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THE EFFECT OF THE MEDICAID PROGRAM ON WELFARE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR SUPPLY

Robert Moffitt and Barbara Wolfe*

Abstract—We examine the effect of the Medicaid program on the labor supply and welfare participation decisions of female heads of family. A key contribution is the development of a family-specific proxy for the valuation of Medicaid benefits. We find that Medicaid has strong and significant effects on labor supply and welfare participation that are negative and positive in sign, respectively, but which are concentrated in the tail of the distribution with the highest expected medical expenditures. We also find that the availability and level of private health insurance have very large effects opposite in sign to those of Medicaid.

I. Introduction

in kind benefits greater than cash
THE provision of subsidized or free medical services to members of the low income population has become a central component of the package of benefits for the poor in the United States over the last twenty years. Prior to 1965 most benefits to the poor were provided in the form of cash payments but, since that time, in-kind benefits in the form of Food Stamps, Medicaid, and housing subsidies have mushroomed to exceed cash programs in terms of caseloads and payments. The Medicaid program is one of the most important of these, accounting for almost 40% of all federal expenditures on means-tested transfers in 1988 (U.S. House of Representatives, 1989, p. 1225).

While there has been a large amount of research on the incentive effects of cash payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and a smaller amount on the Food Stamp program, there has been very little on the incentive effects of the Medicaid program (see Danziger et al. (1981) and Moffitt (1992) for surveys of the literature). The two

studies completed to date (Blank, 1989; Winkler, 1991) both found insignificant effects of Medicaid on AFDC participation probabilities, and either insignificant or weak effects on labor supply. For our purposes, it is important to note that both studies used for their Medicaid variable a state-specific average that may not accurately proxy the valuation of the Medicaid program by any individual family.¹

Studying the Medicaid program requires that two issues be addressed that need not be in the evaluation of cash programs. The first is the development of a variable that accurately proxies the valuation of the program, as just mentioned. Whereas the cash benefit per family is easily obtained from published sources, Medicaid expenditures are rarely available on a family basis in the available micro data sets. We therefore develop a family-specific variable based on expected medical expenditures and health conditions per family which, though not equivalent to the theoretically preferred insurance value of Medicaid, is a proxy for that value. The second issue is the incorporation of the availability of private health insurance if off welfare, a factor that should also be taken into account in analyzing the role of Medicaid. We develop a proxy variable for the expected level and availability of such insurance should a female-headed family be off welfare, and we control for this variable in our model.

The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we briefly lay out the background of the Medicaid program and discuss our data and econometric model. We employ a simple reduced form model of the effects of Medicaid on labor supply and welfare participation. In section III we discuss the development of our Medicaid and private health insurance "heterogeneity" indexes, and we present our results in section IV. A summary appears in section V.

¹ Winkler found labor supply effects for employment probabilities but not for hours of work, and the former were only on the borderline of 10% significance and went away completely when regional dummies were added. Thus the two studies are roughly consistent.

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II. Programmatic Background and Econometric Model

A. The Medicaid Program

The Medicaid program provides health care for certain low-income families in the United States. Authorized under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the program provides benefits to the aged, blind, disabled, families with dependent children, and certain categories of pregnant women and children. The most important characteristic of the program for our purposes is that eligibility is closely tied to the actual or potential receipt of cash transfers, in most cases AFDC or Supplementary Security Income (which provides benefits to the aged, blind, and disabled). Families enrolled in the AFDC program are automatically eligible (or "categorically eligible," in the language of the program) for Medicaid benefits and can retain their Medicaid "card" as long as they are on the program.² The AFDC program, in turn, provides benefits primarily to female heads of family, those without an able-bodied male present in the household and with children under the age of 18 in the family.³ As a consequence, Medicaid receipt, at least among the non-aged and non-disabled, is heavily concentrated in the female head population. We shall therefore focus our study on that group.

B. Data

The data we use in our study are drawn from the "1984" panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This SIPP panel

² In 39 states, female-headed families not on AFDC are covered by the Medically Needy program, which provides catastrophic insurance in case of heavy medical expense. All states also cover some low-income female heads who meet the income eligibility requirements for AFDC but are not, for one reason or another, on the program ("categorically needy without cash assistance"). In addition, recent legislation has extended eligibility for a few months to female heads who leave AFDC for specified reasons and to pregnant women and children in certain non-female-headed families. Nevertheless, despite these extensions, among non-elderly female heads almost 80% of all Medicaid expenditures go to those on AFDC and 92% of all non-elderly non-disabled Medicaid recipients are on AFDC (U.S. House of Representatives (1989), p. 1145). Further, our data for 1986 indicate that only 8% of all female heads are off AFDC and yet covered by Medicaid.

³ Under a related program, AFDC-UP, benefits are provided in some states to low-income husband-wife families. However, the program is small and constitutes only 7% of the national AFDC caseload.

was begun in October 1983 by the Bureau of the Census with an initial interview of a nationally representative sample of the civilian non-institutional population of approximately twenty thousand households. Families were then interviewed every four months until July 1986, and information was collected on income sources and sociodemographic characteristics. The primary advantage of the SIPP for our purposes is that it was designed to collect detailed information on transfer program reciprocity and insurance coverage, and it contained a special set of questions on health status and medical utilization in one interview. The reciprocity information permits us to determine AFDC participation as well as coverage of Medicaid and private health insurance, while the health and medical utilization questions permit us to construct a family-specific medical heterogeneity index, which is a main feature of our analysis.

We use two interviews in the SIPP in our work. First, we use a set of supplementary questions asked in the third interview, conducted in the Spring and Summer of 1984, on health and medical utilization to construct a family-specific value of expected medical expenditures if covered by Medicaid and if covered by private health insurance. Second, we use the last wave of SIPP, administered from April to July of 1986, to estimate the effects of Medicaid, private health insurance, and other variables on AFDC participation and labor supply. In both cases we analyze only the female heads in the survey.

In the next section we outline our econometric model for the estimation of the AFDC participation and labor supply equations. Following that we describe the development of the Medicaid and private health insurance variables that are the key regressors in the model. Subsequently we present the estimation results for our AFDC participation and labor supply equations.

C. Econometric Model

The econometric model we use is a simple reduced form based on the conventional economic theory of labor supply and welfare participation (Moffitt, 1983). Assume that the utility function is $U(H, Y, P)$, where H is hours of work, Y is disposable income, and P is a dummy variable equal to 1 if on welfare and 0 if not. Utility is positive in the second argument and negative in

the first and third. The inclusion of P in the utility function, the main departure from the textbook theory of labor supply, is designed to provide an explanation for the non-participation of families who are eligible for AFDC. The existence of such non-participating eligibles, sometimes ascribed to welfare stigma, results in some families not locating on the boundary of their budget sets.

Let the budget constraint be

$$Y = WH + N + PB \\ = W(1 - tP) + N(1 - Pt) + PG \quad (1)$$

where W is the hourly wage rate, N is nonwage income, B is the benefit if on AFDC (the sum of the cash benefit plus Medicaid, for example), G is the AFDC guarantee (cash plus in-kind), and t is the tax rate on income in the AFDC program. Maximization of utility then results in two equations, one for AFDC participation and one for labor supply conditional on the participation decision:

$$P^* = V[W(1 - t), N(1 - t) + G, 1] \\ - V[W, N, 0] \quad (2)$$

$$P = 1 \text{ if } P^* \geq 0; P = 0 \text{ if } P^* < 0 \quad (3)$$

$$H = H[W(1 - tP), N(1 - tP) + PG] \quad (4)$$

where V is the indirect utility function with arguments for the net wage, net nonwage income, and AFDC participation.

Estimation of this model in its structural form is difficult for many reasons. First, there are numerous nonlinearities in the constraint arising from the nonlinearities in the positive tax system and in the variation in gross hourly wage rates over the hours-worked range. Second, the Medicaid program is an in-kind program whose benefits cannot be presumed to have the same value as cash (Smeeding, 1982; Smeeding and Moon, 1980); therefore, its benefits cannot be added in with those of the cash AFDC benefit. Third, it is difficult to estimate the effects of the tax rate in AFDC because the official rate is 100% in all states; thus it has no cross-sectional variation.⁴ For the same reason, there is no cross-sectional variation in any tax rate for Medicaid; Medicaid benefits are independent of income as long as the

family is on AFDC and are lost in their entirety when AFDC participation ends.⁵

Our solution to these problems is to estimate a reduced form model for the two equations of the following form:

$$P^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{P0} + \beta_2 Y_{P1} + \beta_3 Y_{P2} + \beta_4 G_A \\ + \beta_5 G_F + \beta_6 M + \beta_7 K + X'\alpha + \epsilon_1 \quad (5)$$

$$P = 1 \text{ if } P^* \geq 0; P = 0 \text{ if not} \quad (6)$$

$$E^* = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Y_{P0} + \gamma_2 Y_{P1} + \gamma_3 Y_{P2} + \gamma_4 G_A \\ + \gamma_5 G_F + \gamma_6 M + \gamma_7 K + X'\delta + \epsilon_2 \quad (7)$$

$$E = 1 \text{ if } E^* \geq 0; E = 0 \text{ if not} \quad (8)$$

where $E = 1$ if employed and 0 if not; Y_{Pi} is disposable private income net of taxes at hours point i ($i = 0$ for $H = 0$, $i = 1$ for $H = 20$, and $i = 2$ for $H = 40$); G_A and G_F are the guarantee amounts for AFDC and Food Stamps; M is our proxy for the family-specific valuation of the Medicaid program; K is our proxy for the family-specific valuation of private health insurance if off AFDC; X is a vector of exogenous socioeconomic characteristics; and ϵ_1 and ϵ_2 are normally distributed error terms with mean zero and unit variance.

Equations (5)–(6) constitute the reduced-form AFDC participation equation and contain as regressors potential private income (nonwage income plus earnings minus taxes) at the non-work point, part-time work, and full-time work. This specification is equivalent to entering both the net hourly wage rate over the part-time range and the net hourly wage rate over the full-time range, and permits us to avoid having to specify the full nonlinearity of the budget constraint over all hours points. A similar procedure has been used by Fraker and Moffitt (1988). We enter the guarantee amounts for AFDC and for the Food Stamp program separately from each other and separately from private income; their coefficients will all differ from one another if there is welfare stigma or if the different types of income have different unobserved characteristics. The AFDC and Food Stamp tax rates are not entered because they have no cross-sectional variation. The equation also contains our proxies for Medicaid

⁴ To be exact, the tax rate is 100% after four months of earnings; nevertheless, this still does not provide cross-sectional variation. Effective tax rates may vary across the states but there are no available estimates of such rates for this time period.

⁵ For this reason we cannot address the problem of the Medicaid "notch" since there is no cross-sectional variation in its location independent of the AFDC guarantee, the hourly wage rate, and nonwage income. We discuss both the theoretical issues of the Medicaid notch and the empirical issues in estimating its effects extensively in our background report (Moffitt and Wolfe (1989)).

and private health insurance availability described in the next section; they will not have the same units as G_A and G_F , nor should their coefficients be expected to be the same in any case because of the in-kind nature of medical benefits. Note that M is available only if the female head is on AFDC and K is available only if she is off.⁶ A vector of exogenous characteristics is also entered including age, race, health status, education, family size and composition, and region. It is important to include health status in the equation since the value of Medicaid and private health insurance will be correlated with health.

Equations (7)–(8) constitute the labor supply equation, where we examine only the choice to work or not to work at all. Since only 50% of female heads work, the work choice dominates the hours choice conditional upon work. The labor supply equation contains the same regressors as the AFDC participation equation, as should clearly be the case (see equations (2)–(3)).

The theoretically predicted signs on most of the income variables are unambiguous:

$$\begin{array}{l} \beta_1 < 0 \quad \beta_2 < 0 \quad \beta_3 < 0 \quad \beta_4 > 0 \quad \beta_6 > 0 \quad \beta_7 < 0 \\ \gamma_1 < 0 \quad \gamma_2 > 0 \quad \gamma_3 > 0 \quad \gamma_4 < 0 \quad \gamma_5 < 0 \quad \gamma_6 < 0. \end{array}$$

We also hypothesize $\beta_5 > 0$ because Food Stamps are more often received together with AFDC though they can be received off AFDC as well, and that $\gamma_7 > 0$, presuming that private health insurance is provided primarily through employers and will therefore be an inducement to work. Note that, while most coefficients are of the opposite signs in the two equations, there is no necessity for their magnitudes or significance levels to be related to one another. The existence of non-participating eligibles makes the two equations partially independent of one another, for non-work is not equivalent to AFDC participation.

III. Construction of the Heterogeneity Indexes

The valuation of in-kind transfers in general and of Medicaid in particular is a difficult prob-

lem. Three approaches have been outlined for such valuation (Smeeding and Moon, 1980): (1) the "government cost" approach whereby government expenditures per recipient or per eligible are used, (2) the cash-equivalent value approach, and (3) the "funds released" approach whereby in-kind transfers are valued by the funds released for the purchase of other goods. The cash-equivalent approach is the theoretically preferred method, which in our case would require estimating the equivalent cash value of an insurance policy on the private market that yields the same quantity and quality of care as Medicaid. Unfortunately, that task is beyond our capability because we have neither data on medical expenditures and quality of care with which the parameters of the utility function could be estimated nor any suitable exogenous source of medical price information in our cross-section to estimate the necessary price elasticities.

Our approach is instead to attempt to improve upon the traditional method, a modified form of the government cost approach, by incorporating individual and family heterogeneity. The traditional form of government cost method applied to the Medicaid program (e.g., in the two studies referenced in the introduction) is to use aggregate data on Medicaid expenditures by state—and sometimes by family size and aged/non-aged status—together with information on the number of recipients in each state in each category, to calculate an average expenditure per recipient. This is then taken as the "expected" benefit per recipient and is used as a regressor in a sample of individuals in different states. We shall construct such a variable and test it for comparison purposes below, but our aim is to develop a measure that varies more with individual and family characteristics and therefore more closely approximates the value to the individual family. The values obtained with aggregate data miss many important interfamily differences that affect valuations—health status being the most important, but also expected utilization of medical care, the cost of medical care in the community, and so on. The SIPP data allow us to take such differences into account because information is provided on health status, utilization of medical care, Medicaid and private health insurance coverage, and many economic and demographic characteristics of the family. Using this information we can

⁶ Some women on AFDC have private coverage but the Medicaid program implicitly taxes it at 100% by requiring that private benefits be exhausted before receiving Medicaid benefits. However, as we noted previously, it is also now possible to receive Medicaid for a few months after leaving AFDC.

construct with regression methods an "expected" level of utilization of medical care under Medicaid for a family with a given set of health and other characteristics. In conjunction with outside information on prices of care, we can translate this family-specific value of expected utilization into a value of expected expenditure. This Medicaid "heterogeneity" index will be used for the Medicaid variable in the econometric model.⁷

We also construct a similar family-specific index for private health insurance, using the regression-predicted utilization if covered by private insurance as a measure of expected utilization, and by translating this into an expenditure value using outside information on prices. However, in this case we also predict the probability of being covered by private health insurance if off AFDC—this is not necessary for Medicaid because the probability of Medicaid coverage if on AFDC is one. We multiply the probability of private coverage by the expected expenditures if covered to obtain the private insurance variable we use in the AFDC participation and labor supply regressions.

Construction of the Indexes: The design of the heterogeneity indexes involves many details of specification which we have inadequate space to discuss here; the reader is referred to our background report (Moffitt and Wolfe, 1989) for full details. Here we shall summarize our procedures and results.

The aim is to obtain family-specific proxies for medical expenditures under Medicaid and private health insurance for each of the female-headed families in the 1986 cross-section of the SIPP to be used for the estimation of the econometric model. We use the "topical module" on health care and medical utilization from the third interview of SIPP (1984) for our constructions, containing data on 1,701 mothers and 3,016 children. The module contains questions on two types of medical care utilization over the twelve months prior to the interview: (1) the number of in-patient days (i.e., nights in the hospital) and (2) the number of out-patient days (i.e., out-patient

visits). While this is an incomplete set of all types of medical utilization, it should adequately proxy the level of utilization overall (though we also impute a value of other medical care, as described below). Using such information first on the female head (i.e., the single mother), we estimate the following two equations with Tobit analysis (some women have zero utilization):

$$I_1 = X\beta_1 + Z\delta_1 + S\xi_1 + \hat{L}_1\gamma_1 + \hat{L}_2\phi_1 + \epsilon_1 \quad (9)$$

$$I_2 = X\beta_2 + Z\delta_2 + S\xi_2 + \hat{L}_2\gamma_2 + \hat{L}_1\phi_2 + \epsilon_2 \quad (10)$$

where I_1 is her number of in-patient days over the year; I_2 is her number of out-patient days over the year; X is a vector of her health characteristics; Z is a vector of other individual and family characteristics; S is a vector of state variables including AFDC benefits, a dummy for the presence of a Medically Needy program, and state per capita health expenditures; and $\hat{L}_1$ and $\hat{L}_2$ are predicted probabilities of Medicaid and private health insurance coverage, respectively. We use predicted values of the two coverage variables instead of actual values because the latter are endogenous. The predicted values $\hat{L}_1$ and $\hat{L}_2$ are obtained from a three-category multinomial logit estimation (Medicaid, private insurance, no coverage) as a function of health, individual, and state characteristics.⁸

We then obtain predicted values of $\hat{I}_1$ and $\hat{I}_2$ from the Tobit estimates of (9) and (10), and we

⁷ Like all government-cost concepts, of course, this measure will overstate the true case-equivalent value of Medicaid. However, our measure should be more closely correlated with that true value than is the traditional government cost calculation.

⁸ The X vector includes two variables for health status of the mother and one variable for the presence of a disabled child. The first health measure is based on a commonly-used self-assessment of health, with five possible responses ranging from poor to excellent—we defined a dummy variable for the lowest three categories. The second is a unique variable, not commonly found on most large-scale data sets, which is a dummy variable to indicate that the single mother has difficulty doing housework. This variable is a measure of functional ability that should capture severe disability. The Z vector includes ten variables for age, race, education, headship status, marital status, number of children, and income; the S vector contains average health expenditures in the state. The multinomial logit equations for health insurance include most of these plus housing tenure and variables for the state AFDC benefit and the presence of a state Medically Needy program. See tables 6–7 of Moffitt and Wolfe (1989) for the exact specification. A large number of alternative specifications and variable inclusions were tested before arriving at this set.

convert these values to expenditures using the National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey (NMCUES). The NMCUES is a representative population data set based on interviews of 6000 households in 1980 and 1981, obtaining information on health, use of medical services, charges, and sources of payment for services and health insurance coverage. For each individual in the sample, 554 single mothers and 1033 children in our case, information is available on expenditures over calendar 1980 on in-patient care, out-patient care, and other medical care. Examples of "other medical care" are prescription drugs and specialized equipment used at home. The expenditure values are defined as total medical charges minus out-of-pocket costs.⁹ Using these variables for each mother together with the NMCUES data on utilization (I_1 = hospital nights, I_2 = out-patient visits) and on insurance coverage (L_1 = Medicaid coverage, L_2 = private insurance coverage), we estimate the following three "value" equations:

$$V_1 = a_1 I_1 + b_{11} L_1 + b_{12} L_2 + c_1 S + \nu_1 \quad (11)$$

$$V_2 = a_2 I_2 + b_{21} L_1 + b_{22} L_2 + c_2 S + \nu_2 \quad (12)$$

$$V_3 = a_3 I_1 + a_4 I_2 + b_{31} L_1 + b_{32} L_2 + c_3 S + \nu_3 \quad (13)$$

where V_1 is the value of (i.e., expenditure on) in-patient care, V_2 is the value of out-patient care, and V_3 is the value of other medical care. We include both of the utilization variables in the third equation since we have no specific utilization measure for "other medical care" on the SIPP. Locational characteristics are included in these equations as well.¹⁰

Returning to the SIPP, total predicted value amounts are obtained for each mother by inserting her predicted values of $\hat{I}_1$ and $\hat{I}_2$ into the fitted equations (11)–(13) and by summing the resulting predicted values of $\hat{V}_1$, $\hat{V}_2$, and $\hat{V}_3$. Separate calculations are performed to obtain separate values for Medicaid and private insurance by appropriately setting $L_1 = 1$ or $L_2 = 1$, and using values of $\hat{I}_1$ and $\hat{I}_2$ under either Medi-

caid or private insurance coverage, as appropriate.^{11,12}

Unfortunately, the utilization data in SIPP were not collected for children although insurance coverage is available for them separately from the mother. For children, we use the NMCUES data on children of single mothers to estimate directly the value of Medicaid and private coverage, defined as above, using the child characteristics, the health and other individual characteristics of the mother, insurance coverage, and regional characteristics as regressors. We use the results of this equation to assign expected values of coverage under Medicaid and under private insurance for each child in the SIPP sample, and we aggregate these with those of the mother to obtain a family-specific value for each of the two insurance categories, Medicaid and private insurance.

For private health insurance, we also require a predicted probability of coverage if off AFDC, as we noted previously. The multinomial logit estimates obtained for input into the utilization regressions discussed above are suitable for this purpose. The predicted probabilities of coverage are multiplied by the value of private coverage to obtain our "expected" value of coverage if off AFDC. As an additional exercise, we also obtain separate predicted probabilities for workers and non-workers and construct two separate expected value variables. We will report the results of using the two variables separately in our results section below.

The estimates of the equations we have described are provided in our background report (Moffitt and Wolfe, 1989). Table 1 shows the final estimates of total Medicaid and private insurance

⁹ See our background report, Moffitt and Wolfe (1989), for details on the aggregation of service categories into those corresponding to SIPP.

¹⁰ The S vector includes only regional dummies. See Moffitt and Wolfe (1989), table 8.

¹¹ We may note at this point that these indexes have the advantage of predicting positive values even for those who happen not to have had care in the last twelve months; use of actual values would assign zero to such women even though their expected levels are positive.

¹² The NMCUES and SIPP single mothers appear to be quite similar despite the difference of 3-to-4 years in calendar time between the surveys. Average age, percentage divorced and widowed, percentage household heads, and percentage living in the Northeast and West are identical to two significant digits. The percentage living in the South and in the North Central are slightly different, as are the percentage covered by Medicaid and private health insurance, although the magnitudes of the differences are small.

TABLE 1.—FAMILY INDEX OF VALUE OF MEDICAID AND PRIVATE INSURANCE,
AND FACTORS INFLUENCING VALUES

	Medicaid Total Fam. Value (Annual)	Private Total Fam. Value (Annual)	No. Children < 18	Percent with Disabled Child	Percent with Fair or Poor Health
Current Insurance Coverage					
None	1,973	1,625	1.71	0.066	0.539
Medicaid	4,229	3,816	1.99	0.188	0.576
Private	1,508	1,144	1.62	0.085	0.379
By Current Health Status					
Good or excellent	1,365	895	1.71	0.069	0
Fair or poor	4,113	3,832	1.84	0.121	1.0
By Current Income Relative to Poverty Line					
Below poverty line	3,450	3,060	1.88	0.095	0.56
One to two times the poverty line	1,831	1,439	1.80	0.125	0.49
More than twice the poverty line	1,715	1,355	1.60	0.086	0.36

values for different groups.¹³ As should be expected, those with no insurance coverage have fairly low expected expenditures but so do those with private coverage. Those with Medicaid coverage have the greater values. Interestingly, the expected value of medical care coverage if on Medicaid is higher than under private coverage for all groups regardless of actual coverage. This reflects the full coverage, without deductibles, of Medicaid as against the widespread use of co-insurance by private insurers. The table also shows that expected expenditures are higher for those with worse health conditions, those with low family income, and those with large families.

The annual value of expected medical expenditure for those on AFDC and hence covered by Medicaid is \$4229. The mean annual AFDC guarantee for the sample is \$4118 (see appendix table A-1), a bit less, though including Food Stamps brings it up to \$5912. Thus it is clear that Medicaid benefits are very large relative to those of AFDC and Food Stamps, and it would not be surprising to find that they exert significant effects on labor supply and welfare participation behavior.

IV. Estimation of the Econometric Model

The econometric model is estimated using the female heads in the SIPP in the last interview, in 1986. All female heads with at least one child under the age of 18 and in the age range 18–64 are selected, and only those also present in the third interview are included (to match with the Medicaid and private health insurance variables). The sample size is 545. The means of the main variables used in the estimation are shown in appendix table A-1. Slightly over half the women work and about one-third are on AFDC; work and AFDC are also almost all mutually exclusive, for only 10% of those on AFDC work.

Probit estimates of equations (5)–(8) are obtained using the demographic variables shown in appendix table A-1 for the X vector. The variables used for M and K are as described in the previous section. We also use AFDC and Food Stamp guarantee amounts equal to the maximum amount paid for different matched family sizes with no other income; these values are available from government documents. Private incomes at the three hours points are calculated as the sum of nonwage non-transfer income plus predicted earnings minus taxes, the latter estimated for the federal income tax (EITC included) and the FICA payroll tax. Pre-tax earnings at each point are

¹³ The private insurance variables shown in the table are not multiplied by the probability of coverage.

obtained for non-workers by estimating a selectivity-bias-adjusted equation for the hourly wage and multiplying the predicted values by 20 or 40. The wage-equation estimates are reported in appendix table A-2. All income variables are on a weekly basis.

Table 2 shows the results of the estimated equations. Because part-time and full-time private income are highly collinear (correlation coefficient = 0.96), only one of the two is entered at a time.¹⁴ The equations with full-time income are shown; those with the part-time variable are virtually identical and are not presented (see background report). As the table shows, nonwage income (net private income at zero hours) has an insignificant, but surprisingly positive, effect on AFDC participation but the expected negative and significant effect on employment probabilities. It is possible that the nonwage income variable in our data is quite inaccurate, as is frequently the case in survey data. The full-time net income variable (i.e., the net wage rate) has a negative and significant effect on AFDC participation and a positive and significant effect on employment status, consistent with theory. The employment effects confirm the strong forward-bending labor supply curves found in other studies of female heads of household. The AFDC and Food Stamp benefits have positive effects on AFDC participation and negative effects on employment probabilities, significant or nearly significant in all cases.

The results of most interest are those for the Medicaid and private health insurance variables. The coefficients on both are highly significant for both AFDC and employment, and are of the hypothesized signs.¹⁵ Moreover, the coefficient magnitudes indicate that private health insurance has an effect two or three times larger in absolute value than that of Medicaid. That is, an extra dollar of expected private health insurance has a greater effect than an extra dollar of expected

Medicaid benefits. This may be a result of a lower quality of care provided to the insured under Medicaid than to those covered by private health insurance, or of the presence of stigma of AFDC and Medicaid receipt.^{16,17}

Table 3 shows the results of further tests. The first column shows the effect of using an average state Medicaid value, computed as in prior studies. As the table indicates, the state-based insurance value coefficients are insignificant for both dependent variables. Thus our results suggest that the weak or insignificant Medicaid effects found by Blank (1989) and Winkler (1991) may have been due to their use of a state-specific average; apparently it is necessary to allow for individual heterogeneity in the Medicaid variable.¹⁸ The second and third columns show the effects of splitting the family-specific Medicaid variable into separate components for mothers and children, and splitting the private insurance variable into working and non-working components, respectively. The first exercise shows stronger effects for the mother than for children, perhaps an indication that the children have other health care sources or that the mother is more likely to respond to her own health needs than those of the children. The results of the second exercise

¹⁶ The *t*-statistics on the differences in the absolute magnitudes of the two coefficients are slightly greater than 2 in all equations.

¹⁷ To ensure that the effects of the Medicaid and private health insurance indexes are not being determined by nonlinearities in their construction, the two indexes were linearly projected on all the other variables in the equation plus those additionally involved in the prediction equations noted earlier (see n.7—these variables are primarily state health expenditures, presence of a disabled child, whether help was needed in the home, having had a training course, marital status, headship status, housing tenure, and income, all measured at the third SIPP interview, approximately two years prior to the survey at which the variables in the AFDC and employment status probits were measured). The coefficients on the linear projections are of the same sign and considerably larger than those in table 2, sometimes 3-to-4 times as large. No doubt this instrumental variable procedure removes some of the noise in the raw indexes. Correction of the standard errors for the two-step nature of the procedure using the GLS method of Amemiya (1978) reduces the *t*-statistics on the two index coefficients by approximately 20%, leaving the two still highly significant (*t*-statistics from 4 to 8).

¹⁸ We cannot be positive of this interpretation because we use a different data set than did Blank (NMCUES) and Winkler (Current Population Survey).

¹⁴ In other words, the constraint for private income is sufficiently linear that the net wage is approximately constant over the 0-to-40 range.

¹⁵ The coefficients are significant despite a fairly high correlation between the Medicaid and private health insurance variables (0.72).

TABLE 2.—BASIC AFDC PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS RESULTS^a
(probit coefficients)

	AFDC Participation		Employment Status	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Net Private Income				
Zero Hours	0.001 (0.001)	0.016 ^a (0.003)	-0.006 ^a (0.001)	-0.022 ^a (0.002)
Full-time	—	-0.014 ^a (0.002)	—	0.015 ^a (0.001)
AFDC Guarantee	0.007 ^a (0.003)	0.008 ^a (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Food Stamp Guarantee	0.017 ^a (0.004)	0.024 ^a (0.005)	-0.009 ^a (0.004)	-0.013 ^a (0.005)
Medicaid Index	0.010 ^a (0.002)	0.007 ^a (0.002)	-0.012 ^a (0.002)	-0.006 ^a (0.002)
Private Insurance Index	-0.026 ^a (0.005)	-0.017 ^a (0.005)	0.027 ^a (0.004)	0.016 ^a (0.005)
Log Likelihood Value	-253.6	-203.8	-286.5	-218.5

Notes: Coefficients on other variables are shown in appendix table A-3. Standard errors are in parentheses.
^a Significant at the 10% level.

TABLE 3.—TESTS OF ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS OF AFDC
AND EMPLOYMENT-STATUS EQUATION
(probit coefficients)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
AFDC Participation				
State Medicaid Insurance Value	0.005 (0.006)	—	—	—
Medicaid Index	—	—	0.007 ^a (0.002)	-0.012 (0.011)
Mothers	—	0.032 ^a (0.015)	—	—
Children	—	0.009 ^a (0.002)	—	—
Medicaid Index Spline ^b	—	—	—	0.025 ^a (0.012)
Private Insurance Index	-0.010 ^a (0.003)	-0.024 ^a (0.005)	—	-0.027 ^a (0.005)
Working	—	—	-0.036 ^a (0.008)	—
Not Working	—	—	0.006 (0.007)	—
Employment Status				
State Medicaid Insurance Value	-0.007 (0.006)	—	—	—
Medicaid Index	—	—	-0.012 ^a (0.003)	0.003 (0.009)
Mothers	—	-0.041 ^a (0.017)	—	—
Children	—	-0.011 ^a (0.002)	—	—
Medicaid Index Spline ^b	—	—	—	-0.017 ^a (0.010)
Private Insurance Index	0.007 ^a (0.002)	0.025 ^a (0.004)	—	0.029 ^a (0.004)
Working	—	—	0.035 ^a (0.007)	—
Not Working	—	—	0.002 (0.006)	—

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations correspond to those in columns (1) and (3) of table 2.
^a Significant at the 10% level.
^b Defined as $\text{Max}(0, M - C)$, where M is the value of the Medicaid index and C is the value of M at the 75th percentile of its distribution.

TABLE 4.—EFFECTS OF INCREASES IN MEDICAL BENEFITS ON AFDC AND EMPLOYMENT

	Change in		Absolute Change in Employment Rate ^b (percentage points)
	AFDC Participation Rate ^a (percentage points)	AFDC Caseload (percent)	
Increase in Medicaid of \$50 per month ^c	2.0	5.9	-5.5
<u>Private insurance for all female workers</u>	-3.5	-10.7	7.6
Increase in private health insurance of \$50 per month ^d			
Current coverage levels	-5.3	-15.6	11.7
Coverage for all female workers	-7.3	-21.5	16.0
Increase in private health insurance up to Medicaid levels ^e			
Current coverage levels	-6.0	-17.6	13.3
Coverage for all female workers	-8.3	-24.4	18.1

Notes: Using equations in second and fourth columns of table 2.

^a Base = 34 percentage points.

^b Base = 56 percentage points.

^c Represents 34.5% increase in Medicaid index.

^d Represents 56.5% increase in private health insurance if covered.

^e Represents 64.2% increase in private health insurance if covered.

indicate that the influence of private insurance is more powerful when it is available to workers than when it is available to non-workers. No doubt this is partially because non-working women have the option of Medicaid whereas working women generally do not.

The final column in the table shows the effects of allowing a spline in the Medicaid index variable. The variable entered tests whether the coefficient on the index is different for the one-quarter of the sample with the highest values of the index (see footnote to the table). Interestingly, the effect of the index on AFDC participation is insignificantly different from zero for the three-quarters of the sample with the lower values of the index (-0.012 , t -statistic = 1.1) but the effect of the index for the highest quarter of the sample is significantly greater (their value is $0.013 = 0.025 - 0.012$, t -statistic = 4.8). Similar results hold for employment status: an insignificant effect appears for the bottom three-quarters but the effect for the top one-quarter is -0.014 ($= -0.017 + 0.003$) and strongly significant (t -statistic = 5.9). Thus the AFDC participation and employment effects of the Medicaid program

appear to be concentrated among those with the highest expected Medicaid expenditures, and are essentially zero for the majority of female heads.¹⁹

To gauge the magnitude of the results we have obtained, table 4 reports the results of simulations of changes in Medicaid and private health insurance. The first row shows the effects of an increase in the value of Medicaid coverage of \$50 per month (1984 dollars). This represents a sizable increase of approximately one-third. As the table indicates, this would raise the percentage of female heads on AFDC by 2.0 percentage points—implying an increase in the AFDC caseload of 5.9%—and would reduce employment rates among female heads by 5.5 percentage points. Thus the caseload and work disincentive effects would not be trivial.

The second row shows the effects on caseloads and work incentives that would result if all fe-

¹⁹ To ensure that the high-expenditure effect is not the result of having a disabled child—a variable included in the construction of the indexes but not directly in the AFDC participation and employment status probits—that variable was directly included. The coefficients on the spline variables actually increased to 0.030 and -0.024 as a result.

Not a trivial amount
37% of females working are not covered
but not as big as this
largest

male heads were covered by private health insurance if they were to work (37% of such women are currently not covered). The results show a 3.5 percentage point reduction in the AFDC participation fraction (10.7% reduction in the AFDC caseload) and a 7.6% point increase in the employment rate. The next two rows of the table show the effects of increasing the value of private health insurance (if covered) by \$50 per month, the same size as the Medicaid increase in the first row of the table. Under current coverage levels (73% of workers in the sample are currently covered), this change would have effects in the opposite direction to those of Medicaid that are more than double in size—the AFDC participation rate would fall by 5.3 percentage points (a 15.6% reduction in the caseload) and the employment rate of female heads would rise by 11.7 percentage points. These effects are large and show that private health insurance is likely to have stronger effects on caseloads and work incentives than does Medicaid. But if coverage were 100% among workers, the AFDC participation rate would fall by 7.3 percentage points and the employment rate would rise by 16.0 percentage points. The AFDC caseload would thus fall by approximately one-fifth. These are much larger and more important effects.

The final row shows the effect of increasing private coverage to equal that provided by Medicaid. This would generate the largest effects of all—up to a one-quarter decrease in the AFDC caseload if all female workers were covered, and an increase in their employment rate of 18 percentage points.

V. Summary

Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation in 1984 and 1986, we have estimated the effects of Medicaid and private health insurance availability on the probabilities of AFDC participation and employment for U.S. female heads. A contribution of the study has been the development of family-specific valuations of Medicaid and private health insurance. Our findings are that (1) increases in expected Medicaid benefits strongly increase the likelihood of AFDC participation and strongly decrease the likelihood that the head will work; (2) that, how-

ever, only a minority of families, those with high expected medical expenditures, alter their AFDC participation or employment decisions in response to Medicaid levels and availability; and (3) that private health insurance, especially for workers, exerts a strong negative effect on AFDC probabilities and a strong positive effect on employment probabilities, both effects larger in absolute magnitude than Medicaid effects. Our simulations indicate that (1) extension of private health coverage to all working female heads would lower the AFDC caseload by 10% and would raise employment probabilities among female heads by almost 8 percentage points, and (2) that a subsequent increase in benefits of private plans up to Medicaid levels would result in an AFDC caseload one-quarter lower and employment probabilities 18 percentage points higher than initial levels.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A-1.—CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 1986 SAMPLE OF FEMALE HEADS

	All	AFDC Status ^a		Employment Status ^a	
		On	Off	Working	Not Working
Fraction with working head	0.55	0.09	0.79	1.00	0.0
Fraction on AFDC	0.36	1.00	0.0	0.06	0.67
Fraction covered by Medicaid	0.41	1.00	0.12	0.10	0.85
Fraction covered by private health insurance	0.45	0.10	0.62	0.77	0.14
Age of head	33.77	30.28	34.34	33.48	31.81
Education of head	10.84	12.00	12.19	12.45	11.67
Race (1 = nonwhite)	0.41	0.53	0.32	0.31	0.41
Health of head (1 = poor or fair)	0.45	0.51	0.42	0.47	0.55
No. children 0-5	0.51	0.81	0.39	0.21	0.71
No. children 6-12	0.81	0.80	0.72	0.71	0.89
Family size	3.97	4.10	3.30	3.26	3.19
Regional location					
South	0.35	0.25	0.40	0.39	0.21
Midwest	0.25	0.30	0.20	0.23	0.32
West	0.15	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.15
Medicaid Heterogeneity Index (Family Value)	33.1	38.9	31.7	30.5	37.1
State Medicaid Insurance Value	37.1	43.9	34.7	35.9	41.5
Private Insurance Heterogeneity Index (Family Value)	9.1	4.7	12.1	13.0	6.2
AFDC Guarantee	79.1	90.8	73.7	74.9	85.4
Food Stamp Guarantee	34.1	45.1	29.2	30.8	39.1
Net Private Income, $H = 0$	37.1	24.9	43.2	31.3	44.8
Net Private Income, $H = 20$	130.2	87.9	152.9	149.8	108.7
Net Private Income, $H = 40$	215.1	144.7	253.1	253.2	166.7

Notes: Sample size = 545. All income and index variables are weekly.

^a As of month prior to interview.

TABLE A-2.—ESTIMATES OF THE WAGE EQUATION

Education	0.057 ^b (0.009)
Age	0.114 ^b (0.024)
Age Squared/100	-0.164 ^b (0.032)
Experience ^a	0.057 ^b (0.011)
Experience Squared/100	-0.088 ^b (0.038)
Constant	-1.629 (0.359)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable: log of hourly wage rate. Estimated jointly with a probability-of-working equation using maximum likelihood.

^a Actual years of labor force experience.^b Significant at the 10% level.TABLE A-3.—COEFFICIENTS ON NON-INCOME VARIABLES^a
(probit)

	AFDC Participation	Employment Status
Age	-0.112 ^b (0.066)	0.200 ^b (0.061)

TABLE A-3.—(continued)

Age squared/100	0.132 (0.092)	-0.259 ^b (0.079)
Race (1 = nonwhite)	0.447 ^b (0.146)	-0.301 ^b (0.138)
Health (1 = poor or fair)	0.278 ^b (0.146)	-0.335 ^b (0.135)
Education	-0.079 ^b (0.031)	0.079 ^b (0.025)
Family size	-0.267 ^b (0.102)	0.183 ^b (0.089)
No. children 0-5	0.409 ^b (0.125)	-0.437 ^b (0.127)
No. children 6-12	0.090 (0.096)	-0.080 (0.089)
South	0.011 (0.258)	0.129 (0.237)
Midwest	0.449 (0.216)	-0.267 (0.197)
West	0.086 (0.229)	-0.014 (0.219)
Constant	1.437 (1.089)	-3.413 (1.092)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

^a For the first and third columns of table 2.^b Significant at the 10% level.

Minimum Wages – Again!

Conference on Economic Analysis of Base Salaries and Effects of Minimum Wages, Aix en
Provence, Sept 30 - Oct 1, 1993

Richard B. Freeman
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August 31, 1993

Despite the harsh judgment that standard economics gives to minimum wages -- your basic textbook message is that a wage above market-clearing lowers employment (save in the rare situation of monopsony) -- minima are a policy perennial, with the thousand lives of the proverbial cat. Convention 26 of the International Labor Organisation commits states to create machinery to fix minimum wages, and most countries have some form of minimum (ILO, 1992; Starr, 1981). Most countries also mandate payroll taxes for pensions, health insurance, or unemployment insurance, and guarantee holiday and vacation time that further raise the base-level cost of hiring.

The role of the minimum in wage-setting differs among countries and over time. In the United States, the Reagan administration maintained a fixed nominal minimum, which effectively lowered the wage floor in real terms. During the Bush Presidency Congress enacted increases in the minimum that took effect in 1990 and 1991. At this writing the Clinton administration is considering further increases to help "make work pay more than welfare". By contrast, in 1993 the United Kingdom abolished the wages councils that set industry minima; and many OECD-European countries want to reduce mandated labor costs to fight unemployment. In the developing world, two of the fast-growing East Asian "tigers", Taiwan and Korea, introduced non-negligible minimum wages at the turn of the decade, while in less succesful countries minimum wages proved to be "sawdust" in the face of economic crisis (Freeman, 1992). In East Europe, Hungary has a relatively high minimum, while Poland has a negligible minimum.

Why, despite bad textbook press, does the minimum wage -- by which I mean mandated benefits as well as a legal minimum hourly pay -- continually surface as a tool for redistributing income? How strong are minimum wage floors in different countries? To

what extent do minimum wages have the adverse employment consequences standard analysis predicts? Under what conditions is a minimum a good redistributive tool?

why the minimum?

No method of redistributing income is ideal. All redistributions have some unintended adverse effects on incentives and behavior and can produce wasteful rent-seeking. The question is not whether the minimum distorts market outcomes but how its distortionary effects compare with those of other modes of redistribution, or with the benefits of redistribution.

There are, in my opinion, four attributes of minimum wages which make them a more attractive redistributive tool than textbooks indicate.

Advantages
✱ The first is that the minimum redistributes income with no immediate budgetary consequence. Pass a minimum wage law and neither taxes nor public sector borrowing requirements rise. The direct consequences of the regulation are on market participants, not on the government budget. Contrast this with negative income taxes for low-wage workers, such as the American earned income tax credit, or subsidies to firms that hire low wage workers, both of which come out of the government budget.

The issue is more than one of government book-keeping. Taxes and deficit financing have distortionary effects on behavior. The resultant "excess burden" makes a dollar of transfer costs more than a dollar. In addition, higher taxes or deficits may adversely affect the macro-economy. These factors make redistributions like the minimum that sidestep budgets more attractive than they might otherwise appear to be.

✱ A second attribute of the minimum is that it increases the incentive to work. Measured labor participation may fall due to the adverse employment effect of the minimum,

but if jobs are available at the minimum wage, people will take them. By contrast, many ways of transferring income to the poor -- family income supplements, child allowances; subsidies for consumer items such as food, fuel, housing; much less welfare payments to the jobless -- reduce the incentive to work. From this perspective, minimum wages have more affinity with liberal market ideals than schemes that "de-commodify" labor by providing a base living standard irrespective of market work.

* Third, the minimum is administratively simple. In countries with national minima it is a single number, which makes it relatively easy to determine compliance. Minimum wages also have a self-enforcing character: workers paid less than the minimum can report violations, minimizing the need for a sizeable enforcement agency. The minimum is also easily targetted: it affects directly only low wage workers, though not necessarily workers from low income families (of which more later).

* Fourth, minimum wages and mandated benefits guarantee a base compensation that takes wages and benefits "out of competition" at the bottom of the wage distribution. If the minimum/mandated benefits reflect what society will, in fact, provide the low-paid, this makes low wage firms and ultimately the consumers of their products bear the full cost of that labor, rather than having the body politic pay part of the cost through taxes and subsidies. In this sense, the minimum wage establishes the "right" social cost of labor in the market. It does not subsidise low wage jobs, as do other forms of redistribution.

By stressing these attributes of minimum wages -- absence of a government budget effect; a positive work incentive; administrative simplicity; and charging low wage employers the full social cost of labor -- I do not mean to imply that minimum wages are desirable, or are more desirable than negative income taxes, employer subsidies, or other redistributive

tools. At some level minimum wages will greatly lower employment. By restricting the range of private arrangements in the labor market, they may also have other adverse effects. But if minimum wages are not ideal, neither are other modes of redistribution. Given a redistributive goal, the issue is how the distortions due to the minimum compare to those due to taxes and subsidies -- an issue that depends on the level of minimum, its effects on employment, and other factors that I will lay out shortly.

How High Are Minimum Wages?

*Nominal
✓
Virtual*

The minimum in the standard textbook diagram is just an hourly rate of pay, but in a world where governments mandate diverse labor expenditures and payroll taxes, hourly pay is not the right measure of the lower bound cost of labor. The correct measure is considerably higher. The U.S. has payroll taxes -- mandatory fringes -- that raise the cost of labor some 12% above the wage, and several legal holidays, that bring it another 1-2% higher.¹ An employer who pays the going minimum wage of \$4.25 will also be paying about \$.51 in payroll taxes and holiday-time. In Europe mandated supplementary costs are greater and firms must provide guaranteed vacation time. Even in Britain the wage councils that set minimum under the traditional wage-fixing machinery required that employers provide the 4 week vacation that is part of normal working life.

Exhibit 1 records estimates of minimum wages and supplementary benefits in several OECD countries. It distinguishes between countries that have national statutory minima comparable to the U.S. and countries where collective bargaining determines effective

¹ These statistics are from U.S. Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract 1991 table 684, page 419. I divide the 72% of employer cost for employee compensation into the 9.0% of legally required costs. Note these figures are for all workers, not for the low paid only. The holiday percent is a guesstimate based on the 2.3% of labor cost in the table.

minima (because the Ministry of Labor extends terms to all workers).

The figures on the level, relative level, and percentage of workers affected by the minimum in columns 1-3 are crude. The reported relative minimum for the U.S. appears to me erroneously low: the U.S. minimum bottoms out at 30-33% of hourly earnings not 24%.² Even at this level, however, the data reveal a huge difference in the magnitude of the minimum between the U.S. (and Australia) and European countries. In part this reflects the smaller reliance the U.S. has traditionally placed on national policy in wage-setting than European countries. But in part also it reflects the policies of the Reagan Administration to do away with the minimum in the 1980s through benign neglect.

The figures in column 4 on the add-on cost of supplementary benefits refer to the costs for all production workers in manufacturing and, save for the U.S., do not distinguish between legally mandated and bargained supplements. But the European supplementary costs are essentially mandated, and thus are a magnitude greater than the legally required figures for the United States. The minimum wages in column 1 have to be nearly doubled in some cases to get the true minimum cost of labor.

Exhibit 2 shows the ratio of the U.S. federal minimum wage to hourly earnings in manufacturing. From 1950 to 1980 the ratio sawtoothed at 45-50% of average hourly earnings, jumping with each mandated increase, then drifting downward. From 1980 to

*ratio to
average
wage*

² Published U.S. data normally record the ratio of the minimum to average hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing: in 1989, prior to the 1990 increase, the ratio is 32%. Average hourly earnings for production workers in manufacturing in 1989 were \$10.49. National Income and Product Accounts data give an average wages and salaries for full-time workers in all sectors based on a 40 hour work week were \$11.90, for a ratio of 28%. Median weekly earnings of adult full time workers were about \$427. which is \$10.68 for a 40 hour work week, giving a ratio of 31%.

1989 the relative minimum fell, bottoming at 32% of average earnings in 1989. The relative value of the minimum jumped with the 1990 and 1991 legislated increases but was still just 38% of average manufacturing earnings in 1990 -- far below the 45-50% that existed in the 1950s and 1960s.

The ratio of the minimum to average wage is a reasonable measure of the potential effect of the minimum on the job market, but it is not ideal. In addition to the relative level of the minimum, three other factors help determine the "bite" of the minimum: the extent of legal coverage; enforcement; and potential offsets to the minimum through reducing other labor costs.

Legal coverage can vary substantially. The Dutch minimum does not apply to workers with limited part-time hours. The Belgium minimum applies only to workers with 6 or more months of tenure at the establishment. Coverage in the United States historically exempted small firms in sectors like retail and wholesale trade. Equally important, enforcement of the minimum and/or payroll taxes may be lax in parts of the economy. Spain, for instance, has high payroll taxes for health insurance, but also has an informal sector where firms avoid mandated labor costs. Italy has a large informal sector.

Firms can also adjust other aspects of the employment contract to offset minimum wages. For instance, firms facing a minimum may reduce the training they offer workers. U.S. restaurants, among other employers, have evaded the minimum by requiring workers to clean up on unpaid time after work, or to arrive to set up before official working hours.

A better measure of the potential impact of minimum wages is the shape of the wage distribution. A minimum that "bites" will produce spikes in the distribution at the mandated wage, with fewer workers reporting wages below the minimum than would otherwise be the

case. In Puerto Rico, which pays the U.S. minimum in an economy about two-thirds as productive, hourly earnings distributions show just such a pattern (Exhibit 3). In 1979, when approximately half of the island's workforce was covered by the U.S. minimum of \$2.90 and 25% were covered by industry minima between \$2.50 and \$2.60 there are spikes in hourly earnings around \$2.90 and \$2.50 - \$2.60. In 1983 and 1988 when the U.S. \$3.35 minimum covered the island, there is a huge spike at \$3.35. In the U.S. proper, the distribution even for teenagers does not have such marked spikes.

Employment Effects of the Minimum

The general conclusion of the studies of the American minimum wage covering the pre-1980 minimum wages was that the minimum had a modest adverse effect on employment. The estimated elasticity of employment to changes in the minimum was around 0.10 to 0.20 for the teenagers most affected by the policy (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen).

✓ Since the total earnings going to low-paid workers rises as wages increase when demand is inelastic, the implication was that the minimum is an effective redistributive tool. A 10% increase in the minimum that reduces employment by just 1-2% increases the share of income received by minimum wage workers by 8-9%.

How is the income redistribution divided among the low-paid? There are two polar possibilities. In a worst case scenario, the minimum could create a dual market for low wage workers: some benefit from the minimum, but others are permanently jobless. In a best case scenario, all low wage workers would share equally in the higher wage and reduction in employment. While no study explicitly addresses this issue, the high turnover of young American workers makes it likely that the "equal sharing" scenario is closer to reality. The number of workers who benefit from the minimum over the year presumably

*10% increase 1-2% unemp.
8-9% pay inc.*

far exceeds the number whose pay is higher at any point in time. With full job-sharing, the welfare implications of a minimum are clear: a 10% higher minimum raises the earnings of a representative minimum wage worker by 8-9% and increases leisure (joblessness) by 1-2% -- a redistribution clearly in that workers' interest.

The 1980s decline in the value of the minimum provided a "test" of the effect of the minimum on employment, and of the belief that (evidence notwithstanding) the minimum was a major cause of joblessness among the young. In spite of the drop in the minimum to unprecedented low levels relative to average earnings, joblessness among the less skilled rose. Standard time series estimates of the employment effects of the minimum that include 1980s data show even smaller elasticities of teenage employment to the minimum than those in the Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen review (Wellington; Card, 1992b, footnote 12).

In the early 1990s a set of new studies examined the 1990/91 increased federal minimum or late 1980s increases in some state minimum wages. While there are some conflictual results, the new studies generally tell a similar story about the employment effects of minimum wages, particularly of the increases at the turn of the decade (see Exhibit 4). Three studies surveyed establishments in low wage sectors where minimum wage effects are likely to be greatest and compared changes in employment in a short period surrounding the increased minimum -- for instance, four months before and four months after -- between establishments most and least likely to be affected by the change in law. Two studies report insignificant employment effects (Card and Kreuger; Spriggs). One finds substantial positive effects that suggest monopsony in local labor markets (Katz and Kreuger). While short periods may miss adverse long run employment effects, and while monopsony explanations of positive employment effects raise as many questions as they answer, the message is clear:

at the level of the minimum wage in the late 1980s, moderate legislated increases did not reduce employment and were, if anything, associated with higher employment in some locales. ✓

Studies based on employment across economic units such as states or counties yield more disparate results. Most studies, however, reject the notion that the late 1980s-early 1990s increases had adverse employment effects, and the studies that find adverse effects prior to those increases obtain small elasticities that confirm the effectiveness of the minimum in redistributing wage income. Using Current Population Survey household data Card found that the 1988 increased minimum wage in California did not reduce teenage employment or retail trade employment in that state relative to employment in states that did not raise their minimum: if anything, the relation for teenagers is in the opposite direction. Payroll data for retail trade establishments in California, by contrast, show lower employment in low wage counties/parts of the retail trade industry in response to the increased minimum (Taylor and Kim), but the reported high elasticity of employment may reflect measurement problems (wages are obtained by dividing payroll by employment). In an analysis of the 1990 changed federal minimum, Card found no difference in the change in the employment of teenagers between states with a high and low fraction of teenagers affected by the minimum. By contrast, cross-state studies by Neumark and Wascher find that a coverage-adjusted relative minimum reduced employment of 16-24 year olds from 1973 to 1989, with an elasticity on the same order of magnitude as the pre-1980s studies. But Card, Krueger, and Katz point out two problems in this work. The key variable, a coverage-weighted minimum ratio of the minimum wage to adult wages, is inversely correlated with teenage wages, because high wage states have a low relative minimum but high teenage

wages. This raises the possibility that the relative minimum wage variable may in fact reflect the effect of unmeasured factors on average wages and employment rather than the effect of the minimum per se on employment. Increased labor demand that raises wages and employment can show up in regressions of this type as an adverse effect of the relative minimum on employment.³ There are also problems with the treatment of people in school and not working. Using a similar cross-state design, Williams reports modest adverse effects on teenage employment across states in 1973-89, with regional variation that implies different effects in different regions. Finally, Castillo-Freeman and Freeman find that applying the U.S. minimum to Puerto in the 1980s lowered employment, with a modest estimated elasticity, and altered the distribution of jobs among sectors.

How is one to assess the new work? My reading is that this work confirms the basic conclusion that at U.S. levels, increases in the minimum is a potentially powerful redistributive tool. If your prior was that moderate increases in the U.S. minimum risk large job losses, the new evidence should move you to a major rethink. Even in Puerto Rico, where the minimum altered the entire wage distribution, the estimated elasticity of employment to the minimum was modest. If your prior was that U.S. level minimums have only marginal negative effects on employment, the new evidence should move you to wonder about monopsony, disequilibrium situations in the market, and the like, that seemingly produced positive employment effects in some studies. That moderate increases in the minimum transferred income to the lower paid without any apparent adverse effect on employment in the U.S. at the turn of the 1990s is no mean achievement for a policy tool in

³ This danger that led me to eschew such state level regressions as a way to estimate minimum wage effects (Freeman, 1982).

an era when the real earnings of the less skilled fell sharply.

Distribution Effects of the Minimum

But transferring income to the low paid is not the same as transferring income to the poor, defined as those with low family income. The Minimum Wage Study Commission and American Enterprise Institute research on the pre-1980s minima found teenagers and women, many of whom were members of families with incomes above the poverty level, were major beneficiaries of the minimum. To the extent that secondary earners from middle income families benefit from minimum wages, the attractiveness of the minimum as a redistributive tool is lessened: a minimum wage that increases the pay of a teenager in a fast food store cannot be justified on redistribution grounds if the teenagers' family has higher income than the consumers of the food, who may ultimately bear some of the cost of the higher wage.

Since persons from higher income families pay a higher marginal tax on their earnings than those with low incomes, however, determining the redistributive effects of the minimum on a family income basis requires more than simply calculating the family incomes of those whose wages rise due to the minimum. Ignoring other taxes, a \$1.00 increase in the minimum will increase the take-home pay of a secondary worker from a family in the 35% tax bracket by \$.65 whereas it will increase the take-home pay of a breadwinner who pays zero taxes by \$1.00. The way the minimum interacts with the tax system, including the earned income tax credit, payroll taxes, and other redistributive tools must be assessed carefully to determine its redistributive impact.

The 1980s rise in inequality and the fall in the real earnings of low-paid men suggests that the distribution of beneficiaries by breadwinner status and family income may differ from what it was in earlier decades. In general, the distributional (and employment) effects

of the minimum will depend on its level relative to average wages and the shape of the distribution of wages. A higher minimum relative to average wages will raise the pay of more chief breadwinners and thus of more low income families. A given minimum relative to average wages will also benefit the poor more when the wage distribution of adult breadwinners is wider than when it is compressed. To assess how well a minimum redistributes income to poor families one must estimate the incidence of increased wages and potential job loss at different levels of the minimum for specified distributions of wages, yielding a schedule linking levels of the minimum to the incidence of the minimum on family incomes.

political support of minimum wages

Minimum wages are a political good, instituted by the body politic, not by economists. To understand the role of minima in an economy, it is important to go beyond economic analysis to consider the basis for public support, and opposition to, minimum wages. Who favors and who opposes minimum wages? Why?

Some groups favor minimum wages not so much because they redistribute income but because a minimum make low-paid labor less attractive to employers. In the United States, unions representing garment and textile workers, whose wages far exceed the minimum, lobby for higher minimum wages in part to make nonunion workers in the South or Puerto Rico less attractive substitutes for union members. By the same logic, construction unions favor mandated benefits for nonunion workers to reduce the cost-disadvantage of unionisation and to lower contractor opposition to unions. In the Congress, representatives from high wage states vote for minimum wages to reduce competition from low wage states. High-wage firms, which have competitive reasons for favoring minimum wages (it raises entry

costs to low wage competitors) rarely endorse increases in the minimum but their opposition pales compared to that of small firms and those in fast food and other low wage sectors.

Survey data show, however, that support for the minimum goes beyond interest group calculations.⁴ In the late 1980s when the U.S. federal minimum had virtually disappeared as a wage floor, the vast majority of Americans favored sizeable increases in the minimum (panel A of Exhibit 5). This, even though relatively few saw any benefits to themselves or family members and despite potential higher costs of consumer goods (panel B). Support for the minimum runs counter, moreover, to a general predisposition against government wage-setting. For instance, in the FG/SEIU poll cited in exhibit 5, 49% agreed a lot that "wages should be set by the market and not by the government", 20% agreed a little, compared to 11% who disagreed a lot and 11% who disagreed a little (see Exhibit 6 for corroboratory evidence).

The proportion of people favoring increases in the minimum wage exceeds the proportion who favor increased welfare spending (which like the minimum did not keep pace with inflation in the 1980s). A 1992 CBS/New York Times poll found that 44% believed the U.S. was spending too much on welfare compared to 23% who believed the U.S. was spending too little -- a result that mirrors the pattern of responses from the National Opinion Research Center annual attitudes survey.⁵ Minimum wages seem to be a more popular way

⁴ The particular way questions are posed, and even their order in a survey can affect responses. In the case of the minimum, many different polling organisations have asked the public about attitudes, using different forms of questions in surveys including diverse other questions. The responses are sufficiently similar to support my generalisation in the text.

⁵ Responses to welfare questions, in contrast to those about the minimum, often depend critically on the precise wording of the question. Most people want to assist the poor but do not like welfare. No survey poses increased welfare spending and increased minimum wages as

costly in terms of job loss, inflation, and the like,⁹ support for the minimum drops as the proposed level rises (panel D of exhibit 5).

A 1990 International Social Science Programme survey provides evidence from several countries including the United States about attitudes toward government policies to redistribute income and control wages by law, which presumably involves setting minima, among other things (see Exhibit 6). Americans are least likely to agree that government has a responsibility to reduce differences in income and are second to the British in opposition to control of wages by law. These data make the responses on the minimum wage in Exhibit 5 more striking.

the Minimum Wage as Policy Tool

The argument that the textbook depiction of minimum wages shortchanges its virtue as a redistributive tool does not mean that increasing the minimum in countries like the United States where the wage distribution has widened massively is a desirable way to reduce inequality. Under some conditions, the minimum may offer a better way to improve the economic well-being of low-income people than other policies. Under other conditions, the minimum will be less effective and more costly than other policies. What are those conditions?

To answer this question, consider a government that wants to raise the income of low income citizens by a given amount and seeks to minimise the inefficiency of that transfer. Assume that the government has two options: a minimum wage; or an increase in taxes on higher-paid workers that is given, lump sum, to the low-paid. The inefficiency of the

⁹ Unfortunately, no survey has probed how support varies with different losses of employment, or other costs.

to redistribute income than welfare payments. Why? A plausible explanation is that most people prefer income redistributions that reward those who work (the "deserving" poor) to redistributions for those who do not work (the "undeserving"). The minimum may also appeal to fairness considerations: a belief that it is only fair that full-time workers make a socially reasonable living. Consistent with this, most Americans agree that "employers should pay a full time worker enough for the worker and his or her family to survive without public subsidies": 62% agree a lot; 19% agree a little compared to 6% who disagree a lot and 10% who disagree a little.⁶ And 75% favor "a minimum wage high enough so that a family of four could live above the poverty line if the father worked and the mother stayed home".⁷

Support for minimum wages in the United States is, however, tempered. A majority of the population believe there is some job loss associated with the minimum. And the proportion favoring the minimum drops when the survey tells them that some will lose their jobs (panel C of exhibit 5). In 1987 sixty percent of the population favored a training wage proposal that would have maintained the \$3.35 minimum for new workers for six month.⁸ Presumably because the populace believes that higher minimum wages are likely to be more

alternatives. Cook and Barrett argue that support for the American welfare state is much greater than indicated by crude questions about welfare spending in general. Still, there is nothing like the support for a higher minimum in any survey of opinions toward welfare spending.

⁶ This is from the FH/SEIU survey cited in exhibit 5.

⁷ A Kane, Parsons, and Associates survey for Parent Magazine, 1989

⁸ The APMGEN survey cited in exhibit 5.

minimum is the lost employment of low-paid workers due to labor demand responses. The inefficiency of the tax transfer is the excess burden of the taxes due to supply responses by taxpayers and the reduction in labor supply by low-wage workers. The choice between the two policies depends on which of these costs is less for the given transfer. In a simple stylised model this depends on:¹⁰

- the level of taxes/budget deficits
- the elasticity of supply of high wage workers
- the income effect on the labor supply of low wage workers
- the job loss due to the minimum wage
- the turnover of low wage workers
- the family income of low wage workers

A strategy based on taxes would be more efficacious if existing taxes were low, high wage workers had a low supply elasticity, low wage workers had a small income effect, the demand for labor were highly elastic, labor turnover was small, and many low wage workers were members of high income households. A minimum wage strategy would be more efficacious under the opposite circumstances. The exhibit 4 evidence that in the 1980s displacement effects were non-existent or at worst modest makes the minimum more attractive for the U.S. than in the past. Evidence that labor supply effects are sizeable would operate in the same direction. The issue is, in part, whether the supply-behavior distortions due to taxes and subsidies are greater than the demand-side distortions due to the minimum -- i.e. whether the relevant elasticities of supply are greater than the relevant elasticities of demand. Finally, it is also necessary to add to the tax/subsidy distortions the fact that by subsidising low wage jobs and employers, they will lead to a greater number of such jobs.

¹⁰ The first three factors determine the excess burden of taxes. The fourth factor determines the welfare loss due to a minimum wage floor that reduces employment. The last two factors measure the degree to which the alternative policies target persons from low income families.

But I would not limit analysis to comparing tax burdens and job losses in this simple stylised model. Different countries have different wage-setting systems, different ways of addressing joblessness, and different institutions for training workers. The United States has a highly decentralised mode of setting pay, both in the unionised sector and in the dominant nonunion sector; relatively short durations of unemployment; and firms that provide only limited job training. To the extent that some centralisation of wage-setting is desirable in an economy, a minimum has greater appeal for the U.S. than in countries where other institutions coordinate wage determination. The high turnover of U.S. labor makes a minimum wage more attractive than in settings where the employed and unemployed are sharply differentiated. But the absence of good training opportunities for the unemployed in the United States operates in the opposite direction.

A fitting way to end this paper would be to use well-established estimates of the parameters of the stylised model sketched above in different institutional settings to determine which countries might benefit from more reliance on minimum wages and which might benefit from less. But if economists could do that we would make even the physicists and biologists green with envy. I conclude by simply noting that the logic of the case suggests that those who believe that tax burdens are excessive and incentives critical in inducing work effort -- supply siders! -- ought to find minimum wages a more attractive redistributive policy than most others.

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Exhibit 1: Estimates of Minimum Wages and Labour Costs
in Selected OECD Countries

Country	1990 Level in natl curr	Value/Average	% At Min	Supplementary Costs/ Pay for time worked
Those With National Statutory Minimum				
Belgium	36.9/hr	66	8	.89
France	31.9/hr	61	11	.82
Greece	2452/day ^a	70	--	.61
Luxembourg	32,600/month	62 ^a	--	.43
Netherlands	2041/month	72	5	.75
Portugal	30,000/month	73	8	--
Spain	1775/day	60	2-6%	--
US	4.25/hr	24; 33 ^c	3%-5%	.37
			(legal rqd .12)	
Australia	187/week ^b	35 ^b	--	.33
Those With Collectively Bargained/Wages Councils Minimum				
Denmark	59/hr	69 ^a	--	.18
Germany	2489/month	69 ^a	--	.79
Eire	281/month	41 ^a	--	.35
UK	338/month	52 ^a	11%	.37

SOURCES:

Column 1, from Institute of Personnel Management, 1991, pages 93-95 unless otherwise noted.

Column 2, from Institute of Personnel Management, 1991, table 2.1, page 96. The minimum as a percentage of the average differs modestly among the source studies. Minford reports for Belgium, 65%, Netherlands, 71%, Portugal, 70%; Spain 43%, Germany. Bazen and Benhayoun 1992 report 74% for Portugal.

Column 3, from Institute of Personnel Management, 1991, pages 93-95 unless otherwise noted. Again, different sources give different figures in some cases. Bazen and Benhayoun report 15% for Spain.


Column 4, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1992, table 9. I divided 100 - the percent for pay for time worked as a percent of hourly compensation by pay for time worked as a percent of hourly compensation.

NOTES: a -- Reported by Minford 1989

b -- Institute of Personnel Management, 1991, table 2-5, page 103.

c -- My estimate


Exhibit 2: Minimum Wage as a Percent of
Average Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing, U.S. 1950-1992




SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1992, for minimum wage figures.

Exhibit 3: The Distribution of Wages in Puerto Rico


A. 1979



B. 1983



C. 1988



SOURCE: a. 1980 Puerto Rican Census, b. 1983 Puerto Rican CPS, c. June 1988 Puerto Rican CPS.

NOTE: The Census data are based on annual earnings. We deleted observations when weeks worked was less than twenty, when hours worked last week was less than ten or equal to ninety-nine, and when the wage was less than \$0.50 per hour.

Exhibit 4: Estimated Elasticities of Employment to Minimum Wage
in Studies of the United States Minimum in the 1990s

Establishment Based Studies

Study	Estimated elasticity/Finding ^a
Card and Krueger 1993: 321 Fast Food Restaurants in New Jersey where state minimum wage rose vs 78 restaurants in Pennsylvania, where minimum did not rise	.29(ns) to .32(ns)
Katz and Kreuger 1992: 100 Fast food restaurants in Texas after rise in U.S. minimum	1.85 to 2.64
Spriggs 1993: 241 restaurants in Jackson Ms and Greensboro NC after rise in U.S. minimum	-.42(ns) to .41(ns)

Cross State Studies

Card 1992a: Teenagers and retail trade in California, where the minimum increased from \$3.35 to \$4.25 in July 1988 compared to other states;	no employment effect some + for teens
Taylor and Kim 1993: Retail trade employment in California across sectors and counties	-0.73 to -0.85
Card, 1992b: Employment of Teenagers 1989-1990 by fraction affected by increased minimum wage across states	-0.06(ns) to 0.12(ns)
Williams 1993: Cross-State teenagers, 1977-1989 minimum wage measured relative to hourly earnings	-0.18
Neumark and Wascher 1992: 1973-89, cross states: teenagers or young adults	-0.19 to -0.03 (ns) -0.11 to -0.16
Neumark and Wascher 1993, young adults across states	-0.14 to -0.22
Card, Katz and Kreuger 1993 Re-analysis of Neumark and Wascher dropping fraction teens in school and not working using state minimum instead of coverage-adjusted relative min	0.07(ns) 0.04(ns) to 0.16
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman 1992: application of U.S. minimum to Puerto Rico, 1941-87	-0.15 to -0.11

a, + = higher employment; ns, not significant, t<2)

SOURCE of Specific Elasticity Estimates:

Card and Kreuger, tables 4 and 6; Katz and Kreuger, table 5; Spriggs, table B1 Taylor and Kim, table 2.1 and 3.1; I report their OLS estimates. Instrumental variable estimates are larger, -.95 to -.74; Card, table 3; Williams, table 2; He also reports -.33 with region dummies excluded and a range of estimates from .09 to -.62 for different regions. Using a minimum deflated by state implicit price index he gets modestly higher elasticities; Neumark and Wascher, table 5; Card, Katz and Kreuger, table 1; Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, table 6.3; a larger estimate of -.91 is reported for changes in employment across industries (table 6.4).

Exhibit 5: Public Opinion Toward Increasing the Minimum Wage in the United States

A) BASIC OPINION

Poll and Issue		Favor	Outcome	
			Oppose	not Sure
1987 Gallup	Raising the minimum from \$3.35 to \$4.65	77%	20%	3%
1987 FH/SEIU	Raising the minimum	83%	14%	3%
1988 Gallup	Raising minimum to \$5.05 in 4 years	76%	20%	4%
1989 ABC/WP	Raising the minimum from \$3.35	84-98%	1-2%	--
1989 APMGEN	Raising the minimum from \$3.35	87%	10%	3%
1992 TIME/CNN/YCH	Raising the minimum to make work more attractive than welfare	75%	23%	2%

B) INCIDENCE OF BENEFITS

Would your salary or anyone in your immediate family's salary go up if the government increases the federal minimum wage from \$3.35 an hour? (ABC/WP)

chief wage earner's salary would go up	8%
someone else in family's salary would go up	12%
salary of no one in family would go up	79%

Would you still favor raising the minimum wage if businesses passed the increased salary costs along to the consumer in the form of higher prices on some goods and services? (ABC/WP)

Yes	82%
No	16%

An adequate minimum wage is good for the economy (FH/SEIU)

Agree a lot	53%
Agree a little	25%
Disagree a little	9%
Disagree a lot	10%

C) OPINION BY POTENTIAL JOB LOSS

Raising the minimum wage might result in some job loss (FH/SEIU)

Agree a lot	24%
Agree a little	30%
Disagree a little	19%
Disagree a lot	22%
Don't know	5%

Would you still favor raising the minimum wage even if it causes some businesses to fire workers or stop hiring new workers rather than pay the increased salary? (ABC/WP)

Yes	52-55%
No	42%

D) HOW HIGH A MINIMUM?

1987 FH/SEIU

Minimum of \$3.35 is too low	84%
Raise it to \$3.85	76%
Raise it to \$4.25	60%

1989 ABC/WP

Keep at \$3.35	15%
(Implicit: Raise minimum above \$3.35)	85%
Raise it to \$4.25	34%
Raise it to \$4.55	48%

1989 APMGEN

Minimum should be increased from \$3.35	87%
Raise it to \$4.25	33%
Or Raise it to \$4.55	65%

NOTE: The reader will note that in some cases I report a range of figures. The lower end of the range are the actual responses to the close-ended question. But some people volunteered other answers. The higher end of the range includes answers that were volunteered by respondents that I judge as comparable to the close-ended responses.

SOURCE: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut
The polls from which these are taken are: Gallup, Gallup Poll; FH/SEIU, Fingerhut-Granados, funded by Service Employees International Union; CBSNYT, CBS News and New York Times; ABC/WP, ABC News and Washington Post; TIME/CNN/YCH, Time Magazine, Cable News Network, and Yankelovich, Clancy, and Shulman; APMGEN, Associated Press and Media General

Exhibit 6: Attitudes Toward Government Policies to Reduce Differences in Income
or Control Wages by Law, 1990

Responsibility of the Government to reduce differences in Income		Responsibility of the Government to control wages by law		
	Definitely or Probably Should	In favour	Neither	Against
USA	45	25	25	50
GB	73	25	16	59
W. Germany	64	31	22	47
Norway	71	46	22	33
Israel	72	55	13	32
Italy	79	73	11	15
Eire	81	--	--	--
E. Germany	84	78	9	13
Hungary	80	30	27	42

 SOURCE: David Blanchflower and Richard B. Freeman 1993, tabulated from
 International Social Science Survey Programme computer files

APPENDIX Table A: Specific Questions From Polls on Minimum

1987 GALLUP POLL

As you know, a bill has been introduced in Congress that would gradually raise the minimum wage from the present \$3.35 per hour to \$4.65 per hour over the next three years. Those in favor point out that the minimum wage has not been increased since 1981 while consumer prices have gone up about 20 percent. Those opposed say that increasing the cost of labor would lead to fewer jobs, higher unemployment, and higher inflation. All things considered, do you favor or opposed increasing the minimum wage to \$4.65 per hour over the next three years?


Favor	77%
Oppose	20%
Don't Know	3%

1989 ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST SURVEY

As you may know, the federal minimum wage, which is the minimum amount federal law says employers must pay their workers, is \$3.35 or about \$7,000 a year for a full time worker. Some people want to raise the minimum wage while others do not. Do you think the federal government should raise the minimum wage or keep it at the same level?

Raise the Minimum Wage	84%
Keep it at the same level	1%
Raise it for adults but not teenagers or young people	14%
Eliminate it	1%

Workforce Policy Trends



Use
Panel D
as Inequality
Index

(Min Wage)

Union Coverage ✓

(Productivity)

Output Growth Rate - GDP or GNP # ^{do} ^{growth} _{rate}

✓ Blue Collar %, ~~Burger flipping~~, ~~literate~~ _{jobs}

✓ Part time workers





✓ Imports % of Consumption

(Average job tenure)

? Index of Inequality - College Premia?


Fig 7

EXHIBIT 1: U.S. Relative Hourly Wage Changes, 1967-89



Blue collar
%






- The shift to a post-industrial economy—the decline in blue-collar workers as a share of the non-agricultural labor force—has been underway for most of this century. It is not a new trend that has emerged in the last ten, or even the last twenty years.
- Fully three-fifths of non-agricultural workers were blue-collar workers in 1900; only a quarter are in this category today. But the decline in the blue-collar job share has been gradual and steady: its pace has not significantly accelerated since the 1920s.
- The popular image of the non-agricultural workforce—of assembly-line workers, white-collar managers, and bosses, of large mass-production firms as the representative places in which Americans work—was never completely true. Even at the beginning of the 1930s blue-collar industrial workers made up only half of America's non-agricultural workforce, and blue-collar industrial workers in manufacturing and construction made up only 28 percent.

~~This is~~
import %





- Merchandise imports as a share of total goods output rose from six percent in 1960 to around fifteen percent in 1975—a period during which blue-collar wages and average productivity grew relatively rapidly.
- Since 1975 merchandise imports have grown no more rapidly than in the previous period—from fifteen to twenty-five percent of total goods output. Yet blue-collar wages, which rose rapidly before 1975, have stagnated since.

Part-timers
% of Workforce
Figure 7





FIGURE 7

Union Membership as Percent of Total Nonfarm Employment

FIGURE 2



Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of National Affairs

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Year	ue Collar Work	Imports	Part-Timers	Union Members	nequality Index
1	1900	58.0%				
2	1930	51% 50.0%			11.0%	42.0% 41%
3	1940	50% 48.0%			27.0%	34.0%
4	1945				35.0%	29.0% 28%
5	1960	43% 42.0%	6.0%	14.5%	32.0%	28.0%
6	1970	38.0%	9.0%	15.5%	27.0%	29.0%
7	1980	32.5%	21.0%	17.5%	22.0%	22.0%
8	1992	26.0%	24.0%	18% 17.2%	15.1%	35.0% 33 keep

Hours of work

The statistics of hours of work presented in tables 11 to 15 are mostly obtained from payroll data supplied by a sample of establishments often furnishing at the same time data on wages and on employment. In a few cases, *household sample surveys* provide the data on hours worked. For certain countries, data on hours of work are taken from *social insurance statistics* when they are not available from either payrolls of establishments or household surveys. The data from these various sources are not fully comparable in view of differences in scope, coverage and methods of data collection. The tables generally show the *average number of hours of work per week per wage earner*, but in a few cases hours per day or per month have been shown in the absence of hours per week. Some of the series refer to all employees or cover certain categories of workers as indicated in footnotes. Unless otherwise stated, the series relate to workers of both sexes, irrespective of age. Data by sex are presented whenever possible.

Where possible, the data presented are statistics of average *hours actually worked*; where such data are lacking, statistics of average *hours paid for* are given. The two types of statistics on hours of work are indicated in the tables by the following codes:

(a) *Hours actually worked*

(b) *Hours paid for*

The definition of *hours actually worked* as stated in the resolution adopted by the Tenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (Geneva, 1962) is given in the publication *Current international recommendations on labour statistics* (Geneva, ILO, 1988). The statistics of *hours actually worked* should include all hours actually worked during normal periods of work, overtime, time spent at the place of work waiting or standing by, as well as the time corresponding to short rest periods at the workplace including tea and coffee breaks. Consequently these statistics should exclude hours paid for but not worked such as paid annual leave, paid public holidays, paid sick leave, meal breaks, and time spent in travel from home to work and vice versa. National definitions of *hours actually worked* generally conform with the definition given by the Tenth Conference.

The Tenth Conference did not adopt a definition of *hours paid for* because of the wide differences among countries with respect to wage payments for holidays and other periods when no work is performed. National statistics of *hours paid for* generally comprise, in addition to hours actually worked, hours paid for but not worked such as paid annual vacation, paid public holidays, paid sick leave and other paid leave.

Average hours actually worked or paid for per week or per month are normally compiled by dividing the total number of man-hours actually worked or paid for during a week or a month by the average number of workers on the payrolls during the same period. Average hours actually worked or paid for per day are generally compiled by dividing the total number of man-hours actually worked or paid for during a week, fortnight or month by the total number of man-days actually worked or paid for during the same period.

In making comparisons of data on hours of work, it should be borne in mind that the data are influenced by the number

of days normally worked per week, regulations and customs regarding Saturday and overtime work, the extent of absenteeism, labour turnover, etc. Differences in national definitions of hours of work, the coverage of the series and the methods of compilation must also be taken into account.

For further information, see ILO: *An integrated system of wages statistics: A manual on methods* (Geneva, 1979). For information on the differences in scope, definitions and methods of calculation, etc., used for the various national series, see ILO: *Statistical Sources and Methods* (Technical guide to series published in the *Bulletin* and *Year Book of Labour Statistics*), Vol. 2 "Employment, Wages and Hours of Work (Establishment Surveys)" (Geneva, 1987); Vol. 3 "Economically Active Population, Employment, Unemployment and Hours of Work (Household Surveys)", second edition (Geneva, 1990); Vol. 4 "Employment, Unemployment, Wages and Hours of Work (Administrative Records and Related Sources)" (Geneva, 1989).

Table 11

Hours of work per week in non-agricultural activities

The data shown in this table cover the following major divisions of economic activity: Mining and quarrying; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas and water; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels; Transport, storage and communication; Financing, insurance, real estate and business services; Community, social and personal services. In some cases, however, these divisions are only represented by certain of the groups composing them. Any differences from the above are indicated in footnotes.

Table 12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Part A of Table 12 generally shows hours of work per worker in manufacturing as a whole; where in a few cases other industries are also included in the series, this is indicated in footnotes.

Part B of Table 12 shows hours of work in manufacturing, by industry (major groups), for most of the countries represented in Part A. As far as possible, the different industries have been arranged according to the 1968 International Standard Classification of All Economic Activities (see Appendix) with the corresponding codes.

Tables 13 to 15

Hours of work per week in mining and quarrying; construction; transport, storage and communication

Tables 13 to 15 show statistics of average hours of work per week in three important major divisions of economic activity as follows: Table 13, Mining and quarrying; Table 14, Construction; and Table 15, Transport, storage and communication.

The statistics of hours of work in mining often exclude coal mining owing to the particular conditions regulating work in that industry in different countries (especially the widespread application of systems of payment by results and of payment for travelling time). The statistics of hours of work in construction refer in many cases to building or to certain categories of building workers.

11

Hours of work per week in non-agricultural activities

Durée du travail par semaine dans les activités non agricoles

Horas de trabajo por semana en las actividades no agrícolas

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Type (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
AFRICA - AFRIQUE - AFRICA										
Egypt (b) ¹										
Total ²	58	...	...	56	...	57	...	...	...	...
Males - Hom. ²	58	...	...	56	...	57	...	...	...	...
Fem. - Muj. ²	56	...	...	54	...	57	...	...	...	...
Kenya (b) ³										
Total ⁴	41	41	41	40	40	40	41	40	39	...
Sudan ⁵ (a) ⁶										
Total	...	...	...	...	...	231.37	222.45	...	226.60	...
AMERICA - AMÉRIQUE - AMERICA										
Canada ⁷ (b) ⁸										
B Total	...	32.4 ⁹	32.5	32.5	32.3	32.0 ¹⁰	32.1	31.8	31.5	31.0
Cuba ¹¹ (a) ¹²										
Total ¹³	42.5	43.9	44.3	44.4	43.5	43.7	44.2	...	...	...
Chile ¹⁴ (a) ¹⁵										
Total	43.1	42.4	43.4	43.0 ¹⁶	44.4	44.4	45.3	44.3	44.9	45.2
Males - Hom.	43.1	42.8	43.1	43.6 ¹⁶	44.4	44.6	45.5	44.9	45.7	45.9
Fem. - Muj.	43.1	42.6	43.9	42.4 ¹⁶	44.5	44.1	44.8	43.6	44.2	44.5
Netherlands Antilles (b) ³										
Total	43.6	44.6	...	43.1	43.9	...	40.9 ¹⁸	...	...	...
Males - Hom.	...	44.6	...	43.0	44.0	...	...	...	...	...
Fem. - Muj.	...	...	...	43.0	43.9	...	...	...	...	...
Paraguay ⁹ (a) ³										
Total	...	148	168	180	162	...	170	167	176	167
Males - Hom.	...	150	174	176	166	...	170	172	179	169
Fem. - Muj.	...	140	147	188	148	...	167	152	168	161
Perú ¹⁹ (a) ²⁰										
Total ²¹	46.3	49.6	47.8	46.5	47.9 ²²	47.8 ²²	49.5	48.5	...	...
Puerto Rico (a) ²³										
B Total ²⁴	36.2	36.3	36.1	35.9	36.4	35.1	35.9	36.5	35.5	35.8

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Establishments with 10 or more persons employed.
² Oct. of each year. ³ Employees. ⁴ June of each year.
⁵ Per month. ⁶ Excl. overtime. ⁷ Incl. forestry and logging. ⁸ Employees paid by the hour. ⁹ Ten months' average. ¹⁰ Sample design revised. ¹¹ Incl. fishing and excl. major divisions 6, 8 and 9. ¹² State sector (civilian).
¹³ Wage earners. ¹⁴ Labour force sample survey.
¹⁵ Persons aged 15 years and over. ¹⁶ Beginning fourth quarter 1985: sample design revised. 1985: quarter Nov. 1985-Jan. 1986. ¹⁷ Prior to 1984: incl. Aruba. ¹⁸ Excl. Windward Islands. ¹⁹ Excl. major divisions 2 and 4.
²⁰ Lima. ²¹ May of each year. ²² June. ²³ Civilian labour force employed. ²⁴ Persons aged 16 years and over.

¹ Etablissements occupant 10 personnes et plus. ² Oct. de chaque année. ³ Salariés. ⁴ Juin de chaque année.
⁵ Par mois. ⁶ Non compris les heures supplémentaires.
⁷ Y compris la sylviculture et l'exploitation forestière.
⁸ Salariés rémunérés à l'heure. ⁹ Moyenne de dix mois.
¹⁰ Plan d'échantillonnage révisé. ¹¹ Y compris la pêche mais non compris les branches 6, 8 et 9. ¹² Secteur d'Etat (civils). ¹³ Ouvriers. ¹⁴ Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ¹⁵ Personnes âgées de 15 ans et plus.
¹⁶ A partir du quatrième trimestre de 1985: plan d'échantillonnage révisé. 1985: trimestre nov. 1985-janv. 1986.
¹⁷ Avant 1984: y compris Aruba. ¹⁸ Non compris les îles Windward. ¹⁹ Non compris les branches 2 et 4. ²⁰ Lima.
²¹ Mai de chaque année. ²² Juin. ²³ Main-d'œuvre civile occupée. ²⁴ Personnes âgées de 16 ans et plus.

¹ Establecimientos con 10 y más trabajadores. ² Oct. de cada año. ³ Asalariados. ⁴ Junio de cada año. ⁵ Por mes. ⁶ Excl. las horas extraordinarias. ⁷ Incl. silvicultura y la explotación de la madera. ⁸ Asalariados remunerados por hora. ⁹ Promedio de diez meses. ¹⁰ Diseño de la muestra revisado. ¹¹ Incl. pesca y excl. las grandes divisiones 6, 8 y 9. ¹² Sector de Estado (civil). ¹³ Obreros. ¹⁴ Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ¹⁵ Personas de 15 años y más. ¹⁶ A partir del cuarto trimestre de 1985: diseño de la muestra revisada. 1985: trimestre nov. 1985-enero 1986. ¹⁷ Antes de 1984: incl. Aruba. ¹⁸ Excl. las Islas Windward. ¹⁹ Excl. las grandes divisiones 2 y 4. ²⁰ Lima. ²¹ Mayo de cada año. ²² Junio. ²³ Fuerza de trabajo civil ocupada. ²⁴ Personas de 16 años y más.

HOURS

11

Hours of work per week in non-agricultural activities Durée du travail par semaine dans les activités non agricoles Horas de trabajo por semana en las actividades no agrícolas

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
United States (b)										
B Total	34.8	35.0	35.2	34.9	34.8	34.8	34.7 ¹	34.6	34.5	34.3
Uruguay² (a) ³										
Total	.	.	.	.	42.2	43.1	42.6	43.0	42.8	...
Venezuela⁴ (a)										
B Total	...	41.9	40.7	40.7	41.3	40.5	...	...	...	...
ASIA - ASIE - ASIA										
Cyprus⁵ (b)										
Total ⁶	42	41	41	41	41	41	41	42	42	42*
Males - Hom. ⁶	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	43	43	43*
Fem. - Muj. ⁶	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40*
Hong Kong⁷ (a) ⁷										
Total ⁸	48.1	47.8	47.6	47.6	47.6	47.0	47.9	46.7	46.0	46.5
Males - Hom. ⁸	.	.	.	49.7	49.7	49.1	49.9	48.4	47.4	48.0
Fem. - Muj. ⁸	.	.	.	44.1	43.9	43.3	44.6	43.9	43.4	44.0
Israel (a) ³										
B Total ⁹	36.2	35.9	36.0	35.8 ⁹	35.7	35.6	35.6	36.1	35.9	35.9
Males - Hom. ⁹	39.7	39.6	39.9	40.1 ⁹	40.0	40.0	39.7	40.5	40.3	40.3
Fem. - Muj. ⁹	30.0	29.6	29.4	29.3 ⁹	29.1	28.9	29.3	29.7	29.5	29.3
Israel (a) ¹⁰										
B Total ⁸	35.4	35.2	35.3	35.3 ¹¹	35.1	35.0	35.0	35.5	35.4	35.3
B Males - Hom. ⁸	39.1	39.1	39.7	39.7 ¹¹	39.4	39.4	39.2	40.0	39.9	39.9
B Fem. - Muj. ⁸	29.9	29.6	29.3	29.1 ¹¹	29.1	28.9	29.2	29.5	29.4	29.2
Japan¹² (a) ³										
B Total	47.2	47.4	47.1	47.3	47.2	47.3	47.3	46.9	46.1	45.4
Males - Hom.	50.9	51.3	51.2	51.4	51.3	51.6	51.8	51.4	50.6	49.8
Fem. - Muj.	41.2	41.1	40.7	40.8	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.0	39.4	38.8
Japan (a) ¹³										
B Total	40.3	40.4	40.7	40.6 ¹⁴	40.4	40.6	40.6	40.2	39.5	38.8
B Males - Hom.	41.6	41.7	42.1	42.1 ¹⁴	42.0	42.1	42.3	42.0	41.4	40.7
B Fem. - Muj.	37.6	37.6	37.9	37.5 ¹⁴	37.4	37.5	37.2	36.7	35.8	35.3
Jordan¹⁵ (b) ¹³										
Total	.	.	.	.	.	213.9	215.4	220.4	...	...
Males - Hom.	.	.	.	.	.	218.9	220.9	225.6	...	...
Fem. - Muj.	.	.	.	.	.	197.3	197.6	204.3	...	...

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ New industrial classification. ² Incl. agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. ³ Civilian labour force employed. ⁴ Excl. construction and transport. ⁵ Oct. of each year. ⁶ Adults. ⁷ Excl. mining and quarrying. ⁸ Persons aged 15 years and over. ⁹ Prior to 1985: persons aged 14 years and over; incl. agriculture, forestry and fishing. ¹⁰ Employees. Labour force sample survey. ¹¹ Prior to 1985: persons aged 14 years and over. ¹² Incl. fishing. ¹³ Employees. ¹⁴ Sample design revised. ¹⁵ Per month.

¹ Nouvelle classification industrielle. ² Y compris l'agriculture, la chasse, la sylviculture et la pêche. ³ Main--d'oeuvre civile occupée. ⁴ Non compris la construction et les transports. ⁵ Oct. de chaque année. ⁶ Adultes. ⁷ Non compris les industries extractives. ⁸ Personnes âgées de 15 ans et plus. ⁹ Avant 1985: personnes âgées de 14 ans et plus; y compris l'agriculture, la sylviculture et la pêche. ¹⁰ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main--d'oeuvre. ¹¹ Avant 1985: personnes âgées de 14 ans et plus. ¹² Y compris la pêche. ¹³ Salariés. ¹⁴ Plan d'échantillonnage révisé. ¹⁵ Par mois.

¹ Nueva clasificación industrial. ² Incl. agricultura, caza, silvicultura y pesca. ³ Fuerza de trabajo civil ocupada. ⁴ Excl. construcción y transportes. ⁵ Oct. de cada año. ⁶ Adultos. ⁷ Excl. las minas y canteras. ⁸ Personas de 15 años y más. ⁹ Antes de 1985: personas de 14 años y más; incl. agricultura, silvicultura y pesca. ¹⁰ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ¹¹ Antes de 1985: personas de 14 años y más. ¹² Incl. la pesca. ¹³ Asalariados. ¹⁴ Diseño de la muestra revisado. ¹⁵ Por mes.

11

Hours of work per week in non-agricultural activities

Durée du travail par semaine dans les activités non agricoles

Horas de trabajo por semana en las actividades no agrícolas

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Korea, Republic of (a) ¹										
B Total	52.1	52.5	52.4	51.9	52.5	51.9	51.1	49.2	48.2	47.9
B Males - Hom.	51.6	51.7	51.8	51.5	51.9	51.5	51.0	49.2	48.2	48.0
B Fem. - Muj.	53.0	53.7	53.4	52.8	53.6	52.6	51.2	49.2	48.4	47.8
Myanmar (a) ²										
Total ¹	7.8	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.3	...	...
Singapore ³ (a) ⁴										
Total ⁵	...	...	...	...	...	...	45.6	46.6	46.5	46.7
Singapore ³ (a) ⁶										
Total ⁷	48.6	49.1	49.4	48.0	48.5 ⁸	49.0 ⁸	...	...	...	...
Sri Lanka ⁹ (b) ¹⁰										
Total	50.1	50.4	49.9	48.1	49.7	52.0	50.7	52.4	52.6	...
Thailand ¹¹ (a) ¹²										
Total ¹³	...	216.19 ¹⁴	216.01	220.46	212.73	220.76	222.43	225.78	...	...
Males - Hom. ¹³	...	...	...	...	208.52	213.12	220.75	225.73	...	...
Fem. - Muj. ¹³	...	...	...	...	226.88	205.50	224.48	225.81	...	...
EUROPE - EUROPE - EUROPA										
Belgique ¹⁵ (a) ¹⁶										
B Total ¹⁷	33.6	33.6	33.7	33.3	33.2	33.2	33.6	33.9	33.7	...
España (a) ¹⁸										
B Total ¹⁹	39.1	38.4	37.6	37.2	37.4	36.1	36.5	36.8	36.7	36.6
B Males - Hom. ¹⁹	40.1	39.4	38.6	38.2	38.3	37.1	37.6	37.9	38.0	37.8
B Fem. - Muj. ¹⁹	36.7	36.0	35.4	35.0	35.3	33.9	33.9	34.3	34.1	34.0
France ²⁰ (a) ¹										
B Total	39.5	39.2	39.0	38.9 ²¹	38.9	38.9	39.0	39.0	39.0	39.0
France ²⁰ (a) ¹⁶										
B Total	39.6	39.3	39.1	39.0 ²¹	39.0	39.1	39.1	39.1	39.1	39.1

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Employees. ² Per day. ³ Incl. agriculture, fishing and sea transport. ⁴ Private sector. Establishments with 25 or more persons employed. ⁵ Sept. of each year. Employees. ⁶ Establishments with 10 or more persons employed. ⁷ Aug. of each year. Wage earners. ⁸ June. ⁹ Excl. major divisions 4, 8 and 9. ¹⁰ Oct. March and Sept. of each year. ¹¹ Per month. ¹² Employees. Labour force sample survey. ¹³ Aug. of each year. ¹⁴ Oct. second round (July-Sept.). ¹⁵ Excl. major divisions 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. ¹⁶ Wage earners. ¹⁷ Oct. of each year. ¹⁸ Employed persons incl. armed forces. ¹⁹ Persons aged 16 years and over. ²⁰ Excl. water, communication, public administrations and private domestic services. ²¹ Beginning April 1985: revised series.

¹ Salariés. ² Par jour. ³ Y compris l'agriculture, la pêche et les transports maritimes. ⁴ Secteur privé. Etablissements occupant 25 personnes et plus. ⁵ Sept. de chaque année. Salariés. ⁶ Etablissements occupant 10 personnes et plus. ⁷ Août de chaque année. Ouvriers. ⁸ Juin. ⁹ Non compris les branches 4, 8 et 9. ¹⁰ Oct. mars et sept. de chaque année. ¹¹ Par mois. ¹² Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ¹³ Août de chaque année. ¹⁴ Oct. deuxième enquête (juillet-sept.). ¹⁵ Non compris les branches 4, 6, 7, 8 et 9. ¹⁶ Ouvriers. ¹⁷ Oct. de chaque année. ¹⁸ Personnes occupées y compris les forces armées. ¹⁹ Personnes âgées de 16 ans et plus. ²⁰ Non compris l'eau, les communications, les administrations publiques et les services domestiques privés. ²¹ A partir d'avril 1985: série révisée.

¹ Asalariados. ² Por día. ³ Incl. agricultura, pesca y los transportes marítimos. ⁴ Sector privado. Establecimientos con 25 o más trabajadores. ⁵ Sept. de cada año. Asalariados. ⁶ Establecimientos con 10 y más trabajadores. ⁷ Agosto de cada año. Obreros. ⁸ Junio. ⁹ Excl. las grandes divisiones 4, 8 y 9. ¹⁰ Oct. marzo y sept. de cada año. ¹¹ Por mes. ¹² Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ¹³ Agosto de cada año. ¹⁴ Oct. segunda encuesta (julio-sept.). ¹⁵ Excl. las grandes divisiones 4, 6, 7, 8 y 9. ¹⁶ Obreros. ¹⁷ Oct. de cada año. ¹⁸ Personas ocupadas incl. las fuerzas armadas. ¹⁹ Personas de 16 años y más. ²⁰ Excl. agua, comunicaciones, administraciones públicas y los servicios domésticos privados. ²¹ A partir de abril de 1985: serie revisada.

HOURS

11

Hours of work per week in non-agricultural activities Durée du travail par semaine dans les activités non agricoles Horas de trabajo por semana en las actividades no agrícolas

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for	Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas							
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	
Germany ^{1 2} (b)											
B Total	40.7	40.5	40.9	40.7	40.5	40.2	40.2	40.1	39.7	39.3	
B Males - Hom.	41.1	40.8	41.2	40.9	40.8	40.5	40.5	40.4	39.9	39.6	
B Fem. - Muj.	39.1	39.1	39.7	39.5	39.2	39.0	38.9	38.7	38.4	38.1	
Germany ³ (b)											
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.7	
Males - Hom.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.8	
Fem. - Muj.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.0	
Gibraltar ⁴ (b) ⁵											
Total	44.7	44.3	45.1	44.5	44.0	42.7	44.9	46.1	45.1	...	
Males - Hom.	46.1	45.8	46.9	45.7	46.0	44.6	46.8	47.7	46.8	...	
Fem. - Muj.	38.9	38.4	38.4	39.6	36.9	36.1	38.0	40.1	38.8	...	
Iceland ⁶ (b)											
Total	49.4	48.7	48.9	48.6	48.5	49.2	47.4	46.8	46.4	46.5	
Males - Hom.	.	.	.	50.9	50.8	51.5	49.2	48.6	48.0	48.0	
Fem. - Muj.	.	.	.	44.7	44.5	45.2	44.5	43.8	47.7	43.7	
Iceland ⁶ (b)											
Males - Hom. ⁷	48.8	48.4	49.2	52.2	52.0	51.5	49.2	47.9	47.1	47.4	
Iceland ⁶ (b)											
Males - Hom. ⁸	51.7	50.8	50.4	52.2	52.2	53.7	50.7	50.5	49.7	49.7	
Fem. - Muj. ⁸	43.9	43.6	44.1	45.5	45.2	46.1	44.9	44.4	44.3	44.4	
Luxembourg ² (b) ⁹											
B Total ⁵	41.3	41.2	40.1	40.6	41.0	41.2	41.5	40.5	...	...	
B Males - Hom. ⁵	41.4	41.2	40.1	40.7	41.1	41.2	41.5	40.7	...	...	
B Fem. - Muj. ⁵	40.6	40.9	40.2	39.4	39.3	41.0	41.1	38.9	...	...	
Netherlands (b) ⁵											
B Total ¹⁰	40.4	40.4	40.4	40.3	40.3	40.2	40.1	40.1	40.1	...	
B Males - Hom. ¹¹	40.6	40.5	40.5	40.5	40.4	40.3	40.3	40.3	40.3	...	
B Fem. - Muj. ¹¹	40.0	39.9	39.9	39.8	39.8	39.7	39.7	39.6	39.6	...	
Netherlands ⁵ (b) ⁹											
B Total ¹²	41.0	41.0	40.9	40.9	40.8	40.7	40.7	40.8	40.8	...	
B Males - Hom. ¹³	41.1	41.1	41.0	41.0	40.9	40.8	40.8	40.9	40.9	...	
B Fem. - Muj. ¹³	40.1	40.1	39.9	39.8	39.7	39.6	39.5	39.4	39.5	...	
Norway ¹⁴ (a) ¹⁵											
Total	35.2	34.9	35.0	35.5	35.8	35.2	35.8	35.7	35.3	35.0	
Males - Hom.	40.0	39.9	40.0	40.6	41.1	40.1	40.6	40.4	39.7	39.4	
Fem. - Muj.	28.7	28.4	28.6	29.1	29.4	29.3	30.0	30.1	30.0	29.9	

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ The series relates to the territory of the Fed. Rep. of Germany before 3.10.1990. ² Excl. major divisions 6, 7, 8 and 9. ³ 5 new Länder. ⁴ Excl. mining and quarrying. ⁵ Oct. of each year. ⁶ Excl. major divisions 2, 4, 8 and 9. ⁷ Skilled wage earners. ⁸ Unskilled wage earners. ⁹ Wage earners. ¹⁰ Employees. Incl. juveniles. ¹¹ Employees. Adults. ¹² Incl. juveniles. ¹³ Adults. ¹⁴ Incl. agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. ¹⁵ Employees. Labour force sample survey.

¹ La série se réfère au territoire de la Rép. féd. d'Allemagne avant le 3.10.1990. ² Non compris les branches 6, 7, 8 et 9. ³ 5 nouveaux Länder. ⁴ Non compris les industries extractives. ⁵ Oct. de chaque année. ⁶ Non compris les branches 2, 4, 8 et 9. ⁷ Ouvriers qualifiés. ⁸ Ouvriers non qualifiés. ⁹ Ouvriers. ¹⁰ Salariés. Y compris les jeunes gens. ¹¹ Salariés. Adultes. ¹² Y compris les jeunes gens. ¹³ Adultes. ¹⁴ Y compris l'agriculture, la chasse, la sylviculture et la pêche. ¹⁵ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre.

¹ La serie se refiere al territorio de la Rep. Fed. de Alemania antes del 3.10.1990. ² Excl. las grandes divisiones 6, 7, 8 y 9. ³ 5 nuevos Länder. ⁴ Excl. las minas y canteras. ⁵ Oct. de cada año. ⁶ Excl. las grandes divisiones 2, 4, 8 y 9. ⁷ Obreros calificados. ⁸ Obreros no calificados. ⁹ Obreros. ¹⁰ Asalariados. Incl. los jóvenes. ¹¹ Asalariados. Adultos. ¹² Incl. los jóvenes. ¹³ Adultos. ¹⁴ Incl. agricultura, caza, silvicultura y pesca. ¹⁵ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo.

11

Hours of work per week in non-agricultural activities

Durée du travail par semaine dans les activités non agricoles

Horas de trabajo por semana en las actividades no agrícolas

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Pologne ¹ (a) ²										
Total	155	158	159	159	159	159	160	155	148	143
Portugal ³ (a)										
Total	38.4	38.9	38.2	38.2	38.7	38.7	38.8*	...	...	...
Saint-Marin ⁴ (a) ⁵										
Total	39.9	...	37.6	36.8	36.7	35.3	...	38.9	37.5	37.3
Suisse ⁶ (b) ⁷										
Total ⁸	.	.	43.5	43.4	43.1	42.8	42.6	42.4	42.2	42.1
Sweden ⁹ (a) ⁹										
B Total	35.6	35.7	36.0	36.3	36.5 ¹⁰	37.1	37.2	37.5	37.5	37.3
B Males - Hom.	39.4	39.5	39.9	40.0	40.2 ¹⁰	41.0	40.9	41.1	41.1	40.6
B Fem. - Muj.	31.0	31.2	31.5	31.9	32.2 ¹⁰	32.7	33.2	33.5	33.7	33.5
Sweden (a) ¹¹										
Total	35.3	35.4	35.8	36.0	36.2 ¹⁰	36.3	36.5	36.7	36.9	36.8
Males - Hom.	39.2	39.3	39.7	39.8	40.0 ¹⁰	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.2	40.1
Fem. - Muj.	30.9	31.1	31.4	31.8	32.1 ¹⁰	32.5	32.9	33.2	33.4	33.3
Turquie ¹² (a) ¹³										
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	46.4	45.8	47.1	48.0
Males - Hom.	.	.	.	.	.	.	49.1	49.0	50.2	50.8
Fem. - Muj.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.4	39.2	40.6	41.8
United Kingdom ¹⁴ (a) ¹⁵										
B Total ¹⁶	42.1	42.4 ¹⁷	42.5	42.8	42.7	43.1	43.5	43.4	42.9	...
B Males - Hom. ¹⁸	42.9	43.3 ¹⁷	43.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
B Fem. - Muj. ¹⁸	38.0	38.2 ¹⁷	38.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Yugoslavia ¹ (b) ²										
Total ⁵	...	182	...	185	...	...	183	...	...	...
OCEANIA - OCÉANIE - OCEANIA										
Australia (a) ¹¹										
Total	33.8	33.5	33.8 ¹⁸	34.4	34.1	34.5	34.9	34.6	34.8	34.4
Males - Hom.	36.9	36.6	37.1 ¹⁸	37.8	37.8	38.2	38.8	39.0	39.0	38.5
Fem. - Muj.	29.0	28.8	28.9 ¹⁸	29.3	28.9	29.2	29.5	29.1	29.4	29.2

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Socialised sector. ² Per month. ³ Excl. storage and services. ⁴ Excl. mining and quarrying. ⁵ Employees. ⁶ Normal hours of work. ⁷ Accident insurance statistics; incl. horticulture and forestry. ⁸ Labour force sample survey. ⁹ Employed persons and at work. ¹⁰ Prior to 1986: persons aged 16 to 74 years. ¹¹ Employees. Labour force sample survey. ¹² Incl. agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. ¹³ Civilian labour force employed. ¹⁴ Excl. coal mining and major divisions 6, 8 and 9. ¹⁵ Full-time workers on adult rates of pay. ¹⁶ Oct. of each year. ¹⁷ New industrial classification. ¹⁸ Beginning 1984: estimates based on 1986 census benchmarks.

¹ Secteur socialisé. ² Par mois. ³ Non compris les entrepôts et les services. ⁴ Non compris les industries extractives. ⁵ Salariés. ⁶ Durée normale du travail. ⁷ Statistiques d'assurances-accidents; y compris l'horticulture et la sylviculture. ⁸ Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ⁹ Personnes pourvues d'un emploi et au travail. ¹⁰ Avant 1986: personnes âgées de 16 à 74 ans. ¹¹ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ¹² Y compris l'agriculture, la chasse, la sylviculture et la pêche. ¹³ Main-d'œuvre civile occupée. ¹⁴ Non compris les mines de charbon et les branches 6, 8 et 9. ¹⁵ Travailleurs à plein temps rémunérés sur la base de taux de salaire pour adultes. ¹⁶ Oct. de chaque année. ¹⁷ Nouvelle classification industrielle. ¹⁸ A partir de 1984: estimations basées sur les données de calage du recensement de 1986.

¹ Sector socializado. ² Por mes. ³ Excl. almacenaje y servicios. ⁴ Excl. las minas y canteras. ⁵ Asalariados. ⁶ Duración normal de trabajo. ⁷ Estadísticas del seguro de accidentes; incl. horticultura y silvicultura. ⁸ Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ⁹ Personas con empleo y trabajando. ¹⁰ Antes de 1986: personas de 16 a 74 años. ¹¹ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ¹² Incl. agricultura, caza, silvicultura y pesca. ¹³ Fuerza de trabajo civil ocupada. ¹⁴ Excl. las minas de carbón y las grandes divisiones 6, 8 y 9. ¹⁵ Trabajadores a tiempo completo pagados sobre la base de tasas de salarios para adultos. ¹⁶ Oct. de cada año. ¹⁷ Nueva clasificación industrial. ¹⁸ A partir de 1984: estimaciones basadas en los datos de referencia del censo de 1986.

HOURS

11

Hours of work per week in non-agricultural activities Durée du travail par semaine dans les activités non agricoles Horas de trabajo por semana en las actividades no agrícolas

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Australia ¹ (b) ²										
Total	39.5	39.6	39.6	40.1	39.7	39.8	39.9	...	...	...
Males - Hom.	40.0	40.2	40.3	41.0	40.5	40.6	40.8	...	...	...
Fem. - Muj.	38.2	38.5	38.2	38.2	38.2	38.1	38.2	...	...	...
Australia ³ (b) ²								38.8	38.9	38.6
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.5	39.6	39.1
Males - Hom.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	38.0	38.0	38.0
Fem. - Muj.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.			
Fiji (b)										
Total ⁴	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	...	...
Guam ⁵ (b) ⁶										
Total ⁷	36.2	36.6	36.9	37.3	36.2	36.7	35.9	37.2	37.5	37.7
New Zealand ⁸ (b) ⁹										
Total ⁷	38.8	38.9	39.4	39.6	38.9	38.8	38.6	38.8	38.7	38.5
Males - Hom. ⁷	40.1	40.1	40.6	40.9	40.1	40.2	40.1	40.3	40.2	39.9
Fem. - Muj. ⁷	36.7	37.0	37.3	37.5	37.2	36.9	36.8	36.7	36.8	36.8

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Nov. of each year. ² Full-time adult non-managerial employees. ³ May of each year. ⁴ June of each year. ⁵ Incl. agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. ⁶ Dec. of each year. ⁷ Employees. ⁸ Incl. forestry and logging. ⁹ Establishments with the equivalent of more than 2 full-time paid employees.

¹ Nov. de chaque année. ² Salariés adultes à plein temps, non compris les cadres dirigeants. ³ Mai de chaque année. ⁴ Juin de chaque année. ⁵ Y compris l'agriculture, la chasse, la sylviculture et la pêche. ⁶ Déc. de chaque année. ⁷ Salariés. ⁸ Y compris la sylviculture et l'exploitation forestière. ⁹ Etablissements occupant plus de l'équivalent de 2 salariés à plein temps.

¹ Nov. de cada año. ² Asalariados adultos a tiempo completo, excl. el personal directivo. ³ Mayo de cada año. ⁴ Junio de cada año. ⁵ Incl. agricultura, caza, silvicultura y pesca. ⁶ Dic. de cada año. ⁷ Asalariados. ⁸ Incl. silvicultura y la explotación de la madera. ⁹ Establecimientos con más del equivalente de 2 asalariados a tiempo completo.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

A

All industries
Ensemble des industries
Todas las industrias

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
AFRICA - AFRIQUE - AFRICA										
Egypt (b) ¹										
Total ²	58	...	...	56	...	59	...	...	...	...
Males - Hom. ²	58	...	...	57	...	60	...	...	...	...
Fem. - Muj. ²	56	...	...	54	...	59	...	...	...	...
Kenya (b) ³										
Total ⁴	44	44	43	42	43	41	43	42	43	...
South Africa ⁵ (a) ³										
B Total	47.1	46.2	46.5	46.2	46.6	46.8	47.3	46.9	45.9	41.4
Sudan ⁶ (a) ⁷										
Total	...	...	...	...	...	246.15	246.15	...	245.67	...
AMERICA - AMÉRIQUE - AMERICA										
Argentina ⁸ (a) ⁹										
Total	181.3	177.9	178.4	179.7	188.4 ⁹	...	...	...	175.6 ⁹	...
Bermuda ¹⁰ (a) ¹¹										
Total	...	37.4	37.1	35.5	37.3	38.3	...	...	...	...
Bolivia (a) ¹²										
Total	...	...	...	44.9	...	...	...	46.5	...	...
Canada (b) ¹²										
B Total	37.7	38.4 ¹³	38.5	38.8	38.7	38.8 ¹⁴	38.8	38.6	38.2	37.8
Cuba (a) ¹⁵										
Total ¹⁶	41.8	43.1	43.2	43.4	43.4 ¹⁷	43.0	42.6 ¹⁸	...	...	...
Chile ¹⁹ (a) ²⁰										
Total	43.3	43.2	43.6	43.1 ²¹	44.3	44.1	44.0	43.2	44.9	45.3
Males - Hom.	45.6	45.3	45.7	45.2 ²¹	46.0	45.9	46.1	45.1	46.4	46.9
Fem. - Muj.	37.1	37.7	37.8	38.2 ²¹	37.3	38.8	37.8	37.9	40.4	40.7

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Establishments with 10 or more persons employed. ² Oct. of each year. ³ Employees. ⁴ June of each year. ⁵ Excl. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei; other geographical coverage of samples not specified. ⁶ Per month. ⁷ Excl. overtime. ⁸ Oct.: April and Oct. of each year. ⁹ April. ¹⁰ All persons engaged excl. unpaid family workers. ¹¹ Aug. of each year. ¹² Employees paid by the hour. ¹³ Prior to 1983: establishments with 20 or more persons employed. 1983: 10 months' average. ¹⁴ Sample design revised. ¹⁵ State sector (civilian). ¹⁶ Wage earners. ¹⁷ Prior to 1986: incl. water. ¹⁸ Prior to 1988: incl. fishing, mining and quarrying and gas. ¹⁹ Labour force sample survey. ²⁰ Persons aged 15 years and over. ²¹ Beginning fourth quarter 1985: sample design revised. 1985: quarter Nov. 1985-Jan. 1986.

¹ Etablissements occupant 10 personnes et plus. ² Oct. de chaque année. ³ Salariés. ⁴ Juin de chaque année. ⁵ Non compris Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei; couverture géographique du reste de l'échantillon non spécifiée. ⁶ Par mois. ⁷ Non compris les heures supplémentaires. ⁸ Oct.: avril et oct. de chaque année. ⁹ Avril. ¹⁰ Ensemble de l'effectif occupé non compris les travailleurs familiaux non rémunérés. ¹¹ Août de chaque année. ¹² Salariés rémunérés à l'heure. ¹³ Avant 1983: établissements occupant 20 personnes et plus. 1983: moyenne de 10 mois. ¹⁴ Plan d'échantillonnage révisé. ¹⁵ Secteur d'Etat (civil). ¹⁶ Ouvriers. ¹⁷ Avant 1986: y compris l'eau. ¹⁸ Avant 1988: y compris la pêche, les industries extractives et le gaz. ¹⁹ Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ²⁰ Personnes âgées de 15 ans et plus. ²¹ A partir du quatrième trimestre de 1985: plan d'échantillonnage révisé. 1985: trimestre nov. 1985--janv. 1986.

¹ Establecimientos con 10 y más trabajadores. ² Oct. de cada año. ³ Asalariados. ⁴ Junio de cada año. ⁵ Excl. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei; alcance geográfico del resto de la muestra no especificado. ⁶ Por mes. ⁷ Excl. las horas extraordinarias. ⁸ Oct.: abril y oct. de cada año. ⁹ Abril. ¹⁰ Todo el efectivo ocupado excl. los trabajadores familiares no remunerados. ¹¹ Agosto de cada año. ¹² Asalariados remunerados por hora. ¹³ Antes de 1983: establecimientos con 20 y más trabajadores. 1983: promedio de 10 meses. ¹⁴ Diseño de la muestra revisado. ¹⁵ Sector de Estado (civil). ¹⁶ Obreros. ¹⁷ Antes de 1986: incl. agua. ¹⁸ Antes de 1988: incl. pesca, minas y canteras y gas. ¹⁹ Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ²⁰ Personas de 15 años y más. ²¹ A partir del cuarto trimestre de 1985: diseño de la muestra revisada. 1985: trimestre nov. 1985-enero 1986.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

A

All industries
Ensemble des industries
Todas las industrias

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
El Salvador (a)										
B Males - Hom.	44.2	44.0	44.0	44.0	43.9 ¹	44.0	44.0	44.0	44.0	...
B Fem. - Muj.	44.1	44.0	44.0	44.0	43.9 ¹	44.0	44.0	43.9	44.0	...
Guatemala (a)										
B Total	45.7	46.5	48.7	48.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
Jamaica (a)²										
Total	...	...	...	...	34.54	35.63	37.40	39.16	39.04 ³	...
México (a)										
Total	42.7	43.0	43.4	46.4	46.4	44.2	44.9	45.1	45.4	45.5
Netherlands Antilles (b)²										
Total	42.6	43.5	...	42.2	43.4	...	40.2 ⁵	...	...	...
Males - Hom.	...	43.5	...	42.1	43.4	...	...	...	...	...
Fem. - Muj.	...	...	...	39.8	43.3	...	...	...	...	...
Panamá (a)										
Total	45.8	45.9	45.4	44.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
Paraguay⁶ (a)²										
Total	...	149	188	176	164	...	160	172	189	170
Males - Hom.	...	151	195	172	165	...	163	155	188	174
Fem. - Muj.	...	141	157	197	159	...	151	...	191	151
Perú (a)⁷										
Total ⁸	45.4	47.8	45.9	44.8	48.5 ⁹	47.4 ⁹	48.5	46.7	47.5 ⁹	44.9 ⁹
Puerto Rico (b)										
B Total	37.5	38.7	38.7	38.5	39.0	38.9	39.1	39.5	39.1	39.8 [*]
United States (b)										
B Total	38.9	40.1	40.7	40.5	40.7	41.0	41.1 ¹⁰	41.0	40.8	40.7
Uruguay (a)¹¹										
Total	...	...	...	...	43.4	44.2	42.8	43.8	43.2	...
Venezuela (a)										
B Total	...	43.3	40.1	40.6	40.7	40.2	...	...	...	...
Virgin Islands (US) (b)										
B Total ²	42.3	41.4	42.7	41.7	41.9	42.2	40.4	41.7	42.4	41.4
ASIA - ASIE - ASIA										
Cyprus¹² (b)										
Total ¹³	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41 [*]
Males - Hom. ¹³	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	43	43	43 [*]
Fem. - Muj. ¹³	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40 [*]

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Prior to 1986: Department of San Salvador.
² Employees. ³ Average of the first three quarters.
⁴ Prior to 1984: incl. Aruba. ⁵ Excl. Windward Islands.
⁶ Per month. ⁷ Lima. ⁸ May of each year. ⁹ June. ¹⁰ New industrial classification. ¹¹ Civilian labour force employed.
¹² Oct. of each year. ¹³ Adults.

¹ Avant 1986: Département de San Salvador. ² Salariés.
³ Moyenne des trois premiers trimestres. ⁴ Avant 1984: y compris Aruba. ⁵ Non compris les îles Windward. ⁶ Par mois. ⁷ Lima. ⁸ Mai de chaque année. ⁹ Juin. ¹⁰ Nouvelle classification industrielle. ¹¹ Main-d'œuvre civile occupée. ¹² Oct. de chaque année. ¹³ Adultes.

¹ Antes de 1986. Departamento de San Salvador. ² Asalariados. ³ Promedio de los tres primeros trimestres.
⁴ Antes de 1984 incl. Aruba. ⁵ Excl. las Islas Windward.
⁶ Por mes. ⁷ Lima. ⁸ Mayo de cada año. ⁹ Junio. ¹⁰ Nueva clasificación industrial. ¹¹ Fuerza de trabajo civil ocupada. ¹² Oct. de cada año. ¹³ Adultos.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

**HEURES
HORAS**
A
**All industries
Ensemble des industries
Todas las industrias**

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Hong Kong ¹ (a) ²										
Total	45.2	45.5	44.8	44.8	45.2	44.5	45.9	44.8	44.0	45.2
Males - Hom.				47.7	48.1	47.3	48.6	47.0	45.9	47.3
Fem. - Muj.				41.4	41.7	41.1	42.6	41.8	41.4	42.2
India ³ (a) ⁴										
Total ⁵		46.2	46.2	...	45.7	46.1	46.4	46.4	...	...
Israel ⁶ (a) ¹										
B Total ²	38.4	38.2	38.7	38.6 ⁷	38.8	38.3	38.3	39.3	38.9	39.1
Males - Hom. ²	39.5	39.3	39.8	40.0 ⁷	40.3	39.7	39.9	40.8	40.5	40.7
Fem. - Muj. ²	34.2	34.3	35.0	34.3 ⁷	34.0	33.8	34.0	35.1	34.0	34.6
Israel ⁸ (a) ⁸										
B Total ²	38.1	38.0	38.5	38.6 ⁷	38.8	38.2	38.1	39.2	38.8	39.2
B Males - Hom. ²	39.0	38.9	39.3	39.7 ⁷	40.0	39.4	39.3	40.5	40.2	40.6
B Fem. - Muj. ²	34.9	35.0	35.4	35.3 ⁷	35.0	34.5	34.3	35.6	34.6	35.3
Japan (a) ¹										
B Total	46.0	46.2	46.0	46.2	46.0	46.3	46.8	46.3	45.7	45.0
Males - Hom.	49.9	50.4	50.3	50.5	50.1	50.5	51.2	50.9	50.1	49.2
Fem. - Muj.	39.7	39.9	39.5	39.6	39.6	39.8	39.9	39.5	38.9	38.5
Japan (a) ⁴										
B Total	40.9	41.1	41.7	41.5 ⁹	41.1	41.3	41.8	41.4	40.8	40.0
B Males - Hom.	42.1	42.3	43.0	42.9 ⁹	42.4	42.6	43.4	43.0	42.5	41.7
B Fem. - Muj.	38.3	38.6	38.8	38.4 ⁹	38.4	38.7	38.6	37.9	37.1	36.4
Jordan ¹⁰ (b) ⁴										
Total						248.7	251.9	252.0	...	...
Males - Hom.						248.8	252.3	252.5	...	...
Fem. - Muj.						247.8	248.8	248.6	...	...
Korea, Republic of (a) ⁴										
B Total	53.7	54.4	54.3	53.8	54.7	54.0	52.6	50.7	49.8	49.3
B Males - Hom.	53.6	53.9	54.0	53.5	54.4	54.0	52.8	50.9	49.9	49.4
B Fem. - Muj.	54.0	55.0	54.8	54.2	55.2	54.1	52.4	50.3	49.6	49.0
Macao (b) ¹¹										
Total							53.2	52.9	52.8	...
Myanmar (a) ¹²										
Total ¹³	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.8	8.0	7.7	...	...
Philippines ¹⁴ (a)										
Total ¹⁵	48.9	46.5 ¹⁶	45.9	47.0	48.1	49.4	...	...	...	...

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Civilian labour force employed. ² Persons aged 15 years and over. ³ Excl. coal mining and petroleum production. ⁴ Employees. ⁵ Dec. of each year. ⁶ Incl. mining and quarrying. ⁷ Prior to 1985: persons aged 14 years and over. ⁸ Employees. Labour force sample survey. ⁹ Sample design revised. ¹⁰ Per month. ¹¹ Wage earners. ¹² Per day. ¹³ Workers engaged for less than 30 days (excl. casual workers). ¹⁴ Aug. of each year. ¹⁵ Establishments with 10 or more persons employed. ¹⁶ Prior to 1983: establishments with one or more persons employed.

¹ Main-d'œuvre civile occupée. ² Personnes âgées de 15 ans et plus. ³ Non compris l'extraction du charbon et la production de pétrole. ⁴ Salariés. ⁵ Déc. de chaque année. ⁶ Y compris les industries extractives. ⁷ Avant 1985: personnes âgées de 14 ans et plus. ⁸ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ⁹ Plan d'échantillonnage révisé. ¹⁰ Par mois. ¹¹ Ouvriers. ¹² Par jour. ¹³ Travailleurs engagés pour moins de 30 jours (non compris les travailleurs occasionnels). ¹⁴ Août de chaque année. ¹⁵ Établissements occupant 10 personnes et plus. ¹⁶ Avant 1983: établissements occupant une personne et plus.

¹ Fuerza de trabajo civil ocupada. ² Personas de 15 años y más. ³ Excl. la explotación de minas de carbón y la producción de petróleo. ⁴ Asalariados. ⁵ Dic. de cada año. ⁶ Incl. las minas y canteras. ⁷ Antes de 1985: personas de 14 años y más. ⁸ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ⁹ Diseño de la muestra revisado. ¹⁰ Por mes. ¹¹ Obreros. ¹² Por día. ¹³ Trabajadores ocupados durante menos de 30 días (excl. los trabajadores ocasionales). ¹⁴ Agosto de cada año. ¹⁵ Establecimientos con 10 y más trabajadores. ¹⁶ Antes de 1983: establecimientos con uno o más trabajadores.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

A

All industries
Ensemble des industries
Todas las industrias

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Singapore (a) ¹										
Total ²							47.4	48.6	48.5	48.7
Singapore (a) ³										
Total ⁴	48.3	48.9	48.6	47.0	48.5 ⁵	49.2 ⁵	...	...	...	...
Sri Lanka (b) ⁶										
Total	46.5	48.9	48.6	47.4	47.3	51.5	49.1	50.5	49.3	...
Thailand ⁷ (a) ⁸										
Total ⁹		214.98 ¹⁰	200.83	211.48	216.57	211.58	217.86	219.41	...	...
Males - Hom. ⁹					221.20	212.53	223.31	223.58	...	...
Fem. - Muj. ⁹					200.27	210.41	211.28	214.87	...	...
EUROPE - EUROPE - EUROPA										
Austria ¹¹ (a) ⁷										
B Total	145.5	144.3	145.2	144.9	142.1	139.9	141.0	139.6	139.5	138.2
Austria ¹¹ (b) ⁷										
B Total	171.0	170.3	172.3	173.1	173.2	170.1	170.6	165.7	170.3	169.2
Belgique ¹² (a) ¹³										
B Total ¹⁴	33.6	33.5	33.7	33.1	33.0	33.0	33.4	33.6	33.4	...
Czechoslovakia ¹⁵ (a)										
B Total	43.1	43.1	43.0	43.1	43.1	43.1	43.0	40.7	40.6	40.0
Denmark (a)										
Total	32.5	33.0	33.0	32.1	32.8	32.1	31.8	31.8	31.5	31.5
España (a) ¹⁶										
B Total ¹⁷	38.0	37.4	36.5	36.3	36.7	35.4	35.8	36.8	36.7	36.6
B Males - Hom. ¹⁷	38.5	38.0	36.9	36.8	37.0	35.8	36.3	37.3	37.2	37.1
B Fem. - Muj. ¹⁷	36.0	35.4	35.0	34.5	35.4	33.9	34.3	35.0	34.9	35.0
Finland (a)										
Total	32.5	32.4	32.3	32.3	33.4	32.1	32.1	31.8	31.3	...
France (a) ¹⁸										
B Total	39.4	38.9	38.7	38.6 ¹⁹	38.6	38.6	38.7	38.7	38.7	38.7
France (a) ¹³										
B Total	39.3	38.9	38.7	38.6 ¹⁹	38.7	38.7	38.8	38.8	38.8	38.7

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Private sector. Establishments with 25 or more persons employed. ² Sept. of each year. Employees. ³ Establishments with 10 or more persons employed. ⁴ Aug. of each year. Wage earners. ⁵ June. ⁶ March and Sept. of each year. ⁷ Per month. ⁸ Employees. Labour force sample survey. ⁹ Aug. of each year. ¹⁰ Second round (July-Sept.). ¹¹ Incl. mining and quarrying. ¹² Excl. primary iron and steel. ¹³ Wage earners. ¹⁴ Oct. of each year. ¹⁵ State industry. ¹⁶ Employed persons incl. armed forces. ¹⁷ Persons aged 16 years and over. ¹⁸ Employees. ¹⁹ Beginning April 1985: revised series.

¹ Secteur privé. Etablissements occupant 25 personnes et plus. ² Sept. de chaque année. Salariés. ³ Etablissements occupant 10 personnes et plus. ⁴ Août de chaque année. Ouvriers. ⁵ Juin. ⁶ Mars et sept. de chaque année. ⁷ Par mois. ⁸ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ⁹ Août de chaque année. ¹⁰ Deuxième enquête (juillet-sept.). ¹¹ Y compris les industries extractives. ¹² Non compris la sidérurgie. ¹³ Ouvriers. ¹⁴ Oct. de chaque année. ¹⁵ Industrie d'Etat. ¹⁶ Personnes occupées y compris les forces armées. ¹⁷ Personnes âgées de 16 ans et plus. ¹⁸ Salariés. ¹⁹ A partir d'avril 1985: série révisée.

¹ Sector privado. Establecimientos con 25 o más trabajadores. ² Sept. de cada año. Asalariados. ³ Establecimientos con 10 y más trabajadores. ⁴ Agosto de cada año. Obreros. ⁵ Junio. ⁶ Marzo y sept. de cada año. ⁷ Por mes. ⁸ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ⁹ Agosto de cada año. ¹⁰ Segunda encuesta (julio-sept.). ¹¹ Incl. las minas y canteras. ¹² Excl. siderurgia. ¹³ Obreros. ¹⁴ Oct. de cada año. ¹⁵ Industria de Estado. ¹⁶ Personas ocupadas incl. las fuerzas armadas. ¹⁷ Personas de 16 años y más. ¹⁸ Asalariados. ¹⁹ A partir de abril de 1985: serie revisada.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

A

All industries
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Todas las industrias

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Germany ¹ (b)										
B Total	40.7	40.5	41.0	40.7	40.4	40.1	40.0	39.9	39.5	39.2
B Males - Hom.	41.1	40.8	41.4	41.1	40.8	40.5	40.4	40.2	39.8	39.5
B Fem. - Muj.	39.1	39.1	39.7	39.5	39.2	39.0	38.9	38.7	38.4	38.1
Germany ² (b)										
Total										40.4
Males - Hom.										40.5
Fem. - Muj.										40.0
Gibraltar (b) ³										
Total	47.7	47.6	50.4	48.7	47.3	43.9	47.1	42.4	46.9	...
Males - Hom.	49.0	49.2	51.9	48.8	48.2	44.6	48.6	42.7	47.8	...
Fem. - Muj.	41.4	40.7	42.0	41.2	42.5	39.7	39.2	38.6	38.5	...
Grèce ⁴ (b) ⁵										
B Total	38.6	38.5 ⁶	38.2	39.3 ⁶	39.1	39.2	41.1	41.1	41.1	...
B Males - Hom.	39.6	39.2 ⁶	39.0	40.0 ⁶	39.8	39.8	41.6	41.7	41.6	...
B Fem. - Muj.	37.2	37.7 ⁶	37.2	38.3 ⁶	38.4	38.5	40.5	40.7	40.5	...
Hongrie ⁷ (a) ⁸										
B Total	153.9	152.4	147.1	145.2	144.5	147.7	147.3	142.6	142.5	141.4*
Ireland (a) ⁹										
B Total ¹⁰	40.5	40.8	41.1	41.1 ¹¹	41.4	41.1	41.9	41.7	41.5	41.0*
B Males - Hom. ¹²	42.0	42.4	42.7	42.8 ¹¹	42.9	42.6	43.3	43.5	43.3	...
B Fem. - Muj. ¹²	37.0	37.1	37.2	37.6 ¹¹	38.1	38.2	39.1	38.3	37.9	...
Luxembourg (b) ⁵										
B Total ³	41.2	41.0	39.7	40.2	40.5	40.8	41.2	40.3	...	...
B Males - Hom. ³	41.2	41.0	39.6	40.3	40.7	40.8	41.2	40.5	...	...
B Fem. - Muj. ³	40.6	40.9	40.2	39.4	39.3	41.0	41.1	38.9	...	...
Netherlands (b) ³										
B Total ¹³	40.6	40.5	40.3	40.3	40.1	39.9	39.8	39.8	39.9	...
B Males - Hom. ¹⁴	40.7	40.6	40.4	40.3	40.1	40.0	39.9	39.9	40.0	...
B Fem. - Muj. ¹⁴	40.1	40.0	39.8	39.6	39.4	39.3	39.2	39.2	39.2	...
Netherlands ³ (b) ⁵										
B Total ¹⁰	40.8	40.7	40.5	40.4	40.2	40.0	39.9	39.9	40.0	...
B Males - Hom. ¹²	40.8	40.8	40.5	40.5	40.3	40.1	40.0	40.0	40.1	...
B Fem. - Muj. ¹²	40.1	40.1	39.8	39.8	39.5	39.5	39.3	39.3	39.3	...
Norway (a) ¹⁵										
Total	37.7	37.7	37.7	38.2	38.4	37.2	37.7	37.7	37.0	36.8
Males - Hom.	39.7	39.9	39.7	40.3	40.6	39.2	39.6	39.7	38.9	38.7
Fem. - Muj.	31.5	30.7	31.0	31.6	31.9	31.4	31.9	31.7	31.3	31.2

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ The series relates to the territory of the Fed. Rep. of Germany before 3.10.1990. ² 5 new Länder. ³ Oct. of each year. ⁴ Establishments with 10 or more persons employed. ⁵ Wage earners. ⁶ Sample design revised. ⁷ Socialised sector. ⁸ Per month. ⁹ Sept. of each year. ¹⁰ Incl. juveniles. ¹¹ Revised series. ¹² Adults. ¹³ Employees. Incl. juveniles. ¹⁴ Employees. Adults. ¹⁵ Employees. Labour force sample survey.

¹ La série se réfère au territoire de la Rép. féd. d'Allemagne avant le 3.10.1990. ² 5 nouveaux Länder. ³ Oct. de chaque année. ⁴ Etablissements occupant 10 personnes et plus. ⁵ Ouvriers. ⁶ Plan d'échantillonnage révisé. ⁷ Secteur socialisé. ⁸ Par mois. ⁹ Sept. de chaque année. ¹⁰ Y compris les jeunes gens. ¹¹ Série révisée. ¹² Adultes. ¹³ Salariés. Y compris les jeunes gens. ¹⁴ Salariés. Adultes. ¹⁵ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre.

¹ La serie se refiere al territorio de la Rep. Fed. de Alemania antes del 3.10.1990. ² 5 nuevos Länder. ³ Oct. de cada año. ⁴ Establecimientos con 10 y más trabajadores. ⁵ Obreros. ⁶ Diseño de la muestra revisado. ⁷ Sector socializado. ⁸ Por mes. ⁹ Sept. de cada año. ¹⁰ Incl. los jóvenes. ¹¹ Serie revisada. ¹² Adultos. ¹³ Asalariados Incl. los jóvenes. ¹⁴ Asalariados. Adultos. ¹⁵ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

A

All industries
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Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Pologne ^{1 (a) 2}										
Total	149	152	152	153	151	151	154	150	143	137
Portugal (a)										
Total	38.8	38.6	38.6	38.8	38.7	38.9	39.1*	...	...	...
Roumanie ^{3 (a)}										
Total ⁴	7.9	7.8	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.8	...
Saint-Marin (a) ⁵										
Total	35.7	...	34.9	34.5	34.4	31.7	...	36.7	36.4	35.8
Suisse ^{6 (l) 7}										
Total ⁵	.	.	43.1	43.0	42.6	42.4	41.9	41.8	41.6	41.5
Sweden ^{8 (a) 9}										
Total	37.6	37.7	38.1	38.3	38.3 ¹⁰	38.4	38.5	38.5	38.5	38.4
Males - Hom.	39.3	39.4	39.8	39.9	39.9 ¹⁰	39.9	40.0	40.0	40.0	39.8
Fem. - Muj.	32.5	32.6	33.2	33.5	33.5 ¹⁰	34.1	34.4	34.4	34.5	34.2
Turquie (a) ¹¹										
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	48.7	49.9	48.9	48.2
Males - Hom.	.	.	.	.	.	.	50.3	50.9	50.6	49.3
Fem. - Muj.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.9	45.7	42.0	43.8
Turquie ^{12 (a)}										
Total	.	35.2	35.4	35.2	35.9	36.3	36.0	...	...	...
United Kingdom ^{13 (a) 14}										
B Total ¹⁵	41.0	41.5 ¹⁶	41.7	41.8	41.6	42.2	42.4	42.2	41.6	...
B Males - Hom. ¹⁵	42.0	42.5 ¹⁶	42.8	43.0	42.7	43.5	43.6	43.4	42.6	...
B Fem. - Muj. ¹⁵	37.8	38.1 ¹⁶	38.1	38.1	38.1	38.4	38.7	38.6	38.3	...
Yugoslavia ^{1 (b) 2}										
Total ⁵	...	181	...	184	...	...	184	...	...	...
OCEANIA - OCÉANIE - OCEANIA										
Australia (a) ⁹										
Total	36.1	35.5	36.2 ¹⁷	36.9	37.0	37.3	37.9	37.7	38.1	37.4
Males - Hom.	37.2	36.5	37.4 ¹⁷	38.4	38.6	38.8	39.6	39.4	39.9	39.2
Fem. - Muj.	32.4	32.3	32.7 ¹⁷	32.5	32.7	32.9	33.1	32.8	33.2	32.7

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Socialised sector. ² Per month. ³ State sector. ⁴ Per day. ⁵ Employees. ⁶ Normal hours of work. ⁷ Accident insurance statistics. ⁸ Incl. major divisions 2 and 4. ⁹ Employees. Labour force sample survey. ¹⁰ Prior to 1986: persons aged 16 to 74 years. ¹¹ Civilian labour force employed. ¹² All establishments in the public sector and those with 25 or more persons employed in the private sector. ¹³ Incl. quarrying. ¹⁴ Full-time workers on adult rates of pay. ¹⁵ Oct. of each year. ¹⁶ New industrial classification. Prior to 1983: excl. quarrying. ¹⁷ Beginning 1984: estimates based on 1986 census benchmarks.

¹ Secteur socialisé. ² Par mois. ³ Secteur d'Etat. ⁴ Par jour. ⁵ Salariés. ⁶ Durée normale du travail. ⁷ Statistiques d'assurances accidents. ⁸ Y compris les branches 2 et 4. ⁹ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'oeuvre. ¹⁰ Avant 1986: personnes âgées de 16 à 74 ans. ¹¹ Main-d'oeuvre civile occupée. ¹² Tous les établissements du secteur public et ceux occupant 25 personnes ou plus dans le secteur privé. ¹³ Y compris les carrières. ¹⁴ Travailleurs à plein temps rémunérés sur la base de taux de salaire pour adultes. ¹⁵ Oct. de chaque année. ¹⁶ Nouvelle classification industrielle. Avant 1983: non compris les carrières. ¹⁷ A partir de 1984: estimations basées sur les données de calage du recensement de 1986.

¹ Sector socializado. ² Por mes. ³ Sector de Estado. ⁴ Por día. ⁵ Asalariados. ⁶ Duración normal de trabajo. ⁷ Estadísticas del seguro de accidentes. ⁸ Incl. las grandes divisiones 2 y 4. ⁹ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ¹⁰ Antes de 1986: personas de 16 a 74 años. ¹¹ Fuerza de trabajo civil ocupada. ¹² Todos los establecimientos del sector público y los que emplean 25 o más trabajadores en el sector privado. ¹³ Incl. las canteras. ¹⁴ Trabajadores a tiempo completo pagados sobre la base de tasas de salarios para adultos. ¹⁵ Oct. de cada año. ¹⁶ Nueva clasificación industrial. Antes de 1983: excl. las canteras. ¹⁷ A partir de 1984: estimaciones basadas en los datos de referencia del censo de 1986.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing
Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières
Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

All industries
Ensemble des industries
Todas las industrias

HEURES
HORAS

Country and type Pays et type País y tipo	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Australia ¹ (b) ²										
Total	39.6	40.4	40.9	41.3	41.4	41.5	41.7	...	...	...
Males - Hom.	39.9	40.8	41.5	42.0	41.9	42.3	42.5	...	...	...
Fem. - Muj.	38.3	39.2	39.0	39.0	39.6	39.1	39.4	...	...	...
Australia ³ (b) ²										
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.8	41.4	40.4
Males - Hom.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.7	42.2	41.0
Fem. - Muj.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.2	39.1	38.6
Fiji (b)										
Total ⁴	44	44	44	44	44	43	43	43	...	...
Guam (b) ⁵										
Total ⁶	39.6	39.1	39.4	37.6	40.3	34.7	42.3	42.3	43.3	37.5
New Zealand ⁷ (b) ⁸										
Total	39.6	39.5	40.4	40.7	39.6	40.2	39.9	40.5	40.7	40.4
Males - Hom.	40.4	40.2	41.3	41.6	40.5	41.1	40.8	41.3	41.6	41.2
Fem. - Muj.	37.3	37.6	38.2	38.4	37.4	38.0	37.8	38.3	38.4	38.3

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Nov. of each year. ² Full-time adult non-managerial employees. ³ May of each year. ⁴ June of each year. ⁵ Dec. of each year. ⁶ Employees. ⁷ Establishments with the equivalent of more than 2 full-time paid employees.

¹ Nov. de chaque année. ² Salariés adultes à plein temps, non compris les cadres dirigeants. ³ Mai de chaque année. ⁴ Juin de chaque année. ⁵ Déc. de chaque année. ⁶ Salariés. ⁷ Etablissements occupant plus de l'équivalent de 2 salariés à plein temps.

¹ Nov. de cada año. ² Asalariados adultos a tiempo completo, excl. el personal directivo. ³ Mayo de cada año. ⁴ Junio de cada año. ⁵ Dic. de cada año. ⁶ Asalariados. ⁷ Establecimientos con más del equivalente de 2 asalariados a tiempo completo.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Type (a) Hours actually worked
(b) Hours paid for

Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées
(b) Heures rémunérées

Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas
(b) Horas pagadas

Country, type - ISIC code (a)

Pays, type - Code CITI (a)

Pais, tipo - Clave CIU (a)

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

México (a)

Total

311-312	42.0	42.8	44.0	44.9	45.3	45.6	46.6	47.3	47.7	46.6
313	45.4	44.2	44.0	46.6	45.9	46.2	46.7	46.9	47.1	46.7
314	41.4	41.7	44.6	37.7	41.7	43.7	45.2	43.8	44.3	45.2
321	40.0	41.1	39.6	41.8	41.4	41.8	42.5	42.8	41.9	42.5
322	.	.	.	41.6	42.4	44.2	43.9	42.9	43.6	43.9
324	.	.	.	45.3	43.5	38.5	41.6	45.7	44.9	41.6
331	44.5	46.4	46.2	45.3	44.6	44.7	44.2	44.1	46.0	44.2
332	.	.	.	48.3	47.4	46.0	46.1	47.2	46.7	46.1
341	48.0	47.8	48.2	49.1	48.1	48.9	50.2	49.4	48.9	50.2
342	.	.	.	46.3	48.0	47.8	48.0	47.7	47.5	48.0
351	42.4	42.2	44.9	44.7	44.1	45.6	45.5	45.7	45.7	45.5
352	42.3	42.2	41.9	51.5	52.6	49.4	49.2	47.5	47.6	49.2
354	44.0	44.4	43.0	43.4	42.3	42.0	42.6	41.0	42.0	42.6
355	37.0	34.7	37.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
356	.	.	.	42.4	42.2	44.0	44.4	44.8	44.9	44.3
361	47.3	45.7	47.3	44.2	43.8	44.6	44.3	44.5	44.9	44.3
362	47.5	48.7	48.1	42.9	42.3	49.6	49.8	50.1	49.5	49.8
369	47.3	46.2	44.0	45.7	45.9	47.0	46.9	47.3	47.3	46.9
371	44.9	45.2	45.1	42.9	40.2	41.9	44.0	43.0	43.8	44.0
372	44.9	45.2	45.9	39.0	45.8	46.5	46.5	46.6	46.4	46.5
381	43.4	42.0	43.5	43.2	43.6	43.2	45.1	45.2	45.7	45.1
382	35.2	38.0	41.4	37.4	31.6	43.4	44.2	43.7	44.7	44.2
383	39.5	41.6	40.0	60.7	59.9	43.4	42.9	43.0	43.8	42.9
384	37.9	37.4	40.4	53.4	55.9	41.7	43.0	44.1	44.4	43.0
390	.	.	.	42.2	43.3	44.7	44.1	45.0	44.6	44.1

Panamá (a)

Total

311-312	46.8	46.8	46.4	46.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
313	45.7	50.9	47.6	37.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
314	41.9	45.4	44.5	42.7	...	...	...	...	...	...
321	46.8	45.4	49.0	47.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
322	42.1	42.7	42.2	41.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
323	45.0	46.6	45.5	48.3	...	...	...	...	...	...
324	45.2	46.9	45.8	46.0	...	...	...	...	...	...
331	46.9	47.1	47.5	45.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
332	45.1	44.5	45.0	45.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
341	45.7	46.1	45.1	48.7	...	...	...	...	...	...
342	46.1	45.9	46.3	46.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
351	46.4	43.2	44.3	45.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
353-354,372,390	37.6	39.5	40.1	39.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
353-354,390	48.2	48.3	44.6	43.7	...	...	...	...	...	...
355	48.0	45.8	44.8	45.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
356	50.0	45.6	46.2	43.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
361	48.1	40.6	44.5	42.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
362	45.1	47.7	47.5	47.3	...	...	...	...	...	...
369	47.7	47.5	46.8	46.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
37	50.4	52.1	52.1	43.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
381	45.2	43.2	44.0	45.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
382	48.0	39.9	44.2	44.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
383	46.3	44.3	44.6	44.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
384	47.0	45.3	42.4	44.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
385	41.4	45.7	45.8	35.9	...	...	...	...	...	...

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Perú ¹ (a)										
Total ²										
311-312									51.94	51.94
313									52.40	56.23
314									45.89	...
321									46.23	41.52
322									40.30	48.10
323									42.74	47.14
324									39.80	34.75
332									41.12	38.14
341									48.94	49.86
342									48.59	50.25
351									50.88	66.39
352									48.86	41.81
353										40.45
355									43.42	33.16
356									45.81	51.31
362									47.43	47.73
371									46.58	52.12
372									42.88	51.58
381									66.95	...
382									47.51	50.77
383									44.74	12.56
384									49.68	59.54
385									49.97	52.48
390									47.87	...
Puerto Rico (b) ³										
Total										
311-313	37.5	37.4 ⁴	37.9	37.9	38.7	38.3	37.6	39.8	35.9	39.6
314	38.8	26.3 ⁴	39.1	38.3	39.2	40.4	38.6	39.9	39.0	38.6
321	33.7	33.6 ⁴	37.2	36.5	35.9	39.8	37.6	37.8	35.7	37.1
322	34.7	35.4 ⁴	36.0	34.5	35.6	34.8	37.0	36.7	35.9	35.6
323	36.7	35.9 ⁴	36.8	35.3	37.6	37.6	38.5	38.8	38.6	38.7
324	33.6	38.7 ⁴	36.3	38.6	39.2	38.3	38.5	38.2	38.0	39.2
33	33.6	36.0 ⁴	36.6	36.5	36.2	36.9	37.4	36.7	37.2	36.8
341	36.4	39.0 ⁴	40.0	40.2	41.6	40.4	40.7	40.5	40.0	39.8
342	37.6	38.1 ⁴	39.7	39.3	40.0	39.6	38.8	39.9	41.4	36.8
351-352	41.7	42.5 ⁴	42.0	42.4	42.0	41.9	42.1	42.5	43.1	42.5
353-354	41.5	40.2 ⁴	41.0	38.9	41.0	39.1	40.2	41.2	38.4	43.4
355-356	40.9	38.4 ⁴	39.1	37.1	39.8	39.2	40.2	39.0	39.2	38.2
361	42.3	43.5 ⁴	43.9	42.4	45.6	43.7	44.5	47.8	43.4	45.0
362	40.0	39.8 ⁴	39.7	40.8	41.0	40.3	40.0	42.0	41.5	38.8
369	36.2	37.0 ⁴	40.0	39.5	40.3	41.8	41.9	41.1	38.8	42.4
381	37.8	39.4 ⁴	39.9	39.2	39.6	39.3	40.3	40.1	40.5	39.2
382	39.8	41.4 ⁴	44.2	42.0	41.8	42.9	43.4	43.4	42.0	41.5
383	40.6	40.3 ⁴	41.3	40.3	41.8	41.2	41.6	42.1	42.0	40.4
384	32.9	40.4 ⁴	38.7	39.4	38.8	39.9	39.7	40.3	39.4	38.6
385	40.9	40.3 ⁴	40.9	42.1	41.1	41.5	41.4	41.6	42.4	42.7
390	37.9	38.8 ⁴	39.9	36.9	38.1	37.4	39.3	37.2	39.1	39.4

¹ ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Lima. ² June of each year. ³ March of each year.
⁴ Prior to 1983: Oct. of each year.

¹ Lima. ² Juin de chaque année. ³ Mars de chaque année.
⁴ Avant 1983: oct. de chaque année.

¹ Lima. ² Junio de cada año. ³ Marzo de cada año. ⁴ Antes de 1983: oct. de cada año.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Japan (a)										
<i>Total¹</i>										
31	40.9	40.8	40.8	40.8 ²	40.6	40.8	40.6	40.0	38.8	38.5
321	41.1	40.9	41.3	41.4 ²	41.3	41.6	42.0	41.2	40.1	39.4
322	41.0	41.4	41.8	41.5 ²	41.4	41.5	41.5	40.9	40.0	38.8
323-324	40.9	40.8	41.3	41.0 ²	40.6	40.9	42.0	41.4	40.4	38.7
331	43.3	43.7	44.2	44.8 ²	44.7	45.4	45.2	44.9	43.9	42.5
332	42.8	43.4	43.4	42.8 ²	42.9	43.2	43.8	43.1	42.1	40.9
341	40.6	41.2	41.6	41.8 ²	41.6	41.8	41.1	40.4	40.2	39.4
342	42.5	42.9	43.2	43.3 ²	43.2	43.2	43.8	42.8	41.6	41.0
351-352	37.9	38.0	38.5	38.7 ²	38.5	38.8	38.4	38.1	37.8	37.3
353-354	39.5	39.3	39.8	39.2 ²	39.2	39.0	39.0	39.1	38.7	38.3
355	39.6	40.0	40.9	40.9 ²	40.3	40.6	41.4	41.3	40.6	39.5
36	41.2	41.3	41.9	41.7 ²	41.6	41.7	42.4	42.3	41.6	40.2
371	39.9	39.5	40.6	40.5 ²	39.7	39.5	41.1	41.3	41.5	40.8
372	41.1	41.4	42.0	41.8 ²	41.7	41.8	42.3	41.9	41.7	41.3
381	42.1	42.3	42.8	42.6 ²	42.6	42.7	43.2	43.0	42.3	41.4
382	41.9	41.9	42.8	42.6 ²	42.0	42.3	42.9	42.5	41.7	41.4
383	40.5	41.1	41.7	40.8 ²	40.7	41.0	41.3	40.5	40.1	39.5
384	41.4	41.7	42.7	42.9 ²	41.7	41.9	43.4	43.7	43.0	41.8
385	39.6	40.2	40.7	40.5 ²	40.0	39.9	40.4	40.1	39.6	38.9
390	40.6	40.9	41.3	39.7 ²	39.9	39.9	40.2	39.7	39.0	38.0
Males - Hommes - Hombres¹										
31	43.5	43.7	43.7	43.5 ²	43.3	43.5	44.0	43.4	42.6	41.7
321	43.1	42.9	43.2	43.4 ²	43.2	43.4	44.4	43.8	42.7	42.0
322	43.2	43.5	43.8	43.2 ²	43.1	43.3	43.6	42.9	42.3	41.3
323-324	42.4	42.2	42.7	42.2 ²	42.0	42.3	43.5	43.0	42.0	40.7
331	44.4	45.1	45.5	46.2 ²	46.1	46.8	46.4	46.0	45.2	43.8
332	43.7	44.3	44.3	43.8 ²	43.7	44.1	44.9	44.4	43.4	42.3
341	41.2	41.8	42.3	42.6 ²	42.5	42.7	42.3	41.5	41.6	40.6
342	43.4	43.8	44.1	44.2 ²	44.0	44.1	44.7	43.7	42.6	42.1
351-352	38.4	38.4	39.0	39.3 ²	39.1	39.3	38.9	38.7	38.6	38.0
353-354	39.8	39.5	40.1	39.5 ²	39.4	39.1	39.3	39.4	39.0	38.6
355	40.1	40.8	41.7	41.9 ²	41.1	41.4	42.4	42.3	41.7	40.8
36	41.8	41.9	42.6	42.5 ²	42.2	42.3	43.2	43.2	42.6	41.0
371	40.1	39.7	40.8	40.7 ²	39.8	39.6	41.4	41.6	41.9	41.1
372	41.8	42.1	42.8	42.6 ²	42.5	42.7	43.1	42.7	42.8	42.3
381	43.3	43.6	44.1	44.1 ²	43.9	44.0	44.7	44.5	43.9	42.8
382	42.7	42.6	43.6	43.6 ²	42.8	43.1	43.9	43.6	43.0	42.5
383	42.6	43.2	43.9	43.1 ²	42.7	42.8	43.5	42.7	42.3	41.6
384	42.0	42.3	43.3	43.7 ²	42.4	42.6	44.2	44.6	44.0	42.8
385	41.3	41.8	42.5	42.4 ²	41.6	41.2	42.2	41.9	41.6	40.6
390	42.2	42.4	42.8	41.2 ²	41.4	41.5	42.3	42.0	41.4	40.3
Females - Femmes - Mujeres¹										
31	38.1	37.9	37.8	38.0 ²	37.7	37.9	37.4	36.7	35.4	35.0
321	39.7	39.5	40.0	39.9 ²	39.9	40.1	40.0	39.2	38.0	37.3
322	40.4	40.8	41.2	41.0 ²	41.0	41.1	41.1	40.5	39.5	38.2
323-324	39.5	39.4	39.9	39.7 ²	39.2	39.4	40.7	40.0	38.8	36.7
331	40.9	40.7	41.4	41.5 ²	41.3	41.8	41.6	41.5	40.2	38.8
332	40.5	40.8	41.1	40.3 ²	40.8	41.0	40.8	39.9	38.9	37.7
341	38.5	39.1	39.4	39.1 ²	38.9	38.9	37.9	37.3	36.3	36.3
342	38.9	39.1	39.5	39.4 ²	39.8	39.6	40.6	39.6	38.3	37.5
351-352	36.3	36.3	36.5	36.5 ²	36.3	36.6	36.7	36.1	35.5	34.9
353-354	37.7	37.7	38.0	37.1 ²	37.3	37.4	36.7	36.6	36.2	36.3
355	38.4	38.4	39.1	38.6 ²	38.2	38.6	39.0	38.5	37.8	36.3
36	39.3	39.4	39.5	39.2 ²	39.3	39.6	39.8	39.6	38.6	37.2
371	38.2	38.2	38.8	38.2 ²	37.9	37.8	38.3	38.4	37.9	37.5
372	37.8	38.5	38.4	37.9 ²	37.7	37.9	38.0	37.4	36.6	36.7
381	38.5	38.4	38.9	38.5 ²	38.7	39.0	38.9	38.4	37.5	37.2
382	37.7	38.0	38.4	38.0 ²	37.9	38.3	38.0	37.7	36.6	36.5
383	37.2	38.1	38.3	37.5 ²	37.7	38.2	38.0	37.1	36.8	36.2
384	37.8	38.5	38.9	38.7 ²	37.8	38.1	38.9	38.6	37.5	36.6
385	37.0	37.8	38.0	37.7 ²	37.5	37.8	37.5	37.0	36.3	36.0
390	37.8	38.1	38.6	37.4 ²	37.5	37.5	37.5	37.0	36.2	35.0

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Singapore (a) ¹										
Total ²										
31							46.7	47.6	47.5	47.2
321							47.0	50.0	50.9	50.4
322-324							46.4	48.8	48.3	48.9
33							47.2	49.3	49.0	49.6
34							49.6	49.7	49.6	49.9
35							46.4	47.4	47.8	47.9
36							47.6	50.9	53.3	50.4
37							52.9	55.3	54.5	53.0
381							49.3	50.1	50.0	50.8
382							50.7	49.6	50.4	49.5
383							48.7	49.6	48.2	49.5
384							52.7	53.2	53.4	53.2
385							47.8	45.8	45.7	46.0
390							46.7	45.3	45.8	47.8
EUROPE - EUROPE - EUROPA										
Austria (a) ³										
Total										
31	160.9	153.6	152.3	150.7	148.0	146.5	147.1	146.6	146.8	141.9*
321	139.2	142.0	143.1	142.6	140.1	140.5	141.2	134.2	135.3	134.3*
322	132.4	138.5	138.3	137.1	136.3	135.5	135.9	137.0	136.3	135.9*
323-324	124.6	141.1	140.3	139.3	134.9	137.3	141.8	135.2	135.3	137.6*
33	143.2	150.8	150.6	148.3	147.1	148.4	150.1	148.4	147.7	147.8*
341	150.3	150.6	150.2	149.6	145.8	142.7	138.6	136.2	137.5	137.1*
351-352,354-356	139.9	144.3	143.7	144.3	142.2	139.5	139.2	137.5	137.0	137.1*
361,369	136.5	151.0	152.1	150.7	150.7	150.3	149.2	144.9	144.5	144.5*
362	151.4	153.1	153.1	153.2	148.6	147.5	148.3	145.0	136.1	134.4*
371	134.9	142.8	147.2	147.8	138.9	135.8	141.1	134.7	137.9	132.4*
372	141.2	145.6	146.3	144.5	141.9	137.8	139.9	139.1	137.3	134.5*
381,385	138.5	144.9	146.4	145.5	142.6	138.5	140.9	139.6	139.0	137.4*
382	142.8	143.9	146.5	147.2	144.4	141.5	143.7	144.0	143.3	140.5*
383	136.4	140.3	141.7	141.3	140.1	136.9	138.1	137.2	137.2	136.7*
384	129.2	136.1	136.6	138.8	133.9	129.8	133.1	130.6	135.7	135.5*
Belgique ⁴ (a)										
Total										
311-312	34.6	34.2	33.6	33.6	33.4	33.4	33.5	33.1	...	...
313	33.8	33.5	33.2	33.2	32.6	32.9	33.2	33.7	...	...
314	32.0	32.9	33.4	32.4	31.6	31.1	31.3	31.6	...	...
321	32.7	32.4	32.4	32.1	31.5	31.6	32.0	32.7	...	...
322	32.2	31.3	32.4	31.8	31.4	30.8	30.7	31.2	...	...
323	35.1	35.0	34.3	34.4	30.5	33.4	33.7	33.5	...	...
324	33.9	34.1	34.4	32.7	32.5	30.5	29.2	31.2	...	...
331	34.9	35.3	34.9	35.4	35.0	35.4	35.2	35.4	...	...
332	33.9	31.4	32.8	33.3	33.2	34.3	35.1	35.1	...	...
341	34.7	34.2	33.9	33.7	33.8	32.8	33.8	34.1	...	...
342	34.8	35.1	34.5	33.6	32.3	32.4	33.2	33.3	...	...
351	35.4	34.3	33.7	32.9	32.9	33.0	33.7	32.9	...	...
353	36.9	33.0	33.2	32.4	31.9	33.3	32.4	33.0	...	...
355	36.6	36.0	36.3	36.7	34.8	35.0	35.4	33.5	...	...
361	35.1	35.6	34.6	35.4	34.1	33.9	34.0	34.2	...	...
362	35.0	34.8	34.3	34.6	34.5	33.7	33.3	34.3	...	...
369	35.0	34.3	32.2	33.8	32.9	33.5	34.5	33.1	...	...
372	35.1	35.2	35.1	35.2	32.4	35.3	35.3	35.1	...	...
381	34.0	32.5	33.5	33.9	33.6	33.4	33.7	34.8	...	...
382	32.9	33.9	34.0	33.4	33.7	33.0	33.4	33.7	...	...
383	32.9	33.7	33.3	32.8	33.1	32.2	33.4	33.9	...	...
384	33.4	33.2	32.6	32.1	33.6	32.8	33.3	33.7	...	...
385	34.7	32.8	32.6	33.7	32.8	30.8	32.1	30.7	...	...
390	29.7	32.1	35.8	27.6	32.1	31.3	34.6	33.0	...	...

¹ ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968. See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

² Private sector. Establishments with 25 or more persons employed. ³ Sept. of each year. Employees. ⁴ Par

¹ Secteur privé. Etablissements occupant 25 personnes et plus. ² Sept. de chaque année. Salariés. ³ Par mois.

¹ Sector privado. Establecimientos con 25 o más trabajadores. ² Sept. de cada año. Asalariados. ³ Por mes.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing
Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières
Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Czechoslovakia ¹ (a)										
Total										
311-312	45.4	45.3	45.2	45.1	45.0	44.8	44.7	42.7	42.8	42.9
313	45.1	45.0	44.7	44.4	44.4	44.2	44.4	41.7	42.6	42.1
314	42.4	42.4	42.3	42.3	42.6	42.6	42.2	40.1	40.4	40.6
321	40.8	40.8	40.6	40.7	40.8	40.9	40.7	38.8	38.6	38.3
322	40.1	40.1	40.0	40.1	40.4	40.4	40.1	38.2	38.4	38.7
323	41.0	40.8	40.8	40.9	40.7	40.9	40.9	39.2	38.9	40.5
324	40.9	41.0	41.1	41.0	41.4	41.3	41.3	38.8	38.6	38.1
331	43.5	43.4	43.3	43.5	43.7	43.6	43.5	41.2	41.2	40.7
332	42.8	42.6	42.5	42.5	42.6	42.7	42.6	40.7	40.6	39.6
341	43.5	43.4	43.1	42.9	43.1	43.0	43.0	41.2	41.5	41.2
342	42.8	42.6	42.4	42.4	42.3	42.2	42.1	40.0	40.5	40.8
351	42.6	42.5	42.4	42.3	42.2	42.1	42.0	39.6	40.0	38.9
352	41.9	41.9	41.8	42.0	41.8	41.9	41.8	39.6	40.1	40.9
353	42.4	42.3	42.2	42.2	42.0	41.9	41.8	39.3	39.4	39.2
354	43.7	43.6	43.4	43.5	43.4	43.2	41.7	38.6	41.9	40.8
355	42.6	42.4	42.1	42.3	42.2	42.4	42.2	39.4	39.0	39.5
356	42.0	42.1	42.2	42.3	42.6	42.5	42.7	39.6	36.7	37.7
361	41.2	41.1	41.1	41.3	41.3	41.4	41.4	40.2	39.9	39.5
362	41.8	41.7	41.7	41.8	41.6	41.6	41.6	40.1	40.4	39.9
369	44.6	44.4	44.1	44.3	44.4	44.5	44.3	41.8	41.9	41.3
371	42.5	42.4	42.4	42.2	42.2	42.1	41.9	39.7	40.0	39.0
372	41.9	41.9	41.9	42.0	42.1	42.0	41.6	39.3	39.8	38.4
381	43.2	43.1	43.1	43.3	43.5	43.2	43.2	40.7	40.7	39.9
382	44.6	44.5	44.6	44.6	44.6	44.5	44.4	41.6	41.6	40.1
383	42.2	42.2	42.2	42.4	42.4	42.4	42.2	40.0	40.1	40.7
384	44.0	44.0	43.9	44.1	44.1	44.2	44.1	41.5	41.3	39.6
385	42.8	42.7	42.7	42.5	42.7	42.8	43.1	40.7	39.9	41.1
390	42.1	41.9	41.9	42.0	42.1	41.7	41.6	40.0	38.7	39.4
Denmark (a)										
Total										
313	31.8	32.2	32.1	28.9	31.3	31.3	31.9	32.3	31.5	31.0
314	30.5	30.8	31.3	29.5	30.7	30.2	30.3	30.7	30.0	30.0
321	30.9	31.3	31.9	31.3	31.5	31.2	30.7	30.9	30.5	30.5
322	28.1	28.6	29.5	28.4	29.2	28.2	28.3	28.5	28.0	29.0
323	31.1	31.3	31.5	31.3	31.9	30.5	30.3	30.3	30.0	30.0
324	30.1	30.9	31.4	31.6	31.2	31.3	30.3	30.1	30.0	30.0
331	32.5	33.5	33.9	33.0	33.5	32.8	32.5	32.2	32.0	32.0
332	32.7	33.4	33.5	32.6	34.7	31.7	32.4	32.0	32.0	32.0
341	32.9	33.2	33.4	32.1	33.0	31.7	31.3	31.5	31.0	30.5
351	33.5	33.4	33.5	33.1	33.5	33.0	32.3	32.9	31.5	31.5
352	31.0	31.7	32.2	31.4	33.0	31.5	30.8	31.2	31.0	31.5
353-354	35.2	34.8	35.9	35.4	36.0	35.9	35.2	34.5	34.5	33.0
355	31.7	33.1	32.8	30.9	32.5	31.8	29.6	31.0	30.5	29.5
356	32.5	33.1	32.8	32.1	32.9	32.2	31.4	31.2	30.5	31.0
361-362	30.6	32.1	31.9	30.9	31.9	31.5	31.4	31.3	30.5	30.5
369	33.2	34.2	34.3	33.7	34.1	33.7	33.2	33.1	33.5	32.5
37	32.5	33.6	33.4	32.1	33.3	32.6	32.8	32.3	31.5	32.0
381	33.5	34.1	34.1	33.0	33.9	33.1	32.9	32.7	33.0	33.0
382	33.7	34.0	33.7	33.2	34.1	33.1	32.9	32.9	32.5	32.0
383	32.4	32.9	33.1	31.9	32.9	32.2	32.2	31.8	31.0	31.5
385	32.0	31.7	32.3	31.3	32.4	31.4	30.9	30.8	31.5	31.0
390	30.9	32.1	32.1	30.7	31.0	31.0	30.5	30.9	30.5	30.0

¹ ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ State industry

¹ Industrie d'Etat.

¹ Industria de Estado

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) Pais, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
España (a) ¹										
Total ²										
31	40.4	39.6	38.6	38.6	38.6	37.4	37.7	38.0	37.5	37.6
321	37.4	36.8	36.0	35.2	36.0	34.8	35.3	36.4	36.1	36.5
322.324	36.0	35.9	35.0	35.1	35.3	33.9	34.7	35.5	35.9	35.4
323	38.0	37.4	37.0	36.0	37.6	36.6	35.9	36.5	37.0	36.9
33	39.3	38.8	37.9	37.5	38.1	37.1	36.7	37.9	37.7	37.6
34	38.1	38.0	36.7	36.6	37.3	35.1	36.2	36.8	36.2	36.2
351-352.354	38.5	37.9	37.3	36.8	36.8	35.2	36.4	36.7	37.1	36.7
353	39.3	36.1	35.3	35.2	35.2	35.0	36.0	35.5	37.1	35.8
355-356	37.7	37.1	37.0	36.6	35.8	35.2	35.2	36.4	36.3	36.1
36	37.9	37.5	37.2	36.7	37.6	36.1	36.2	37.2	37.2	37.2
37	35.8	36.3	35.7	35.4	34.5	34.0	34.7	35.6	36.4	35.9
381	37.8	37.8	36.5	36.2	36.9	35.5	36.0	36.7	36.8	36.8
382	38.0	37.1	36.1	35.2	36.5	35.3	35.3	37.4	36.9	36.1
383	36.7	35.6	35.2	35.9	35.8	33.6	33.9	36.1	36.1	36.3
384	36.9	35.6	33.6	34.1	34.5	33.6	34.6	35.8	35.7	35.7
385	40.8	39.4	36.2	35.6	35.4	35.0	36.1	35.7	36.2	36.4
390	38.2	37.3	37.2	35.8	37.2	35.7	35.9	36.5	35.7	35.4
Males - Hommes - Hombres ²										
31	41.6	40.9	39.6	39.5	39.4	38.5	38.9	39.2	38.7	38.6
321	38.3	37.3	36.1	36.0	36.1	35.2	36.3	37.3	36.8	37.4
322.324	37.8	38.1	37.1	37.6	36.9	35.4	36.4	37.4	38.3	37.4
323	38.6	37.9	37.4	37.1	38.1	37.7	36.2	36.9	37.0	37.8
33	39.5	39.0	38.1	37.7	38.1	37.3	36.9	38.0	38.1	37.9
34	38.4	38.4	37.0	36.9	37.6	35.4	36.7	37.2	36.7	36.7
351-352.354	38.9	38.4	37.5	37.3	37.0	35.5	36.7	37.3	37.4	37.0
353	39.3	36.9	36.3	35.6	36.4	35.4	36.0	35.8	37.1	36.1
355-356	37.9	37.4	37.6	36.9	35.8	35.3	35.5	36.6	36.5	36.3
36	38.1	37.8	37.3	36.9	38.0	36.3	36.3	37.4	37.4	37.4
37	35.8	36.4	35.7	35.5	34.4	33.9	34.6	35.6	36.4	36.0
381	38.0	38.0	36.7	36.3	36.9	35.5	36.2	36.8	37.0	37.0
382	38.1	37.1	36.3	35.6	36.6	35.4	35.4	37.6	37.0	36.1
383	36.8	35.9	35.4	36.0	36.1	33.5	34.1	36.0	36.3	36.4
384	36.9	35.6	33.5	34.0	34.5	33.5	34.5	35.8	35.7	35.7
385	41.0	40.1	37.3	36.6	34.9	35.3	36.4	36.5	35.9	36.6
390	39.6	39.0	38.1	36.8	37.9	36.5	35.7	37.3	36.8	36.4
Females - Femmes - Mujeres ²										
31	36.7	35.8	35.8	36.0	36.2	34.3	34.4	34.8	34.4	35.0
321	36.2	36.2	36.0	34.2	35.8	34.2	34.3	35.4	35.2	35.4
322.324	35.3	34.9	34.0	33.7	34.5	33.2	33.9	34.7	34.9	34.6
323	36.5	36.1	36.2	33.9	36.0	33.2	35.5	35.7	37.1	35.5
33	36.8	35.0	31.9	34.2	37.3	34.4	35.2	36.5	34.0	34.0
34	36.9	36.3	35.0	35.1	35.7	33.7	34.5	34.9	33.9	34.2
351-352.354	36.6	36.0	36.5	34.4	36.1	33.7	34.6	34.7	36.1	35.9
353	39.7	28.5	26.8	26.7	24.5	30.5	36.4	32.8	34.9	31.0
355-356	36.8	35.8	34.8	35.0	35.8	34.5	33.5	35.3	35.3	35.2
36	36.6	35.6	36.4	35.0	34.1	34.0	34.9	35.2	35.8	35.6
37	36.9	34.9	34.3	32.8	38.5	35.0	38.4	37.9	35.9	34.6
381	35.3	34.7	33.7	34.5	35.8	35.3	33.4	34.5	34.2	34.4
382	36.2	36.5	34.0	29.3	33.9	34.1	33.7	35.8	35.8	36.2
383	36.2	34.4	34.3	35.8	34.6	33.8	33.2	36.3	35.5	36.0
384	36.4	36.3	36.5	35.8	34.8	35.4	36.0	35.8	34.6	34.7
385	39.3	36.2	32.7	32.6	38.0	34.0	34.5	33.2	37.1	36.2
390	33.0	30.8	33.3	32.3	34.8	33.6	36.3	34.5	33.5	33.2

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Employed persons incl. armed forces. ² Persons aged 16 years and over.

¹ Personnes occupées y compris les forces armées. ² Personnes âgées de 16 ans et plus.

¹ Personas ocupadas incl. las fuerzas armadas. ² Personas de 16 años y más.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS
B
By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Type (a) Hours actually worked
(b) Hours paid for

Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées
(b) Heures rémunérées

Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas
(b) Horas pagadas

Country, type - ISIC code (a)
Pays, type - Code CITI (a)
País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Finland (a)										
Total										
311-312	34.2	33.6	33.5	33.6	33.4	33.2	33.0	33.1	32.5	...
313	32.9	33.3	33.0	33.8	33.8	33.2	33.5	33.0	32.6	...
314	31.9	32.0	32.1	31.4	31.6	32.8	33.0	30.6	29.5	...
321	32.1	31.7	31.9	31.9	31.0	30.9	30.7	30.5	29.7	...
322	32.2	32.0	31.3	31.4	30.9	30.8	31.0	31.1	30.4	...
323	31.7	31.4	32.0	31.5	31.6	31.4	30.5	30.5	31.7	...
324	32.5	32.0	32.6	32.2	32.9	31.1	31.6	31.4	32.0	...
331	31.3	32.1	32.1	31.8	31.6	32.1	32.7	32.0	31.5	...
332	33.7	33.4	33.4	33.0	32.4	32.1	32.1	31.9	31.3	...
341	31.3	31.5	32.1	31.3	31.2	32.0	31.8	31.6	30.4	...
342	30.5	30.2	29.7	29.9	29.9	29.7	29.8	29.1	28.5	...
351	32.8	32.9	32.7	32.4	31.9	31.7	31.5	31.7	30.8	...
352	32.9	33.3	32.7	32.7	32.3	32.4	32.4	32.5	31.3	...
353	37.7	37.0	36.6	35.4	36.0	35.2	35.5	32.4	31.2	...
354	33.0	34.1	33.9	33.8	33.9	33.1	32.5	33.7	32.1	...
355	31.0	30.6	30.7	31.3	31.2	30.6	30.7	29.9	29.8	...
356	33.3	33.3	33.0	33.2	32.6	32.7	31.9	32.3	33.0	...
361	32.2	32.6	30.9	31.1	31.4	31.7	30.9	29.9	31.2	...
362	32.0	32.4	32.8	33.0	31.5	32.5	31.6	32.1	31.5	...
369	34.2	33.5	33.2	32.9	32.9	33.1	33.2	33.0	31.8	...
371	32.5	32.0	32.7	32.7	32.4	32.5	31.8	32.0	31.5	...
372	33.3	32.5	32.4	32.5	32.4	31.8	30.8	31.0	31.0	...
381	32.7	32.5	32.3	32.6	32.5	32.9	32.9	32.5	31.8	...
382	32.8	32.8	33.1	33.8	33.2	33.4	32.8	32.8	32.0	...
383	33.2	32.6	32.8	33.0	32.5	32.5	32.3	32.0	31.4	...
384	32.6	32.0	31.9	31.0	31.2	31.4	31.6	30.6	31.6	...
385	32.8	32.0	33.4	33.4	31.3	32.1	34.3	33.6	33.4	...
390	32.0	33.0	32.5	32.3	32.0	32.5	32.9	33.0	32.6	...
France ¹ (a) ²										
Total										
31	39.70	39.50	39.40	39.30 ³	39.10	39.30	39.30	39.10	39.20	39.06
313				38.70	38.40	38.60	38.70	38.50	38.40	38.29
314				38.00	38.00	37.80	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00
321	39.00	39.00	39.10	39.00 ³	39.00	38.90	39.00	39.00	38.80	38.94
322	39.20	39.00	38.90	39.00 ³	39.10	39.00	39.10	39.10	39.00	39.09
323	39.10	38.90	39.10	39.20 ³	39.00	38.90	39.00	38.80	39.00	38.85
324	39.50	39.20	39.20	39.10 ³	39.20	39.10	39.20	39.10	39.20	39.31
331	39.70	39.60	39.40	39.40 ³	39.30	39.40	39.40	39.40	39.50	39.34
332	39.50	38.60	39.00	39.20 ³	39.20	39.20	39.50	39.30	39.40	39.16
341	38.80	38.80	38.60	38.40 ³	38.40	38.50	38.50	38.50	38.50	38.40
342	39.00	38.70	38.60	38.70 ³	38.70	38.80	38.80	38.80	38.80	38.80
351				37.60	37.70	37.70	37.90	37.80	37.80	37.76
352				38.30	38.30	38.30	38.20	38.40	38.30	38.29
355	39.20	38.80	38.70	38.60 ³	38.50	38.50	38.50	38.30	38.40	38.50
356	39.10	39.00	39.00	38.90 ³	38.90	38.90	39.00	38.90	39.00	38.91
362	38.90	38.70	38.60	38.40 ³	38.50	37.70	38.50	38.30	38.40	38.40
371	39.10	38.30	37.60	37.80 ³	37.60	38.50	38.50	38.50	38.80	38.70
372	39.10	38.50	38.40	38.20 ³	38.10	38.20	38.20	38.10	38.10	38.02
383	39.10	38.50	38.30	38.70 ³	38.70	38.80	38.80	38.80	38.80	38.70
384				38.80	38.60	38.70	38.80	38.70	38.80	38.65

¹ ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Oct. of each year. ² Wage earners. ³ Beginning April 1985: revised series.

¹ Oct. de chaque année. ² Ouvriers. ³ A partir d'avril 1985: série révisée.

¹ Oct. de cada año. ² Obreros. ³ A partir de abril de 1985: serie revisada.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - (ISIC code (a)) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Germany ¹ (b)										
<i>Total</i>										
31	43.1	42.8	42.7	42.7	42.7	42.6	42.6	42.4	42.1	41.6
314	.	40.3	39.5	40.2	40.1	40.0	40.1	39.0	38.7	37.9
321	40.1	40.5	40.9	41.0	40.9	40.8	40.8	40.8	40.2	39.8
322	38.4	39.0	39.2	39.4	39.6	39.4	39.5	39.5	38.9	38.6
323	39.2	38.9	39.5	39.9	39.8	39.6	39.7	39.8	39.4	38.9
324	39.6	39.3	39.6	39.8	39.7	39.3	39.8	39.9	39.4	38.9
331	41.4	41.9	42.2	42.0	42.2	41.9	41.8	41.7	41.3	40.9
332	39.4	40.1	40.5	40.4	40.5	40.4	40.4	40.4	39.6	39.5
341	43.1	43.5	43.5	42.8	42.4	42.8	43.6	42.9	41.5	40.4
342	41.4	41.7	41.7	40.7	40.3	40.3	39.8	39.3	39.3	39.1
351	41.0	41.0	40.7	40.6	40.4	40.5	40.9	40.3	39.7	39.5
352	40.7	40.8	40.9	40.9	40.8	40.7	40.8	40.5	40.0	39.9
353	40.8	40.9	40.8	40.7	40.6	40.4	40.6	40.3	39.4	39.6
355	40.3	40.3	40.9	41.1	40.8	40.8	41.1	40.9	40.0	39.5
356	40.8	41.0	41.2	41.1	41.0	40.8	40.9	40.7	40.2	40.0
361	40.0	39.8	40.0	40.2	40.1	40.0	40.6	40.9	40.7	39.6
362	40.8	41.2	41.2	40.9	40.9	41.1	41.8	41.6	40.4	39.7
369	42.5	43.2	43.1	42.4	42.9	42.9	43.4	43.8	43.4	43.0
371	40.5	39.3	41.4	40.7	39.9	39.4	40.4	39.9	39.4	38.7
372	41.3	41.5	42.0	41.2	40.9	40.6	40.4	40.1	39.7	39.4
381	41.0	40.7	41.3	40.7	40.5	40.2	40.0	39.8	39.6	39.4
382	40.8	39.9	41.2	41.2	40.9	40.2	39.9	40.1	39.7	38.9
383	40.0	40.0	40.5	39.9	39.5	39.2	38.8	38.4	38.2	38.0
384	39.8	40.0	40.6	40.2	39.7	39.4	39.0	39.0	38.7	38.7
385	39.6	39.1	40.0	39.7	39.4	38.7	38.2	38.1	38.1	37.7
390	39.6	39.2	39.8	39.7	39.8	39.3	39.0	39.0	38.4	38.3
<i>Males - Hommes - Hombres</i>										
31	44.3	43.9	43.6	43.6	43.6	43.5	43.5	43.2	43.0	42.5
314	.	40.8	39.7	40.5	40.4	40.3	40.4	39.1	38.9	37.9
321	41.4	42.1	42.2	42.2	42.0	41.8	41.9	41.8	41.1	40.6
322	40.0	40.7	40.9	40.8	41.0	41.0	41.0	40.7	40.3	39.9
323	40.0	40.0	40.4	40.7	40.5	40.5	40.6	40.5	40.1	39.6
324	40.3	40.1	40.4	40.6	40.3	40.1	40.5	40.6	40.1	39.6
331	41.6	42.2	42.4	42.2	42.4	42.1	42.0	41.9	41.5	41.0
332	39.8	40.4	40.8	40.7	40.8	40.7	40.6	40.7	39.9	39.8
341	43.5	43.7	43.7	43.0	42.6	43.0	43.8	43.0	41.5	40.5
342	41.7	42.0	42.0	40.9	40.5	40.6	40.1	39.6	39.6	39.3
351	41.1	41.1	40.8	40.6	40.4	40.6	41.0	40.3	39.7	39.5
352	41.2	41.3	41.4	41.3	41.3	41.2	41.2	40.9	40.3	40.3
353	40.8	40.9	40.8	40.7	40.7	40.4	40.6	40.3	39.4	39.7
355	40.6	40.5	41.1	41.3	41.1	41.1	41.3	41.1	40.1	39.7
356	41.4	41.7	41.8	41.5	41.5	41.3	41.4	41.1	40.6	40.4
361	40.8	40.5	40.7	40.7	40.8	40.7	41.5	41.8	41.4	40.4
362	41.1	41.6	41.5	41.1	41.2	41.4	42.1	41.9	40.6	39.9
369	42.5	43.4	43.2	42.5	43.0	43.0	43.5	43.9	43.5	43.1
371	40.6	39.4	41.4	40.8	39.9	39.4	40.5	39.9	39.5	38.7
372	41.5	41.7	42.2	41.4	41.1	40.8	40.6	40.3	39.8	39.5
381	41.5	41.1	41.8	41.1	41.0	40.6	40.4	40.3	40.0	39.8
382	40.9	40.0	41.3	41.4	41.1	40.3	40.0	40.2	39.8	39.1
383	40.7	40.7	40.9	40.3	40.0	39.6	39.2	38.9	38.7	38.5
384	40.0	40.1	40.8	40.3	39.8	39.5	39.0	39.1	38.7	38.7
385	40.0	39.5	40.3	40.2	39.8	39.1	38.5	38.4	38.4	38.0
390	40.1	39.6	40.1	40.1	40.2	39.7	39.4	39.4	38.6	38.7

^(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ The series relates to the territory of the Fed. Rep. of Germany before 3.10.1990.

¹ La série se réfère au territoire de la Rép. féd. d'Allemagne avant le 3.10.1990.

¹ La serie se refiere al territorio de la Rep. Fed. de Alemania antes del 3.10.1990.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Type (a) Hours actually worked
(b) Hours paid for

Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées
(b) Heures rémunérées

Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas
(b) Horas pagadas

Country, type - ISIC code (a)

Pays, type - Code CITI (a)

Pais, tipo - Clave CIU (a)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Germany ¹ (b)										
<i>Females - Femmes - Mujeres</i>										
31	40.2	40.2	40.3	40.4	40.4	40.3	40.2	40.2	39.8	39.3
314	.	39.9	39.4	40.0	39.9	39.8	39.8	38.9	38.5	38.0
321	38.9	39.0	39.5	39.6	39.6	39.5	39.4	39.5	39.0	38.6
322	38.2	38.8	39.0	39.2	39.4	39.2	39.3	39.3	38.7	38.3
323	38.7	38.4	39.1	39.5	39.5	39.2	39.2	39.5	39.1	38.5
324	39.1	38.9	39.1	39.4	39.3	38.8	39.3	39.5	39.0	38.4
331	38.6	39.4	40.1	40.1	39.7	39.6	39.7	39.6	39.2	38.8
332	37.7	38.6	38.8	39.0	39.2	39.1	39.1	39.2	38.5	38.2
341	39.4	39.8	40.2	40.2	40.0	40.1	40.0	40.1	39.9	39.0
342	40.2	40.2	40.3	39.5	39.1	39.1	38.6	38.2	39.1	38.0
351	40.0	40.1	39.8	39.9	39.8	39.9	40.2	39.5	39.1	39.0
352	39.5	39.7	39.9	39.9	39.8	39.8	39.8	39.6	39.1	39.1
353	40.1	40.2	40.4	40.1	40.0	39.7	40.0	39.6	39.0	39.0
355	39.5	39.3	39.9	40.2	39.9	39.9	39.9	39.9	39.3	38.8
356	39.4	39.2	39.9	39.8	39.6	39.5	39.6	39.5	39.1	38.8
361	39.1	38.8	39.1	39.5	39.3	39.1	39.6	39.8	39.7	38.6
362	39.2	39.2	39.6	39.7	39.5	39.3	39.7	39.8	39.3	38.5
369	39.6	38.8	39.6	39.6	39.7	39.7	39.8	40.1	39.5	39.0
371	39.2	38.8	40.0	39.2	38.6	38.4	38.6	38.3	38.0	37.7
372	39.6	39.6	40.2	39.7	39.4	39.0	38.8	38.5	38.3	38.1
381	39.6	39.4	39.9	39.2	39.0	38.9	38.5	38.2	38.1	37.9
382	38.9	38.3	39.7	39.3	38.9	38.6	38.2	38.0	37.7	37.3
383	39.0	39.0	39.9	39.2	38.7	38.4	38.0	37.6	37.5	37.3
384	38.6	39.1	39.8	39.4	38.8	38.6	38.2	38.3	37.9	37.9
385	39.0	38.5	39.6	39.1	38.7	38.2	37.8	37.6	37.6	37.4
390	39.0	38.7	39.5	39.3	39.3	38.8	38.6	38.5	38.1	37.9

Germany ² (b)

Total

31	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.9
321	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.0
322	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.2
323	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.3
324	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.8
331	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.1
332	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.6
341	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.5
342	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.1
351	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.0
352	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.0
353	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.8
355	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.3
356	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.6
361	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.4
362	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.8
369	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.3
371	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.5
372	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.7
381	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.4
382	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.5
383	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.2
384	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.2
385	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.5

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ The series relates to the territory of the Fed. Rep. of Germany before 3.10.1990. ² 5 new Länder.¹ La série se réfère au territoire de la Rép. féd. d'Allemagne avant le 3.10.1990. ² 5 nouveaux Länder.¹ La serie se refiere al territorio de la Rep. Fed. de Alemania antes del 3.10.1990. ² 5 nuevos Länder.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for	Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées	Type (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas							
Country, type - ISIC code ^(a) Pays, type - Code CITI ^(a) País, tipo - Clave CIU ^(a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Germany ¹ (b)										
<i>Males - Hommes - Hombres</i>										
31										41.2
321										40.2
322										40.7
323										40.7
324										40.2
331										41.2
332										40.8
341										40.5
342										40.3
351										40.1
352										41.1
353										39.9
354										40.5
355										41.7
356										40.6
361										40.9
362										41.3
369										39.5
371										39.8
372										40.6
381										40.5
382										40.3
383										40.3
384										39.6
<i>Females - Femmes - Mujeres</i>										
31										40.2
321										39.8
322										40.0
323										40.1
324										39.6
331										40.1
332										40.3
341										40.2
342										39.8
351										39.9
352										40.8
353										39.6
354										40.0
355										41.2
356										40.1
361										40.5
362										39.8
369										39.1
371										39.7
372										39.0
381										40.1
382										39.8
383										39.7
384										39.5

^(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968 See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ 5 new Länder.

¹ 5 nouveaux Länder.

¹ 5 nuevos Länder.

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing
Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières
Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Grèce ¹ (b)										
Total ²										
311-312	36.9	41.4 ³	37.2	38.6 ³	38.9	39.3	41.7	41.3	41.4	...
313	39.7	39.7 ³	40.5	40.8 ³	39.9	40.1	41.2	41.3	41.5	...
314	37.3	35.5 ³	36.8	38.5 ³	38.5	38.4	40.7	40.6	40.4	...
321	38.1	39.2 ³	37.8	39.2 ³	39.3	39.9	40.8	41.8	40.8	...
322,324	37.1	37.3 ³	37.6	38.6 ³	38.7	38.9	40.3	40.7	40.3	...
323	38.6	41.0 ³	38.4	38.5 ³	38.4	38.6	40.3	40.3	41.0	...
331	38.6	36.6 ³	37.1	38.9 ³	39.2	38.5	40.3	40.8	40.5	...
332	38.3	38.7 ³	38.1	38.2 ³	38.4	38.7	40.3	40.4	40.4	...
341	39.6	40.2 ³	39.7	40.2 ³	39.2	39.4	41.5	41.4	42.0	...
342	39.9	39.5 ³	40.1	39.8 ³	39.4	40.1	41.3	41.0	41.2	...
351	40.4	39.2 ³	39.6	40.4 ³	40.1	40.5	41.6	41.4	41.3	...
354	38.7	39.6 ³	40.1	41.4 ³	42.3	40.9	41.3	41.9	41.8	...
355	38.5	38.7 ³	38.1	39.5 ³	39.2	39.4	40.7	40.6	40.7	...
36	39.8	39.3 ³	39.5	39.4 ³	39.5	39.3	41.1	41.5	41.8	...
37	42.3	40.3 ³	40.9	41.2 ³	41.6	40.8	42.4	43.2	43.3	...
381	39.8	38.8 ³	38.3	39.4 ³	39.0	39.3	41.2	41.2	41.6	...
382	37.5	38.7 ³	37.2	39.5 ³	39.9	39.7	40.8	41.4	41.4	...
383	38.4	38.3 ³	39.3	39.4 ³	38.9	38.7	40.6	41.4	41.5	...
384	41.6	39.9 ³	38.4	40.4 ³	38.9	40.6	42.5	42.2	42.2	...
390	38.6	37.6 ³	38.2	38.7 ³	38.3	38.7	40.3	40.6	40.3	...
Males - Hommes - Hombres ²										
311-312	39.2	42.9 ³	39.6	40.1 ³	40.7	40.6	42.3	41.8	41.9	...
313	41.3	40.1 ³	40.8	41.7 ³	41.0	41.0	41.4	41.6	41.8	...
314	37.1	37.3 ³	38.2	39.4 ³	39.5	39.9	41.6	41.0	41.0	...
321	39.9	39.8 ³	38.3	40.3 ³	39.9	39.5	41.7	41.3	41.2	...
322,324	37.4	35.4 ³	38.4	39.4 ³	39.5	40.3	41.5	40.6	40.4	...
323	37.6	41.4 ³	38.5	38.3 ³	38.3	38.7	40.6	40.4	41.5	...
331	38.7	36.9 ³	37.9	39.2 ³	39.5	38.6	40.2	40.8	40.5	...
332	38.3	38.8 ³	38.2	38.3 ³	38.4	38.9	40.4	40.5	40.5	...
341	39.5	40.5 ³	40.0	40.5 ³	39.4	39.4	41.9	41.7	42.6	...
342	40.1	39.9 ³	40.4	40.2 ³	39.8	40.3	41.5	41.1	41.5	...
351	41.0	39.1 ³	39.4	40.9 ³	40.6	41.3	42.1	41.7	41.7	...
354	38.9	39.7 ³	40.3	41.5 ³	42.4	40.9	41.4	42.0	42.0	...
355	37.1	38.7 ³	39.3	39.5 ³	39.4	39.6	40.9	40.6	41.0	...
36	40.0	39.5 ³	39.7	39.9 ³	39.8	39.7	41.2	41.6	41.9	...
37	42.3	40.3 ³	41.0	41.2 ³	41.6	40.8	42.5	43.0	43.3	...
381	39.5	38.7 ³	38.6	39.6 ³	39.2	39.5	41.3	41.3	41.8	...
382	37.5	38.7 ³	37.3	39.5 ³	39.9	39.7	40.8	41.4	41.5	...
383	39.3	38.7 ³	39.3	39.6 ³	39.3	38.8	40.9	41.8	41.8	...
384	41.7	39.9 ³	38.4	40.4 ³	38.9	40.6	42.6	42.3	42.3	...
390	38.5	38.7 ³	38.2	38.8 ³	38.5	38.9	40.4	40.4	40.3	...
Females - Femmes - Mujeres ²										
311-312	34.6	39.6 ³	34.9	37.2 ³	37.5	38.2	41.4	40.9	40.9	...
313	36.0	38.7 ³	39.9	39.0 ³	37.9	38.6	40.9	40.7	40.8	...
314	37.4	34.7 ³	36.0	38.0 ³	38.8	37.3	40.1	40.3	40.1	...
321	37.1	38.9 ³	37.5	38.5 ³	38.9	38.5	40.2	40.5	40.5	...
322,324	37.0	37.7 ³	37.4	38.4 ³	38.6	38.6	40.1	40.7	40.2	...
323	40.5	40.3 ³	38.2	38.9 ³	38.4	38.4	39.7	40.3	40.3	...
331	38.1	35.9 ³	35.3	38.0 ³	38.3	38.1	40.3	40.9	40.4	...
332	37.7	36.6 ³	37.5	36.7 ³	37.2	35.5	39.9	40.0	40.0	...
341	39.7	39.6 ³	38.8	39.4 ³	38.4	39.3	40.8	40.7	40.8	...
342	39.3	38.8 ³	39.5	39.1 ³	38.8	39.6	41.0	40.7	40.7	...
351	39.7	39.3 ³	39.9	39.8 ³	39.6	39.7	41.0	41.0	40.8	...
354	37.5	38.2 ³	36.8	40.0 ³	40.5	41.3	40.6	40.5	40.1	...
355	40.2	38.7 ³	38.1	39.6 ³	38.8	39.0	40.2	40.5	40.2	...
36	38.7	38.3 ³	38.0	37.8 ³	37.9	37.6	40.5	40.9	40.8	...
37	38.7	39.7 ³	38.7	41.1 ³	41.7	40.0	41.8	41.6	41.4	...
381	40.8	39.0 ³	37.4	38.4 ³	38.2	38.5	40.7	40.6	40.7	...
382	35.1	38.1 ³	32.5	38.0 ³	39.3	36.3	38.6	40.2	39.9	...
383	39.6	37.5 ³	38.9	38.7 ³	38.0	38.4	40.0	40.4	40.8	...
384	40.3	38.7 ³	38.0	37.9 ³	38.2	39.0	40.0	40.4	40.3	...
390	38.7	36.1 ³	38.1	38.6 ³	38.1	38.5	40.1	40.8	40.3	...

^(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Establishments with 10 or more persons employed. ¹ Etablissements occupant 10 personnes et plus. ¹ Establecimientos con 10 y más trabajadores. ² Nov. de

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code ^(a) Pays, type - Code CITI ^(a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU ^(a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Hongrie ¹ (a) ²										
Total										
311-312	160	158	153	150	150	153	152	150	149	149*
313	165	163	157	153	152	155	154	151	155	150*
314	150	148	143	142	141	144	144	141	140	169*
321	150	148	143	141	141	145	144	141	139	134*
322	149	147	143	139	138	141	144	138	138	139*
323	149	151	144	143	141	148	145	137	130	138*
324	151	149	144	143	141	146	144	142	142	142*
331	152	151	145	143	143	148	145	132	142	146*
332	154	153	147	146	146	148	147	143	141	140*
341	150	150	147	146	144	147	147	142	140	141*
342	150	149	147	147	146	150	148	139	145	146*
351	151	150	147	146	146	148	148	147	145	144*
352	153	151	148	145	144	147	149	142	144	143*
353	152	153	149	145	148	151	149	148	147	148*
355	154	153	147	147	147	151	149	144	140	130*
356	150	147	142	140	139	146	146	143	133	139*
361	153	152	147	144	143	146	146	142	136	140*
362	149	149	146	145	143	146	145	143	143	134*
369	158	157	151	147	146	149	150	144	148	142*
371	153	153	149	147	146	148	148	159	142	136*
372	152	151	146	145	144	147	146	143	143	139*
381	153	151	144	143	143	146	145	137	139	141*
382	157	155	148	146	146	150	148	135	142	141*
383	154	152	146	145	143	147	147	141	141	142*
384	155	153	146	146	144	148	147	143	142	133*
385	154	153	146	145	147	147	147	139	141	137*
390	152	151	145	142	141	145	145	142	138	137*
Ireland ³ (a)										
Total ⁴										
311-312	43.6	43.6	42.8	43.4 ⁵	43.4	41.7	42.2	42.4	42.1	...
313	45.4	45.7	46.0	45.0 ⁵	45.5	45.2	46.0	45.4	44.4	...
314	40.0	39.4	41.3	40.0 ⁵	38.9	39.4	39.6	39.6	38.7	...
321 ⁶	39.0	38.9	39.7	39.1 ⁵	39.4	40.1	40.0	39.8	39.5	...
322 ⁷	37.5	37.2	36.7	37.7 ⁵	38.2	38.0	38.5	37.7	36.8	...
323-324 ⁸	34.8	36.6	37.4	38.3 ⁵	38.9	35.9	38.3	39.4	39.6	...
332	39.3	40.3	40.2	39.8 ⁵	39.6	39.4	41.5	40.0	41.1	...
341	42.8	43.7	43.5	41.3 ⁵	43.7	45.2	44.6	44.7	44.2	...
342	41.0	40.3	40.6	40.1 ⁵	40.4	40.5	42.0	41.9	41.0	...
351-352	41.7	43.8	43.7	43.9 ⁵	43.3	44.5	43.9	45.0	44.1	...
355	39.8	39.1	39.3	40.2 ⁵	42.9	40.4	40.2	40.6	39.3	...
356	40.3	40.2	40.5	40.4 ⁵	40.4	40.8	40.8	40.7	40.6	...
36	40.0	40.0	40.5	39.8 ⁵	39.7	40.4	42.5	42.9	43.6	...
361-362	37.4	36.9	37.6	37.9 ⁵	37.8	38.4	40.2	40.2	39.9	...
369	42.4	42.8	43.1	41.8 ⁵	41.7	42.6	44.6	45.2	46.6	...
37	33.3	41.4	42.8	41.6 ⁵	41.7	43.7	41.4	41.5	41.7	...
381	40.3	40.7	41.0	41.1 ⁵	40.8	41.9	42.1	42.6	43.1	...
382 ⁹	39.6	40.6	40.7	41.9 ⁵	41.2	41.4	42.0	42.1	40.8	...
383	38.4	39.8	39.6	38.6 ⁵	40.2	40.7	43.0	40.8	40.8	...
385	40.1	40.0	42.0	41.0 ⁵	40.2	40.6	41.5	40.2	40.5	...
390	40.4	38.0	40.8	40.6 ⁵	40.7	39.8	41.3	40.7	41.1	...

^(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Socialised sector. ² Per month. ³ Sep. of each year.
⁴ Incl. juveniles. ⁵ Revised series. ⁶ Excl. made-up textile products. ⁷ Incl. made-up textile products. ⁸ Excl. fur. ⁹ Excl. manufacture of office and computing machinery.

¹ Secteur socialisé. ² Par mois. ³ Sept. de chaque année.
⁴ Y compris les jeunes gens. ⁵ Série révisée. ⁶ Non compris la confection d'ouvrages en tissu. ⁷ Y compris la confection d'ouvrages en tissu. ⁸ Non compris la fourrure. ⁹ Non compris la fabrication de machines de bureau et de machines à calculer.

¹ Sector socializado. ² Por mes. ³ Sept. de cada año.
⁴ Incl. los jóvenes. ⁵ Serie revisada. ⁶ Excl. los artículos confeccionados de materiales textiles. ⁷ Incl. los artículos confeccionados de materiales textiles. ⁸ Excl. las pieles. ⁹ Excl. la construcción de máquinas de oficina y cálculo.

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing
Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières
Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipe (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Ireland ¹ (a)										
<i>Males - Hommes - Hombres ²</i>										
311-312	45.6	45.7	44.4	45.0 ³	44.9	43.2	43.7	44.0	43.8	...
313	46.8	46.5	46.7	45.9 ³	46.5	46.0	46.7	46.1	45.6	...
314	41.5	41.3	43.6	41.4 ³	40.7	41.3	41.3	41.2	41.1	...
321 ⁴	39.9	40.2	41.9	40.5 ³	40.9	41.4	41.7	42.0	41.5	...
322 ⁵	39.7	39.9	39.8	40.7 ³	40.4	40.0	41.4	41.0	38.8	...
323-324 ⁶	35.3	38.5	40.0	38.0 ³	39.4	36.5	38.0	40.1	41.2	...
332	39.3	40.5	40.5	39.9 ³	39.8	39.4	41.8	40.2	41.7	...
34	43.0	42.8	42.9	41.8 ³	41.9	42.8	43.6	43.9	42.8	...
341	44.8	46.0	46.1	43.1 ³	45.7	47.6	46.6	46.9	46.4	...
342	41.9	41.1	41.4	40.6 ³	40.8	41.1	42.6	42.8	41.3	...
351-352	43.3	45.6	45.5	45.6 ³	44.9	46.2	45.4	46.7	45.8	...
355	40.1	39.5	39.7	40.5 ³	43.6	41.8	41.9	42.3	39.9	...
356	41.3	41.2	41.7	41.7 ³	41.4	41.8	41.8	42.2	42.3	...
36	40.6	40.9	41.3	40.4 ³	40.2	40.9	43.1	43.6	44.5	...
361-362	37.6	37.4	38.1	38.5 ³	38.3	38.7	40.6	40.7	40.5	...
369	42.7	43.1	43.4	42.0 ³	42.0	42.9	45.0	45.8	47.3	...
37	33.3	41.6	43.2	42.0 ³	41.7	43.9	41.6	41.6	42.0	...
381	40.6	41.1	41.7	41.7 ³	41.3	42.3	42.4	43.0	43.8	...
382 ⁷	40.0	41.0	40.8	42.0 ³	41.4	41.7	42.5	42.7	41.0	...
383	41.2	42.1	40.9	41.3 ³	42.4	42.0	44.8	43.2	42.6	...
385	41.9	42.4	43.7	42.6 ³	43.0	44.0	43.5	42.8	43.3	...
390	41.0	39.2	41.0	41.4 ³	41.8	42.1	43.0	44.0	42.2	...
<i>Females - Femmes - Mujeres ²</i>										
311-312	36.8	36.5	36.3	37.5 ³	37.7	36.5	37.0	37.6	36.6	...
313	32.1	36.2	37.3	34.9 ³	35.5	36.1	37.7	35.9	33.7	...
314	38.2	37.2	38.8	38.2 ³	36.8	37.4	37.8	37.8	35.3	...
321 ⁴	37.3	36.9	36.1	36.8 ³	37.2	38.3	37.7	37.3	37.2	...
322 ⁵	36.9	36.5	36.1	37.7 ³	37.7	37.7	37.9	37.2	36.3	...
323-324 ⁶	34.3	35.6	33.5	38.6 ³	38.2	35.0	38.4	38.5	37.5	...
332	38.9	38.7	38.4	38.2 ³	36.8	35.8	36.0	39.0	34.9	...
34	38.5	38.0	37.3	37.2 ³	38.1	38.3	39.6	38.5	38.8	...
341	37.6	37.5	36.2	36.5 ³	38.1	39.0	39.3	38.9	37.5	...
342	39.2	38.4	38.0	37.6 ³	38.0	37.9	39.8	38.3	39.3	...
351-352	34.8	37.2	36.9	37.6 ³	37.0	38.8	38.8	39.7	39.3	...
355	37.1	36.1	37.0	38.9 ³	40.5	35.8	35.9	35.2	36.1	...
356	37.5	37.7	37.1	36.2 ³	36.7	38.0	38.2	36.8	35.9	...
36	36.1	35.7	36.1	35.1 ³	35.7	37.0	38.7	37.8	36.6	...
361-362	36.4	35.9	36.2	35.1 ³	35.8	37.0	39.0	38.2	37.0	...
369	34.1	34.5	34.9	35.4 ³	35.5	37.2	37.3	36.3	35.8	...
37	30.4	36.4	38.0	33.2 ³	41.1	36.5	...	...	...	...
381	37.0	37.3	33.7	35.1 ³	36.1	38.7	38.7	38.8	37.6	...
382 ⁷	35.2	37.2	40.7	40.5 ³	39.4	38.3	38.7	37.8	37.8	...
383	36.7	38.5	39.1	36.8 ³	38.7	39.8	41.9	39.1	39.6	...
385	38.6	38.4	40.7	39.7 ³	38.3	38.5	40.3	38.6	38.7	...
390	39.7	36.6	40.1	38.6 ³	39.8	38.0	40.0	38.2	39.7	...

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Sep. of each year. ² Adults. ³ Revised series. ⁴ Excl. made-up textile products. ⁵ Incl. made-up textile products. ⁶ Excl. fur. ⁷ Excl. manufacture of office and computing machinery.

¹ Sept. de chaque année. ² Adultes. ³ Série révisée. ⁴ Non compris la confection d'ouvrages en tissu. ⁵ Y compris la confection d'ouvrages en tissu. ⁶ Non compris la fourrure. ⁷ Non compris la fabrication de machines de bureau et de machines à calculer.

¹ Sept. de cada año. ² Adultos. ³ Serie revisada. ⁴ Excl. los artículos confeccionados de materiales textiles. ⁵ Incl. los artículos confeccionados de materiales textiles. ⁶ Excl. las pieles. ⁷ Excl. la construcción de máquinas de oficina y cálculo.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Luxembourg ¹ (b)										
<i>Total</i>										
311-312	42.7	42.7	42.4	42.1	42.6	42.2	44.3	39.8	...	...
313-314	42.8	41.7	41.4	42.3	42.0	42.2	41.4	41.2	...	...
321	40.5	40.5	40.7	39.7	41.0	41.2	42.6	40.6	...	...
322,324	39.8	39.5	40.2	32.0	30.9	40.1	40.0	39.9	...	...
33	...	40.9	41.3	...	...	...	42.1	40.8	...	...
331	40.1	40.8	40.9	40.6	41.9	42.6	42.6	41.7	...	...
332	39.6	40.9	...	...	...	...	40.1	39.7	...	...
341	...	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	39.6	...	...
342	...	...	42.1	...	...	...	41.8	40.4	...	...
351	41.2	42.0	42.0	40.9	41.5	41.6	42.2	41.7	...	...
352	40.3	40.3	40.5	40.6	40.6	40.7	40.2	37.4	...	...
36	41.5	41.7	39.7	40.3	41.9	42.6	43.1	41.3	...	...
361-362	40.7	40.8	38.3	39.3	41.0	41.4	41.5	40.2	...	...
369	42.6	43.4	42.3	42.1	43.5	44.6	45.6	43.3	...	...
371	40.8	39.4	37.6	38.8	38.9	38.6	38.7	38.7	...	...
372	39.3	41.7	41.2	40.8	40.7	40.7	41.0	39.7	...	...
381	42.3	42.7	42.4	42.4	42.9	43.6	43.8	43.0	...	...
384	41.0	40.8	38.3	43.1	41.3	43.5	43.3	41.3	...	...
385	41.2	43.7	41.7	42.8	41.8	42.7	42.6	...	...	...
390	...	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	39.4	...	...
<i>Males - Hommes - Hombres</i>										
311-312	43.4	43.4	42.9	42.6	43.2	42.7	45.3	40.5	...	...
313-314	42.6	41.8	41.6	42.8	42.3	42.7	41.7	42.0	...	...
321	40.8	40.6	40.9	40.3	41.5	41.4	43.1	41.2	...	...
322,324	40.4	40.4	40.7	40.7	41.5	42.2	40.0	40.0	...	...
33	...	41.0	41.4	...	...	...	42.2	41.0	...	...
331	40.4	41.0	41.1	40.7	42.1	42.7	42.8	41.9	...	...
332	39.6	40.9	...	...	...	...	40.1	39.8	...	...
34	...	42.8	42.3	...	...	...	41.8	40.8	...	...
341	...	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	40.3	...	...
342	...	...	42.2	...	...	...	41.8	40.8	...	...
351	41.3	42.1	42.1	40.9	41.6	41.6	42.2	41.7	...	...
352	40.3	40.3	40.6	40.8	40.9	40.9	40.3	38.2	...	...
36	41.8	42.2	39.7	40.5	42.3	42.9	43.6	41.9	...	...
361-362	40.6	40.7	37.0	38.8	41.0	41.2	41.4	40.6	...	...
369	42.6	43.4	42.3	42.0	43.6	44.6	45.7	43.3	...	...
371	40.8	39.4	37.6	38.8	38.9	38.6	38.7	38.7	...	...
372	39.3	41.8	41.2	40.8	40.7	40.7	41.0	39.7	...	...
381	42.5	42.8	42.5	42.6	43.0	43.7	43.9	43.1	...	...
384	41.4	41.1	38.8	42.7	41.5	43.6	43.5	41.2	...	...
385	42.5	44.2	42.6	43.5	42.8	44.3	44.1	...	...	...
390	...	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	39.7	...	...
<i>Females - Femmes - Mujeres</i>										
311-312	40.9	41.1	41.0	40.9	41.1	41.0	41.7	38.5	...	...
313-314	43.2	41.3	40.8	40.2	40.5	40.2	40.1	39.0	...	...
321	40.0	40.0	40.0	37.0	39.9	40.0	40.0	38.6	...	...
322,324	39.8	39.5	40.2	32.0	30.8	40.1	40.0	39.9	...	...
33	...	40.0	40.2	...	...	...	40.0	39.0	...	...
331	38.9	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	41.6	40.0	39.7	...	...
332	...	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	37.1	...	...
341	...	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	38.7	...	...
342	...	...	40.9	...	...	...	41.1	38.6	...	...
351	39.9	41.5	40.2	40.1	40.5	40.6	40.7	40.7	...	...
352	40.0	40.3	40.3	40.2	40.0	40.3	40.0	36.5	...	...
36	40.8	40.8	39.7	39.8	41.0	41.6	41.6	39.4	...	...
361-362	40.8	40.8	39.7	39.8	41.0	41.6	41.7	39.4	...	...
369	41.0	42.4	40.6	40.0	40.3	41.7	40.0	37.7	...	...
371	40.4	39.1	40.8	40.8	40.2	39.4	39.0	39.4	...	...
372	39.8	40.0	41.3	42.3	40.9	40.4	40.3	38.1	...	...
381	40.4	41.0	40.0	40.3	40.0	40.0	39.8	39.7	...	...
384	40.0	40.0	36.0	45.0	40.5	42.5	42.2	41.3	...	...
385	40.6	43.4	41.3	42.5	41.2	41.9	41.9	...	...	...
390	...	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	39.1	...	...

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968. See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing
Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières
Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Netherlands ¹ (b)										
Total ²										
311-312	41.0	41.0	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.2	39.8	39.6	39.8	...
313	40.9	40.7	40.6	40.4	40.1	40.3	40.3	40.5	40.6	...
314	40.2	40.1	39.6	40.1	39.8	39.0	39.6	39.5	39.5	...
321	40.6	40.5	40.4	40.4	39.9	40.0	40.3	40.2	40.4	...
322	40.2	40.2	40.1	39.4	39.4	39.2	...	...	...	...
323	40.8	40.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
324	40.6	40.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
331	40.8	41.1	41.2	41.1	40.8	40.5	40.4	40.6	40.5	...
332	40.4	40.3	40.3	40.5	40.3	40.8	40.3	40.7	41.0	...
341	40.8	40.8	40.1	39.9	39.4	38.8	38.8	38.3	38.6	...
342	40.3	40.1	39.2	39.0	37.8	37.8	37.6	37.8	37.8	...
351	40.1	39.8	39.8	39.4	39.2	39.0	38.9	39.1	38.9	...
352	40.4	40.3	40.1	40.1	40.1	39.9	39.8	40.0	40.0	...
353-354	40.2	40.2	39.8	40.0	39.4	39.1	39.0	39.2	38.9	...
355	40.8	40.7	40.6	40.3	40.4	39.9	...	39.8	40.1	...
356	40.6	40.5	40.3	40.2	40.2	40.1	40.4	40.2	40.1	...
361	40.5	40.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
362	40.9	40.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
369	41.4	41.3	41.4	41.8	42.0	41.6	41.9	41.0	41.5	...
371	40.2	40.3	40.6	40.3	40.3	39.3	39.1	39.1	38.6	...
372	40.4	40.7	40.6	40.1	40.0	39.7	39.6	39.7	39.8	...
381	40.9	40.8	40.5	40.5	40.6	40.5	40.4	40.4	40.7	...
382	40.9	41.0	40.9	41.0	40.8	40.8	40.6	40.6	40.8	...
383	40.2	40.2	40.2	40.1	40.1	40.1	40.0	40.3	40.3	...
384	40.9	40.4	40.2	40.5	40.3	40.3	39.9	39.9	40.1	...
385	40.3	40.0	39.8	39.8	40.1	40.2	39.4	39.6	39.8	...
385,390	40.3	40.0	40.0	39.8	39.9	40.1	39.6	39.7	39.9	...
390	...	...	...	39.8	39.8	40.0	39.7	39.7	40.0	...
Males - Hommes - Hombres ³										
311-312	41.1	41.2	41.0	40.8	40.7	40.4	40.0	39.9	40.0	...
313	41.0	40.8	40.7	40.4	40.1	40.3	40.3	40.6	40.7	...
314	40.3	40.2	39.8	40.1	39.9	39.1	39.7	39.5	39.5	...
321	40.7	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.1	40.1	40.7	40.4	40.7	...
322	40.5	40.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
324	40.7	40.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
331	40.9	41.2	41.2	41.2	40.9	40.6	40.4	40.6	40.6	...
332	40.5	40.3	40.4	40.6	40.4	41.0	40.4	40.7	41.1	...
341	40.9	40.9	40.1	39.9	39.5	38.8	38.8	38.3	38.6	...
342	40.3	40.2	39.2	39.1	37.9	37.8	37.6	37.8	37.9	...
351	40.2	39.8	39.7	39.3	39.2	38.9	38.9	39.0	38.8	...
352	40.5	40.4	40.2	40.1	40.1	40.0	39.8	40.0	40.0	...
353-354	40.2	40.2	39.8	40.0	39.3	39.0	38.9	39.1	38.8	...
355	40.8	40.7	40.6	40.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
356	40.7	40.5	40.3	40.3	40.2	40.2	40.4	40.3	40.1	...
361	40.7	40.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
362	41.0	40.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
369	41.5	41.1	41.5	41.9	42.1	41.7	42.0	41.1	41.6	...
371	40.2	40.3	...	40.3	40.4	39.3	39.1	39.1	38.6	...
372	40.4	40.7	40.6	40.1	40.0	39.7	39.6	39.7	39.8	...
381	41.0	40.9	40.5	40.5	40.7	40.6	40.5	40.5	40.8	...
382	40.9	41.0	40.9	41.1	40.8	40.9	40.6	40.7	40.9	...
383	40.2	40.2	40.2	40.1	40.1	40.1	40.1	40.3	40.3	...
384	40.9	40.4	40.2	40.5	40.4	40.3	40.0	39.9	40.2	...
385	40.4	40.1	39.8	39.9	40.2	40.3	...	39.7	39.9	...
385,390	40.3	40.1	40.0	39.9	39.9	40.1	39.7	39.7	40.0	...
390	...	...	...	39.9	39.8	40.0	39.8	39.8	40.1	...
Females - Femmes - Mujeres ³										
31	40.1	40.1	39.9	39.5	39.5	39.4	39.2	38.9	39.0	...
311-312	...	...	40.0	39.5	39.5	39.4	39.2	38.8	38.9	...
32	40.0	40.0	39.9	39.6	39.5	39.3	39.1	39.3	39.4	...
33-34	39.9	39.9	39.1	38.9	37.8	38.0	37.9	37.8	37.9	...
342	...	...	38.9	38.6	37.5	37.6	37.4	37.4	37.5	...
351-352	40.1	40.0	39.9	39.9	39.7	39.7	39.7	39.9	39.8	...
353-356,36	40.0	40.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
37-38	40.1	40.0	39.9	39.9	39.9	39.8	39.8	39.8	39.7	...
383	...	...	...	...	...	39.9	39.9	40.0	39.8	...

^(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Netherlands ¹ (b) ²										
Total ³										
311-312	41.2	41.3	41.1	40.9	40.8	40.5	40.0	39.8	40.0	...
313	41.2	41.0	40.9	40.5	40.1	40.3	40.3	40.7	40.7	...
314	40.3	40.2	39.7	40.2	40.0	38.9	...	...	...	...
321	40.7	40.5	40.5	40.5	40.0	40.0	40.5	40.3	40.7	...
322	40.2	40.2	...	39.3	39.3	39.2	...	...	...	...
323	41.0	40.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
324	40.8	40.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
331	40.9	41.3	41.4	41.3	41.0	40.6	40.5	40.7	40.9	...
332	40.5	40.3	40.4	40.6	40.4	41.0	...	40.8	41.2	...
341	41.0	41.0	40.1	40.0	39.4	38.8	38.7	38.3	38.4	...
342	40.6	40.5	39.3	39.3	37.9	37.9	37.8	38.0	38.1	...
351	40.1	39.7	39.6	38.9	38.7	38.5	38.4	38.6	38.3	...
352	40.6	40.4	40.2	40.0	40.1	40.0	39.9	40.0	40.1	...
353-354	40.3	40.4	39.9	39.9	39.1	38.7	38.6	38.7	38.3	...
355	41.0	40.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
356	40.8	40.6	40.3	40.3	40.2	40.2	40.5	40.3	40.2	...
361	40.6	40.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
362	41.1	40.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
369	41.7	41.6	41.9	42.3	42.5	42.1	42.2	41.4	41.9	...
371	40.2	40.3	...	40.4	40.4	39.1	38.8	38.8	38.1	...
372	40.4	40.8	...	40.0	39.8	39.5	39.6	39.6	39.6	...
381	41.0	40.9	40.5	40.5	40.7	40.6	40.4	40.5	40.9	...
382	41.1	41.2	41.1	41.2	40.9	41.0	40.8	40.8	41.0	...
383	40.2	40.2	40.2	40.0	40.1	40.0	39.9	40.4	40.3	...
384	40.9	40.4	40.1	40.4	40.4	40.3	40.0	39.9	40.4	...
385,390	40.4	40.0	40.0	40.1	40.1	39.8	39.6	39.6	40.2	...
Males - Hommes - Hombres ⁴										
311-312	41.4	41.5	41.2	41.1	40.9	40.7	40.2	40.0	40.2	...
313	41.2	41.0	41.0	40.6	40.1	40.2	40.3	40.7	40.7	...
314	40.4	40.3	39.9	40.2	40.2	39.1	...	39.6	...	...
321	40.9	40.7	40.7	40.7	40.3	40.2	41.0	40.5	41.0	...
331	41.0	41.4	41.5	41.4	41.1	40.7	40.5	40.7	40.9	...
332	40.5	40.3	40.4	40.7	40.5	41.1	...	...	41.3	...
341	41.1	41.1	40.2	40.0	39.5	38.8	38.7	38.2	38.4	...
342	40.6	40.5	39.3	39.3	37.9	37.9	37.8	38.1	38.1	...
351	40.1	39.7	39.6	38.9	38.7	38.4	38.3	38.6	38.2	...
352	40.7	40.5	40.2	40.0	40.2	40.0	39.9	40.1	40.2	...
353-354	40.3	40.3	...	39.9	39.1	38.7	38.6	38.7	...	...
355	41.0	40.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
356	40.9	40.5	40.4	40.3	40.2	40.2	40.6	40.4	40.2	...
361	40.8	40.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
362	41.2	40.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
369	41.7	41.7	41.9	42.3	42.5	42.2	42.3	41.5	41.9	...
371	40.2	40.3	...	40.4	40.4	39.1	38.8	38.9	38.1	...
372	40.4	40.8	...	40.0	39.8	39.5	39.5	39.6	39.6	...
381	41.1	41.0	40.6	40.6	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.6	40.9	...
382	41.1	41.2	41.1	41.2	41.0	41.0	40.9	40.9	41.1	...
383	40.2	40.2	40.2	40.1	40.1	40.0	40.0	40.4	40.4	...
384	41.0	40.5	40.2	40.5	40.4	40.3	40.0	39.9	40.4	...
385,390	40.5	40.0	...	40.1	40.2	39.9	39.8	39.7	40.4	...
Females - Femmes - Mujeres ⁴										
31	40.2	40.2	39.9	39.9	39.9	39.6	39.3	38.8	39.1	...
311-312	...	...	...	...	...	39.7	39.3	39.7	39.0	...
32	40.0	40.0	39.9	39.6	39.4	39.3	39.0	39.2	39.3	...
33-34	40.2	40.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
351-352	40.2	40.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
353-356,36	40.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
37-38	40.0	40.1	40.0	39.9	40.0	39.8	39.7	39.9	39.7	...

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Oct. of each year. ² Wage earners. ³ Incl. juveniles.
⁴ Adults

¹ Oct. de chaque année. ² Ouvriers. ³ Y compris les
jeunes gens. ⁴ Adultes.

¹ Oct. de cada año. ² Obreros. ³ Incl. los jóvenes. ⁴ Adultos

Hours of work per week in manufacturing
Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières
Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Norway (a) ¹										
Total										
31	37.5	37.8	36.9	37.6	37.9	35.6	36.5	36.6	36.5	36.7
32	35.2	33.6	33.3	35.9	34.0	33.3	33.8	34.1	34.8	34.9
33	38.1	38.4	38.4	37.8	38.9	37.1	36.7	37.0	36.4	36.2
34	35.5	35.1	34.0	35.4	35.5	35.3	36.1	35.1	34.8	33.2
35	38.3	38.3	38.5	38.9	38.5	37.9	38.7	38.6	38.5	38.4
36	38.2	38.3	38.8	38.4	39.7	38.8	39.4	38.2	36.1	35.6
37	38.2	38.4	38.8	39.3	39.6	37.8	37.3	37.6	36.8	36.8
38	38.6	38.9	39.7	39.5	39.9	39.0	39.5	39.8	38.5	38.7
39								36.2	36.1	35.1
Males - Hommes - Hombres										
31	40.5	40.9	40.0	40.9	41.4	38.3	39.6	40.1	39.3	39.5
32	38.6	40.3	38.7	41.2	39.7	40.6	40.2	40.5	40.2	40.8
33	39.9	40.3	40.0	40.2	40.0	38.9	38.5	38.9	38.7	38.5
34	37.9	37.9	35.8	37.7	38.1	36.8	38.0	36.5	36.5	34.7
35	39.5	39.9	39.6	40.4	40.6	39.4	39.9	40.2	40.0	40.0
36	39.4	39.4	39.6	40.1	41.3	39.8	40.3	39.3	37.1	37.6
37	38.7	39.1	39.4	39.7	39.9	38.2	37.8	38.8	38.1	37.8
38	40.1	40.2	41.1	41.1	41.4	40.5	40.8	41.1	39.9	39.9
39								36.8	37.2	36.0
Females - Femmes - Mujeres										
31	31.3	31.3	30.9	31.5	32.1	31.4	30.9	30.9	31.8	31.5
32	33.7	31.4	31.3	33.1	30.5	29.8	30.9	30.2	31.3	32.3
33	28.7	28.4	30.2	29.1	34.2	29.7	30.2	30.2	29.6	28.8
34	30.5	29.0	29.4	29.6	29.2	31.9	31.9	31.8	30.9	29.8
35	33.0	32.3	33.6	34.7	33.2	34.4	35.3	33.0	32.6	33.2
36	33.7	33.0	32.9	29.5	33.7	34.8	34.0	32.9	32.1	28.5
37	34.1	30.0	34.9	37.0	37.5	35.6	34.9	31.5	30.3	32.6
38	30.6	31.1	31.2	31.5	32.1	30.7	32.4	33.4	31.5	31.8
39								35.1	33.6	32.6
Pologne ² (a) ³										
Total										
311-312	155	156	157	159	152	152	154	162	155	152
313	157	157	156	160	157	158	160	142	154	155
314	153	155	156	154	154	155	154	151	150	150
321	143	146	146	147	145	145	148	143	132	124
322	149	149	148	147	146	147	148	143	137	136
323	143	146	146	145	143	145	146	135	132	127
324	145	152	149	148	146	146	148	142	128	121
331	152	154	154	155	153	153	154	151	145	143
332	153	154	151	151	150	151	152	147	143	140
341	149	152	152	153	152	152	153	149	143	143
342	132	136	138	136	136	136	136	129	128	131
351	142	144	147	148	148	146	147	145	142	138
352	146	147	147	150	150	149	152	147	141	140
353	151	149	144	147	149	151	152	150	150	136
354	152	150	148	150	154	161	157	154	146	142
355	145	150	147	149	146	146	151	145	132	129
356	145	145	145	146	145	145	147	142	136	136
361	145	149	149	150	150	150	151	146	144	137
362	138	140	141	141	142	144	144	143	139	136
369	160	157	159	159	158	158	158	155	146	143
371	154	156	156	158	159	158	157	153	150	141
372	148	149	150	149	151	152	153	149	144	138
381	149	152	151	153	151	152	154	153	141	137
382	151	156	155	156	156	156	157	151	144	133
383	147	150	150	151	150	150	152	148	140	127
384	150	154	154	156	154	156	157	153	144	131
385	150	153	155	154	153	153	154	151	146	135
390	148	157	150	151	151	153	152	168	136	135

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Employees. Labour force sample survey. ² Socialised sector. ³ Per month.

¹ Salariés. Enquête par sondage sur la main-d'œuvre. ² Secteur socialisé. ³ Par mois.

¹ Asalariados. Encuesta por muestra sobre la fuerza de trabajo. ² Sector socializado. ³ Por mes.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Type (a) Hours actually worked
(b) Hours paid for

Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées
(b) Heures rémunérées

Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas
(b) Horas pagadas

Country, type - ISIC code (a)
Pays, type - Code CITI (a)
País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Portugal (a)										
Total										
311-312	39.8	40.0	40.7	40.5	40.4	41.0	...	...	...	...
313	42.8	43.2	43.0	42.1	42.4	42.8	...	...	...	...
314	37.6	37.5	37.4	40.0	35.7	34.0	...	...	...	...
321	38.7	38.0	37.8	37.7	37.5	37.5	...	...	...	...
322	37.3	36.3	37.2	36.4	37.1	36.8	...	...	...	...
323	36.9	39.1	38.9	39.3	37.3	38.1	...	...	...	...
324	38.1	37.5	37.4	37.5	37.5	38.0	...	...	...	...
331	39.2	39.6	39.9	40.4	40.8	40.2	...	...	...	...
332	39.3	39.7	39.0	39.6	40.4	39.8	...	...	...	...
341	40.1	40.2	39.7	40.6	39.6	40.1	...	...	...	...
342	41.5	40.2	40.4	41.2	40.9	41.0	...	...	...	...
351	38.4	42.2	38.2	38.6	39.2	39.8	...	...	...	...
352	37.7	37.8	38.2	38.8	38.2	38.0	...	...	...	...
353	37.3	40.1	41.6	39.8	39.8	34.8	...	...	...	...
354	40.1	41.8	...	37.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
355	36.4	36.5	36.1	36.2	35.9	36.0	...	...	...	...
356	39.1	39.6	40.3	39.4	38.4	39.4	...	...	...	...
361	39.2	41.6	42.4	40.8	40.2	41.0	...	...	...	...
362	37.7	39.6	38.6	39.4	41.3	40.4	...	...	...	...
369	40.0	39.8	40.0	39.9	39.6	39.3	...	...	...	...
371	37.1	36.4	37.5	37.9	37.4	38.1	...	...	...	...
372	39.4	39.6	40.1	40.4	40.4	40.0	...	...	...	...
381	39.5	39.9	40.1	40.2	40.2	40.0	...	...	...	...
382	39.8	40.6	39.2	39.9	39.7	40.6	...	...	...	...
383	38.2	37.1	36.6	39.1	38.9	38.3	...	...	...	...
384	36.5	34.7	33.9	35.4	36.4	39.1	...	...	...	...
385	40.0	41.2	43.1	41.4	41.4	39.4	...	...	...	...
390	40.1	40.2	42.4	42.4	42.9	48.2	...	...	...	...
Saint-Marin (a) ¹										
Total										
311-313	37.6	...	37.2	35.6	35.7	33.6	...	38.7	32.1	37.5
321	31.5	...	31.1	30.9	33.9	34.4	...	36.9	33.3	30.7
322	34.7	...	32.8	35.5	33.1	32.4	...	37.4	52.3	30.8
323	34.8	...	34.4	32.2	35.0	31.6	...	38.2	39.7	37.7
324	33.9	...	18.2	30.6	28.1	26.1	...	28.4	25.3	30.1
331	28.8	...	33.9	34.7	37.5	33.0	...	39.1	38.8	36.1
332	39.2	...	35.6	33.0	31.3	31.7	...	33.9	32.6	35.3
341	32.2	...	32.7	36.5	36.5	32.9	...	38.5	34.1	38.0
342	37.5	...	37.9	30.3	36.0	32.5	...	36.6	33.7	36.0
352	37.9	...	36.1	35.3	35.2	32.9	...	36.6	31.1	37.5
355	37.4	...	35.2	35.0	35.1	34.3	...	34.0	38.9	35.3
356	37.1	...	32.1	31.1	34.9	33.4	...	34.6	33.3	26.9
36	39.4	...	37.2	34.4	32.7	31.3	...	38.1	36.2	35.8
372	...	...	...	...	...	15.7	...	35.4	32.2	...
381-383	35.8	...	36.4	34.9	35.5	30.9	...	36.9	36.1	37.5
384	26.7	...	31.8	36.2	32.5	32.1	...	36.6	35.6	36.4
390	33.9	...	34.8	30.8	33.8	28.1	...	38.6	32.6	33.3

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968. See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Employees.

¹ Salariés.

¹ Asalariados.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS
B
By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées				Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas			
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Suisse ¹ (i) ²										
<i>Total ³</i>										
311-312	.	.	44.1	44.0	43.6	43.3	43.1	42.8	42.7	42.6
313	.	.	43.4	43.2	43.1	43.0	43.0	42.8	42.7	42.3
314	.	.	41.9	42.0	41.8	41.7	41.2	41.2	41.0	41.0
321	.	.	43.8	43.5	43.3	43.2	42.8	42.7	42.4	42.1
322	.	.	43.7	43.5	43.4	43.2	42.8	42.4	42.2	42.0
323-324	.	.	43.7	43.6	43.4	43.3	43.0	42.8	42.8	42.5
33	.	.	44.7	44.6	44.3	44.0	43.9	43.8	43.5	43.3
341	.	.	43.0	43.0	42.8	42.4	42.2	41.9	41.8	41.8
342	.	.	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.5	40.5
351-352	.	.	42.3	42.3	42.2	42.0	41.5	41.3	40.8	40.8
355-356	.	.	43.4	43.3	43.0	42.8	42.5	42.3	42.1	42.0
36	.	.	44.1	44.0	43.6	43.3	43.2	43.0	42.9	42.8
37	.	.	43.5	43.3	42.9	42.8	42.2	42.1	41.9	41.8
381-382,384	.	.	43.0	42.9	42.2	42.0	41.3	41.0	40.9	40.9
383-385	.	.	42.7	42.7	42.0	41.9	41.2	41.2	41.1	41.1
3853 ⁴	.	.	42.5	42.4	41.8	41.6	40.9	40.9	40.8	40.7
Turquie ⁵ (a)										
<i>Total</i>										
311-312	.	32.9	31.1	31.1	31.3	31.7	32.2	...	...	...
313	.	26.1	25.1	26.3	27.8	28.7	26.3	...	...	...
314	.	38.8	42.9	40.2	37.9	39.7	37.7	...	...	...
321	.	38.2	38.4	39.6	40.0	39.9	39.9	...	...	...
322	.	38.2	38.5	39.6	39.1	39.5	39.7	...	...	...
323	.	38.5	38.9	39.8	40.4	39.0	40.0	...	...	...
324	.	37.2	37.5	34.2	37.0	36.8	34.9	...	...	...
331	.	36.2	37.9	35.2	35.7	36.0	36.0	...	...	...
332	.	37.3	37.0	35.8	37.3	38.9	37.5	...	...	...
341	.	31.3	31.6	33.5	34.9	35.2	31.8	...	...	...
342	.	30.6	32.3	31.0	31.4	30.2	32.0	...	...	...
351	.	33.4	34.1	35.3	35.8	35.7	34.8	...	...	...
352	.	27.3	27.6	27.5	27.5	26.1	26.1	...	...	...
353	.	25.8	36.0	34.4	31.9	31.6	32.4	...	...	...
354	.	26.4	28.0	25.6	22.2	28.2	31.4	...	...	...
355	.	40.2	35.5	36.7	35.3	35.9	37.9	...	...	...
356	.	35.5	33.3	35.2	33.6	35.3	34.9	...	...	...
361	.	42.2	43.3	37.5	44.8	45.3	45.4	...	...	...
362	.	35.4	36.1	39.0	42.7	41.0	41.0	...	...	...
369	.	34.1	34.3	33.9	34.5	36.0	35.6	...	...	...
371	.	39.3	36.7	35.7	40.2	41.1	40.8	...	...	...
372	.	24.6	30.4	27.0	33.7	34.5	33.1	...	...	...
381	.	36.6	37.4	37.2	36.9	37.9	36.6	...	...	...
382	.	35.5	35.8	34.5	35.3	35.3	33.6	...	...	...
383	.	32.2	33.5	33.1	32.4	32.3	32.3	...	...	...
384	.	34.2	34.0	32.2	33.5	40.0	33.9	...	...	...
385	.	39.1	37.3	36.3	40.4	36.4	32.5	...	...	...
390	.	36.1	45.0	42.4	39.3	39.0	38.2	...	...	...

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Normal hours of work. ² Accident insurance statistics.
³ Employees. ⁴ Watchmaking and jewellery. ⁵ All establishments in the public sector and those with 25 or more persons employed in the private sector.

¹ Durée normale du travail. ² Statistiques d'assurances accidents. ³ Salariés. ⁴ Horlogerie et bijouterie. ⁵ Tous les établissements du secteur public et ceux occupant 25 personnes ou plus dans le secteur privé.

¹ Duración normal de trabajo. ² Estadísticas del seguro de accidentes. ³ Asalariados. ⁴ Relojería y joyería. ⁵ Todos los establecimientos del sector público y los que emplean 25 o más trabajadores en el sector privado.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for	Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées	Type (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas							
Country, type - ISIC code (a)										
Pays, type - Code CITI (a)										
Pais, tipo - Clave CIU (a)										
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
United Kingdom (a) ¹										
Total ²										
31		43.5	43.5	43.3	43.2	43.2	43.6	43.7	43.1	...
321		41.2	41.3	41.2	40.7	41.3	40.7	40.2	40.1	...
322		37.5	37.4	37.4	37.2	37.3	37.3	37.4	37.2	...
323		41.0	41.5	42.3	42.1	42.1	40.6	41.1	40.6	...
324		39.4	39.3	39.9	39.2	40.1	39.8	38.9	39.5	...
33		42.5	42.4	43.6	43.1	43.8	43.4	41.9	42.0	...
34		41.4	41.7	41.6	41.4	42.2	42.2	42.2	41.3	...
351-352		41.8	42.2	41.9	42.3	42.5	42.7	42.9	42.2	...
355		41.5	41.8	42.6	41.6	42.4	41.7	41.0	39.6	...
356		43.5	43.2	43.0	43.5	43.7	43.8	43.5	43.1	...
362		41.4	42.0	42.3	39.8	42.2	41.3	42.1	42.3	...
369 ³		44.3	44.2	44.0	44.1	44.3	44.5	43.9	42.7	...
371 ⁴		41.7	42.2	42.3	42.0	43.3	43.6	42.8	42.1	...
372 ⁵		42.9	43.7	43.4	43.0	44.0	43.2	44.2	43.2	...
381		41.6	42.0	42.1	42.3	42.9	42.9	42.3	41.8	...
382 ⁶		41.6	42.2	42.8	42.1	43.4	43.9	43.5	42.4	...
383		40.4	40.4	40.8	40.5	41.0	41.4	41.8	40.8	...
384 ⁷		40.8	41.3	41.0	40.8	41.9	42.6	42.4	41.7	...
385		40.3	39.8	40.4	40.5	40.8	41.0	42.2	41.9	...
390		40.1	40.7	40.2	40.6	40.4	41.5	40.3	39.9	...
Males - Hommes - Hombres ²										
31	44.9	45.2 ⁸	45.3	45.1	44.9	45.0	45.1	45.0	44.7	...
321	42.8	43.3 ⁸	43.8	44.0	43.5	44.4	43.3	42.6	42.4	...
322	41.6	41.8 ⁸	41.3	41.7	41.3	40.9	41.4	41.2	41.5	...
323	42.4	43.1 ⁸	44.2	44.5	44.2	43.5	42.2	42.9	42.6	...
324	41.0	41.2 ⁸	40.8	41.4	40.5	42.1	41.3	40.7	41.0	...
33	43.0	43.0 ⁸	42.9	44.1	43.6	44.4	43.8	42.4	42.5	...
34	41.2	42.1 ⁸	42.5	42.4	42.1	43.0	42.9	42.9	41.7	...
351-352	42.8	42.7 ⁸	43.0	42.7	43.0	43.3	43.4	43.6	43.0	...
355	40.4	42.2 ⁸	42.5	43.3	42.2	43.0	42.1	41.5	39.8	...
356	43.2	44.7 ⁸	44.3	44.2	44.4	44.7	44.7	44.7	44.1	...
362	43.0	41.8 ⁸	42.3	42.7	39.9	42.5	41.6	42.6	42.7	...
369 ³	45.1	45.3 ⁸	45.2	45.0	45.2	45.3	45.5	44.7	43.6	...
371 ⁴	41.3	41.9 ⁸	42.4	42.4	42.1	43.5	43.8	43.0	42.3	...
372 ⁵	41.8	43.3 ⁸	44.1	43.7	43.2	44.4	43.4	44.4	43.4	...
381	41.3	42.5 ⁸	42.9	43.0	43.0	43.6	43.5	43.1	42.5	...
382 ⁶	41.4	41.8 ⁸	42.4	43.0	42.4	43.7	44.2	43.8	42.7	...
383	41.8	41.8 ⁸	41.8	42.1	41.6	42.4	42.6	43.3	41.5	...
384 ⁷	40.6	41.1 ⁸	41.4	41.2	41.0	42.0	42.8	42.5	41.9	...
385	41.4	41.1 ⁸	41.4	41.6	41.3	41.3	41.9	43.2	42.5	...
390	41.8	41.3 ⁸	42.4	41.8	42.2	42.3	43.6	42.2	41.8	...

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Full-time workers on adult rates of pay. ² Oct. of each year. ³ Incl. ceramic. ⁴ Incl. non-ferrous foundries. ⁵ Excl. non-ferrous foundries. ⁶ Incl. marine engines and marine engineering. ⁷ Excl. marine engines and marine engineering. ⁸ New industrial classification.

¹ Travailleurs à plein temps rémunérés sur la base de taux de salaire pour adultes. ² Oct. de chaque année. ³ Y compris la céramique. ⁴ Y compris les fonderies des métaux non ferreux. ⁵ Non compris les fonderies des métaux non ferreux. ⁶ Y compris les moteurs de marine et l'ingénierie marine. ⁷ Non compris les moteurs de marine et l'ingénierie marine. ⁸ Nouvelle classification industrielle.

¹ Trabajadores a tiempo completo pagados sobre la base de tasas de salarios para adultos. ² Oct. de cada año. ³ Incl. la cerámica. ⁴ Incl. las fundiciones de metales no ferrosos. ⁵ Excl. las fundiciones de metales no ferrosos. ⁶ Incl. los motores para navios e ingeniería marina. ⁷ Excl. los motores para navios e ingeniería marina. ⁸ Nueva clasificación industrial.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

HEURES
HORAS
B
By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
United Kingdom (a) ¹										
<i>Females - Femmes - Mujeres ²</i>										
31	38.4	39.1 ³	38.8	38.7	39.0	38.7	39.7	40.1	39.0	...
321	37.6	38.1 ³	38.2	38.0	37.5	37.9	37.8	37.3	37.2	...
322	37.5	36.8 ³	36.7	36.8	36.5	36.8	36.7	36.8	36.6	...
323	37.9	37.7 ³	37.8	38.3	38.9	39.6	37.9	37.5	37.7	...
324	37.8	38.0 ³	38.2	38.7	38.1	38.4	38.6	37.4	38.1	...
33	38.2	38.4 ³	38.4	38.7	38.4	39.1	39.2	38.1	38.0	...
34	37.7	38.6 ³	38.8	38.5	38.7	39.2	39.5	39.8	39.6	...
351-352	39.0	38.2 ³	38.5	38.5	39.2	39.1	39.8	40.0	39.2	...
355	38.5	38.3 ³	38.8	39.5	38.6	39.1	39.2	38.5	38.6	...
356	38.5	39.0 ³	38.8	38.4	39.0	39.3	39.8	39.0	38.9	...
362	38.9	38.8 ³	39.6	39.7	38.9	40.3	38.6	38.5	39.5	...
369 ⁴	37.8	38.3 ³	38.3	38.1	38.0	38.4	38.9	38.9	37.7	...
371 ⁵	37.7	38.1 ³	38.5	38.5	38.8	39.3	39.7	39.1	38.3	...
372 ⁶	37.8	38.1 ³	38.8	38.7	38.3	39.1	39.6	40.2	40.5	...
381	37.4	38.0 ³	38.2	37.9	38.7	39.0	39.5	38.3	38.3	...
382 ⁷	38.4	38.8 ³	39.1	39.5	39.4	39.9	40.1	40.0	39.1	...
383	37.6	38.1 ³	38.1	38.4	38.7	38.8	39.5	39.4	39.4	...
384 ⁸	37.6	38.2 ³	38.4	38.2	38.4	39.1	40.3	39.9	38.8	...
385	38.4	38.9 ³	37.2	38.3	38.9	39.6	39.0	40.3	40.8	...
390	37.7	38.6 ³	38.2	38.4	38.0	38.1	39.0	37.9	37.7	...
Yugoslavia ⁹ (b) ¹⁰										
<i>Total ¹¹</i>										
311-312	...	170	...	184	...	...	183	...	...	...
313	...	184	...	184	...	...	184	...	...	...
314	...	183	...	183	...	...	184	...	...	...
321	...	183	...	182	...	...	182	...	...	...
322	...	182	...	183	...	...	182	...	...	...
323	...	184	...	183	...	...	183	...	...	...
324	...	184	...	184	...	...	184	...	...	...
331	...	183	...	183	...	...	183	...	...	...
332	...	183	...	183	...	...	183	...	...	...
341	...	184	...	184	...	...	185	...	...	...
342	...	184	...	182	...	...	184	...	...	...
351	...	184	...	185	...	...	184	...	...	...
351,356	...	184	...	184	...	...	184	...	...	...
352	...	183	...	183	...	...	183	...	...	...
353	...	184	...	184	...	...	184	...	...	...
354	...	183	...	184	...	...	185	...	...	...
355	...	186	...	184	...	...	185	...	...	...
356	...	183	...	183	...	...	182	...	...	...
361	...	184	...	183	...	...	183	...	...	...
362	...	184	...	183	...	...	182	...	...	...
369	...	184	...	183	...	...	184	...	...	...
371	...	184	...	185	...	...	185	...	...	...
372	...	185	...	183	...	...	184	...	...	...
381	...	184	...	185	...	...	184	...	...	...
382	...	185	...	186	...	...	185	...	...	...
383	...	184	...	184	...	...	183	...	...	...
384	...	186	...	189	...	...	188	...	...	...
385	...	185	...	185	...	...	185	...	...	...
390	...	182	...	182	...	...	181	...	...	...

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Full-time workers on adult rates of pay. ² Oct. of each year. ³ New industrial classification. ⁴ Incl. ceramic. ⁵ Incl. non-ferrous foundries. ⁶ Excl. non-ferrous foundries. ⁷ Incl. marine engines and marine engineering. ⁸ Excl. marine engines and marine engineering. ⁹ Socialised sector. ¹⁰ Per month. ¹¹ Employees.

¹ Travailleurs à plein temps rémunérés sur la base de taux de salaire pour adultes. ² Oct. de chaque année. ³ Nouvelle classification industrielle. ⁴ Y compris la céramique. ⁵ Y compris les fonderies des métaux non ferreux. ⁶ Non compris les fonderies des métaux non ferreux. ⁷ Y compris les moteurs de marine et l'ingénierie marine. ⁸ Non compris les moteurs de marine et l'ingénierie marine. ⁹ Secteur socialisé. ¹⁰ Par mois. ¹¹ Salariés.

¹ Trabajadores a tiempo completo pagados sobre la base de tasas de salarios para adultos. ² Oct. de cada año. ³ Nueva clasificación industrial. ⁴ Incl. la cerámica. ⁵ Incl. las fundiciones de metales no ferrosos. ⁶ Excl. las fundiciones de metales no ferrosos. ⁷ Incl. los motores para navíos e ingeniería marina. ⁸ Excl. los motores para navíos e ingeniería marina. ⁹ Sector socializado. ¹⁰ Por mes. ¹¹ Asalariados.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991

OCEANIA - OCÉANIE - OCEANIA

Australia ¹ (b) ²

Total

31	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.6	41.7	40.7
321-322.324	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.8	39.4	39.4
34	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.3	40.6	39.2
35	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.9	41.0	40.7
37	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	43.5	42.7	42.2
381-383	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.9	41.8	40.2
384	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.1	41.5	40.0
390	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.5	41.7	41.1

Males - Hommes - Hombres

31	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.4	42.3	41.0
321-322.324	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	44.4	41.5	41.4
34	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.0	41.4	39.6
35	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.9	41.8	41.2
37	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	43.8	43.1	42.5
381-383	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.6	42.4	40.7
384	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.4	41.7	40.3
390	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	43.1	42.3	41.7

Females - Femmes - Mujeres

31	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.4	39.9	39.9
321-322.324	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	38.8	38.1	37.6
34	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	38.9	38.6	38.0
35	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	38.6	39.2	39.2
37	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.0	39.0	39.3
381-383	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.5	39.2	38.6
384	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.0	40.0	37.9
390	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.6	39.3	38.7

Australia ³ (b) ²

Total

31	41.7	41.3	41.6	41.8	41.6	41.6	42.5	...	...	...
321-322.324	39.8	40.6	39.4	39.7	41.5	41.4	40.6	...	...	...
34	39.5	41.0	39.6	40.2	40.1	39.8	40.3	...	...	...
35	38.5	38.9	40.5	41.1	40.9	40.6	40.6	...	...	...
37	39.2	40.3	40.8	41.6	41.3	41.5	42.0	...	...	...
381-383	38.8	39.2	41.2	41.5	42.3	41.8	42.2	...	...	...
384	38.0	40.6	41.3	41.7	42.6	41.3	41.6	...	...	...
390	40.3	41.7	40.9	41.5	41.5	42.4	42.0	...	...	...

Males - Hommes - Hombres

31	42.3	41.9	42.4	42.3	42.1	42.3	43.2	...	...	...
321-322.324	42.7	42.1	41.1	42.8	43.9	45.2	43.5	...	...	...
34	39.9	41.4	40.3	40.3	40.8	40.7	40.8	...	...	...
35	39.0	39.9	41.5	42.0	41.8	41.4	41.5	...	...	...
37	39.3	40.4	41.0	41.8	41.6	41.7	42.3	...	...	...
381-383	39.2	39.5	41.5	42.0	42.9	42.2	43.1	...	...	...
384	38.0	40.8	41.4	42.1	40.4	41.5	41.9	...	...	...
390	40.6	42.0	41.5	42.2	41.9	43.3	42.6	...	...	...

Females - Femmes - Mujeres

31	39.9	38.4	39.4	40.0	39.9	39.6	40.5	...	...	...
321-322.324	38.7	40.1	38.8	38.2	39.6	38.9	38.7	...	...	...
34	38.4	39.7	37.8	39.9	38.8	37.9	38.9	...	...	...
35	37.5	36.7	38.4	38.8	38.7	39.0	38.3	...	...	...
37	38.0	38.7	38.1	38.2	38.0	38.5	38.7	...	...	...
381-383	37.1	38.3	40.1	39.1	40.2	40.2	39.5	...	...	...
384	37.4	39.3	40.2	38.7	39.1	39.9	40.3	...	...	...
390	38.9	40.5	38.1	38.6	40.0	38.7	39.6	...	...	...

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ May of each year. ² Full-time adult non-managerial employees. ³ Nov. of each year.

¹ Mai de chaque année. ² Salariés adultes à plein temps, non compris les cadres dirigeants. ³ Nov. de chaque année.

¹ Mayo de cada año. ² Asalariados adultos a tiempo completo, excl. el personal directivo. ³ Nov. de cada año.

Hours of work per week in manufacturing

Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières

Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

**HEURES
HORAS**
B
By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
New Zealand ¹ (b) ²										
Total ³										
311-312	32.5	40.2	40.4	40.8	32.8	38.7	37.6	39.5 ⁴	41.9	40.6
313	41.5	40.2	41.5	41.2	42.0	41.7	40.4	41.5 ⁴	41.1	41.5
314	40.3	40.5	42.0	41.8	41.8	41.6	39.2	39.6 ⁴	40.3	39.3
321	40.6	39.2	41.2	40.3	40.3	40.3	40.1	39.9 ⁴	40.3	40.3
322	37.5	37.3	38.0	38.1	38.0	39.0	37.6	38.9 ⁴	38.2	38.8
323	39.6	38.5	39.7	39.6	37.5	39.8	38.3	39.7 ⁴	40.2	40.9
324	38.6	38.3	39.5	39.8	38.5	38.4	38.8	38.5 ⁴	39.7	39.1
331	40.5	38.8	41.5	41.7	41.1	41.1	40.4	41.4 ⁴	41.2	40.5
332	39.9	38.8	40.4	40.3	39.8	39.9	39.0	40.2 ⁴	40.2	39.6
341	39.9	39.0	40.7	41.3	39.6	41.3	41.6	42.2 ⁴	42.3	43.3
342	39.9	39.3	40.3	40.1	39.9	39.8	39.6	40.2 ⁴	40.3	39.8
351	41.9	41.2	42.5	42.4	40.7	41.1	41.1	43.2 ⁴	42.6	42.6
352	39.2	39.4	39.9	40.2	39.9	40.4	39.9	39.7 ⁴	39.8	39.2
353	39.9	41.1	39.0	39.2	42.9	40.3	36.4	41.1 ⁴	42.2	41.1
354	41.2	44.1	46.5	43.9	44.4	43.8	43.6	42.7 ⁴	50.1	43.1
355	39.4	39.1	41.0	41.3	39.0	40.4	41.0	39.6 ⁴	42.0	43.0
356	41.1	40.8	42.2	42.4	42.4	41.6	41.9	41.5 ⁴	41.6	41.1
361	41.8	41.1	41.2	42.2	41.1	42.3	40.5	38.4 ⁴	39.7	37.3
362	41.4	40.0	39.6	43.2	42.1	41.7	37.9	40.7 ⁴	41.6	42.0
369	42.3	41.8	42.0	40.9	43.9	42.6	38.5	42.1 ⁴	42.8	42.2
371	41.5	41.2	42.1	43.5	42.6	46.5	43.5	41.2 ⁴	46.4	46.2
372	42.0	42.4	42.0	41.6	42.0	42.6	42.8	42.8 ⁴	42.6	42.2
381	40.5	40.5	41.3	41.5	40.8	41.1	40.7	40.9 ⁴	40.6	40.7
382	40.0	39.4	40.8	41.2	40.7	40.8	40.1	40.5 ⁴	40.7	40.8
383	39.9	38.6	40.5	40.6	39.9	39.6	39.5	39.9 ⁴	39.5	40.0
384	39.1	38.9	40.7	39.0	38.3	40.4	40.1	41.5 ⁴	40.9	40.7
385	39.0	38.6	39.2	39.1	39.1	39.2	39.6	38.6 ⁴	41.8	39.3
390	38.9	38.7	38.8	39.4	39.0	39.1	38.5	39.7 ⁴	39.2	39.0
Males - Hommes - Hombres ³										
311-312	31.5	40.7	40.8	41.7	32.2	38.8	38.3	39.9 ⁴	42.6	41.2
313	42.7	40.9	42.6	42.4	43.4	43.1	41.5	42.5 ⁴	42.2	42.7
314	41.7	41.7	42.5	42.0	43.2	42.6	39.5	40.4 ⁴	41.6	40.0
321	42.5	40.3	43.0	42.1	41.9	42.1	41.8	41.6 ⁴	42.1	41.8
322	39.0	39.3	39.3	39.7	39.3	39.9	38.9	40.8 ⁴	39.4	40.4
323	41.6	40.2	41.2	40.7	38.4	41.4	38.7	40.8 ⁴	41.1	42.1
324	39.5	39.3	40.0	40.4	39.8	40.2	39.3	39.2 ⁴	40.4	40.8
331	40.8	38.9	41.9	42.0	41.5	41.5	40.8	42.1 ⁴	41.6	40.9
332	40.4	39.2	40.9	40.6	40.3	40.4	39.5	40.8 ⁴	40.9	40.4
341	40.1	39.4	40.9	41.4	39.4	41.6	42.2	43.1 ⁴	43.3	43.8
342	40.8	40.3	41.4	41.4	41.0	40.8	40.5	41.2 ⁴	41.5	41.0
351	42.7	42.0	43.2	43.2	41.5	41.9	42.0	44.4 ⁴	43.4	43.4
352	40.1	40.2	40.9	41.3	40.8	41.7	41.0	40.7 ⁴	40.9	40.2
353	39.7	41.1	39.0	39.5	43.3	40.3	36.9	41.3 ⁴	42.6	41.4
354	41.7	44.7	47.4	46.8	44.9	44.7	44.5	44.4 ⁴	50.9	43.7
355	40.0	39.8	42.0	42.3	39.6	41.2	41.8	40.2 ⁴	43.1	40.7
356	42.2	41.4	43.1	43.6	43.3	42.5	42.8	42.6 ⁴	42.3	41.9
361	42.4	42.2	41.7	43.2	41.5	43.2	40.9	39.5 ⁴	40.1	38.7
362	41.9	40.3	40.4	44.1	42.8	42.2	38.2	40.9 ⁴	42.0	42.4
369	42.8	41.6	42.6	41.3	44.5	43.1	38.7	42.8 ⁴	43.6	42.9
371	41.9	42.9	42.7	44.1	42.9	44.4	44.2	41.1 ⁴	47.1	47.1
372	42.5	40.6	42.3	41.9	42.2	43.0	43.6	43.4 ⁴	43.0	42.9
381	40.9	39.8	41.9	42.1	41.4	41.6	41.2	41.6 ⁴	41.2	41.1
382	40.4	39.1	41.2	41.7	41.3	41.2	40.5	41.0 ⁴	41.2	41.3
383	40.6	39.1	41.4	41.6	40.8	40.6	40.4	40.8 ⁴	40.4	40.9
384	39.4	39.4	41.0	39.4	38.7	40.7	40.5	41.8 ⁴	41.3	41.2
385	39.7	39.3	39.6	39.4	39.9	38.7	40.1	39.5 ⁴	41.1	39.7
390	39.7	40.2	39.4	40.1	39.4	39.7	39.4	41.1 ⁴	40.0	40.0

^(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Establishments with the equivalent of more than 2 full-time paid employees. ² Employees. ³ Feb. of each year. ⁴ Prior to 1989: full-time employees and half of part-time employees.

¹ Etablissements occupant plus de l'équivalent de 2 salariés à plein temps. ² Salariés. ³ Fév. de chaque année. ⁴ Avant 1989: salariés à plein temps, y compris la moitié des salariés à temps partiel.

¹ Establecimientos con más del equivalente de 2 asalariados a tiempo completo. ² Asalariados. ³ Febr. de cada año. ⁴ Antes de 1989: asalariados a tiempo completo, incl. la mitad de los asalariados a tiempo parcial.

HOURS

12

Hours of work per week in manufacturing Durée du travail par semaine dans les industries manufacturières Horas de trabajo por semana en las industrias manufactureras

B

By industry (major groups)
Par classe d'industrie
Por agrupación de industria

Country, type - ISIC code (a) Pays, type - Code CITI (a) País, tipo - Clave CIIU (a)	Type (a) Hours actually worked (b) Hours paid for		Type (a) Heures réellement effectuées (b) Heures rémunérées		Tipo (a) Horas efectivamente trabajadas (b) Horas pagadas					
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
New Zealand ¹ (b) ²										
<i>Females - Femmes - Mujeres</i> ³										
311-312	36.6	38.0	39.2	38.0	34.8	38.3	35.8	38.5 ⁴	40.0	39.0
313	37.1	37.4	37.4	36.8	37.9	37.4	36.9	38.0 ⁴	37.6	37.5
314	38.8	39.1	41.4	41.4	39.8	40.4	38.9	38.4 ⁴	38.9	38.4
321	38.3	38.0	39.1	38.5	38.7	38.4	38.3	37.8 ⁴	38.3	38.5
322	37.3	37.0	37.8	37.9	37.8	38.9	37.4	38.3 ⁴	38.0	38.5
323	37.4	36.4	37.9	38.2	36.5	37.6	37.8	37.0 ⁴	38.2	37.9
324	38.0	37.6	39.1	39.4	37.7	37.3	38.4	37.9 ⁴	39.2	37.9
331	37.8	37.5	38.0	38.3	37.7	37.8	37.9	37.8 ⁴	38.3	37.4
332	37.7	37.2	38.2	39.1	38.1	37.9	37.2	38.2 ⁴	38.1	36.9
341	39.0	37.4	39.9	40.6	40.4	39.8	39.2	38.0 ⁴	38.1	40.6
342	38.3	37.7	38.5	38.3	38.2	38.2	38.4	38.7 ⁴	38.7	38.0
351	38.4	37.5	39.0	38.8	37.4	38.3	37.7	38.9 ⁴	39.6	39.5
352	37.7	38.2	38.5	38.7	38.5	38.5	38.2	38.0 ⁴	38.3	37.7
353	42.9	41.5	39.4	37.3	38.9	40.7	31.5	39.1 ⁴	39.1	38.3
354	36.7	37.9	38.0	38.7	40.3	38.1	38.7	36.5 ⁴	45.7	39.6
355	36.9	36.7	37.8	38.4	37.2	37.3	37.8	37.5 ⁴	36.8	38.4
356	38.3	38.9	39.6	39.1	40.0	39.0	39.4	38.7 ⁴	39.6	38.9
361	41.1	39.6	40.5	40.8	40.7	40.9	40.0	36.8 ⁴	39.1	34.9
362	37.8	37.6	34.9	37.2	37.9	39.1	36.5	39.5 ⁴	39.3	39.1
369	36.8	36.9	36.2	37.5	38.2	37.8	36.6	38.3 ⁴	37.9	37.1
371	36.0	36.9	34.2	36.9	39.8	66.1	37.9	41.8 ⁴	40.8	39.7
372	36.9	36.8	39.1	39.0	39.5	38.6	35.3	38.3 ⁴	39.1	37.6
381	38.2	40.0	38.4	38.6	38.0	38.6	38.0	37.8 ⁴	38.1	38.6
382	37.7	37.2	38.5	38.6	37.7	38.3	37.8	37.4 ⁴	37.6	37.2
383	38.8	37.9	39.2	39.1	38.6	38.3	38.2	38.3 ⁴	38.1	38.2
384	37.1	36.7	39.1	36.0	35.4	38.7	37.4	40.0 ⁴	38.2	37.3
385	37.8	37.4	38.7	38.7	38.2	39.8	39.1	37.6 ⁴	42.5	38.8
390	38.0	37.9	38.1	38.7	38.4	38.3	37.6	37.1 ⁴	38.0	37.3

(a) ISIC - CITI - CIIU 1968: See Annex - Voir annexe - Véase anexo.

Explanatory notes and source: see p. 715 - Notes explicatives et source: voir p. 716 - Notas explicativas y fuente: véase p. 718

¹ Establishments with the equivalent of more than 2 full-time paid employees. ² Employees. ³ Feb. of each year. ⁴ Prior to 1989: full-time employees and half of part-time employees.

¹ Etablissements occupant plus de l'équivalent de 2 salariés à plein temps. ² Salariés. ³ Fév. de chaque année. ⁴ Avant 1989: salariés à plein temps, y compris la moitié des salariés à temps partiel.

¹ Establecimientos con más del equivalente de 2 asalariados a tiempo completo. ² Asalariados. ³ Febr. de cada año. ⁴ Antes de 1989: asalariados a tiempo completo, incl. la mitad de los asalariados a tiempo parcial.

DRAFT

**Minimum Wages Around the World:
Minimum Wage Information for 146 Countries**

Prepared by U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 1993.

Minimum Wages Around the World: Minimum Wage Information for 142 Countries

This report is based upon cables from American Embassies
from September 1991 to February 1992.

- Prepared by U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 1993.

Workers' Union (BWU). These minimum wages are set according to worker's duties.

Belize - State Department Cable, October 1991

Current hourly minimum-wage rates in Belize apply only to domestic workers (BZ \$1.10), shop assistants (BZ \$1.25) and workers in establishments where liquor is sold (BZ \$1.50). These rates, which date in some cases to the pre-independence period, are outdated and largely irrelevant.

The Belize Minimum Wage Council, appointed in 1991 by the Ministry of Labour, has recommended a minimum wage of BZ \$2.25 (US \$1.13) per hour for all manual labor. The Council's recommendation is being considered by the Minister of Labour who will submit his Ministry's final proposal to the Cabinet for consideration.

Bolivia - State Department Cable, November 1991

Bolivia has a legislatively set minimum wage that covers all salaried workers. In February 1991, the minimum wage was doubled from 60 bolivianos to 120 bolivianos per month, which is less than US \$35. On his own, a minimum-wage earner cannot provide his family with a reasonable standard of living. Although nearly all salaried Bolivians earn more than even the new minimum, the figure is significant because other benefits, such as old-age payments, are pegged to the minimum wage. Prevailing wages are still low. The average worker (in textiles and construction, for example) earns a monthly wage of US \$125 per month.

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Bolivia, 1991 - 1992*. In February 1992, the minimum wage was increased to 135 bolivianos.

Brazil - State Department Cable, October 1991

Brazil has a legislatively set minimum wage, which became effective on September 1, 1991. The minimum monthly salary is cruzeiros 42,000 (US \$60.87), and it applies throughout Brazil.

Update: State Department Cable, January 1992. The minimum wage was expected to be increased to cruzeiros 95,000 in January 1992.

Canada- State Department Cable, various dates

Canada has a federal minimum wage that applies to employees under federal jurisdiction (industries such as banking, shipping, air transport, broadcasting, railways, grain elevators and pipelines -- about 10 percent of the labor force). Individual provincial and territorial minimum wages generally cover all employees except farm labor and private domestics. In Ontario, Quebec, and Newfoundland, the general minimum wage orders are supplemented by special orders covering particular industries or occupations. Only five provinces (Prince

Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia) have lower minimum-wage rates for young workers and students. The following were the hourly minimum-wage rates by jurisdiction in October 1991 (C\$ 1 to US \$0.88):

Jurisdiction	Rate (C \$)	Effective Date
Federal	4.00	May 26, 1986
Alberta	4.50	Sept. 1, 1988
Under 18, attending school	4.00	Sept. 1, 1988
British Columbia	5.00	April 1, 1990
17 and under	4.50	April 1, 1990
Manitoba	5.00	March 1, 1991
New Brunswick	5.00	Oct. 1, 1991
Newfoundland	4.25	April 1, 1988
Nova Scotia	4.50	Jan. 1, 1989
Age 14 - 18	4.05	Jan. 1, 1989
Ontario	5.40	Oct. 1, 1990
Students/under 18, not employed more that 28 hours in a week	4.55	Oct. 1, 1990
Prince Edward Island	4.75	April 1, 1991
Under 18	4.00	April 1, 1989
Quebec	5.30	Oct. 1, 1990
Saskatchewan	5.00	July 1, 1990
Northwest Territories	5.00	April 1, 1986
Yukon Territory	5.97	April 1, 1990

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Canada, 1991*. The minimum wages have been increased as follows (youth rates are unavailable):

Jurisdiction	Rate (C \$)
Newfoundland	4.75
Nova Scotia	5.00
Ontario	6.00
Quebec	5.55
Northwest Territories	6.50
Yukon Territory	6.24

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Canada, 1992*. The minimum wages are as follows (youth rates are unavailable):

Jurisdiction	Rate (C \$)
Federal	4.00
Newfoundland	4.75
Prince Edward Island	4.75
Nova Scotia	5.15
New Brunswick	5.00
Quebec	5.70
Ontario	6.35
Manitoba	5.00
Saskatchewan	5.35
Alberta	5.00
British Columbia	5.50
Yukon Territory	6.24
Northwest Territories	6.50

Chile - State Department Cable, February 1992

Chile has a minimum wage that took effect on July 1, 1991, through legislation introduced by the Executive. Although the current minimum wage is legislated, it was set through tripartite consultation. This minimum wage is 33,000 pesos per month (US \$94.30 at a rate of 350 pesos to US \$1).

On April 27, 1990, soon after the Aylwin government took office, the government signed a tripartite agreement with leading business and labor groups increasing the minimum wage by 50 percent. Labor and government (with business dissenting) agreed to double the family allowance to 1,100 pesos per person for workers earning less than 50,000 pesos, and 800 pesos for those earning 50,000 to 80,000 pesos. On April 30, 1991, labor and management agreed to a government initiative raising the wage to its current level. The effective minimum wage for a family of four is 37,400 pesos (US \$106.86). The wage covers all salaried workers, but approximately eighty percent of the work force earns more than the minimum wage.

Colombia - State Department Cable, November 1991

Colombia has a national minimum wage, which most recently became effective on January 1, 1991. In December 1990, the National Labor Council, a tripartite advisory board, failed to reach an agreement between administration, labor, and private-sector representatives. The government subsequently raised the monthly minimum from 42,025 pesos to 51,720 pesos, or about US \$86 at the prevailing exchange rate. This wage serves as an important benchmark for wage bargaining. Considering prevailing local living costs in Colombia, the current minimum wage is insufficient to provide an adequate standard of living for a worker and family. Labor experts estimate that at least half of the work force receives the minimum wage or less. Lax enforcement is partly due to the

	Bolivares	US \$
For urban workers	6,000	101
For rural workers	4,500	76

As far as is known, non-compliance with the minimum-wage decree is not a widespread phenomenon. (Neither statistics nor estimates are available regarding compliance with any minimum-wage decree for the past few years.)

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Venezuela, 1991 - 1992*. The government increased the minimum wage in February 1992 to US \$138 for urban workers and \$108 for rural workers.

EUROPE

Austria - State Department Cable, various dates

In Austria, minimum-wage rates are set in annual collective-bargaining negotiations between the federal employers' organization (representing, by law, all private enterprises) and the national trade-union federation. Results of the wage negotiations apply to all workers in a particular industry, whether union members or not. These collective agreements are signed as a contract, and violations of this contract can be challenged at the Federal Labor Court. In October 1991, the lowest hourly wages (AS 52.02, approximately US \$4.50) were found in the restaurant/tourism and textile/leather-working industries.

Approximately ninety-five percent of all employees are covered by union-bargained wage agreements. Among those not included are private teachers, apartment house superintendents, and certain types of cleaning personnel. A government agency composed of union, industry and government representatives may establish minimum wages for workers not covered by agreements.

Austrian unions and governing politicians consider a gross annual income of AS 140,000 (approximately US \$12,000) to be an acceptable minimum-wage standard. Currently, 180,000 of Austria's 3-million-strong work force fall below this mark, but the unions hope that by Spring 1992 all workers' incomes will be moved up to this figure.

Belgium - State Department Cable, various dates

The Belgian private-sector minimum wage is negotiated by the "recognized" (that is, the larger) trade unions and the Belgian business federation (VBO/FEB) within the framework of nationwide inter-industry negotiations held every two years. After agreement is reached, the National Labor Council signs a formal collective-bargaining agreement and this agreement is made mandatory for the entire private sector by Royal Decree. Collective Agreement #43 of March 26,

1991, provided for a general monthly minimum wage to be established by the National Labor Council (a joint labor-management advisory council with public agency status and power to conclude collective agreements) where there is no sector-level collective agreement.

The minimum wage is automatically adjusted for changes in the cost of living. Wages are increased by 2% whenever the growth in the CPI, based on an average of four months, amounts to 2%.

Effective January 1991, the minimum wage was BF 38,095 per month for entry-level employees at least 21 years of age, and BF 39,156 per month for workers over twenty-one-and-a-half years old with six months' service. (The exchange rate is US \$1 to BF 35.) Employees aged 16 to 20 receive a percentage of the adult minimum wage.

In the public sector, the minimum wage is determined by negotiations between the government and public-service unions. In practice, the public-service minimum wage follows developments in the private sector. In October 1991, the monthly minimum wage in the public sector was BF 38,145.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, October 1992.¹ The minimum monthly wage is 39,257 BF for workers over 21 and BF 40,340 per month for workers over twenty-one-and-a-half with six months' service.

Bulgaria - State Department Cable, December 1991

Council of Ministers Decree No. 129 of July 5, 1991, set a minimum monthly salary of Bulgarian leva 620 (US \$32.63 at 19 lev to US \$1) for the whole country. The decree set the minimum wage for collective-bargaining purposes at BL 652 (US \$34.32). There are certain automatic benefits paid. For instance, families with children receive BL 145 (US \$7.63) per month for one child and BL 320 (US \$16.84) for two children. Employers pay all Social Security contributions (35 percent of the monthly wage). The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a minimally acceptable standard of living in the cities.

Czechoslovakia - Foreign Labor Trends: Czechoslovakia, 1991 - 1992.

The minimum wage at the end of 1991 was set at 2,000 crowns per month.

Cyprus - State Department Cable, November 1991

The Republic of Cyprus has a legislatively set minimum wage that is renewed every year. The current minimum-wage rate took effect on April 1, 1991. This rate applies to clerks, salespersons, nursery assistants, practical nurses, and hairdressers. The rate is 148 Cypriot pounds (US \$316) per month as a starting

¹ "Minimum pay in 18 countries," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 225, October 1992, p. 17.

wage, rising to 160 Cypriot pounds (US \$341.84) per month after six months of employment. All other occupations are covered under collective-bargaining agreements between labor unions and employers. The minimum wage resulting from these agreements is at least 50 Cypriot pounds (US \$106.8) higher than the legislated minimum wage.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus also has a legislatively set minimum wage, which is renewed annually after negotiations between representatives of labor unions, employers, and the TRNC government. The current minimum wage took effect on January 1, 1991. Negotiations over next year's rate are currently underway. The current minimum-wage rate is 520,000 Turkish lira per month (US \$105). Union representatives are demanding that it be raised to 1,050,000 Turkish lira (US \$212) but the government and employers have offered only 758,000 Turkish lira (US \$153). A compromise is expected to be around 800,000 TL (US \$161). Very few, if any, workers are paid only the minimum wage. However, increases in the minimum wage are reflected in the level of wages contained in most collective-bargaining agreements. Unskilled workers such as gardeners and maids earn an average of 1.2 million TL (US \$242) per month; unskilled workers in industries such as construction earn as much as 2 million TL (US \$404) per month.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, October 1992.² The statutory minimum wage in the Republic of Cyprus is 166 Cypriot pounds per month.

Denmark - State Department Cable, various dates

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Denmark. Wage levels for unionized workers are based upon the wage agreements negotiated biennially by management and labor. Wage levels for workers not covered by labor-management contracts are generally the same as those of workers in the same sector who are covered by such contracts. Nearly all wages and salaries are adjusted twice a year for changes in the cost of living.

Two systems operate to determine pay: the "minimum wage" system and the "standard wage" system. The "minimum wage" system applies only to engineering workers and some white-collar staff, and lays down very low minimum wages at central employer/university levels. Additions to wage rates are then negotiated at company or plant levels. The "standard wage" system is the more-general system where basic rates of pay are set by industry-level collective agreement (although further company-level bargaining is not precluded). Where applicable, rates for workers under age 18 are negotiated.

Finland - State Department Cable, November 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Finland. However, all employers are required to pay the minimums established in sectoral collective-bargaining agreements between unions and employer organizations.

² *Ibid.*

France - State Department Cable, various dates

France has an administratively set minimum wage that applies to all private- and public-sector workers. Workers who are 17 years old receive 90% of the minimum and those under 17 receive 80%; after six months of consecutive employment, young workers must be paid at the full rate. The minimum wage includes benefits in kind and payments relating to individual performance and excludes overtime premia, profit sharing, seniority agreements and attendance bonuses.³ On July 1, 1991, the adult minimum wage was set at 32.66 FF per hour (US \$5.67 at an exchange rate of US \$1 to 5.76 FF) or 5,519.54 FF per month (US \$958.25) based on a 169-hour month.

The minimum wage is revised whenever the cost-of-living index rises by two percentage points. In addition, labor law requires that, each July, this rate be revalued by at least fifty percent of the actual annual increase in the purchasing power of hourly wages.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, March 1992 and July 1992.⁴ The minimum wage was increased by 2 percent on March 1, 1992, to 33.31 FF per hour, or 5,629.39 per month. It was further increased by 2.3 percent on July 1, 1992, to 34.06 FF per hour, or 5,756.14 FF per month.

Germany - State Department Cable, various dates

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Germany. Wages and salaries are set either by agreements between industrial unions and counterpart employer federations or by individual contract. These collective-bargaining agreements, which cover about 90 percent of all wage and salary earners, set minimum pay rates and are legally enforceable. The government can, under certain circumstances, extend these agreements to all employees in an industry.

Greece - State Department Cable, October 1991

Greece has a minimum wage that is set by collective bargaining between the general confederation of labor and the employers' association and is specified in the annual national collective-bargaining agreement. The Ministry of Labor subsequently ratifies that minimum-wage rate, thereby making it legally binding. The current daily adult minimum wage, effective as of July 1, 1991, is 3501 Greek drachmae (US \$18.50) and the minimum monthly salary is 78,272

³ "France: Minimum pay setting," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 227, December 1992, pp. 18-19.

⁴ "SMIC increased by 2%," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 218, March 1992, p. 5, and "Minimum wage up 2.3%," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 222, July 1992, p. 7.

drachmae. The income of approximately 17 percent of the labor force is at the minimum-wage level.

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Greece, 1991 - 1992*. On January 1, 1992, the minimum daily wage was increased to 3,691 drachmae (US \$20), and the minimum monthly salary was increase to 82,499 drachmae (US \$453). On July 1, 1992, the minimum daily wage will be 3,839 drachmae (US \$21) and the minimum salary will be 85,799 drachmae (US \$471).

Hungary - State Department Cable, February 1992

Hungary has an administratively set minimum wage. The minimum wage is negotiated at the Interest Reconciliation Council, which has a tripartite structure representing the interests of employers, employees (unions), and the government. The rate is then set and implemented by a Ministry of Labor decree, most recently in Decree 3/1991 (III. 27), dated March 27, 1991. The current minimum wage is 7,000 forints per month (approximately US \$93).

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Hungary, 1991 - 1992*. The minimum monthly wage in Hungary in 1992 was 8,000 forints per month (US \$107).

Iceland - State Department Cable, November 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Iceland. Union membership is so pervasive and effective that labor contracts, in effect, assure even the lowest-paid workers a sufficient income for a decent standard of living.

Ireland - State Department Cable, September 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Ireland. However, the Labor Court has set minimum-wage rates for fifteen of the traditionally lowest-paid industries, based on recommendations from Joint Labour Committees. These rates range from IP 119.00 per week in the clothing industry to IP 177.00 per week in the electrical contracting industry. For some industries, young workers receive reduced minimum-wage rates.

Italy - State Department Cable, October 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Italy. Wages are determined by national sectoral collective-bargaining contracts and, de facto, apply to all workers in similar occupations.

Luxembourg - State Department Cable, October 1991

Luxembourg has a legislatively set minimum wage, which was most recently fixed on April 1, 1991. The minimum wage applies, without exception, to all

sectors of the economy and varies by skill level and age. The minimum wage increases annually until the worker reaches 18 years of age, and a supplement is added for workers with dependents. Wages and salaries are indexed, so that every increase of 2.5 percent in the general cost-of-living index entails a 2.5-percent increase in the gross remuneration the following month. The minimum wage for workers who are at least 18 years of age with no dependents is 207.64 Luxembourg francs (FLUX) per hour (US \$5.99 at an exchange rate of US \$1 to 34.61 FLUX). For workers who are 15 years old, the rate is 124.58 FLUX (US \$3.59) per hour. For students who are 18 years old, the rate is 166.11 FLUX (US \$4.79) per hour, while for students who are 15 years old, the rate is 99.66 FLUX (US \$2.88) per hour.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, August 1992.⁵ On August 1, 1992, the minimum wages were increased. The monthly rates for adults were:

- unskilled worker, no dependents: 37,739 FLUX
- unskilled worker, with dependents: 38,882 FLUX
- skilled worker, no dependents: 45,287 FLUX
- skilled worker, with dependents: 46,659 FLUX

Malta - State Department Cable, December 1991

Malta has a legislatively set minimum wage. Each year the government reviews its income policy and changes the cost-of-living adjustment, which effectively alters the minimum wage. The minimum wage applies universally to all full-time adult Maltese workers. As of January 1, 1992, the minimum wage will be LM 35.63 per week, or approximately US \$442 per month.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, February 1993.⁶ For 1993, the minimum wage was increased to LM 36.63.

Netherlands - State Department Cable, September 1991

The Netherlands has a legislatively set minimum wage that is adjusted every six months for changes in the cost of living. As of July 1, 1991, the adult minimum wage is guilders 485.10 per week; this rate is before taxes and does not include benefits. This is equivalent to US \$255.32 at an exchange rate of guilders 1.90 to US \$1. The Netherlands has a reduced minimum wage for workers under the age of 23. The minimum wage for young workers ranges from 33 percent of the adult minimum wage for workers who are 16 to 85 percent of the adult minimum for those who are 22. The purpose of the reduced minimum wage is to provide incentives for the employment of young people, one of the demographic groups with the highest rate of unemployment among the population. A proposal to further reduce the minimum wage for youth was dropped in 1991.

⁵ "New minimum wage rates," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 223, August 1992, p. 10.

⁶ "Controversy over minimum wage raise," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 229, February 1993, p. 10.

The legislated minimum wage, together with social benefits available to all minimum-wage earners, provides an adequate living for workers and their families.

Update: State Department Cable, February 1992. Effective January 1, 1992, the latest semi-annual automatic cost-of-living adjustment resulted in a comprehensive minimum wage of guilders 492.30 per week, guilders 98.46 per day, or guilders 2,133.60 per month. (As of February 10, 1992, the exchange rate is US \$1 to guilders 1.77.) There continues to be a reduced minimum wage for workers under the age of 23.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, October 1992.⁷ The monthly adult minimum wage is guilders 2,163.2 per month.

Norway - State Department Cable, September 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Norway. Wage rates are set through collective bargaining at the national and industry levels. The vast majority of work places are covered by union-negotiated salaries, including the public sector.

Poland - State Department Cable, November 1991

Minimum wages in Poland are negotiated every three months by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and representatives of trade unions. The minimum wage is broadly applicable in the state economic sector where enforcement and union representation ensure compliance. It is not possible to determine whether the minimum wage is recognized in Poland's burgeoning private sector, although wages are reportedly higher in the private sector. On October 1, 1991, the minimum wage was set at 652,000 zlotys (or US \$57.61 at the October 1 exchange rate of 11,318 zlotys to US \$1).

Portugal - State Department Cable, October 1991

Portugal has a legislatively set minimum wage; this was first established for full-time workers, agricultural workers, and domestic employees in 1974, 1977, and 1978, respectively. Workers under age 18 receive a 25% reduction in the minimum wage. Except in 1982, minimum wages have been increased every year. The current minimum monthly wage, established on January 1, 1991, for general workers is 40,100 escudos or US \$278; for agricultural workers, it is 40,100 escudos or US \$278; and for domestics, it is 33,500 escudos or US \$232. Even with rent control and various social-assistance subsidies, it is difficult for a single-income family to maintain a decent standard of living on a

⁷ "Minimum pay in 18 countries," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 225, October 1992, p. 18.

minimum-wage income, particularly in urban areas. Workers receive a Christmas bonus equal to one month's salary.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, February 1993.⁸ As of January 1, 1992, the minimum wage was 38,000 escudos for domestics and 44,500 for all other sectors.

Romania - State Department Cable, October 1991

Romania has a legislatively set minimum wage. According to Government Decision 133/91, as amended (most recently on September 1), the national minimum wage is 6,775 lei per month, or 39.85 lei per hour. In addition to this national minimum wage, Decision 133/91 prescribes a series of minimum wages to be used for employees in various occupational categories. These range from 8,025 lei per month for unskilled laborers to 24,130 lei per month for managerial personnel such as directors, chief engineers, and accountants. (The official exchange rate is currently 60 lei to US \$1. However, most organizations, including embassies, use the weekly bank-auction rate, which is currently 306 lei to US \$1.)

Added to these amounts are trimester calculations, which are based on a percentage of prospective consumer price increases. These calculations are mandated by Government Decision 579/91, also dated September 1, and are designed to assist workers in coping with steep price increases. For the September-December trimester period, wage indexation was set at 13.43 percent.

Offsetting these amounts, however, are government regulations promulgated in March that require employees to pay certain taxes through payroll deduction. These taxes were previously paid by employers or were not paid at all. They include a progressive income tax, which currently ranges from 6 to 45 percent for employees without children and from 5 to 45 percent for employees with children. Workers are also required to pay 3 percent for the general pension fund and 1 percent for unemployment insurance (employers pay an additional 22 percent for disability and 4 percent for unemployment).

Spain - State Department Cable, various dates

In Spain, the Ministry of Labor, through consultations with a tripartite body, establishes a basic minimum wage for unskilled workers in all occupations. In addition, the Ministry of Labor, in consultation with the National Labor Council and the Syndical Organization, may act to set statutory minimum rates for different occupational categories within an industry or region.

Minimum wages are increased annually, based on the projected changes in the cost of living. The minimum wage was last raised on January 1, 1991. The rate

⁸ "Portugal/Spain: Minimum pay setting," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 229, February 1993, p. 34.

for workers over age 18 is 745,500 Ptas per year (based on 14 equal payments), 53,250 Ptas per month, and 1,775 Ptas per day. The dollar equivalents at the exchange rate of US \$1 to 105 Ptas are: \$7,100 per year, \$507.14 per month, and \$16.90 per day. The rate for workers below age 18 is 492,240 Ptas per year (14 equal payments), 35,160 Ptas per month, and 1,172 Ptas per day. The dollar equivalents are \$4,688 per year, \$334.85 per month and \$11.16 per day.

The government does not publish or maintain data on the total number of workers covered by these minimum wages, but it estimates that some 350,000 workers currently may be paid at these wage rates. This is a conservative estimate based primarily on employment data. While some pensioners also receive monthly annuities and subsistence payments based on current minimum-wage rates, over 4.8 million pensioners (78 percent of all pensioners) received monthly annuities below the prevailing minimum wage in 1990.

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Spain, 1991 - 1992*. In January 1992, the government increased the daily minimum wage by 5.7 percent, to 1,876 Ptas for adults and 1,239 for youths.

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, February 1993.⁹ As of January 1, 1993, the minimum-wage rate for workers over 18 is 1,951 Ptas per day and 58,530 Ptas per month (based on 14 equal payments). For workers under 18, the rates are 1,289 Ptas per day and 38,670 Ptas per month.

Sweden - State Department Cable, November 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Sweden; wages are set in collective-bargaining processes.

Switzerland - State Department Cable, various dates

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Switzerland. Salaries and wages are freely negotiated between employers and employees, and annual salary increases are related to the rise in the cost of living. In the industrial labor field, wages are in most cases determined by collective-bargaining rounds between labor unions and employers' associations.

Turkey - State Department Cable, October 1991

Turkey has an administratively set minimum wage, which by law must be determined by a tripartite (government, employer, and union) board at least every two years. In recent years, the minimum wage has been adjusted annually. It legally applies to the agricultural as well as to the industrial and service sectors, and it is generally well enforced in the latter two. Workers on family farms and younger teenagers in the informal economy of the cities often

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

earn less than the minimum wage. The minimum wage is, for the most part, paid only to persons new to the labor force or those providing temporary or part-time services. Adult workers in the industrial and service sectors usually earn much more than the minimum wage, through the process of collective bargaining.

On July 30, 1991, the minimum wage was set at 801,000 TL per month (about US \$167) for workers over 16 years of age and 587,000 TL (US \$123) for children aged 13 to 15.

Turkmenistan - State Department Cable, May 1992

A Presidential Decree will increase the minimum wage, effective July 1. The minimum wage for workers, as well as the minimum retirement pay, will be set at 750 rubles per month. The previous minimum wage, announced early in 1992, was 350 rubles per month.

United Kingdom - State Department Cable, April 1991

Statutory minimum-wage fixing in Great Britain is confined to those industries covered by the 26 Wages Councils, affecting some 2.5 million workers. The main Councils cover retailing, catering, clothing manufacture and hairdressing. There are also a number of smaller Councils, covering mainly specific manufacturing industries, some of which employ only a few hundred workers. The Councils are independent bodies. Each Council is made up of equal numbers of workers' and employers' representatives, together with three independent members, one of whom serves as the chairman of the Council. The role of the independent members is to try to bring the two sides to an agreed settlement. Where agreement is not possible, a vote is taken and the independents have the casting vote in favor of the employers' final offer or of the workers' final claim. They cannot impose a compromise settlement.

Under the provisions of the 1986 Wages Act, each Council is restricted to setting a single minimum hourly rate, a minimum hourly overtime rate, the number of hours a week after which that rate should take effect, and a limit on how much an employer can charge for living accommodation provided. The minimum rates vary from Council to Council and apply to all workers covered aged 21 or over, including part-time workers, pieceworkers and homeworkers. Most Councils meet once or twice a year.

Minimum hourly rates as of April 8, 1991

Wages Council	UK £
Aerated waters	2.79
Boot and shoe repairing	2.77
Button manufacturing	2.28
Clothing manufacturing	2.4875
Coffin furniture and cerement making	2.86
Cotton waste reclamation	2.29

Wages Council	UK £
Flax and hemp	(Council adjourned indefinitely)
Fur	2.60
General waste materials reclamation	2.33
Hairdressing undertaking	2.66
Hat, cap and millinery	2.54
Lace finishing	(Council adjourned indefinitely)
Laundry	2.785
Licensed non-residential establishment	2.74
Licensed residential establishment and licensed restaurant	2.56
Linen and cotton handkerchief, household goods and linen piece goods	2.40
Made-up textiles	2.42
Ostrich and fancy feather and artificial flower	2.54
Perambulator and invalid carriage	2.69
Retail bespoke tailoring	2.96
Retail food and allied trades	2.955
Retail trades (non-food)	2.955
Rope, twine, and net	2.365
Sack and bag	2.32
Toy manufacturing	2.34
Unlicensed place of refreshment	2.58

Update: *European Industrial Relations Review*, January 1993¹⁰. On November 5, 1992, the government announced that the wages councils will be abolished under the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights bill. The weekly minimum-wage rates for the six largest wages councils are as follows:

Wages council	Effective date	UK £
Hairdressing undertakings	April 13, 1992	112.00
Licensed non-residential	January 15, 1992	113.49
Licensed residential	May 1, 1992	109.20
Retail food and allied trades	April 6, 1992	120.12
Retail trades/non-food	April 6, 1992	119.54
Unlicensed places of refreshment	June 8, 1992	113.88

USSR - State Department Cable, October 1991

There was no legislatively set minimum wage in the USSR. However, reform plans being debated at the republic level envisage the eventual establishment of minimum wages in some republics. Official trade-union spokesmen have estimated that more than one-half of the population does not have an income to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living. As spiraling inflation steadily

¹⁰ "United Kingdom: Minimum pay setting," *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 228, January 1993, pp. 23-25.

erodes workers' incomes, the RSFSR Parliament has recognized the necessity to guarantee a minimum income to its citizens. After some debate, the Parliament decided in late October to introduce a system of indexing wages, salaries, and pensions for persons with incomes below a basic minimum level.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Australia - State Department Cables, various dates

Australia has had an administratively set minimum wage since 1966; however, it is now largely outmoded. For example, in November 1991, the minimum rate prescribed in the metal industry was A \$230.10 (US \$182.91); however, it is unlikely that anyone in the metal industry actually received this low rate. Instead, Commonwealth and State Industrial Relations Commissions, which are independent industrial tribunals appointed by the federal and state governments to resolve labor disputes, maintain a comprehensive system of "awards" in cases brought for settlement. These awards stipulate minimum rates for specific classifications: actual pay rates may be higher if market conditions warrant. The great majority of wage earners are covered by these awards. Award rates for young workers (usually under 21) are frequently fixed as percentages of adult rates.

Brunei - State Department Cable, September 1991

Brunei has an administratively set minimum wage, which went into effect on January 1, 1991. The minimum wage is applied throughout the country. For Bruneian citizens and permanent residents, it is BD 20.50 per day (US \$12.06); for foreigners, it is BD 18.00 (US \$10.63).

Cambodia - State Department Cable, February 1992

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Cambodia. Recent reports indicate that government employees and soldiers have not been receiving even the low monthly salaries that are due them.

China - State Department Cable, December 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in China, although administrative regulations reportedly fix the minimum "living wage" in some large cities at 50 yuan per month (less than US \$10). Union officials report that this wage figure applies to those who cannot work because of long-term unemployment, disability, etc. In Beijing, employed workers reportedly earn more than 100 yuan

management, government, and academic specialists. In determining wage-level recommendations, the councils examine changes in the consumer price index, the skill level of workers, local labor market conditions, and the ability of firms to pay. Allowances for food, transportation and other items may be included in the calculation of the minimum wage, but the basic wage must comprise at least 75 percent of the minimum wage. The current general minimum wage for Jakarta is 2,500 rupiah per day, or approximately US \$1.25. In nearly all other regions, the minimum wage is less than in Jakarta. Minimum wages as a rule do not meet the basic physical need figure, a measure of the monetary requirement for a single worker or a family to meet basic nutritional, clothing, and shelter needs. (This figure is also determined by the wage councils.) In Jakarta, the amount a single worker would need to meet his basic needs is 3,313 rupiah.

Japan - State Department Cable, various dates

Japan has an administratively set minimum wage that is determined by the Minister of Labor or the Director of the Prefectural Labor Standards Office. This rate is usually based on the recommendation of the Minimum Wage Council, a tripartite body composed of representatives of public interest, labor and management. Theoretically, the authorities also have the power to set minimums by extension of the provisions of collective-bargaining agreements. The minimum wage varies by prefecture (which have been divided into four ranks) and industry, and it is revised annually. For example, effective October 1991, the Tokyo metropolitan area minimum hourly wage, the highest regionally set rate, was yen 575 (US \$4.42 at yen 130 to US \$1). Japan's lowest regional minimum hourly wage rate is Kagoshima prefecture's yen 492 (US \$3.78). Workers in selected industries are covered by higher minimum wages.

Korea - State Department Cable, February 1992

Korea has a minimum wage that was implemented in 1988. The minimum-wage level is reviewed annually. Companies with fewer than 10 employees are exempt from this law, and some still pay below-minimum wages. In 1991, the rate was 196,800 won per month, or about US \$262.40 (at an exchange rate of 750 won to US \$1). In 1992, the minimum wage was 222,000 won per month, or US \$292.11 per month (at an exchange rate of 760 won to US \$1).

Update: *Foreign Labor Trends: Korea, 1992-1993*. In 1993, the minimum wage was set at 227,130 won (about US \$289).

Laos - State Department Cable, September 1991

There is no legislatively set minimum wage in Laos. In November 1990, the Lao Council of Ministers promulgated a Labor Code, which provides for establishing a minimum wage in Article 36. The president of the Lao federation of trade unions reports that the government will probably determine the minimum wage in 1992. At present, only about fifteen percent of the work force are salaried workers, the majority of the remainder being subsistence farmers. Salaried

Mongolia - State Department Cable, November 1991

Mongolia has an administratively set minimum wage, which was most recently fixed on October 13, 1991, under Government Order 294. The current minimum wage is 700 Mongolian tugriks per month. At the official exchange rate of 40 tugriks to US \$1, this equals US \$17.50. At the current unofficial exchange rate of 70 tugriks to US \$1, it equals US \$10. Mongolia is currently experiencing severe inflation and economic shortages as a result of its transition to a free-market economy. However, while wages are low and apparently falling behind inflation, it is impossible to assess the impact on living standards since housing, utilities, health care, education and other public services are available at little or no cost to Mongolians.

Nauru - State Department Cable, November 1991

Nauru has an administratively set minimum wage that applies to all citizens. The current wage of Australian \$4.45 per hour (US \$3.56) became effective on July 1, 1991. There is no official minimum wage for foreign guest workers: their salaries are agreed upon by the employee and the contracting employer and are determined by market conditions, custom, and the consumer price index. The approximate average wage rate is A \$3.00 per day (US \$2.40) for unskilled laborers and A \$9.08 per day (US \$7.26) for skilled workers.

New Zealand - State Department Cable, October 1991

The minimum wage in New Zealand is set by the Minister of Labor, who is required by law to review the minimum wage before December 31 of each year. This rate applies to all workers who are 20 and over. The current rate of NZ \$245 for a 40-hour week (NZ \$6.125 per hour, or approximately US \$3.43) was established in September 1990.

Papua New Guinea - State Department Cable, October 1991

Papua New Guinea has a legislatively set minimum wage that is revised every quarter based on a cost-of-living formula. The current minimum-wage rate for an urban worker is kina 58.23 per week, or US \$61.14.

Philippines - State Department Cable, September 1991

The current minimum wage for metro Manila is 118 pesos per day (US \$4.37). The regional wage board for Manila established this rate on a provisional basis in December 1990. Regional wage boards in various parts of the country granted smaller increases in minimum pay. Regional minimum pay ranges from 64 pesos (US \$2.37) to 113 pesos (US \$4.18) per day. While the December 1990 increase was determined administratively by the wage boards, the authority for minimum-wage setting is contained in the Minimum Wage Act of 1989. Employers' groups have asked the Supreme Court to disallow the