

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Collection/Record Group: Clinton Presidential Records

Subgroup/Office of Origin: Public Liaison

Series/Staff Member: Suzanna Valdez

Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 9445

FolderID:

Folder Title:

Cuba File 1995 [2]

Stack:

S

Row:

30

Section:

5

Shelf:

6

Position:

1

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 2, 1995

PRESS BRIEFING
BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO,
GENERAL JOHN SHEEHAN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF
THE U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND,
AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS PETER TARNOFF

12:15 P.M. EDT

MR. MCCURRY: Good afternoon, everybody. As you know, we're here to discuss some matters related to Cuban migration policy. But I know a lot of you have got interest in the Oklahoma City investigation. For that reason, I've asked the Attorney General to start with just a very brief statement on that subject. She's not in a position to take many questions. We will then move on to the Cuban migration discussion.

Attorney General.

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: At approximately 6:45 a.m. this morning, the FBI arrested Robert Jacks and Gary Land in Carthage, Missouri based on material witness warrants issued by a magistrate judge in Oklahoma, based on probable cause to believe that they possessed information concerning the April 19, 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. The arrest occurred without incident. Jacks and Land are cooperating with the FBI in the investigation, and have agreed to be interviewed and provided consent to search their property. The investigation is continuing.

Also today, at the request of Director Freeh, I have approved his appointment, Larry Potts as the Director of the FBI. Director Freeh's recommendation was based on Mr. Potts's long and distinguished career in law enforcement and the confidence the Director has in him.

Director Freeh has described Mr. Potts as the very best the FBI has. Mr. Potts has been directing the investigation of the Oklahoma City bombing, and the results to date are a tribute to his ability to coordinate a complex, nationwide, multi-agency investigation.

Q How did you find those guys?

Q Madam Attorney General, are these two considered suspects in the bombing?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I would not comment and I would ask everyone to let the investigation proceed and not jump to conclusions.

Q Well, is either believed to be John Doe II?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Again, I would not comment and would reiterate my concern.

Q General Reno, is the search --

Q Can you tell us how they were discovered, how you found them? Could you tell us how you found them? Did they give

MORE

themselves up, or did you get an informant tip, or how were they discovered?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Again, as I have told you all, it's just not right for me to comment on how the investigation is conducted, what leads us to a certain point, because that can only lead to an interruption of the investigation, and I know we want to have it proceed as --

Q In other words, you're not going to say anything?
(Laughter.)

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I have told you again and again that I don't comment on pending investigations, because I think --

Q Ma'am can you tell us please why Potts was named and what's the reason -- and the head of -- the Assistant Director of FBI --

Q Could you tell us how the search for John Doe II is proceeding?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Again, as I have said before, we are following every lead, and there are many. The people of this country are cooperating in an extraordinary fashion, and the investigation is proceeding.

Q And you're looking for others, are you?

Q Are there other suspects that you are still looking for at this point?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I think it's fair to say that we're following every lead with respect to any information that would lead us to anybody responsible for this bombing.

Q Ms. Reno, could you talk about the death threats you've been getting?

MR. MCCURRY: I think that's about all. We want to move on.

Q Well, I think she might answer my question, which was fully on the floor. I want to know why Mr. Potts's named and have we had a man like this designated in the FBI before and what's the reason for this?

ATTORNEY GENERAL: As Director Freeh has said, he appointed Mr. Potts as the Deputy Director of the FBI based on his very distinguished career in law enforcement. Larry Potts is an extraordinary agent, a dedicated law enforcement official. He has been the person responsible in this instance for the day-to-day operation of the Oklahoma City investigation, and I think it has been a landmark for law enforcement efforts.

Q Ms. Reno, can you talk about the death threats?

MR. MCCURRY: Okay, we're going to move on now to the subject of Cuba. At this hour, the United States and the Republic of Cuba are releasing a joint statement on agreements that they have reached to regularize further their migration relationship. That's what our cast here is to talk about. I'm going to ask Attorney General Reno to open with a statement on that. We will have a copy of the joint statement that we are issuing along with the Republic of Cuba. That will be available to you at the conclusion of the briefing.

MORE

Attorney General Reno will speak and then I've also asked General John Sheehan, who is the Commander In Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, to talk a little bit about Guantanamo Bay and some aspects of the migration agreement. We also have Doris Meissner, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Admiral Kramek, who is the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff, who is here as well. And they're available as you might have any questions related to the agreement that we discussed today. So I'll start again with Attorney General Reno.

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: It has long been the policy of the United States that Cubans who wish to migrate to the United States should do so by legal means. The U.S. interest section in Havana accepts and processes requests for visas, and it also operates an in-country program for those Cubans who seek refugee status for entry into the United States.

Pursuant to this policy, last August I announced that Cubans attempting a regular means of migration to the United States on boats and rafts would not be allowed to enter this country, but, rather, would be brought to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay where they would be offered safe haven.

Last September, following negotiations with representatives of the Cuban government, the United States announced that it would increase Cuban migration to the United States to permit 20,000 legal entrants per year. This program, which includes immigrant visas, refugee applications and a special Cuban migration program designed to broaden the pool of potential entrants, is on target, and we expect to continue Cuban legal migration at this level in the years to come. This year alone, we expect to bring 7,000 Cuban refugees to the United States through our in-country program in Havana.

The United States is now prepared to make another important step towards regularizing Cuban migration between Cuba and the United States. First, with respect to Guantanamo, we will continue to bring to the United States those persons who are eligible for special humanitarian parole under the guidelines announced by the President last October and December.

The government of Cuba has agreed to accept all Cuban nationals in Guantanamo who wish to return home, as well as persons who have previously been deported from the United States and persons who would be ineligible for admission to the United States because of criminal record, medical, physical or mental condition, or commission of acts of violence while at Guantanamo.

All other Cubans in the safe haven will be admitted into the United States on a case-by-case basis as special Guantanamo entrants, bearing in mind the impact of paroles on state and local economies and the need for adequate sponsorships. As has been true for all Cubans and Haitians previously paroled into the United States from Guantanamo, sponsorship and resettlement assistance will be obtained prior to entry. The number of these special Guantanamo entrants admitted to the United States will be credited against the 20,000 annual Cuban migration figure. Thus, there will be no net increase in Cuban migration.

Effective immediately, Cuban migrants intercepted at sea, attempting to enter the United States or who enter Guantanamo illegally will be taken to Cuba where U.S. consular officers will assist those who wish to apply to come to the United States through already-established mechanisms. Cubans must know that the only way to come to the United States is by applying in Cuba.

MORE

All returnees will be permitted to apply for refugee status at the U.S. interest section in Havana. Cuba is one of only three countries in the world in which the United States conducts in-country processing for refugees. The government of Cuba has committed to the government of the United States that no one will suffer reprisals, lose benefits or be prejudiced in any manner, either because he or she sought to depart irregularly, or because he or she has applied for refugee status at the United States interest section.

The Cuban government made a similar commitment in the context of the September, 1994 agreement and we are satisfied that it has been honored. Moreover, the government of Cuba will permit monitoring by U.S. consular officers of the treatment of all returnees.

Migrants intercepted at sea or in Guantanamo will be advised that they will be taken back to Cuba where U.S. consular officials will meet them at the dock and assist those who wish to apply for refugee admission to the United States at the interest section in Havana. They will be told that the government of Cuba has provided a commitment to the United States government that they will suffer no adverse consequences or reprisals of any sort, and that U.S. consular officers will monitor their treatment. They will also be told that those persons who seek resettlement in the United States as refugees must use the in-country refugee program.

Measures will be taken to ensure that persons who claim a genuine need for protection which they believe cannot be satisfied by applying at the U.S. interest section will be examined before return. Cubans who reach the United States through irregular means will be placed in exclusion proceedings and treated as are all illegal migrants from other countries, including giving them the opportunity to apply for asylum.

The United States government reiterates its opposition to the use of violence in connection with departure from Cuba and its determination to prosecute cases of hijacking and alien smuggling.

These new procedures represent another step towards regularizing migration procedures with Cuba, finding a humanitarian solution to the situation at Guantanamo and preventing another uncontrolled and dangerous outflow from Cuba.

I want to make clear that the United States policy towards Cuba remains the same. We remain committed to the Cuban Democracy Act and its central goal -- promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. We will continue to enforce the economic embargo to pressure the Cuban regime to reform.

We will continue to reach out to the Cuban people through private humanitarian assistance and through the free flow of ideas and information to strengthen Cuba's fledgling civil society. And we remain ready to respond in carefully calibrated ways to meaningful steps towards political and economic reform in Cuba.

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: Thank you very much. I would like to applaud the effort on the part of the Attorney General to regularize this process for three very simple reasons -- first, the safety of the 6,000 American servicemen that are serving in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As you know, we were moving down a trail where there was distinct possibility of some of those servicemen and some of those Cubans being hurt.

Second, from a military perspective, it's costing us \$1 million a day to run the camps at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. That money now can be turned -- and once we return these servicemen back to the

MORE

parent units, back into the readiness accounts and we can start plussing up the readiness capability to military forces. In addition to that, we're about ready to spend \$100 million to make the camps more permanent, and so all of these collective things, I think, go, and I would like to truly applaud the efforts on the part of the Attorney General to regularize this process.

MR. MCCURRY: Let me just add one closing comment before we go to questions. In developing the approach that the administration has outlined today, we have consulted very closely with both Governor Chiles and with Senator Graham. And I must say that the President is grateful for the fact that they have both authorized the White House to indicate that they are fully supportive of the policy that we are reviewing today with you.

With that, let's go to questions and you can direct them anywhere.

Q How about Senator Mack?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we will continue consultations. There have been consultations ongoing this morning with other members as well.

Q Was this policy forced because it was about to blow up on Guantanamo?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: What we have tried to do from the beginning is regularize migration from Cuba so that anybody who came to this country came legally and safely. It was clear as we put the process into effect that it was beginning to work. We now have a track record since September of legal migration procedures working so that people can apply safely for refugee status. Over 6,000 have been determined to be refugees; 800 have all ready been brought to this country; and I think people can understand that legal migration does work.

At the same --

Q That's not an answer to my question. The General indicated safety --

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: You asked what prompted this, and I'm --

Q No, I didn't ask what prompted it. He indicated there was a safety problem.

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Well, I'm telling you what prompted the particular change. Seeing that worked, seeing however, that the migrants at Guantanamo had been dislocated, had lost their jobs, had not been able to watch firsthand how it was working, I think that this represents a humanitarian way to address the issue while putting everybody on notice that legal migration processes are working and that they will be utilized.

Q Well, General, you said that any Cubans who tried to leave Cuba now must do so through the Cuban interest section, will be intercepted at sea and brought back to Cuba. But you were equally as firm last summer, as was the President, in saying that this is not the way to get to the United States and that those who were in Guantanamo would never be admitted to the United States. Why should anybody in Cuba believe the new policy when the old policy was reversed?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: One of the things that we have tried to do in this whole process is avert a mass migration to this

MORE

country and to avoid a tremendous outflow of illegal immigrants. What we did then was to put into place a system that we knew worked. Obviously, it was not that convincing to those at Guantanamo, but it has been convincing to people in Havana, in Cuba who can see that it's worked and who are utilizing those processes now. We think that this is the best way to move forward to further regularize migration from Cuba.

Q General, how long would you anticipate this will take? You said all of those there now would be eligible, but you said on a case-by-case basis. Which is it?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Not all. Those with --

Q I understand. All who qualify, but -- but basically, you've got a large number of people --

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: What we want to do is to admit those that are not excludable that don't have criminal histories. We want to admit them in an orderly way based on appropriate sponsorships, based on concern for the community that they're going to. What we have been doing to date is paroling in on a humanitarian basis the children and their families at roughly 500 a week, and I would expect that rate would continue.

Q That it would continue to be 500 a week until you've emptied the compound there at Guantanamo? Is that the --

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Again, what we want to do -- it may be that, or it may be as we formulate it and see just what's involved, that we can speed it up, but we want to make sure that it's done in an orderly way.

Q Can the General tell us a question, please? You said, sir, I believe I understood you to say that you were going to spend \$100 million making permanent the camps down there?

GENERAL SHEEHAN: That's correct.

Q Well, if you're taking these people away from there and back to Cuba, why do you need to spend \$100 million on camps if it was already perfect there?

GENERAL SHEEHAN: What I said was that this act, on the part of regularizing the process has averted that \$100 million that we can use now to put back into the readiness O & M accounts so the readiness of the forces will not suffer as a result of this housing migrants.

Q Yes, but you said you were going to spend \$100 million on making permanent the camps.

Q No, no, no.

GENERAL SHEEHAN: No. What I said was, it averts that \$100 million cost.

Q General, how explosive was the situation in the camps there? You alluded to that at --

GENERAL SHEEHAN: I think the Attorney General has a right. This is a process of a lot of dynamics. There are 6,000 people in the camps right now who are in the process of coming into the United States at a rate that the Attorney General has spoken about. As we saw this summer going down and the protocols ran out, where there was no exit strategy for the camps; then clearly, the frustration level on the camps was going to be very high. These were

MORE

essentially young males, 15 to 32 years old, very, very talented people.

I think that you need to understand that better than 50 percent of these kids are high school graduates, but nine percent of college degrees and two percent have graduate degrees. There are 127 doctors in the camps; but, yet, if there's no exit strategy for them, they're frustrated.

Q But how did you see that frustration become manifested?

GENERAL SHEEHAN: It's manifested itself twice in Guantanamo previously and once in Panama when the Cubans who were there thought they were going to be -- end up in a permanent internment process.

Q So there is a threat of violence. Is that what you're saying?

GENERAL SHEEHAN: There is always a threat of violence in that type of situation. I would call it civil disturbance as opposed to violence, but there is some violence probability, yes.

Q Can you tell us a little bit about how this was negotiated, who did the negotiating for the U.S. and who did the negotiation for the Cubans?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: I think all I'd like to say is that this was negotiated through normal diplomatic channels and not go into the details of how the conversation was --

Q Well, we don't really have such normal diplomatic relations with the Cubans.

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: Yes, we do. We have a U.S. interest section in Havana, there is a Cuban interest section here, and we have regular migration talks, the last of which occurred, I think, a couple of weeks ago in New York.

Q Was this, Mr. Tarnoff, negotiated in the context of those migration talks, or was this a separate, secret negotiation?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: I'd rather not go into the details of how this was actually conducted, because this was, again, done in diplomatic channels, but it certainly was consistent with the administration's policy decided last summer to be in touch with the Cubans on migration matters.

Q Did anyone from the U.S. have a direct discussion with Fidel Castro?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: I'm not going to talk about the specifics of what the exchanges were, but I can say that what happened was fully consistent with and in the context of the migration talks that we've been having with the Cubans over the last nine years.

Q Has Cuba been provided with any assurances that any of the sanctions added last August would be rolled back?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: None whatsoever.

Q -- or, these sanctions would be eased in any way?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: None whatsoever.

MORE

Q How about that the administration will oppose the Helms bill?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: The administration stated its position on the Helms-Burton legislation. At the end of last week, the State Department informed Chairman Gilman of the House International Relations Committee that, while we supported many of the objectives of the Helms-Burton draft legislation as we see it, namely the promotion of an acceleration of democracy in Cuba, the endorsement of the continued vigilance and reinforcement of the embargo, the other provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act, and also features of that bill which allow the United States to begin assistance to a transition government in Cuba, all of those we regard as quite positive. There are, nonetheless, certain other aspects of the bill, the extraterritoriality of it and other things which do cause problems, but we are available to have discussions with sponsors of the bill on the legislation.

Q Mr. Secretary, does this agreement between the United States and Cuba improve the relationship between the two countries?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: I don't believe the overall relationship is affected. This is a narrow agreement on migration matters that is a direct result of the September 9, 1994 accord between us, and it's a natural extension from that, and limited to migration matters.

Q To follow up, has there ever been a case where the United States has forcibly returned refugees to a communist country?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: Well, let me talk to the Attorney General or the -- but we do have policies in other countries with respect to returning nationals to those countries.

Q Has the U.S. ever returned forcibly any refugee to a communist country?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: We are trying to make sure that our policy with respect to returns are consistent. As you have seen, there have been situations with respect to Chinese boats that have come within or near our shores, and we're trying to make sure that everybody understands that we need to address the problem through legal migration standards.

Q Was there any agreement on the part of the Cubans to crack down on boat people?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: There was no agreement, other than the September agreement.

Q A question for General Reno. How long have the Guantanamo Bay Cubans -- how long has the process of admitting them been going on? Do I understand that 500 a week --

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: As you will recall, the President, early on in October, noted that there were humanitarian cases of the elderly, of people who were ill, and we started addressing those acute humanitarian concerns. We all were concerned with the status of the children at Guantanamo, and in December the President made clear that we were going to try to review each case and bring in the children and their immediate families.

Q But have you gone past those humanitarian concerns already?

MORE

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: No. We are still bringing the children out in an orderly way, trying to do it -- and as a person reaches 70 or as a medical problem develops, we've tried to address those humanitarian concerns and will continue to do so. But when we reach the end of that group, then we will admit all others who are not excludable because of criminal records or other factors and bring them in, again in an orderly way, on a case-by-case basis.

Q And how many would you think that will be?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: We're going to start reviewing the whole process and be geared up to do it in as orderly a way as possible.

Q How many Haitians are still in Guantanamo?

Q How many will be coming into the U.S.? How many will go back to Cuba? Do you have any figures?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I wouldn't speculate on that. We'll just see as the process works out. But again, I would stress that it is not an increase that will not produce a net increase in legal migration from Cuba.

Q Will Cuba continue to curb the exodus of migrants as they promised last September, or is that null and void now?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Cuba made that commitment last September, has honored that commitment, and every indication is that it will continue to honor that commitment.

Q What do you mean --

Q Does that mean that you will slow the influx of Cubans from Cuba, the legal migration to reward these people who fled their country and were taken to Guantanamo.

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: What we've tried to do is address the issue of those who seek immigrant visas, those who have applied for refugee status, and even then, through the legal migration process there are others. We have then developed the special program for Cuba that establishes the lottery, and these would be part of the lottery, in effect.

Q General Reno, where are these people going to end up, and who is going to pay for their relocation and for the rest of -- until they get settled?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: We have worked with people in the community to develop sponsorships. The community relations service works with various groups to ensure proper sponsorship, works with families, and where they end up will depend on where families are located across this country.

Q Do you expect them mostly, however, in Florida -- Miami area?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I think Florida will certainly be a place that many of them seek to reside, and the community has pulled together in an extraordinary way in trying to develop sponsorships. They have worked closely with the community relations service in arranging for sponsorships for those people that are currently being brought in for humanitarian concerns.

Q Will any federal resettlement funds be made available for these people?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: There are provisions now for Cuban Haitian resettlement, and we will work with the states as we try to work with all states to address the issue.

Q Could you talk for a second? We understand you're under increased death threats -- numerous ones. Are you doing anything about it? Is it true? Can you talk at all about them?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I don't know. I'll let you talk to the FBI. I don't pay any attention to it.

Q Secretary Tarnoff, if Cuba is a safe and democratic enough place to forcibly repatriate --

Q General, what have you done to bring Governor Chiles and Senator Graham on board? They're obviously concerned about the effect on Florida of this influx. What steps have you taken to appease them?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: We have worked with everybody concerned by our efforts beginning last summer to regularize migration from Cuba. What we have tried to avoid is a massive flow into South Florida in ways that could adversely affect the community, just in terms of a vast number of people coming in, in a short period of time. We have worked with the Governor, with the Senator in trying to address these problems and trying to make sure that what we do regularizes migration so that people can understand where they stand, that we do so in accordance with humanitarian interests and that we maintain an adherence to international migration policy, and I think we've been able to do it, and I appreciate both the Governor's and the Senator's great assistance in this effort.

Q General Reno, what happened with the Haitians that are in Guantanamo now? Do you foresee any similar policy in the future for them?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: What we're doing right now with respect to the unaccompanied minors in Haiti, we worked with United States -- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. We asked them to become involved so that we could relocate the children based on what was in the best interest of the child. We are attempting to place them with their families in Haiti. Where families are not located, we're trying to see what is in the best interest. And so that we made sure we did everything consistent with international migration policy, we have been working with the U.N. High Commission on Refugee Status.

Q How many Haitians are there in --

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I don't know the last number. A little over 400 the General tells me.

Q General, Representative Tauzin from Louisiana says he has -- he thinks he has voluntary with the fertilizer industries to neutralize their product so it can't be used to make bombs. Does that sound like a good idea to you, or do you think we still may need the legislation, perhaps like Europe, so fertilizer cannot be used for bomb-making?

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I think what we need to do is what we have all ready initiated -- a thoughtful, good, bipartisan discussion on what needs to be done. The ATF will look at the situation -- I certainly think they would consider such legislation -- see what can be done to minimize the use of these otherwise legal products in terms of bomb manufacture.

Q Attorney General Reno, you're talking about regularizing migration, why not regularize something else?

MORE

Q What happened to your recommendation on easing -- lifting the -- sanctions, for instance?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: Well, our policy has been consistent in support of the Cuban Democracy Act which involves strict monitoring of the embargo and pursuit of what is called Track 2, and that is programs of direct benefit to the Cuban people. And we are continually seeking to implement that, to find new ways to strengthen both parts of that.

But this migration agreement has nothing to do with that. It's a separate -- and I might add that the reason we have to conclude these migration agreements with Cuba is because Cuba is not a free society, it's not a democratic society, it has not offered hope to its people, and only when Cuba is well on the road to democracy could our relationship improve significantly and will this migration problem disappear.

Q There's an older law which is to grant Cubans asylum. So that is essentially being superseded by what the Attorney General did, by intercepting them and forcibly repatriating them.

ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: We will continue, and I have stressed in my remarks, that we will continue to provide the opportunity for refugee status which is asylum in-country, and for those who think that there are extreme circumstances that warrant asylum processing or refugee processing otherwise, we are going to continue to adhere to international migration policy with respect to refugees and asylum.

Q Secretary Tarnoff, this shows, obviously, that you can cut a worthwhile deal with Castro. Why not use this as a basis for broader negotiations on appropriation of property, the embargo and the transition to democracy?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: Again, let me go back to my statement and to say that this agreement builds on what we concluded with the Cubans last summer. It was in the interest of the United States to regularize migration in Cuba, from Cuba, and this is a further step which goes in that direction.

Our policy mark with respect to all other aspects of Cuban policy and U.S. attitudes toward Cuba remains the same. And there is nothing in this agreement which affects in any way, shape or form our overall approach to Cuba, which is the one I described beforehand.

Q Secretary Tarnoff, you just said that Cuba is not a democratic society. What guarantees have you received from that government that U.S. officers there, consular officers there will be able to monitor the Cubans that are repatriated or caught at sea and repatriated to their country?

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: We had understandings last summer in connection with the September 9th agreement that Cuba would do nothing to impede the attempts by Cuban nationals to go to the interest section and to apply for admission to the United States. There have also been 1,600 Cubans who have returned from Guantanamo voluntarily, over 200 of whom have also applied for regular admission status at the interest section. So it was based on our experience with the Cubans, our ability to have people on the ground, more people, if necessary, to monitor the situation that the Attorney General concluded that it was possible for us to have this kind of an agreement with a high degree of assurance that the Cubans would continue to honor it.

MORE

Q Mr. Tarnoff, how can you justify in moral terms the repatriation, the forced repatriation of people to a society that by the administration's own reckoning does not value basic human rights.

UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF: The rationale that we are using is for the purposes of legal migration to the United States. We believe we have not only a commitment by the government of Cuba, but experience with that government over the last nine months that they will not interfere with the ability of these people to either return to their homes, resume their lives, or come to the interest section and begin the process of legal migration to the United States. This has nothing to do with the broader reaches of Cuban society where the attitudes of the United States is well-known.

MR. MCCURRY: Thank you. I want to thank everyone for the briefing. I've got copies here of the joint statement that has been simultaneously issued in Havana and will be issued here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

12:48 P.M. EDT

MEMORANDUM

TO: Alexis Herman

FROM: Suzanna Valdez

DATE: May 1, 1995

RE: Cuba Announcement

I have identified the following issues that may be problematic with the announcement that is planned for tomorrow:

- Policy

The President has repeatedly stated his support for a firm policy on Cuba consistent within the Cuban Democracy Act. Policy shift would be contrary to statements made just two weeks ago. Aside from the politically catastrophic fallout in the Cuban-American community, Congressional opposition will seek to portray the President in a very negative ideological light. Presidential opponents will no doubt carry this battle into the election as proof of the President's foreign policy ineptitude (allowing a bitter US enemy to win after 36 years). In addition, expect any confirmation hearing in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be particularly difficult.

This shift in policy will also anger our supporters in the Cuban-American community who will feel betrayed and embarrassed. This point can become particularly sharp if they feel that they were not consulted on what was essentially a political decision. We could be faced with the embarrassing consequences of having our long-time allies railing against our policy, leaving us with no friends to fend off the attacks.

Statements made against the Bush White House criticizing the forcible repatriation of Haitian were used by us in Florida to illustrate the moral bankruptcy of that administration in dealing with humanitarian issues. Although this position was reversed, which we paid a political price for (remember Randall Robinson), with the Haitian and has been applied to the Chinese as well, there will be much more criticism from conservative presidential hopefuls who will no doubt will use this point against us. This policy will no doubt get legally challenged which will last through the campaign.

- Migration

In light of the current anti-immigrant sentiment in the country, the influx of 20,000+

refugees will only heighten tensions and strengthen anti-immigration groups who seek to embarrass the Administration. Moreover, Florida will not tolerate the arrival of new refugees as the issue of immigration is not a regional one but state-wide. Refugees should be re-settled in different states while at the same time understanding that they will ultimately move to Miami. Lastly, the Administration may receive criticism over astronomical expenditures for Guantanamo Bay suggesting that money and effort were wasted.

- Leadership

- With the bombing in Oklahoma and the President's newly announced embargo on Iran, he has shown strong, tough leadership. This announcement, however, demonstrates inconsistency and only reinforces those who characterize the President as a "waffler." As a result, it would be self-defeating in light of his performance on Oklahoma and Iran to take this position on Cuba. Furthermore, if a change in general Cuba policy is made, this could become fodder in the media. In light of the back pedaling being done by conservatives, they will be more than happy to engage us in an offensive on this issue. In fact, it appears as if the Congress has been looking for this fight since the November elections.

Majority support your policy

- policy is sellable

- vs. process

1st time you add. Cuba Am. comm.

project - toughness - commit

you've been tougher
than any other Pres.

See secret negotiations

Spanish - Jaime Ortega

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 25, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton announced today that he has appointed Richard Nuccio as Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Cuba. Mr. Nuccio will be responsible for coordinating overall Cuba policy as well as outreach to the public on this important issue. The creation of a full time coordinator for Cuba underscores the high priority the President places on Cuba policy and outreach to the Cuban-American community. The Coordinator will report to the President through the Secretary of State, and will work closely with the staffs of both the National Security Council and White House Office of Public Liaison. To facilitate close coordination with those offices and concerned agencies, Mr. Nuccio will chair an interagency task force on Cuba and maintain an office in the White House complex.

Mr. Nuccio currently is Senior Policy Adviser to Assistant Secretary Alec Watson in the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Nuccio served as a staff consultant for Congressman Robert Torricelli and as senior associate at the Inter-American Dialogue.

102D CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 5323

To promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba through the application of appropriate pressures on the Cuban Government and support for the Cuban people.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 4, 1992

Mr. TORRICELLI (for himself, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. YATRON, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, Mr. COLORADO, Mr. ROTH, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. GOSS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. GUARINI, and Mr. McCURDY) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Post Office and Civil Service, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries

A BILL

To promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba through the application of appropriate pressures on the Cuban Government and support for the Cuban people.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the "Cuban Democracy Act
5 of 1992".

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 The Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The government of Fidel Castro has dem-
4 onstrated consistent disregard for internationally ac-
5 cepted standards of human rights and for demo-
6 cratic values. It restricts the Cuban people's exercise
7 of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other
8 rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of
9 Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of
10 the United Nations on December 10, 1948. It has
11 refused to admit into Cuba the representative of the
12 United Nations Human Rights Commission ap-
13 pointed to investigate human rights violations on the
14 island.

15 (2) The Cuban people have demonstrated their
16 yearning for freedom and their increasing opposition
17 to the Castro government by risking their lives in or-
18 ganizing independent, democratic activities on the is-
19 land and by undertaking hazardous flights for free-
20 dom to the United States and other countries.

21 (3) The Castro government maintains a mili-
22 tary-dominated economy that has decreased the well-
23 being of the Cuban people in order to enable the
24 government to engage in military interventions and
25 subversive activities throughout the world and, espe-
26 cially, in the Western Hemisphere. These have in-

1 cluded involvement in narcotics trafficking and sup-
2 port for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador.

3 (4) There is no sign that the Castro regime is
4 prepared to make any significant concessions to de-
5 mocracy or to undertake any form of democratic
6 opening. Efforts to suppress dissent through intimi-
7 dation, imprisonment, and exile have accelerated
8 since the political changes that have occurred in the
9 former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

10 (5) Events in the former Soviet Union and
11 Eastern Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba's
12 external support and threaten Cuba's food and oil
13 supplies.

14 (6) The fall of communism in the former Soviet
15 Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal rec-
16 ognition in Latin America and the Caribbean that
17 Cuba provides a failed model of government and de-
18 velopment, and the evident inability of Cuba's econ-
19 omy to survive current trends, provide the United
20 States and the international democratic community
21 with an unprecedented opportunity to promote a
22 peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

23 (7) However, Castro's intransigence increases
24 the likelihood that there could be a collapse of the
25 Cuban economy, social upheaval, or widespread suf-

1 fering. The recently concluded Cuban Communist
2 Party Congress has underscored Castro's unwilling-
3 ness to respond positively to increasing pressures for
4 reform either from within the party or without.

5 (8) The United States cooperated with its Eu-
6 ropean and other allies to assist the difficult transi-
7 tions from Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
8 Therefore, it is appropriate for those allies to co-
9 operate with United States policy to promote a
10 peaceful transition in Cuba.

11 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

12 It should be the policy of the United States—

13 (1) to seek a peaceful transition to democracy
14 and a resumption of economic growth in Cuba
15 through the careful application of sanctions directed
16 at the Castro government and support for the Cuban
17 people;

18 (2) to seek the cooperation of other democratic
19 countries in this policy;

20 (3) to make clear to other countries that, in de-
21 termining its relations with them, the United States
22 will take into account their willingness to cooperate
23 in such a policy;

24 (4) to seek the speedy termination of any re-
25 maining military or technical assistance, subsidies,

1 or other forms of assistance to the Government of
2 Cuba from any of the independent states of the
3 former Soviet Union;

4 (5) to continue vigorously to oppose the human
5 rights violations of the Castro regime;

6 (6) to maintain sanctions on the Castro regime
7 so long as it continues to refuse to move toward de-
8 mocratization and greater respect for human rights;

9 (7) to be prepared to reduce the sanctions in
10 carefully calibrated ways in response to positive de-
11 velopments in Cuba;

12 (8) to encourage free and fair elections to deter-
13 mine Cuba's political future;

14 (9) to prevent Cuba from evading the United
15 States embargo of that country through a North
16 American Free Trade Agreement;

17 (10) to request the speedy termination of any
18 military or technical assistance, subsidies, or other
19 forms of assistance to the Government of Cuba from
20 the government of any other country; and

21 (11) to initiate immediately the development of
22 a comprehensive United States policy toward Cuba
23 in a post-Castro era.

1 SEC. 4. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

2 (a) CUBAN TRADING PARTNERS.—The President
3 should encourage the governments of countries that con-
4 duct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit re-
5 lations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the pur-
6 poses of this Act.

7 (b) SANCTIONS AGAINST COUNTRIES ASSISTING
8 CUBA.—

9 (1) SANCTIONS.—The President may apply the
10 following sanctions to any country that provides as-
11 sistance to Cuba:

12 (A) The government of such country shall
13 not be eligible for assistance under the Foreign
14 Assistance Act of 1961 or assistance or sales
15 under the Arms Export Control Act.

16 (B) The United States shall not negotiate
17 for purposes of entering into any agreement
18 with such country to establish free trade areas.

19 (C) Such country shall not be eligible,
20 under any program, for forgiveness or reduction
21 of debt owed to the United States Government.

22 (2) DEFINITION OF ASSISTANCE.—For pur-
23 poses of paragraph (1), “assistance to Cuba”—

24 (A) means assistance to or for the benefit
25 of the Government of Cuba that is provided by
26 grant, concessional sale, guaranty, or insurance,

1 or by any other means on terms more favorable
2 than that generally available in the applicable
3 market, whether in the form of a loan, lease,
4 credit, or otherwise, and such term includes
5 subsidies for exports to Cuba and favorable tariff
6 treatment of articles that are the growth,
7 product, or manufacture of Cuba; and

8 (B) does not include—

9 (i) donations of food to non-
10 governmental organizations or individuals
11 in Cuba, or

12 (ii) exports of medicines or medical
13 supplies, instruments, or equipment that
14 would be permitted under section 5(c) of
15 this Act.

16 (3) APPLICABILITY OF SECTION.—This section,
17 and any sanctions imposed pursuant to this section,
18 shall cease to apply at such time as the President
19 makes and reports to the Congress a determination
20 under section 8(a).

21 **SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE.**

22 (a) PROVISIONS OF LAW AFFECTED.—The provisions
23 of this section apply notwithstanding any other provision
24 of law, including section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance
25 Act of 1961, and notwithstanding the exercise of authori-

1 ties, before the enactment of this Act, under section 5(b)
2 of the Trading With the Enemy Act, the International
3 Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the Export Adminis-
4 tration Act of 1979.

5 (b) DONATIONS OF FOOD.—Nothing in this or any
6 other Act shall prohibit donations of food to non-
7 governmental organizations or individuals in Cuba.

8 (c) EXPORTS OF MEDICINES AND MEDICAL SUP-
9 PLIES.—Exports of medicines or medical supplies, instru-
10 ments, or equipment to Cuba shall not be restricted—

11 (1) except to the extent authorized by section
12 5(m) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or
13 section 203(b)(2) of the International Emergency
14 Economic Powers Act;

15 (2) except in a case in which there is a reason-
16 able likelihood that the item to be exported will be
17 used for purposes of torture or other human rights
18 abuses;

19 (3) except in a case in which there is a reason-
20 able likelihood that the item to be exported will be
21 reexported; and

22 (4) except in a case in which the item to be ex-
23 ported could be used in the production of any
24 biotechnological product.

25 (d) REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EXPORTS.—

1 (1) ONSITE VERIFICATIONS.—(A) Subject to
2 subparagraph (B), an export may be made under
3 subsection (c) only if the President determines that
4 the United States Government is able to verify, by
5 onsite inspections and other appropriate means, that
6 the exported item is to be used for the purposes for
7 which it was intended and only for the use and bene-
8 fit of the Cuban people.

9 (B) EXCEPTION.—Subparagraph (A) does not
10 apply to donations to nongovernmental organizations
11 in Cuba of medicines for humanitarian purposes.

12 (2) LICENSES.—Exports permitted under sub-
13 section (c) shall be made pursuant to specific li-
14 censes issued by the United States Government.

15 (e) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND FACILI-
16 TIES.—

17 (1) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES.—Tele-
18 communications services between the United States
19 and Cuba shall be permitted.

20 (2) TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.—Tele-
21 communications facilities are authorized in such
22 quantity and of such quality as may be necessary to
23 provide efficient and adequate telecommunications
24 services between the United States and Cuba.

1 (3) LICENSING OF PAYMENTS TO CUBA.—(A)

2 The President may provide for the issuance of li-
3 censes for the full or partial payment to Cuba of
4 amounts due Cuba as a result of the provision of
5 telecommunications services authorized by this sub-
6 section, in a manner that is consistent with the pub-
7 lic interest and the purposes of this Act, except that
8 this paragraph shall not require any withdrawal
9 from any account blocked pursuant to regulations is-
10 sued under section 5(b) of the Trading With the
11 Enemy Act.

12 (B) If only partial payments are made to Cuba
13 under subparagraph (A), the amounts withheld from
14 Cuba shall be deposited in an account in a banking
15 institution in the United States. Such account shall
16 be blocked in the same manner as any other account
17 containing funds in which Cuba has any interest,
18 pursuant to regulations issued under section 5(b) of
19 the Trading With the Enemy Act.

20 (4) AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
21 COMMISSION.—Nothing in this subsection shall be
22 construed to supersede the authority of the Federal
23 Communications Commission to issue such licenses
24 and authorizations for the provision of services or

1 acquisition of facilities as may be required under the
2 Communications Act of 1934.

3 (f) DIRECT MAIL DELIVERY TO CUBA.—The United
4 States Postal Service shall take such actions as are nec-
5 essary to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba,
6 including, in the absence of common carrier service be-
7 tween the 2 countries, the use of charter service providers.

8 (g) ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN
9 CUBA.—The United States Government may provide as-
10 sistance, through appropriate nongovernmental organiza-
11 tions, for the support of individuals and organizations to
12 promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba.

13 **SEC. 6. SANCTIONS.**

14 (a) PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS BE-
15 TWEEN CERTAIN UNITED STATES FIRMS AND CUBA.—

16 (1) PROHIBITION.—Notwithstanding any other
17 provision of law, no license may be issued for any
18 transaction described in section 515.559 of title 31,
19 Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on July 1,
20 1989.

21 (2) APPLICABILITY TO EXISTING CONTRACTS.—
22 Paragraph (1) shall not affect any contract entered
23 into before the date of the enactment of this Act.

24 (b) PROHIBITION RELATING TO TAX DEDUCTIONS.—

1 (1) PROHIBITION.—A domestic concern may
2 not receive a tax deduction for that portion of the
3 otherwise deductible expenses of such domestic con-
4 cern, or of a foreign subsidiary or affiliate of such
5 domestic concern, which is allocated or apportioned
6 to income derived from Cuba. For purposes of this
7 subsection, income paid through one or more entities
8 shall be treated as derived from Cuba if such income
9 was, without regard to such entities, derived from
10 Cuba.

11 (2) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this sub-
12 section, a “foreign subsidiary or affiliate” of a do-
13 mestic concern is a partnership, corporation, or
14 other enterprise organized under the laws of a for-
15 eign country which is controlled in fact by such do-
16 mestic concern (as determined under regulations of
17 the President).

18 (c) PROHIBITIONS ON VESSELS.—

19 (1) VESSELS ENGAGING IN TRADE.—Beginning
20 on the 61st day after the date of the enactment of
21 this Act, a vessel which enters a port or place in
22 Cuba to engage in the trade of goods or services
23 may not, within 180 days after departure from such
24 port or place in Cuba, load or unload any freight at

1 any place in the United States, except pursuant to
2 a license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.

3 (2) VESSELS CARRYING GOODS OR PASSENGERS
4 TO OR FROM CUBA.—Except as specifically author-
5 ized by the Secretary of the Treasury, a vessel carry-
6 ing goods or passengers to or from Cuba or carrying
7 goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has any
8 interest may not enter a United States port.

9 (3) INAPPLICABILITY OF SHIP STORES GEN-
10 ERAL LICENSE.—No commodities which may be ex-
11 ported under a general license described in section
12 771.9 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, as in
13 effect on May 1, 1992, may be exported under a
14 general license to any vessel carrying goods or pas-
15 sengers to or from Cuba or carrying goods in which
16 Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest.

17 (4) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this
18 subsection—

19 (A) the term “vessel” includes every de-
20 scription of water craft or other contrivance
21 used, or capable of being used, as a means of
22 transportation in water, but does not include
23 aircraft; and

24 (B) the term “United States” includes the
25 territories and possessions of the United States

1 and the customs waters of the United States
2 (as defined in section 401 of the Tariff Act of
3 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401)).

4 (d) **RESTRICTIONS ON REMITTANCES TO CUBA.**—The
5 President shall establish strict limits on remittances to
6 Cuba by United States persons for the purpose of financ-
7 ing the travel of Cubans to the United States, in order
8 to ensure that such remittances reflect only the reasonable
9 costs associated with such travel, and are not used by the
10 Government of Cuba as a means of gaining access to Unit-
11 ed States currency.

12 (e) **CLARIFICATION OF APPLICABILITY OF SANC-**
13 **TIONS.**—The prohibitions contained in subsections (a),
14 (b), and (c) shall not apply with respect to any activity
15 otherwise permitted by section 5 or section 7 of this Act
16 or any activity which may not be regulated or prohibited
17 under section 5(b)(4) of the Trading With the Enemy Act
18 (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)(4)).

19 **SEC. 7. POLICY TOWARD A TRANSITIONAL CUBAN GOVERN-**
20 **MENT.**

21 Food, medicine, and medical supplies for humani-
22 tarian purposes should be made available for Cuba under
23 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Agricultural
24 Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 if the
25 President determines and certifies to the Committee on

1 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
2 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the
3 government in power in Cuba—

4 (1) has made a public commitment to hold free
5 and fair elections for a new government within 6
6 months and is proceeding to implement that deci-
7 sion;

8 (2) has made a public commitment to respect,
9 and is respecting, internationally recognized human
10 rights and basic democratic freedoms; and

11 (3) is not providing weapons or funds to any
12 group, in any other country, that seeks the violent
13 overthrow of the government of that country.

14 **SEC. 8. POLICY TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC CUBAN GOVERN-**
15 **MENT.**

16 (a) **WAIVER OF RESTRICTIONS.**—The President may
17 waive the requirements of section 6 if the President deter-
18 mines and reports to the Congress that the Government
19 of Cuba—

20 (1) has held free and fair elections conducted
21 under internationally recognized observers;

22 (2) has permitted opposition parties ample time
23 to organize and campaign for such elections, and has
24 permitted full access to the media to all candidates
25 in the elections;

1 (3) is showing respect for the basic civil lib-
2 erties and human rights of the citizens of Cuba;

3 (4) is moving toward establishing a free market
4 economic system; and

5 (5) has committed itself to constitutional
6 change that would ensure regular free and fair elec-
7 tions that meet the requirements of paragraph (2).

8 (b) POLICIES.—If the President makes a determina-
9 tion under subsection (a), the President shall take the fol-
10 lowing actions with respect to a Cuban Government elect-
11 ed pursuant to elections described in subsection (a):

12 (1) To encourage the admission or reentry of
13 such government to international organizations and
14 international financial institutions.

15 (2) To provide emergency relief during Cuba's
16 transition to a viable economic system.

17 (3) To take steps to end the United States
18 trade embargo of Cuba.

19 (4) To enter into negotiations for a framework
20 agreement providing for trade with Cuba.

21 **SEC. 9. EXISTING CLAIMS NOT AFFECTED.**

22 Except as provided in section 5(a), nothing in this
23 Act affects the provisions of section 620(a)(2) of the For-
24 eign Assistance Act of 1961.

1 Act shall apply to violations of this Act to the same extent
2 as such penalties apply to violations under that Act.

3 (e) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL.—The
4 Department of the Treasury shall establish and maintain
5 a branch of the Office of Foreign Assets Control in Miami,
6 Florida, in order to strengthen the enforcement of this
7 Act.

8 SEC. 11. DEFINITION.

9 As used in this Act, the term "United States person"
10 means any United States citizen or alien admitted for per-
11 manent residence in the United States, and any cor-
12 poration, partnership, or other organization organized
13 under the laws of the United States.

14 SEC. 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.

15 This Act shall take effect on the date of the enact-
16 ment of this Act.

O



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

April 14, 1994

Mr. Joe Velasquez
Office of Political Affairs
Old Executive Office Building
Room 115
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Velasquez:

I am writing to you on the recommendation of Lula Rodriguez. Due to the political nature of the situation, she thought it would be a good idea for me to inform you of what is going on.

Yesterday, April 13, I participated in Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen's (R-FL) and Congressman Diaz-Balart's (R-FL) television program. I participated in the program, a Spanish language thirty-minute show targeting the Cuban-American community in South Florida, as a Cuban-American member of the Clinton Administration. Because I work the Cuban desk in the Pentagon, most of the questioning pertained to the current situation on the island. I did make sure to clearly state to the viewers the President Clinton's position on the issue. I am enclosing copies of the follow-up letters.

Should you have any questions pertaining to this, you can contact me at (703)697-9301.

Sincerely,

Raimundo L. Ruga



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

April 14, 1994

Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
U.S. House of Representatives
127 Cannon Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen:

It was an honor to participate in your program and I thank you for giving me the opportunity to share that time with your constituents. It was also a great opportunity to reiterate President Clinton's commitment to address the special needs and concerns of the Cuban-American community in the State of Florida.

Should you need anything in which I may be of assistance, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Raimundo L. Ruga



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

April 14, 1994

Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart
U.S. House of Representatives
509 Cannon Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Diaz-Balart:

It was an honor to participate in your program and I thank you for giving me the opportunity to share that time with your constituents. It was also a great opportunity to reiterate President Clinton's commitment to address the special needs and concerns of the Cuban-American community in the State of Florida.

Should you need anything in which I may be of assistance, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Raimundo L. Ruga

TO: AL MALDON
JANET MURKIN
FAZIERIN F41

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

21-Jul-1995 04:56pm

TO: (See Below)

FROM: Stephen B. Silverman
Office of Cabinet Affairs

SUBJECT: Radio Marti report

Iris Burnett called from USIA. An incomplete IG report on management of radio-tv Marti was sent to Rep. Skaggs and another Member (unclear who). According to Iris, the report is highly critical of the Martis and is one-sided. It suggests, apparently, that the stations are unduly controlled by Jorge Mascanosa (sp?) and that during the height of the Cuba refugee problem, the stations broadcast that the United States was still accepting refugees -- contrary to stated policy at the time.

Guy Gugilotta (Post) and Steven Greenhouse (NY Times) have the story and are said to be writing for this weekend. Joe Duffy spoke to both. Rep. Skaggs apparently showed it to Rep. Diaz-Ballart (a big supporters of Martis) today, in a mocking sort of way.

Let me know if anyone else should be told or if there's anything I should do.

Steve.

Distribution:

TO: Mary Ellen Glynn
TO: Kathryn Higgins
TO: Patrick J. Griffin
TO: Richard L. Siewert
TO: Morton H. Halperin
TO: Andrew D. Sans
TO: Janice A. Enright

CC: Erin A. O'Connor



For Immediate Release
July 24, 1995

**Statement by USIA Director Joseph Duffey
Regarding Documents Provided to Congress by
the Office of the Inspector General
About the Office of Cuba Broadcasting**

Materials regarding an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Inspector General into the Office of Cuba Broadcasting were received by certain Members of Congress and by me at the same time late last week. I have now had time to review these documents in detail.

Although these materials raise serious allegations, they represent only one side of what will surely prove to be a complex issue. I am concerned about this premature release of incomplete information, in particular with respect to allegations contained in the documents of serious violations of government procedures, inappropriate influence, and violations of professional guidelines of the charter of the International Bureau of Broadcasting.

Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, the management of USIA does not have the authority to either supervise or approve investigations of this kind by the Inspector General. I have, however, over the past several months repeatedly urged the Office of Inspector General to complete its investigation in a timely manner and provide materials responding to these charges in a complete and thorough report. Because of my concern about thoroughness and impartiality in this process, I now intend to bring the conduct of this investigation to the attention of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The issues involved are of a most serious nature, and only an investigation conducted with the highest degree of professionalism and fairness can do justice to all the parties involved.

The broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti have served as a source of accurate news and the voice of hope to the Cuban people during a difficult time. The service can be proud of its many achievements. Again, it is important that these charges be examined in a way that is responsible and fair to all parties involved.

CONTACT: Kimberly Marteau
PHONE: (202) 619-4355



THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY BOARD FOR CUBA BROADCASTING
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20017

July 25, 1995

Mr. President:

We, the members of the President's Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, are outraged to have learned that USIA Inspector General Marion Bennett has admitted sending elements of an ongoing investigation of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), including employee Affidavits, to Congressman David Skaggs (D-CO). This information also found its way into the national media.

In light of this breach of professional standards and ethics on the part of the Inspector General, we believe that she is incapable of conducting a fair, unbiased and professional investigation. We concur with Dr. Joseph Duffey, Director of the U. S. Information Agency, who stated, (... "investigations must be conducted with the highest degree of professionalism and fairness").

At the July 6, 1995 Advisory Board meeting the subject of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigations was extensively discussed. It was brought to our attention that valuable management resources have been spent reviewing and responding to over ten separate investigations, none of which have yielded findings of wrongdoing. Moreover, both former OCB Director Richard Lobo and current acting Director Dr. Rolando Bonachea gave testimony categorically denying any attempts by any member of the Advisory Board to interfere with or influence in any way OCB operations.

In light of the serious nature of these allegations, we respectfully request that Ms. Bennett be immediately relieved of her duties as the head of the Office of the Inspector General pending a thorough investigation of her actions in this matter.

Respectfully Yours,

Jorge Mas Canosa
Chairman

Tony Costa
Board Member

Joseph Glennon
Board Member

Salvador Lew
Board Member

Christopher Coursen
Board Member

cc: Dr. J. Duffey

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

July 27, 1995

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our outrage for recent actions taken by the U.S. Information Agency's (USIA) Inspector General, Ms. Marian Bennett, with respect to an ongoing investigation of USIA's Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB).

According to recent media reports, Ms. Bennett released a draft version of this investigation, even though the investigation has yet to be completed. In fact, the draft version released by Ms. Bennett does not include information from key OCB management personnel.

It is clear to us that this latest example of unethical, unprofessional and inappropriate activity by the USIA IG is more evidence of a politically-motivated campaign of harassment and intimidation against OCB. This action by Ms. Bennett disqualifies USIA's IG from conducting any type of objective and impartial investigation of OCB.

Mr. President, in light of this pattern of unethical and inappropriate activity on the part of Ms. Bennett, and the fact that she has compromised the credibility and integrity of USIA and your administration, we believe you should ask for her immediate resignation.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

Yvonne Rodriguez
Yvonne Rodriguez
Member of Congress

Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Member of Congress

Chris Smith
Chris Smith
Member of Congress

Dan Burton
Dan Burton
Member of Congress

Robert Torricelli
Robert Torricelli
Member of Congress

RECEIVED JUL 29 1995

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 26, 1995

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Bowsher:

Over the past weeks, we have sent several letters regarding serious allegations about the politicization, misconduct, and abuse of power in the USIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Specifically, we have called for a GAO investigation of what we consider to be a campaign of political harassment against the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) by OIG.

This past weekend, The Washington Post and The New York Times published stories based on an incomplete report released by the IG's office on its on-going investigation of OCB. This report contained inflammatory allegations that have yet to be responded to by officials associated with OCB. Needless to say, these stories have damaged the integrity of the OCB and the reputations of several officials, who seem to have never even been provided the basic American concept of due process.

The decision to release this incomplete report not only raises very serious ethical questions, but, again, betrays a stark political motivation behind the OIG's investigation of OCB. Simply put, we do not believe it a coincidence that an incomplete report full of scathing information injurious to OCB -- with no rebutting material -- was wrongly released days before Congress was to debate funding for broadcasting to Cuba. USIA Director Joseph Duffey has questioned the report's release and is referring the matter to the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

It is our understanding that the OIG has asked the GAO to delay the investigation we have requested until it completes its own. We are convinced that the events of last week have completely compromised and discredited OIG's investigation, and, furthermore, we believe it to be improper if, in fact, OIG is intervening in a GAO investigation.

We, therefore, are urging you to proceed with your investigation into the activities of the OIG forthwith. We are deeply troubled by the on-going legal and ethical problems of the USIA IG's office, and we await your reply to this most pressing issue.

Sincerely,



Ilana Ros-Lichten
Member of Congress


Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Member of Congress


Robert Torricelli
Member of Congress


Dan Burton
Member of Congress


Chris Smith
Member of Congress


Robert Menendez
Member of Congress

*next week
w/ Alex's*
MEMORANDUM
*E-mail
Nelson Reynani*

TO: Suzanna Valdez

FROM: Antonio de Velasco

RE: Media Coverage of Richard Nuccio

DATE: July 27, 1995

These are the most recent articles regarding Mr. Nuccio and his role in the administration:

The Miami Herald May 19, 1995**Exile pressure may pay off: Policy chief could step aside**

This article describes a meeting between Leon Panetta and Cuban American Democrats concerning Morton Halperin and Cuba policy. It is here where Mr. Nuccio is first mentioned as a someone who would supplant Halperin and "take charge of Cuba issues at the NSC."

Diario Las Americas June 28, 1995**Clinton Insists He Will Not Change His Policy Towards The Government In Havana**

President Clinton's video address is covered in this article. The video is first described as having been recorded "at the direction of Richard Nuccio." Later however, the article claims that the video was objected to by some in the White House but that "Samuel Berger and Morton Halperin, both of the NSC, insisted it would serve to promote Nuccio's image among exiles." It is later alleged that "Nuccio has not answered the calls of this paper, nor those of various Hispanic stations in Miami."

The Washington Post June 28, 1995**Have Speech, Will Deliver**

As part of the "In the Loop" feature, Al Kamen reveals that the "speech was the idea of Richard A. Nuccio" and quotes a "official" who calls the video a "shot - in - the -dark method of communication."

The Miami Herald July 5, 1995**Point man on Cuba has title, but does he have clout?**

This article takes head on the question of Mr. Nuccio's role. It quotes a "well-placed administration official" as saying "Because of the reaction to May 2 was unexpected, the decision was made to downplay the role of Tarnoff and Halperin," but both men "continue to be major players, but the idea is to keep them off the front page." The article insinuates throughout that Mr. Nuccio's place is minimal and only for window dressing.

Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen is quoted as saying "I don't for one minute believe that Rick Nuccio is writing Cuba policy. They're playing a shell game, thinking Cuban Americans will be fooled. Nuccio is just the front man for Lake, Halperin, and other Castro appeasers in the administration." Mr. Nuccio declines to discuss his new position on the record.

Memorandum
*Graham - news bureaus
more tract II*

UPI Wire July 17, 1995

The newly formed Cuban-American National Alliance is profiled here. In a description of a meeting with White House officials Mr. Nuccio is described as Mr. Halperin's "adviser on Cuban policy."

The Miami Herald July 18, 1995**Menoyo hopeful after discussions in Washington**

Cambio Cubano leader Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo expresses a positive outlook after meeting with White House aides, people from the Pentagon, and members of Congress. Mr. Halperin and Mr. Nuccio are mentioned as among those who met with Menoyo.

The Miami Herald July 23, 1995

A glimmer of hope on Cuba? Pointman for U.S. policy says Menoyo visit was positive
Mr. Nuccio here is characterized as the "administration's lead man on Cuba" and he is liberally quoted from. He comes across as in charge, yet his words could be perceived as more confrontational with the exile community than previous public statements by those in the administration when he asserts that Washington must base its decisions "on what is happening inside Cuba and around Cuba and not on what is happening in Miami and Union City."

Diario Las Americas**According to Nuccio Menoyo has Courage**

As in the previous article, Mr. Nuccio's appearance on the Foro Interamericano program is discussed. As in the last article, Mr. Nuccio, calling Mr. Menoyo "Eloy," is portrayed as the voice of the administration on Cuba policy.

Conclusion:

Although there are rumblings about the "window dressing" nature of Mr. Nuccio's appointment, recent events have to a degree overshadowed this speculation. Since his appointment there have been a flurry of Cuba news items ranging from the detainment of Robert Vesco to reports about a relaxation of the travel ban and the establishment of news bureaus in both countries to the most recent trouble at Cuba Broadcasting. This activity combined with Mr. Nuccio's recent assertive statements about Mr. Menoyo and the exile flotilla, have served to silence, in the mainstream media at least, speculation that his role is limited.

cc Graham

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1995

MEMORANDUM TO HAROLD ICKES
ALEXIS HERMAN
SANDY BERGER

FROM: MARCIA L. HALE *MH*
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR MEETING ON CUBA

Governor Chiles and Senator Graham have requested to meet with the President on July 13 regarding Cuba. Amongst the domestic related issues they would like to discuss is reimbursement for the state of Florida.

Pat Griffin and I are submitting a scheduling request for this meeting. However, your input and advice on whether or not this meeting should take place would be appreciated.

Thank you.

- ① what are their issues before meeting
- ② ~~no~~ media what is intention w/media?

Foreign policy only > Tony Lake