered follow-on investigations. We continue to investigate a limited number of reports, including one from a former Romanian contractor in North Korea which alleges that U.S. POWs were being held in North Korea in 1979. We have been unable to confirm any of these reports.

Based on prior reports and a preliminary analytical assessment of interviews with North Korean defectors, we will be pursuing the issue of live Americans in North Korea.

The Department of Defense is aware of four Americans who defected in the 1960s from the 1st Cavalry Division. They account for some of these live sighting reports. Two of the defectors appear to be individuals who were seen in the North Korea propaganda film, "Nameless Heroes." Two additional American military personnel also defected, one in 1979 and one in 1982.

Although we have thus far been unable to substantiate that Americans are still detained against their will, the information available to us precludes ruling out that possibility. Actions to investigate live sighting reports will continue to receive the highest priority and resources.

EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
June 15, 1996

POW SIGHTINGS IN NORTH KOREA

Q: What can you tell us about the possibility that American POWs are alive in North Korea?

A: -- We have seen these press reports. There are some situations where there may be Americans living in North Korea. They may be defectors.

-- Although we have thus far been unable to substantiate that Americans are still detained against their will, the information available to us precludes ruling out that possibility. Actions to investigate live sighting reports will continue to receive the highest priority and resources.

-- Primary responsibility for POW/MIA issues lies with the Department of Defense.

SPECIAL NOTE:

From June 10-14, 1996, a Department of Defense delegation met in Pyongyang with their counterparts from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The purpose of the meeting was to plan joint humanitarian recovery operations of remains of U.S. servicemembers from the Korean War, as called for in a May 9, 1996 agreement. During the talks, the U.S. and the DPRK agreed on the dates, locations, and logistics for the first two recovery operations. The first recovery operation will begin on July 10, 1996 at an aircraft crash site in Unsar County, Korea.

EAP/P - John Ohta (using DOD language)
NOT YET CLEARED BY PA NICK BURNS as of 6/15 2:30 p.m.

John Feltig

EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
June 17, 1996

NORTH KOREA - LIVE AMERICAN POW'S

Q: Do you have any comment on press stories that there may be live American POW's in North Korea?

A: -- THE ISSUE OF AMERICAN MIA'S FROM THE KOREAN WAR HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR THE U.S. EVER SINCE THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR.

-- WE TOOK AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD LAST WEEK WHEN A TEAM FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE NORTH KOREANS TO BEGIN IN JULY THE FIRST JOINT OPERATION TO RECOVER THE REMAINS OF A U.S. SOLDIER KILLED DURING THE WAR.

-- DOD HAS RECEIVED ^{Some} ~~NUMEROUS~~ REPORTS CONCERNING LIVE AMERICANS IN NORTH KOREA, AND INVESTIGATES THESE REPORTS ~~WITH GREAT VIGOR~~. *MOSTLY Hearsay*

-- AT THIS POINT, DOD IS AWARE OF FOUR AMERICAN DEFECTORS WHO ARE LIVING IN NORTH KOREA.

-- WHILE THERE ARE NO SUBSTANTIATED REPORTS OF OTHER AMERICANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, DOD CONTINUES TO DEVOTE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY AND RESOURCES TO INVESTIGATING REPORTS OF LIVE SIGHTINGS.

-- FOR FURTHER INFORMATION I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE DOD POW/MIA OFFICE.

*From the 1960's
I suspect these
indivs are the
basis for at
least some
reports.*

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002c. cable	re: North Korea. (2 pages)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)

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*File
No 110000*

**Testimony by
DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE DEPUTY DIRECTOR J. ALAN LIOTTA**

**Before the
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ASIA SUBCOMMITTEE**

June 20, 1996

In about twenty days, a team of ten American Department of Defense remains recovery experts will deploy into North Korea on the first-ever joint US-North Korean recovery operation. This unprecedented event is the result of long years of frustrating, but ultimately successful, negotiations with North Korea on the POW/MIA issue.

The issue of accounting for our missing servicemen from the Korean War is one that the current Administration and the Department of Defense take very seriously. It is an issue for which progress has long been overdue. Since the signing of the Armistice in 1953, the U.S. Government has been working to bring home thousands of American servicemen who remain unaccounted for from the Korean conflict. Despite continuous frustrations in dealing with the North Korean Government, we never gave up hope that we would one day make serious progress on this most important humanitarian issue. Over the last six months, a series of direct talks with the North Koreans finally achieved the breakthrough the U.S. Government, veterans of the Korean War, and the families of the missing have long been waiting for.

Prior to these direct contacts, we had conducted talks on the POW/MIA issue through the United Nations Command (UNC) to its counterpart, the North Korean People's Army (KPA), at Panmunjom. These UNC-KPA talks achieved some progress with the signing of an agreement in

1993 to regularize the remains repatriation process. This agreement facilitated the subsequent return of over 200 remains between 1990 and 1994. However, as a result of the North Korean's recovery techniques, we have successfully identified only six of these remains. We were convinced that joint recovery operations were the only way to proceed if we were to have any hope of recovering significant numbers of identifiable remains.

Despite former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's statement to former President Jimmy Carter in 1994 that joint recovery operations were possible, the KPA refused over the next 18 months to discuss the issue with the US. During this time, the UNC continued to negotiate with the North Koreans, pressing them to agree to joint recovery operations, but to no avail. At the end of last year, after careful interagency deliberation, we decided to try direct contacts with the KPA to see if this new venue would achieve the desired results. In light of direct contacts with North Korea associated with the Agreed Framework, direct talks no longer held the political disadvantages they once inferred on the US alliance with South Korea. We therefore believed the time for direct talks with North Korea on the POW/MIA issue had come.

Our first direct talks took place in Hawaii in January of this year at the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii (CILHI). From 10-14 January, 1996, a US delegation headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs James Wold met with representatives of the KPA and North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs at CILHI. These talks had three principal objectives: resolve outstanding issues involving previous repatriations, get the DPRK to commit to joint recovery operations, and demonstrate the capabilities of CILHI to

further their understanding of why were unable to identify more of the 208 remains they returned to the US.

Although the talks at CILHI failed to achieve any agreements, we did succeed in broadening the North Koreans' understanding of the need for joint recovery operations. In late March, the North Koreans signaled that they wished to meet again, and we subsequently agreed to hold another round of talks in New York from 2-10 May 1996. At that time, we resolved the past issues associated with the repatriated remains and agreed to a subsequent working-level meeting in the first half of June 96 to begin planning joint recovery operations aimed at implementing joint operations as early as this year. I have just returned from 8 days of these working-level talks in North Korea and am pleased to report that our first joint recovery operation will begin on July 10, 1996, at a crashsite in Unsan County in the northwestern part of North Korea. The first operation will last twenty days. During our working-level talks, we had the opportunity to briefly visit the general area of the site. A second joint recovery operation is set for early September 1996, at the site Congressman Richardson and I visited over the Memorial Day weekend. Although the working-level talks were arduous, we agreed on a myriad of technical details necessary to achieve this long-awaited breakthrough.

Despite our significant progress on the remains aspect of this issue, we are not content to accept progress on this aspect of the issue alone. A key concern remains unresolved reports of live Americans living in North Korea. Over the years, the U. S. Government has received reports, mostly hearsay, of live Americans in North Korea. Some of these reports allege the

Americans are Korean War POWs, other reports describe them as defectors. Most of the reports are linked to the appearance of these Americans in a North Korean propaganda film, "Nameless Heroes," or their role as language instructors in a military training facility. We do know that there are currently four American servicemen who deserted their units in the 1960s, subsequently defected to North Korea, and are still living there. Two later defectors were reported to have died. Because of their close similarities with individuals in the propaganda film, and because some of the reports indicate the alleged POWs appeared in the films and served as language instructors, we suspect these individuals are the basis for at least some of these reports. However, because we cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that these Americans account for all of the reports, we continue to investigate these reports to the utmost of our abilities. Through the State Department Office of Consular Affairs, we are working to attempt to contact these individuals.

Meanwhile, here at home, the Defense POW/MIA Office has begun the daunting task of producing a more accurate listing of the Korean War unaccounted for. This involves reviewing and reconciling the official Korean War casualty list with the American Battle Monuments Commission's list of unaccounted for remains and the Central Identification Laboratory's Korean War forensic data base. Already, thousands of errors and inconsistencies have been identified and corrected, but there remains much more to accomplish before we have the desired goal. We hope to complete our first draft by August 1996.

In addition to this, we are continuing our efforts to locate, review, declassify and centralize Korean War documents from both Department of Defense and National Archives sources. This effort is intended to provide more accurate information to the families, as well as make the information more accessible to the public, in compliance with recent Congressional legislation.

We are also looking into expanding contacts with the Chinese Government on the Korean War POW/MIA issue. Already, the Chinese are accepting specific case inquiries (we currently are preparing five such cases), and we hope to expand this into joint archival research efforts.

Finally, with the approval of the use of DNA as a forensic tool in the identification of remains, families can now provide reference samples through the service casualty office. Mitochondrial DNA testing requires a reference sample from the individual's maternal line, such as the mother, brother, sister, mother's sister or brother, or the mother's sister's children. The service casualty office, will determine who the most eligible next of kin is and arrange for a kit with detailed instructions to be sent to that person for a blood sample to be taken.

The Korean War is often referred to as the "forgotten War." As I have clearly demonstrated, that is not true today. Our commitment to account for our servicemen from this conflict is stronger and more robust than at any time since the signing of the Armistice. President Clinton reaffirmed this commitment in his dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. in 1994. Secretary of Defense Perry recently signed a DoD

policy statement establishing the Korean War accounting effort as a DoD priority, with directions to the individual Services to devote commensurate resources to the effort. For my part, I can assure you that the Defense POW/MIA office intends to carry on its mission of accounting for our Korean War missing. We are determined not to let the daunting challenges facing us deter our efforts to succeed. As American military experts deploy into North Korea next month to begin the first joint recovery operation, they do so in a concerted effort to remember and respect the brave servicemen for whom they are searching and working to bring home after so many years.

Thank You.

DoD News Briefing**Monday, June 17, 1996 - 1:00 p.m.****Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA****Subject: North Korea****(Also participating is Allen Liotta, Deputy Director, Office of POW/MIA Affairs)**

Mr. Bacon: Good afternoon.

Allen Liotta is well known to some of you as an expert on our efforts to follow up on all the leads about POWs/MIAs in Korea from the Korean War. He's the Deputy Director of the Office of POW/MIA Affairs. He has just returned from North Korea where he was heading the team that was negotiating the details of later trips into North Korea to look for remains of POWs/MIAs, so he's here to talk about that. He can also take questions about the reports that some of you wrote over the weekend on the reports that have come out, or the unconfirmed reports that have come out about sightings of people in North Korea.

MR. LIOTTA: Good afternoon. It's good to see you all again after such a short time.

I have a brief statement I'd like to make, and then I'll be glad to take questions from you all.

From the 10th to the 15th of this month I led the delegation to Pyongyang, North Korea for discussions with the North Koreans on joint recovery work. My delegation was a technical working level delegation that came out of the New York agreement that was signed on May 9th between the North Koreans and us, on doing recovery work in North Korea and settling compensation issues over remains they had given to us in the past.

One of the significant parts of the delegation is this was the first DoD delegation to travel to the North Korean capital since the end of the war. As a result of that, the North Koreans treated us with a great deal of respect. We had very high level discussions in terms

of within the military counterparts it was all working level with the exception of a dinner with a two star general that's responsible for this issue. They wanted to make sure that we'd done a little bit of touring in the country and saw some things that were related to the issues, so we did take a tour of the museum for the Korean War. It's significant, although other Americans have been in this museum before, principally some congressmen and senators, we were taken to more rooms than any other American group had been to in this museum. There are 80-plus rooms in the museum. We saw about 39 of them. Not all the rooms deal with the Korean War. A lot of them deal with the Japanese War and the struggle against the Japanese.

We also went to the crash site, and what we did was, as the negotiations proceeded, we agreed on two joint recovery operations. A first which will occur next month in July. It will start on the 10th of July. It will last for 20 days. There will be ten Americans involved -- eight will be working at the site, and two Americans will remain in Pyongyang as liaison with the foreign ministry and the defense ministry officials there. That operation will end on the 30th of July, and then we will return in September for another 20 day mission. That mission will also include ten Americans under the same setup -- eight and two -- and will last, as I said, for 20 days. We haven't set a specific start date for the September mission. We'll do that after, but the mission will occur during the month of September.

The first crash site is an F-80C aircraft, crashed in Unsar County which is in the very northern part of the peninsula, about 18 kilometers from the Chinese border. They took us to the crash site, to the area of the crash site, I should say. As with the Nam Po city crash site that I briefed you about, or that you heard about after Congressman Richardson's visit, we did not actually see wreckage on the ground, in the area. We were taken to the specific grid coordinates that we had provided to them for this crash site. We walked the terrain, we spent a little over an hour at the crash site walking the terrain, getting a feel for the area. But again, this is a crash site that's over 45 years old. It's an area that was cultivated. So there was no surface wreckage that we were able to see in the short time that we were there.

My delegation consisted of three representatives in the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, which does the actual excavation work; two representatives from my office; and a State Department representative.

Q: Why did you choose that site if there was no wreckage there? Why are you interested in that site in particular?

A: We provided the North Koreans ten sites -- not all crash sites. Some crash sites and some grave sites. Of those ten, we asked them to choose two sites. We said we could go to any of these ten sites. We think these are all good possibilities for recovery work. We asked them to select from that. They did select two of those ten sites. This is one of those ten sites.

Q: The F-80C carried how many people?

A: It's a one-seat aircraft. It was a one-seater, so there's one individual involved in this crash.

Q: The F-80C is the one you're going to in July?

A: That's correct. And then the September operation is a B-29 bomber which crashed outside of Nam Po City. It's the area that they took Congressman Richardson too. I was also in Congressman Richardson's delegation as the DoD representative. They took us to that crash site during his visit.

Q: Where was that again?

A: It's in Nam Po City which is southeast of Pyongyang.

Q: What's the name of the pilot who was in the F-80?

A: We don't release the names of the crew members that are involved for privacy of the families. But Air Force Casualty is attempting to contact the family members involved in these incidents.

Q: Was this plane shot down, or...

A: Yes, it was. Both of these planes were shot down.

Q: Was he a prisoner of war or was he always simply missing?

A: In the F-80C incident? He's always been missing. He was never a POW.

Q: And the B-29 crew?

A: The B-29 crew had 13 aboard. Four parachuted out and were captured; three were returned; one was not returned. The other nine were aboard the aircraft at impact.

Q: Did you see any wreckage at that site?

A: No, we did not. And at that site with Congressman Richardson, we were not allowed to roam around. They basically took us to a spot on a road, a dirt road. We pulled over and they said this is roughly the area where the excavation work would be done. At that time, they had not identified that site as one of the sites we would go to. They just said this is the kind of area we would go to of the kind of a crash site, it would be somewhere in here, somewhere... And they pointed anywhere in these hills where we could possibly be.

The significance of the crash site visit we went to with my delegation is we were allowed to roam around and move through the mountains and the hills and the valleys and talk to people, probably a little less than a kilometer as we were taking pictures.

Q: ...recover remains?

A: The joint recovery work? Yes. The main reason is to recover and identify remains so we can return them to their families.

Q: What happened to the one B-29 crew member who wasn't returned?

A: We're pursuing in that case, we don't know. We have evidence that he was in the prison camps at the time, but he was not returned to us, and we're pursuing that.

Q: You wandered around the site... This most recent visit when you wandered around that site, did you talk to people in the area?

A: We did not talk to any local witnesses in the area. There was some local buildings nearby and a village not too far away. But there were no people out working in the fields while we were walking around that we could talk to.

Q: What will the people, the surveyors, the people who go there, what will they do if there's nothing to see? I don't understand how you can...

A: That's where, as with any crash site, getting to the crash site is half the battle; finding something is the other half of the battle. The key will be to find, part of the key is hopefully to find some local witnesses. The North Koreans will help us identify some local witnesses that have lived in the area for a long period of time that were there during the crash during the war or had relatives there during the war. Oftentimes what we find in the Asian culture, in these environments, is the crash site becomes a local legacy, local lore. Everybody knows where it is, where it went down. We find someone who can pinpoint the location of the crash site. Even if it's been cultivated on top of it, our experience in Southeast Asia has shown that when you dig down five, six, seven feet, you can find a wealth of crash material at that level. So our confidence is if we can find the specific site and we dig the specific site, that we will be able to recover remains and crash site related evidence that will help us account for the pilot.

Q: Did you address at any time the issue of the American defectors that are living in North Korea? Or did you address at any time the possibility of other Americans alive, being possibly held against their will there?

A: I won't get into the specific official and unofficial discussions we had, but I did raise the issue of live American prisoners of war with my North Korean counterparts. We had also raised it with them in New York, at the time in New York as an area of interest that we need to pursue, that we have some reporting that we need to get to the bottom of. They were, as they have been in the past with U.S. congressmen and U.S. senators, who have raised this issued, noncommittal. They've maintained that they have no Americans being detained against their will in North Korea.

Q: How credible is this evidence that there may be 10 to 15 Americans alive in North Korea?

A: We have a variety of reporting, largely hearsay reporting, about these kinds of... About Americans. The number ranges broadly, somewhere between 10 and 15 are the most frequent kinds of reports that we hear. That's what we're trying to determine, is exactly

how credible are these reports. If we can corroborate this information and then if we can corroborate it, what action needs to be taken after that.

To date, we have not been able to corroborate any of this information. And we have not been able to determine with any degree of sufficiency the credibility of this information.

Q: Are you going to press on this at all? You say they're noncommittal. Is this within the area of your agenda? Do you have any leverage at all? Do you intend to try?

A: Absolutely we intend to press on this, and it is specifically within my office's purview to follow up on this, and we absolutely intend to follow up on this with the North Koreans.

Q: The report that we saw on Friday referred to very compelling reports. Would you use a different adjective in describing this evidence?

A: As I've seen it, the report that you're referring to, and that's been written up in the newspapers, I think overplayed the impact of that internal report. What that report was, it was an internal working document that an analyst drafted to draw out some of the "what if" scenarios, the questions about some of the reporting, to focus some attention on it, to ask the questions that an analyst should rightfully ask about what else do we need to follow up on here, where else do we have to go for leads? What other action should we take to try and corroborate this information. So that report, that internal working report was designed for that purpose, to raise those kinds of questions in our office, amongst our analysts, so that they can put some analytic thought behind it and figure out where do we go next in an effort to try and corroborate some of this information.

Q: It does say DPMO concludes that there are these two different groups. I mean does DPMO conclude that or not? That's what the report says.

A: No. That is not an official conclusion of the organization. It's an internal document that the analyst had written to try and put his thoughts down.

Q: Did he misrepresent what the facts are then?

A: No, I don't think he misrepresented an organizational conclusion. He considers himself part of the organization. I think it was just a mixed pronoun in terms of [views]. He's citing the organization when he's citing his own personal views. But because he considers himself part of the organization, he used the organization rather than himself... When an analyst typically writes, they don't write "this analyst thinks this or that." Not necessarily.

Q: It' also represented in the report a variety of additional citing reports have been received culminating in a recent flurry, the last 60 days, of very compelling reports. What very compelling reports did you receive earlier this year?

A: We did not receive a series of very compelling reports this year. Part of that was, the analyst had an opportunity to meet with some of the North Korean defectors, so he had talked with those defectors. We'd gotten more robust or fulsome briefings from them than had been previously reported. But none of the information they provided to us was information that you could characterize as a smoking gun, or information that definitively corroborated any previous information.

Q: Those are the very compelling reports he's referring to?

A: I'm not sure what he was referring to in terms of very compelling. I'm not sure exactly what he's referring to.

Q: Do you know why this was prepared, this document?

A: As I said, this is an internal document that our analysts frequently will do as an analytic exercise to determine how are we doing, how are we looking at this information, where do we need to go next for additional information, what are the next things we can do, helps crystallize analytic thought about some of the information that we do get. Very rarely in the analytic world do you make a single decision based on a single piece of evidence. You get a pattern of evidence and you look at that pattern. So it's very common for analysts to step back at a point in time to take a look at all the information they've gotten thus far and determine if there's any clear patterns emerging, and then where do you go next.

Q: When you raised this issue when you were in Pyongyang and you got the noncommittal response, did you press at all? Did you ask to be taken out to these sites to visit them?

A: To visit with the POWs? I mean to visit with... No, they did not. They steadfastly maintain that there are none.

Q: I don't mean to quibble here, but you said they said to you no Americans are being held against their will, right?

A: Right.

Q: Did you at all think about following up to ask, can I just go talk to the Americans, even if they're not being held against their will?

A: We have asked to talk to the American defectors from the 1960s, and it's being treated as a consular issue, to try and gain access to them so that we can perhaps facilitate contact with their families. And because it's being treated as a consular issue, it's being handled by the Department of State, not by DoD. But that request has been made of the North Koreans.

Q: I thought you said the analyst who wrote this report was able to talk to some of these defectors. Did I misunderstand?

A: He was able to talk to defectors who have come out of North Korea. Korean defectors, not American defectors. Perhaps that's a misunderstanding.

Q: Also that report, wasn't it used as the basis for a briefing of the Joint Staff as well as OSD? In other words, this wasn't just an internal working document that stayed inside your office.

A: There are analysts not just within OSD and the DPMO and the POW/MIA office. There are analysts throughout the Defense Department establishment. As I said, the report is designed to stimulate thought, and energize some people to say are we getting all the information? Is there other information? How else do we corroborate this information? So there's going to be a natural dialogue amongst analysts that focus on the issue. Specifically on POW/MIA, but also in the broader context of Korea as we try to analyze the information to put in context with other information that exists on Korea.

Q: So the answer is yes, it was used as a briefing for the Joint Staff?

A: I don't believe it was used as a briefing, but there was dialogue with other analysts, yes.

Q: On which sites you're going to search, why did you leave it up to the Koreans when you could have searched sites, possibly mass grave sites and other things? Why do you search a site here, an F-80C where one American was down, when you could have pressed to go to grave sites where possibly dozens of Americans... Why did you leave it up to them?

A: That's a good question. There are two reasons, actually. We carefully selected the sites that we did posit to them. We left it up to them to demonstrate to them that our objective here is a purely humanitarian objective. There's no other agenda involved with what we're trying to accomplish. We felt that by giving them a variety of sites that they could choose from, it would be one way to demonstrate to them that that is, indeed, our objective.

From our perspective, the sites that we proposed to them all had several things in common. One, they were not near any military installations or sensitive installations. Two, they were not near any major industrial facilities or large cities that would involve maybe having to tear down houses or redirecting roads, things that would complicate their approval process. Also, we gave them a mixture of crash sites and grave sites, but to be quite honest with you, we have more experience dealing in crash sites than we do in mass grave sites, and our objective is to make identification. Not just to recover remains, but to identify those remains so that we can return them to the families. In a crash site investigation you can go and do your excavation, not recover remains from the crash site, but recover sufficient evidence from the crash site that shows that the pilot was in the aircraft at the time of the crash, perished in the crash, and therefore, you can provide closure to the family by being able to definitively state to them that their loved one died in the incident and we know what happened to them, even in the absence of being able to recover remains that we can turn over to the family.

Q: How many Americans are still listed as missing, and how many of these cases realistically could you expect to get closure on over the coming years?

A: There are currently over 8100 Americans listed as unaccounted for from the Korean War. I stated at the last press conference that I gave after the New York agreement, we would hope, our expectation is that we could recover perhaps about half of those, 3,000 to 4,000. But that estimation really is going to be geared by our experience on the ground. If we get to some of these crash sites and we discover that the 45 plus years is making it very difficult to retrieve crash site evidence or remains, that number could drop rapidly. The same once we get into mass grave sites. If we find that we're not having any luck within the mass grave sites, the number would drop even faster.

Q: As you moved around in North Korea, your movement was limited. We hear reports, of course, that people are starving and everything else. Can you give us your general impressions of what you saw in the countryside and the people in the city of Pyongyang? How does it look now?

A: Sure. These are my general observations. I wasn't there looking at the food situation, doing any sort of assessment. The World Food Program and others are there doing that. But I can tell you that in the drive from Pyongyang out to the crash site, which is about a four and a half hour drive, we did go through a number of villages and small towns. The corn cribs were empty, grain silos were empty. The crops that we saw, I would characterize as stunted or underdeveloped. We saw a lot of flood damage. Almost all the bridges on the roads which we traveled were washed out and we did a lot of having to drive the cars through the rivers themselves. On the fields that you can see from the roads, you can see a lot of silt and other leftover damage from the floods. I'm not a farmer so I can't say the effect that would be on there. But what struck me was corn, which I would expect this time of season to be knee high or better, was ankle high.

Q: Back to the analyst's report for just one question. Could you give us an example of the sort of evidence you're talking about which the author found compelling or riveting or whatever, and which you were saying is very tentative and not hard and so on?

A: I don't want to be trying to juxtapose against the author's view. His intent was to generate some thought and stimulation within the analytic community or our office, and that's what he's done, and that's what his report is designed to do. That's what we pay him to do. But the kind of reporting that he gets is frequently there's an individual who sees some caucasians or caucasian looking people, doesn't have an opportunity to talk with them so he asks another person, do you know who those people are? Do you know why they're here? The other person says I've heard they're Americans. The other key for us is, there seems to be some loose interchangeability between the words defectors, deserters, and POWs. And we don't know whether there is a loose interchangeability in how they use it, whether it's simply a status symbol, or whether they attach significant distinction to those words, as we attach significant distinction to the words.

Q: ...on that level you're talking about.

A: That's correct.

Q: You and your office, just so we put this in clear context, you and your office have reason to believe that there are whatever number, 10 to 15, whatever number, that there are Americans still in North Korea, either defectors, there against their will, prisoners of war. In other words, aside from the report we just talked about, as you move through your daily work and your investigation, you have reason to believe that there are people still there. You talked about over 8,000 missing, unaccounted for. A specific number if you can.

A: We know that there are Americans living in North Korea, because we know of the defectors from the 1960s. That's one of the complicating factors. When you get reports about this, we don't know if these reports are referring to Americans whom we know are there, or if they're referring to someone else. That's why we have to go through this corroborative process to try and determine the veracity of the reporting which we get.

We proceed on the assumption when we get these reports, every report needs to be investigated. We need to make a determination about these reports, we need to corroborate the information about the reports, and we proceed along that basis. We don't rule any report out simply because they say it's not possible that someone could have survived 40-plus years in captivity since the end of the war. We do not dismiss a report on that basis. We investigate every report, try and make an analytic determination on the veracity and the credibility of the information that's there, and based on the analytic conclusion that's reached at that point, additional steps could be taken.

Q: What have you found so far? What are your conclusions? If you've investigated all these reports, and we assume you've investigated many, many...

A: Yes. The conclusions are we have no conclusive proof that there are Americans being held against their will in North Korea.

Q: What's your opinion on that? Do you think it's possible?

A: My personal opinion is guided by what I see in my professional capacities. I have no information that shows to me or indicates to me definitively that there are Americans living against their will, being detained against their will in North Korea.

Q: What's in it for the North Koreans? Why now? What's the significance of being the first military delegation to visit since the end of the war?

A: I believe that they have made the internal political decision to cooperate with us on this humanitarian issue. I think the reason is because part of the agreed framework which dictates the development of bilateral relations between our two countries, clearly says that one of the five areas they have to cooperate on is POW/MIA. They know it's extremely important to the United States Congress. Congressman Richardson's raised it with them, as has Senator

Smith and several others during trips there. When they have had delegations here that have been to Capitol Hill they've heard the same story. The United States has made it very clear to them across the board that this is an issue of prime importance for the American people and for the families and the veterans and we intend to pursue it. I believe they have made the determination if they have any hope of trying to improve relations with us, this is one of the areas they must do that with. That's why in the New York agreement it says, and we state in the press release here, this represents another positive step to the contribution of the overall improvement in relations.

Q: Did you make any payments during your trip at all? Pay for anything?

A: Other than the hotel, the food, things like that, and souvenirs. But we didn't make any payments to them for anything.

Q: What's the compensation to the... What kind of financial compensation is there from the United States to North Korea in return for this cooperation?

A: One of the agreements was that the United States will bring in all the equipment which we're going to use. We're not going to, as we do in Southeast Asia or other places, Brazil and other places we've done operations, oftentimes we lease local equipment, minimize the logistics of what we have to bring with us, but under this agreement, we will bring in everything with us to use for the equipment.

Q: And leave it there when you leave?

A: We will leave it there between the operations, but it will return... It will remain U.S. Government property and it will return at the end of the second joint operation.

Q: What do you estimate this first operation will cost? This 20 day operation?

A: I don't know. The Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii is the organization that runs these operations. I don't know what it would cost us.

Q: You mentioned earlier that the U.S. Government wants to talk to these deserters, American deserters who are there. Have the North Koreans indicated they would allow you to do that? Allow the State Department to do that?

A: They have not yet.

Q: They have not said either way?

A: They have not responded to the State Department request.

Q: Have they acknowledged that these deserters exist?

A: To my knowledge, they have not yet acknowledged that they exist.

Q: If there's any sort of evidence that Americans are being held against their will in North Korea, is this the moment to go ahead with these other forms of cooperation with them?

A: I think that's a hypothetical question that I really can't tackle. We have to make that determination first, based on the evidence that we have.

Q: I see the family groups this morning said this is not the moment to go forward with the search for remains if there's any question about Americans still being alive in North Korea and held against their will.

A: I would argue that when you have a society as closed and isolated as North Korea, you have to seize upon any opportunity you can to make inroads into that country. If you hope to get additional information, if you hope to get answers to some of the more difficult questions, you pursue whatever avenues are open to you. We have a unique opportunity right now for U.S. servicemen to go into a country that technically we're still at war with, to begin these kinds of operations, and to recover the remains of fallen comrades and return them to their families, as well as to eventually gain access to archival information and other kinds of records that the North Koreans have that can help us in this process, and as we do that and as we gain additional information, it allows us to target and ask more specific questions and get other information and relate it to other questions.

Q: Did you see things in the museum that would lead you to believe there's information there of an archival nature of some other kind that would be helpful?

A: Yes, we did. We saw, for example, a shoot-down record, and I made a point, it was in a display of anti-aircraft, a brigade hailing one of their anti-aircraft brigades. I made a point of pointing to that shoot-down record and saying these are the kinds of records which can be very helpful to us when we take your information and combine it with our information and synthesize it, it gives us more specific information about the incident, tells us about witnesses that were involved in the shoot-down that might have additional corroborating information. So I pointed that out to them and said this is why we need to begin the process of doing archival work as well as field work. They understood that process.

Q: Like a diary sort of thing?

A: No, it's generally a shoot-down record kept by an operational unit that says this unit shot down an American plane at this time at this place. Whether they witnessed anybody parachuting out of the aircraft, if anybody was captured, that kind of information.

Q: Are you briefing South Korea at all on your findings? Are any members from South Korea a part of your team?

A: There were no South Koreans on my team, but we work very closely with our allies. We talked with them before we went in about the specific things which we would be discussing. After we came out we talked with the South Koreans and gave them a full read on what we discussed.

Q: I'm not sure if I got an answer to my earlier question about whether there's any financial compensation. You talked about equipment, but is the United States making any direct payments to North Korea in return for this cooperation?

A: I won't get into the specifics that we negotiated and talked about, but we are treating this as we do our other operations around the world. So what we do will be consistent with those operations in terms of compensation for fields which are destroyed, the process of the excavating work if we have to tear up a farmer's rice field, things like that, then we will compensate for those.

Q: Are we going to pay for remains?

A: No, we are not going to pay for remains.

Press: Thank you.

- END -

FAX COVER SHEET

File
Korea POW/MIA

Defense POW/MIA Office

2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400[Phone: (703) 602-2102 X 157]
Fax (U): 602-1890/1891

Ms. SANDY KRISTOFF (NSC)

202 456 9250

TO: Mr. Bob DORSE (NO Comptrol); ^{S4} Phone: 693 6392FROM: LTC Martin Wisda, DPMO
(703) 602-2102 ext ~~155~~ (DSN 332)SUBJECT: COORDINATION ON REQ FOR EXCEPTION TO POLICY -
MEANS FOR NKS SUPPORTING JT RECOVERY OPS.

REMARKS:

PLEASE TELEPHONE COORDINATION TO ME
AT ABOVE PHONE #.

THANKS

VLR

LTC WISDA

Approval
passed 6/25/96
1450
CLP



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



In reply refer to:
I-96/22314

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTORATE OF CONTRACTING
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, HAWAII
FT. SHAFTER, HI 96858-5025

SUBJECT: Exception to Policy for Provision of Subsistence
Rations to North Korean Workers in Support of Joint
Recovery Operations

The U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) will conduct two joint recovery operations this year in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In light of the critical food shortage in that country, it is reasonable that CILHI should provide subsistence rations to workers in direct support of these operations. An exception to policy is hereby authorized with respect to these first two joint recovery operations. This exception to policy will be reviewed after completion of the first two operations. OSD point of contact for this action is LTC Wisda, Defense POW/MIA Office, (703) 602-2102 ext 157.

Franklin D. Kramer



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400In reply refer to:
I-96/22314MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRSFROM: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA Affairs)
Prepared by: LTC Martin J. Wisda, DPMO/PP, 602-2102 x157SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Policy-Provision of
Subsistence Rations to North Korean Workers Supporting Joint
Recovery Operations in North Korea ACTION MEMORANDUMPURPOSE: To request exception to policy for provision of
subsistence rations to North Korean Workers in support of joint
recovery operations in North Korea.DISCUSSION: It is normal practice for the U.S. Army Central
Identification Laboratory to contract for local labor from the
host nation in support of remains recovery operations in that
country. Provision of subsistence rations for these laborers is
not authorized under normal conditions.

The DoD working-level team coordinated with North Korea for
up to sixty Korean Peoples Army soldiers to support on-site joint
recovery operations in July and in September. It was also agreed
that the U.S. would provide subsistence rations to these workers
in light of the current critical food shortage in North Korea.
CILHI will require an exception to policy for the provision of
subsistence rations to other than U.S. personnel. The attached
memorandum to the Directorate of Contracting, U.S. Army Support
Command, Hawaii, authorizes this action.

DPMO will review this exception to policy once the first two
joint recovery operations take place and the food situation in
North Korea either improves or worsens.

RECOMMENDATION: That ASD/ISA sign the attached memorandum
authorizing the exception to policy, to be reviewed after the
first two joint recovery operations take place this year.

COORDINATION: OSD GC _____, State _____, NSC _____, ARMY _____

DECISION:

APPROVED_____
DISAPPROVED

File
No Korea
low/MIA

Kristoff, Sandra J.

From: Hall, Wilma G.
To: Kristoff, Sandra J.
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Subject: RE: North Korea MIA Jt. Recovery Ops [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 25, 1996 2:39PM

→ Mr. Lake has read your E-mail and initialled "Yes, approve policy exception"

From: Kristoff, Sandra J.
To: Bass, Peter E.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: North Korea MIA Jt. Recovery Ops [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 25, 1996 12:33 PM

Please pass to Lake -- guidance needed TODAY.

Note to Lake from Kristoff

RE: Exception to Policy on Food Rations during MIA Recovery Ops

Under USG policy we contract for local labor in support of remains recovery operations, but we are not authorized to provide subsistence rations for those workers under normal conditions.

DOD would like an exception to this policy for the North Korean recovery operations in July and September. This would allow us to give subsistence rations to the up to 60 NK soldiers that will be providing support to the U.S. team.

Recommend we concur in this policy exception. It would be difficult at best to have the U.S. team be fed while the NK soldiers who are supporting the effort stand by and watch. Believe provision of food would enhance cooperation in the future on MIA accounting. Also in line with the humanitarian aspects of MIA issue.

Yes, approve policy exception _____

No, maintain current policy of no food provisions _____

UNCLASSIFIED

**U.S. Department of State
Office of Korean Affairs
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
(202) 647-7717
(202) 647-7388 FAX**

Date:

/ 6/20 /

To:

Sandy Kristoff

Organization:**Phone:** ()

-

Fax: ()

-

From:

Jeff Goldstein

Number of pages including this cover sheet

{ 6 }

COMMENTS

Final version of
Dwe's testimony
for this afternoon

UNCLASSIFIED

House Committee on National Security
Sub-committee on Military Personnel

June 20, 1996

THE RETURN OF REMAINS AND POW/MIA ISSUES WITH NORTH KOREA

Testimony of David G. Brown
Director, Office of Korean Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Chairman,

It is my pleasure to represent the State Department
before this committee.

The return of the remains of US servicemen and an accounting for those missing have been important issues for the US since the end of the Korean War. We have been in active contact with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the remains issue since 1985. A number of channels have been used to achieve progress on this issue, including the Military Armistice Commission, meetings between US and DPRK Embassies in Beijing, our New York channel via the DPRK UN Mission, and direct negotiations, most recently between US delegations led by the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) and North Korean delegations led by the Foreign Ministry and including representatives of the Korean People's Army (KPA).

A number of Congressmen have also played important roles over the last decade, including Congressman Sonny Montgomery

File
North
Korea
POW/MIA

- 2 -

and Senators Bob Smith and Frank Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, your own comments in hearings last November helped underline the importance of this issue. Most recently, Congressman Bill Richardson visited Pyongyang to convey the importance of North Korean cooperation on the return of remains.

State and DOD have cooperated in various ways to accomplish the US goal of bringing fallen Americans home through the institution of joint recovery operations. Over the last several months, the State Department has assisted DOD by serving as a channel of communications with the North, by despatching personnel to assist DPMO's negotiators and by providing advice on the political context within which the remains negotiations have taken place.

What is the political context for these activities? The US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October, 1994 made clear to North Korea that the implementation of the nuclear agreement and progress on other issues of concern to the United States would be needed in order for North Korea's relations with the US to improve. In addition to the nuclear issue, we have made clear to the North Koreans our concerns about a number of other issues. These include: missile proliferation, DPRK support for terrorism, North-South dialogue, the reduction of conventional military threats, and -- prominently -- the return of the remains of American servicemen who died in North Korea during the Korean War.

- 3 -

We have made clear to the North Koreans that more normal relations will only be possible if we are able to make progress on these issues of concern to the US. We have stressed the importance of resolving the important humanitarian issue of repatriating remains.

Our South Korean allies have fully understood our efforts to deal with North Korea on the remains issue, recognizing the importance of this humanitarian issue to the US. We appreciate the understanding and support they have shown.

Under DPMO's skillful leadership, our consistent approaches to the North Koreans have produced some significant and welcome progress. As Mr. Liotta has indicated in his testimony, detailed negotiations with North Korea over the past five months produced agreement last week in Pyongyang to conduct the first joint recovery operations in North Korea beginning next month. DPRK agreement to joint recovery operations is a major step forward.

These negotiations have taken place against the backdrop of forty years of post-Korean War hostility between the US and North Korea. North Korea is perhaps the most closed society in the world. The Korean Peoples Army, the organization with which DPMO reached agreement last week and with which DPMO will be working to conduct the joint recovery

- 4 -

operations, has been one of the most impenetrable elements in North Korea. In this context, our agreement to conduct joint recovery operations with the KPA in North Korea is truly a major accomplishment. And one on which we must build with continued firmness and patience.

Apart from the return of remains there is the related and important question of whether there are Americans POWs or MIAs still alive in North Korea. The State Department fully supports DOD's efforts to check all reports alleging that there may be Americans held against their will in North Korea. While there have been reports of live American POWs, thus far, the USG has been unable to substantiate that any Americans are being held in North Korea against their will.

The agreement to conduct joint recovery operations reflects the success we have had in persuading North Korea of the importance of these humanitarian issues and in building a basis for constructive work with North Korea. This bodes well for our ability to make progress on the repatriation of remains and to resolve the fate of the American soldiers still listed as missing in action from the Korean War. We will continue to encourage North Korean cooperation, making clear that concrete accomplishments are needed in this and other areas in order for our bilateral relations to improve.

Thank you.



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

*5/16
Korea 7/26/96*

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

July 26, 1996

No. 447-96

(703)697-5131(media)

(703)697-3189(copies)

(703)697-5737(public/industry)

REMAINS RECOVERED IN NORTH KOREA

The Department of Defense announced today that skeletal remains believed to be those of an American soldier lost during the Korean War have been recovered in North Korea. The remains were excavated earlier this week by a U. S.- North Korean team which has been conducting a joint excavation about 100 kilometers north of Pyongyang since July 10.

The U. S. team from the U. S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), had been conducting an investigation near the suspected site of the crash of an Air Force F-80. During interviews with local villagers and officials, the U. S. team learned of another site where it was believed an American might be buried. The remains were excavated, along with other evidence which suggests the site was a foxhole burial. There was no name-specific information found at this site.

The remains are scheduled to be returned to American control in a repatriation ceremony on Monday at Panmunjom. They will be taken to the CILHI where forensic processes will seek to establish the identification of the American.

In an agreement signed by the U. S. and North Korea in May, both sides agreed that another joint recovery operation will be conducted in September.

-END-

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages **ONE**

To: DEBRA HENDERSON	From: PAUL SIVIGNY
Page 1 of 1	Page 1 of 1
DPMO	703-697-5131
703-602-1890	703-697-3501
NSN 7540-01-317-7088	5010-101
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION	

INTERNET AVAILABILITY: This document is available on DefenseLINK, a World Wide Web Server on the Internet, at: <http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/>

FAX COVER SHEET

File
Korea (No)
POW/MIA

Defense POW/MIA Office

2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400

Phone: (703) 602-2102

Fax (U): 602-1890/1891

5 PP

TO: Ms. Sandy Krustoff
or Mr. Bob Soettinger; Phone: 202 456 9251
Say ~~9250~~ 9250

FROM: LTC Martin Wisda, DPMO
(703) 602-2102 ext ~~156~~ 157 (DSN 332)

SUBJECT: DPMO response to KPA Lt Col Pak's letter
concerning conditions for 2nd joint recovery opn.

REMARKS:

State has coordinated on our response but asked that we run it by the OSC. Therefore, I am faxing our response (signed by our chief of staff LTC Al Lott who is on leave thru 23 Aug) for your review. Plz give me a call w/ your OK or any comments.

Regards

LTC Martin Wisda

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400In reply refer to:
I-96/22392Korean People's Army
ATTN: COL Pak Rim Su
Panmunjom Mission

Dear Colonel Pak:

Thank you for your August 18, 1996, letter to Mr. Liotta. Since he is on leave, I would like to respond on his behalf. Your letter comes at an opportune time, since we are in the final stages of preparation for the second operation. Preparations are already made to pick up the second recovery team's China visas and we have delivered a letter to your Mission at the United Nations detailing the team members and their scheduled arrivals in Pyongyang. We are optimistic that this second operation, like the first, will provide evidence allowing us to resolve the status of more of our missing servicemen.

The first operation has garnered very positive responses from the national leadership, the Congress, the U.S. media, and especially, the families of those missing from the Korean War. We hope that we can build upon the success of the first operation with success in the second operation this September. We recognize that a weighty national decision was made in your country to proceed with these humanitarian recovery operations. The United States appreciates the decision made at the June 1996 meeting in Pyongyang to allow two joint operations initially. We are confident that this commitment will be honored.


We are only at the initial stages of these joint operations, and there will be much we can learn from each other as we proceed. We recognize that concerns and issues will arise from time to time. It is our hope that we can resolve these issues to the satisfaction of both parties. We plan to conduct the second operation to establish a firm foundation upon which we can build a POW/MIA humanitarian program benefiting both the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

From your letter, we recognize that you have specific concerns over compensation from the first recovery operation. We find this puzzling since your representative signed a receipt which stated that the funds given to the representative resolved all compensation issues for the first recovery operation.



Although we consider the matter of compensation for the first operation concluded, it will be possible during the operation in September to discuss compensation based on additional activities and support provided by your countrymen and military personnel. Any unresolved compensation issues can be discussed further at a November or early December meeting where we can discuss the matter comprehensively. At such a meeting discussions can also be held concerning the lessons learned from the first two operations and a possible agreement on further operations in 1997. I look forward to continued successes in these operations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Joe B. Harvey', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Joe B. Harvey
Chief of Staff
Defense POW/MIA Office

①

~~072026477388~~ August 18, 1996

Mr. Alan Liotte
Deputy Director
POW/MIA Office
Defense Department
United States of America

Washington, D.C.

I acknowledge my receipt of your letter dated August 9.

As I indicated in my letter dated July 26, we are now seriously reviewing whether we will continue the second round of the joint recovery operations scheduled for September.

It is quite beyond imagination that the servicemen from the hostile country come to our country under the present circumstances where the armed forces of both sides are sharply confronted with each other.

However, we made our weighty decision to proceed to the joint recovery operations of the U.S. remains with intent to promote the confidence between the DPRK and the United States and, as your side recognizes, we provided all our possible cooperation for the success of the first round of the joint recovery operations.

Your side has committed itself to take its humanitarian steps to support the flood relief operations in the DPRK in response to the joint recovery operations.

You will be well aware of such commitments, since you visited our country together with the US Congressman Mr. Richardson.

The U.S. side, however, has still neither taken any humanitarian steps, nor made appropriate compensation for the first round of the joint recovery operations, far from its already-made promise.

We are very much displeased with this.

Both sides agreed to conduct the second round of the joint recovery operations after the conclusion of the first round of the joint recovery operations. However, the problems arisen in the first operation have not been yet fully settled and no consultations necessary for the preparations of the second operation have been made.

(2)

Under such circumstances, it is completely illogical to mention about the beginning of the second operation without proper consideration.

It is from your side understanding of such realistic requirement that your side proposed to hold consultations on the compensation for the first operation and on the second operation around August 20, and we agreed to your proposal.

I could not but be surprised that you did not mention any of the above matters in your August 8 letter.

Through this, we have keenly felt that it was all right for us to review whether we would continue the joint recovery operations in forthcoming September.

If your side hopes the successes of the second operation, it should take the already-agreed humanitarian steps, before anything else. The working-level talks should be held between the two sides to discuss and resolve the unfinished compensation, the appropriate mode of compensation and issues related with the second operation.

I expect you will exert your sincere efforts so that our joint operations which was started through many difficulties should not be ended with its one round of the joint operations.

Sincerely yours,

Col. Pak Rim Su
Deputy Representative
Panmunjom Mission of the
Korean People's Army

FAX COVER SHEET

Defense POW/MIA Office

2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400

Phone: (703) 602-2102
Fax (U): 602-1890/1891

5 pp.*Ms. Sandy Kristoff**NSC*

TO: MR. BOB SUETTINGER; Phone: (202) 456-9251
(Ext) 9250

FROM: LTC Martin Wisda, DPMO
(703) 602-2102 ext ~~155~~ (DSN 332)
157

SUBJECT: INFO ON NY TIMES ARTICLE - KOREAN
WAR POW REPORT.

REMARKS:

*M. Wold asked that I fax you the attached info
regarding subj article.*

*V/R**LTC Marty Wisda.*

INFO PAPER THE LIST OF 389

1. On 9 Sep 53, following the exchange of POWs ("Operation Big Switch," completed 6 Sep 53), the UNC provided the Communists a list of 3,404 unaccounted-for UN personnel, including 944 US, 2,410 ROK, and 50 from other nations. As information was received on individuals on the list (e.g., remains returned in "Operation Glory", etc.), names were removed from the list and an updated version passed to the Communists. By 11 Aug 64, the list was down to 2,233 UN personnel, including 389 US. This is the current "List of 389." The list should be described as the "List of 388", since the remains of one person on the list (Kanji Yoshida) have been returned and identified by CILHI.

2. The UNC's description of the original list was as follows: "This complete tabulation of names of individuals together with their nationalities and service numbers contains the names of men who we know you held. The list contains only the names of people who:

- 1) Spoke or were referred to in broadcasts from your radio stations.
- 2) Were listed by you as being your captives.
- 3) Wrote letters from your camps.
- 4) Were seen in your prisons."

Analysis of the names on the list indicates this description was incorrect. The original list contains many names of individuals never reported by any source to have been alive in enemy hands. Paul Cole states "What is indisputable is the fact that many of the names on the original UNC list were men who had never been held alive in enemy hands. ..." (Cole, Vol. I, p. 225)

3. A 10 Mar 54 letter from the White House to a family member states, in reference to the original list of 944: "In many cases, we already had received information from the repatriates which established that these persons had died while in captivity ... In other cases the repatriates informed us that they had been told by their captors or other prisoners ... that certain persons were known to have perished in the crash of their planes. Others were included because, while no information was available about them, members of their crews were repatriated or were reported as believed to be in custody of the enemy ... In several instances ... we learned that the emergency of the crash was so severe and so sudden that no other persons were believed to have been able to survive."

4. The House Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on 27 May 57 on "Return of American Prisoners of War Who Have not Been Accounted for by the Communists." Stephen S. Jackson, DASD (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve) made the following statement in his testimony: "... [O]fficials of the U.N. Command handed the Communist side a list of 3,404 names of missing U.N. Command personnel including the names of 944 United States servicemen of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge. At the outset I should like to make it clear that in placing this demand for an accounting on the Communists, the U.N. Command did not intend to imply that we were charging the Communists with holding this large group of Americans alive and against their will. Rather, under the terms of the armistice agreement we were demanding an accounting for missing U.N. Command personnel of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge of their whereabouts if alive, or the circumstances of their death and the location of their remains, if deceased."

5. Recent DPMO analysis of the 389 list indicates that for only 235 of the names on the list is there any evidence (no matter how sketchy or uncorroborated) that the individual was either alive or dead in enemy hands. There is no such evidence for the other 153 names on the list.

REMARKS FOR DASD(POW/MIA AFFAIRS) JAMES WOLD

SUBJECT: KOREAN WAR/CORSO TESTIMONY

QUESTION: In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIAs in November 1992, Retired LTC Philip Corso alleged that hundreds of American POWs or MIAs from the Korean War were transferred to the former Soviet Union. He added that this was known by the Eisenhower Administration which accepted Corso's recommendation to "write the captives off a" as MIAs" because there was nothing that could be realistically done to recover them, and to spare the families of the servicemen in question. Mr. Corso bases his testimony on reports from captured Chinese POWs and from a defector from the former Soviet Union.

ANSWER: For over four years now, the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs has been investigating the issue of Soviet involvement in the transfer of American POW/MIAs out of the Korean theater. Although we still lack conclusive proof of the actual transfer of Americans, we have accumulated a significant body of circumstantial evidence that supports the allegations. Outside of the Commission's efforts, the Defense POW/MIA office has been searching archives across the nation for such reports as have been referred to by Mr. Corso (we have been aware of his assertions since early 1992). Although we have yet to locate these reports, we have learned that the historical record of the period concerning POW/MIAs was less than accurate. It also appears that much of what Mr. Corso asserts is based on those inaccuracies.

For instance, in conjunction with the signing of the Armistice in July 1953, the United Nations Command submitted a list of servicemen, including 944 Americans (actually 948) who were reportedly believed to be still under Communist control. However, our recent research indicates that this suspicion was not based on reliable evidence; in many cases, there was no evidence of capture. The US military's own efforts reduced the 944 list to some 450 men within the first year, and subsequently, the list was revised down to 388. In an effort to produce a more accurate listing of potential "discrepancy" cases, our analysts have analyzed the remaining 388 cases and have determined that in a third of these cases, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Communists had the individuals under their control, at anytime. We are using the other cases for which there is some evidence as a baseline to expand as we come closer to realizing our effort to produce a more accurate listing of unaccounted for from the Korean War (PMKOR).

Also, typical of the frustrations we consistently encounter, Corso's defector has only provided hearsay evidence, not direct evidence, of a Soviet transfer program. But we continue to look wherever there may be a possible source of information regarding this issue, and we do not discount Mr. Corso's testimony. Rather, we have incorporated it into our growing body of knowledge upon which we hope to be able to act more conclusively as the evidence develops.

TUESDAY, September 17, 1996

pushing the three sides to allow more than 1 million refugees to return to their homes and aggressively protecting human rights and private property.

Instead, they have chosen to grant ultranationalist Serbs and Croats as much separatism as possible as long as they maintain the veneer of a united Bosnian state.

The preliminary election results also underlined a common view in Bosnia that the U.S. diplomatic and military engagement in this country is just beginning, not coming to an end.

Senior West European diplomats said today that Carl Bildt, the top international diplomat in Bosnia and a former prime minister of Sweden, is recommending that a brigade of 3,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops remain in Bosnia for as long as two years.

There are currently nearly 20,000 U.S. troops in Bosnia as part of the 53,000-member NATO-led force. When President Clinton announced the U.S. deployment to Bosnia last year, he promised Congress that the troops would be home by late December.

In an indication of how much fear of ethnic violence remains in this country even with NATO combat troops present to keep the peace, U.N. officials announced that far fewer Bosnians ventured across ethnic divides to vote than had been previously reported.

U.N. spokesman Alexander Ivanko said only 13,500 Muslims and Croats out of a pool of 150,000 people voted Saturday in or near the Serb-held towns or villages from which they had been driven during the 3½-year war.

Under the terms of the Dayton accord, the elections are supposed to prepare for the formation of institutions that are to bind Bosnia back together.

The vote will establish the three-member presidency, a national parliament with 14 representatives from each ethnic group, and separate assemblies for the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serb territory, known as the Serb Republic.

Results in the voting for these bodies will be released later this week. According to the Dayton accord, they must meet within one month.

The accord mandated that only Muslims voting in the Muslim-Croat federation could pick the Muslim presidential candidate; only Croats voting in the Muslim-Croat federation could choose the Croat candidate, and only Serbs voting in the Serb Republic could vote for the Serb candidate.

Bosnia still must have one more set of elections—an important vote for the control of its 109 municipalities. That vote, which was also supposed to occur Saturday, was postponed by the OSCE because of

massive voter registration fraud by the Serbs.

Ed van Thijn, the top Western election monitor, said he doubts that the municipal vote can be held by

mid-November—a date that has been urged by U.S. officials eager to end the American engagement in Bosnia—because all of Bosnia's voters must be re-registered.

NEW YORK TIMES

September 17, 1996

Pg. 1

U.S., in 50's, Knew North Korea Held American P.O.W.'s

By PHILIP SHENON

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 — Newly declassified documents show that the United States knew immediately after the Korean War that North Korea had failed to turn over hundreds of American prisoners known to be alive at the end of the war, adding to growing speculation that American prisoners might still be alive and in custody there.

The documents, obtained from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and other Government depositories by a Congressional committee, show that the Pentagon knew in December 1953 that more than 900 American troops were alive at the end of the war but were never released by the North Koreans.

The documents may only deepen the mystery over the fate of Americans still considered missing from the Korean War. In June a Defense Department intelligence analyst testified that on the basis of "a recent flurry" of "very compelling reports," he believed that as many as 15 Americans were still being held prisoner in North Korea.

While not dismissing the analyst's report entirely, the Defense Department has said it has no clear evidence that any Americans are being held against their will in North Korea, although it has pledged to continue to investigate accounts of defectors and others who say they have seen American prisoners there.

The North Korean Government has said it is not holding any Americans. A handful of American defectors are known to live in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, and some are believed to have appeared in North Korean propaganda films.

The documents were obtained by the House National Security subcommittee on military personnel. Congressional investigators said much of the information was confirmed by a former military aide to President Eisenhower, Col. Phillip Corso.

In a statement prepared for delivery before the House panel on Tuesday, Colonel Corso, who is retired, said, "In the past I have tried to tell Congress the fact that in 1953, 500 sick and wounded American prisoners were within 10 miles of the prisoner exchange point at Panmunjom but were never exchanged." Panmunjom was the site of peace negotiations between the United States and North Korea that ended with an armistice on July 27, 1953.

One of the documents obtained by the House subcommittee, a December 1953 memo that had been on file at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kan., shows that the Army believed at that time that 610 "Army people" and 300 Air Force personnel were still being held prisoners by the North Koreans, five months after a prisoner exchange between the United States and North Korea.

The memo said that President Eisenhower was "intensely interested" in the fate of "the missing P.O.W.'s," and that he had wanted to make sure "everybody was doing all they could about it."

Al Santoli, a Congressional investigator who helped gather the documents, said the House subcommittee would explore the possibility that some of the American prisoners reported missing in 1953 were the same Americans reportedly sighted in recent years in North Korea.

He said that the intelligence information released by the Eisenhower Library had been declassified at the request of the subcommittee, and that it showed that the Eisenhower Administration "was trying to do what it could to get the prisoners back" short of war.

Historians of the Korean War have suggested that the Eisenhower Administration chose not to make public much of its intelligence on the issue of missing Americans for fear of whipping up a war hysteria among Americans who would have demanded that the prisoners be returned home.

"In a nuclear age, Eisenhower could not risk telling the Russians or the Chinese that we're willing to go to all-out war to get our prisoners back," Mr. Santoli said.

The hearing Tuesday of the sub-

TUESDAY, September 17, 1996

committee will include potentially explosive testimony from a Czech defector, Jan Sejna, who now works for the United States Defense Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Sejna, a former Czech defense official, had access to information about medical experiments carried out on American prisoners of war by Russian and Czech personnel in a hospital in North Korea during the war. Mr. Sejna had described experiments in which American prisoners were drugged in a program to "develop comprehensive interrogation techniques, involving medical, psychological and drug-induced behavior modification."

At the end of the testing, the Americans were reportedly executed.

NEW YORK TIMES

September 15, 1996

Pg. E14

Test-Ban Monitoring Need Not Wait for India

To the Editor:

Your Sept. 10 editorial advocating approval of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty regrets that its international monitoring and inspection system cannot begin operating until India ratifies it, an event that will take years, if not decades.

Nearly all other countries, including all five of the declared nuclear weapon states, will sign the treaty. After signing, they should draft and sign an agreement that is not dependent on India's approval but puts into place, for the interim, most of the verification provisions of the treaty.

Through this separate agreement, seismic stations in remote areas could share data, and on-site inspections could help assure that rumblings being detected were small earthquakes, not nuclear tests. The side agreement would help to instill confidence that no nations, including Russia and China, were clandestinely testing atomic weapons.

It could also help to persuade the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, even while waiting for Indian adherence.

DAVID A. KOPLOW

PHILIP G. SCHRAG

Washington, Sept. 10, 1996

The writers were legal advisers to the United States delegation to the test-ban negotiations during the Carter Administration.

Editor's note: The editorial referred to appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, Sept. 10, 1996, Pg. 16.

NEW YORK TIMES

September 17, 1996

Pg. 10

Fort Hood G.I.'s Pack And Wait for the Word

By The New York Times

FORT HOOD, Tex., Sept. 15 — The crowd at the First Cavalry Division Memorial Chapel was sparse at the Protestant services on Sunday morning. About 30 worshippers, instead of the usual 70 or so, were in the pews to hear words of encouragement from the chaplain, Capt. Steven Maglio.

The small turnout was not a surprise to the chaplain. Some 3,000 soldiers from the Third Brigade, First Cavalry Division were busily packing while they waited to hear whether they would be sent to the Persian Gulf.

"At times like this, people want to stay home and be with their families as much as possible," he said.

Outside the calm of the chapel, the brigade headquarters was bustling with meetings and the Post Exchange was filled with shoppers seeking basics like socks and underwear.

Off base, the military supply stores in downtown Killeen were busy.

"We never have a seamstress on Sunday," said Mary Ann Carrillo, the manager of Fatigues and Things Army Store. "But we have so many soldiers wanting patches sewn on their uniforms that we are working overtime to get them all done."

Although the soldiers here do not know what lies ahead for them, most expressed a willingness, even eagerness, to get to Kuwait. Sgt. Avery Mobley, a member of a field artillery unit, fought in the Persian Gulf war. As soldiers around him packed electronic equipment, Sergeant Mobley said he was eager to return to the region where he spent seven months in 1991. "That's what I'm paid to do," he said.

Other members of his unit expressed similar feelings. Sgt. Herman Lovett called the deployment a "good train-up."

"It gives us the opportunity to do what we are trained to do," he said. Then watching his soldiers struggle with several pieces of bulky equipment, he added, "The hard part is just getting there."

Maj. Sam Carter was one of many officers and enlisted soldiers who visited a small fast-food restaurant on the base this morning. Part of Major Carter's unit, which provides automation support, is likely to be deployed. He supports the mission.

"Our way of life is somewhat threatened," he said. "If Saddam Hussein threatens the oilfields, that can affect our way of life and our standard of living. So we stand behind the President. If he makes the decision to go, we'll go."

Pvt. Kevin O'Dell, who joined the Army just five months ago and is unlikely to be deployed, said the United States was right to send more troops to the region. "I don't think we should let Saddam get away with anything," he said.

Later in the day, the brigade commander, Col. Eric Olson, briefed several hundred families who assembled in the base movie theater about the situation in Kuwait. They were told of the weather (hot, up to 115 degrees during the day) and the latest update about the deployment (again, no news yet).


While Colonel Olson talked to the families, Kelli Veler and her husband, Lieut. Jim Veler, talked with the press. Lieutenant Veler, a logistician, said members of his unit were excited about leaving. "It's actually a good situation," he said. "We've trained for four years, and we're ready to go somewhere and do something."

Mrs. Veler, who is seven months pregnant, was less enthusiastic. "I don't want him to go," she said. "This is our first child, and I want to have him here."

When asked about the need to return to the Persian Gulf, Mrs. Veler said: "I always thought it wasn't our problem. It seemed like we were just acting as a policeman for the world, and we didn't have to get involved. But it's too late now."

Several soldiers expressed disappointment and questioned the need to return to the region. Pfc. Daniel Perpignan, a communications specialist, said: "I think we should've taken care of business the first time. Now, maybe the second time we'll get it taken care of."

Pfc. Dakari Boyd, agreed, saying: "If they would've done what they needed to do, we wouldn't be going there. Hopefully, they will take some of the lessons from the first time and apply them to the second time, so there won't be a third time."



File No. ~~Korea~~ ^{Korea} POW/MIA

Defense POW/MP Weekly Update

October 15, 1996

REMAINS OF KOREAN WAR SOLDIER IDENTIFIED

The remains of an American soldier who died in combat during the Korean War have been identified and returned to his family in the United States. The name is not being released at the request of the family.

The U. S. Army corporal was buried in his hometown with full military honors. Remains were repatriated to U. S. control on July 29 in a formal ceremony at the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea.

In a historic joint operation with the North Koreans, the remains were recovered near Unsan, North Korea, approximately 45 miles south of the Chinese border. The soldier had been buried there following combat between U. S. and Chinese forces in November 1950. His burial site was found after U. S. investigators interviewed local officials and villagers who directed the team to a location where they believed an American soldier was buried. Found at the same burial site were his dog tag, rations, as well as spent and unspent ammunition.

The joint operation was the result of months of negotiations between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Defense Department's POW/MIA Office. The first round of negotiations led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James W. Wold, began in January 1996, but no agreement was reached. Several low-level contacts in the next few months led both sides to schedule formal negotiations in New York City in May. There, a formal agreement was signed resolving past issues and agreeing to conduct two joint recoveries in 1996. Later, follow-on technical discussions in Pyongyang, North Korea, set up logistical agreements, including the dates and sites, for the two operations.

Identification of the soldier was made by the U. S. Army's Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, where the remains were flown from Korea. Among the forensic procedures used at the CILHI were

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comparisons between the remains and dental charts from medical records.

An honor guard from his parent unit during the Korean War provided escort for the burial.

NAME CHANGE FOR DPMO

The name of the Defense POW/MIA Office has been changed to the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. The abbreviation "DPMO" remains the same. The change reflects the increased responsibilities of the organization as a result of legislation in the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. The legislation requires that the office be responsible for missing personnel accounting, as it has in the past, as well as the additional oversight of personnel recovery. The personnel recovery function includes combat search and rescue; escape and evasion; and others.

INVESTIGATIVE TEAM IN CHINA

U. S. and Chinese technical representatives began a joint investigation in China last week in search of information about Americans unaccounted-for from the war in Southeast Asia.

This is the third joint field activity by U. S. and Chinese investigators. The operation is to last until approximately October 21, during which three cases will be investigated. Eight Americans are listed as unaccounted-for in China.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	re: Defectors. (3 pages)	10/17/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Agency
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea - Miscellaneous, 1996 [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1452

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. note	For Anthony Lake from Sandra Kristoff. (1 page)	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Agency
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. letter	To Anthony Lake from James Laney. (3 pages)	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Agency
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1048

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea - Miscellaneous, 1996 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1452

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