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Collection/Record Group: Clinton Presidential Records

Subgroup/Office of Origin: Political Affairs

Series/Staff Member: Reta Lewis

Subseries:

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Cuba [1]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. tables	re: Democratic National Committee political statistics (Campaign) (8 pages)	08/15/1994	Personal Misfile
002. letter	NCEC Services to Joe Velasquez re: GOTC scheduling maps (6 pages)	08/11/1994	Personal Misfile
003. statement	re: Base voters strategy discussion document (3 pages)	08/15/1994	Personal Misfile

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 Political Affairs
 Reta Lewis
 OA/Box Number: 5176

FOLDER TITLE:

Cuba [1]

2016-0920-F

im1889

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Jorge S. Villalba
6600 SW. 57th Avenue
Miami, FL 33143

August 26, 1994

Ms. Reta Lewis
Special Assistant to the President
White House Office of Political Affairs
Old Executive Office Building, Room # 115
Washington, D.C. 20500

Re: Current crisis in Cuba and the country's eventual democratization

Dear Ms. Lewis:

As a member of Governor Lawton Chiles' Commission on a Free Cuba, I would like to thank you for meeting with us earlier this week. The Cuban American community, as you had a chance to see during your visit to Miami, is deeply concerned about the present situation in Cuba, and strongly urges the U.S. Government to continue increasing the pressure on Fidel Castro.

I, like most Cuban Americans, applaud the President's decision to end U.S. flights to Cuba, as well as stopping the flow of U.S. dollars to the island. These actions will severely curtail Castro's income and bring Cuba one step closer to democracy.

I strongly support the President's decision to increase television and radio broadcasts to Cuba, as well as his decision to ask the United Nations to implement strong sanctions against Cuba. Although I am firmly against any type of negotiation with Castro, as are most Cuban Americans, history shows that if it were to come to that, the United States must negotiate from a position of strength and power. Increasing this government's pressure on the dictator's regime is the only way to assure that Castro accepts the United States terms in the case of any possible negotiation.

While I am thankful for the President's actions thus far, I am respectfully requesting that the U.S. go even further. The present crisis in Cuba is unequivocal evidence that Castro's regime is at its most fragile moment in history. The United States must seize this golden opportunity by increasing its pressure on him twofold. Make no mistake about it; the only way to end the massive exodus of Cubans from the island is by precipitating Castro's downfall.

✓ Q (thank you)
Dear Jorge:
Thanks for your insight and your support.
I truly appreciate your advice.
Thanks again.
Rj

Page 2

Letter to Reta Lewis from Jorge S. Villalba
August 26, 1994

The much discussed naval and aerial blockade of Cuba would be ideal. In addition, I am requesting that you consider the following points, and to discuss them with the President.

- Castro is a master when it comes to getting his way through the use of bluffs and of threats. Let us use this strategy against him.
- Even if we are not seriously considering military action against Castro, let us act as if we are. We can achieve this by both, training and arming a portion of the Cuban rafters currently held in Guantanamo, and positioning a number of American warships near the Cuban coasts.

I feel that bluffing can be a powerful weapon in the fight against Castro, if employed effectively. It is an option that I trust you, along with the rest of the President's advisers, will seriously consider. Please thank the President for the attention he has devoted to the Cuban crisis, and his ongoing commitment to a free and democratic Cuba. As a member of the Cuban community, I send him my highest regards.

If you would like to contact me you may call me at (305) 663-2078 or fax a response to (305) 663-2083.

Respectfully Yours,



Jorge S. Villalba

Former Political Prisoner and
Commissioner, Governor's Commission
on a Free Cuba



3rd District

August 28, 1994

Ms. Reta Lewis
Special Assistant to the President
for Political Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Reta:


I am writing this letter in support of David Hauber, a Kansas lawyer who is interested in an appointment to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. I have the highest professional and personal regard for Mr. Hauber. He would bring invaluable practical litigation experience to the bench, coupled with the temperament and the legal research and writing skills necessary to act as an appellate judge. Finally, in my opinion, Mr. Hauber's fair-mindedness, compassion coupled with clear thinking, and dedication to the pursuit of justice would enable him to serve with distinction. Accordingly, if the Vice President's Office may assist him in any way, I urge you to do so.

Sincerely,


Judy Hancock

JLH:mt

✓ P
Dear Judy:
Thanks for your note
re: Mr. Hauber. I have
passed this recommendation
on to Presidential Personnel.
Thanks again RJL



PUBLIC
PRIVATE

PARTNERSHIP

Governmental & Business Consultants

ART COLLINS
President

August 25, 1994

Ms. Rita Lewis, Special Assistant
to the President for Political Affairs
Room 115
Old Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Rita:

Please find the enclosed letter from Malcolm Cunningham regarding his request for Secretary Ron Brown to be the luncheon speaker at an American Bar Association (ABA) forum in New York City on January 26, 1995.


I would appreciate any help you can offer with this process. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact Jevelle or me at 904/561-0762. Once you have had an opportunity to address this request, please give me a call.

Thank you for your assistance. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,


Art Collins

Enclosure


①
Call Jevelle.
- Tell her I passed info to Brown's people.
- No one can focus 1995 until after the elections



DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE

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Tedd Miller
Phyllis Outlaw
Kathryn Pearson-West
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Mattie Robinson
Edward Rogers
Anita Bellamy Shelton
Barbara Lett Simmons
Cheryl Simmons
Sabrina Sojourner
Paul Strauss
Harry Thomas, Jr.
Romaine Thomas
Kurt Vorndran
Beth Waitkus
Joslyn Williams
Robert Yeldell
Michael Gilliland
General Counsel
Catherine L. York
Executive Director

August 25, 1994

Ms. Reta Lewis
Special Assistant to the President
for Political Affairs
The White House
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Ms. Lewis:

Eric Washington, Chairman, District of Columbia Democratic Party, would like your assistance in setting up a Trustee Program for big contributors. He would like for our big donors to have some access to The White House, if at all possible.

The opportunity to meet and socialize with Democratic leadership, and White House advisors would surely yield generous contributions.

Any assistance you could offer would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Martha Holbert
Executive Director
D.C. Democratic Party

✓ 6
Send us a list
w/ the level
of what they are
doing + who they are,
+ what they did for Clinton +
We will involve
them.
rtr

?
What does
this mean.



HIGH, STACK, LAZENBY, PALAHACH, GOLDSMITH & DEL AMO

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

525 STRAWBRIDGE AVENUE

MELBOURNE, FLORIDA 32901

3929 PONCE DE LEON BOULEVARD

CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134

(305) 443-3329 FAX (305) 443-0850

115 SOUTH 2ND STREET

FORT PIERCE, FLORIDA 34950

ROBERT KING HIGH (1924-1967)
CHARLES R. STACK, P.A.
ROBERT A. LAZENBY, P.A.
MICHAEL PALAHACH, P.A.
GLEN R. GOLDSMITH
GEORGE W. MAXWELL III
CLAY D. MORGAN
CARLOS C. DEL AMO
ARTHUR GARCIA, JR.
JAMES M. ADAMS, JR.
ALVIN S. CAWN (OF COUNSEL)

MELBOURNE TELEPHONE
(407) 725-5525
FAX (407) 984-2411

FT. PIERCE TELEPHONE
(407) 461-6161
FAX (407) 464-6740

PLEASE REPLY TO:
CORAL GABLES, FL 33134

August 29, 1994

BY FACSIMILE


Ms. Reta Lewis
Office of Political Affairs
OEOB, Room 115
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Reta:

Manolo Reyes is an extremely prominent Cuban exile of longstanding in the community. His intentions are always totally honorable.


He wanted you to have the enclosed which provides a short but meaningful history, some suggestions and his conclusions.

Very truly yours,


CHARLES R. STACK

CRS/mn
Enclosure

Bud:
Thank you for your
advice re: the
Ryl.
Reyes memo





BUDDY MACKAY
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

STATE OF FLORIDA

Office of the Governor

THE CAPITOL
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0001

~~* Meeting w/ Ansel~~

~~- Colonel~~
~~- Job Bush~~

FACSIMILE

DATE 9/13/94

TO RITA LEWIS

TELEPHONE NUMBER (202) 456-6257

FAX NUMBER (202) 456-7929

FROM Marcy Posner / Todd Wilde

TELEPHONE NUMBER (904) 488-4711

FAX NUMBER (904) 921-6114

MESSAGE LT. GOV. MACKAY URGENTLY WANTED

YOU TO SEE THE ATTACHED

Thanks

Marcy

✓ Q

Ann C/C
These are
The two people
Chels are interested
in for the
Commission.
Pete
Please advise

Stemmer
is 1st
Chaves

5 PAGES TO FOLLOW

TO: 904 921 6114

SEP 13, 1994 5:24PM P.02

FROM:

BOB GRAHAM
FLORIDA**United States Senate**

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0003

August 24, 1995

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are aware that very soon you will select candidates for the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. Among the criteria for commission members is the ability to independently bring sound judgment to this challenging process, and yet collectively represent a variety of perspectives. We recommend two nominees, endorsed by the Florida Defense Conversion and Transition Commission, for your consideration. Both candidates, General Carl Stiner, USA (retired) and Admiral Huntington Hardisty, USN (retired) are well-respected individuals with senior military leadership experience in joint and combined commands. These candidates are extremely capable and can be relied on to make the hard, objective decisions necessary in the best interest of the nation, while balancing awareness of military requirements with community and economic impacts. A synopsis of their experience follows and resumes are enclosed.

General Stiner, prior to his retirement from the U.S. Army, was the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida from 1988-1993. Among the highlights of his distinguished career, he served as Commander, Joint Task Force South and operational commander of Operations Just Cause, and on the Joint Staff as Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Washington, DC.

Admiral Hardisty served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii from 1988 until his retirement in March 1991. His decorated career includes service as Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Washington DC, and Deputy and Chief of Staff, CINCPACFLT.

We also commend to your attention the recommendation from the Florida delegation members of the House of Representatives for Congressman Tom Lewis.

We strongly endorse these candidates for the BRAC Commission. Their experience, coupled with an interest to fairly arrive at the difficult decisions for BRAC 95, qualifies them very well for this endeavor. We look forward to working with you on this issue of importance to our national security and the state of Florida.


With kind regards,

FROM:


TO: 904 921 6114

SEP 13, 1994 5:23PM P.03


Respectfully,



Bob Graham
United States Senator



Connie Mack
United States Senator



Lawton Chiles
Governor of the State of Florida

EG/hes
Attachments

FROM:

TO:

904 921 6114

SEP 13, 1994

5:26PM

P.04



BIOGRAPHY

ADMIRAL HUNTINGTON HARDISTY Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

Admiral Huntington Hardisty is the fourteenth naval officer to hold the position of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. As the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, he heads the largest of the unified commands and directs Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force operations across more than 100 million square miles -- over 50 percent of the earth's surface. The U.S. Pacific Command extends from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Africa, from the Arctic to the Antarctic. He is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense and is the U.S. military representative for collective defense arrangements in the Pacific.

Admiral Hardisty, a native of Atlanta, Georgia, was commissioned an ensign on June 6, 1952, following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Admiral Hardisty earned a master of science degree in international relations from Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1954.

Designated a naval aviator in 1955, Admiral Hardisty's early Navy tours include duty as a Naval Aviator with Fighter Squadrons 12, 22, 101 and 102; Special Weapons Project Test Pilot, Naval Air Special Weapons Facility, Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Aircraft Handling Officer, USS AMERICA (CVA 66); Commanding Officer, Squadron 32; Air Operations Officer, Carrier Strike Force, SEVENTH FLEET; and Special Plans and Air Operations Officer Southeast Asia in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Plans, Policy and Operations, Washington August 1961, at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, while flying an F4B Phantom II, he set a world three (3) low-level speed record which was unsurpassed for 16 years.

In 1971, Admiral Hardisty was assigned as the Commander, Attack Carrier Air Wing ELEVEN. Returning to Washington, D.C. in 1972, he served as the Executive Assistant to the Director, Navy Program Planning, Admiral Hardisty's command of the USS SAVANNAH (AOR 4) in 1973, and command of USS ORISKANY (CVA 34) in 1974.

Admiral Hardisty was Dean of Academies at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, when he was selected to command in February 1977, and ordered to assume duties as acting President of the War College. He next assumed command of the U.S. Facility at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, serving also as the Commander in Chief Pacific Representative attended the CNO Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course in Idaho Falls, Idaho, prior to assuming command of the Carrier Group SEVEN. In 1980.

In July 1981, Admiral Hardisty became Commander, Carrier Group FIVE/Carrier Strike Force SEVENTH FLEET, in July assignment in July 1982, as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) became Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations, in 1983.

In 1984, Admiral Hardisty was assigned as the Director for Operations, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He became Deputy and Chief of Staff, CINCPACFLT, in 1986, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Washington D.C., in 1988, assuming his present position in September 1988.

Admiral Hardisty's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Navy Distinguished Service Medal with gold star, Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit with Combat "V" and four gold stars, Distinguished Flying Cross with one gold star, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with two gold stars, Navy Commendation Medal with one gold star, Philippine Legion of Honor and various campaign medals.

Admiral Hardisty is married to the former Sally Mae Ivet of St. Petersburg, Florida. They have two sons: John and

Oct 1990 - Retired after 38 years of active service.

July 1991 - Selected for Board of Directors, Kaman Company, Bloomfield, CT

May 1993 - Named in Readiness Assessment Task Force. This external task force of 8 retired generals and admirals was formed to develop methods for assessing readiness through an index of indicators for training, morale and maintenance funding....



FROM:

TO:

924 921 6114

SEP 13, 1994

5:27PM P.05

ADMIRAL HUNTINGTON HARDISTY, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

Admiral Huntington Hardisty, U. S. Navy (Ret.) is former Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Command. He was born in Atlanta, Georgia and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1952 and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1964. He held nine commands as a naval aviator culminating in Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet, vice Chief of Naval Operations, and CINCPAC. Admiral Hardisty retired March 1, 1991 and resides in Falls Church, Virginia. He is a member of the Board of Directors and consultant to Kaman Corporation; a member of the Board of Directors for Contraves USA; a member of the Board of Trustees and a consultant to the Center for Naval Analyses Corporation; a member of the Military Advisory Panel to the National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency; a senior fellow at the National Defense University; a senior vice president of the Association of Naval Aviation; Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Aviation Museum Foundation; and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association. He is also a member of the Secretary of Defense Joint Task Force on Readiness.

FROM:

TO:

904 921 6114

SEP 13, 1994

5:27PM P.06



United States Special Operations Command

Public Affairs Office - MacDill AFB, FL 33608-6001 - (813) 830-4600

GENERAL CARL W. STINER, USA (RET.)

General Carl W. Stiner, U.S. Army, is the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. As Commander in Chief, he is responsible for all the special operations forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Born in LaFollette, Tennessee, on 7 September 1936, General Stiner graduated from Tennessee Polytechnic Institute in 1958 with a Bachelor of Science Degree and was commissioned in the Infantry. He served initially with the 9th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia, the 7th Infantry Division in Korea, and commanded a basic training company at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

General Stiner's first special operations tour of duty was 1964-65 with the 3d Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Following graduation from the Army Command and General Staff College in 1967, he served in Vietnam as both an infantry battalion and brigade operations officer (S-3) with the 4th Infantry Division.

In 1970, after a tour with Headquarters, Department of the Army in Washington, D.C., he joined the 82d Airborne Division where he commanded the 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, and served as the Division Operations Officer (G-3). Following graduation from the Army War College in 1975 and tour in Saudi Arabia, he commanded the 1st Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Benning.

Promoted to Brigadier General in 1980, he served first as the Chief of Staff, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), then headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, and later as the Assistant Division Commander of the 82d Airborne Division. After serving on the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C., as Assistant Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs, in 1984 he was promoted to Major General and appointed as Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg.

He held this post until assigned as Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, in January 1987. In October 1988, he was named Commanding General. General Stiner retired in May, 1993.



KVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg. As Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, he was designated Commander, Joint Task Force South, and served as the operational commander of all forces employed on Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in December 1989.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab, Army General Staff Identification Badge, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Service Badge. He also holds a Master's Degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg State College.

He and his wife, the former Sue Rouver, have two daughters: Leoria, who resides in Tampa, Florida, and Carla, who resides in Knoxville, Tennessee.

Don't
worry
about it

Call Monica
assist on all her
within a meeting
scheduled w/

Peta
Joe

September 16, 1994

POTUS. If so, when.

MEMORANDUM FOR LEON PANETTA

THROUGH:

MARCIA HALE

MH

Sheen @ - remind me to talk w/
Harry or John about this

FROM:

JEFFREY FARROW, Co-Chair, Inter-Agency
Working Group on Puerto Rico

SUBJECT:

Meetings with Puerto Rico's Commonwealth
party president and Resident Commissioner

CC: Ambassador Albright

Pat Griffin
✓ Joan Baggett
Christine Varney
Jack Quinn

This is to:

- 1) further discuss the meeting the President is scheduled to have next Wednesday with the head of the Puerto Rico political party that favors substantial changes within the islands' current political status, San Juan Mayor Hector Luis Acevedo, and
- 2) recommend a similar meeting with the islands' Resident Commissioner, Congressman Carlos Romero Barcelo, who is an aggressive leader of the competing statehood party, as well as recommend consultations with the relevant House and Senate committee chairmen.

Background

During 1992, the President committed to actively support implementation of a future status choice by the people of Puerto Rico. He reiterated the pledge last year after a government dominated by statehood advocates called a plebiscite among status plans put forth by the islands' three parties, each of which is based on a different vision of the best status for the islands.

A package of greater benefits and powers under the current status -- known as 'commonwealth' -- won an upset plurality victory over statehood 48.6% to 46.3%, with 4.4% for independence. Proponents of all three options then pressed for Federal action on the commonwealth proposals which include:

- agreement that the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship is bilateral and cannot be changed without the islands' consent;

2

- job-creating revisions in the Federal tax incentive for U.S. corporate activity in insular areas;
- extension of Supplemental Security Income;
- Food Stamps-level funding of the special food program for Puerto Rico; and
- tariff protection for local agricultural products other than coffee (which is already protected from foreign competition.)

Motivating statehood leaders was their confidence that the proposals are unrealistic. --

Requiring the islands' consent for changing the relationship would be constitutionally unprecedented.

The tax incentive for insular corporate activity was substantially restricted by the President's economic program.

Extending SSI would cost some \$900 million a year.

Food Stamps-level funding would cost about \$600 million a year.

The tariff protections would run counter to international trade agreements.

-- Clear rejection of or inaction on the proposals would be likely to help the statehooders win another plebiscite that they hope to hold in 1997 or '98 as well as win the 1996 elections.

Recognizing the difficulty of achieving their proposals -- and the stakes for '96 and beyond -- commonwealth leaders privately indicated flexibility regarding the agenda and sought negotiations on a less ambitious bottom line.

They were well-positioned to make the request because all parties asked for a Federal response; talks would be less harsh than a flat rejection of their proposals; their leadership includes the President's principal 1992 supporters in the islands; and the President had pledged to make commonwealth work better if it won.

After a position on Puerto Rico's petition was requested for a House hearing, the President decided that an inter-agency working group should be organized to develop policy on questions raised by the plebiscite as well as other Puerto Rico issues. An emphasis was to be placed on the islands' economic problems, in part because they are a basis of the political and social issues.

The mechanism should also enable a promise to consider the islands' situation in policymaking to be carried out as well as provide a means for the White House to fulfill its role as the 'agency' responsible for Puerto Rico status matters.

Reaction was generally positive; but some statehood leaders are wary of the effort enabling commonwealthers to claim progress under the current status before the '96 election. Although Governor Pedro Rossello, who heads the statehood party, designed the plebiscite to petition for Federal action, he now says it is up to the commonwealthers to deliver on their victory and he suggests the process was flawed because their proposals are fallacious. Res. Comm. Romero is concerned that the working group will obscure a direct response to the proposals although he would like to see it clarify the status issue.

Issues

As you will recall, the meeting with Mayor Acevedo was agreed to in lieu of a more concrete measure he requested for the recent anniversary of the establishment of Puerto Rico's commonwealth government: replacement of the Bush policy directive regarding Puerto Rico with one similar to the Kennedy directive that it had replaced. The committed to purpose of the meeting was to enable Acevedo to make the case for the commonwealth agenda; but he very much wants the Bush memo, which undermines commonwealth, rescinded at the time of the meeting. He also wants the meeting to show that commonwealth proposals will be seriously considered.

As you know, news of the meeting concerned Res. Comm. Romero, who not only doubts the viability of the commonwealth proposals but also questions the commonwealth 'mandate.' He has also asked for a meeting.

Discussion

The Bush Memo:

President Bush issued his directive after the 1992 election in fulfillment of a promise to Republican statehooders. It primarily undermines commonwealth by describing the islands' status as territorial, subject to broad Federal control. Kennedy had suggested that commonwealth made Puerto Rico something more than a mere territory and less subject to unilateral Federal powers.

The issue is at the heart of the status debate in Puerto Rico and the four other U.S. insular areas. In essence, it is whether there can be a distinct status called commonwealth in which Federal powers are limited by mutual agreement even though the Constitution only provides for territories in which Federal

powers are broad (other than States and the Federal District.)

The argument for such a status is that there are areas populated by U.S. Citizens that will not become states -- and obtain the power in the Federal decision-making process that States have -- and that they should, therefore, be immune from unlimited Federal control. The lack of such a status option would mean that they have no real alternative to what is essentially a colonial situation other than an independence they do not want.

While statehood is said to be an option in the case of Puerto Rico, it is much less likely to be sought if commonwealth is more than a territorial status. Although the issue hasn't been clearly resolved by the courts, however, most opinions don't hold Federal powers to be as limited as commonwealthers would like.

Puerto Rico was taken off the U.N.'s list of non self-governing territories, though, based on U.S. representations that commonwealth made the islands more self-governing than they are generally considered to be. The Bush memo, while legally supportable, is inconsistent with those representations -- a principal argument commonwealthers make for rescinding it.

Commonwealthers object to two other aspects of the memo. One calls for continued status referenda until there is a fundamental change in Puerto Rico's status -- which suggests commonwealth cannot be an 'ultimate' status. The other calls for agencies to treat Puerto Rico as a State -- which suggests special policies should not be developed for the islands (although this appears to have little practical effect.)

Perhaps the best argument for replacing the Bush memo is that it is unnecessary and obnoxious. (Its only essential provision continued the Kennedy memo's assignment of matters involving Puerto Rico's status to the White House.) And this Administration's policies ought to be made by this President -- a step that, by and large, Puerto Ricans in the States as well as the islands would like.

But, precipitously rescinding the Bush directive would concern statehooders such as Representative ~~10112111~~, who has not only supported the Bush policy but sponsored a bill based on it.

The Commonwealth 'Mandate':

A fundamental question is whether the plebiscite was conclusive since commonwealth did not receive majority support. Other than that the rules of the plebiscite only required a plurality, it is hard to argue that a popular will for a specific change can be understood from less than half the vote. House Subcommittee Chairman de Lugo and Senate Committee Chairman Johnston have expressed concerns in this regard.

The President's ability to regard the results as less than a mandate is somewhat limited, however, by saying that he was "excited" about the plebiscite when it was called and by interpreting the results as a commonwealth victory. Still, the commonwealthers themselves opposed the plebiscite's lack of a majority requirement beforehand!

In any case, though, the vote clearly expressed an overwhelming sentiment for: changing the existing status; equal treatment in Federal programs; and a continued close association with the U.S.

Administration Action:

While months have passed since the decision to organize the working group was made, delays related to congressional concerns, other insular issues, and administrative support have been overcome.

Memos to EOP staff and agencies regarding membership on and cooperation with the working group should go out before the Acevedo meeting -- obviating a major concern of the Mayor's. Puerto Rico matters are so controversial, however, that acting without substantial consultation will result in many complaints. And the downside is greater than the positive benefits of acting.

Other Factors

Several factors complicate the handling of this matter.

One is that both the statehooders and commonwealthers are led by Democrats since Gov. Rossello became a Democrat. (While most statehooders are Republicans, many commonwealthers have long supported our Party.) Also, both parties have very well-very connected lobbyists here.

Another complicating factor is that there is no consensus on the issues in Congress among the relatively few Members who are interested; but those who are interested have strongly-held views. Among others, they include three Puerto Ricans who represent States in the House and who all have different status preferences.

A third factor is that there are almost as many Puerto Ricans in the U.S. (2.7 million) as in the islands (3.6 million) and they are politically significant in a few States. Some are divided on the options, although others are more concerned that the islands' wishes be respected and its economic needs be met.

Some other aspects of the issue should be kept in mind as well.

Statehood support has grown at the expense of commonwealth for two principal reasons in addition to a desire for political equality. One is that past initiatives to enhance commonwealth have failed in Washington. The other is the great disparities that have arisen in the treatment of needy Puerto Ricans in social programs. In spite of this, Puerto Ricans remain a people who cannot be easily assimilated into our nation in a classic 'melting pot' sense.

Statehood would be extremely controversial: At best, it would be based on a bare majority petition. Most Puerto Ricans do not speak English...and do not want to. The islands' per capita income is less than half that of Mississippi, and the 60% below the poverty level would require about \$3 billion a year in social programs spending. Puerto Rico would have more political power than half the States and be a Democratic state. It would raise a racial issue vis a vis D.C.'s statehood petition. There would be resistance from diehard nationalists. Finally, statehood would eliminate the \$2 billion plus U.S. corporate activity incentive, which is vital to the islands' current economy and to many firms' profits.

Some of the commonwealth proposals are essentially similar to the commonwealth proposals of Guam, a territory that has no prospect of statehood and, like Puerto Rico, is populated by U.S. Citizens who do not want independence. (Further, Secretary Babbitt has already indicated a desire to seriously consider the most fundamental of the proposals: requiring local consent for the application of Federal policies that would affect the relationship.) Some proposals also resemble aspirations of the other U.S. insular areas.

There is international interest, principally because of Puerto Rico's Latin identity. Additionally, Cuba has instigated U.N. inquiries in which several nations have favored reversing the 1953 finding that Puerto Rico's status was non-colonially self-governing. While such a change is unlikely, inaction could increase calls to add Puerto Rico to the territories that the U.S. is obliged to develop into self-government.

Recommendations

1. The meeting with Mayor Acevedo should continue to primarily be a listening session. The opportunity to formally present his proposals is a substantial step, in light of the situation.

Further, given congressional views and powers, the President

should stress the necessity of consulting with key Members of Congress in addition to promising careful consideration of the commonwealth position. He should indicate that the members of the working group will be named within a couple of weeks and that a decision on the Bush memo will be made as expeditiously as possible.

2. A similar meeting should be held with Res. Comm. Romero -- as Puerto Rico's official representative and as a principal spokesman for the statehood perspective.

3. Chairman George Miller, Delegate Ron de Lugo, and Senator Bennett Johnston should also be consulted before deciding on the Bush memo and any actions that we ought to pursue.

Finally, we will prepare an overall strategy memo based on these meetings and other consultations, as we discussed when we met.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. tables	re: Democratic National Committee political statistics (Campaign) (8 pages)	08/15/1994	Personal Misfile

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Clinton Presidential Records
Political Affairs
Reta Lewis
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FOLDER TITLE:

Cuba [1]

2016-0920-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. letter	NCEC Services to Joe Velasquez re: GOTC scheduling maps (6 pages)	08/11/1994	Personal Misfile

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003. statement	re: Base voters strategy discussion document (3 pages)	08/15/1994	Personal Misfile

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