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Folder Title:

Korea [Folder 1] [9]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax cover sheet	Phone Number. [partial] (1 page)	03/30/1993	b(7)(C)
001b. report	Wisner-Tarnoff Breakfast. (2 pages)	03/30/1993	P1/b(1)
002. report	Page 4 of Unknown Report. (1 page)	02/10/1993	P1/b(1)
003. email	From White House Situation Room to Wagle, Patterson at 5:10pm. Subject: Reaction. (2 pages)	01/27/1993	P1/b(1)
004. report	South Korea. (7 pages)	02/1993	P1/b(1)
005. minutes	Principals Committee Meeting, November 15, 1993. Record ID: 9321299. (10 pages)	11/15/1993	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Steven Aoki. Subject: Deputies Meeting. Record ID: 9321250. (3 pages)	11/05/1993	P1/b(1)
006b. draft	Memo for Leon Fuerth, Rick Inderfurth, Marc Grossman et al. Subject: Deputies' Meeting. Record ID: 9321250. (1 page)	11/1993	P1/b(1)
006c. agenda	for Deputies' Meeting. Record ID: 9321250. (1 page)	11/1993	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Aoki. Subject: North Korea. Record ID: 9321300. (1 page)	11/16/1993	P1/b(1)
007b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: North Korea. Record ID: 9321300. (2 pages)	11/16/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs
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2009-0528-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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6/3/93
7:23pm

Leininger

Remarks by Secretary Aspin U.S.-Korea Business Conference

15 June 1993

Thank you very much. I'm very delighted to be here and have this chance to meet with you today. I'd like to take the opportunity to talk a little about our relationship with South Korea and the new U.S. Administration's defense policies.

The Republic of Korea is a great success story and a strong ally of the United States in Asia. We have a superb defense relationship. We have an excellent economic relationship. And our political ties are stronger than ever. We are very interested in the security of South Korea and in President Kim Young Sam's efforts to strengthen democracy.

Looking at the broader Asia Pacific region, America has a continued interest in being part of the area's phenomenal economic success. The U.S. remains committed to Asian security. We recognize our role in providing for Asian stability, and we want to support democratic and economic growth throughout the region.

I know that there is some concern that the new U.S. Administration is focused on other parts of the world and that American interest in Asia is waning. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Trade between the United States and Asian nations amounts to more than 300 billion dollars per year;

roughly 2.6 million American jobs depend on it. U.S. firms have invested more than 62 billion dollars in Asia. Trade with the region dwarfs U.S. trade with Europe, and the increase in trade has been dramatic -- more than 230 percent from 1978 to 1988. We have a stake and an interest in peace in Asia.

But there have been tremendous changes in the world in the past few years. The security environment of the last half-century has been transformed with startling speed. The Cold War is over. The Soviet Empire is gone. We must now ask ourselves some fundamental questions: What dangers threaten U.S. interests? What should be our strategy to cope with these dangers? What mix of initiatives and institutions can protect and defend our interests?

From the Clinton Administration's perspective, the old world of bi-polar rigidity has been replaced by a new world of fluid complexity. We see dangers in this new security environment in four broad areas: nuclear, regional, democratic and economic. Let me very briefly highlight each one.

The first is the new nuclear danger -- the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This threat is more dangerous than ever, given the crises which afflict our world after the Cold War, and the ease with which technology can be spread.

During the Cold War, we faced thousands of strategic nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union. They're still there, but the

threat of a strategic nuclear exchange has receded to the vanishing point.

The new nuclear danger we face stems from a handful of warheads in the hands of others. The leaders of the Soviet Union may have presided over an evil empire, but they weren't crazy when it came to nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons continue to spread, we won't always be sure about their new owners. That includes North Korea.

North Korea's potential development of nuclear weapons is the number one security threat in Northeast Asia. North Korea's refusal to allow inspections of its facilities and its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty potentially pose a grave danger. The prospect of North Korea with nuclear weapons is very dangerous and destabilizing. It's especially dangerous when we see North Korea also developing missiles with a range that allows them to hit South Korea and Japan. North Korea's forty-year history of aggression, terrorism, and irresponsible weapons sales adds to the concern over its potential possession of these weapons. [update]

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction demands actions to constrain suppliers and reduce the incentives for nations to seek these weapons. For better than twenty years we have joined with other countries in a variety of efforts aimed at stopping proliferation, including arms control treaties that restrict international trade in sensitive equipment and

materials. But the time is right for new and intensified efforts. We need to convince governments around the world to increase their export controls. And we need to give fresh thought to controlling the spread of sophisticated conventional weapons.

The second danger we face is from conflicts and crises that can threaten regional peace and stability. Here I'm talking about the actions of regional aggressors like Iraq; ethnic and religious civil wars that could spread across borders, as in the former Yugoslavia; and a breakdown in civil order, as in Somalia. To respond to these crises, we need fully capable armed forces stationed in the U.S. But we also need American forces stationed outside the U. S. We must be able to reach trouble spots quickly to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression. We also recognize that the forward presence of U.S. forces in a region demonstrates American commitment and can serve as the foundation for regional stability and security.

Let me specifically address one very worrisome problem -- North Korea's threat to peace and stability in Asia.

In addition to its nuclear threat, there is a North Korean conventional threat to South Korea -- an army of a million troops, two-thirds of which is deployed within 30 miles of the DMZ. This army exists in a nation that is undergoing a political transition that may not proceed peacefully. Kim Il-Sung may soon be gone. And the U.S. and South Korea must be prepared for

anything from internal collapse to desperate aggression. These contingencies would have an impact not only on the future of the Korean Peninsula but on the security of the entire region.

U.S. military forces must be able to deal with regional threats such as North Korea in concert with our allies. The ability to operate with ad hoc coalitions, demonstrated during the Gulf War, will be required in the future as well. The Gulf War showed that well-trained forces positioned in the Pacific, with access throughout Southeast Asia, can respond quickly and effectively. That's a capability we want to keep.

The third danger in the post-Cold War world arises from the possibility of the failure of democratic reform, especially in the former Soviet Union. It is in our interest to see democracy triumph.

Democracies tend to make war less, support terrorism less, make and keep better treaties. More democracies, less defense spending. More dictatorships, more defense spending. The rise of dictatorships in the former communist republics and elsewhere would likely mean a less peaceful world, and certainly a more difficult world for the United States and its allies.

The Defense Department has an important role to play in promoting democracy. The U.S. military can help spread understanding of the principles -- and benefits -- of civilian control of the military. Two weeks ago I was in Europe to open the Marshall Center in Germany. The center will bring together

individuals from Western Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. The studies, programs, and conferences carried out by the center will promote defense cooperation and provide education to military and civilian personnel. This will contribute to our efforts to educate the armed forces of the former Soviet Bloc on how the military operates in a democracy.

The countries of Asia know the tremendous advantages of democratic progress. The Republic of Korea is a particularly impressive example of how to build a democracy. The international trend is toward the open and free expression of ideas, and our security policies should support that trend.

The fourth danger in this new world is a failure to see national security interests in a way that includes the economy. This is one which affects each of you directly.

Economic well-being is vital to any nation's security. I think this is one area where this Administration clearly breaks with the previous one. We want to focus on putting our domestic economic house in order. We don't want to do that at the expense of our trading partners. On the contrary, a healthy U.S. economy will benefit all trading nations.

The most important thing we can do for U.S. security is to strengthen the American economy. In the short run, our defense depends upon strong, effective military forces capable of meeting any threats to our security. We've got that. But in the long run, U.S. national security depends upon economic strength. We

cannot fill, train, and equip an effective military force without a strong economy.

Our long-term well-being is in jeopardy in the United States today because of two decades of low productivity growth, lack of investment, and rising budget deficits. The improved security environment allows us to reduce the defense budget to help cut the deficit and provide funds for investment in economic growth. We have already begun the transition of our defense industries, workers, and military personnel toward a post-Cold War economy.

But the cuts in our defense budget and the size of our forces do not mean that we are abandoning our security commitments. There are some who ask whether the United States can, in current economic circumstances, afford to maintain troops in Asia; they should be asking whether we can afford not to. Today, across the U.S., Americans benefit, in employment, investment, and consumer goods, from the strength of our relations with Asia.

One reason why we can maintain our forward presence in Asia is that alliances foster stronger economic and trade relationships, and our Asian allies -- Japan and Korea -- contribute to mutual efforts and the cost of our presence. In 1989, South Korea paid 45 million dollars in direct contributions to support U.S. forces. In 1993, they're paying 220 million -- a 400 percent increase. And by 1995, they're committed to pick up one-third of our direct costs. That's a tremendous help in

supporting our forward presence in Korea.

There remains a significant role for U.S. presence in Asia, consisting of permanently stationed forces in Korea and Japan, and an aircraft carrier presence. But the safer environment resulting from the end of ^{the} Cold War does mean that we have been able to reduce troop strength without endangering regional security. Neither our adversaries nor our friends should mistake these adjustments in our ground and air forces as a diminishment of U.S. commitment.

Since 1990, the Department of Defense has pursued the East Asia Strategy Initiative -- a careful, three-phased approach to adjustments in America's force posture. In the first phase we carried out planned reductions of about 12 percent in our regional military strength and a similar additional reduction with the withdrawal from the Philippines.

Now we're in the second phase. And we'll make modest reductions in our forces in Japan. But we've halted the withdrawal of about 6,500 troops from South Korea because of the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

The third phase will run from 1996 to the turn of the century. As we approach it, we will evaluate the security environment and consult often with our allies and friends. We want to make sure we have the military strength that is needed to guarantee regional stability and protect our mutual interests into the Twenty-first Century.

We would hope that the security situation, especially the North Korean nuclear program, will have improved to the point that we can proceed with additional adjustments. But we are not going to cut military strength without regard to the strategic implications.

In Asia, we are shifting from a large permanent U.S. military presence to a more widely dispersed regional posture. This includes arrangements that give our forces access to facilities in the region. Some are formal, such as the one concluded with Singapore in 1990. And some are informal, such as the arrangements for commercial use and repairs that we have throughout the region. We're also conducting joint training activities, information exchanges, periodic ship visits, and professional military education programs with our friends and allies. These are important elements that underscore America's continuing security interest in Asia.

We believe that the U.S. presence in Asia has been a check against potential adventurism and aggression. It has created a climate of stability permitting the evolution of democracy and economic progress. Throughout the vast Asian Pacific region, economies have prospered and democratic institutions have taken root along with an ever increasing commitment to human rights. Americans will remain engaged in East Asia and the Pacific. By doing so, we promote our own hopes for democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity.

These are particularly exciting times. The challenges and difficulties are great, but the opportunity to create a more peaceful, stable and prosperous world is even greater. We're making great changes in our defense effort. With these changes, we hope to lay the foundation for a Twenty-first Century marked by democracy, peace and prosperity.

Thank you very much.

TREASURY NEWS



Department of the Treasury

Washington, D.C.

Telephone 202-622-2960

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JUNE 14, 1993

REMARKS OF LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE U.S. - KOREA BUSINESS COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

It's a pleasure to be here meeting with corporate leaders of Korea and the United States. As a Treasury official and an economic analyst, I find your focus this year on financial sector liberalization to be highly appropriate. As we meet today, we have the opportunity to highlight the tasks facing both our countries as we prepare our economies to meet the twenty-first century.

The Challenges of the 1990s

The United States and Korea now confront the challenge of renewal in order to keep pace with the rapidly evolving world. The United States is facing up to its responsibilities to contribute to a growing global economy. Korea also has a major responsibility to help make that happen. Importantly, we must work together to bring about the changes needed if all our futures are to be secure and prosperous.

First, in the United States we are focusing on reinvigorating macroeconomic coordination with our G-7 partners to spur economic growth. Growth in Europe is weak, and little better in Japan, despite the stimulus program. Japan's large trade surplus continues to grow and serve as a drag on other economies. We are seeking additional action to spur growth.

We have worked hard to restore U.S. credibility in the international economic arena. The President has offered a sound plan to reduce the U.S. budget deficit and improve domestic savings and investment, with the emphasis on social and physical infrastructure – specifically roads, plant, and equipment to raise our future productivity. The markets, which are the most critical judge, have responded positively with a substantial decline in long-term interest rates. Most recently, signs of emerging strength in job creation are generating some confidence that our growth may strengthen as well.

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Second, our focus on growth leads us to what we might call export activism -- for services as well as goods. Korea, and its leaders of industry meeting here today, know only too well that strong export growth can fuel rapid domestic expansion and rising living standards. In the United States, our export growth offset weak domestic demand growth in the United States until recently and kept our economy moving forward, albeit slowly. Our export activism recognizes that we cannot have imports without exports, or exports without imports. As President Clinton said "we must compete, not retreat."

Our export activism is directed at expanded trade, not managed trade. It is directed at getting other countries to expand their imports, not reduce their exports. Export activism recognizes that markets are not perfect and that governments sometimes need to help contribute to a better functioning market. Now our governments need to make markets more open.

Broadening this to a "market access activism" approach leads us in the financial sector to open financial markets abroad to U.S. firms, just as foreign firms have access to our market. Secretary Bentsen expressed this view when he voiced concern during his confirmation hearing that some foreign countries still do not give U.S. banks and securities firms a fair opportunity to compete in their financial markets. I think it is fair to say that Korea could be counted among those countries, as I will detail in a few moments.

Korea's Economic Future

The high growth achievements of Korea and other Asian nations have been spectacular. These accomplishments have come as a result of hard work, high savings, and an uncanny sense of the direction of global markets. Asian firms have moved swiftly to capture major shares of key industrial markets and have provided low cost, high quality products.

As we move towards the G-7 summit in Tokyo next month, I believe that many global economic leaders will be looking beyond Japan. Many other Asian powerhouses will be providing the basis for strong regional and perhaps even global growth as we move into the twenty-first century. In the United States we have a keen appreciation of Asian competitive skills and the potential expanse of Asian markets.

Our skill at developing a fully integrated, truly multilateral global economy will be tested in the coming months. The United States will be hosting the next APEC Ministerial in Seattle this fall and looks forward to that opportunity to solidify and convey our regional aspirations. A United States dis-engaged from Asia will be a United States diminished -- this Administration will not let this occur.

Korea's growing global influence is demonstrated by several unique and some

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shared characteristics. Korea's importance to the United States is borne out by the fact that it is the first bilateral visit of our President outside of the G-7. Korea's role in the Uruguay Round, its high profile participation in APEC, and its border with one of the world's few remaining hard-line communist regimes will generate tremendous challenges and opportunities in the years to come. But if the Republic of Korea is to meet those challenges it must build on the achievements of its first 45 years. There is much to be proud of:

- In 1962 per capita income was \$82 and now exceeds \$6700, more than doubling in the last five years alone.
- Over the past 30 years, Korea's real economic growth has averaged over 8 percent.
- In 1962 Korea's exports totalled just \$43 million, compared to \$75 billion last year.
- Today, Korea is the United States' eighth largest trading partner. Korean shipbuilding, steel, and construction firms are among the most respected internationally, and many Korean consumer products have become household names world-wide.

On the political front as well, the Republic of Korea has made truly impressive strides, perhaps most clearly reflected by the election of President Kim Young Sam, the first civilian President in more than 30 years. Like President Clinton, President Kim was voted into office on an agenda for economic and political change. His ambitious anti-corruption campaign has garnered strong popular support, giving him the confidence that we hope will bring equally fundamental changes to the Korean view of its place in the global economy. Competitiveness will continue to be paramount to every economy; the opportunity to compete must be open to all players, whether domestic or foreign.

That is the real challenge facing Korea today: does it have the foresight to test the economy's competitiveness, and in so doing strengthen it? Or, will barriers to market access in Korea continue to dull the edge of Korean industry while remaining a major irritant in relations with major trading partners? The next few weeks will provide the answers to these questions as President Kim and his new government complete their work on the five year economic plan.

Korean Financial Sector Reform: The Credibility Test

As many of you know, the Treasury Department has engaged the Korean Ministry of Finance in Financial Policy Talks since early 1990. Over a year ago, in March 1992, the Korean authorities committed to preparing a blueprint for financial sector liberalization. Our interests in this process are two-fold.

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First, we seek opportunity for all our competitive sectors. We want our industry to be able to invest in Korea and once in Korea, to be able to continue operating on a sound and equal footing. Korea's domestic market consists of increasingly sophisticated individuals and firms, making Korea potentially attractive for a wide range of investment.

Second, our financial services industry is a global leader and should have full access to this important market. Our own financial market is so open and competitive that, to paraphrase Frank Sinatra, if our firms can make it here, they can make it anywhere. Our banks, securities firms, and other financial services providers have technological advantage in many products, including derivatives, syndicated loans, and securitization. Broadened access to the Korean market would help U.S. firms diversify internationally their asset portfolios. And the earnings of these financial firms are an important offset to our merchandise trade deficit.

In the coming weeks the Korean administration will be finalizing its five year economic plan, which will include a focus on the financial sector. The financial plan should include the following:

- First, decontrol domestic interest rates and cease reliance on "window guidance."
- Second, ease restrictions on capital account and foreign exchange transactions more generally, including restrictions on deferred payments for imports and on underlying documentation required for foreign exchange transactions.
 - These restrictions impact most severely on foreign financial institutions, given their natural business.
- Third, abandon directed credit schemes, which limits banks' abilities to lend to what they perceive to be the most profitable ventures.
- Fourth, adopt more indirect means of monetary control, which would free banks from mandatory purchases of government bonds and allow for freer movement of capital flows.
- Fifth, enhance foreign financial institutions' access to won funding sources which serve no purpose but to limit the ability of foreign firms to do business in Korea.
- Sixth, make the Korean regulatory environment transparent, consistent and open.

We believe that these measures are needed to open the Korean financial sector. If such clear steps in the direction of market opening are undertaken in this new plan, I believe we will see the initiation of an expanding bilateral economic relationship with symbiotic benefits to both the United States and Korea.

- 5 -

From Korea's point of view, such steps would bring down painfully high domestic interest rates and restore incentives to invest in Korea. Enhanced intellectual property protection and a revamped foreign investment environment would also contribute to attracting foreign investment and securing leading edge technology.

Steps to open further the stock market to foreign participation would increase the capitalization of the Korean stock market and help Korean firms diversify away from an overwhelming focus on debt financing. The Korean capital market would deepen with such a forward moving approach, making a critically important contribution to Korea's future.

Uruguay Round

Our bilateral efforts to promote financial sector opening are paralleled in the Uruguay Round financial services negotiations. A major effort is underway to reach agreement on market access issues among the G-7 countries by the time of the Tokyo summit. Our efforts in financial services, however, have been hampered by the large number of free riders. The most favored nation (MFN) provision of the Dunkel text requires countries that have open financial markets to extend these benefits to all countries, even those with closed markets. It provides little incentive for countries with significant barriers to market access to liberalize.

It is for this reason that the United States has taken an MFN exemption in financial services and it is our intention to retain that position unless and until others undertake significant liberalization that will provide meaningful market access for our financial firms. I would venture to say that without a substantially improved financial services offer, Korea stands a chance of falling into that category. Korea's dependence on an open international trade regime for the foundation of its economic success, highlights Korea's need to take a leadership role in bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion. An acceptable Uruguay Round financial services offer would also enhance greatly the credibility of Korea's liberalization plan.

Conclusion

As Korea moves to join the OECD, a commendable goal, new standards of economic behavior will be required. Announcing a far-ranging financial sector reform plan, incorporating it into the Uruguay Round and achieving membership in the OECD will make Korea a first class economic power. A strong financial sector will be key to sustaining Korea's economic powerhouse, a goal now all the more important with unification of the Korean peninsula looming on the horizon.

Korea and the United States both are launching new Administrations voted in with a mandate for change. Like the U.S., Korea faces new challenges, both political and economic, and the time has come to devise new approaches to these challenges.

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With expanding trade and financial linkages a positive sum game, I believe that Korea and the United States can work together to achieve our shared goals. We want to succeed and we want Korea to succeed.

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
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OKover

**KEYNOTE STATEMENT BY
FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
KANG SOK JU, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

(At the Official Talks between
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
and the United States of America)

New York, June 1993



**PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION**

I think it is significant that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America have started bilateral talks today.

Our bilateral face-to-face meeting itself demonstrates the character of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. We believe we have now got on the right track in seeking solution to the nuclear issue. It is, of course, a belated start, but it is fortunate, anyway.

Our talks should not be misused by either side to pursue its ulterior intentions. Equality and impartiality should prevail at our talks and any unilateral demands should not be imposed on either side.

The attitude of the two sides at the talks will be a touchstone that confirms whether both sides are really serious in their desire to find the solution.

We are looking forward to a fruitful outcome of the talks. We are seriously considering the impact which the outcome of our talks will have on the future of the bilateral relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States in particular and on the international situation in general.

For this reason, our talks, to all intents and purposes, should be substantial and meaningful talks. We are sincere and serious in our position to find the solution. And therefore, we do not care either the ranking of the officials or the formula of the talks.

Our Government has earlier decided to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This decision is clearly a logical consequence of the United States policy to strangle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Our decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the consequential outcome of the policy pursued by the United States so far over the last four decades since the end of the Korean War, a policy of hostility against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

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In the cold war era, hostility in the inter-State relations was reasoned as essential justification for the so-called differences in ideology and for the balance of power.

Now, the cold war era has ended, but the United States still follows up with its policy of antagonizing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and nothing will serve to justify the validity of such policy. We have come to the conclusion that the unchanged anti-DPRK policy of the United States is, after all, intended to strangle our socialist system.

Our decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is also motivated by the double-crossing acts of the United States against our good will.

We have fulfilled in good faith the agreement reached at the previous bilateral DPRK-US high-level talks last year.

We have signed the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and faithfully accepted six ad hoc inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We have made such progress at the inter-Korean dialogue that the north and south have adopted and effectuated the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

This is our greatest good will and concession to the United States.

However, the United States has gone back on its commitments to refrain from interfering in our internal affairs and from posing nuclear threats, and abused our good will in its efforts to stamp out our political system.

While the north and south were moving towards improved inter-Korean relations, the United States resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, only to plunge the inter-Korean dialogue into a deadlock, and to seriously threaten the existence of our Republic.

And while the ad hoc inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency was under way in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States tried to impose " special inspections " so as to disarm our Republic.

The United States has intentionally spurned at our call for direct talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States and tried to isolate our Republic internationally.

Meanwhile, the United States has launched all forms of smear campaigns about the prospect of our political system.

All these actions have been launched in coincidence and in high intensity. We have felt bitterly disillusioned by such double-crossing actions of the United States, and we have confirmed that there has been no change in the United States policy to strangle our Republic, and we have decided that we can no longer believe in the credibility of the United States.

It would be nothing but a sheer-humiliation for us, if we continued fulfillment of our obligations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty even under such pressure, perfidy and indignity. And we felt our survival jeopardized.

This is why we have finally decided to take a self-defensive measure to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to make a clean slate of the contempt we have suffered for having been sold down the river and to defend our own dignity and our right to survival. Our withdrawal is the political decision we have taken after a serious consideration of all possible options.

The actions taken by the United States following the announcement of our decision have reconfirmed us in our belief that we were right in our assessment of the United States policy.

Ever since the announcement of our decision to withdraw from the Treaty, the United States has tried to internationalize our nuclear issue with a view to bringing heavy pressure to bear upon our country.

The United States has manipulated the International Atomic Energy agency to charge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement and referred the nuclear issue to the United Nations, and made the United Nations Security Council adopt an unacceptable resolution against our country.

This has brought us to a clear conclusion that the real intention of the United States is not to try to resolve the nuclear issue but to practice on this issue to strangle our political system.

If the United States had been really serious in its intention to resolve the nuclear issue, it would not have rejected from the outset our earlier proposal for direct bilateral talks. But the United States intended to strangle our country and therefore it must have preferred pressure to dialogue.

In the first part of my statement, I have highlighted the importance of the attitude of the two sides to the talks, because we are still skeptical as to whether the United States is indeed serious in seeking a solution to the nuclear issue or it is going to use the bilateral talks to renew its pressure on our country.

As for our position we have consistently maintained so far with respect to the nuclear issue, we would not manufacture nuclear weapons, and we do not need nuclear weapons, either.

We have never thought of making nuclear weapons.

As early as in 1983, we proposed the idea of a nuclear free Northeast Asia. In 1985, we joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since 1986, we have voiced our call for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. We have called for a North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which we have finally succeeded in adopting together with the south. We have shown good faith and sincerity in accepting the ad hoc inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have built self-supportive atomic energy industry which is geared absolutely to peaceful purposes.

We do not need nuclear bombs.

From the rational viewpoint, any big weapon must be systemized and arsenalized. Even if we had one or two atomic bombs, we could not challenge the United States that can shower tens of thousands of atomic bombs on our country.

Suppose we have one or two atomic bombs, and can we simply fire away such a scanty stock of the bombs and then just sit down empty-handed, waiting for massive nuclear retaliation?

It is very clear to anybody that one or two atomic bombs are not enough to blow up either Japan or South Korea, to say nothing of the United States.

Even at this moment, we have no intention to possess atomic bombs, and we sincerely hope not to do so.

Our conventional armaments are sufficient for our purpose of self-defense. The whole country, the entire people and all the armed forces are armed with the conventional weapons, forming a nationwide fortification, and this is what we pride ourselves on.

When we sound rather too self-confident, it does not mean that we have any super weapon to build our confidence upon. Our confidence is based on such self-defensive national defense capability.

However, our patience has its limit. Our decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a warning that our non-nuclear policy has reached its breaking point. We are prepared to sacrifice our life to defend our dignity and to obtain quid pro quo.

Our future option depends entirely on the outcome of our bilateral talks.

For the fundamental solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, it would be essential for the United States to revise its DPRK policy in line with the changes in the post cold war international relations.

First, It would be important for the United States to rescind its policy of strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

If the United States had not posed nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the nuclear issue would not have originated on the Korean peninsula at all.

If the United States did not try to strangle our country, we would not face such an extreme situation as it is today.

The United States still pursues this policy and tries to impose its unilateral demands on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We believe this is a totally unacceptable high-handed act of a Superpower.

Second, it is important for the United States to call off all forms of pressure and revoke its policy of hostility against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Hostility in bilateral relations breeds mistrust, and mistrust, in turn, ends up in confrontation.

Any pressure on our country will never lead to a solution of the nuclear issue.

We will not be frightened by economic sanctions. We have habituated and physically adapted ourselves to living on our own, and we have firmed up our own mode of living in our own way.

We are prepared to take a resolute self-defensive measure to counter any military attack.

Third, The United States will have to recognize and respect our entity and political system.

As the Charter of the United Nations stipulates, the world community is based on the principle of the sovereign equality and self-determination of all its Members.

The United States will have to drop its concept and standpoint of styling itself the leader of the community and regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a renegade of the community.

No problems will be resolved if our bilateral relations remains based on such standpoint, because we place more value on our sovereignty than our life.

Fourth, Our bilateral relations should be relations of equality, mutual benefits, good-neighborhood and cooperation.

If the United States approaches the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with rapprochement, we will return it with the same rapprochement.

If the United States pledges not to strangle our country, we will also want to live on good terms with Americans.

There is no need for our two nations to keep on playing cat and dog in a childish way indefinitely.

We are a member of the world community and we are also seeking for right to survival like other nations.

If the United States offers to help us, we would be willing to accept it.

The point of immediate priority is that the United States rescind its policy of strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and posing nuclear threat against the DPRK.

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Of course, we might not be able to resolve all the pending issues at one go. At this round of the bilateral talks, we might just as well discuss only those issues related more directly to the nuclear issue.

We want to obtain a policy commitment from the United States that it will not try to strangle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and in return the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will make its own policy commitment that it will not manufacture nuclear weapons. This is our major objective at this round of our bilateral talks.

If the two sides agree to make their respective policy commitments at our talks, then we can proceed to our joint search for the ways to practically guarantee and verify these commitments.

Such bilateral policy commitments would have to be kept on record in a mutually acceptable format of a joint document.

If such a document is adopted, we would be willing to propose our further ideas on how to guarantee and verify the proposed policy commitments.

* * *

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400



COVER SHEET PLUS 5 PAGES

FROM: CCOA Quinn

DATE: 25 JAN 93

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REMARKS:

TEAM SPIRIT MSGS - PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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SUBJ: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE--TEAM SPIRIT 93

A. CINCPAC WFO SEOUL KORA 280100Z DEC 92

B. USCINCPAC DBT54Z JAN 93

1. REF A PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR SUBJECT EXERCISE.

REF B PROVIDES CINCPAC ENDORSEMENT WITH CHANGES.

2. OASD(PA) CONCURS WITH ACTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH AND WILL MAKE EXERCISE RELEASE 0800 (EST) 26 JAN 93 TO COINCIDE WITH RELEASE IN SEOUL.

3. REQUEST USCINCPAC COORDINATE WITH CINCPAC WFO TO INCORPORATE CHANGES TO ORIGINAL PAG AND RETRANSMIT.

4. REF A APPROVED WITH CHANGES NOTED REF B, EXCEPTING CHANGE RECOMMENDED PARA 5, ANSWER 4, AND THE FOLLOWING:

A. PARA 4A, THIRD SENTENCE: CHANGE TO READ: (QUOTE) THE PURPOSE OF TEAM SPIRIT 93 IS TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSIVE READINESS OF ROK AND BOTH ROK BASED AND CONUS BASED U.S. FORCES THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED/JOINT OPERATIONS (UNQUOTE).

B. PARA 5A: INSERT FOLLOWING AS Q2/A2. (QUOTE) Q2. THE TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISE WAS CANCELED IN 1992 TO PROMOTE A MORE PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT. WHAT HAS CHANGED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA THAT WOULD WARRANT GOING AHEAD WITH PREPARATIONS FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93?

A2. SUSPENSION OF THE TEAM SPIRIT 92 WAS AN EXCEPTIONAL MEASURE TAKEN IN JANUARY 1992 IN RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA'S COMMITMENT TO TAKE THE FIRST STEPS VIA IAEA SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, THE EXERCISE WAS SUSPENDED IN THE HOPE THAT FURTHER PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE INCLUDING ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE BILATERAL NUCLEAR INSPECTION REGIME. THE 8 OCTOBER 1992 U.S./ROK SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS COMMUNIQUE INDICATED THAT, "IN THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENT IN SOUTH-NORTH RELATIONS ESPECIALLY ON BILATERAL NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS," THE U.S. AND ROK WOULD CONTINUE PREPARATIONS FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93. SINCE THAT TIME, NORTH KOREA HAS NOT TAKEN STEPS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO RESOLVING SOUTH-NORTH DIFFERENCES; ESPECIALLY ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AND BILATERAL INSPECTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, PREPARATIONS FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93 HAVE GONE FORWARD AND WILL CONTINUE, TO INCLUDE TROOP AND EQUIPMENT DEPLOYMENTS (UNQUOTE).

C. INSERT FOLLOWING AS Q3/A3 AND RENUMBER ACCORDINGLY. (QUOTE) Q3. NORTH KOREA SAYS TEAM SPIRIT IS A NUCLEAR AND OFFENSIVE EXERCISE DESIGNED TO THREATEN THE NORTH. WHY DO THE U.S. AND ROK WANT TO THREATEN NORTH KOREA?

A3. AS NOTED IN OUR OPENING STATEMENT, TEAM SPIRIT IS A SOLELY DEFENSIVE EXERCISE. IT IS CONDUCTED IN AN EAST-WEST RATHER THAN SOUTH-WEST AXIS, AND IT IS A STRICTLY CONVENTIONAL, NON-NUCLEAR EXERCISE. WE WOULD NOTE THAT MILITARY OBSERVERS OF PREVIOUS TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISES, INCLUDING THOSE REPRESENTING THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (NSC) NATIONS OF POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA (WHICH WERE APPOINTED TO THAT BODY BY NORTH KOREA), HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT THE EXERCISE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE. IN A PRESS

CONFERENCE IN SEOUL IN MARCH 1991, THE NSC REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THIS POINT, AND THAT BY INVITING OBSERVERS THE SOUTH-KOREANS HAD HELPED TO EASE TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA AND DEMONSTRATED THE OPENNESS OF THEIR DEFENSE POLICY (UNQUOTE). C. PARA 5A(A4) THIRD LINE: DELETE (QUOTE) OFFENSIVE AND (UNQUOTE).

E. PARA 5A(A4): CHANGE THIRD SENTENCE TO READ: (QUOTE) IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THIS YEAR'S TEAM SPIRIT WILL BE SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS EXERCISES, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF U.S. FORCES WILL BE SOMEWHAT REDUCED (UNQUOTE).

5. OASD(PA) DESIRES AUDIOVISUAL COVERAGE OF TEAM SPIRIT 93 INCLUDING STILL, ELECTRONIC, AND VIDEOTAPE COVERAGE OF ALL PHASES OF THE EXERCISE. COLOR SLIDES ARE REQUESTED WITH COMPLETE CAPTIONS AND CREDIT LINES. VIDEOTAPE CLIPS WITH NATURAL SOUND (EDITED AND UNEDITED). SHIP AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAILABLE OR FEDERAL EXPRESS (NO. 1548-9866-6) ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, ROOM 5A516 THE PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20330-2900 MARK PACKAGES TO THE ATTENTION OF CJC. ONCE MATERIAL HAS BEEN SHIPPED, CONTACT OIC AT OSA 227-1900 WITH THE SHIPPING INFORMATION (BEEPER 203 896-2618). OASD(PA) POC: LENA CARTER OR BETTE SPRIGG AT AC 203 695-0168.

4. OASD(PA) POC FOR PLANS IS LCOR BRIAN CULLIN, USN AT OSA 226-1074/COMM (703) 693-1074. OASD(PA) POC FOR QUERIES IS LTC KERRY GERSHANECA, USMC, AT OSA 227-5131/COMM (703) 697-5131. BT

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SUBJ/PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - TEAM SPIRIT 93//

REF/A/RMG/CINC UNC CFC/280100ZDEC92//

NARR/REF A IS CINC UNC CFC PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93.

POC/PATTON/MAJ/PRIPHN: (808)477-1349/SECPHN: (808)477-6481//

RMKS/1. REF A IS THEATER-COORDINATED PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS

GUIDANCE AND IS FORWARDED FOR ASD(PA) APPROVAL WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

A. IN PARAGRAPH 4A, FIRST SENTENCE, ADD "(DATE AND TIME TBD)" BETWEEN "SIMULTANEOUSLY" AND "IN."

B. IN PARAGRAPH 4B, LINE 7, DELETE "KPA AND CPV" AND REPLACE WITH "NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT."

C. IN PARAGRAPH 5, ANSWER 1, DELETE "NO" AND ADD "MILITARY" BETWEEN "SCHEDULED" AND "TRAINING."

D. IN PARAGRAPH 5, ANSWER 4, DELETE AS WRITTEN AND REPLACE WITH: "AS A MATTER OF POLICY WE DO NOT NORMALLY DISCUSS DETAILS OF EXERCISE SCENARIOS. IN GENERAL, THIS EXERCISE, LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, WILL INVOLVE AIR, LAND AND SEA BATTLE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF COMBINED/JOINT FORCES IN AN EAST-WEST SCENARIO."

E. IN PARAGRAPH 5, DELETE QUESTION AND ANSWER 15 AND RENUMBER QUESTION AND ANSWER 16 ACCORDINGLY.

F. IN PARAGRAPH 7B(2), FIRST SENTENCE, ADD "MILITARY MEDIA" BETWEEN "INFORMATION:" AND "PHOTOGRAPHY." IN SECOND SENTENCE, ADD "MILITARY MEDIA-GENERATED" BETWEEN "INCLUDES" AND "MATERIALS." DELETE THIRD SENTENCE, WHICH BEGINS WITH "MATERIALS" AND ENDS WITH "GUIDANCE."

G. IN PARAGRAPH 7B(3)(C), DELETE FIRST AND SECOND SENTENCE AS WRITTEN AND REPLACE WITH "DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL: DEPLOYMENT OF THE POOL IS NOT RECOMMENDED, HOWEVER, UNIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS/NCO'S SHOULD PLAN FOR AND BE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE THIS POOL IF TASKED BY CFPA."

H. IN PARAGRAPH 7D, LAST SENTENCE, REPLACE "ESCORT" WITH "LIAISON."

I. IN PARAGRAPH 7D(3), LAST SENTENCE, REPLACE "ESCORTS" WITH "LIAISON OFFICERS."// BT

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SECTION 001 OF 003

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - TEAM SPIRIT 93 (U)

A. TS 92 SMB

B. DOD INST 5405.3

1. (U) EXERCISE INFORMATION: EXERCISE TEAM SPIRIT IS A JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISE THAT IS CONDUCTED IN THE SPRING. THE EXERCISE INVOLVES FORCES FROM BOTH THE U.S. AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

2. (U) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO FORWARD FOR COORDINATION THEATER APPROVED PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE REGARDING THE EXERCISE. THIS PROPOSED GUIDANCE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH IN-COUNTRY PLAYERS INCLUDING THE ROK MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

3. (U) GENERAL: THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93 WILL BE ACTIVE. THIS ALLOWS PARTICIPATING UNITS TO SOLICIT MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE EXERCISE, INCLUDING UNIT PREPARATIONS. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES WILL INCLUDE:

A. EMPHASIS THAT THE EXERCISE IS A ROUTINE, REGULARLY SCHEDULED DEFENSIVE EXERCISE.

B. EMPHASIS THAT THE TRAINING IS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ROK AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.

C. DEMONSTRATING THE COMBAT READINESS OF ROK AND U.S. SUPPORTING FORCES THROUGH A COMBINED/JOINT FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE.

D. FOCUS ON ROK/US INTEROPERABILITY IN COMBINED EXERCISES

4. (U) SPECIFIC:

A. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED STATEMENT WILL BE MADE APPROXIMATELY SIMULTANEOUSLY IN SEOUL AND IN WASHINGTON, DC.: QUOTE: THE UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT THE 17TH TEAM SPIRIT FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE WILL BEGIN IN MID-MARCH 1993 AND LAST ABOUT TEN DAYS. THE EXERCISE WILL INVOLVE ROK AND U.S. FORCES STATIONED IN KOREA AND U.S. FORCES DEPLOYING TO THE THEATER. THE PURPOSE OF TEAM SPIRIT 93 IS TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSIVE READINESS OF ROK AND COMUS BASED U.S. FORCES THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED/JOINT OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS INCLUDE RECEIVING, STAGING, EMPLOYING AND REDEPLOYING OUT-OF-COUNTRY FORCES. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON IMPROVING ROK/U.S. COMBINED PARTICIPATION TO ENSURE THESE FORCES HAVE THE READINESS NECESSARY TO DETER AGGRESSION AND PRESERVE THE FREEDOM OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. THE FIRST TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISE WAS CONDUCTED IN JUNE 1978. UNQUOTE.

B. IN SEOUL, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE RELEASED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE TS 93 ANNOUNCEMENT: QUOTE: THE ROK GOVERNMENT NOTIFIED NORTH KOREA TODAY THAT FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE TEAM SPIRIT 93 WILL BE HELD FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN MID-MARCH, WITH SOME STAGING AND DEPLOYMENTS COMMENCING IN JANUARY. THE NORTH WAS ALSO INFORMED THAT THE ROK GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO INVITE APPROPRIATE KPA AND CPV AUTHORITIES AND THE FOUR PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION TO OBSERVE THE EXERCISE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND INVITATION IS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THIS RECURRING DEFENSIVE TRAINING EVENT. UNQUOTE.

FINAL DISTR ADDED FOR JCS PER MAJ MCCLELLAN/SJS

ACTION

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5. (U) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

A. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS MAY BE USED AFTER THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE EXERCISE:

Q1. IS THIS EXERCISE CONNECTED WITH THE POLITICAL OR MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY?

A1. NO. THIS IS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED TRAINING EXERCISE. SIMILAR COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED SINCE JUNE 1978.

Q2. WHAT ARE COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISES?

A2. A COMBINED OPERATION INVOLVES MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY. A JOINT OPERATION INVOLVES MORE THAN ONE SERVICE OF A SINGLE COUNTRY. A COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISE INVOLVES MORE THAN ONE SERVICE FROM MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY. IN TS 93, SUPPORTING FORCES FROM THE U.S. AND ROK WILL OPERATE TOGETHER UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND (CFC).

Q3. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISE?

A3. THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE IS TO ALLOW CINC CFC AND CFC COMPONENT COMMANDERS TO TRAIN AND EVALUATE THE COMMAND'S CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE ROK/US AIR-LAND-SEA DEFENSIVE BATTLE DOCTRINE AND TO EVALUATE AUGMENTATION BY U.S. BASED FORCES.

Q4. WHAT IS THE SCENARIO FOR THE EXERCISE?

A4. WHILE WE DO NOT NORMALLY DISCUSS DETAILS OF EXERCISE SCENARIOS, THIS EXERCISE LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, WILL INVOLVE AIR, LAND AND SEA BATTLE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF COMBINED/JOINT FORCES IN AN EAST-WEST SCENARIO.

Q5. ARE ANY NATIONS OTHER THAN THE U.S. AND THE ROK INVOLVED?

A5. NO. THERE ARE NO THIRD COUNTRY UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE.

Q6. CAN THE MEDIA COVER EVENTS DURING TS 93 AS IN PAST YEARS?

A6. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE EXERCISE WILL BE OPEN FOR COVERAGE BY MEDIA; HOWEVER, THE EMPHASIS WILL BE ON TRAINING. PRESS COVERAGE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO DISRUPT THE TRAINING VALUE OF THE EXERCISE.

Q7. HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS YEAR'S EXERCISE?

A7. MORE THAN 100,000 PERSONNEL WILL PARTICIPATE IN TEAM SPIRIT 93. THIS INCLUDES ROK FORCES, U.S. FORCES THAT ARE STATIONED IN THE ROK AND U.S. AUGMENTING FORCES.

Q8. WHAT IS THE MISSION OF CFC?

A8. THE ROK/U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND WAS ESTABLISHED IN NOVEMBER 1978 BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ROK AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF DEFENDING THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

Q9. DOES THAT MEAN TEAM SPIRIT IS DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND'S ABILITY TO ACTUALLY DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA?

A9. TEAM SPIRIT IS TRAINING, NOT A WAR GAME. TRAINING IS ESSENTIAL TO ALL MILITARY FORCES TO HONE AND RETAIN UNIT AND INDIVIDUAL SKILLS. IT IS PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL IN A BINATIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION SUCH AS CFC, TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF THE FORCES.

Q10. DOES THE PARTICIPATION OF DEPLOYED U.S. SUPPORTING FORCES INDICATE THAT THEY ARE THE COMBAT ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO KOREA IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ROK?

A10. NO. THIS EXERCISE IS NOT RELATED TO ANY SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PLANS INVOLVING OFFSHORE AMERICAN FORCES. THESE ARE THE TYPES OF FORCES WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN DEFENDING THE ROK UNDER TERMS OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY.

Q11. WHAT SPECIFIC ROK PARTICIPATION IS THERE IN TEAM SPIRIT?

A11. QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED ABOUT ROK PARTICIPATION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE PAO.

Q12. WHICH U.S. UNITS WILL PARTICIPATE?

A12. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, WE DO NOT DISCUSS SUCH OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

Q13. WILL AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER PARTICIPATE THIS YEAR?

A13. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, WE DO NOT DISCUSS SUCH OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

Q14. WILL THIS YEAR'S TEAM SPIRIT DIFFER FROM PREVIOUS YEARS?

A14. EACH EXERCISE VARIES TO SOME DEGREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESIRED TRAINING OBJECTIVES. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THIS YEAR'S TEAM SPIRIT WILL BE SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS EXERCISES. IN ADDITION TO AN FTX, A CPV WILL ALSO BE CONDUCTED DURING THIS YEAR'S EXERCISE. COMPUTER SIMULATION SYSTEMS WILL BE USED DURING THE CPV TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERALL EXERCISE.

Q15. WHAT STATE-OF-THE-ART EQUIPMENT WILL BE USED DURING THIS YEAR'S EXERCISE?

A15. SIMILAR SYSTEMS TO THOSE USED IN PREVIOUS TEAM SPIRITS WILL BE

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EMPLOYED FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93. SOME OF THESE SYSTEMS WILL BE DISPLAYED TO THE MEDIA DURING THE EXERCISE.

Q16: WHAT OTHER NATIONS MAY OBSERVE THE EXERCISE?

A16: THE ROK GOVERNMENT HAS INVITED NORTH KOREA, RUSSIA, CHINA AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION TO OBSERVE THE EXERCISE.

B. AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, ANY QUESTIONS THAT CANNOT BE ANSWERED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT AND O'S AND A'S WILL BE TAKEN WITHOUT COMMENT AND FORWARDED WITH THE PROPOSED ANSWER, IF KNOWN, TO CFPA-P1 (MESSAGE ADDRESS CINC UNC CFC SEOUL KOR//CFPA-P1//).

6. (U) CONTINGENCY STATEMENT: THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ANY ASPECT OF TS 93 UNTIL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE IN SEOUL, KOREA AND/OR WASHINGTON, D.C. IN THE EVENT OF INQUIRY PRIOR TO THE INITIAL RELEASE, FORWARD THE INQUIRY WITHOUT COMMENT, TO THE UNC/CFC PAO (CFPA).

7. (U) MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

A. THE UNC/CFC PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE WILL ESTABLISH A C/JIB TO OPERATE FROM THREE DAYS PRIOR TO STARTX TO THREE DAYS AFTER ENDEX AT SUMON AB. BRIEFINGS TO NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE SCHEDULED AS NECESSARY. THE C/JIB WILL BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM THE UNC/CFC AND USFK/EUSA PAO AND AUGMENTED BY ANG/AR PERSONNEL, AND OTHER PACIFIC AREA COMMANDS. THE C/JIB WILL BE THE CENTER OF OPERATIONS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES RELATED TO TS 93. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE C/JIB WILL COORDINATE NEWS MEDIA VISITS, TOURS, AND INTERVIEWS AS APPROPRIATE. THE C/JIB WILL SEEK TO INSURE THAT THE NUMBERS OF PRESS PERSONNEL VISITING TRAINING AREAS ARE MANAGEABLE AND WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH EXERCISE EVENTS. BECAUSE OF LOGISTICAL LIMITATIONS SOME EVENTS WILL REQUIRE PRESS POOLS, CONSISTING OF SMALLER GROUPS OF MEDIA REPRESENTING AND PROVIDING INFORMATION TO ALL MEDIA.

B. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

(1) AFTER THE INITIAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION, CINC CFC IS THE SOLE RELEASING AUTHORITY FOR EXERCISE-RELATED NEWS MATERIALS. AUTHORITY TO RELEASE INFORMATION HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO CHIEF OF STAFF CFC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER CFC. CINC UNC/CFC WILL COORDINATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS, WHEN NECESSARY, WITH THE ROK AND US JCS, OASD/PA, CINCPAC, THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, SEOUL, AND ROK MND. COMPONENT COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATTERS PERTAINING TO TS 93 WITH CINC UNC/CFC PAO AS APPROPRIATE.

(2) RELEASE OF INFORMATION: PHOTOGRAPHY AND/OR AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS NOT ALREADY APPROVED MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE C/JIB IN SUMON FOR CLEARANCE PRIOR TO RELEASE WITHIN KOREA. THIS INCLUDES MATERIALS INTENDED SOLELY FOR PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES. MATERIALS PREPARED FOR RELEASE IN THE CONUS OR OVERSEAS AREAS OUTSIDE KOREA DO NOT HAVE TO BE CLEARED BY THE CFC C/JIB, UNLESS THEY ARE INTENDED FOR USE PRIOR TO TS ENDEX, BUT WILL BE IN CONSONANCE WITH THE PAG OR OTHER SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE.

(3) HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASES:

(A) ALL UNITS PARTICIPATING IN TEAM SPIRIT ARE ENCOURAGED TO HAVE INDIVIDUALS COMPLETE A DD FORM 2266 HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE FORM PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT BUT NOT DATED. FORMS MAY BE FORWARDED TO HOMETOWN NEWS CENTER FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT. CFPA WILL PROVIDE HOMETOWN NEWS CENTER WITH A COVER STORY TO BE USED FOR ALL TEAM SPIRIT 93 FORMS.

(B) INTERNAL/COMMAND INFORMATION NEWS RELEASES FOR ROK-BASED UNITS ARE GOVERNED BY PROVISIONS OF THIS PAG, AND MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE C/JIB FOR CLEARANCE. STORIES FOR CLEARANCE MAY BE TRANSMITTED BY MESSAGE TO: CINC CFC SEOUL KOR//CFPA-P1//.

(C) DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL: IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT THE OASD/PA MAY ACTIVE THE DOD PRESS POOL AND DEPLOY TO COVER THE EXERCISE. UNIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS/MCO'S SHOULD PLAN FOR AND BE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE THIS POOL IF TASKED BY CFPA. AS A MINIMUM PLANNING SHOULD INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS FOR GROUND TRANSPORTATION, BILLITING, PROTECTION OF MEDIA EQUIPMENT AND

CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIRECTIVES OF THE SERVICE CONCERNED. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH MILITARY JOURNALIST PHOTOGRAPHER, OR VIDEO TEAM MEMBER TO ENSURE THAT COPIES OF ALL AUDIO-VISUAL DOCUMENTATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE CINC UNC/CFC PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE FOR RELEASE. NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY WILL BE PERMITTED. (NOTE: BY REGULATION REPRESENTATIVES OF STARS AND STRIPES AND AFPS/AFKN ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SUBMIT NEWS AND AUDIOVISUAL MATERIAL FOR SCREENING PRIOR TO PUBLIC RELEASE. THEREFORE, THEY WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS EXERCISE AS EXTERNAL MEDIA).

(1) MILITARY MEDIA WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH EXERCISE OPERATIONS AND WILL KEEP THE C/JIB INFORMED OF THEIR MOVEMENTS/LOCATIONS.

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(2) A/V DOCUMENTATION WILL INCLUDE B&W, COLOR TRANSPARENCY AND COLOR PRINT FILMS FOR STILL PHOTOGRAPHY, VIDEO FOR COMBAT DOCUMENTATION. A/V DOCUMENTATION WILL INCLUDE THE FULL RANGE OF EXERCISE EVENTS IN STILL AND VIDEO. UPON COMPLETION OF THE EXERCISE DUPLICATES OF ALL A/V PRODUCTS WILL BE SENT TO THE C/JIB AS WELL AS TO OASD/PA, USCINCPAC PAO/J032, HQ PACAF PAO, CINCPACFLT PAO, CDRSARPAC PAO AND, IF REQUESTED, TO SERVICE PA OFFICES.

D. MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE C/JIB AFTER THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. IN GENERAL, ACTIVITIES OF A VISUAL NATURE WILL BE OF GREATEST INTEREST TO STILL AND VIDEO MEDIA, BUT THE PRINT MEDIA WILL WANT OPPORTUNITIES TO TALK WITH EXERCISE PERSONNEL AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS. THESE INTERVIEWS CAN BE CONDUCTED DURING BREAKS IN THE ACTION. PERSONNEL WHO GRANT INTERVIEWS WILL BE BRIEFED IN ADVANCE AND MADE AWARE THAT THEIR COMMENTS MUST BE LIMITED TO UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR AREA OF JOB KNOWLEDGE AND RESPONSIBILITY. EXERCISE EVENTS WILL NOT BE LINKED TO REAL WORLD CONTINGENCY PLANNING. PERSONAL OPINIONS WILL BE CLEARLY LABELED AS SUCH AND NOT BE GIVEN AS OFFICIAL COMMENT. MEDIA ESCORT OFFICERS WILL INSURE COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY PROVISIONS.

(1) UNSOLICITED COVERAGE OF CONUS-BASED PARTICIPANTS IS AUTHORIZED FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. IF LOCAL MEDIA WISH TO DEPLOY WITH CONUS UNITS, THE CONUS COMMAND CONCERNED WILL REFER THE REQUEST TO CFPA FOR ACTION. THERE CAN BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH AIRCRAFT MISSION AND NO ADDITIONAL COST TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. DIRECT COORDINATION IS AUTHORIZED BETWEEN THE SPONSORING UNIT AND CFPA.

(2) NEWS MEDIA TRANSPORTATION:

(A) MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHO REQUEST TO DEPLOY WITH A PARTICIPATING UNIT WILL SUBMIT THEIR REQUEST IN WRITING TO THE UNIT PAO.

(B) UNIT PACS WILL FORWARD REQUESTS TO HQ AMC WITH INFO TO CFPA.

(C) HQ/AMC PA WILL FORWARD REQUEST IAW APPROPRIATE NEW AMC REGULATIONS (FORMERLY MACR 55-130, PARA 23-28, AND 66-141, PARA 21-33).

(D) UNITS ACCOMPANIED BY LOCAL MEDIA WILL COORDINATE WITH THE TS 93 C/JIB IF ANY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE DESIRES TO VISIT OTHER TS 93 UNITS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

(E) CIVILIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES MUST:

(E1) HAVE A VALID PASSPORT AND WORKING MEDIA VISA OBTAINED FROM THE ROK CONSULATE.

(E2) BE ACCREDITED BY CFPA UPON ARRIVAL AT THE C/JIB.

(E3) BE ACCOMPANIED BY A UNIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SPONSORING UNIT.

(E4) HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO PAY FOR TRANSPORTATION TO HOME STATION IF MILITARY TRANSPORTATION IS NOT AVAILABLE.

(3) MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ACCOMPANYING UNITS WILL BE PROVIDED DETAILED ITINERARIES BASED ON THEIR SPECIFIC INTERESTS. UNITS SPONSORING MEDIA MUST SUPPORT COVERAGE IN THE FIELD. SPONSORING UNIT WILL PROVIDE ESCORTS TO ENSURE NO BREACHES OF SECURITY OCCUR AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ARE GIVEN PROPER PROTECTION.

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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

COVER SHEET PLUS 5 PAGESFROM: CON CavinDATE: 25 JAN 93

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OASD(PA):DPL
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PHONE: COMM: (703) 697-1254
DSN: 227-1254
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SUBJ: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE--TEAM SPIRIT 93

A. CINC UNO CFC SEOUL KORA 080100Z DEC 92

B. USCINCPAC 080754Z JAN 93

1. REF A PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR SUBJECT EXERCISE.

REF B PROVIDES CINCPAC ENDORSEMENT WITH CHANGES.

2. OASD(PA) CONCURS WITH ACTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH AND WILL MAKE EXERCISE RELEASE 0800 (EST) 26 JAN 93, TO COINCIDE WITH RELEASE IN SEOUL.

3. REQUEST USCINCPAC COORDINATE WITH CINC UNO CFC TO INCORPORATE CHANGES TO ORIGINAL PAG AND RETRANSMIT.

4. REF A APPROVED WITH CHANGES NOTED REF B, EXCEPTING CHANGE

RECOMMENDED PARA 5, ANSWER 4, AND THE FOLLOWING:

A. PARA 4A, THIRD SENTENCE: CHANGE TO READ, (QUOTE) THE PURPOSE OF TEAM SPIRIT 93 IS TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSIVE READINESS OF ROK AND BOTH ROK BASED AND CONUS BASED U.S. FORCES THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED/JOINT OPERATIONS (UNQUOTE).

B. PARA 5A: INSERT FOLLOWING AS Q2/A2. (QUOTE) Q2. THE TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISE WAS CANCELED IN 1992 TO PROMOTE A MORE PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT. WHAT HAS CHANGED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA THAT WOULD WARRANT GOING AHEAD WITH PREPARATIONS FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93?

A2. SUSPENSION OF THE TEAM SPIRIT 92 WAS AN EXCEPTIONAL MEASURE TAKEN IN JANUARY 1992 IN RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA'S COMMITMENT TO TAKE THE FIRST STEPS VIA IAEA SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, THE EXERCISE WAS SUSPENDED IN THE HOPE THAT FURTHER PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE INCLUDING ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE BILATERAL NUCLEAR INSPECTION REGIME. THE 8 OCTOBER 1992 U.S./ROK SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS COMMUNIQUE INDICATED THAT, "IN THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENT IN SOUTH-NORTH RELATIONS ESPECIALLY ON BILATERAL NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS," THE U.S. AND ROK WOULD CONTINUE PREPARATIONS FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93. SINCE THAT TIME, NORTH KOREA HAS NOT TAKEN STEPS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO RESOLVING SOUTH-NORTH DIFFERENCES, ESPECIALLY ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AND BILATERAL INSPECTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, PREPARATIONS FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93 HAVE GONE FORWARD AND WILL CONTINUE, TO INCLUDE TROOP AND EQUIPMENT DEPLOYMENTS (UNQUOTE).

C. INSERT FOLLOWING AS Q3/A3 AND RENUMBER ACCORDINGLY. (QUOTE) Q3. NORTH KOREA SAYS TEAM SPIRIT IS A NUCLEAR AND OFFENSIVE EXERCISE DESIGNED TO THREATEN THE NORTH. WHY DO THE U.S. AND ROK WANT TO THREATEN NORTH KOREA?

A3. AS NOTED IN OUR OPENING STATEMENT, TEAM SPIRIT IS A SOLELY DEFENSIVE EXERCISE. IT IS CONDUCTED IN AN EAST-WEST RATHER THAN SOUTH-WEST AXIS, AND IT IS A STRICTLY CONVENTIONAL, NON-NUCLEAR EXERCISE. WE WOULD NOTE THAT MILITARY OBSERVERS OF PREVIOUS TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISES, INCLUDING THOSE REPRESENTING THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (NNSC) NATIONS OF POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA (WHICH WERE APPOINTED TO THAT BODY BY NORTH KOREA), HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT THE EXERCISE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE. IN A PRESS

CONFERENCE IN SEOUL IN MARCH 1991, THE NNSC REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THIS POINT AND THAT BY INVITING OBSERVERS THE SOUTH KOREANS HAD HELPED TO EASE TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA AND DEMONSTRATED THE OPENNESS OF THEIR DEFENSE POLICY (UNQUOTE).

D. PARA 5A(A4), THIRD LINE: DELETE (QUOTE) OFFENSIVE AND (UNQUOTE).

E. PARA 5A(A4): CHANGE THIRD SENTENCE TO READ (QUOTE) IN

GENERAL, HOWEVER, THIS YEAR'S TEAM SPIRIT WILL BE SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS EXERCISES, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF U.S. FORCES WOULD BE SOMEWHAT REDUCED (UNQUOTE).

5. OASD(PA) DESIRES AUDIOVISUAL COVERAGE OF TEAM SPIRIT 93 INCLUDING STILL, ELECTRONIC, AND VIDEOTAPE COVERAGE OF ALL PHASES OF THE EXERCISE. COLOR SLIDES ARE REQUESTED WITH COMPLETE CAPTIONS AND CREDIT LINES. VIDEOTAPE CLIPS WITH NATURAL SOUND (EDITED AND UNEDITED). SHIP AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAILABLE OR FEDERAL EXPRESS (NO. 1545-9866-6). ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, ROOM 5A216, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON DC 20330-2900. MARK PACKAGES TO THE ATTENTION OF OIC ONCE MATERIAL HAS BEEN SHIPPED. CONTACT OIC AT DSN 227-2600 WITH THE SHIPPING INFORMATION (BESPER 202 896-2618). OASD(PA) POC, AEN CARTER OR BETTE SPRIGG AT AC 703 697-0166.

4. OASD(PA) POC FOR PLANS IS LCDR BRIAN CULLIN, USN AT DSN 223-1074/COMM (703) 693-1074. OASD(PA) POC FOR QUERIES IS LTC KERRY GERSHANECK, USMC, AT DSN 227-5131/COMM (703) 697-5131. BT

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SUBJ/PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - TEAM SPIRIT 93//

REF/A/RMG/CINC UNC CFC/280100ZDEC92//

NARR/REF A IS CINC UNC CFC PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93.

POC/PATTON/MAJ/PRIPHN: (808) 477-1349/SECPHN: (808) 477-6481//

RMKS/1. REF A IS THEATER-COORDINATED PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE AND IS FORWARDED FOR ASD(PA) APPROVAL WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

A. IN PARAGRAPH 4A, FIRST SENTENCE, ADD "(DATE AND TIME TBD)" BETWEEN "SIMULTANEOUSLY" AND "IN."

B. IN PARAGRAPH 4B, LINE 7. DELETE "KPA AND CPV" AND REPLACE WITH "NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT."

C. IN PARAGRAPH 5, ANSWER 1, DELETE "NO" AND ADD "MILITARY" BETWEEN "SCHEDULED" AND "TRAINING."

D. IN PARAGRAPH 5, ANSWER 4, DELETE AS WRITTEN AND REPLACE WITH: "AS A MATTER OF POLICY WE DO NOT NORMALLY DISCUSS DETAILS OF EXERCISE SCENARIOS. IN GENERAL, THIS EXERCISE, LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, WILL INVOLVE AIR, LAND AND SEA BATTLE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF COMBINED/JOINT FORCES IN AN EAST-WEST SCENARIO."

E. IN PARAGRAPH 5, DELETE QUESTION AND ANSWER 15 AND RENUMBER QUESTION AND ANSWER 16 ACCORDINGLY.

F. IN PARAGRAPH 7B(2), FIRST SENTENCE, ADD "MILITARY MEDIA" BETWEEN "INFORMATION:" AND "PHOTOGRAPHY." IN SECOND SENTENCE, ADD "MILITARY MEDIA-GENERATED" BETWEEN "INCLUDES" AND "MATERIALS." DELETE THIRD SENTENCE, WHICH BEGINS WITH "MATERIALS" AND ENDS WITH "GUIDANCE."

G. IN PARAGRAPH 7B(3)(C), DELETE FIRST AND SECOND SENTENCE AS WRITTEN AND REPLACE WITH "DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL: DEPLOYMENT OF THE POOL IS NOT RECOMMENDED. HOWEVER, UNIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS/NCO'S SHOULD PLAN FOR AND BE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE THIS POOL IF TASKED BY CFPA."

H. IN PARAGRAPH 7D, LAST SENTENCE, REPLACE "ESCORT" WITH "LIAISON."

I. IN PARAGRAPH 7D(3), LAST SENTENCE, REPLACE "ESCORTS" WITH "LIAISON OFFICERS."// BT

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AMEMBASSY SEOUL KOR//POL-MIL//

DSAF WASH DC//PA//

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SECTION 001 OF 003

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - TEAM SPIRIT 93 (U)

A. TS 92 SNEB

B. DOD INST 5405.3

1. (U) EXERCISE INFORMATION: EXERCISE TEAM SPIRIT IS A JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISE THAT IS CONDUCTED IN THE SPRING. THE EXERCISE INVOLVES FORCES FROM BOTH THE U.S. AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

2. (U) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO FORWARD FOR COORDINATION THEATER APPROVED PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE REGARDING THE EXERCISE. THIS PROPOSED GUIDANCE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH IN-COUNTRY PLAYERS INCLUDING THE ROK MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

3. (U) GENERAL: THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93 WILL BE ACTIVE. THIS ALLOWS PARTICIPATING UNITS TO SOLICIT MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE EXERCISE, INCLUDING UNIT PREPARATIONS. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES WILL INCLUDE:

- A. EMPHASIS THAT THE EXERCISE IS A ROUTINE, REGULARLY SCHEDULED DEFENSIVE EXERCISE.
- B. EMPHASIS THAT THE TRAINING IS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ROK AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.
- C. DEMONSTRATING THE COMBAT READINESS OF ROK AND U.S. SUPPORTING FORCES THROUGH A COMBINED/JOINT FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE.
- D. FOCUS ON ROK/US INTEROPERABILITY IN COMBINED EXERCISES

4. (U) SPECIFIC:

A. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED STATEMENT WILL BE MADE APPROXIMATELY SIMULTANEOUSLY IN SEOUL AND IN WASHINGTON, DC.: QUOTE: THE UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT THE 17TH TEAM SPIRIT FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE WILL BEGIN IN MID-MARCH 1993 AND LAST ABOUT TEN DAYS. THE EXERCISE WILL INVOLVE ROK AND U.S. FORCES STATIONED IN KOREA AND U.S. FORCES DEPLOYING TO THE THEATER. THE PURPOSE OF TEAM SPIRIT 93 IS TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSIVE READINESS OF ROK AND COMUS BASED U.S. FORCES THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED/JOINT OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS INCLUDE RECEIVING, STAGING, EMPLOYING AND REDEPLOYING OUT-OF-COUNTRY FORCES. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON IMPROVING ROK/U.S. COMBINED PARTICIPATION TO ENSURE THESE FORCES HAVE THE READINESS NECESSARY TO DETER AGGRESSION AND PRESERVE THE FREEDOM OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. THE FIRST TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISE WAS CONDUCTED IN JUNE 1976. UNQUOTE.

B. IN SEOUL, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE RELEASED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE TS 93 ANNOUNCEMENT: QUOTE: THE ROK GOVERNMENT NOTIFIED NORTH KOREA TODAY THAT FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE TEAM SPIRIT 93 WILL BE HELD FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN MID-MARCH, WITH SOME STAGING AND DEPLOYMENTS COMMENCING IN JANUARY. THE NORTH WAS ALSO INFORMED THAT THE ROK GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO INVITE APPROPRIATE EPA AND CPV AUTHORITIES AND THE FOUR PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION TO OBSERVE THE EXERCISE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND INVITATION IS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THIS RECURRING DEFENSIVE TRAINING EVENT. UNQUOTE.

FINAL DISTR ADDED FOR JCS PER MAJ MCCLELLAN/SJS

ACTION

INFO SJS-W(0) CJCS(1) NIDS(1) J7(6) SECDEF-W(1)
USDP:FILE(1) USDA:AM(1) USDA:TS(1) ASD:PA(1)

(M,C)

5. (U) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

A. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS MAY BE USED AFTER THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE EXERCISE:

Q1. IS THIS EXERCISE CONNECTED WITH THE POLITICAL OR MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY?

A1. NO. THIS IS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED TRAINING EXERCISE. SIMILAR COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED SINCE JUNE 1976.

Q2. WHAT ARE COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISES?

A2. A COMBINED OPERATION INVOLVES MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY. A JOINT OPERATION INVOLVES MORE THAN ONE SERVICE OF A SINGLE COUNTRY. A COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISE INVOLVES MORE THAN ONE SERVICE FROM MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY. IN TS 93, SUPPORTING FORCES FROM THE U.S. AND ROK WILL OPERATE TOGETHER UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND (CFC).

Q3. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISE?

A3. THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE IS TO ALLOW CINC CFC AND CFC COMPONENT COMMANDERS TO TRAIN AND EVALUATE THE COMMAND'S CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE ROK/US AIR-LAND-SEA DEFENSIVE BATTLE DOCTRINE AND TO EVALUATE AUGMENTATION BY U.S. BASED FORCES.

Q4. WHAT IS THE SCENARIO FOR THE EXERCISE?

A4. WHILE WE DO NOT NORMALLY DISCUSS DETAILS OF EXERCISE SCENARIOS THIS EXERCISE LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, WILL INVOLVE AIR, LAND AND SEA BATTLE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF COMBINED/JOINT FORCES IN AN EAST-WEST SCENARIO.

Q5. ARE ANY NATIONS OTHER THAN THE U.S. AND THE ROK INVOLVED?

A5. NO. THERE ARE NO THIRD COUNTRY UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE.

Q6. CAN THE MEDIA COVER EVENTS DURING TS 93 AS IN PAST YEARS?

A6. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE EXERCISE WILL BE OPEN FOR COVERAGE BY MEDIA; HOWEVER, THE EMPHASIS WILL BE ON TRAINING. PRESS COVERAGE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO DISRUPT THE TRAINING VALUE OF THE EXERCISE.

Q7. HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS YEAR'S EXERCISE?

A7. MORE THAN 100,000 PERSONNEL WILL PARTICIPATE IN TEAM SPIRIT 93. THIS INCLUDES ROK FORCES, U.S. FORCES THAT ARE STATIONED IN THE ROK AND U.S. AUGMENTING FORCES.

Q8. WHAT IS THE MISSION OF CFC?

A8. THE ROK/U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND WAS ESTABLISHED IN NOVEMBER 1978 BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ROK AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF DEFENDING THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

Q9. DOES THAT MEAN TEAM SPIRIT IS DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND'S ABILITY TO ACTUALLY DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA?

A9. TEAM SPIRIT IS TRAINING, NOT A WAR GAME. TRAINING IS ESSENTIAL TO ALL MILITARY FORCES TO MAINTAIN AND RETAIN UNIT AND INDIVIDUAL SKILLS. IT IS PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL IN A BINATIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION SUCH AS CFC, TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF THE FORCES.

Q10. DOES THE PARTICIPATION OF DEPLOYED U.S. SUPPORTING FORCES INDICATE THAT THEY ARE THE COMBAT ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO KOREA IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ROK?

A10. NO. THIS EXERCISE IS NOT RELATED TO ANY SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PLANS INVOLVING OFFSHORE AMERICAN FORCES. THESE ARE THE TYPES OF FORCES WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN DEFENDING THE ROK UNDER TERMS OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY.

Q11. WHAT SPECIFIC ROK PARTICIPATION IS THERE IN TEAM SPIRIT?

A11. QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED ABOUT ROK PARTICIPATION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE PAO.

Q12. WHICH U.S. UNITS WILL PARTICIPATE?

A12. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, WE DO NOT DISCUSS SUCH OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

Q13. WILL AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER PARTICIPATE THIS YEAR?

A13. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, WE DO NOT DISCUSS SUCH OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

Q14. WILL THIS YEAR'S TEAM SPIRIT DIFFER FROM PREVIOUS YEARS?

A14. EACH EXERCISE VARIES TO SOME DEGREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESIRED TRAINING OBJECTIVES. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THIS YEAR'S TEAM SPIRIT WILL BE SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS EXERCISES. IN ADDITION TO AN FTX, A CPV WILL ALSO BE CONDUCTED DURING THIS YEAR'S EXERCISE. COMPUTER SIMULATION SYSTEMS WILL BE USED DURING THE CPV TO ENHANCE THE

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EMPLOYED FOR TEAM SPIRIT 93. SOME OF THESE SYSTEMS WILL BE DISPLAYED TO THE MEDIA DURING THE EXERCISE.

Q18: WHAT OTHER NATIONS MAY OBSERVE THE EXERCISE?

A18: THE ROK GOVERNMENT HAS INVITED NORTH KOREA, RUSSIA, CHINA AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION TO OBSERVE THE EXERCISE.

B. AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, ANY QUESTIONS THAT CANNOT BE ANSWERED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT AND Q'S AND A'S WILL BE TAKEN WITHOUT COMMENT AND FORWARDED WITH THE PROPOSED ANSWER, IF KNOWN, TO CFPA-PI (MESSAGE ADDRESS CINC UNC CFC SEOUL KOR//CFPA-PI//).

6. (U) CONTINGENCY STATEMENT: THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ANY ASPECT OF TS 93 UNTIL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE IN SEOUL, KOREA AND/OR WASHINGTON, D.C. IN THE EVENT OF INQUIRY PRIOR TO THE INITIAL RELEASE, FORWARD THE INQUIRY WITHOUT COMMENT, TO THE UNC/CFC PAO (CFPA).

7. (U) MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

A. THE UNC/CFC PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE WILL ESTABLISH A C/JIB TO OPERATE FROM THREE DAYS PRIOR TO STARTX TO THREE DAYS AFTER ENDEX AT SUMON AB. BRIEFINGS TO NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE SCHEDULED AS NECESSARY. THE C/JIB WILL BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM THE UNC/CFC AND USEK/USIA PAO AND AUGMENTED BY ANG/AR PERSONNEL, AND OTHER PACIFIC AREA COMMANDS. THE C/JIB WILL BE THE CENTER OF OPERATIONS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES RELATED TO TS 93. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE C/JIB WILL COORDINATE NEWS MEDIA VISITS, TOURS, AND INTERVIEWS AS APPROPRIATE. THE C/JIB WILL SEEK TO INSURE THAT THE NUMBERS OF PRESS PERSONNEL VISITING TRAINING AREAS ARE MANAGEABLE AND WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH EXERCISE EVENTS. BECAUSE OF LOGISTICAL LIMITATIONS SOME EVENTS WILL REQUIRE PRESS POOLS, CONSISTING OF SMALLER GROUPS OF MEDIA REPRESENTING AND PROVIDING INFORMATION TO ALL MEDIA.

B. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

(1) AFTER THE INITIAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION, CINC CFC IS THE SOLE RELEASING AUTHORITY FOR EXERCISE-RELATED NEWS MATERIALS. AUTHORITY TO RELEASE INFORMATION HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO CHIEF OF STAFF CFC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER CFC. CINC UNC/CFC WILL COORDINATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS, WHEN NECESSARY, WITH THE ROK AND US JCS, OASD/PA, CINCPAC, THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, SEOUL, AND ROK MND. COMPONENT COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATTERS PERTAINING TO TS 93 WITH CINC UNC/CFC PAO AS APPROPRIATE.

(2) RELEASE OF INFORMATION: PHOTOGRAPHY AND/OR AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS NOT ALREADY APPROVED MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE C/JIB IN SUMON FOR CLEARANCE PRIOR TO RELEASE WITHIN KOREA. THIS INCLUDES MATERIALS INTENDED SOLELY FOR PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES. MATERIALS PREPARED FOR RELEASE IN THE CONUS OR OVERSEAS AREAS OUTSIDE KOREA DO NOT HAVE TO BE CLEARED BY THE CFC C/JIB, UNLESS THEY ARE INTENDED FOR USE PRIOR TO TS ENDEX, BUT WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE PAO OR OTHER SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE.

(3) HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASES:

(A) ALL UNITS PARTICIPATING IN TEAM SPIRIT ARE ENCOURAGED TO HAVE INDIVIDUALS COMPLETE A DD FORM 2296 HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE FORM PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT BUT NOT DATED. FORMS MAY BE FORWARDED TO HOMETOWN NEWS CENTER FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT. CFPA WILL PROVIDE HOMETOWN NEWS CENTER WITH A COVER STORY TO BE USED FOR ALL TEAM SPIRIT 93 FORMS.

(B) INTERNAL/COMMAND INFORMATION NEWS RELEASES FOR ROK-BASED UNITS ARE GOVERNED BY PROVISIONS OF THIS PAG, AND MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE C/JIB FOR CLEARANCE. STORIES FOR CLEARANCE MAY BE TRANSMITTED BY MESSAGE TO: CINC CFC SEOUL KOR//CFPA-PI//.

(C) DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL: IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT THE OASD/PA MAY ACTIVE THE DOD PRESS POOL AND DEPLOY TO COVER THE EXERCISE. UNIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS/INCO'S SHOULD PLAN FOR AND BE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE THIS POOL IF TASKED BY CFPA. AS A MINIMUM PLANNING SHOULD INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS FOR GROUND TRANSPORTATION, BILLITING, PROTECTION OF MEDIA EQUIPMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR RAPID FILING OF STORIES. CFPA WILL BE THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT IF AND WHEN SUCH A POOL ARRIVES.

C. INTERNAL MEDIA COVERAGE AND AUDIOVISUAL COVERAGE: UNC/CFC COMPONENT COMMANDERS WILL CONDUCT INTERNAL/COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAMS TO INSURE EACH PARTICIPANT'S UNDERSTANDING OF TS 93 AND THEIR ROLE IN THE OPERATION. IN ADDITION, INTERNAL/COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAMS, AS A MINIMUM, SHOULD INCLUDE COVERAGE OF COLD WEATHER INDOCTRINATION, SAFETY, DRIVING IN KOREA BOTH NIGHT AND DAY, AND SOME BACKGROUND ON KOREAN CUSTOMS AND CULTURE. TS 93 ARTICLES FOR INTERNAL MEDIA USE WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE C/JIB FOR APPROVAL AND SUBSEQUENT RELEASE BY CINC UNC/CFC PAO. AUDIO-VISUAL DOCUMENTATION OF TS 93 IS ENCOURAGED AND WILL BE

CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIRECTIVES OF THE SERVICE CONCERNED. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH MILITARY JOURNALIST PHOTOGRAPHER, OR VIDEO TEAM MEMBER TO ENSURE THAT COPIES OF ALL AUDIO-VISUAL DOCUMENTATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE CINC UNC/CFC PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE FOR RELEASE. NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY WILL BE PERMITTED. (NOTE: BY REGULATION REPRESENTATIVES OF STARS AND STRIPES AND AFRTS/AFKN ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SUBMIT NEWS AND AUDIOVISUAL MATERIAL FOR SCREENING PRIOR TO PUBLIC RELEASE. THEREFORE THEY WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS EXERCISE AS EXTERNAL MEDIA).

(1) MILITARY MEDIA WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH EXERCISE OPERATIONS AND WILL KEEP THE C/JIB INFORMED OF THEIR MOVEMENTS/LOCATIONS.

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(2) A/V DOCUMENTATION WILL INCLUDE 8MM, COLOR TRANSPARENCY AND COLOR PRINT FILMS FOR STILL PHOTOGRAPHY, VIDEO FOR COMBAT DOCUMENTATION. A/V DOCUMENTATION WILL INCLUDE THE FULL RANGE OF EXERCISE EVENTS IN STILL AND VIDEO. UPON COMPLETION OF THE EXERCISE, DUPLICATES OF ALL A/V PRODUCTS WILL BE SENT TO THE C/JIB AS WELL AS TO OASD/PA, USCINCPAC PAO/J032, HQ PACAF PAC, CINCPACFLT PAO, CDRSARPAC PAO AND, IF REQUESTED, TO SERVICE FA OFFICES.

D. MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE C/JIB AFTER THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. IN GENERAL, ACTIVITIES OF A VISUAL NATURE WILL BE OF GREATEST INTEREST TO STILL AND VIDEO MEDIA, BUT THE PRINT MEDIA WILL WANT OPPORTUNITIES TO TALK WITH EXERCISE PERSONNEL AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS. THESE INTERVIEWS CAN BE CONDUCTED DURING BREAKS IN THE ACTION. PERSONNEL WHO GRANT INTERVIEWS WILL BE BRIEFED IN ADVANCE AND MADE AWARE THAT THEIR COMMENTS MUST BE LIMITED TO UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR AREA OF JOB KNOWLEDGE AND RESPONSIBILITY. EXERCISE EVENTS WILL NOT BE LINKED TO REAL WORLD CONTINGENCY PLANNING. PERSONAL OPINIONS WILL BE CLEARLY LABELED AS SUCH AND NOT BE GIVEN AS OFFICIAL COMMENT. MEDIA ESCORT OFFICERS WILL INSURE COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY PROVISIONS.

(1) UNSOLICITED COVERAGE OF CONUS-BASED PARTICIPANTS IS AUTHORIZED FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. IF LOCAL MEDIA WISH TO DEPLOY WITH CONUS UNITS, THE CONUS COMMAND CONCERNED WILL REFER THE REQUEST TO CFPA FOR ACTION. THERE CAN BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH AIRCRAFT MISSION AND NO ADDITIONAL COST TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. DIRECT COORDINATION IS AUTHORIZED BETWEEN THE SPONSORING UNIT AND CFPA.

(2) NEWS MEDIA TRANSPORTATION:

(A) MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHO REQUEST TO DEPLOY WITH A PARTICIPATING UNIT WILL SUBMIT THEIR REQUEST IN WRITING TO THE UNIT PAO.

(B) UNIT PAOS WILL FORWARD REQUESTS TO HQ AMC WITH INFO TO CFPA.

(C) HQ/AMC PA WILL FORWARD REQUEST IAW APPROPRIATE NEW AMC REGULATIONS (FORMERLY MACR 55-130, PARA 23-28, AND 55-141, PARA 21-33).

(D) UNITS ACCOMPANIED BY LOCAL MEDIA WILL COORDINATE WITH THE TS 93 C/JIB IF ANY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE DESIRES TO VISIT OTHER TS 93 UNITS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

(E) CIVILIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES MUST:

(E1) HAVE A VALID PASSPORT AND WORKING MEDIA VISA OBTAINED FROM THE ROK CONSULATE.

(E2) BE ACCREDITED BY CFPA UPON ARRIVAL AT THE C/JIB.

(E3) BE ACCOMPANIED BY A UNIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SPONSORING UNIT.

(E4) HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO PAY FOR TRANSPORTATION TO HOME STATION IF MILITARY TRANSPORTATION IS NOT AVAILABLE.

(3) MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ACCOMPANYING UNITS WILL BE PROVIDED DETAILED ITINERARIES BASED ON THEIR SPECIFIC INTERESTS. UNITS SPONSORING MEDIA MUST SUPPORT COVERAGE IN THE FIELD. SPONSORING UNIT WILL PROVIDE ESCORTS TO ENSURE NO BREACHES OF SECURITY OCCUR AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ARE GIVEN NORMAL COURTESIES.

(4) UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR ACCREDITATION TO COVER TS 93 FROM MEDIA WHICH DO NOT MAINTAIN BUREAUS IN KOREA SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NEAREST ROK CONSULATE PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY.

(5) MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ARRIVING AT THE C/JIB WITHOUT PROPER VISAS AND CREDENTIALS WILL BE REFERRED TO THE KOREAN OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICE (KOIS) PRIOR TO ACCREDITATION BY CFPA.

E. MISCELLANEOUS:

(1) SITUATIONS AND EVENTS REQUIRING RESOLUTION NOT COVERED BY THIS OR OTHER APPROVED GUIDANCE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF COMBINED FORCE COMMAND C/JIB.

(2) IN CASE OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT, THE INITIAL RELEASE WILL BE MADE

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BY THE JCS IN SUMMA WITH IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION OF USCINCPAC,
APPROPRIATE SERVICE COMMANDER AND SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS
INVOLVED.

(A) 14W 000 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES. UNIT COMMANDERS MAY
INFORM ALL UNIT PERSONNEL OF EXERCISE DETAILS AS NECESSARY.
COMMANDERS/COMMANDING OFFICERS MAY INFORM MILITARY FAMILY MEMBERS OF
THE EXERCISE BY DRAWING ON THIS PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. RELEASE
OF INFORMATION TO MILITARY FAMILY MEMBERS MAY NOT BE EARLIER
THAN APPROVED RELEASE DATE CONTAINED IN THE CONFIRMATION
ANNOUNCEMENT MESSAGE, NOR PRECEED UNIT MOVEMENT TO THE EXERCISE AREA
BY MORE THAN 72 HOURS.

S. (U) THE POC IS MAJ PHIL HUTCHISON, CFPA PRODUCTS AND OPERATIONS
DIVISION DSN: 723-4880 BT

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OPINION

■ American activism regarding Korean unification might take several forms. Why shouldn't the US president foster a Camp David summit between the leaders of North and South Korea?

Get Ready for Korean Unification

By Edward A. Olsen

AMONG the foreign-policy surprises in store for President Clinton is the prospect of a unified Korea and what to do about it. Americans are ill-prepared to deal with this issue, but we had better get ready. The Clinton administration may have to put Korean unification on a front burner.

The world has lived with a divided Korea for more than a generation. The existence of two Koreas seems normal. In fact, it remains abnormal and is a problem destined to be resolved. The Korea problem is a by-product of the cold war that has outlived its original context.

North and South Korea already are adapting to new realities. That process is proceeding haltingly because neither Seoul nor Pyongyang trusts the other enough to rapidly accelerate toward ending their conflict. But there is a growing sense that the Korean cold war will end, too.

The United States has two fundamental options. It can be a passive observer or an active protagonist, helping Koreans to unify. US passivity may have been satisfactory during the cold war, when it appeared the stalemate might endure indefinitely. But passively leaving Korean unification to the Koreans is too risky in the post-cold-war era. The US must become an enthusiastic backer of Korean unification.

Two factors favor activism. First, the process of Korean unification is certain to be expensive. South Koreans are intimidated by the anticipated costs. Unlike the former West Germany, South Korea almost certainly cannot afford to foot the bill and may seek help. The financial demands on the US and Japan could be enormous.

Second, regardless of how the costs are met, the US will have to deal with the influence a unified Korea will have on its region.

As long as the US has major political, economic, and security concerns in the Western Pacific – and there is no sign that they will evaporate – Korea's impact on China, Japan, and Russia matters. Consequently, the way that Koreans eventually unify also matters.

American activism regarding Korean unification might take several forms. Borrowing from our Middle East experience, why shouldn't the US president foster a Camp David summit between the leaders of North and South Korea?

If such approaches are too flamboyant for Washington's taste, the US could take the initiative in expanding the network of inter-Korean contacts by upgrading its diplomatic access to North Korea. If pursued as part of an explicitly pro-unification US policy, these steps would not be destabilizing. Both Seoul and Pyongyang should welcome such US activism.

At a minimum, the US should become relentlessly upbeat about Korean unification. American officials from the president to the ambassador in Seoul should display enthusiasm for unification, look forward to its consequences, foresee opportunities, and relish the stability it could bring to Northeast Asia.

AS unification becomes a more realistic prospect, the US must be prepared to help at the margins as the two current Koreas recreate a national government. The US won't want to be, nor can it afford to be, the sole external guarantor for that costly process. But the US has borne heavy financial burdens subsidizing South Korean security since the Korean War cease-fire. It is not unreasonable to anticipate some continuation of security and financial guarantees from the US.

The costs for Korean unification, however, should be divided among the countries that still stand behind the UN commitment to Korea. In particular, Japan should bear a significant financial burden. Tokyo has a moral obligation of many years standing that it should fulfill by paying a hefty share of the unifica-

tion costs. Involving Japan may not be an easy task, but that, too, should be part of an activist agenda for the US.

Meanwhile, Americans must prepare for the day when unification is achieved. How will a unified Korea fit in the Asian balance of power? How will US policies toward China and Japan be affected? How will the US manage the transfer of arrangements it has with South Korea to the new political entity?

The last question is perhaps the most pressing for US planners. Since the main purpose of US forces in Korea has been to deter (and if necessary defend against) renewed North Korean aggression, won't the US military mission evaporate after unification?

Many specialists in post-cold-war European security are today trying to reinvent NATO; others say NATO should be relegated to history. After unification, should Americans and Koreans simply declare victory and move on to a post-containment relationship without a reinvented alliance? For planning purposes, Americans should determine in advance whether it is in their interest to seek new problems that might sustain the old defense relationship with Korea.

Just as Americans debate the pros and cons of NATO, it seems certain that Korea's unification will provoke a comparable debate about continued US involvement there. Why not preempt that issue by planning carefully for a less military-oriented US relationship with post-unification Korea?

Korean unification may or may not occur during the four to eight years available to the Clinton administration. But at a minimum the new administration can prepare contingency plans for Korea. In keeping with its "change" theme, it should adopt a creative approach to the Korea problem that will allow the US to be well-positioned to deal with Korean unification.

■ Edward A. Olsen is professor of Asian studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

Cuban Refugees: an Early Clinton Challenge?

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	Page 4 of Unknown Report. (1 page)	02/10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs
OA/Box Number: 64

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea [Folder 1] [9]

2009-0528-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	From White House Situation Room to Wagle, Patterson at 5:10pm. Subject: Reaction. (2 pages)	01/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	South Korea. (7 pages)	02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

THE CRISIS IN PYONGYANG

November 15, 1993

Since the Fall of 1993, the tension along the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea has reached levels not seen since the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950. Indeed, the North Korean Armed Forces are mobilized and reinforced in forward positions optimal for the launching of a surprise attack on the South. Further, in early November, Pyongyang ordered that all of its military personnel and eligible reservists have their heads shaved, a move associated with improving the chances of partially protected troops to withstand exposure to chemical and biological weapons. Ominously, such steps are thought to be indications of last minute preparations for war.

Pyongyang's rhetoric notwithstanding, the current North Korean military buildup comes at a time when Pyongyang finds itself under extreme pressure as a result of a collapsing economy and political instability surrounding the completion of the succession process transferring power from Kim Il-Song to his son and heir Kim Jong-Il. In this connection, the support of the DPRK's Armed Forces is considered crucial for the survival of the Kims' regime. Thus, a high level North Korean defector recently predicted that in the aftermath of Kim Il-Song's death, with the military "supporting Kim Jong-Il ... North Korea could keep its system [of government] for ever."

Indeed, the recent tension and related military activities in North Korea are integral components of the completion of the succession process in Pyongyang. With the North Korean elite committed to a "sacred war of unification" and in despair over its inability to salvage the country's economy, war may very well seem a tempting solution to all their troubles.

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Indeed, North Korea's movement to war has been accelerating since the Spring of 1993, almost immediately after the cancellation of the "semi-war status" decreed by Kim Jong-Il. At first, there were indications that the "semi-war status" had served its

purpose to solidify the support of the military elite behind Kim Jong-Il. Indeed, the DPRK's sacred Army Day, April 25, passed with virtually no celebrations or public events. In fact, neither Kim Il-Song nor Kim Jong-Il appeared in public, a very perplexing omission considering the recent elevation of Kim Jong-Il to the key military position of chairman of the National Defence Commission.

However, in late April 1993, a series of internal military moves began that strongly suggest that Pyongyang was apprehensive about an imminent threat to the stability of the regime. First, Kim Jong-Il ordered the transfer of 3 divisions with over 1,700 armored vehicles away from the zone between Pyongyang and the DMZ and to the Chinese border. This was the largest troop movement by North Korea since the Korean War. Some observers argued that the reason for the redeployment was a fear that these army units might be loyal to the old guard military high command and thus be used to deny Kim Jong-Il his rise to power.

Meanwhile, in early April, the Sunan airport north of Pyongyang was closed, ostensibly for repairs, and virtually all international flights were diverted to Wonsan. In reality, however, the Sunan airport was in good shape and key political/official flights, including those of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in and out of Cambodia, continue to use Sunan.

The reason for the closing down of Sunan became apparent in late April. Large units of the fiercely loyal Special Forces, and then a corps level concentration of forces, were deployed to the Sunan area. The size and character of the units that were deployed suggest that either active preparations for a military coup, or a preemptive positioning against the possibility of a coup, was being undertaken. In any case, the build-up of forces in Sunan continued to grow through mid-May, 1993.

Subsequently, Chinese officials added fuel to the speculations about a crisis in reaction to Kim Il-Song's incapacitation or even death. They pointed to a growing tension within the military and technocrat senior officialdom over the collapse of the North Korean economy which the "reformers" attribute to expenditures on the military build-up and the denial of Western technological and financial assistance. These young officials are now convinced that once in power, rhetoric aside, Kim Jong-Il will not bring about the moderation, modernization and socio-economic reforms the technocrats believe are crucial to the very survival of the DPRK. Consequently, a Chinese official stressed, Kim Jong-Il was so disliked by the reformist minded Army that he "won't last a day" once Kim Il-Song dies, unless, of course, some drastic steps are preemptively taken by Kim Jong-Il and his loyalists.

Other knowledgeable foreign observers with lengthy experience in Pyongyang, mainly Russians, Iranians, and Japanese, have similar

though less alarming interpretations for the sudden troop movements around Pyongyang. Having been conditioned to observe fierce loyalty to the Kims, the Army is essentially incapable of even contemplating a military coup to avert the realization of the desires of the Great Leader. Consequently, observers believe that the troop movements are both a precautionary measure by Kim Jong-Il as well as a preemptive act against the possibility of an intra-military power struggle getting out of hand.

The apprehension of some of Pyongyang's closest allies about the military's loyalty has not been lost on Kim Jong-Il and his key supporters. Indeed, the extent of the military's loyalty is not a simple question because Kim Il-Song has not yet relinquished the firm hold of his fierce loyalists on the armed forces. For example, Marshal O Chin-U, a staunch ally of Kim Il-Song, remains on active duty. In this connection, it is important to keep in mind that it is a key goal of the old guard to ensure that their allies remain in leadership positions during any war, even if the Great Leader is incapacitated. Further, O Chin-U's remaining in position also expresses Kim Il-Song's determination to remain in an actual leadership position during any war of unification.

Nonetheless, beginning in April, 1992, Kim Jong-Il increased his control over the military through the replacement of some 664 generals. All of the promoted officers are younger technocrats and are loyal to Kim Jong-Il. However, Kim Jong Il was forced to leave the Minister of Defense, O Chin-U (83) and the Chief of the General Staff, Choe Kwang (76), both fiercely loyal to Kim Il-Song, in their very powerful yet isolated positions at the top. However, to somewhat balance the power of the old guard commanders, on 8 April 1993, Kim Jong-Il was elected Chairman of the National Defence Committee, the supreme defense body of the DPRK. This position was one of the crucial power posts that had previously been held by Kim Il-Song.

However, in the Summer of 1993, with the succession process suddenly accelerating, and with the question of the ultimate loyalty of the old guard members at the top of the military establishment being raised anew, Pyongyang embarked on a series of symbolic measures aimed at pacifying all the key components of the DPRK's elite.

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However, in late July 1993, there were new indications of a further consolidation of Kim Jong-Il's leadership, especially in the defense establishment. Indeed, in one article in Nodong Sinmun magazine, Dr. Pak Mun-Kon, a North Korean ideologist, seemed to suggest that the succession process had already been completed. "Today our People's Army and people are defending the socialist stronghold steel-strong under the leadership of the Dear Comrade Leader, an iron-willed and sagacious general, who

succeeded to the Juche cause pioneered by the Great Leader and is brilliantly consummating it."

Another simultaneous indication of Kim Jong-Il's growing power is the sudden policy emphasis on the development of military industries and self-sufficiency: "Self-reliant defense capabilities are the military guarantee for safeguarding, defending, and glorifying socialism. The present situation is still tense and calls for further strengthening our revolutionary armed forces."

The significance of Pyongyang's emphasis on self-reliance in weapons acquisition should be examined in the context of the position of the former Chief of General Staff, O Kuk-Yol, who is both "Kim Jong-Il's right hand man," as well as a military reformer and leading advocate of the development of military industries and sophisticated weapons. Indeed, the sudden emphasis on the domestic production of weapons reflects the growing salience of issues important to Kim Jong-Il and O Kuk-Yol, and, thus is indicative of their growing power in Pyongyang. Indeed, North Korean made weapons systems dominated the major military parade in Pyongyang on 27 July 1993.

That date, July 27, 1993, the 40th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, the DPRK's "2nd Great Victory," would normally have been a festive occasion, but the conservative and bland 1993 celebration could not conceal a very interesting event with a direct bearing on the succession process: The brief return of Kim Yong-Chu, Kim Il-Song's brother, to the forefront of political activity in Pyongyang. Kim Yong-Chu had been the original successor to Kim Il-Song, before the rise of Kim Jong-Il in the early 1970s. He disappeared in 1975 into total political limbo, and would have been executed had he not been the Great Leader's brother.

However, in the several key ceremonies on July 26 and 27, Kim Yong-Chu's name ranked between the 10th and 11th places in the Pyongyang hierarchy, and he was described as a "former" holder of various titles and senior positions. No explanation was given for the return of Kim Yong-Chu, nor has he been mentioned in the media since then.

Observers have speculated that the return of Kim Yong-Chu was associated with the apprehension of many of the Pyongyang "old guard" that Kim Il-Song's death and the rise to power of Kim Jong-Il will result in a massive purge of the older generation. The return of Kim Yong-Chu to prominence thus may have been meant to serve as a gesture to assure the old guard that there would not be a clear cut and drastic generational change in Pyongyang.

Indeed, by mid August, there was a sudden resurgence of a propaganda blitz using the most arcane communist themes, complete

with exhortations for "socialist collectivism," and calls for individuals to make greater sacrifices on behalf of the state. While this short but intense propaganda campaign clearly revealed the further collapse of the North Korean economy and the dire need for a "further tightening of the belt," its old fashioned style is revealing.

The unabashed return to "basics," to the propagandistic style of the late 1940s and 1950s, is aimed at the remnants of the old guard in Pyongyang rather than at the masses. With North Korea increasingly adopting the priorities and themes associated with Kim Jong-Il and his younger followers, it has become necessary to appease the old guard, in action through the return of Kim Yong-Chu, and with symbolic gestures in the form of a propaganda blitz. Despite this demonstration of concern for its sensibilities, the Pyongyang old guard is not in a position to challenge, let alone block, the rise to power of Kim Jong-Il and the younger generation of the Pyongyang nomenklatura.

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In any case, by late September 1993, North Korea may have finally committed itself to completing the transfer of power from the ailing Kim Il-Song to his son and heir Kim Jong-Il. The actual hand over of power will take place in the course of the General Congress of the Workers' Party now scheduled for December 1993. This will be the first Party congress since October 1980.

According to Pyongyang's plans, the climax of the Congress will be the unanimous election of Kim Jong-Il as General Secretary of the Workers' Party, a position now held by Kim Il-Song. Although Kim Jong-Il has accumulated numerous titles and power positions over the last year, this would be his most important Party related title. General Secretary of the Workers' Party is an ideological title that complements Kim Jong-Il's April appointment as Chairman of the National Defence Committee. Furthermore, irrespective of whether the General Congress of the Workers' Party actually takes place as currently planned, the mere preoccupation with the election of Kim Jong-Il as General Secretary of the Workers' Party puts him back at the center of the succession process in North Korea.

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Meanwhile, in order to prepare the public for a change in leadership, in the last week of October 1993 there was a sudden revival of the inheritance issue in the North Korean media.

On October 26, virtually all the organs of the official media included the following statement in their editorials:

"The Korean revolution is dynamically advancing along

the road of Juche because the question of inheriting leadership has been successfully solved in Korea and the Korean people have an illustrious leader at the head of the party and the revolution."

Indeed, Kim Il-Song was cited as specifically confirming the fact that Kim Jong-Il has effectively already been the leader of North Korea for some time. "As comrade Kim Jong-Il has wisely guided the party, the state, and the Army as a whole from long ago, the question of inheritance of leadership has been solved successfully in our country." Pyongyang went further to stress that "the dear leader comrade Kim Jong-Il [is] at the head of the party, the revolution, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces." Pyongyang anticipates new triumphs with Kim Jong-Il "leading our revolution."

The next day, the DPRK media further elaborated on the position and role of Kim Jong-Il as the country's leader. Kim Il-Song was quoted as stressing that "comrade Kim Jong-Il is wisely leading the revolution and construction with his extraordinary leadership ability." Virtually all the organs of the official media in Pyongyang recounted the numerous achievements of Kim Jong-Il in building the North Korean society and economy, as well as his contributions to the development of the Juche doctrine.

Further, Kim Jong-Il was identified as having "converted" all vital aspects of the DPRK such as "the whole society," "the revolutionary ranks," and the military system. Until late October, such accolades were reserved solely for Kim Il-Song. Indeed, Pyongyang went even further in hailing the leadership qualities of Kim Jong-Il: "Matchless grit, extraordinary creativity, determination and stubbornness are the leadership traits and merits of the dear leader comrade Kim Jong-Il as a distinguished artist of leadership."

Soon afterward, Pyongyang also intensified the legitimization of Kim Jong-Il as a leader of the DPRK. On November 10, an intense campaign was launched throughout the North Korean elite to study the leadership qualities of Kim Jong-Il and vow "unquestioned trust" in him. Pyongyang's media closely covered these events, elucidating the official position toward Kim Jong-Il: "Our people's trust in the dear leader comrade Kim Jong-Il is the purest and noble ideological feeling of entrusting all destinies entirely to the leader, an unshakable ideological feeling of faith based on a deep understanding of the greatness of his feats and an unquestioned belief that they can hew out their destiny and future when they follow the leader." Several special conferences and seminars to study the "greatness" of Kim Jong-Il were held in the next few days in the key institutions in Pyongyang.

Later, on November 11, a seminar was held by the Ministry of the

People's Armed Forces. It is highly significant that the main speech was delivered by the Chief of the General Staff, Choe Kwang. Although a Kim Il-Song devotee, Choe Kwang proved himself while in office as "a key supporter of Kim Jong-Il" in several key military and political forums. A few other senior generals delivered speeches and lectures that in effect identified Kim Jong-Il as the nation's leader. Virtually all the speeches in this seminar were concluded by a reference to Kim Jong-Il as "a great leader of people who has personified all traits of the leader of the revolution at highest level." To date, the title "great leader" was solely reserved to Kim Il-Song.

Moreover, the Minister of Defense, O Chin-U was not mentioned as either being present in this all important seminar let alone as having delivered an almost obligatory speech. The mere omission of O Chin-U might hint on his being eased out of office with Choe Kwang emerging as a compromise leader of the Armed Forces because of his acceptability to both the old and the young guard.

In any case, there were ominous warnings of an impending major crisis, if not a catastrophe, in the speech of Choe Kwang: A brilliant leader, Kim Jong-Il is capable of delivering "historical victory" for the DPRK by "smashing the frantic moves of the enemies." However, Choe Kwang explained, the true "greatness" of Kim Jong-Il lies in his ability to transform "a misfortune into a blessing and adversity into a favorable condition" despite the enormity of the challenges. In other words, Choe Kwang was predicting a major setback that would ultimately be reversed under the leadership of Kim Jong-Il.

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Thus, despite the sporadic public parading of Kim Il-Song in recent months, it is increasingly apparent that Kim Jong-Il is already effectively the DPRK's leader. Still, Pyongyang seems incapable of making the final and overt transfer of power from the "Great Leader" to the "Dear Leader."

Thus, as of the Fall of 1993, the transition of power to Kim Jong-Il continues to accelerate but nevertheless remains seemingly inconclusive. This is because despite a decade of preparation and half-measures, Pyongyang remains apprehensive of that dreaded moment when the Great Leader steps off the stage leaving the Dear Leader in control.

Moreover, this crucial phase comes at a most dangerous time to the DPRK, when the threat of collapse due to severe economic crisis is not inconceivable. Indeed, Kim Jong-Il inherits an unstable North Korea that must virtually abandon the Juche doctrine in order to survive. Under such conditions, Kim Il-Song might still decide to lash out and strike for the last time,

launching the "revolutionary offensive" that is "our party's traditional struggle method."

Indeed, it should be remembered that for more than a year now, Pyongyang has in effect been issuing the West an ultimatum: Either bail out the North Korean economy and finance the modernization of its military-dominated industrial base or North Korea will strike out against South Korea and Japan, shattering the stability of the entire Pacific Rim. Indeed, a senior North Korean official acknowledged in June 1992 that "North Korea may end up taking a certain type of military action for its survival if [the] superpowers support only one side."

Thus, Kim Jong-Il's current initiation of a major crisis that might ultimately evolve into a major war in North East Asia, and North Korea's growing preoccupation with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, serves both as a means of solidifying the support of the all important military elite as well as clearly demonstrates that the "Sacred War for Reunification, 1993," is very much at the top of Pyongyang's short list of options for confronting the crises ahead.

by Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest

(This paper may not necessarily reflect the views of all of the Members of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. It is intended to provoke discussion and debate.)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. minutes	Principals Committee Meeting, November 15, 1993. Record ID: 9321299. (10 pages)	11/15/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Steven Aoki. Subject: Deputies Meeting. Record ID: 9321250. (3 pages)	11/05/1993	P1/b(1)

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006b. draft	Memo for Leon Fuerth, Rick Inderfurth, Marc Grossman et al. Subject: Deputies' Meeting. Record ID: 9321250. (1 page)	11/1993	P1/b(1)

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006c. agenda	for Deputies' Meeting. Record ID: 9321250. (1 page)	11/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Aoki. Subject: North Korea. Record ID: 9321300. (1 page)	11/16/1993	P1/b(1)

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007b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: North Korea. Record ID: 9321300. (2 pages)	11/16/1993	P1/b(1)

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