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Korea [Folder 1] [2]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. list	Sequence of Events. (2 pages)	12/05/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	Proposal. (1 page)	12/05/1993	P1/b(1)
001c. list	Positions. (2 pages)	12/05/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: DAS Einhorn. (4 pages)	12/03/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: post-Summit approach. (6 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)
004. report	Information by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (5 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)
005. report	National Intelligence Estimate. (14 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs
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Korea [Folder 1] [2]

2009-0528-F

vz1423

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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001b. paper	Proposal. (1 page)	12/05/1993	P1/b(1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Dec-1993 14:21 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

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SIT: AOKI BEERS CLARKER PONEMAN RAGLE VAX WIEDEMANN

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RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE

<SUBJ>

DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USVIENNA 003424

DEPT FOR PM ACDA

DOE HQS:IS-40

NRC:IP

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, KN

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

1. SUMMARY. IN HIS DECEMBER 2 STATEMENT TO THE IAEA DECEMBER BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING (FULL TEXT FAXED DECEMBER 2 TO PM) DG HANS BLIX SAID THE REFUSAL OF THE DPRK TO PERMIT THE IAEA TO CONDUCT REGULAR INSPECTIONS SINCE FEBRUARY HAD LED TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SYSTEM COULD NOT BE SAID AT PRESENT TO PROVIDE ANY MEANINGFUL ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL USE OF THE DPRK'S DECLARED NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL. HOWEVER, THE SYSTEM COULD BE FULLY OR PARTIALLY RESTORED IF

TAB VII

COOPERATION WERE FORTHCOMING FROM THE DPRK. END
SUMMARY.

-
2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL REITERATED WHAT HE HAD SAID AT THE UNGA NOVEMBER 1, NAMELY THAT "IAEA VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN THE DPRK SUGGEST THAT SOME NUCLEAR MATERIAL EXISTS THERE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE AGENCY. HENCE, THE AGENCY CANNOT VERIFY THE CORRECTNESS AND ASSESS THE COMPLETENESS OF THE DPRK'S REPORT OF MATERIAL SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS." THIS REMAINED THE UNSOLVED, CENTRAL ISSUE.

3. BLIX TOLD THE DECEMBER BOARD: "ONE MONTH LATER, I AM BOUND TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM WHICH WAS IN PLACE ON DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE DPRK CANNOT BE SAID TO PROVIDE ANY MEANINGFUL ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL USE OF THESE INSTALLATIONS AND THIS MATERIAL. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE SYSTEM COULD NOT WITH RENEWED EFFORTS BE FULLY OR PARTIALLY RESTORED, IF COOPERATION WERE FORTHCOMING FROM THE DPRK. NOR IS IT TO DENY THE POSSIBLE TRUTH OF A STATEMENT MADE ON NOVEMBER 11 BY THE FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. KANG SOK JU, THAT THE DPRK "TOTALLY FROZE THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHIN THE DPRK" AND THAT "STILL NOW INSPECTION CAMERAS AND SEALS OF THE IAEA REMAIN ON THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OF OUR COUNTRY." HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF VERIFICATION, SUCH STATEMENTS OFFER LITTLE ASSURANCE."

4. CONCLUDING ON THE DPRK, BLIX SAID "THE AGENCY IS READY AT ANY TIME TO RECEIVE A TEAM FROM THE DPRK FOR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE--INCLUDING THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND VISITS TO ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS. IT IS ALSO READY TO SEND AN INSPECTION TEAM TO PERFORM A FULL RANGE OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES. THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INDICATED IN DETAIL BY THE AGENCY AND ARE OF THE SAME KIND AS THE AGENCY UNDERTOOK IN THE DPRK AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR WITHOUT OBJECTIONS BY DPRK AUTHORITIES. THEY OBVIOUSLY GO FAR BEYOND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, BUT THEY DO NOT INCLUDE THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND VISITS TO ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS, ABOUT WHICH THE AGENCY IS MANDATED TO CONSULT SEPARATELY WITH THE DPRK."

-
5. ON OTHER SUBJECTS, BLIX MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:
UKRAINE:

----- THE UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS RECENTLY FIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO BECOME A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE IN THE FUTURE AND EXPRESSED THE WISH OF UKRAINE TO CONCLUDE A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT APPLYING TO "ALL NUCLEAR MATERIALS USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN UKRAINE." THE IAEA INTENDS TO EMBARK ON DISCUSSIONS ON A DRAFT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR

SUBMISSION TO THE BOARD. THE AGENCY RECOGNIZES THAT THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE REMAINS TO BE CLARIFIED AND THAT SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION MAY HAVE A BEARING ON THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

IRAQ:

----- WITH IRAQ'S RECENT FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 715 (ON LONG-TERM MONITORING) A MAJOR STEP HAD BEEN ACHIEVED TOWARDS IRAQ'S FULFILMENT OF ALL OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECTION C OF THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION 687 OF 1991 IN

THE VIEW OF THE UN

SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ AND THE IAEA. THEY WILL PROCEED TO SATISFY THEMSELVES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THAT THEY CAN IMPLEMENT SATISFACTORILY THE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION WORK IN IRAQ.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USVIENNA 003424

DEPT FOR PM ACDA

DOE HQS:IS-40

NRC:IP

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: N/A

FROM: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, KN

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT
- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

IRAN:

----- AN IAEA TEAM HEADED BY DDG FOR SAFEGUARDS, PELLAUD, HAD VISITED IRAN 15-21 NOVEMBER AND HAD SEEN INSTALLATIONS RELATING TO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN TEHERAN (INCLUDING SHARIF UNIVERISTY), ESFAHAN AND KARAJ. THE TEAM HAD SEEN ALL THE LOCATIONS, BUILDINGS AND LABORATORIES IT WISHED TO VISIT AND HAD OPEN AND FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS ON POINTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THE IAEA HAD A DUTY, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL SAID, NOT ONLY TO LOOK FOR INSTALLATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE DECLARED UNDER SAFEGUARDS BUT ALSO TO HELP DISPEL ERRONEOUS NOTIONS THAT MAY BE DISSEMINATED. "ALTHOUGH SOME MAY PREFER THE TWILIGHT IN WHICH SPECULATIONS BECOMES EASIER," SAID DR. BLIX, "THE IAEA MUST SEEK MAXIMUM CLARITY AND BE AN INSTRUMENT TO ACHIEVE IT."

PLUTONIUM:

----- A FURTHER INFORMAL MEETING OF EXPERTS HAD TAKEN PLACE 22-23 NOVEMBER AT WHICH THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES RELATED TO PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM WAS DISCUSSED. THERE HAD BEEN A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS THAT THE PEACEFUL STORING OR USE OF THESE MATERIALS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSPARENCY AND THAT THE IAEA MIGHT BE ASKED TO MAINTAIN AND PUBLISH AN APPROPRIATE REGISTER. STRENGTHENING OF SAFEGUARDS:

----- THE AGENCY WAS EMBARKING ON A NUMBER OF IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS, INCLUDING ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING, AND SPECIFIC OFFERS TO

COOPERATE IN TESTING SOME OF THE MEASURES DISCUSSED
HAD ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
HUNGARY, JAPAN AND SWEDEN.

FINANCIAL SITUATION:

----- THE AGENCY WILL AGAIN BE OBLIGED
BY THE SUBSTANTIAL ARREARS OF SOME MEMBER STATES TO
CUT ITS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN 1994 BY 12 PERCENT.

BECKER

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SECTION: 01 OF 02

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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS IN VIENNA

OBERSTFERNERGASSE 11
A-1100 VIENNA, AUSTRIA
TELEPHONE 36 31 52

TELEFAX NUMBER (0043) (1) 369-83-92

DATE: 3 December 1993


TO: FM/PNW - Gary Samore
USMission USUN New York
FROM: Mike Lawrence

PAGES: 11 (Including Cover Sheet)

MESSAGE:

The attached report is what Blix intends to send to the Security Council.

Also attached is an IAEA press release issued December 2, 1993 on DPRK.

**B**GOV/2687/Add.2
1 December 1993

International Atomic Energy Agency

BOARD OF GOVERNORSRESTRICTED Distr.
Original: ENGLISH

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**REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF KOREA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (INFCIRC/403)**

Addendum

1. Despite many contacts between the Agency Secretariat and the DPRK since the thirty-seventh regular session of the IAEA General Conference adopted the resolution on the "Implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (GC(XXXVII)/RES/624), the safeguards situation has deteriorated. In the two months that have passed neither consultations nor inspections of any kind have taken place at nuclear facilities in the DPRK. Surveillance equipment, like cameras have failed to operate, seals have not been checked, and many items, which, for reasonable assurance against misuse, require visits and verification with determined intervals, have not been visited for a long time.

In the light of this the Director General of the IAEA, in his November 1993 presentation to the United Nations General Assembly, stated that "the longer the Agency is precluded from conducting inspection, the more safeguards-related data deteriorate, and the less assurance safeguards can provide that even the declared facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes".

One month later, the safeguards system which was in place on declared nuclear material and installations in the DPRK cannot be said to provide any meaningful assurance of peaceful use of these installations and this material. This is not to say that the system could not, with renewed efforts, be at least partly restored if co-operation were forthcoming from the DPRK.

The Agency is ready at any time to receive a team from the DPRK for consultations about the whole safeguards issue - including the need for additional information and visits to additional locations. It is also ready to send an inspection team to perform a full range of inspection activities. These activities have been indicated in detail by the Agency and are of the same kind as the Agency undertook in the DPRK at this time last year without objections by DPRK authorities. They evidently go far beyond maintenance activities, but they do not include the question of additional information and visits to additional locations, about which the Agency is mandated to consult separately with the DPRK.

2. The following describes developments over the implementation of the DPRK's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency (INFCIRC/403) since the 37th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference. Earlier developments have been described in documents GOV/2643, GOV/2687, GOV/2687/Add.1, and in the Director General's oral reports to the Board and General Conference.

3. On 25 October 1993, the IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards sent a telex to the Director of the Department for External Relations of the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the DPRK, Mr. Choi. The telex referred to two meetings, on 20 and 22 October, one between a representative of the DPRK's Permanent Mission and the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the second between that representative and the Assistant Director General of the Agency's External Relations at which the Agency had again stressed the need for inspection as specified in the Agency's telex of 8 September.

The telex also said that "the safeguards status of the facilities listed in the telex mentioned [8 September 1993] is deteriorating" and made it clear that "to account for the failure of some surveillance equipment, certain measures not foreseen in the telex of 8 September would also have to be taken." The telex also explained that the necessary inspection mission to the DPRK would have to "comprise seven inspectors and last for two to three weeks". Moreover, if the DPRK was to decide to refuel the 5MW(e) reactor at this juncture, "the composition and duration of the mission would have to be adjusted accordingly."

4. In a letter of 25 October 1993, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the United Nations clarified the position of the Government of the DPRK "with regard to the unjust action of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)". The letter, inter alia, stated that "the IAEA did not do what it had to do in response to the sincere efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to solve the 'nuclear issue' through negotiations, but, instead, adopted an unreasonable 'resolution' at its last General Conference. The IAEA is at present making another attempt to include the 'nuclear

issue' in the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations." It further stated that "this is nothing but a trick to cover its [IAEA's] scope of partiality committed by itself [IAEA] under the guise of the name of international community."

5. On 28 October 1993 Director Choi of the Department for External Relations of the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the DPRK, replied to DDG-SG's telex of 25 October, saying that "the Agency Secretariat has ignored the DPRK's proposal for consultations, and therefore, it is responsible for the situation it has brought to such a point that the September meeting of the Board of Governors and the subsequent 37th regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency have respectively adopted provocative 'resolutions' against the DPRK". He added that this has "divested the Agency Secretariat of its justification for any further dealings with the DPRK".

Mr. Choi said, however, that, "under an agreement reached at the recent DPRK-USA working-level contacts in New York, we [DPRK] have decided now to agree to accept Agency inspection for the purpose of maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment on such scope as they were carried out last August." As for the routine and ad hoc inspections proposed by the Agency, Mr. Choi stated that "the future and scope of these inspections would depend on the degree to which the on-going DPRK-USA talks make progress and the Agency's partiality and injustice are redressed". He also added that "if the current session of the United Nations General Assembly unreasonably takes up our [DPRK's] nuclear issue" for discussion at this juncture, "it will only help to widen the area of the partiality and injustice of the Agency's Secretariat."

Mr. Choi concluded by saying that "our [DPRK's] permission of the maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment is more than what the Agency deserves in the present-day circumstances" and that "in case the maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment would not take place because of your [the IAEA's] failure to respond positively to our goodwill measure, the Agency Secretariat will be held totally responsible for the consequences therefrom."

6. DDG-SG replied to Director Choi on 29 October 1993. Recalling the Director General's telex of 14 September 1993 to the DPRK's Minister of Atomic Energy he said that "the Agency has to perform all the activities specified in the telex of 8 September 1993, in order 'to meet its technical requirements and to thereby ensure, inter alia, continuity of safeguards over the DPRK's declared nuclear activities'."

He also said that "all the activities specified in the telex of 8 September are overdue and necessary to halt the further deterioration of the relevant safeguards data." He emphasized that "these activities must be viewed as an integral whole and not as a set of activities from which a state can pick and choose. In seeking to limit Agency's inspection activities to 'maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipments', the DPRK is widening the area of non-compliance with the safeguards agreement and reducing the assurance that all declared installations and material are used only for peaceful purposes."

He concluded by expressing the hope that "the DPRK will review its position and agree to the Agency performing all the inspections activities specified in the telex of 8 September" following which the Agency "will be in a position to send an inspection team to the DPRK."

7. Director Choi responded on 31 October 1993. He said that "our country [DPRK] finds itself in a unique situation in which the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons still remains temporarily suspended". He added that in this situation "our [DPRK's] permission of the Agency's activities for the maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment is more than what the Agency deserves." He reiterated that the scope of the routine and ad hoc inspection "would widen gradually, but only contingent on the degree to which the DPRK-USA talks make progress and the partiality and injustice on the part of some officials of the Agency's Secretariat are redressed".

Mr. Choi urged the Agency Secretariat to respond positively to the DPRK's suggestion in relation to the maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment and "to respond to the DPRK's goodwill measures." He also added that in the case of the Agency's positive response, "we [DPRK] would be prepared to consider positively the Agency's request accordingly, even during the period of the Agency's activities of the maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment, depending on the progress of the DPRK-USA talks".

8. In his 1 November 1993 statement for the forty-eight session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Director General, inter alia, said that "the Agency cannot verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the DPRK's report of material subject to safeguards". He stressed that "the Agency has not asserted that the DPRK is diverting nuclear material for weapons development. However, until such time as the inconsistency between the DPRK's report and the Agency's findings is satisfactorily resolved through additional information and visits to additional locations - the possibility that nuclear material has been diverted cannot be excluded".

The Director General regretted that, so far, the DPRK has been "seeking to restrict IAEA's safeguards verification - reducing transparency". He also said that, as a result, "a number of verification measures of the DPRK's declared nuclear activities have become overdue, and continuity of some safeguards relevant data has been damaged. The longer the Agency is precluded from conducting inspection, the more safeguards-related data deteriorate, and the less assurance safeguards can provide that even the declared facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. For its part, the Agency is ready to conduct inspection of the nuclear installations and material which the DPRK has declared and submitted to safeguards. However, the inspection activities are an integral whole. They are not a set of activities from which an inspected State can pick and choose. The Agency is also ready to consult with the DPRK on all outstanding safeguards issues, including the question of inspection of non-declared sites and additional information."

9. On 1 November 1993 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/RES/48/14), which, inter alia, took note "of resolutions GOV/2636 of 25 February 1993,

GOV/2639 of 18 March 1993, GOV/2645 of 1 April 1993 and GOV/2692 of 23 September 1993 of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with the implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as Security Council resolution 825 (1993) of 11 May 1993" and "expressed its grave concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance." The resolution also commended "the Director General and the Secretariat of the Agency for their impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreement still in force between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and urged the DPRK "to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement."

10. The Acting DDG-SG replied, on 5 November 1993, to Director Choi's telex of 31 October 1993, saying that "the scope of the Agency's rights and obligations, and the DPRK's rights and obligations, are not dependent upon any discussions you [DPRK] may have with outside parties" and that "by not accepting the required inspection activities on its [DPRK's] declared nuclear material and facilities, DPRK is depriving itself of the possibility of obtaining credible assurances concerning the peaceful nature of these items." He added that the "acceptance of safeguards by the DPRK is not a favour made to the IAEA," and that he hoped that the DPRK would "review its position on inspections." He also stated the Agency's readiness to receive a consultation team from the DPRK "to discuss all outstanding safeguard issues."

11. Director Choi responded on 10 November 1993. He said that the DPRK's permission for the maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment "is the best measure for the Agency's Secretariat in the unique situation in which the effectuation of withdrawal from the NPT has been suspended" and that "this is the measure taken by us [DPRK] on the basis of the agreement reached at the DPRK-US talks".

He also said that in case the "continuity of the C/S safeguards information will be lost because of your [the IAEA's] failure to accept our [DPRK's] goodwill offer, the Agency will be totally responsible for it, and we [DPRK] cannot but take corresponding action accordingly." Mr. Choi also mentioned that, if the Agency were to send an inspection team for the maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment, "we [DPRK and the IAEA] may discuss the outstanding safeguards issues on that occasion."

12. In a communication of 15 November from the DPRK Permanent Mission the Secretariat was asked to circulate, to all members of the Board of Governors, a Statement made on 11 November by Mr. Kang Sok Ju, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DPRK and Head of the DPRK side's delegation to the DPRK-US high level talks.

The First Vice-Minister said that he deemed it "necessary to clarify the truth of the situation and our [DPRK] principled stand for a solution of the nuclear problem." It was clear that the DPRK and the US were "the parties vested with chief responsibility and authority for the solution of

this problem". Accordingly, the DPRK had, inter alia, taken "practical measures for the solution of the nuclear problem," such as temporarily suspending the effectuation of its declaration to withdraw from the NPT, resuming "negotiation with the IAEA and the North-South dialogue." Under this "special situation we [DPRK] totally froze the movement of nuclear material within the DPRK to fulfil our [DPRK] commitment to proving the transparency of our [DPRK] nuclear activities and allowed inspection for ensuring the continuity of safeguards in this regard." The main, current problem was that the US had failed to show similar movement and in parallel.

The First Vice-Minister added that "the DPRK has until now remained faithful to its promise to the United States that it will allow the readjustment and replacement of the inspection cameras of the IAEA. Still now the inspection cameras and seals of the IAEA remain on the nuclear facilities of our [DPRK] country." He also stated that "Though we [DPRK] consider that the observation by cameras alone is enough to ensure the continuity of safeguards we [DPRK], making allowances for the circumstances of the US side, clearly manifested our magnanimous stand that the scope of inspection might be expanded and already held an informal negotiation with the US side and then proposed a working-level negotiation with the IAEA. Nevertheless, the United States and the IAEA are claiming that if the continuity of safeguards is to be ensured, we [DPRK] must accept an overall inspection by the IAEA..."

The First Vice-Minister went on to say that "Under the special circumstances in which we [DPRK] unilaterally and temporarily suspended the effectuation of our withdrawal from the Treaty, there must be a clear distinction between the guarantee of continuity of safeguards and full compliance with the safeguards agreement. The full compliance with the safeguards agreement must, in any case, be debated and solved in direct links with the abandonment of the nuclear threat and stifling policy of the United States through future DPRK-US talks." He also said that "The nuclear problem will be solved smoothly when, an agreement is reached on the formula of package solution and the United States take a practical action of renouncing the nuclear threat and hostile policy against us [DPRK] according to it and we fully comply with the safeguards agreement, remaining committed to the Treaty. There is no change in our [DPRK] stand to fully ensure the continuity of safeguards until an agreement is reached on the formula of package solution."

He concluded by saying that "If the International Atomic Energy Agency ignores our sincere proposal for negotiation to ensure the continuity of safeguards and distorts the fact as if the continuity of safeguards in the DPRK has been broken, it would be considered to be a signal urging the DPRK to quit the non-proliferation Treaty promptly."

13. The Acting DDG-SG replied on 24 November 1993 to Director's Choi's telex of 10 November 1993. He said that, to confirm what the DPRK already knew, "the Agency needs to perform all the activities specified in the telex of 8 September, as well as certain additional activities that have also become necessary in view of the loss of continuity in the application of surveillance." The Acting DDG-SG made clear that "safeguards verification is a system of many interrelated components, designed to give, together, assurance of peaceful use of nuclear installations and material" and added that "as many components of the system require periodic

visits by inspectors, it is inevitable that the longer these inspections are delayed beyond the established timetable, the more eroded the safeguards become - the less there is of continuity."

Emphasizing, therefore, that the reloading of cameras and checking of seals is not enough to ensure continuity, he stated that "the Agency will not lend itself to creating a semblance of continuity of safeguards by only looking after a few components of the system, when more is needed."

He further stated that inspection of all the declared nuclear facilities in the DPRK is overdue, which includes "the IRT Research Reactor, the critical assembly and the sub-critical assembly that are to be inspected once a year, and where the last inspection was in May 1992" and "the Natural Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant which is to be inspected at least 4 times a year, and where only 3 inspections have been performed since May 1992, the last being in November 1992." Based on the above he concluded that "the Agency has not yet been in a position to verify the initial inventory of the Fuel Fabrication Plant". He added that "the situation is similar in the nuclear fuel rods storage facility which requires 3 inspections per year, and where only 1 inspection has been performed in May 1992."

The Acting DDG-SG concluded by expressing his hope that the DPRK will accept the Agency performing all the required activities and stated that the Agency "remains ready to receive a DPRK consultation mission at any time to discuss other outstanding safeguards issues."

14. In a paper titled "Information by the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Maintaining the Continuity of the IAEA Safeguards in the DPRK" (dated 1 December 1993) sent to the Agency by the Permanent Mission of the DPRK, the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the DPRK, inter alia, while describing the DPRK's "sincere efforts for maintaining the continuity of the safeguards data", points out that "at present the containment and surveillance systems installed by the Agency remain untouched". Therefore "even though some video surveillance systems run out the reactor core and inlets/outlets for nuclear material flow channels in the Experimental NPP (KDE-) and ion exchange process and other main processes in the Radiochemical Laboratory (KDF-) are fully frozen by containment and surveillance systems of the IAEA." Underlining that "there are more containment and surveillance systems than necessary in our [DPRK] nuclear facilities, in view of the specific nature of our [DPRK] nuclear facilities and present construction status of the Radiochemical Laboratory", the paper states that "since containment and surveillance measures complement and complete each other, the continuity of the safeguards is maintained although one of them temporarily is in insufficient status."

The paper underlines that there should be "a clear distinction between full implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and the problem for ensuring the continuity of safeguards data in the current special situation in which we [DPRK] unilaterally suspended the effectuation of our [DPRK] withdrawal from the NPT." It continues saying that "even though physical inventory verification of nuclear material for the time being is delayed in other facilities having non-weapon grade material, except the KDE- and KDF- which are under the Agency's containment

and surveillance, it is too natural that nobody can have suspicion that the non-weapon grade material would be diverted to military activity for so-called 'manufacture of nuclear weapons'".

The paper further states that "the IAEA inspection activity for maintenance of containment and surveillance systems is adequate to the created current special situation in ensuring the continuity of safeguards in the DPRK." It points out that the Agency Secretariat, by requesting the DPRK to accept full ad hoc and routine inspections in accordance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency "instead of conducting the inspection for maintenance of containment and surveillance systems", shows that "some officials of the IAEA Secretariat continue to join hostile forces in the plot of stifling our [DPRK] socialist system".

The paper concludes by saying that "the issue of the routine and ad hoc inspections the Agency insists on" "will be resolved one by one if the further DPRK-US high-level talks will make a progress and if the further consultations with the Agency will be held."

15. On 1 December 1993 Director Choi replied to the 24 November telex from the Acting DDG SG. Referring to his telex of 10 November 1993, proposing that the Agency send an inspection team for maintenance and replacement of C/S equipment and discussion of outstanding safeguards issues, Director Choi said "if the Agency's Secretariat had accepted our reasonable proposal, many problems could have been resolved in maintaining the continuity of safeguards more sufficiently". He added "it is very regrettable that our [DPRK] proposal has not been realized because of some officials of the IAEA Secretariat. As for the issue of the alleged 'deterioration' of continuity of safeguards, the IAEA Secretariat that avoided replying to our [DPRK] proposal is fully responsible for it."

Director Choi concluded that "the serious problems raised in relation between us [DPRK] and the Agency will be settled gradually, if the DPRK US talks make progress and the IAEA accepts our [DPRK] proposal. If the Secretariat of the Agency is really concerned about the continuity of safeguards they have to respond positively to our [DPRK] reasonable proposal."

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003. cable	re: post-Summit approach. (6 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)

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<CLAS>UNCLASSIFIED<DTG>191213Z NOV 93
<ORIG>USMISSION USVIENNA
<SUBJ>STATEMENT OF KANG SOK DU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRKMND HEAD OF DPRK
DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:C/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK DU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRKMND HEAD OF DPRK
DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

1. MISSION RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM THE IAEA ON
NOVEMBER 18, 1993. OUR UNEECSBANDING IS THAT IT WILL
BE CIRCULATED TO ALL BOARD MEMBERS.

BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT

BY MR. KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN
FFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF KOREA

AND

HZAD OF EPRK SIDE'S DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA
HIGH-LEVEL TALKS

(11 NOVEMBER 1993, PYONGYANG)

VERY ILL-BODING SIGNS ARE APPEARING THESE DAYS,
BECLOUDING THE PROSPECTS OF SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

SOME QUARTERS ARE PAINTING AN EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC
PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS IF CONTINUITY OF THE
SAFEGUARDS ON OUR COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WERE ON
THE VERGE OF SUSPENSION, ARGUING THAT IF THE DPRK
REFUSES TO ACCEPT "A TOTAL INSPECTION" BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) WITHIN A FEW
DAYS, "UN SANCTIONS" MUST BE IMPOSED ON IT.

AND IT MUST NOT GO UNNOTICED THAT, WITH A VIEW TO
BACKING THESE ARGUMENTS OF THEIRS, THEY ARE CONCEALING
THE ESSENCE OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA AND ARE DISTORTING FACT TO CREATE THE
IMPRESSION THAT THE DPRK IS PLAYING A HIDE-AND-SEEK TO
DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ARE SETTING AFLOAT THE
FALSE RUMOR THAT IT IS USING THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AS A
BARGAINING CHIP TO ATTAIN A CERTAIN SELFISH AIM.

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE
POLITICAL PURPOSE SOUGHT BY THE DISHONEST FORCES IN
SPREADING SUCH ARGUMENTS AND RUMORS ZEALOUSLY, I DEEM
NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE TRUTH OF THE SITUATION AND
PRINCIPLED STAND FOR A SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM.

AS IS ALREADY KNOWN, THE DPRK AND THE US SIDES
PUBLISHED A JOINT STATEMENT AFTER DISCUSSING AND
REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE IN
THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND HELD TALKS ON

THIS BASIS.

IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THE TWO SIDES CONFIRMED IT AS THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM TO REFRAIN FROM NUCLEAR THREATS, RESPECT EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, ENSURE A FAIR APPLICATION OF FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA, AND CLEARLY DEFINED THE DPRK AND THE USA AS THE PARTIES VESTED WITH CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

ACCORDING TO THIS, WE HAVE TAKEN PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS TILL TODAY.

WITH THE PUBLICATION OF THE DPRK-US JOINT STATEMENT, WE UNILATERALLY AND TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED THE EFFECTUATION OF OUR DECLARATION ON OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND RESUMED NEGOTIATION WITH THE IAEA AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

AND, UNDER THIS SPECIAL SITUATION, WE TOTALLY FROZE THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHIN THE DPRK TO FULFIL OUR COMMITMENT TO PROVING THE TRANSPARENCY OF OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND ALLOWED INSPECTION FOR SURING THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGARDS IN THIS REGARD.

ESPECIALLY, WE MADE A BIG BOLD DECISION TO REPLACE THE EXISTING GRAPHITE MODERATED REACTORS WITH LIGHT WATER REACTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY, IN ORDER TO FUNDAMENTALLY DISPEL THE SO-CALLED "SUSPICION OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT" AGAINST THE DPRK.

ALL THESE SINCERE EFFORTS, HOWEVER, HAVE FAILED TO CALL FORTH A PRACTICAL RESPONSE FROM THE US SIDE, AND THE CURRENT SITUATION IS DEVELOPING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THIS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FAITHLESS STANCE OF THE US SIDE, OUR DIALOGUE PARTNER, TOWARD THE TALKS.

CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON AT THE PAST UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295 FROM USMISSION UNVIE E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS
TALKS, OUTRAGEOUS WORDS THREATENING AND ANTAGONIZING THE DPRK HAVE ROLLED OFF THE TONGUES OF OFFICIAL FIGURES OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUCCESSION AND THEY ARE ERTLY REVEALING THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE THE "TEAM IRIT" MILITARY MANEUVERS, NUCLEAR WAR EXERCISES AGAINST THE DPRK.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY BROUGHT THE THIRD-STAGE DPRK-US TALKS THAT HAS TO BE HELD WITHIN TWO MONTHS TO A DEADLOCK BY SETTING UNREASONABLE PRECONDITIONS AND ORCHESTRATED THE ADOPTION OF A "RESOLUTION" LAYING THE

BLAME AT OUR DOOR AT THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE IAEA AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

ALL THESE FACTS SHOW THAT OVER THE FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE TALKS BEGAN ONLY THE DPRK HAS UNILATERALLY MOVED TO IMPLEMENT THE POINTS AGREED UPON AT THE TALKS, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT MOVED AT ALL.

THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT AT THE TALKS THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON A EQUAL FOOTING HAS BEEN IGNORED BY THE US SIDE AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF IMPASSE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM.

THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION AS IF DPRK WERE TO BLAME FOR IT. THIS FOSTERS THE SUSPICION THAT THE UNITED STATES STILL PURSUES A POLITICAL PURPOSE OF STIFLING OUR REPUBLIC, UNWILLING TO SOLVE THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN SERIOUS EARNEST.

PARTICULARLY, IT IS AN ACT OF REVERSING BLACK AND WHITE TO CRY THAT THE CONTINUITY OF THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF THE DPRK IS BROKEN.

TO GUARANTEE THAT OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WILL NOT BE ORIENTED TO MILITARY PURPOSE UNTIL THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM HAS COMPLETELY BEEN SOLVED THROUGH THE DPRK-US TALKS, THE DPRK HAS UNTIL NOW REMAINED FAITHFUL TO ITS PROMISE TO THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL ALLOW THE READJUSTMENT AND REPLACEMENT OF THE INSPECTION CAMERAS OF THE IAEA.

STILL NOW THE INSPECTION CAMERAS AND SEALS OF THE IAEA REMAIN ON THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OF OUR COUNTRY.

UNTIL NOW, WE HAVE ALLOWED INSPECTION TEAMS OF THE IAEA TO CHANGE FILMS AND BATTERIES OF THE INSPECTION CAMERAS, CONFIRM THEIR SEALS AND READJUST THE CAMERAS WHENEVER NECESSARY FOR THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS. ONLY RECENTLY, WE INFORMED THE IAEA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OF OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE SUCH INSPECTION TEAM AT ANY TIME IT REQUESTS THAT.

CONSIDERING THE SCALE AND CONDITIONS OF OUR NUCLEAR FACILITIES, THEY CAN FULLY CONFIRM ONLY WITH THE CAMERAS THAT OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MILITARY PURPOSE.

WHEN THE CAMERAS WERE READJUSTED AND REPLACED IN AUGUST, NOBODY WAS AFRAID THAT THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS MIGHT BE BROKEN.

THOUGH WE CONSIDER THAT THE OBSERVATION BY CAMERAS ALONE IS ENOUGH TO ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS WE, MAKING ALLOWANCES FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE US SIDE, CLEARLY MANIFESTED OUR MAGNANIMOUS STAND THAT THE SCOPE OF INSPECTION MIGHT BE EXPANDED AND ALREADY HELD INFORMAL NEGOTIATION WITH THE US SIDE AND THEN PROPOSED A WORKING-LEVEL NEGOTIATION WITH THE IAEA.

NEVERTHELESS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE IAEA ARE CLAIMING THAT IF THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS IS TO BE ENSURED, WE MUST ACCEPT AN OVERALL INSPECTION BY THE IAEA AND SET THIS AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE OPENING OF

THE THIRD-STAGE DPRK-US TALKS.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE IAEA DMAFD IS THAT WE WHOLLY COMPLY WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE.

OUR WHOLE COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT MEANS OUR FULL RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

AS WE MADE CLEAR IN A STATEMENT OF THE DPRK GOVERNMENT, WE DECLARED OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT BECAUSE OUR REPUBLIC'S SUPREME INTERESTS WERE IN DANGER OWING TO THE US NUCLEAR THREAT AND THE PARTIALITY OF THE IAEA.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

THE UNITED STATES CAME OUT TO THE DPRK-US TALKS BECAUSE

IT RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RETURN US TO THE TREATY WITHOUT A CHANGE IN ITS NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY TOWARD KOREA AND THE DPRK. JOINT STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND.

THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS PUT INTO PRACTICE NONE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO US HAS NO FACE TO DEMAND US POINT-BLANK TO RETURN TO THE TREATY.

THIS IS WHY THE UNITED STATES, CRAFTILY ENOUGH, IS SEEKING OUR SUBSTANTIAL RETURN TO THE TREATY BY REALIZING INSPECTION EQUIVALENT TO THE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE CLOAK "CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS", AVOIDING THE WORDS OF RETURN TO THE TREATY OUTWARDLY.

N THIS INCREASES THE SUSPICION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD INTENDED TO COAX US WITH AN EMPTY TALK INTO RETURN TO THE TREATY, NOT COMPLETELY GIVING UP NUCLEAR THREAT TO OUR COUNTRY AND HOSTILE POLICY OF STIFLING IT FROM THE FIRST.

UNDER THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE UNILATERALLY AND TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED THE EFFECTUATION OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GUARANTEE OF CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

THE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT MUST, IN ANY CASE, BE DEBATED AND SOLVED IN DIRECT LINKS WITH THE ABANDONMENT OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FUTURE DPRK-US TALKS.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED ANY TIME IF THEY TRY TO DELIBERATELY ATTRIBUTE OUR NUCLEAR PROBLEM TO SUCH TECHNICAL AND WORKING RULES AS THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH THE

POLITICAL FACTORS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY STILL REMAIN.

IN A NUTSHELL, THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES IN DEMANDING ONLY OUR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE, ITSELF NOT MOVING UT ALL, CANNOT BE CONSTRUED OTHERWISE THAN TO INVENT A PRETEXT OF SANCTIONS AND PRESSURE ON US BY RENDERING THE SITUATION COMPLICATED, NOT TO SETTLE THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN ACTUALITY.

WE MAKE IT CLEAR ONCE AGAIN THAT WE CANNOT FULLY COMPLY WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNLESS THE UNITED STATES GUARANTEES IN DEED THAT IT WOULD NOT TRY TO STIFLE OUR SYSTEM.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA CAN NEVER BE SOLVED THROUGH PRESSURE. ONLY THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION CAN IT BE SOLVED.

WE PROPOSED TO THE US SIDE THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION OF NUCLEAR PROBLEM PROCEEDING FROM THE JUDGEMENT THAT THE MAJOR CAUSE OF NO PROGRESS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM LIES IN THE LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES.

IF THE THING IS TO GO WELL, THE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SETTLED ONE BY ONE WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE

SAILANT, MOVING FIRST AND US, THE SUFFERER, RESPONDING.

BUT THE UNITED STATES, CONTRARY TO ITS POSITION, IS NOW TELLING US TO MOVE FIRST. THIS IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

WE INSIST ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION WHEREBY THE SIDES SHOULD AT LEAST DEFINE THEIR WORK AND EACH SIDE SHOULD DO ITS SHARE.

IF THE DPRK-US TALKS OF THIRD-STAGE ARE HELD AND AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION THERE, A DEFINITE PROSPECT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL BE OPENED.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED SMOOTHLY WHEN, AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION AND THE UNITED STATES TAKE A PRACTICAL ACTION OF RENOUNCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY AGAINST US ACCORDING TO IT AND WE FULLY COMPLY WITH THE UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295 FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNPJK SCSA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, REMAINING COMMITTED TO THE TREATY.

THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR STAND TO FULLY ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS UNTIL AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION.

NOW THE MATTER DEPENDS ON HOW THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR A PACKAGE SOLUTION, RENOUNCING ITS HOSTILE POLICY OF STIFLING THE DPRK.

THE FORMULA WILL BE A TOUCHSTONE SHOWING WHETHER OR
NOT THE UNITED STATES TRUPY HAS THE WILL
TO SOLVE THE

NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND THE WILL FOR DIALOGUE.

IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SHOW A POSITIVE
RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL, WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO CONSIDER THAT THE US SIDE HAS NO WILL FOR A
GENUINE DIALOGUE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE NKCLEAR
PROBLEM.

IF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IGNORES
OUR SINCERE PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATION TO ENSURE THE
CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS AND DISTORTS THE FACT AS IF
THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE DPRK HAS BEEN
BROKEN, IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE A SIGNAL URGING
THE DPRK TO QUIT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY PROMPTLY.

THE BALL IS IN THE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

END TEXT.

BECKER

NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

CT>SECTION: 03 OF 04

ECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Information by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (5 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs
OA/Box Number: 64

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea [Folder 1] [2]

2009-0528-F

vz1423

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	National Intelligence Estimate. (14 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs
OA/Box Number: 64

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea [Folder 1] [2]

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