

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Korea, July-December, 1995 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Kristoff, Sandra

Original OA/ID Number:

1040

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
30	2	10	2	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	From John Barry Kotch to Anthony Lake and Stanley Roth. Subject: United Nations. [partial] (1 page)	07/10/1995	P6/b(6)
002. letter	From John Barry Kotch to Anthony Lake. [partial] Subject: Korea (1 page)	01/06/1995	P6/b(6)
003a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Anti-Americanism. Record ID: 9508102. (1 page)	11/08/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	South Korea. (6 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	Point Paper to Provide Perspective. (5 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. letter	To General John Shalikashvili from General Gary Luck. Subject: U.S. Force Korea position. (1 page)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)
003e. cable	re: Perspective. (3 pages)	10/17/1995	P1/b(1)
003f. memo	For Anthony Lake from Robert Suettinger. Subject: South Korea. (1 page)	11/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1444

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9600005
RECEIVED: 02 JAN 96 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: FRAZIER, G

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: INDIA
KOREA

CHINA P R
FOREIGN TRAVEL

PERSONS: GLICKMAN, D

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF FORN TRAVEL BY SEC GLICKMAN OF AGRICULTURE TO INDIA
/ CHINA / & KOREA ON 25 JAN - 3 FEB 96

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 05 JAN 96 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: GRUMMON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

GRUMMON

FOR CONCURRENCE

FAIRFAX
LITWAK
ROTH
STATE

FOR INFO

APPEL
BAKER JANE
HALPERIN
LORIN
PARRIS
PONEMAN
SATTERFIELD
SESTAK
WALES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



DIAG
0005

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
WASHINGTON
20250-0100

December 19, 1995

Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

Secretary Glickman plans to travel to India, China and Korea beginning in late January. Mr. Glickman plans to build on his trip to Asia last summer where the importance of expanding U.S. agricultural exports was emphasized. In India the visit will build upon our history of agricultural technical cooperation while at the same time registering our support for their efforts to open their markets to world trade. To compliment his discussions on general agricultural and trade matters, the Secretary intends to engage government and private officials on bilateral issues such as Chinese and Korean trade barriers to horticultural and livestock products. The opening of the new Agricultural Trade Office will highlight our trade interests in the large Shanghai market area.

The Secretary plans to depart Washington January 25, and return February 3. We have not yet completed a detailed schedule, but a tentative itinerary with notional meetings follows:


<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Activities</u>
January 26-29	New Delhi	The Secretary plans to travel to the Punjab Agricultural University to meet with academics and scientists. He has also been invited to visit the farm of the Minister of Agriculture which is also in the Punjab. The Secretary will visit the U.S. funded Gene Bank and sign a Memorandum of Understanding on scientific cooperation. In addition he will make courtesy calls on the Ministries of Commerce, Minister of Finance and the Minister of Food Processing. Discussions with business people active in the U.S. India Agribusiness Alliance is also top priority for the schedule.

Anthony Lake
December 19, 1995
page two

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Activities</u>
January 30-31	Beijing	The Secretary will meet with the Ministers of Agriculture, Internal Trade, and Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to discuss the mutual benefits of trade and bilateral issues. In addition he expects to meet with Chinese importers of U.S. agricultural and food commodities.
February 1	Shanghai	The Secretary will cut the ribbon to open the new Agricultural Trade Office in Shanghai. Discussions with local and U.S. agricultural trade interests, including groups that USDA funds, are being set up. The Secretary will also meet with the Mayor of Shanghai and municipal agricultural officials.
February 2-3	Seoul	Market access issues will be a major focus of the Secretary's visit to Seoul. Meetings with President Kim and the Ministers of Agriculture and Health & Welfare are scheduled.

I look forward to your comments on the Secretary's trip.

With best regards,



Greg Frazier
Chief of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9509098
RECEIVED: 20 DEC 95 14

TO: STOIBER, C

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 27 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
FOREIGN TRAVEL

JAPAN

PERSONS: JACKSON, S

SUBJECT: FORN TRAVEL APPROVAL

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 23 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

ROTH

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY RS DATE 12-28-95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9509098

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	ROTH	X	95122014	CONCURRENCE TO EXEC SECRETARY
001	STATE	Z	95122014	COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE
001		X	95122112	ACTION OFFICER CONCURS
001	BAKER JANE	Z	95122112	PREPARE MEMO FOR SENS
002	BAKER JANE	Z	95122708	APPROPRIATE ACTION
003		X	95122808	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001	951211	STATE	
003	951227	STOIBER, C	

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9098
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>2</u>	<u>JB 12/28</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

9098

December 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR CARLTON R. STOIBER
Director
Office of International Programs
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel Approval

This memorandum is to confirm that the following foreign travel request has been approved:

Shirley Ann Jackson
Chairman

April 10 - 25, 1996

Korea
Japan


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9523555Date December 26, 1995

FOR: Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: Mr. Andrew D. Sens, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
From: Carlton R. Stoiber, Director, Office of International Programs
Date: December 11, 1995
Subj: Foreign travel of Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Seoul and Taejeon, South Korea; Nagoya and Tokyo, Japan - April 10-25, 1996


WH Referral Dated: 20 DEC 95
NSCS ID# (if any): 9509098

☐ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☐ A draft reply is attached.
☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.
☐ A translation is attached.
☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
☒ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
☐ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:


Director
Secretariat Staff

9523555

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9509098

REFERRAL

DATE: 20 DEC 95

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRILL, K

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: SENS

SOURCE: STOIBER, C

DATE: 11 DEC 95

SUBJ: NOTIFICATION OF FORN TRAVEL BY JACKSON OF NRC TO SEOUL / TAEJEON /
NAGOYA / & TOKYO ON 10 - 25 APR 96

REQUIRED ACTION: COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE

DUE DATE: 23 DEC 95

COMMENT:

FOR

B. Paiter
JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

95
DEC 21 AM 1:14
8/14



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 11, 1995

9523555

Staff
9098

Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20506

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF FOREIGN TRAVEL

Dear Mr. Sens:

Traveler's Name and Title: Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman

Date(s) of Travel: April 10-25, 1996

City(ies) and Country(ies): Seoul and Taejeon, South Korea; Nagoya and Tokyo, Japan

Purpose: (1) To present an address at the Korean Atomic Industrial Forum Annual Conference and keynote presentation at the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Annual Conference, (2) To meet with government and utility nuclear energy representatives in Korea and Japan to discuss nuclear safety issues, and to tour nuclear facilities.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carlton R. Stoiber".

Carlton R. Stoiber, Director
Office of International Programs

UNCLASSIFIED :
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9509098
RECEIVED: 20 DEC 95 14

TO: SENS

FROM: STOIBER, C

DOC DATE: 11 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
FOREIGN TRAVEL

JAPAN

PERSONS: JACKSON, S

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF FORN TRAVEL BY JACKSON OF NRC TO SEOUL / TAEJEON /
NAGOYA / & TOKYO ON 10 - 25 APR 96

ACTION: CONCURRENCE TO EXEC SECRETARY

DUE DATE: 23 DEC 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

~~FOR ACTION~~

ROTH

FOR CONCURRENCE

FAIRFAX
LITWAK
STATE

FOR INFO

APPEL
BAKER JANE
PONEMAN

COMMENTS:

Concurrence
Stanley RTH

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

Staff
9098



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 11, 1995

Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20506

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF FOREIGN TRAVEL

Dear Mr. Sens:

Traveler's Name and Title: Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carlton R. Stoiber", is written over the word "Sincerely,".

Carlton R. Stoiber, Director
Office of International Programs

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9509098

REFERRAL

DATE: 20 DEC 95

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRILL, K

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: SENS

SOURCE: STOIBER, C

DATE: 11 DEC 95

SUBJ: NOTIFICATION OF FORN TRAVEL BY JACKSON OF NRC TO SEOUL / TAEJEON /
NAGOYA / & TOKYO ON 10 - 25 APR 96

REQUIRED ACTION: COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE

DUE DATE: 23 DEC 95

COMMENT:

FOR



JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

Cleared by phrc
12/20

Stanley Roth

Washfax Receipt

Department Of State

B

C

UNCLASSIFIED

Message No. 030240

Classification

No. Pages 2

From: Maura Hartly
(Officer Name)

9/8
(Office symbol)

647-6648
(Extension)

7224
(Room number)

Message Description: Cable to SEOUL: RESPONSE TO DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT
MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM
(9522958)

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	XXXXXXXXXX	456-9461	WHSITRM
	XXXXXXXXXX		
	Executive Secretariat		
	Roth	Uershbow	
	Suettinger	Feeley	

MUST GO ☐

NON-MUST GO ☒

Remarks: Please clear by: COB today, if possible. Leave diff's
slightly from ltt last. Thanks for your help.

NSC POC: _____

S/S Officer: Mury
Maura Hartly

CROSSHATCH

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 6.3

12/20

APPR Done DRAFT Done
CLEAR 1 DR 2 SS/TP
3 MH 4 SSO 5 _____
6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____

ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:JCM
12/18/95 7-8890 SEKGEN 2702
EAP/K:DGBROWN

EAP/K:DRANK
S/S:MHARTY

S/S-C:SSARKIS (PHONE)
S/S-O:GROLSON

ALSO SSC

PRIORITY SEOUL

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, US, KS

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT MESSAGE TO
THE PRESIDENT FROM KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM (9522958)

1. FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD BE
DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT KIM:

BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF
THE BALKAN PEACE TALKS IN DAYTON. THE INITIALING OF THE
PEACE AGREEMENT WAS THE RESULT OF MUCH HARD WORK BY
SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HOLBROOKE AND OUR NEGOTIATING TEAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR
CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS. ULTIMATELY, THE PARTIES
THEMSELVES MADE THE DIFFICULT DECISIONS THAT WERE
NECESSARY TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT AND PAVE THE WAY FOR A
BOSNIA THAT IS STABLE, WHOLE AND DEMOCRATIC.

WE WELCOME THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT IN PARIS AND THE
CHALLENGE POSED BY ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THAT PROCESS

UNCLASSIFIED

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2

WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT, BUT THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE A DURABLE PEACE MUST NOT BE LOST. THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE THE DAYTON AGREEMENTS FULLY IMPLEMENTED. WE EXPECT STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE NATO-LED IMPLEMENTATION FORCE AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN THE RESETTLEMENT, RECONSTRUCTION AND CONCILIATION EFFORT.

I APPRECIATE YOUR EXPRESSION AND LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR CONTINUING COOPERATION WITH THE PEACE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CRITICAL WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT.

2. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT WISHES TO DO SO. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

YY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9507582
RECEIVED: 16 OCT 95 12

TO: SATTERWHITE, DAVID

FILE

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
KOREA NORTH

KOREA SOUTH
MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY RE PAPER ON US - KOREA POLICY

ACTION: LAKE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 19 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ROTH

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY JS DATE 12-20-95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9507582

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ROTH	Z 95101612 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 LAKE	Z 95121818 FOR SIGNATURE
003	X 95122008 LAKE SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 951219 SATTERWHITE, DAVID H

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9507582
RECEIVED: 16 OCT 95 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: SATTERWHITE, DAVID H

DOC DATE: 08 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
KOREA NORTH

KOREA SOUTH
MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKLEY LTR FWD PAPER ON US KOREA POLICY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 19 OCT 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
~~ROTH~~

FOR CONCURRENCE
FAIRFAX
LITWAK
PONEMAN

FOR INFO
WALES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

rec'd 12/19 11:30e
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 7582

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG we A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	<u>2</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor</u> <u>has seen</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u> 12/19	<u>[Signature]</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u> 12/20	<u>[Signature]</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

Natl Sec
has seen
Revised -
Ready for
Signature

Reverse
TABLE

Reverse
(no need for
new gyps)

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1995

Dear David:

I hope you'll excuse this belated response to your letter enclosing your thoughtful paper on U.S.-Korea policy.

I am hopeful that in the wake of the recently concluded LWR contract agreement it might be possible to move forward in some of the areas you suggested in your paper, beginning with the opening of the liaison office. I am much more skeptical, however, about the short-term prospects for replacing the armistice regime with a peace treaty, since this is an issue that needs to be negotiated primarily between the two parties on the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, the North has grown increasingly uninterested in North-South dialogue since the death of Kim Il Sung and this has seriously impaired the prospects not only for a peace treaty but for tension reduction measures on the Peninsula.

Thank you for sharing your views on Korea policy. Best of luck with your post-doctoral studies.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. David H. Satterwhite, Ph.D.
Center for Korean Studies
Institute of East Asian Studies
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

Staff to Stanley Roth

BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO



SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

7582

CENTER FOR KOREAN STUDIES
INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES
TELEPHONE: (510) 642-5674
FAX: (510) 643-7062

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

8 October 1995

Honorable Mr. Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Dear Mr. Lake:

Warmest greetings, with appreciation for your kind words both when we met in April, and in your subsequent note to me in May.

You will note that I have escaped the confines of my small-college posting to Florida -- having resigned my tenure-track appointment at Eckerd College -- and am currently on a postdoctoral fellowship at the Center for Korean Studies, UC-Berkeley. This setting is far more conducive to my research endeavors, and I am pleased to be giving talks both here, and at Harvard in the spring, with research travels to Japan and Korea in the meantime.

Although the remainder of this letter will address concerns over the ongoing situation in Korea, let me mention that I have followed coverage of your own work, and that of the Administration, quite closely. Both as a concerned scholar, and as a member of the Society of Friends (Quakers), I have been particularly impressed with this Administration's serious efforts to promote peaceful solutions to long-standing conflict situations. In this regard, your own travels to the Bosnia-Herzegovina region, and the tenacious efforts of Asst Secretary Holbrooke and his team in recent weeks, are commendable. Similarly, the concerted diplomatic efforts by Secretary of State Christopher in the Middle East, Ambassador Gallucci vis-a-vis the nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula, the Administration's supportive role in the peace process vis-a-vis Northern Ireland, and the principled effort to restore both social order and an elected government in Haiti -- these and others point to an Administration keenly committed to peaceful, long-term solutions. Heartfelt support and congratulations are in order.

On a personal note, I should say that I was quite moved by your own attention to the continuing concerns of families who lost loved ones in the Vietnam War. I had the opportunity to address some of these same issues when, in 1991, I led a group of 34 university students on a month-long sojourn through Vietnam. This was also the first group of American students to visit Laos since the war there ended in 1975, through the kind support and assistance of then-U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Charley Salmon. In short, the travels I directed were a personal effort to promote reconciliation, following years of distance between our respective peoples and governments. I am immensely pleased that your Administration has both ended the embargo and normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam -- these were crucial steps in the long-overdue process of healing wounds from that war.

As you will recall from our meeting and earlier correspondence, I am deeply concerned with the even longer-running tensions on the Korean peninsula. Although I have taken the liberty of enclosing a manuscript now at press, which makes some policy recommendations in its second half, I am mindful that your schedule and duties may prevent you from reading it through, so I raise a point or two below. The manuscript, incidentally, assesses the historical context of the nuclear scare of recent years, while considering what it would take to bring Korea more fully into a "new world order" -- defining the latter at least in part in terms of how well it is able to address the ongoing tensions of the Korean peninsula itself.

You recall that the best known dictum from Clausewitz is that war is but the continuation of diplomacy by other means, a dictum predicated on the good-faith assumption that diplomacy has been seriously tried, but has failed, and that the use of force is a last resort -- regrettable but necessary. In Korea, a state of war in abeyance has been the reality for the past four-plus decades, and Clausewitz has been turned on his head: diplomacy has been attempted only when warfare -- in Korea a perpetual state of armed readiness, fraught with tensions and the potential for renewed hostilities -- has been recognized, or feared, as a debilitating dead end.

The diplomatic accord signed last October with the DPRK, and the subsequent negotiations earlier this year in Kuala Lumpur -- both of which are hard-won successes I support and praise -- are nonetheless successes which mask deeper problems. Trained in U.S. foreign policy, int'l relations, and Northeast Asian politics in particular, I maintain that a more conscious, sustained effort needs to be made to break the historical impasse on the Korean peninsula, through successive steps.

- 1) Moving away from military/security dominance of discourse on present realities and future possibilities.

This is not to ignore or play down legitimate security concerns on the peninsula, but to place into a context of diplomatic negotiations -- pace Clausewitz -- the high-pitch military tensions obtaining there.

- 2) Initiating dialogue on the range of issues pursuant to a workable peace treaty to replace the Armistice.
- 3) Moving expeditiously toward full and mutual diplomatic relations, to facilitate normal channels of state-to-state communication.

As is appropriate in any event, our national technical means would monitor DPRK officials in Washington closely; the mere presence of a U.S. Embassy in P'yongyang, however, can only have a triple positive effect: of permitting immediate dialogue to forestall misunderstandings or miscalculations; of providing first-hand observation (and nuanced interpretations) of events in P'yongyang and its environs; and of restraining inflammatory, anti-American rhetoric on the part of the DPRK leadership, by virtue of an actual American presence.

Each of these steps should be taken in consultation with our allies in the ROK, but under no circumstances allowing a vice-like veto by the ROK over U.S. prestige and policy initiatives. The U.S.-ROK relationship surely is mature enough not to require U.S. deference to every ROK

objection; these, indeed, have been allowed thus far to permanently postpone progress on U.S.-DPRK dialogue and improved relations, symptomatic of an ROK (and U.S. military) "we will win at all costs" war footing, substituting (apologies to Clausewitz), war-winning considerations in the place of diplomacy that would secure the peace.

Note that I have emphasized **U.S. initiatives** in these matters. This represents a break with the past, in which we have been content to react to events -- by the weight of inertia, circumstances, and a lack of political vision or courage on the part of predecessor U.S. administrations. Crises have punctuated long periods of U.S. diplomatic dormancy in Korea -- the crises of 1968, '76, '80, '87, and '91-94 stand out, among others -- much like emergency-room medicine has replaced health maintenance and preventive care in many of America's inner cities.

The Clinton Administration is in the unique position, by virtue of a genuinely more enlightened foreign policy approach geared to negotiating workable, peaceful solutions, to taking the initiative towards peace in Korea. Just as in the recent policy initiatives vis-a-vis Cuba, in which steps toward openness have been matched by firmness on the embargo -- skillfully deflecting opposition from knee-jerk Cold Warriors -- dialogue and the nuclear agreement of the past year have opened a window of opportunity for further initiatives vis-a-vis the DPRK. I would hope that we could act with such vision, rather than await the next crisis.

I have written at some length, for which I apologize, but with a vigor and level of concern for which I offer no apologies. My schedule this year at Berkeley -- bereft of teaching and committee duties -- is such that I could come out to Washington even on short notice, should you find it useful to pursue these themes in conversation, over lunch or a more formal discussion. Quite sincerely, I offer my training and services to the furtherance of U.S. policy in the Northeast Asian region.

Kindly convey my best regards to Ms. Soderberg, from whom I have not heard since my visit in April.

In Highest Esteem,



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NORTH KOREA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

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***A Half-Century of U.S. Korea Policy:
Inching Toward U.S.-DPRK Rapprochement***

The July 1994 death of DPRK President Kim Il-Sung signalled the passing of an era in Korean and global politics. As nemesis of the U.S. longer than any other leader -- personifying the Stalinist enemy image long after the ideology itself had ceased to be a threat -- Kim's demise might have been welcomed in the West with a sense of relief and closure. Instead, his half century at the helm ended just months too soon, for crucial elements of an evolving new order surrounding the peninsula were left unsettled, tantalizingly within reach yet likely to be more difficult to achieve in his absence. The ironies of this situation require explanation. How had an aging dictator, worshiped at home and ridiculed abroad, come to possess the key to Northeast Asian regional security? How had mounting fears of a DPRK nuclear weapons' capability brought the U.S. a step closer to normalization of relations with north Korea after decades of hostility? Despite the Cold War's end elsewhere, however, how might myopic habits -- between rival Korean regimes, and on the part of the U.S. -- doom the peninsula to continued tensions, making a mockery of Korean aspirations for peace and unification?

Recent years have seen a roller-coaster of extremes, ranging from increased tensions and mutual threats of annihilation,¹ to a series of high-level negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK officials, resulting in substantive progress on issues which had not, until recently, seemed to warrant a serious U.S. effort at engaging north

Korea in dialogue. Probing the quandary posed by these hopeful signs amidst still-hostile DPRK-U.S. relations, and suggesting scenarios by which U.S. policymakers could more assertively effect a paradigm shift on the peninsula, aimed at a lasting peace, are the broader aims of this brief essay.

Assessing continuities in U.S. Korea policy over the past half century, particularly as Korea fits into considerations of an "old," "renewed," or transformed world order, concerns us first. The nuclear issue, which in recent years has colored all other aspects of the broader Korea Question, garners separate attention. Very much an outgrowth of the decades-long Korean conflict, the DPRK's alleged effort to acquire a nuclear weapons' capability has served nonetheless as a potent catalyst, focusing renewed global attention on Korea while prompting a thorough reassessment of long-term security calculations on the peninsula and in the region. How the DPRK has forced this rethinking, challenging in the process a precarious status quo long dominated by U.S. military containment policies, is a central issue in our second section. This critical juncture, then -- marked by nuclear fears, Kim Il-Sung's passing, and the need to conceptualize a more durable solution to Korean tensions -- serves as backdrop to our concluding effort to chart a series of suggested U.S. policy initiatives towards Korea.

I. Korea in the "New World Order"

"At this dawn of a new world order..." wrote an ardent Korean nationalist, reflecting hopes arising from decades of hardship endured by the Korean people. His sentence would have fit circumstances well in 1990, given the momentous events then unfolding in the Persian Gulf region and the former Soviet bloc -- events which contributed to a new ordering of global power configurations with the dismantling of the Soviet Union in late 1991. "How might these changes affect the Korean peninsula?" the nationalist could have been asking. Rather, these prescient words were written in July 1945, by none other than Syngman Rhee -- a controversial figure later to emerge as President of

the Republic of Korea -- three weeks before Japan's surrender ended the Pacific War.² The revelry that followed over Korea's liberation from colonial rule was short-lived, however, for the "new world order" of the day arrived with devastating effect: Korea was hastily divided, its hopes for self-rule thwarted, and its polarized politics skewed further by U.S. and Soviet regimes in their respective occupation zones.

As illustrated by the foregoing quote from 1945, the concept of a "new world order" deserves consideration in several dimensions, beginning with its historical applicability to Korea. Long before U.S. President George Bush popularized the phrase anew in 1990, setting off an intense discourse on the subject that reverberates to this day, successive efforts by major powers to articulate grand new global designs have had a ravaging effect on Korea. Early in the century, for instance, the promise of "self-determination of peoples" -- a key element in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's own "quest for a new world order"³ -- would inspire hope and great courage among the Korean people when, in 1919, they rose up to demand independence from Japan's harsh colonial rule. Little did they know at the time that promises of deliverance did not extend to Korea, for the U.S. was bound by the terms of an earlier, colonial pact -- the secret Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, which had recognized Japan's "rights" over Korea in return for unimpeded U.S. dominance over the Philippines. Brutally suppressed by Japan in 1919, the Koreans went on to suffer until their momentary liberation in 1945, Wilson's eloquence and the emerging League of Nations' "new world order" notwithstanding.

A second externally imposed order ties in with the first. Just as the fascists of Italy and Germany's Third Reich had visions of a new global design, and sought to supplant the old, colonial, balance-of-power order with their own,⁴ Japan, too, had sought to remake its part of the world in its own image. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, although belatedly conceived and cynically applied as a popular alternative to Western colonial domination, symbolized an "order" Japan was prepared to enforce throughout Asia, had it

triumphed in the war. Korea had already experienced this "co-prosperity" firsthand, in a colonial regime noted for its intensity. It is in this context that domestic and expatriate nationalists such as Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, Kim Kyu-Shik, and Cho Man-Shik, as well as socialist leaders including Yo Un-Hyong, Pak Hon-Yong, and Kim Il-Sung -- with no less impeccable nationalist credentials -- vociferously resisted the permanent subjugation of Korea to the Asian version of the Axis powers' world order. Japan's defeat, albeit at the hands of the Allied powers rather than through a self-fought "war of national liberation," provided an opportunity for contending visions to surface. In his July 1945 letter Rhee had given voice to a "new world order" to be facilitated and dominated by the U.S. This, despite the peninsula's division, was largely what Korea got.

The immensely complex politics of Korea in August 1945, and the geopolitical calculations for Korea's future as discussed by the Allied powers prior to war's end, have been presented in lucid detail in recent decades.⁵ Two facets are germane to our discussion. First is the "grand design for a new world order" envisioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt;⁶ second is the early imposition of Cold War rivalries on Korea by Roosevelt's successor, President Harry Truman, in a more narrowly conceived "order" than that envisioned by FDR's internationalism. Neither plan, however, respected the Korean people's capacity to determine their own future, for Korea itself had taken on significance in the emerging U.S. and Soviet-dominated global order beyond that which could be entrusted to the Korean people.

The Roosevelt approach challenged the existing order of colonial empires, incurring the hostility of Great Britain and France in the process. The vehicle by which to accomplish FDR's objectives -- which were to foster "eventual" self-government, and to supplant colonial control with a U.S.-dominated system of political and economic "access," more properly seen as fostering a new dependency on the U.S. -- was trusteeship.⁷ Conceived as a decades-long process of tutelage, trusteeship incurred the wrath of the Korean people, for it

suggested explicitly that they were not yet capable of managing their own independence and self-government. Roosevelt's death, Truman's ascendance, and the rapid emergence of Cold War antagonisms "saved" Korea from trusteeship, only to impose a different, wrenching fate in the form of division and the seeds of an ongoing civil war.

While Roosevelt had sought to "incorporate the Soviet Union" through a shared administration of trusteeship, thereby restraining the Soviets while simultaneously ensuring U.S. dominance in a new hegemonic order,⁸ Truman (and his successors) came to prefer more overt containment instruments. A race was on to prevent Soviet domination of Korea, to divide the peninsula in a manner assuring U.S. advantage, and to foster an anti-Communist, pro-American leadership in the U.S. zone of military occupation. Declassified U.S. documents are clear on this process, including the crucial U.S. proposal that Korea be divided,⁹ the dynamics by which the Left was systematically excluded and suppressed in the American sector, and the heightened sense that the U.S., in Korea, was "... in an ideological battleground upon which [America's] entire success in Asia may depend."¹⁰ Its perceived adversary in this battle was none less than a "plan of conquest... [by] Communist imperialism... to control all Asia from the Kremlin."¹¹

The Cold War's early impact on Korea was soon to be matched by a divided Korea's deepening of the Cold War. At each turn, the U.S. found reason to suspect Soviet intentions, while failing to reflect on its own actions in like manner. Thus, while U.S. President Truman would learn from a trusted personal advisor, in June of 1946, that "...[i]t is clear from the actions of the Soviets that they have no immediate intention of withdrawing from Korea,"¹² Truman could write to his Secretary of War in early August, barely a month later -- based on advice several months in the making -- "I am convinced that we may be required to stay in Korea a considerable length of time."¹³ Similarly, an accusatory finger was pointed at Soviet efforts to set up a sympathetic party and northern government, "... riding rough-shod over all political factions which might oppose or even question" their

actions,¹⁴ yet the U.S. was engaged in an identical process, having favoured certain parties and politicians while suppressing others,¹⁵ and having secretly discussed, just weeks prior to the 1946 accusation above, "... hold[ing] elections immediately in southern Korea" as a step towards a separate southern regime.¹⁶

Separate regimes were to emerge in southern and northern Korea in August and September 1948, respectively, after the U.S. took the initiative in handing the "Korea Question" over to the United Nations in 1947. How the U.N. was utilized for U.S. purposes is an important dimension of the post-WWII order, but one we will not explore in depth at present. Suffice it to say that U.S. global interests could be pursued through a domination of the U.N., particularly by overriding Soviet objections through the use of the General Assembly. How the fledgling regime in northern Korea was perceived by the U.S. is, however, directly germane to more recent portrayals of the DPRK in the "new" world order of the 1990s. The CIA would summarize official U.S. thinking in June 1950, just a week prior to the Korean War's outbreak, in these words:

The "Democratic People's Republic" of northern Korea is a firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.¹⁷

Being convinced of "... the fiction of northern Korean independence"¹⁸ -- indeed, going to the point of seeing Kim Il-Sung as no more than a "Korean stooge" of the Kremlin¹⁹ -- it was a logical assumption that the Korean War itself had been instigated by the Soviet Union, as evidence -- in the words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson -- of Moscow's "Communist imperialist aims in Asia."²⁰ With the Chinese Communist Party's victory in 1949, and subsequent PRC military participation in support of the DPRK, moreover, the Korean War placed Korea center-stage in U.S. policy, both as bulwark against further encroachment, and as a linchpin in the post-WWII "new" -- now "old" -- world order.

U.S. perceptions of Kim Il-Sung as a puppet on Soviet strings are revealing in several ways. First, to peg Korean communists as mere

instruments of Moscow failed to reflect what the U.S. already knew: that the Korean communists had fought tenaciously in a nationalist struggle against Japan, earning them popular legitimacy as patriots, and that Korea, in 1945, was on the verge of a social revolution. The latter is attested to by numerous internal sources at the time. Ambassador Pauley, for instance, reported that conditions were ripe: "Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere in the world."²¹ Another insider reported that "early opinion surveys by the American Military Government established that a majority of the Korean people favored a socialist economy."²² In the context of widespread "People's Committee" activities throughout the peninsula in 1945-1946,²³ Korea as a whole is likely to have adopted a socialist model of distribution and development had not the U.S. so forcefully intervened. In that sense, Kim Il-Sung -- together with many other communists -- more accurately reflected Korean sentiments and realities at the time than the official U.S. version of events lets on. As a result, the local application of the U.S.-conceived "order" in Asia meant taking sides within Korea, suppressing in the process widely held sentiments calling for socio-economic and political change.

A second revealing aspect of U.S. portrayals of Kim Il-Sung is comparative: if Kim was perceived as being manipulated from behind the scenes at the Soviet's whim, were the Soviet handlers having any better luck than U.S. handlers of its own dictator, Syngman Rhee? The now declassified record shows U.S. exasperation over Rhee's "obstinacy," "recalcitrance," "unpredictability," "irrationality," "intransigence," and "willingness to strain U.S.-ROK relations," among a litany of other complaints.²⁴ These would even lead, in 1953, to U.S. plans to seize Rhee and replace his "authoritarian" government, which was acknowledged to be a "police state," "dominated by the personality of its President."²⁵ Despite these endearing qualities, Rhee went on dictating -- both to the people of the ROK, and to the U.S. government, the latter as dependent on Rhee as the reverse²⁶ -- until his ouster by "people power" in 1960.

While we await a more thorough account of Soviet archival perceptions of Kim Il-Sung, we know that this relationship, too, was often strained. We also know that Kim went on to skillfully play the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and to outlive the Soviet Union itself by several years. The early U.S. image of Kim, then, as a marionette extension of Soviet policy, served U.S. policy-makers poorly the longer it persisted; once in place, however, the "new world order" assessment was highly resistant to change. Recognizing Kim Il-Sung earlier as the master of his own fate, with a legitimating nationalism and, for Koreans, a popular ideology of self-reliance, would have enabled an earlier dialogue and reduction of tensions, in Korea's and the U.S. interest.

A third perception stems from the foregoing: that Kim Il-Sung -- with Soviet backing -- bears full blame for the origins of the Korean War. Simply stated, the Korean War started long before June 25, 1950. Military preparations had occasionally flared into hostilities from at least a year earlier, and both sides were increasingly committed to reunification through force of arms -- Rhee threatening on many occasions to "march north." Had he acquired sufficient arms first, it is likely Rhee would have initiated the war; as it happened, however, the north completed its preparations early and struck decisively in 1950, strengthened by the presence of battle-hardened Koreans who had fought with Mao in the Chinese civil war. The rest is not just "history," however, for it was the U.S. that repeatedly had to restrain Rhee, first from prolonging the war in 1953, and later from unilaterally recommencing the war in order finally to unify the peninsula on terms he would hope to dictate.²⁷ With the origins and legacies of the Korean War now more thoroughly researched and understood, the official myth that Kim Il-Sung "started" or "caused" the war should have been laid to rest decades ago; the origins lie more in Korea's arbitrary division by the superpowers, as a cog in the U.S. attempt to call the shots in its emerging "new world order" of 1945.

We have focused on historical details from the 1945-1950 period to illustrate the following: Kim Il-Sung and the new DPRK had taken on all the qualities crucial to a potent "enemy image" by this

time, fitting integrally into a more global perception of the Soviet Union and Communism as the larger enemy to be restrained by the U.S.-led system. The Korean War was to confirm these perceptions, solidifying in the process the parameters of the "new world order" as it applied to Asia. Japan and south Korea would be protected at all cost; the Soviet Union and China would be restrained; and the U.N. would serve as the legitimating international watchdog of "order" on the Korean peninsula. North Korea, in this calculus, would remain "the enemy" in active limbo, ignored diplomatically yet utilized fully as the aggressive foe requiring constant vigilance.

The Armistice of 1953, then, and the militarized standoff at the 38° parallel, have served in the maintenance of what has now become the "old" world order. Revision of that order would, in subsequent decades, be held hostage to progress on inter-Korean dialogue, with the U.S. abjuring a leadership role which might have amended the order's parameters to account for changes afoot internationally. Similarly, U.S. policy was dominated by military considerations; these, in turn, fed on the enemy image solidified during the Korean War. Lest the "order" be misunderstood to have been benign, however -- holding the line against an aggressive north, always portrayed as seeking the violent overthrow of the southern Republic -- the mirror image should be kept in mind. Not only had the line been crossed in the autumn of 1950, when U.N. forces sought during the Korean War to reunify the peninsula through force of arms; official -- if secret -- U.S. policy in succeeding decades remained the overthrow of the north Korean regime. One finds, for instance -- thanks to an otherwise cautious censorship process in the declassification of U.S. documents -- records of the National Security Council from December 1960 in which action is authorized to "[e]ncourage the ROK Government to promote and support covert activities in north Korea designed to further anti-communist aims."²⁸ It will likely take years to learn how extensive these U.S.-supported efforts were, symptomatic of an activist, destabilizing dimension of the U.S.-led "world order."

Given the foregoing discussion, it came as no surprise to find the "new world order" of 1990 applied to the Korean peninsula, and enunciated forcefully by U.S. Gen. Robert RisCassi, then-Commander of the U.S., U.N., and U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command in south Korea. In May, 1991, just months after the bombing of Baghdad, and in a pointed reference to the DPRK's suspected nuclear weapons' program, an interview with Gen. RisCassi yielded the following:

... the swiftness with which the U.S. reacted in the Middle East, the speed with which a multinational coalition was formed and the ability of the U.S. and South Korea to conduct the large Team Spirit military exercise in South Korea during the Gulf War were object lessons for the Korean peninsula. "I don't think those three aspects were lost on Kim Il-Sung."²⁹

To the "rogue" states of the world -- a term applied to a short list, including north Korea³⁰ -- the message was clear. Their behavior, even if less destabilizing than Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, would be subject to unilateral interpretation and multilateral action. In addition, the guarantors of global order would command the airwaves as well, seeking thereby to frame the issues and influence the international debate, through a preponderant access to the established Western media. Seen in this light, the message of the "new" world order was -- and largely remains -- a bellicose, threatening set of intrusive "orders" to those portrayed as potential threats to the world order. It is noteworthy that, in addition to numerous retorts from P'yongyang, the People's Republic of China issued spirited statements, on its own and others' behalf, "concerned" by the new world order concept for "pay[ing] more attention to the role of big and developed countries, avoiding the [global] North-South problem." "Obviously," continued a carefully worded *Beijing Review* piece in late 1991, the post-Gulf War U.S. proposal was "... to create a structure and world order that can maintain [the] U.S. dominant position and promote U.S. interests in the world."³¹

This was not a position taken by the PRC or DPRK alone. Similar expressions of caution came from European capitals as well, with the

Economist capturing these sentiments over the course of 1991. "The Gulf War," it reported in September, "showed that the commanding heights of ... power are still the monopoly of a few advanced countries, in some instances of America alone."³² In contrast to voices from the U.S. proclaiming a "best hope ... in American strength and will, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them,"³³ the *Economist* spoke of the need "... to draw up some rules for self-restraint," reminding its (global) readership that "... one man's intervention is often another man's aggression."³⁴ These might have been comforting words in P'yongyang for, in November of 1991, it was reported that the U.S. Secretary of State would be "spreading the new world order" to Asia, expecting, on the one hand, "Japan to do more to build the new world order," while simultaneously "... assembling both a case and a coalition against ... North Korea" over the latter's suspected nuclear weapons' program.³⁵ Given U.S. Korea policy from 1945, and the U.S.'s skillful assembly of a U.N. coalition to fight in Korea in 1950, the more recent efforts from 1991 suggest not a "new," but a "renewed" world order in Asia.

Before turning our attention more centrally to the nuclear issue, we provide a less cynical, somewhat more appreciative perspective on the "new" world order following 1990. Although cautions remain valid over an unrestrained U.S. hegemony in a unipolar -- increasingly multipolar -- world, the end of the Cold War has also opened a window of opportunity. In the place of nuclear and ideological rivalries, one detects more carefully reasoned arguments and diplomatic initiatives from all parties involved in Korea issues, including the U.S. Thus, from the window being only slightly ajar in 1988, when the U.S. and DPRK sat down in Beijing for a series of low-level diplomatic discussions, to the more recent intensive and high-level talks in Geneva, New York, Berlin, and P'yongyang, the long-dormant potential for tension-reducing negotiations has finally begun to materialize. In the process of a first-ever willingness on the part of the United States to discuss a full and interconnected range of issues with the DPRK, aimed clearly at avoiding confrontation on the peninsula over the

nuclear issue, one can suggest that the "world order" is starting to be conceived of anew.

II. Nuclear Poker: Bluff or The Bomb?

With multiple crises elsewhere threatening the foundations of the post-Cold War "new world order," a global sigh of relief could be sensed October 21, 1994, when the U.S. and the DPRK initialed an agreement on north Korea's nuclear program. The terms, while worrisome to hard-line Western critics of the regime in P'yongyang,³⁶ are significant. First, they provide a constructive alternative, both to the climate of mutual sabre-rattling of recent years, and to the graphite-moderated reactors upon which the DPRK's nuclear program currently depends. Second, they provide breathing room for the DPRK economy, providing an infusion of petroleum energy resources to offset former Soviet assistance. Just as importantly, the agreed-upon energy assistance forestalls near-term economic collapse in the DPRK, and the greater *disorder* in the region such a collapse is likely to produce.

Third, the agreement signifies a diplomatic breakthrough. Vigilant, hostile foes, the U.S. and the DPRK are nonetheless launched on a course of negotiations, confidence-building, and -- barring unforeseen difficulties in the process now underway -- eventual diplomatic recognition.³⁷ How narrowly had a more serious conflict been avoided, how close to a nuclear capability had north Korea come, and how fundamentally has the nuclear scare altered the international, diplomatic calculus in the region, particularly between the Korean states and the United States? These and other questions are deserving of careful attention now that the more pressing crisis appears to have been averted with the 1994 Agreement.

To begin, one must recognize that no solid proof ever emerged that the DPRK had actually assembled a workable nuclear device, or that it was close to having done so. Indeed, multiple inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), between 1992 and

the mid-1970s -- with a continuing, low-key program and technical capabilities at present.⁴¹ The fourth is the publicized concern in the early 1990s that the DPRK, too, was seeking a nuclear device.

Nuclear brinksmanship was first engaged in by the U.S. during the Korean War. Unlike the DPRK's own "sea of fire" warnings in 1994, however, the U.S. had the actual destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five years earlier to back up its 1950-51 threats against P'yongyang, going so far as to fly solitary B-29 aircraft high over the north Korean capital in "simulated atomic bombing runs," sending an unmistakable message to the DPRK leadership.⁴² Halliday and Cumings have documented the extensive consideration given in U.S. policy-making circles to the use of atomic weapons against north Korea and China, beginning just weeks into the Korea War. In addition to the simulated atomic bombings of P'yongyang in September 1951, now-declassified materials show the deployment of atomic weapons to forward positions near Korea, and the preparations made to employ them at various stages in the war.⁴³ Had all of this remained a secret, one might, in hindsight, dismiss the atomic option as one of numerous contingencies never employed. That President Truman publicly threatened the use of atomic weapons as early as November 1950, however,⁴⁴ followed in the next two years by American military and political figures repeating the threat both in private and in public, should be seen as having forcefully injected the nuclear weapons' spectre into all subsequent considerations of renewed conflict in Korea.⁴⁵

The second phase follows soon after the first, and is inextricably linked to it. Not only had tensions persisted on the peninsula after the Armistice of 1953, but pressures had built up considerably between the U.S. and its tempestuous ally, ROK President Rhee. How the U.S. might reduce its defence burden in the south in response to its own military and budgetary needs, simultaneously strengthen the ROK defence posture, yet also avoid an untoward empowerment of Rhee -- with which he would be tempted anew to threaten unification by force -- were complex issues that were debated by the Eisenhower

administration throughout the 1954-56 period. By mid-1957 the course had been determined: ROK requests for modernized military equipment would be honored, restrictive clauses in the 1953 Armistice would be formally repudiated in order to facilitate this modernization,⁴⁶ and U.S. forces would also be "modernized" -- through the deployment of nuclear weapons.⁴⁷

Before its later policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the presence of nuclear weapons was fully articulated, the U.S. publicly announced its intention to introduce such weapons to the ROK on July 16, 1957, and on January 29, 1958, it further announced the actual deployment of nuclear weapons by U.S. Forces in south Korea.⁴⁸ For the ensuing thirty-three years, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons -- as the only such weapons on the peninsula -- was an open secret: known in military circles, and certainly by the DPRK, yet increasingly kept out of public discourse in the U.S. and ROK. The doctrine of deterrence served as ample justification to the U.S. for their deployment, yet their very presence, and the manner in which battlefield exercises practiced their probable use, were perceived by the DPRK as overt, nuclear-backed threats to its very existence. "One side's deployment," to paraphrase the *Economist's* point, above, "was perceived by the other as nuclear aggression." Seen in this light, the military stand-off on the Korean peninsula since the 1950s has embodied a basic imbalance, on an order of magnitude far greater than the more publicly debated question of relative troop strengths. Phase Two, then, has carried with it the very real potential for a nuclear arms race in Korea, both as a natural corollary to the conventional arms race underway there, and as an explicable -- even predictable -- response to the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons.⁴⁹

Given the above, Phase Three of the Korean nuclear issue might well have been a "self-reliant" response by the DPRK to rectify the imbalance; indeed, it is known that a north Korean nuclear program got underway in the early 1960s, and that, following the establishment in 1964 of the Atomic Energy Research Institute, a Soviet-supplied research reactor was completed in 1965.⁵⁰ These facts

notwithstanding, the third phase is more accurately seen as a south Korean effort to acquire the bomb, in an ironic twist on the arms race and U.S. nuclear weapons' deployment in Korea. The ROK nuclear program predated that of the DPRK by several years, beginning in 1956 with the conclusion of the U.S.-ROK Atomic Energy Agreement.⁵¹ A south Korean research reactor was completed in 1962,⁵² followed by an aggressive nuclear power program that by the early 1990s provided the ROK with nine working nuclear reactors supplying roughly forty percent of south Korea's electricity. Plans for numerous additional reactors, including a plutonium-fueled reactor to go on-line by the year 2011,⁵³ make south Korea's nuclear program one of the most ambitious in the world.

From 1968 to 1976, the ROK government sought quite deliberately to move from its early nuclear power program, to acquire expertise in the full nuclear fuel cycle, including the acquisition of nuclear reprocessing technology and, significantly, a nuclear weapons' capability. The initial decision in 1969 to study fuel cycle requirements appeared a logical corollary, coming soon after the 1968 decision to open bids on south Korea's first nuclear power plant. Within a year, however, political considerations led to a major shift of emphasis, after it became known early in 1970 that the U.S. planned a sizable reduction in its troop level stationed in the ROK. Although this was to have been matched by a long-term plan to modernize ROK forces, the troop reduction news caused "... alarm over [the ROK's] security and perception of a lessening of U.S. commitment" to the Republic's defence.⁵⁴

A former high-ranking member of the south Korean government's Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC) -- a "covert, ad hoc governmental committee responsible to the [presidential] Blue House"⁵⁵ -- told U.S. investigators that in 1970 "the WEC voted unanimously to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons."⁵⁶ Only concerted U.S. government pressure between 1974 and 1976 succeeded in getting south Korea to cancel its plans to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France, not long after south Korean

President Park Chung-Hee, reacting to the hasty U.S. retreat from Vietnam in April 1975, was quoted as saying "... Seoul would be forced to develop its own nuclear capability if the United States withdrew its nuclear shield."⁵⁷ According to Peter Hayes' seminal work on the subject, in addition to an increased public commitment to south Korea's defence, the hidden price the U.S. agreed to pay for forcing cancellation of the ROK's reprocessing plans included an increased incorporation of the ROK military into U.S. nuclear contingency plans for the Korean peninsula.⁵⁸

Although the ROK was forced by an alarmed U.S. to back down from its plans for an independent nuclear capability, the whole episode had direct salience to more recent nuclear tensions on the peninsula. First, the 1953 ROK-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty notwithstanding, the ROK felt justified in pursuing its nuclear option as a legitimate last resort, pursuant to its own national security interests. Second, the ROK embarked on this course despite pressures to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's provisions: pressures which led the ROK to ratify the NPT in March of 1975 when, despite the formality, the ROK had not yet given up its efforts to acquire a reprocessing capability. Third, the ROK achieved its national interests vicariously -- even without acquiring the bomb -- by forcing the U.S. to strengthen the alliance and its security commitment to the ROK. Throughout, by virtue of its sizable nuclear program, south Korea has maintained a distinct advantage over north Korea in the nuclear arena, and has retained the technical capability necessary to produce a workable nuclear device in roughly one to two years, should it decide at some later date to do so.⁵⁹ In short, in the highly charged setting of hostile regimes on a militarized peninsula, the potential for a nuclear-armed ROK has, perforce, loomed large in the eyes of its rival to the north.

The foregoing paragraphs provide a context by which to briefly assess the much publicized nuclear program of the DPRK in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and the nuclear weapons' potential of that program. Phase Four in these nuclear considerations can

appropriately be seen, we argue, as a DPRK reaction, both to decades of hostilities involving a direct (U.S.) or potential (ROK) nuclear threat to its existence, and to the increasing isolation experienced by the DPRK in the past decade. Whether one assumes that a nuclear weapon was actually in the making, or that the DPRK leadership wished merely to signal its long-term capability to do so, the pivotal issue is to understand the perceived national interests of the DPRK in the whole process.

Stated succinctly, those national interests begin -- as for any other nation-state -- with security from external attack or from internal, regime-threatening disorder. A series of developments involving its own allies signalled to "self-reliant" north Korea, ironically, the pressing necessity of being even more self-reliant than in the past. These events included Soviet and then Chinese diplomatic recognition of the ROK; termination -- by virtue of the Soviet Union's collapse -- of a retaliatory nuclear umbrella theoretically protecting the DPRK; and China's unmistakable process of "going soft on capitalism" in its headlong effort to industrialize. Faced with an increasingly powerful rival in the south, moreover -- the latter bolstered by a hostile and nuclear-equipped U.S. -- and by a weakened alliance structure of its own, the DPRK quite naturally would have sought the means by which to preserve its own national security. From a purely realpolitik perspective, then, north Korea is likely to have considered a nuclear weapons' capability in its own defence. This was predicted as an eminently conceivable scenario by Ha's careful application of world order theory to the Korean states over a decade ago.⁶⁰

Western intelligence agencies would have been remiss in not considering such scenarios and calculating the probabilities of the DPRK "going nuclear." Policy-makers with access to this intelligence, in turn, should have been considering steps by which to reduce the tensions and perceived threats which could predictably lead the DPRK to seek nuclear weapons. In this context, the ROK's own nuclear efforts between 1970 and 1975 should, at the very least, have raised

serious warning flags regarding north Korea's long-range perceptions; if U.S.-allied south Korea would actively move in that direction, why would the perceived "enemy" in Korea not also seek to do so, particularly when the DPRK's military intelligence could be assumed to be increasingly aware of southern nuclear capabilities and intentions? We do not know whether U.S. intelligence analysed these probabilities; we sense, however, that the U.S. "enemy image" of north Korea would have blinded military and civilian strategists alike to the DPRK's perceptions of its own legitimate national security interests.⁶¹

Given the immense expense of a nuclear weapons' program, however, and the propaganda value to the DPRK of its decades-long "nuclear-free Korea" proposal,⁶² how might these competing national interests -- a viable economy (ensuring a more supportive population), and a claim both to legitimacy and the moral high ground on the nuclear question -- be furthered as well? In this regard, a paradoxical strategy pursued by the DPRK for well over a decade needs to be considered, seeking as it did to improve relations with the U.S., reduce the level of military tensions on the peninsula, and end the U.S. economic embargo -- all geared to a practical national interest: the economic survival of north Korea. The paradox is at several levels. At one level, the state behaviour of the DPRK, including sponsorship of terrorist attacks on the ROK, raised rather than lowered tensions. At a second level, decades of hostility had conditioned all parties in the conflict to see proposals -- notably the north's calls for mutual troop reductions and a nuclear-free Korea -- as no more than disingenuous public relations and propaganda. Third, the success of this strategy would require changes at home in the DPRK, not only due to decades of anti-U.S. conditioning, but due also to the anticipated impact on the DPRK's public of significantly increased external trade, flying in the face of self-reliant economic development with tightly controlled foreign trade. Fourth, and most importantly, how might the objective of improved relations with the U.S. be rectified with the possible discovery of a secret nuclear-weapons' program?

The DPRK appears to have pursued a dual-track strategy. In numerous forums throughout the 1980s, it sought to engage the U.S. in substantive dialogue, publicly signalling room for compromise on earlier DPRK demands, for instance, that U.S. troops be removed from Korean soil as a precondition for talks.⁶³ The U.S. response was predictably negative, basing its objections on the need for the DPRK to first engage the ROK in substantive dialogue, so as not to undermine U.S.-ROK alliance solidarity. This same logic could have been applied to the ROK by the DPRK's allies, as the ROK maneuvered to engage the Soviet Union, first, and then China, in normalization talks; in the event, normalization proceeded without such interruption. As with earlier perceptions by the U.S. cited above, blind to the mirror-image inconsistencies of its own policies, the U.S. held firm, unwilling to treat seriously with the DPRK on a one-to-one basis. Direct, low level talks commenced only after ROK President Roh Tae-Woo publicly called upon allies in 1988 to engage in dialogue with the DPRK.

Had the DPRK's own early efforts at dialogue borne fruit, together with its promotion of a nuclear-free Korea, the benefits to the DPRK would have been substantial. North Korea would have retained the moral high ground in a principled opposition to nuclear weapons; the only such weapons to be physically removed from Korea would be those of the U.S.; the DPRK would have saved itself the considerable expense of nuclear-related investments; and its own national security would have been inestimably enhanced. This need not have been seen as a zero-sum game, in which benefits to the DPRK were inevitably at the expense of U.S. and ROK interests. Rather, a more secure DPRK would have enabled tensions to be diminished on the peninsula, and what tensions that persisted would not be overshadowed by a trip-wire nuclear spectre. These could have been accomplished, in turn, without weakening the U.S.-ROK Security Treaty in the slightest. Finally, long-term Korean interests would have been served by reducing the perceived need of a frightened and insecure DPRK from turning to nuclear weapons for security.

Unfortunately, as Hayes has pointed out,⁶⁴ nuclear weapons had become too central to U.S. military planning contingencies in Korea. We argue, further, that military calculations had become far too weighty in U.S. policy considerations, with a concomitant abnegation of intelligent, forward-looking diplomacy.⁶⁵ Clausewitzian strategy had, in a sense, been turned on its head: diplomacy was relegated to the last resort, after military tensions had been permitted to rise to a feverish pitch, making peace all but unattainable.

The second track in DPRK strategy can be seen as a fall-back, less than optimal, reactive, expensive, and highly risky pursuit of a nuclear weapons' capability. Already tenuous Soviet support evaporated, together with its nuclear umbrella. The economic contest with the south turned into a rout, with the DRPK falling exponentially behind. Diplomatic initiatives appeared to have fallen on deaf ears, while Team Spirit and other U.S.-ROK military preparations in the south gave the impression that only might mattered. The Bomb -- or the bluff of the bomb -- loomed large as a justifiable national security device. "Justifiable" in this context deserves discussion, however, for we have argued elsewhere that nuclear weapons in Korea -- whether U.S., ROK, or DPRK -- cannot be condoned or justified.⁶⁶ The term is used, rather, in a realpolitik assessment of national security interests. In this sense, virtually no one questions the justification Japan would make for moving rapidly to a nuclear weapons' capability, should either or both of the Korean states acquire nuclear weapons. Destabilizing as such a proliferation would appear, it would also seem understandable and even inevitable that Japan would move in that direction -- Japan's Peace Constitution and Non-Nuclear Principles notwithstanding -- if it felt threatened by Korean weapons. The DPRK has, for nearly half a century, lived with a greater and demonstrated nuclear threat to its very existence. Given the failure of its earlier efforts, the DPRK may finally have felt justified in pursuing the nuclear option.

As international attention came to be focused on north Korea's nuclear program between 1989 and 1994, peaking in 1993 and 1994 with a heightened possibility that war would resume on the peninsula

(unless the DPRK backed down), we argue that an important shift occurred in DPRK -- and U.S. -- thinking. From the U.S. perspective, the prospect of a nuclear-free Korea became an attractive, worthwhile goal only when the DPRK appeared on the verge of breaking the U.S. nuclear monopoly on the peninsula.⁶⁷ The DPRK, in turn, stood to achieve its national interest objectives with or without the bomb, in the process of bluffing the world community into thinking its bomb-making efforts were about to materialize. Prolonging the uncertainty, then, while drawing the U.S. into progressively more substantive discussions, could obviate the very necessity for nuclear weapons. Could the DPRK achieve its interests by giving up its alleged nuclear ambitions, just as the ROK had vicariously benefited in 1975-76 by yielding to U.S. anti-proliferation pressures?

The month-by-month, often daily chronology of developments in U.S.-DPRK negotiations has been chronicled well elsewhere.⁶⁸ With the October 1994 Agreement in place, however, we may reflect on the process and its outcome. First, north Korea has halted work on the nuclear reactors and reprocessing of spent fuel rods that had caused its neighbours and the West such concern, and has continued to grant IAEA inspectors access to its declared nuclear facilities, as part of its obligations under the NPT and related safeguards agreement. In turn, this has breathed a second chance into efforts for the NPT itself to gain international renewal. The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993, and from the IAEA in June 1994 -- both subsequently reversed -- had been interpreted as a rallying cry for many near-nuclear nations to lobby for an end in 1995 to the NPT altogether. The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreement, then, had a salutary effect on the proliferation regime largely writ, and on the DPRK's nuclear activities specifically. As a result, the U.S. and its allies gained a more responsive counterpart in northern Korea, pledged to abide by international rules regarding nuclear matters.

For its part, the DPRK has emerged with the bulk of its national security interests intact. Despite an ongoing military standoff and level of tensions unparalleled anywhere in the world, north Korea

today has a less threatened existence, by virtue of the U.S. withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from Korean soil, a joint ROK-DPRK denuclearization declaration, and the 1994 Agreement's economic assistance component. Most significantly, DPRK objectives to be taken seriously, to be dealt with as an independent and sovereign nation-state, and to be negotiated with as an equal across the table from the U.S., have been accomplished as a direct result of the DPRK's handling of the nuclear fears of recent years. None of these signifies that the DPRK has worked its way off of the West's "rogue" list, and the negotiated posture of the moment is tenuous, conditional both on meticulous adherence to the Agreement's terms, and on the absence of serious destabilizing incidents. It does mean, however, that Phase Four of the nuclear question in Korea could very well be the last, having paved the way for an agreed-upon denuclearization of the peninsula in the context of broader talks on the future of U.S.-Korean relations. Ironies abound, but "bluff" or "the bomb," the situation in Korea has been brought back from the brink.

III. Diplomatic Divide: Choosing Between Militarized Momentum and a New Korea in the World Order

The Cold War's deep freeze in Korea has, through the highly charged events of recent years, finally begun to thaw. How rapidly might the next steps be taken toward reconciliation; how thoroughly might the era be conceived of anew; yet what forces might yet intervene to postpone the paradigm shift now so close at hand? In this concluding section we probe the crucial policy choices and opportunities now presenting themselves, suggesting in the process a set of reciprocal strategies the U.S. and Korean states should pursue. The resulting rapprochement could, if successful, serve as linchpin in a more pacific and prosperous region, and could signal a more meaningfully "new" order. We would go so far as to say, however, that absent a peaceful resolution in Korea, all claims to a new world order will ring hollow. If squandered or derailed, the moment could also make a mockery of the "new," serving up instead a "renewed old order," lacking in vision, initiative, and courage.

To begin, we would note the progress that has been made to date, all the more remarkable given intransigent hostilities since the mid-1940s. Images of polished, well-spoken negotiators, emerging with palpable satisfaction and mutual respect from difficult talks over the nuclear issue, for instance, or of a friendly embrace between former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the late DPRK President Kim Il-Sung, stand in sharp contrast to decades of blistering recriminations and hostile posturing on both sides. The late 1994 partial lifting of restrictions on U.S. business transactions with the DPRK, and the early 1995 opening of direct U.S. telephone services -- partial outcomes of the October 1994 Agreement -- are further illustrations of a willingness to engage the DPRK anew, putting into motion a range of contacts not easily undone. Each of these is momentous. Combined, the picture of a U.S. diplomatic mission in P'yongyang, or even of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State being dispatched to the DPRK capital for direct talks with his north Korean counterparts -- seeking thereby to defuse a new crisis in December 1994 ⁶⁹-- owes its success to the near-miss nuclear tensions of the early 1990s. This is intensely ironic, for the militarized momentum on the peninsula had spawned the DPRK's nuclear program in the first place, and the outcome of these tensions might just as predictably have led to a second Korean War.⁷⁰

In the north, the central role of the Korean Workers' Party -- and of Kim Il-Sung until his death -- have been bolstered by a symbiotic relationship with the Korean People's Army. However threatening this union may have appeared -- or been portrayed -- in the south, the strategic national interests of the north dictated both a disproportionate military share of the DPRK state budget, and considerable military influence in state policy. The decision to "go nuclear" can be seen as a "natural" and direct outgrowth of these dynamics, as we have shown above. We argue further that it will be a delicate process over months and years to come for the DPRK military's role and overriding security concerns to be ameliorated; their preponderant influence can be expected to resurface if the U.S.

or south Korea renew what is perceived by the north to be a threatening, bellicose posture on the peninsula. Party and state leadership in policy matters will prevail in the meantime, but the DPRK's readiness and willingness to go to war again, whatever the cost, should be borne in mind.

This reality leads to several related suggestions. Precisely because its military resolve is unquestioned, yet also because the costs of renewed warfare would be horrendously high,⁷¹ the leadership in the north must retain absolute control over the KPA, and must strenuously commit itself to good-faith negotiations with the U.S. and ROK. In the process, its habitually hostile response to whatever disconcerting external provocation, large or small, must be softened, its more stridently self-righteous, ideological, and isolationist bombast replaced by a nuanced, well-reasoned negotiating style -- as was seen fairly consistently in 1994. Implementation of the 1994 Agreement will require mutual effort, with each side patiently and sincerely earning the other's trust in a climate far more conducive to instinctive mistrust. Knowing full well the DPRK leadership's dogmatic, reactive propensities -- a condition strengthened by decades of hostile standoff -- the U.S. must also, for its part, foster a non-threatening climate of pragmatic dialogue. It, too, must restrain its armed forces from provocative posturing -- long accustomed as they are to dictating security policy from the steely tensions of life "on the Z" in Korea. For U.S. forces, continued tensions on the peninsula are an insidiously comforting status quo from which to be gingerly weaned, coaxed instead into playing a role supportive of diplomatic, tension-reducing efforts.

Having chosen the path of dialogue in 1994, U.S. policy-makers have, to their credit, reversed an immense momentum of U.S. Korea policy, notable for its shortsighted abnegation of a principled leadership role. Several factors conspired to immobilize U.S. policy, even after initiatives for change began to be taken by every other actor in the region. Three such factors worth reiterating are, first, the vice-grip veto granted to south Korea over bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue,

based on the faulty notion that U.S. support for the ROK would be undermined by deliberately divisive negotiation demands put forth by the north. The U.S. security commitment to the ROK is as strong now as ever, such that this argument is itself disingenuous; it assumes, perhaps unwittingly, that the U.S. would not be able to hold firm in negotiations with the DPRK, insisting in the process on concessions from north Korea as the price for improved relations, to balance incentives granted by the U.S. Nonetheless, normal U.S.-DPRK state relations have been held hostage to ROK sensibilities, while the ROK has simultaneously benefited for decades by prolonging U.S.-DPRK hostilities.

Second is the virtual veto long wielded by the U.S. military over Korea policy. Here, too, as we have noted earlier, the logic was faulty: securing the peninsula's stability meant prolonging the war, for to negotiate a peace treaty to replace the Armistice would require extending a semblance of recognition and legitimacy to the enemy. This was anathema to the U.S. military command, hardened in its hatred of its implacable foe to the north, and able to prevail over civilian policy-making by virtue of the military's senior role in security issues since the Korean War.⁷² Since the war has technically never ended, and tensions have remained high throughout, narrow security considerations have been allowed to predominate in U.S. policy circles long after a negotiated peace accord would have provided a far greater sense of security on the peninsula.

Third, U.S. Korea policy has been caught in a limbo born of bureaucratic inertia and domestic political amnesia. Without dynamic foreign policy leadership and a vision for long-term geopolitical reform -- or, alternatively, without a crisis-like jolt from external events -- policies toward such intractable situations as Korea have gone largely unquestioned. U.S. regime changes, too, have bred inertia, for the Republican presidencies of Reagan and Bush sought to maintain an ideological firmness toward the socialist world, while the Democratic presidencies of Carter and Clinton have operated under severe pressure not to appear "soft" toward traditional U.S. foes.

With the juxtaposition of these factors, U.S. policy toward the whole of Korea likely would have remained static for several more years, had it not been for changes initiated by the ROK in 1988, and by the DPRK shortly thereafter. In both instances the U.S. ceded the initiative to others, beginning its low-level dialogue with the DPRK in Beijing only after receiving the green light to do so from ROK President Roh Tae-Woo.⁷³ The DPRK provided the second instance with its feared moves toward a nuclear weapons' capability. Although many now see the West's crisis-like reaction as somewhat overblown and unnecessary -- reflecting more a hiatus in attention paid by the U.S. to changing Korean realities -- the truth of the matter is that the status quo had been shattered; a joker had been dealt into the deck by the DPRK, and the U.S. now has to reconsider its entire game plan. Its military preparedness would, if presented as the single viable solution to this new dimension of the decades-long Korean standoff, likely lead to war. If, instead, the long-term interests of the Korean people were to be kept in mind -- while serving the near-term interest of avoiding another old-order war in a new-world setting -- a more viable solution would have to emerge. Although slow in coming, forced upon U.S. policy-makers in circumstances not of their choosing, the shift to a diplomatic alternative has signalled a dramatic break with the past. What remains to be done, and will this commitment to dialogue last?

Although serious obstacles and potential pitfalls remain, a logical series of steps leads from the 1994 Agreement to a genuinely more stable and peaceful Korea. Whether this means unification will be achieved in the space of years or decades cannot be predicted at this juncture, although the aspiration still appears to burn deeply in the hearts of most Koreans, north and south. The stage has clearly been set for a meaningful reconciliation among the parties involved, including the U.S. and the DPRK. The next steps in this process should be, we suggest, the following, with scenarios depicted as their likely outcome.

Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and DPRK are long overdue and should be established immediately. The pragmatic benefits of normalized relations -- foremost among them the establishment of regular channels for dialogue and crisis resolution -- far outweigh the politicized reasons to delay relations any longer.

Two recent events signal the advantages of diplomatic relations: the December 1994 downing of a U.S. military helicopter in north Korean territory, and the formal opening of diplomatic liaison offices between the U.S. and Vietnam twenty years after the war there ended. With armed forces arrayed against each other in Korea, the slightest incident has the potential of escalating into open warfare. Fortunately, several factors contributed to a peaceful resolution of the late 1994 helicopter incident, including the fortuitous presence of a member of the U.S. House of Representatives in north Korea at the time the chopper went down, mutual U.S. and DPRK intentions to abide by the recently-concluded nuclear agreement, and the willingness of the U.S. to dispatch to P'yongyang a ranking State Department officer for dialogue on the issue.

Commentators at the time noted that the whole affair could have been explosive, yet could also have been handled far more expeditiously if diplomats had already been posted to P'yongyang. We note that the *absence* of a U.S. diplomatic presence increases the risk that an incident of this sort will escalate into open hostilities; further, that the potential exists for elements in the militaries involved -- including the U.S. -- distrustful of the momentum towards a negotiated settlement on the peninsula, to provoke an escalation of tensions through precisely such an incident. The momentum of peaceful dialogue won out in the latest incident, but needs to be consolidated through the normalization of diplomatic relations at the earliest possible moment.

Twenty years after the U.S. hastily departed Saigon, diplomatic relations between Washington and Hanoi have been partially restored.

the U.S.-imposed embargo on Vietnam has been lifted, and decades of trauma in the American psyche and social fabric are finally drawing to a close. Parallels in the hostile relations -- U.S.-Vietnam, U.S.-north Korea -- abound, including bitter wars which the U.S. failed to win, debilitating U.S. trade embargoes, and belated U.S. recognition both of the benefits and imperatives of rapprochement with former enemies. Among lessons to be learned from these parallels, two are particularly instructive. Both Asian foes persevered with immense national pride, neither bending to superior firepower or postwar pressures -- indeed, each becoming more intensely dogmatic in its ideological reaction to U.S. hegemonic demands -- but both also willing to negotiate in good faith when treated with respect. The simple lesson, albeit one difficult for the U.S. to accept, was that big-power pressures will be counterproductive, while reasonable dialogue will more likely yield results -- whether in arranging joint searches for MIA remains in the jungles of Vietnam, for instance, or in addressing nuclear proliferation concerns in north Korea.

A second lesson arises from the "roadmap" approach employed by the U.S., in which conditions were imposed on Vietnam if the latter wished to be "rewarded" with U.S. diplomatic recognition -- and only if the map's signposts were followed. Some would argue that the approach worked, having led to an exit from Cambodia and greater cooperation on MIA issues, for instance. Others maintain that the approach was not only hegemonic -- unthinkable had it been an imposition of demands on the U.S. by Vietnam -- but that it delayed normalization by several years while, to the chagrin of U.S. corporations, tipping off allies to the imminent investment potential in Vietnam once the embargo was lifted.

In Korea, the U.S. has concerns which are likely to be pressed into the "roadmap" mould -- the withholding of full relations until the DPRK has answered to a number of demands, in addition to its continued adherence to the terms of the nuclear agreement. These concerns include DPRK state sponsorship of international acts of terror, the DPRK's export of arms, and a pattern of on-again, off-again

talks between north and south Korea. Legitimate as some of these concerns may be, we suggest that in the Korean context the "roadmap" is more likely to lead to a cul-de-sac, or to costly detours. Unlike the Vietnamese case, the DPRK is known to have leverage, in its ability to abrogate the nuclear accord if pressed. This outcome can be predicted with some certainty if the U.S. issues new demands, appearing thereby to shift the goal-posts -- a complaint made to no avail by Vietnam. Second, the nuclear accord itself should be seen as the crucial precondition; now that it is in place, and as there is clear evidence that it is being honored, diplomatic relations should follow.

Unlike the Vietnamese case in one further respect, the timing of progress in Korea is of utmost sensitivity and importance. On the positive side, moving swiftly to normalized diplomatic channels is likely to lead quickly to breakthroughs in other areas of U.S.-DPRK (and ROK) concern. Prevarication or postponement, however, will be the easier path to take, due to the pitfalls and potholes we briefly enumerate below. This, in turn, will derail the momentum, undermine the trust painstakingly built over the nuclear accord, and lead immediately to heightened tensions and slowed north-south dialogue. In short, the window of opportunity for progress is only slightly ajar, yet is in danger of being pushed closed. Diplomatic relations could, if established at once, allow for the paradigm shift of which we speak.

Normal relations should be accompanied or closely followed by two U.S. initiatives and one pressing policy revision. The trade embargo maintained against north Korea should be lifted forthwith, with the possible exclusion of strategic or dual-purpose materials and technologies. Second, the U.S. should go one step beyond its oft-heard principle that open trade will open heretofore closed societies. Finally, diplomacy should reassert its precedence over military determinants of policy.

Recognizing the hardships experienced by north Korea in recent years -- just as the petroleum export provisions of the nuclear

agreement do -- the U.S. should treat the DPRK as a developing economy, and should push forcefully for DPRK access to World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank funds. These multilateral sources will, as a matter of established practice, require of the DPRK both transparency in its accounts and compliance with lending provisions. Coterminal discussions should be held to solve the problem of outstanding DPRK debts to Western lending sources. External assistance in vitalizing north Korea's economy at this juncture is crucial: in order to forestall collapse, to underwrite a measure of domestic stability, and to inch the economies of north and south closer, such that their eventual union will be mutually beneficial rather than a rout and unilateral domination one by the other. If allowed, any of these outcomes -- collapse, instability, or rout of the DPRK economy -- will bring a greater cost to south Korea and the region than would be entailed by the establishment of diplomatic relations and the preventive medicine of economic development assistance.

Given the unique tensions of Korea, and the U.S. role therein, many still look -- even defer -- to the U.S. for guidance, as was manifestly clear during the nuclear controversy. To date, needless to say, the U.S. role has been overwhelmingly conservative, dominated by military-security considerations, and colored by the economic embargo against north Korea. The foregoing initiatives would, if implemented, catch the region and globe's imagination, presaging an era of cooperative effort on the peninsula, and asserting a new U.S. role in a newly-conceived order, finally to encompass Korea. Should it cede the initiative again to regional players -- Japan, for instance, is well positioned to move boldly and on short notice into a new relationship with P'yongyang, despite political turmoil at home -- the U.S. would confirm the skeptics' fears: that the Cold War's end ushered in only a new phase of ambivalent, indecisive, and reactive U.S. policy in Asia, prone to repeat some errors of the past.

One such error requires what we have termed a pressing policy revision: to retrieve Korea policy from the clutches of the U.S. military, placing it more forcefully into the hands of civilian policy-makers in

the executive branch. The size and nature of the U.S. military deployment in Korea carries with it a logic of its own. This is to perpetuate the perception of north Korea as the perpetual enemy, to promote military readiness, in turn, and -- Clausewitz reversed -- allow substantive dialogue to break out only if shows of force fail sufficiently to intimidate or impress the enemy. The logic is circular, for the annual Team Spirit U.S.-ROK military exercises, for instance, have *increased* tensions on the peninsula, and have consistently given rise to a military reflex on the part of north Korea.

If, on the contrary, the promotion of a peaceful alternative in Korea were the real priority, diplomatic dialogue would come first, and Team Spirit would be postponed indefinitely as an unnecessary irritant and impediment to the fostering of peace. At present, even the tentative scheduling of Team Spirit, or a show of U.S. military force in virtually any extraordinary deployment, can be predicted to undermine diplomatic trust, set back efforts at rapprochement, and potentially lead the DPRK back to the brink with its nuclear trump card, at whatever the cost. Allowing current progress to be reversed, largely because of the force of military habit and dictate, would illustrate the cul-de-sac of which we warn above. There is no possible military solution on the Korean peninsula, and dialogue, diplomacy, and normalized relations must prevail. While maintaining its guard, the U.S. military's role must be eclipsed by statesmanship capable of envisioning pragmatic steps to a non-nuclear, peaceful Korea.

The road to rapprochement in Korea is, unfortunately, littered with land mines, any one of which can have the debilitating effects alluded to above. We mention some salient factors here briefly.

- 1) The U.S. Congressional elections of 1994 swept a Republican Party majority into office, presaging a hard-line, conservative foreign policy shift. This came at precisely the moment further dialogue is needed to ensure consolidation of the progress made in Korean relations to date. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms, can

each be expected to pursue criticisms of the 1994 nuclear agreement they had voiced earlier. Not known for subtle diplomacy, their "Cold World Order" proclivities and bluster are likely to focus renewed hostile rhetoric on north Korea -- and on the voices of reason which prevailed within the U.S. administration in bringing the nuclear agreement to fruition.

Ever sensitive to external criticism, and prone to exaggerate the impact such utterances from Senators might have on U.S. policy -- accustomed as the DPRK is for the state to speak with a single voice -- north Korea will almost certainly be provoked into a rhetorically hostile response. An escalation of words will ensue, jeopardizing both the nuclear agreement and the momentum towards reconciliation it symbolizes, unless the Republican Senators -- and the DPRK leadership -- can be convinced of the need for restraint and continued dialogue. The sensitivity of historical timing is apparent in these events for, had the nuclear agreement not been reached prior to the 1994 U.S. elections, it would have been inestimably more difficult a few months later. Its progress can still be undone, by accident or by deliberate political sabotage on the part of the new Republican majority in the U.S. Congress.

- 2) Even more assuredly than the words of Senators, military incidents at the 38th^o parallel, or elsewhere on the peninsula, have the potential of derailing progress towards reconciliation. We have alluded above to the possibility that, mindful of ongoing tensions, hard-line elements in any of the militaries could very well provoke such a destabilizing incident. Numerous factors of timing and circumstance could affect the outcome, but the primary stabilizing influence will now come from the political will exhibited on both sides to prevent incidents from becoming impediments -- or renewed hostilities. The December 1994 helicopter downing serves as an object lesson in several respects. On the one hand, its timing suggests the distinct possibility of subversion -- of hopes the nuclear agreement

reached just eight weeks earlier would unravel. On the contrary, the timing enabled authorities on all sides of the issue to uphold the agreement's principles, by seeking an amicable solution to an otherwise destabilizing event. Extraordinary efforts, prescient political will, and a new dimension of vigilance against "friendly fire" as well as external attack, will be required to uphold the momentum of dialogue so recently and belatedly begun.

- 3) The death of Kim Il-Sung has ushered in a period of uncertainty in north Korean politics, with concerns at home and abroad over stability, a smooth leadership transition, and systemic viability in the absence of its long-time centre. At this critical juncture we note -- among a range of possibilities -- the potential for a dogmatic leadership to emerge, eager to deepen the DPRK's self-reliant posture, and suspicious of the 1994 nuclear accord, the implications of which could be dependence for the nation's crucial energy needs on the U.S., Japan, and south Korea.

Old habits die hard, and it is entirely conceivable that previous patterns of ideological and bombastic rhetoric critical of the U.S. will emerge anew. A range of DPRK actions -- from hostile language and propagandistic public relations, to a more serious move interpreted as revoking the nuclear agreement itself, or making hard-line demands patently unacceptable to the U.S. or the ROK -- could undermine all sense of conciliatory progress made to date. The DPRK leadership lineup and foreign policy posture since 1995 will likely have confirmed or dispelled fears of a north Korea not yet ready to productively engage the world. Our cautionary note, then, is that the still opaque workings of the DPRK state could reverse the benefits so recently won, causing a collapse of confidence, and of the 1994 accord.

- 4) Although little examined in this essay, the politics of the Republic of Korea are similarly complex, giving rise to a range of possible developments. Current trends toward democratization, with an ROK administration both responsible and confident in

its proposed openings to the north, are encouraging. Potential pitfalls worth mentioning, however remote some may appear, include the following: an overzealous student movement, seeking to regain from the government the initiative toward reconciliation and unification the movement sees more rightly as its own; an assertive military, concerned by talk of peace while intensely suspicious, both of its enemy to the north, but also of south Korea's civilian leadership, drawn as it is from the ranks of the long-time political opposition; and third, an overly cautious U.S. Any hint of political instability within the ROK likely would cause the U.S. to revert to policies dominated by security considerations, at the expense of bold initiatives for further democratization and the nurturing of peace on the peninsula. Fortunately, state and society in the ROK are likely to play a more positive role in the months and years to come than is suggested by these potential pitfalls.

- 5) The last factor having the potential to stall or reverse progress made to date in Korea is political instability in the region, particularly involving China. Conflict over the Spratly Islands, tensions over the status of Taiwan or Tibet, and domestic upheaval after the death of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, for instance, could have a dampening effect on regional dialogue, stifling initiatives for change, and causing excessive caution to interrupt the momentum maintained thus far. With its enormity in the region, and as north Korea's principal remaining ally, China must be factored into the Korean equation; stability in and continued western dialogue with China will, in turn, help maintain a context in Korea conducive of peaceful progress.

IV. Conclusion

If a half century of conflict in Korea carries with it indelible legacies, the scenario we would predict for the coming decade is one of continued crisis, tensions, and turmoil, exacerbated by the potential

pitfalls outlined above. Lack of initiative and innovative progress will, in turn, condemn the U.S. and the Korean states to an outmoded world order, characterized by hegemonic demands on the part of the U.S., frustrated "followership" on the part of south Korea, and strident, self-reliant pronouncements -- increasingly difficult to implement -- on the part of north Korea.

This essay has argued, on the other hand, that a unique opportunity has arrived to break the confines of this mould. The logic of decades-long hostilities on the peninsula led north Korea in the direction of an independent nuclear weapons' capability, and that same pattern of hostilities brought the peninsula close to another war in 1993-94. In a supreme irony, however, this nuclear weapons-induced crisis also forced upon the region's actors -- principally the United States -- a reconceptualization of the problems and stakes involved. The preferred solution, arising from this new calculus, was peace over war, dialogue over devastation, and an altered role to be played by the U.S. in Korea. A world order in which the U.S. can step back from the brink of Korea in this way, negotiate directly with its longest-standing enemy, and move toward diplomatic recognition of the DPRK is, we argue, symptomatic of a genuinely "new" world order.

We also note that the new order has not yet fully arrived; that legacies of the old persist; and that pitfalls may yet undermine the progress seen to date. These points notwithstanding, a scenario quite at odds with the gloomy one above can be predicted. Therein, the U.S. and DPRK move to establish relations quickly, likely to be followed just as quickly by Japan, and by some form of ROK-DPRK rapprochement. Second, the U.S. and the DPRK, urged on by economic pressures from the ROK and Japan, expand their discussion to other pressing issues, with commerce taking the place of the U.S.-led embargo, and active north-south trade being underwritten by substantial ROK investment in DPRK productive facilities.

Third, a series of confidence-building measures enables the force structure on each side of the 38th^o parallel to be altered, with a

reduction in the number of troops, the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, and the timely conclusion of a peace treaty to replace the 1953 Armistice. Joint Olympic sports teams, broadened family visits, and increasingly diverse exchanges among representatives of the academic, economic, and cultural worlds, among others, would serve further to reconcile the divergent societies of north and south Korea. In short, this scenario builds upon the nuclear near-miss of 1993-94, and the painstakingly negotiated settlement of October 1994. It charts, in the process, a logical path out of the decades-long tensions which led to the proliferation scare of the early 1990s.

Hindsight brings not just benefits, but imperatives for historical learning and rectification of damages. In hindsight, Korea was sacrificed to the demands of successive world orders not of its choosing, and has borne an unwarranted burden through a half-century of enforced division. The order of world politics has changed again, in dimensions directly pertinent to the status of Korea. The ideological divide, first, is no longer a compelling factor; if the Cold War is over elsewhere, a less divisive paradigm, with newly conceived solutions, must rise to take its place. Second, the role of the U.S. has changed, not just with the dramatic breakup of its long-time Soviet adversary, but with the rise of global economic forces and the relative decline of the American juggernaut. Much to its dismay, the U.S. cannot afford a single-handed hegemony, and is not in a position to "call the shots" in the manner it has long been accustomed. It must reconcile itself to these new realities and can, we contend, find a broader basis for global cooperation than has been possible through its unilateral leadership style.

With these changes has come a third: the relative empowerment of small states. Pursuit of the nuclear option is but one of several ways small states have sought to assert their independence and achieve their national objectives; a corollary can be seen in the rapid economic development of others. In either instance, it is no longer feasible for the United States, or any other single power, to rein in the forceful presence of determined states on the rise. Combined, these factors

point to a world order not amenable to the old rules, but responsive to new arrangements and a new discourse based on shared interests. It has long been in the interests of all states involved for the Korean states to be diplomatically recognized, and for a more lasting solution to be fashioned on the peninsula. This set of interests has only recently become clear to the United States, through the ironic twist of a threatened, but uniquely assertive -- and potentially nuclear-armed -- north Korea. It is to the credit of each state actor in this drama -- the U.S., DPRK, ROK, and Japan -- that the opportunity to create the terms of the new order in Korea has been seized. It is also incumbent on all to move this process forward. In the process, the regional and broader global order must be defined precisely in terms of its ability to bring a new order to the tensions of the Korean peninsula, righting the historical wrongs so unfairly imposed by the previously new, now outmoded, and belatedly discarded old world order.

Endnotes

- ¹ Reference is to the statements by U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton and DPRK representative to North-South talks Park Yong-Soo in July 1993 and March 1994, respectively. Pres. Clinton's remarks, made first during a visit to the DMZ, threatened north Korea with the "destruction of their society as they know it" if the DPRK were to provoke hostilities on the peninsula. Pres. Clinton reiterated this position in November 1993 at the White House, following meetings with ROK Pres. Kim Young-Sam. Clinton said: "... [I]f North Korea... were to attack... they would pay a price so great that the nation would probably not survive as it is known today" (Quoted in the *U.S.-Korea Review*, Vol. II, No. VI, Dec.1993/Jan.1994, p. 7). Mr. Park's threatening remarks, from the eighth working-level meeting at Panmunjom between south and north Korea, were that "Seoul... will become a sea of fire" if a new war were to break out in Korea (Quoted widely, but see excellent discussion by Minn Chung, "Seoul Will Become a Sea of Fire," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2, 1994).
- ² Syngman Rhee, in a letter dated July 21, 1945, to U.S. Pres. Truman, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1945, Vol. VI, *The British Commonwealth/The Far East* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 8451, 1969), pp. 1031-32.
- ³ This phrase is taken from Thomas J. Knock's work, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford Univ Press, 1992), as reviewed by Francis P. Sempa in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, Fall 1993, pp. 820-822.
- ⁴ See, on this point, M.L. Smith and Peter M.R. Stirk, Eds., *Making the New Europe: European Unity and the Second World War* (New York and London: Pinter Press, of St. Martins Press, 1989, 1990), particularly the contribution entitled "The Italian Fascist New Order in Europe."
- ⁵ See, in particular, Bruce Cumings' seminal work, *The Origins of the Korean War*, particularly Vol. I, *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 1981). See also Cumings' "Introduction" in his edited volume, *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953* (Seattle: Univ of Washington Press, 1983).
- ⁶ Willard Range, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt's World Order* (Athens, Georgia: Univ of Georgia Press, 1959), p. 49, as cited in Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. I, *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- ⁷ See Cumings, *Ibid.*, Chapter Four, pp. 101-131, for an excellent discussion of FDR's trusteeship proposal and how it was received, debated, and amended, although never implemented.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 113, 130.
- ⁹ Dean Rusk, participant in the late-night August 10, 1945 meeting at which the U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) decided to propose Korea's "temporary" division to the Soviet Union, which had entered the war against Japan just two days earlier, has recounted the events -- and the rationale for the proposal -- in a July 12, 1950 memorandum, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, reprinted in full in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1945, Vol. VI, *Op.cit.*, p. 1039. The distinctly *political* character of the decision to divide Korea is discussed in Cumings, *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.
- ¹⁰ This phrase is in a letter of July 16, 1946, from Pres. Truman to his Ambassador-at-large for German and Japanese reparations' policy, Edwin W. Pauley -- who had conducted a far-reaching study mission to Korea in June, 1946. The letter is contained in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, Vol. VIII, *The Far East* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 8554, 1971), pp. 713-714. Truman concurs with and quotes the phrase from Amb. Pauley's own letter to Truman of June 22, as reproduced in *Ibid.*, pp. 706-709.

- ¹¹ This wording is from an address by Pres. Truman to the American people on April 11, 1951, reprinted in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 6446, 1957), p. 2611. Although the quote is from after the outbreak of the Korean War, the adversarial relationship it describes was well underway early after respective zones of occupation were set up, as will be shown below.
- ¹² Letter from Amb. Edwin W. Pauley to Pres. Truman, *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VIII, Op.cit., pp. 706-709.
- ¹³ Pres. Truman in a letter to Secretary of War Patterson, in *Ibid.*, pp. 721-722.
- ¹⁴ An observation in Amb. Pauley's June 22, 1946 letter to Pres. Truman, in *Ibid.*, p. 706.
- ¹⁵ See, on this point, Cumings, *Origins*, Vol. I, Op.cit., pp. 91-100, 193-201, passim.
- ¹⁶ Memorandum on a meeting of the U.S. Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, May 22, 1946, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, Vol. VIII, *The Far East*, Op.cit., pp. 681-682. This position was stated even more explicitly by Secretary of State Marshall in January 1947, when Marshall instructed the U.S. Office of Far Eastern Affairs to "... have [a] plan drafted of policy to organize a definite government of Southern Korea and connecting up its economy with that of Japan." Telegram of January 28, 1947, from Secretary of State Marshall to Gen. MacArthur, as cited in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1947, Vol. VI, *The Far East* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 8606, 1972), p. 603, fn. 17.
- ¹⁷ Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, "Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime," in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, Vol. VII, *Korea*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 8859, 1976), pp. 109-110. This assessment of the DPRK's dependence on the Soviet Union for its existence is revealing, given the identical, albeit confidential, assessment of the ROK's dependence on the U.S. The latter assessment appears in numerous places in now-declassified documents, including NSC 8, "Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With Respect to Korea," April 2, 1948 (approved by Pres. Truman on April 8), a portion of which states:

Such is the extent of this dependence that it is estimated that economic collapse would ensue in south Korea within a matter of weeks after the termination of U.S. aid to that area.

See, for this document, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. VI, *The Far East and Australia* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Document 8681, 1974), p. 1166.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 111.
- ¹⁹ This characterization is contained in a telegram of July 7, 1947 from the U.S. Political Advisor in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1947, Vol. VI, *The Far East*, Op.cit., p. 690.
- ²⁰ "Review of United States Policy in the Korean Conflict: Statement by the Secretary of State [Acheson], June 1, 1951," in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, Vol. II, Op.cit., p. 2618.
- ²¹ Letter of June 22, 1945 from Amb. Pauley to Pres. Truman in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, Vol VIII, Op.cit., p. 706.
- ²² Donald S. Macdonald, *U.S.-Korean Relations From Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 230.
- ²³ On the People's Committees, see Bruce Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. I, Op.cit., Chaps. 8-10, pp. 267-381.
- ²⁴ These choice depictions of Rhee are from numerous declassified documents in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, as cited at length in my dissertation, to which the reader is referred: *The Politics of Economic Development: Coup, State, and the Republic of Korea's First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966)*, University of Washington, 1994 (UMI Dissertation Services, Order No. 9504684).

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- 25 Ibid.
- 26 The strained but mutually dependent relation between Rhee and the U.S. is evident in the declassified U.S. record of over a decade, including the following observation:
 From the point of view of the United States, we have no alternative to continuing to work with Syngman Rhee... This does not mean, of course, that we should not continue hammering away at our points of difference with Rhee in an effort to bring him closer to our point of view... This, in fact, is current American policy.
 International Cooperation Administration, Office of the Assistant to the Director for Evaluation, "Evaluation of Korea Program," April 15, 1958 [Secret: declassified by AID/OPA in May, 1982], p. 23; available from the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), Washington, D.C.
- 27 On the need to restrain Rhee, see my dissertation, Ibid., pp. 245-246, 289, 294, and the revealing documentation on the evolution of plans drawn up to remove Rhee from office on several occasions in 1953 and 1954, as contained in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. XV, Parts 1 & 2, *Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Dept of State Publication Nos. 9347 and 9348, 1984), pp. 965-968, 1115-1116, and 1123-1130. Rhee's willingness to engage in "unilateral military action" in order to bring about unification by force of arms was to trouble U.S. policy makers frequently between 1953 and 1955, occasioning a special trip by Vice Pres. Richard Nixon to meet with Rhee specifically on this point in November, 1953, and being reflected in now-declassified documents as late as the November 30, 1955 Operations Coordinating Board's "Progress Report on U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 5514)," [Top Secret, declassified with deletions, January 6, 1990], pp. 1, 5. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
- 28 "U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5913/1 and NSC 6018), December 16, 1960, p. 6, attached to December 21, 1960 Memorandum on the Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 20, 1960 [Top Secret/Eyes Only; declassified with deletions January 23, 1991], Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
- 29 Mark Clifford, "Deadly Demonstration: U.S. General Sounds Gulf Warning to North Korea," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 2, 1991, p. 18.
- 30 The words of Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, are revealing in this regard. "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains," he is reported to have said. "I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-Sung." Quoted in *The Defense Monitor*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C., 1994. One would add Iran, Iraq, and Libya to Powell's short list.
- 31 Pan Tongwen, "New World Order -- According to Bush," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 28-Nov.3, 1991, p. 13.
- 32 "A New World Order: To the Victors, the Spoils -- and the Headaches," *The Economist*, September 28, 1991, p. 21.
- 33 "New World Order: What's New? Which World? Whose Orders?" *The Economist*, February 23, 1991, p. 25. Note that Pres. Bush had also said that "there is no substitute for American leadership;" September 11, 1990 speech to a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress, as quoted in the *Beijing Review*, Oct.28-Nov.3, 1991, p. 12.
- 34 "A New World Order," *The Economist*, September 28, 1991, Op.cit., p. 24.
- 35 "Spreading the New World Order," *The Economist*, November 16, 1991, p. 39.
- 36 See, for instance, Robert Burns, Associated Press, "Doubts Raised About Buying Off North Korea in Nuclear Deal," as reported in *St. Petersburg Times* [Florida], October 21, 1994. See also references to Sen. Robert Dole's criticisms of the nuclear agreement in various wire reports of October 20, 1994, including a quote in which Sen. Dole commented: "[the accord] ... shows it is always possible to get an agreement when you give enough away," in Ibid., October 20, 1994.
- 37 The establishment of liaison offices in each other's capital had been discussed previously (see, for instance, "U.S. Plans Office in North Korea," *New York Times*,

- September 11, 1994, p. 9); these plans were set in motion with the October 21, 1994 Agreement, and were moving steadily toward establishment in 1995.
- 38 The IAEA inspections indicated possible discrepancies and underreporting of plutonium extracted by north Korea, leaving open the potential that more than the DPRK's claimed 100 grams of plutonium had been separated from other reactor wastes. See, on this point, David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Sept/Oct, 1994, pp. 46-53.
- 39 The then-Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. James Woolsey, took pains to clarify this point in numerous interviews in 1993 and early 1994, stating that the estimates from limited intelligence sources on north Korea included the possibility that the DPRK had already acquired one or more nuclear devices, but that this was not a certainty. See, for instance, his comments as reported in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, February 27, 1993, p. 472, "Nuclear Powers Still Multiply, Woolsey Warns Congress."
- 40 U.S. Pres. George Bush, speaking in October 1991, pledged to remove all land-based nuclear weapons from Korea in the coming months, and by December of 1991 ROK Pres. Roh Tae-Woo publicly asserted that there were no longer any nuclear weapons in south Korea. Others have noted, however, that the removal of land-based nuclear weapons eliminates only a portion of the nuclear concerns, as U.S. naval and air forces routinely carry a range of nuclear weapons and delivery systems when entering south Korean ports and U.S. air installations in the ROK. These are still subject to the "neither confirm nor deny" provisions of U.S. policy, which enabled the U.S. to introduce and transship nuclear weapons in and through its facilities in Japan, for instance, despite official statements to the contrary by the Japanese government, which could claim that this could not have happened, as Japan had never been officially notified by the U.S. of such intentions. The late U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, exploded these myths in frank comments to the Japanese mass media in the 1980s.
- 41 See, for a discussion of the ROK nuclear weapons' potential, two sources: Ha Young-Sun, *Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea* (Seoul: Seoul National Univ Press, 1983), particularly Chapter 4, pp. 115-145; and Peter Hayes, "The ROK Nuclear Potential," in Andrew Mack, ed., *Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula* (St. Leonard's, Australia: Allen and Unwin in association with Australian National Univ, 1993), pp. 51-84.
- 42 "Operation Hudson Harbor" is the name given to this atomic weapons' set of practice flights, with the actual dropping of dummy atomic bombs. See, on this point, Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War*, pp. 163, 165; our quote is from p. 165.
- 43 See multiple references in *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90, 121-128, 152-155, and 163-165.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.
- 45 U.S. plans to utilize nuclear weapons in Korea should hostilities commence anew are revealed in a number of now-declassified documents. In the January 8, 1954 discussions of the National Security Council (179th meeting, documented on January 11, 1954, Section 3, "Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea"), it is noted that "... in the present circumstances it would take 22 hours ... to initiate an atomic attack in the event that the Communists did renew their aggression," but it was also noted that "within the next six to eight months [Admiral Radford] believed that we would be able to react against the enemy with atomic weapons in a matter of four hours or less, instead of the present 22 hours." [Top Secret, Eyes Only; declassified with portions exempted October 26, 1984], Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, National Security Files.

More recently declassified documents, such as an April 17, 1954 memorandum, indicate serious plans even after the Korean War to utilize atomic weapons against the PRC, should the Armistice in Korea be breached.

A personal anecdote is highly fitting at this juncture. An uncle of mine, decorated as a young Lt. Col. pilot over Germany in WWII, and directly "in the know"

regarding strategic bombing scenarios in the years thereafter, strenuously urged his brother -- my father -- to reconsider plans to relocate the family to Japan in 1952. "The war in Korea," he warned, "is likely to involve atomic weapons at any time, and your family shouldn't be anywhere near the peninsula." [Lt. Col. Robert B. Satterwhite, 1918-1956; as told in 1952 to Dr. J. P. Satterwhite]

- 46 On June 21, 1957, the U.S. formally notified its Chinese and north Korean counterparts at ongoing talks in Panmunjom that Subparagraph 13d of the Korean Armistice Agreement was being repudiated. Just a week later the U.S. introduced into its military arsenal in the ROK new military aircraft, for instance, and subsequently modernized ROK equipment in a variety of other ways (see *New York Times*, June 21, 1957, pp. 1, 4). On these points, I am indebted to an anonymous source for providing me with a copy of *Korea Chronology, 1905-1972*, compiled by U.S. military intelligence officer Y. K. Simpson [SFO, Co. B, 502d MI Bn, EUSA MI Group (Prov)]. Not formally classified, the following is noted on page 1 of this useful Chronology: "Do not disseminate outside U.S. intelligence community." Although not normally privy to documents from that "community," I received and have quoted from it in the spirit of legitimate scholarly inquiry.
- 47 The internal discussion leading to formal deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons is highly instructive, as great care had to be taken not to inform Pres. Rhee prematurely, lest his curiosity regarding U.S. force "modernization" might lead to demands for additional advanced weapons for ROK forces. When Rhee got wind of U.S. plans, this is precisely what happened, as predicted. On this far-ranging internal discussion, see the June 14, 1957 memorandum of discussion at the 326th meeting of the National Security Council (June 13, 1957), Section 3, "U.S. Policy Toward Korea," pp. 6-16 [Top Secret, Eyes Only; declassified with portions exempted, November 14, 1986], Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, National Security Files.
- 48 Simpson, *Korea Chronology*, Op.cit., pp. 39, 40, entries for July 15, 1957 and January 29, 1958, respectively. These are reported in the *New York Times* on July 16, 1957, p. 3 (regarding reorganization of U.S.-Korea forces into a "pentomic" battle group structure), and January 29, 1958, p. 3, the latter in a brief article entitled "U.N. Korea Forces Get Atomic Cannon."
- 49 The impact on both south and north Korea of the U.S. nuclear deployment in the ROK is discussed in Peter Hayes' excellent study, *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991); on south Korea, in particular, see Chapter 7, "Collaboration," pp. 105-122.
- 50 See, on the DPRK nuclear program, the useful but largely neglected work by Ha Young-Sun, *Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea*, Op.cit., pp. 118, 122.
- 51 This was technically known as the "Agreement for Cooperation Between Governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy," as cited in *Ibid.*, p. 82. See also Simpson, *Korean Chronology*, Op.cit., p. 37, entry for February 3, 1956.
- 52 Ha, Op.cit., p. 85.
- 53 On these details, see Tom Clements, "Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula: Visit of the MV Greenpeace Spotlights South Korean Nukes," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 26:1-2, 1994, pp. 139-142.
- 54 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 33.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 80.
- 57 Ha, *Nuclear Proliferation*, Op.cit., p. 127. See Ha's useful appendices, particularly Appendix 2, "Chronology of South Korean Major Statements on Nuclear Weapons," and Appendix 3, "Chronology of the Failure of South Korean Reprocessing Plant Project," pp. 176-181.

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- 58 Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg*, Op.cit., Chapter 7, "Collaboration," pp. 105-122, passim.
- 59 Ibid., p. 211. See also Hayes, "The ROK Nuclear Potential," Op.cit. and Tom Clements, Op.cit., in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 26: 1-2, 1994, p. 140.
- 60 Ha, *Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea*, Op.cit., pp. 136, 138-39, 145, 170. In particular, the following passage from Ha was, for 1983, quite prescient:
 Technological barriers to nuclear proliferation in Korea either have been or will be overcome rapidly in the near future. Dispersion of nuclear weapons in this region will thus hinge on a complex balance of nontechnological incentives and disincentives for nuclear proliferation. (p. 170)
- 61 The foregoing neither agrees with a likely DPRK national interests' calculation, nor condones the probable DPRK effort to acquire nuclear weapons as appropriate or legitimate. Rather, we would seek to understand what the DPRK leadership may have been thinking, in order that we might more clearly chart suggested -- more pacific -- policy directions.
- 62 That the DPRK had considered the nuclear option, and the costs such an option would entail, is revealed in a discussion between President Kim Il-Sung and Mr. Yasue Ryosuke, then-Editor in Chief of the Japanese intellectual monthly journal *Sekai*, in which Pres. Kim is quoted in Ha, Op.cit. (p. 129), as follows:
 We have no intention of arming ourselves with nuclear weapons. We have not enough money to produce nuclear weapons or adequate place to test them.
- 63 Selig Harrison, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for instance -- who has visited north Korea three times, beginning in 1972 -- reported this flexibility on the part of north Korea from his 1987 visit to the DPRK in various publications, including the December 3, 1987 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* ("The 'Great Follower': Kim Il-Sung promotes a Chinese-style open-door policy," pp. 36-39), and shared these insights with a wide range of policy-makers and interested observers -- myself included -- in Washington, D.C. in the fall of 1987.
 Mr. Harrison's writings and public appearances, we would add, have been among the most visible and principled in their call for improved relations and understanding between the United States and the DPRK. Among many such writings, the reader is referred to a slim conference volume entitled *Dialogue With North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1989), and an excellent opinion page piece by Mr. Harrison, "'Package' Incentives for Forswearing Nuclear Arms," *Washington Post*, January 30, 1994.
- 64 Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg*, Op.cit., Chap. 6, "Airland Battle," pp. 89-103.
- 65 See Ibid., Chap. 5, "Plot," pp. 71-86, for a good discussion of the Carter troop withdrawal debacle as an illustration of the U.S. military establishment's policy line carrying the day in U.S. Korea policy.
- 66 See David Satterwhite, "Korean Imperatives at a Crossroads: U.S. Korea Policy in the 'New World Order,'" *Sekai* (No. 564), February 1992, pp. 304-313 (in Japanese).
- 67 See Ha, Op.cit, p. 139, where he argues that:
 ... small-power nuclear forces can still exert some influence on the superpowers, since the latter must consider "deterrence by uncertainty" and "diffusion of nuclear proliferation" resulting from the possible use of nuclear weapons by small powers.
- 68 See, among a wealth of literature on the subject, Minn Chung, "Chronology of Crisis: Important Developments for Peace, Reconciliation, and Denuclearization of Korea," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 26: 1-2, 1994, pp. 143-146.
- 69 Reference is to the sending to P'yongyang of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard in late December, 1994, to negotiate the release from DPRK custody of Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall, whose helicopter had been brought down inside north Korean territory on December 17, 1994, touching off a potential crisis -- and snag in the momentum of improved dialogue between the U.S. and the DPRK.
- 70 Testimony by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 24, 1995, confirms that the U.S. seriously considered

bombing nuclear facilities in the DPRK in 1994, but opted instead for further dialogue, certain that even a "surgical strike" would lead to renewed war in Korea.

⁷¹ See, in this regard, Bruce Cumings, "Old and New Korean Wars," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 26: 1-2, 1994, pp. 130-131.

⁷² The dominance of the U.S. military establishment over policy in Korea is legend. Long after U.S. ambassadors elsewhere had gained control over the interrelated functions of their respective embassies, for instance, the U.S. armed forces' command in Korea retained control over the massive U.S. economic aid program. After prolonged objection, the military finally relinquished control on March 20, 1959, when President Eisenhower had to personally sign off on a "Memorandum of Agreement... between the Departments of State and Defense pertaining to the administration of U.S. aid programs in Korea" (U.S. Office of Economic Cooperation, "Report on Korea: NSC 5817," April 29, 1959).

⁷³ This shift in U.S. policy was enunciated in a 1988 State Dept policy statement.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7582

December 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SR*

SUBJECT: Reply to letter from David Satterwhite

David Satterwhite, whom you knew in a previous incarnation and who is now on a post-doctoral fellowship at Berkeley, has sent you a lengthy paper on U.S.-Korea policy. He advocates a much "softer" line towards North Korea, including initiating dialogue on a peace treaty to replace the Armistice, lifting the trade embargo, moving expeditiously to full diplomatic relations and de-emphasizing military/security issues in favor of more emphasis on diplomatic initiatives. He concedes the need to consult with the ROK on these steps but advocates against giving them "a vice-like veto."

Your reply thanks him for his thoughtful paper and expresses the hope that in the wake of the recently concluded LWR contract agreement it will be possible to make progress on some of the issues he has suggested.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to David Satterwhite
Tab B Correspondence from David Satterwhite

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear David:

I hope you'll excuse this belated response to your letter enclosing your thoughtful paper on U.S.-Korea policy.

I am hopeful that in the wake of the recently concluded LWR contract agreement it might be possible to move forward in some of the areas you suggested in your paper, beginning with the opening of the liaison office. I am much more skeptical, however, about the short-term prospects for replacing the armistice regime with a peace treaty, since this is an issue that needs to be negotiated primarily between the two parties on the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately the North has grown increasingly disinterested in North-South dialogue since the death of Kim Il Sung and this has seriously impaired the prospects not only for a peace treaty but for tension reduction measures on the Peninsula.

Please feel free to continue sharing your observations on Korea policy as you proceed with your post-doctoral studies. Best of luck!

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. David H. Satterwhite, Ph.D.
Center for Korean Studies
Institute of East Asian Studies
University of California
Berkley, California 94720

Staff to Stanley Roth



7582

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BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

8 October 1995

Honorable Mr. Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Dear Mr. Lake:

Warmest greetings, with appreciation for your kind words both when we met in April, and in your subsequent note to me in May.

You will note that I have escaped the confines of my small-college posting to Florida -- having resigned my tenure-track appointment at Eckerd College -- and am currently on a postdoctoral fellowship at the Center for Korean Studies, UC-Berkeley. This setting is far more conducive to my research endeavors, and I am pleased to be giving talks both here, and at Harvard in the spring, with research travels to Japan and Korea in the meantime.

Although the remainder of this letter will address concerns over the ongoing situation in Korea, let me mention that I have followed coverage of your own work, and that of the Administration, quite closely. Both as a concerned scholar, and as a member of the Society of Friends (Quakers), I have been particularly impressed with this Administration's serious efforts to promote peaceful solutions to long-standing conflict situations. In this regard, your own travels to the Bosnia-Herzegovina region, and the tenacious efforts of Asst Secretary Holbrooke and his team in recent weeks, are commendable. Similarly, the concerted diplomatic efforts by Secretary of State Christopher in the Middle East, Ambassador Gallucci vis-a-vis the nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula, the Administration's supportive role in the peace process vis-a-vis Northern Ireland, and the principled effort to restore both social order and an elected government in Haiti -- these and others point to an Administration keenly committed to peaceful, long-term solutions. Heartfelt support and congratulations are in order.

On a personal note, I should say that I was quite moved by your own attention to the continuing concerns of families who lost loved ones in the Vietnam War. I had the opportunity to address some of these same issues when, in 1991, I led a group of 34 university students on a month-long sojourn through Vietnam. This was also the first group of American students to visit Laos since the war there ended in 1975, through the kind support and assistance of then-U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Charley Salmon. In short, the travels I directed were a personal effort to promote reconciliation, following years of distance between our respective peoples and governments. I am immensely pleased that your Administration has both ended the embargo and normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam -- these were crucial steps in the long-overdue process of healing wounds from that war.

As you will recall from our meeting and earlier correspondence, I am deeply concerned with the even longer-running tensions on the Korean peninsula. Although I have taken the liberty of enclosing a manuscript now at press, which makes some policy recommendations in its second half, I am mindful that your schedule and duties may prevent you from reading it through, so I raise a point or two below. The manuscript, incidentally, assesses the historical context of the nuclear scare of recent years, while considering what it would take to bring Korea more fully into a "new world order" -- defining the latter at least in part in terms of how well it is able to address the ongoing tensions of the Korean peninsula itself.

You recall that the best known dictum from Clausewitz is that war is but the continuation of diplomacy by other means, a dictum predicated on the good-faith assumption that diplomacy has been seriously tried, but has failed, and that the use of force is a last resort -- regrettable but necessary. In Korea, a state of war in abeyance has been the reality for the past four-plus decades, and Clausewitz has been turned on his head: diplomacy has been attempted only when warfare -- in Korea a perpetual state of armed readiness, fraught with tensions and the potential for renewed hostilities -- has been recognized, or feared, as a debilitating dead end.

The diplomatic accord signed last October with the DPRK, and the subsequent negotiations earlier this year in Kuala Lumpur -- both of which are hard-won successes I support and praise -- are nonetheless successes which mask deeper problems. Trained in U.S. foreign policy, int'l relations, and Northeast Asian politics in particular, I maintain that a more conscious, sustained effort needs to be made to break the historical impasse on the Korean peninsula, through successive steps.

- 1) Moving away from military/security dominance of discourse on present realities and future possibilities.

This is not to ignore or play down legitimate security concerns on the peninsula, but to place into a context of diplomatic negotiations -- pace Clausewitz -- the high-pitch military tensions obtaining there.

- 2) Initiating dialogue on the range of issues pursuant to a workable peace treaty to replace the Armistice.
- 3) Moving expeditiously toward full and mutual diplomatic relations, to facilitate normal channels of state-to-state communication.

As is appropriate in any event, our national technical means would monitor DPRK officials in Washington closely; the mere presence of a U.S. Embassy in P'yongyang, however, can only have a triple positive effect: of permitting immediate dialogue to forestall misunderstandings or miscalculations; of providing first-hand observation (and nuanced interpretations) of events in P'yongyang and its environs; and of restraining inflammatory, anti-American rhetoric on the part of the DPRK leadership, by virtue of an actual American presence.

Each of these steps should be taken in consultation with our allies in the ROK, but under no circumstances allowing a vice-like veto by the ROK over U.S. prestige and policy initiatives. The U.S.-ROK relationship surely is mature enough not to require U.S. deference to every ROK

objection; these, indeed, have been allowed thus far to permanently postpone progress on U.S.-DPRK dialogue and improved relations, symptomatic of an ROK (and U.S. military) "we will win at all costs" war footing, substituting (apologies to Clausewitz), war-winning considerations in the place of diplomacy that would secure the peace.

Note that I have emphasized **U.S. initiatives** in these matters. This represents a break with the past, in which we have been content to react to events -- by the weight of inertia, circumstances, and a lack of political vision or courage on the part of predecessor U.S. administrations. Crises have punctuated long periods of U.S. diplomatic dormancy in Korea -- the crises of 1968, '76, '80, '87, and '91-94 stand out, among others -- much like emergency-room medicine has replaced health maintenance and preventive care in many of America's inner cities.

The Clinton Administration is in the unique position, by virtue of a genuinely more enlightened foreign policy approach geared to negotiating workable, peaceful solutions, to taking the initiative towards peace in Korea. Just as in the recent policy initiatives vis-a-vis Cuba, in which steps toward openness have been matched by firmness on the embargo -- skillfully deflecting opposition from knee-jerk Cold Warriors -- dialogue and the nuclear agreement of the past year have opened a window of opportunity for further initiatives vis-a-vis the DPRK. I would hope that we could act with such vision, rather than await the next crisis.

I have written at some length, for which I apologize, but with a vigor and level of concern for which I offer no apologies. My schedule this year at Berkeley -- bereft of teaching and committee duties -- is such that I could come out to Washington even on short notice, should you find it useful to pursue these themes in conversation, over lunch or a more formal discussion. Quite sincerely, I offer my training and services to the furtherance of U.S. policy in the Northeast Asian region.

Kindly convey my best regards to Ms. Soderberg, from whom I have not heard since my visit in April.

In Highest Esteem,



David H. Satterwhite, Ph.D.
Postdoctoral Fellow, '95-96
Center for Korean Studies
Univ of California-Berkeley

Note: With residences both in Berkeley and Seattle, and frequent travels between the two, I may be reached at either of the following.

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NORTH KOREA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
*edited by Hazel Smith, Keven Magill, Chris Rhodes
and Diana Pritchard. The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1995*

*Chapter contribution by
David Satterwhite, Ph.D.
Politics & Asian Studies*

May 1995 final draft

***A Half-Century of U.S. Korea Policy:
Inching Toward U.S.-DPRK Rapprochement***

The July 1994 death of DPRK President Kim Il-Sung signalled the passing of an era in Korean and global politics. As nemesis of the U.S. longer than any other leader -- personifying the Stalinist enemy image long after the ideology itself had ceased to be a threat -- Kim's demise might have been welcomed in the West with a sense of relief and closure. Instead, his half century at the helm ended just months too soon, for crucial elements of an evolving new order surrounding the peninsula were left unsettled, tantalizingly within reach yet likely to be more difficult to achieve in his absence. The ironies of this situation require explanation. How had an aging dictator, worshiped at home and ridiculed abroad, come to possess the key to Northeast Asian regional security? How had mounting fears of a DPRK nuclear weapons' capability brought the U.S. a step closer to normalization of relations with north Korea after decades of hostility? Despite the Cold War's end elsewhere, however, how might myopic habits -- between rival Korean regimes, and on the part of the U.S. -- doom the peninsula to continued tensions, making a mockery of Korean aspirations for peace and unification?

Recent years have seen a roller-coaster of extremes, ranging from increased tensions and mutual threats of annihilation,¹ to a series of high-level negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK officials, resulting in substantive progress on issues which had not, until recently, seemed to warrant a serious U.S. effort at engaging north

Korea in dialogue. Probing the quandary posed by these hopeful signs amidst still-hostile DPRK-U.S. relations, and suggesting scenarios by which U.S. policymakers could more assertively effect a paradigm shift on the peninsula, aimed at a lasting peace, are the broader aims of this brief essay.

Assessing continuities in U.S. Korea policy over the past half century, particularly as Korea fits into considerations of an "old," "renewed," or transformed world order, concerns us first. The nuclear issue, which in recent years has colored all other aspects of the broader Korea Question, garners separate attention. Very much an outgrowth of the decades-long Korean conflict, the DPRK's alleged effort to acquire a nuclear weapons' capability has served nonetheless as a potent catalyst, focusing renewed global attention on Korea while prompting a thorough reassessment of long-term security calculations on the peninsula and in the region. How the DPRK has forced this rethinking, challenging in the process a precarious status quo long dominated by U.S. military containment policies, is a central issue in our second section. This critical juncture, then -- marked by nuclear fears, Kim Il-Sung's passing, and the need to conceptualize a more durable solution to Korean tensions -- serves as backdrop to our concluding effort to chart a series of suggested U.S. policy initiatives towards Korea.

I. Korea in the "New World Order"

"At this dawn of a new world order..." wrote an ardent Korean nationalist, reflecting hopes arising from decades of hardship endured by the Korean people. His sentence would have fit circumstances well in 1990, given the momentous events then unfolding in the Persian Gulf region and the former Soviet bloc -- events which contributed to a new ordering of global power configurations with the dismantling of the Soviet Union in late 1991. "How might these changes affect the Korean peninsula?" the nationalist could have been asking. Rather, these prescient words were written in July 1945, by none other than Syngman Rhee -- a controversial figure later to emerge as President of

the Republic of Korea -- three weeks before Japan's surrender ended the Pacific War.² The revelry that followed over Korea's liberation from colonial rule was short-lived, however, for the "new world order" of the day arrived with devastating effect: Korea was hastily divided, its hopes for self-rule thwarted, and its polarized politics skewed further by U.S. and Soviet regimes in their respective occupation zones.

As illustrated by the foregoing quote from 1945, the concept of a "new world order" deserves consideration in several dimensions, beginning with its historical applicability to Korea. Long before U.S. President George Bush popularized the phrase anew in 1990, setting off an intense discourse on the subject that reverberates to this day, successive efforts by major powers to articulate grand new global designs have had a ravaging effect on Korea. Early in the century, for instance, the promise of "self-determination of peoples" -- a key element in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's own "quest for a new world order"³ -- would inspire hope and great courage among the Korean people when, in 1919, they rose up to demand independence from Japan's harsh colonial rule. Little did they know at the time that promises of deliverance did not extend to Korea, for the U.S. was bound by the terms of an earlier, colonial pact -- the secret Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, which had recognized Japan's "rights" over Korea in return for unimpeded U.S. dominance over the Philippines. Brutally suppressed by Japan in 1919, the Koreans went on to suffer until their momentary liberation in 1945, Wilson's eloquence and the emerging League of Nations' "new world order" notwithstanding.

A second externally imposed order ties in with the first. Just as the fascists of Italy and Germany's Third Reich had visions of a new global design, and sought to supplant the old, colonial, balance-of-power order with their own,⁴ Japan, too, had sought to remake its part of the world in its own image. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, although belatedly conceived and cynically applied as a popular alternative to Western colonial domination, symbolized an "order" Japan was prepared to enforce throughout Asia, had it

triumphed in the war. Korea had already experienced this "co-prosperity" firsthand, in a colonial regime noted for its intensity. It is in this context that domestic and expatriate nationalists such as Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, Kim Kyu-Shik, and Cho Man-Shik, as well as socialist leaders including Yo Un-Hyong, Pak Hon-Yong, and Kim Il-Sung -- with no less impeccable nationalist credentials -- vociferously resisted the permanent subjugation of Korea to the Asian version of the Axis powers' world order. Japan's defeat, albeit at the hands of the Allied powers rather than through a self-fought "war of national liberation," provided an opportunity for contending visions to surface. In his July 1945 letter Rhee had given voice to a "new world order" to be facilitated and dominated by the U.S. This, despite the peninsula's division, was largely what Korea got.

The immensely complex politics of Korea in August 1945, and the geopolitical calculations for Korea's future as discussed by the Allied powers prior to war's end, have been presented in lucid detail in recent decades.⁵ Two facets are germane to our discussion. First is the "grand design for a new world order" envisioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt;⁶ second is the early imposition of Cold War rivalries on Korea by Roosevelt's successor, President Harry Truman, in a more narrowly conceived "order" than that envisioned by FDR's internationalism. Neither plan, however, respected the Korean people's capacity to determine their own future, for Korea itself had taken on significance in the emerging U.S. and Soviet-dominated global order beyond that which could be entrusted to the Korean people.

The Roosevelt approach challenged the existing order of colonial empires, incurring the hostility of Great Britain and France in the process. The vehicle by which to accomplish FDR's objectives -- which were to foster "eventual" self-government, and to supplant colonial control with a U.S.-dominated system of political and economic "access," more properly seen as fostering a new dependency on the U.S. -- was trusteeship.⁷ Conceived as a decades-long process of tutelage, trusteeship incurred the wrath of the Korean people, for it

suggested explicitly that they were not yet capable of managing their own independence and self-government. Roosevelt's death, Truman's ascendance, and the rapid emergence of Cold War antagonisms "saved" Korea from trusteeship, only to impose a different, wrenching fate in the form of division and the seeds of an ongoing civil war.

While Roosevelt had sought to "incorporate the Soviet Union" through a shared administration of trusteeship, thereby restraining the Soviets while simultaneously ensuring U.S. dominance in a new hegemonic order,⁸ Truman (and his successors) came to prefer more overt containment instruments. A race was on to prevent Soviet domination of Korea, to divide the peninsula in a manner assuring U.S. advantage, and to foster an anti-Communist, pro-American leadership in the U.S. zone of military occupation. Declassified U.S. documents are clear on this process, including the crucial U.S. proposal that Korea be divided,⁹ the dynamics by which the Left was systematically excluded and suppressed in the American sector, and the heightened sense that the U.S., in Korea, was "... in an ideological battleground upon which [America's] entire success in Asia may depend."¹⁰ Its perceived adversary in this battle was none less than a "plan of conquest... [by] Communist imperialism... to control all Asia from the Kremlin."¹¹

The Cold War's early impact on Korea was soon to be matched by a divided Korea's deepening of the Cold War. At each turn, the U.S. found reason to suspect Soviet intentions, while failing to reflect on its own actions in like manner. Thus, while U.S. President Truman would learn from a trusted personal advisor, in June of 1946, that "...[i]t is clear from the actions of the Soviets that they have no immediate intention of withdrawing from Korea,"¹² Truman could write to his Secretary of War in early August, barely a month later -- based on advice several months in the making -- "I am convinced that we may be required to stay in Korea a considerable length of time."¹³ Similarly, an accusatory finger was pointed at Soviet efforts to set up a sympathetic party and northern government, "... riding rough-shod over all political factions which might oppose or even question" their

actions,¹⁴ yet the U.S. was engaged in an identical process, having favoured certain parties and politicians while suppressing others,¹⁵ and having secretly discussed, just weeks prior to the 1946 accusation above, "... hold[ing] elections immediately in southern Korea" as a step towards a separate southern regime.¹⁶

Separate regimes were to emerge in southern and northern Korea in August and September 1948, respectively, after the U.S. took the initiative in handing the "Korea Question" over to the United Nations in 1947. How the U.N. was utilized for U.S. purposes is an important dimension of the post-WWII order, but one we will not explore in depth at present. Suffice it to say that U.S. global interests could be pursued through a domination of the U.N., particularly by overriding Soviet objections through the use of the General Assembly. How the fledgling regime in northern Korea was perceived by the U.S. is, however, directly germane to more recent portrayals of the DPRK in the "new" world order of the 1990s. The CIA would summarize official U.S. thinking in June 1950, just a week prior to the Korean War's outbreak, in these words:

The "Democratic People's Republic" of northern Korea is a firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.¹⁷

Being convinced of "... the fiction of northern Korean independence"¹⁸ -- indeed, going to the point of seeing Kim Il-Sung as no more than a "Korean stooge" of the Kremlin¹⁹ -- it was a logical assumption that the Korean War itself had been instigated by the Soviet Union, as evidence -- in the words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson -- of Moscow's "Communist imperialist aims in Asia."²⁰ With the Chinese Communist Party's victory in 1949, and subsequent PRC military participation in support of the DPRK, moreover, the Korean War placed Korea center-stage in U.S. policy, both as bulwark against further encroachment, and as a linchpin in the post-WWII "new" -- now "old" -- world order.

U.S. perceptions of Kim Il-Sung as a puppet on Soviet strings are revealing in several ways. First, to peg Korean communists as mere

instruments of Moscow failed to reflect what the U.S. already knew: that the Korean communists had fought tenaciously in a nationalist struggle against Japan, earning them popular legitimacy as patriots, and that Korea, in 1945, was on the verge of a social revolution. The latter is attested to by numerous internal sources at the time. Ambassador Pauley, for instance, reported that conditions were ripe: "Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere in the world."²¹ Another insider reported that "early opinion surveys by the American Military Government established that a majority of the Korean people favored a socialist economy."²² In the context of widespread "People's Committee" activities throughout the peninsula in 1945-1946,²³ Korea as a whole is likely to have adopted a socialist model of distribution and development had not the U.S. so forcefully intervened. In that sense, Kim Il-Sung -- together with many other communists -- more accurately reflected Korean sentiments and realities at the time than the official U.S. version of events lets on. As a result, the local application of the U.S.-conceived "order" in Asia meant taking sides within Korea, suppressing in the process widely held sentiments calling for socio-economic and political change.

A second revealing aspect of U.S. portrayals of Kim Il-Sung is comparative: if Kim was perceived as being manipulated from behind the scenes at the Soviet's whim, were the Soviet handlers having any better luck than U.S. handlers of its own dictator, Syngman Rhee? The now declassified record shows U.S. exasperation over Rhee's "obstinacy," "recalcitrance," "unpredictability," "irrationality," "intransigence," and "willingness to strain U.S.-ROK relations," among a litany of other complaints.²⁴ These would even lead, in 1953, to U.S. plans to seize Rhee and replace his "authoritarian" government, which was acknowledged to be a "police state," "dominated by the personality of its President."²⁵ Despite these endearing qualities, Rhee went on dictating -- both to the people of the ROK, and to the U.S. government, the latter as dependent on Rhee as the reverse²⁶ -- until his ouster by "people power" in 1960.

While we await a more thorough account of Soviet archival perceptions of Kim Il-Sung, we know that this relationship, too, was often strained. We also know that Kim went on to skillfully play the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and to outlive the Soviet Union itself by several years. The early U.S. image of Kim, then, as a marionette extension of Soviet policy, served U.S. policy-makers poorly the longer it persisted; once in place, however, the "new world order" assessment was highly resistant to change. Recognizing Kim Il-Sung earlier as the master of his own fate, with a legitimating nationalism and, for Koreans, a popular ideology of self-reliance, would have enabled an earlier dialogue and reduction of tensions, in Korea's and the U.S. interest.

A third perception stems from the foregoing: that Kim Il-Sung -- with Soviet backing -- bears full blame for the origins of the Korean War. Simply stated, the Korean War started long before June 25, 1950. Military preparations had occasionally flared into hostilities from at least a year earlier, and both sides were increasingly committed to reunification through force of arms -- Rhee threatening on many occasions to "march north." Had he acquired sufficient arms first, it is likely Rhee would have initiated the war; as it happened, however, the north completed its preparations early and struck decisively in 1950, strengthened by the presence of battle-hardened Koreans who had fought with Mao in the Chinese civil war. The rest is not just "history," however, for it was the U.S. that repeatedly had to restrain Rhee, first from prolonging the war in 1953, and later from unilaterally recommencing the war in order finally to unify the peninsula on terms he would hope to dictate.²⁷ With the origins and legacies of the Korean War now more thoroughly researched and understood, the official myth that Kim Il-Sung "started" or "caused" the war should have been laid to rest decades ago; the origins lie more in Korea's arbitrary division by the superpowers, as a cog in the U.S. attempt to call the shots in its emerging "new world order" of 1945.

We have focused on historical details from the 1945-1950 period to illustrate the following: Kim Il-Sung and the new DPRK had taken on all the qualities crucial to a potent "enemy image" by this

time, fitting integrally into a more global perception of the Soviet Union and Communism as the larger enemy to be restrained by the U.S.-led system. The Korean War was to confirm these perceptions, solidifying in the process the parameters of the "new world order" as it applied to Asia. Japan and south Korea would be protected at all cost; the Soviet Union and China would be restrained; and the U.N. would serve as the legitimating international watchdog of "order" on the Korean peninsula. North Korea, in this calculus, would remain "the enemy" in active limbo, ignored diplomatically yet utilized fully as the aggressive foe requiring constant vigilance.

The Armistice of 1953, then, and the militarized standoff at the 38° parallel, have served in the maintenance of what has now become the "old" world order. Revision of that order would, in subsequent decades, be held hostage to progress on inter-Korean dialogue, with the U.S. abjuring a leadership role which might have amended the order's parameters to account for changes afoot internationally. Similarly, U.S. policy was dominated by military considerations; these, in turn, fed on the enemy image solidified during the Korean War. Lest the "order" be misunderstood to have been benign, however -- holding the line against an aggressive north, always portrayed as seeking the violent overthrow of the southern Republic -- the mirror image should be kept in mind. Not only had the line been crossed in the autumn of 1950, when U.N. forces sought during the Korean War to reunify the peninsula through force of arms; official -- if secret -- U.S. policy in succeeding decades remained the overthrow of the north Korean regime. One finds, for instance -- thanks to an otherwise cautious censorship process in the declassification of U.S. documents -- records of the National Security Council from December 1960 in which action is authorized to "[e]ncourage the ROK Government to promote and support covert activities in north Korea designed to further anti-communist aims."²⁸ It will likely take years to learn how extensive these U.S.-supported efforts were, symptomatic of an activist, destabilizing dimension of the U.S.-led "world order."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7582

December 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

STANLEY ROTH *SR*

SUBJECT:

Reply to letter from David Satterwhite

David Satterwhite, whom you knew in a previous incarnation and who is now on a post-doctoral fellowship at Berkeley, has sent you a lengthy paper on U.S.-Korea policy. He advocates a much "softer" line towards North Korea, including initiating dialogue on a peace treaty to replace the Armistice, lifting the trade embargo, moving expeditiously to full diplomatic relations and de-emphasizing military/security issues in favor of more emphasis on diplomatic initiatives. He concedes the need to consult with the ROK on these steps but advocates against giving them "a vice-like veto."

Your reply thanks him for his thoughtful paper and expresses the hope that in the wake of the recently concluded LWR contract agreement it will be possible to make progress on some of the issues he has suggested.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to David Satterwhite

Tab B Correspondence from David Satterwhite

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	From John Barry Kotch to Anthony Lake and Stanley Roth. Subject: United Nations. [partial] (1 page)	07/10/1995	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1444

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Fax to:

From the desk of

John Barry Kotch

P6(b)(6)

[001]

July 10, 1995

Anthony Lake and Stan Roth
The National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Tony and Stan,

In view of Pres. Kim's upcoming visit and North Korea's recent decision to quit the Military Armistice Commission, I am enclosing a memo on the future of the UN Command and some thoughts on the necessary elements for a progression from Armistice Agreement to Peace Treaty.

You may also wish to refer to an Executive summary on The UN Command in Historical Perspective which I recently completed, the concluding chapter on "The Legacy of the UN Command" along with a long ago piece on "The Origins of the American Security Commitment to South Korea." In Korea, the UN and UN Command served as an instrument of U.S. policy, a *modus operandi* that was essentially repeated in Kuwait four decades later. Both collective security enforcement actions put the primary emphasis on the rapid response to aggression around a UN-sanctioned U.S.-led coalition. The downside was that the UN as an entity never developed the capacity to institutionalize collective security through Charter-designated procedures and mechanisms (such as the Military Staff Committee) with results that are all too apparent in the flawed performance of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia.

We might discuss this further in the context of PRD 25 and future U.S. policy toward UN peacekeeping although obviously the political climate today is radically different from that which prevailed during both the Korean and Kuwaiti enforcement actions.

With best wishes,



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. letter	From John Barry Kotch to Anthony Lake. [partial] Subject: Korea (1 page)	01/06/1995	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F

vz1444

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

John Barry Kotch, Ph.D.

Researcher

P6(b)(6)

[002]

January 6, 1995

Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
The White House (West Wing)
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Tony,

What a pleasant surprise to have the pleasure of your company on New Year's day courtesy of Tim Russert!

Although he is a tough interlocuteur and the topics covered were complex and not easily explained, I thought you acquitted yourself reasonably well coming across as both thoughtful and reassuring and succeeded in establishing an easy and relaxed rapport. You were at your best in fielding his curve ball on baseball!

Given the changed political environment since November, you might want to consider a rematch with Russert perhaps even working yourself into a quasi-regular slot. Someone needs to come forward to fill a void, trumpeting the Administration's recent foreign policy successes from Haiti to North Korea (which even many critics grudgingly admit to) and how they fit in with the core themes of democratization and curbing rogue regimes in the same way that a clear connection has been made between trade, economic summits and growing the economy here at home (along the lines of "Look what we said we'd do, look what we did [and it wasn't easy!], and this is where we go from here") in a clear and convincing fashion.

Finally, I recently talked to Stan Roth whom I have known for some time. He has as copy of my presidential profile project proposal on Korea which I hope you will look upon favorably. I believe it could provide a useful politico-historical underpinning for the nuclear inspection agreement by demonstrating how past presidents have been backed into a corner on Korea. (to paraphrase Cy Vance in Hard Choices, "Every Administration has had its Korea problem and we were no exception") whereas in this instance, persistence paid off and North Korea is doing something it has never done before - comply fully with an agreement which severely restricts its internal freedom of action.

Regarding the recent helicopter incident - almost a carbon copy of one which occurred during the Carter Administration except for the fact that the survivor was released in three days rather than thirteen - can one conclude that Kim Il Sung was in a better mood than his son or more in control not needing to placate various constituencies before a release could be effected? I guess we'll just have to wait and see!

With best wishes for the New Year (and a happy New Year to you)

File - Korea 95
Re: copy to Korea
St. Paul by T. Kotch
Jan 11 1995
Stanley Hall

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9508102
RECEIVED: 06 NOV 95 09

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ANTI - AMER IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 09 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ROTH
SUETTINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/18/2012
2009-0528-f

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9508102

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE

Z 95110711 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION

002 PRESIDENT

Z 95110821 FOR INFORMATION

002

X 95111517 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 951108

VICE PRESIDENT

002 951108

WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 11/7 6:10 pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8102
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [Signature] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>we 11/8</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>ARS 11/9</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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cc: Lake Berger Bass
 Roth Svettinger
 COMMENTS _____

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~diskette requested 1700 11/7~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Anti-Americanism. Record ID: 9508102. (1 page)	11/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1444

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	South Korea. (6 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1444

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	Point Paper to Provide Perspective. (5 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1444

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. letter	To General John Shalikashvili from General Gary Luck. Subject: U.S. Force Korea position. (1 page)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1444

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. cable	re: Perspective. (3 pages)	10/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1444

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. memo	For Anthony Lake from Robert Suettinger. Subject: South Korea. (1 page)	11/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Sandra Kristoff)
OA/Box Number: 1040

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July - December, 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
vz1444

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