

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Chron File - December 1994 #1 [1]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 377				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Letter from President Yeltsin on NATO and Nagorno-Karabakh. Record ID: 9409622. [See 2015-0815-M-2] (2 pages)	12/04/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. letter	To President Clinton from President Yeltsin. [English translation] [See 2015-0815-M-2] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. letter	To President Clinton from President Yeltsin. [Original Russian] [See 2015-0815-M-2] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. letter	To President Yeltsin from President Clinton. [See 2015-0815-M-2] (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - December 1994 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4663

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 1, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RBS*

FROM:

JOSEPH SESTAK *JS*

SUBJECT:

Relocation of U.S. Southern Command Headquarters

Attached at Tab A is Governor Chiles' letter to the President soliciting support for Florida as the site of USSOUTHCOM's Headquarters upon its relocation from Panama. Included is the President's response prepared by White House Correspondence per instructions of IGA, and the President's annotation for you to see him regarding the letter.

In accordance with the Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan, SOUTHCOM's headquarters are due to move in 1997, although a one year delay is possible. DoD is conducting a study of new locations and would like to make a recommendation in time for the upcoming budget deliberations, but a decision may be 4-6 months away. Options include building/leasing commercial sites and using existing military bases. The leading candidates from SOUTHCOM's point of view are Miami and Puerto Rico. Candidates being studied by DoD include Homestead AFB, downtown Miami, McDill AFB (Tampa), and Jacksonville; San Juan and Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico; Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; New Orleans; San Antonio; and Houston.

DoD's principal consideration is to determine where the CINC can best accomplish his mission in LATAM. The cost differentials in infrastructure between locations are not significant (maximum \$40 million). Congressional interest such as Governor Chiles' will continue due to the fact that the headquarters' relocation will include 450 direct staff with 300 associated support personnel.

Preliminary NSC consultations also have been conducted by Chat Blakeman in Inter-American Affairs with State, DoD, JCS, SOUTHCOM, and the Panama Canal Commission on a PRD regarding a post-2000 presence in Panama, procedures governing the reversion of properties to Panama, and the Canal Commission's strategy for turning over the canal to Panama in good order. The aim is to have recommendations to the deputies in January.

Concurrence by: Chat Blakeman 

Attachment

Tab A Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1994

The Honorable Lawton Chiles
Governor of Florida
Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Dear Lawton:

I appreciate your letter and your interest in the placement of the United States Southern Command. I have shared a copy of your letter with the Department of Defense staff so that they will know your views on this issue. I will certainly keep your ideas in mind as I continue working to meet the needs of our nation's industrial and technological defense base.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

Tony
see me re: this

Tony
see me re this

LAWTON CHILES
GOVERNOR

Office of the Governor

THE CAPITOL
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0001

October 21, 1994

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Florida strongly desires to become the new headquarters for the United States Southern Command upon its departure from the Republic of Panama. I am confident that you will find our State the ideal candidate for its relocation, and I ask your support in encouraging the Department of Defense to select Florida as Southern Command's new home.

Our State offers many benefits which will make it easier for Southern Command to do its job. The recent mobilizations into Haiti and the Gulf proved once again that Florida's strategic location and direct access make it the most effective training and staging ground for military operations within this hemisphere. Florida is a natural fit with its multilingual, multinational population and cultural diversity.

Facilities exist throughout Florida which not only meet Southern Command's current needs, but those of the future, as well. Those who serve in Southern Command — and their families — will find a very warm welcome and an unbeatable quality of life.

Here in Florida, we value each military installation within our State and support their roles and missions in maintaining our national security. We appreciate the contributions the military community has made to Florida's economy and quality of life.

Florida has been one of the hardest hit states with the closure of bases and cancellation of numerous defense contracts. The presence of Southern Command could make a sizeable dent in the unemployment created by the loss of some 18,000 jobs from base closures alone.

I am personally committed to doing all I can to make our vision of Florida as the new home for Southern Command a reality. Speaking for all Floridians, I would appreciate your support for this vision as well.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Lawton Chiles".
LAWTON CHILES

LC/ED/dac

TO: CONWAY, JAMIE A

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ARMY

AP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INVITATION FOR POTUS TO ATTEND CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY

ACTION: LAKE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 01 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SEATON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
NSC/CHRON
SEATON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9409416

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SEATON
002 LAKE
003

Z 94112814 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
Z 94120208 FOR SIGNATURE
X 94120208 LAKE SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 941201 CONWAY, JAMIE A

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 9416
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>SW</u>	
Sens			
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Soderberg	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
berger	<u>3</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Lake	<u>4</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>MBN R</u>	<u>DO</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette MBN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


December 1, 1994

Dear Captain Conway:

Thank you for the President's invitation to your Change of Command ceremony on December 5, 1994. Regretfully, he is unable to attend, as he will be in Budapest on that date.

Good luck in your follow-on assignment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Anthony Lake", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Captain Jamie A. Conway, USA
Commander, Hqs and Hqs Company
U.S. Army Garrison
Headquarters Command
Fort Meyer, VA 22211-5050



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

9416
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS COMMAND
FORT MYER, VIRGINIA 22211-5050



November 23, 1994

Office of the Commander


Mr. Anthony Lake
The White House
Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs
Washington, DC 20500-0001

Dear Mr Lake:

I would like to extend an invitation for President Clinton and the First Lady to attend the Change of Command ceremony scheduled for my unit on Monday, December 5, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at Fort Myer Ceremonial Hall and the duration of the ceremony will be approximately 30 minutes. We will have approximately 225 soldiers in formation and 150 guests in attendance.

It would be a great honor and privilege to have our Commander-In-Chief or the First Lady present to witness this ceremony, so rich in traditions. We will warmly welcome President Clinton's presence and only hope that his or the First Lady's schedule permits their attendance.

I can be contacted at Fort Myer at (703) 696-3650/3651 or after 7:00pm at (202) 872-8641.


Jamie A. Conway
Captain, U.S. Army
Commander, HQs and HQs Company
US Army Garrison

Enclosure

Copy Furnished:

Director, White House Military
Office

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9416

November 29, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*
SUBJECT: Invitation for POTUS to Attend Change of Command Ceremony

At Tab II is an invitation from Captain Jamie A. Conway, U.S. Army, for the President to attend his change of command ceremony on December 5, 1994. At Tab I is your response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I expressing the President's regrets.

Attachments

Tab I Letter for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9406634
RECEIVED: 16 AUG 94 17

TO: KIMMEL, MANNING

File: Admiral
Kimmel

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS: KIMMEL, EDWARD

SUBJECT: REPLY TO KIMMEL RE RESTORATION OF RANK

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 19 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SEATON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BELL
NSC CHRON
SEATON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

WBS

DATE

12/2

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9406634

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SEATON
001 LAKE
001 SEATON
001 LAKE
001 SEATON
002 LAKE
003 PRESIDENT
004
004 WH STRIPPING DESK

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 94091919 FOR FURTHER ACTION
Z 94092011 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 94092021 FOR REVISION
Z 94092115 FOR SIGNATURE
X 94092315 FOR FURTHER ACTION
Z 94110716 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
Z 94110916 FOR SIGNATURE
X 94120116 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
X 94120216 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

003 941107
003 941107
004 941201 KIMMEL, MANNING
004 941201 WH STRIPPING DESK

DISPATCH FOR INFO

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6634

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 18N A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Sens			
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Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>MBN 12/2</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>OPS 42</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Date 12-1-94 ?

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 1, 1994

Dear Mr. Kimmel:

I have reviewed the events surrounding the retirement after Pearl Harbor of your grandfather, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. While I understand your desire to see him posthumously promoted, I agree with the judgment of prior investigatory commissions, as recently revalidated by Secretary of Defense Perry.

Your grandfather was, without question, a patriotic American who served our country with bravery and dedication. With regard to the issue of his permanent retirement grade, though, the historical record provides no compelling justification for me to reverse prior decisions that he be retired at the two-star level.

I appreciate the importance of this issue to your family and respect your unwavering commitment to upholding its good name.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

Mr. Manning M. Kimmel IV
Post Office Box 307
142 North Confederate Avenue
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29731-6307

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1994

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a proposed letter to the family of Rear Admiral Kimmel, one of the two most senior military officials held responsible for the failure of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. Kimmel was relieved of his duties by President Roosevelt and retired in his permanent two-star rank, rather than in his highest temporary rank (the four stars he held at the time of Pearl Harbor).

The family has campaigned ever since to restore Kimmel's temporary rank. The matter has been reviewed by many administrations, each of which has confirmed Roosevelt's original action. On September 7, 1994, Secretary Perry wrote a letter to the family standing by previous official judgments.

Tony recommends that you sign the attached letter, supporting Secretary Perry's decision.

John Podesta *JP*
Todd Stern *TS*

*I want to discuss
this when I get
back to Washington
before I sign letter*

Manning Kimmel's recent argumentation relies heavily on the "FDR/Marshall" conspiracy thesis -- that President Roosevelt and General George Marshall knew an attack was imminent and suppressed information in order to permit the U.S. to be drawn into the war. This accusation was also the major thrust of the Republican Party's effort to unseat FDR in 1944. Mr. Kimmel cites an unpublished chapter of a book which takes note of a 1989 BBC documentary supporting this thesis. This chapter is particularly appealing to the Kimmel family because the author argues that both Kimmel and Short should be posthumously advanced in rank. It claims that "it is even possible -- nay, likely (but pure speculation) -- that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won."

Kimmel and Short were the most senior military officials held accountable for the failure of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. While the Kimmel family believes accountability should be placed higher up the chain of command, the decisions of the investigating committees and subsequent reviews of those decisions have stood the test of time. We find nothing to suggest that earlier findings are in error. In the absence of new findings, we believe that the evidence supports the historical record.

At my request, Bob Bell recently took the opportunity to discuss the Kimmel case with Admiral Crowe while in London on other business. Admiral Crowe said he thought it would be very difficult for you to restore Admiral Kimmel's rank on the heels of Secretary Perry's recent letter to the family upholding prior official judgments. He also told Bob that while he originally saw this as a means for you to reach out to the military community (many retired admirals have lobbied on behalf of Admiral Kimmel) and still believes Kimmel was treated unjustly, he no longer feels as strongly about it as before.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Manning Kimmel
Tab B	SecDef response to Edward Kimmel
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence



April 5, 1994

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear President Clinton,

I was hoping to meet you this afternoon at the reception in Fort Mill, but although my name was submitted by Congressman John Spratt, I was informed that the invitation that was originally extended to me was rescinded due to that fact that I am in broadcasting and the owner of two radio stations in York County. My reason for wanting to attend the reception was not of a "news nature" but a "personal nature". Since our meeting will not be possible, I have requested Congressman Spratt to give you this letter and the accompanying information.

I hope you can understand the extreme frustration and disappointment my family has experienced the past 50 years in trying to get Washington to honestly and fairly deal with the issue of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. I only hope that this packet of information is in your hands and not in those of a military aide who once again would relegate it to the Pentagon for an all too familiar "form letter response."

Although The White House has formally recognized my Grandfather as a "patriotic American who served his country well," they have refused to formally retire him at his proper rank, and rather would want the tarnish on his name to remain. A half century of research and numerous Naval and Congressional hearings, have proven Admiral Kimmel was not to blame for Pearl Harbor, and dozens of his Naval peers, including Admiral Crowe, agree that this simple gesture is long overdue.

SAM NUNN, D-GA, CHAIRMAN
JIM EXON, D-NEBRASKA
CARL LEVIN, D-MICHIGAN
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, D-MASSACHUSETTS
ED BENGAMAN, D-NEW JERSEY
JIM GLENN, D-OHIO
RICHARD C. SHELBY, D-ALABAMA
ROBERT C. BYRD, D-WEST VIRGINIA
BOB GRAMM, D-FLORIDA
CHARLES S. ROBB, D-VIRGINIA
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, D-CONNECTICUT
DICK THURMOND, D-SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN W. WARNER, D-VIRGINIA
WILLIAM J. COHEN, D-MAINE
JOHN MCLAIN, D-ARIZONA
TRENT LOTT, D-MISSISSIPPI
DAN COATS, D-INDIANA
BOB SMITH, D-NEW HAMPSHIRE
DAK KEMP THORNE, D-IDAHO
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, D-NORTH CAROLINA

ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR
ANTHONY J. PRINCIP, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

July 16, 1993

General Colin Powell, Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E873, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20318

Dear General Powell:

Since April 1987, the Kimmel brothers, Edward and Thomas, have endeavored to have the Department of Defense initiate action to promote their father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, posthumously, to the rank of Admiral. He was Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

In 1988, after an extensive investigation, then Secretary of the Navy, William L. Ball, III, recommended to then Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, that the matter be placed before the President for decision. Secretary Carlucci declined to do so.

The Kimmel brothers have provided extensive documentation based on scholarly research to the Department of Defense and to us in support of their position. They have also gained support of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, two former Chiefs of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke and Thomas Moorer, Veterans of Foreign Wars and many other World War II veterans. Also, attached to this letter is a 1991 letter from thirty-six prominent retired Navy admirals urging President Bush "to nominate to the U.S. Senate Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN for posthumous promotion to Admiral...."

Reasons for not correcting this wrong have been conveyed in the past. But the reasoning has been unclear, such as (this matter) "has been reviewed a number of times in the decades since Admiral Kimmel's retirement in 1942" and that "the promotional process was not the way to address the issue of Admiral Kimmel's place in history."

The Kimmel brothers are merely seeking to remove the stigma and obloquy associated with the charge by the Roberts Commission which issued its report in 1942. After a hurried investigation to find a scapegoat, the Commission charged Admiral Kimmel with

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

September 23, 1993

Dear Colleague:

Following the 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, unjust blame was placed on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commander of the United States Army's Hawaiian Department. As a result, both officers reverted their permanent ranks of Rear Admiral and Major General respectively, in which they retired and from which they never were advanced. This injustice can be rectified by posthumously advancing these two officers to the rank of Admiral and Lieutenant General respectively.

In 1944 a Naval Court of Inquiry found that no blame should be placed on Admiral Kimmel and specifically approved his decisions and disposition of forces. Further, a Joint Committee of the Congress in 1946 specifically found that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short had been derelict in his duty. Despite these findings, their names carry the unwarranted blame for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor. The Congress can correct this mistake and set the historical record straight.

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 authorizes the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to advance certain Naval and Army officers on the retired list to the highest ranks in which they served while on active duty. Admiral Kimmel and General Short are both eligible for such advancement.

In November 1991, an Army Board for the Correction of Military Records recommended that Major General Short be advanced posthumously to the rank of Lieutenant General. This recommendation was turned down by the Department of the Army despite the fact that it was supported by the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association and Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee of Lexington, Kentucky.


Numerous organizations and naval personnel have supported advancing posthumously Rear Admiral Kimmel to the rank of Admiral on the retired list, including the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, thirty-seven navy flag officers among whom were five former Chiefs of Naval Operations, twenty-nine other full admirals, three vice admirals and one rear admiral, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).

The Executive Branch has not seen fit to nominate either Rear Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short for advancement in rank on the retired list as contemplated by the reference statute, despite the fact that almost all of their contemporary officers have been so nominated and advanced. The only appropriate way to redress this injustice is for Congress to call on the President to posthumously advance Rear Admiral Kimmel and General Short to Admiral and Lieutenant General respectively.

Should you have occasion to visit with any of the petitioners I urge you to discuss Admiral Kimmel and the Pearl Harbor disaster.

My brother, Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret), and I are still committed to seeing that corrective steps are taken to offset the baseless public impression that our father was solely responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster and "derelict in his duty". Hopefully you will become a convert to our cause along with the illustrious Petitioners noted above.

Sincerely,


Edward R. Kimmel

In 1941 our code-breaking capability was in its infancy, and totally unsuspected by Japan. By mid-1941 it had been given the code-name "Magic," and it could break some, but not all, of Japan's codes. Sometime that year President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top advisers were informed that they could henceforth be provided in real time with the text of messages sent between Tokyo and its Embassy in Washington; that is, we could be reading messages sent in the diplomatic code about as soon as either of the intended recipients could. It was a coup of the first magnitude.

Official recipients of Magic were the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy (Cordell Hull, Henry Stimson, and Frank Knox), and the Service Chiefs (Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark). One or two other officers not in the direct intelligence chain, notably high-handed Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, then building his power structure in the Navy Department, were also aware of Magic, and as events marched on, others inevitably were included. One of our primary concerns, nevertheless, was to keep knowledge of it at a minimum, and prevent all chance that persons aware of it might fall into the hands of the enemy.

We were also worried that demonstrating foreknowledge too often of supposedly secret enemy plans might endanger Magic. We should not, for example, consistently concentrate forces at just the right place and time needed to defeat the enemy, for repeated coincidences of this nature might raise suspicions. Of the many ways Japan might deal with the possibility that their codes might have been invaded, the simplest would be to change codes immediately, thus risking alerting us to the fact. A more subtle reaction might be to make no overt change at all, but begin using the compromised system for disinformation, or to send messages designed to discover whether or not invasion had actually occurred.

Cryptographers are traditionally alert for any signs their systems have been compromised. From the code-breakers' point of view, once the enemy even suspects one of his codes has been violated, anything taken from the code or codes in question is no longer valuable, or at the minimum must be held suspect in its turn.

The code-breakers considered it a thousand times more difficult to invade a new system than it could have been for the originators to create it in the first place. Unwise use of Magic thus might lead to its sudden demise, possibly forever but certainly for a very long time. We consequently went to tremendous lengths, at this early stage of our code breaking capability, to keep everything about it as secret as possible. The extreme emphasis on security seems a bit exaggerated today, for we frequently did not pass vital information to those who had most need of it. At times we incurred deliberate losses it might have been possible to avoid--but this is always very difficult to explain to the survivors. It was always hard to judge which objective would be best served with any particular bit of intelligence, and it still is. Danger of compromising the source is an inherent factor in use of intelligence at any time.

It is necessary to appreciate the foregoing to gain an insight into the tremendous diplomatic power game Roosevelt embarked upon after election to his unprecedented third term, and the tremendous care with which he used his tools. Magic was fundamental to his entire foreign policy because, in poker parlance, it let him "look down Japan's throat."

Magic gave FDR information about Japanese plans and strategy at their very highest level, just as a similar capability, code-named "Enigma," served Winston Churchill against Hitler. Granting today's perception that our entry into World War II was imperative, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Magic, which continued to improve, was one of the important factors.

Without Magic, our President could not have had the sure touch with which he led us through the war, all the while suffering from a slowly debilitating illness that had no cure. With Magic, we had an extremely vulnerable tool, but it was of incalculable value. Men had sacrificed their lives to obtain only small portions of the extraordinary mosaic of logic and equipment that had gone into its creation, and more would do so to prevent even a small chance of its discovery by the enemy (it was, for example, the reason why Captain

the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, under Commander Joseph Rochefort, and elsewhere in the navy complex, some of them, unbelievably, at an establishment in a small house near to Admiral Kimmel's own official quarters, were sent only to Washington, where they were buried in the jungle of official paper there. The barest suggestion of these strange things would have served to alert Kimmel and Short to the possibility something unusual was going on. But none of it--not even that obtained on their own official real estate--ever reached either one. Rochefort and the others were categorically forbidden to pass any information anywhere except through top-secret channels directly to their superiors in Washington, D.C.

Whether one takes this broadcast at face value or not, whatever the putative warnings and rumors of which it now would appear there were many, the attack, exactly half a century ago, was a strategic and tactical surprise of the first order. Eight investigations (by some counts nine), the latest completed in May, 1946, submitted reports totaling more than 15,000 pages in 30 printed volumes, plus another 15 volumes of appendices. All of them seem to have concentrated on what the army and navy commanders knew, when they knew it, and what they did about it. Few have paid much attention to what they should have known, and why they did not, beyond the tautological excuse that someone with "greater judgment" would have "more accurately" interpreted the warnings he actually did receive.

What could Admiral Kimmel have done better? With realistic appreciation of the warnings he did receive, and those he did not, what more should he have done during that crucial first week of December? Were there any indications that he should have had that he did not receive? Were there others, superior to him, who also should have done more? Is it possible that our high command, quite properly obsessed with the danger of an Axis victory in Europe, really wanted Japan to initiate the war that Hitler was obviously trying for the moment to avoid--and that only the extent of Japan's attack, that it reached across the Pacific to Pearl Harbor, was in fact a surprise? How else explain the superior intelligence made available to our commanders in the Far East? Or the extraordinary dilatoriness in getting a last minute alert message on the way to Pearl Harbor? It was almost as though the men in charge were torn in two directions: to let Japan attack, since it was vital that we get into the World War (we know that FDR's watchword, at that moment, was that Japan must attack first); or loyalty to the standards of military conduct ingrained in all of them. Many naval officers in high ranking posts asked themselves these questions at the time, and there were no answers, as there are none today.

But in 1942 American public opinion, fueled by a demanding media, had to have an immediate scapegoat for the Pearl Harbor disaster, and despite their strenuous efforts, Kimmel's in particular, the two hapless commanders in Hawaii found this was to be their only contribution to the national war effort. Hurriedly called, the Roberts Commission sat from 18 December 1941 to 23 January 1942, permitted no legal representation by either of the two accused commanders, found nonetheless that they had been seriously derelict in their duties, and brought about their retirement for cause two months later. It was not fair, but it may have been politic at the time. It is even possible--nay, likely (but pure speculation)--that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won. Undeniably, the ability to lay blame for initial failure on someone who could then be put aside would be helpful to its overall prosecution. Under such over-riding circumstances, there may be some excuse for relegating truth to a secondary role; but at the bar of history it must always remain primary.

Eight subsequent investigations of how the war began were held in all. In 1944 an official Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel. Most of the others found fault not only with Kimmel and Short but also, in various and different ways, with Marshall, Stark, MacArthur, and FDR. It is still, as this is written, an unsettled question as to where the most fault lies. All agree that there was much blame to spread around, but that in the largest sense it was necessary for America to become fully involved in World War II, and the sooner the better. Thus, Japan's duplicitous initiative was the greatest

planning is always devoted to preserving the element of surprise. The defeat of the Maginot Line, the invasion of Normandy in 1944, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, all are examples of this. Another generally accepted truism: the prophet of disaster is usually unpopular too, along with the victimized leader.

For Admiral Richardson, not quite a prophet of disaster but the closest thing to it at the time, there was no warning that he was about to lose his job, except that he knew he had been unusually forthright in stating his disagreement with the President. He had even gone so far as to say that senior officers in the navy had lost confidence in their civilian leadership. This "hurt the President's feelings," the admiral was later told. The axe fell without even a telephoned preliminary notice from his close friend, the CNO; so it is probable, as Richardson believed, that instructions from FDR himself must have forbidden the courtesy. In January 1941, exactly one year after he took command, he received a dispatch cutting his normal tour in half, returning him to Washington, and directing his replacement by Admiral Kimmel.

In Washington, although told by Secretary of the Navy Knox to expect a call to the White House, Richardson never again saw the President (he had seen him frequently before). Demoted to Rear Admiral, he was employed in a succession of minor jobs in Washington. He reached the statutory retirement age of 64 in October 1942, was put on the retired list, and immediately recalled to active duty in similar assignments--as before, not connected with the war effort. He was finally retired in 1947. In his book he says, "after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel received the rawest of raw deals from Franklin D. Roosevelt and, insofar as they acquiesced in this treatment, from Frank Knox and "Betty" Stark (CNO)." Elsewhere in the same book he wrote, "I believe the President's responsibility for our initial defeats in the Pacific was direct, real, and personal."

Admiral Hart has already been mentioned. The "Purple" machine that provided "Magic," the ability to intercept and decode Japanese messages, was available to him and General MacArthur via a top secret special shipment sent in January 1941 (Hawaii received no such shipment.) How much use of it either of the commanders in the Philippines made is not specifically known, but Hart was not caught napping by the Japanese attack. He disposed of the forces under his command as well as anyone could have under the short time available to him, and it is possible that he might have done even better, possibly have saved the submarine *Sealion* (under overhaul and immobile), had he had another day's warning. His performance illustrates at least what could be done in the very minimum of time.

Hart was nothing if not a dedicated naval officer and knowledgeable fleet commander. Although he must have guessed that he was being protected because of his knowledge of our ability to decode Japanese messages, it no doubt caused him much heartburn to abandon his forces in the summary way he did, in mid-February 1942, knowing they were being used as a death offering in support of a cause already known to be lost. The Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously awarded to the commanding officer of the sacrificed *Houston* was truly deserved, as the facts now available clearly demonstrate, but it can never be more than an inadequate symbol of the debt owed to all the men of that forlorn, deserted, Asiatic Fleet. Yet, war is never without sacrifice, demanded and given. Before blame and accusation are handed out it is first necessary to decide what were the alternatives to all concerned. Japan, with a warrior class based on a samurai culture, would have had no difficulty with this problem. Neither, probably, would Nazi Germany. Had we abandoned the Dutch East Indies, more of our Asiatic Fleet might have survived; but the Dutch were our allies, and it would have been hard to predict the judgment of history.

Hart, the Asiatic Fleet's Commander-in-Chief, retired from active duty in June 1942. In February 1945 the Governor of Connecticut appointed him United States Senator on the death of Senator Francis Maloney of that state. He did not run for reelection in 1946, and his term expired the next year.

though intuitive, information of the intentions of the Japanese fleet--all had to wait until the general could be found and attend to business.

Marshall was a man of commanding presence and a nearly mystical sense of duty. Absent some overriding criterion, there is literally no way he would, or could, have been so derelict in his duties on this all important Sunday. Other officials--Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Marshall's navy counterpart Admiral Stark, many lesser officers, in particular those involved with code work--were at their desks or trying frantically to reach someone in authority with what they considered to be important information. All were well aware of the critical state of Japanese-American relations. The Army Chief of Staff could not have been an exception. Admiral Richardson wrote that though he had no proof, he was certain FDR had directed that only General Marshall could send any warning message to Hawaii. Would the conscientious Marshall have absented himself from his post virtually the entire morning of that terribly important Sunday--on his own? Richardson did not think so. On the contrary, the rest of his life he believed that FDR wanted an attack of some kind to launch us into the war, and that Marshall held the key. But when FDR "realized the extent of the damage done by the attack on Pearl Harbor, he lost his nerve and (ran for cover)."

General MacArthur's USAFFE was created on 25 July 1941 when President Roosevelt called the Philippine armed forces into the service of the United States. Initially this force consisted only of the relatively small U.S. Army garrison on Corregidor, augmented by the Philippine Constabulary (the army of the autonomous but not yet fully independent Philippines), and other U.S. Army forces in the archipelago. MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935, already personally wealthy, was now politically powerful as well. As Field Marshall of the Philippine Army he had a fabulous apartment at the top of the storied Manila Hotel, supplied and staffed by the Philippine government, from which he carried out his administrative duties. Although the U.S. Army might have selected someone other than a flamboyant and ambitious retired general, even a former chief of staff, for the post of Commanding General of the USAFFE, Roosevelt picked MacArthur, a choice from which there was no audible dissent. He was guilty of far more dereliction than Admiral Kimmel when, 10 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, with complete knowledge that it had occurred, he permitted total destruction of his newly arrived air forces. He had, like Hart, been given Magic (it came in on a "purple" machine sequestered in his headquarters, and he and Hart were theoretically the only ones to see the messages). When orders came to save himself he protested loudly but did so nonetheless, along with, presumably, all those who had had contact with Magic. He had known FDR well for years, had been held over as Army Chief-of-Staff by Presidential order for an extra year after his term expired in 1934, and may well have contributed to FDR's political career, possibly by important campaign contributions, in ways known to no one else. The last point is speculative; the facts are that despite his failure at this critically important juncture he was continued as commander of the U.S. Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE), later appointed Supreme Commander Far East; and although the victory over Japan had clearly been won at sea, was given the honor of receiving the Japanese surrender. The sop to the navy was that the Japanese emissaries were obliged to surrender on board the U.S. battleship *Missouri*.

The records show that MacArthur was kept better informed than either of the Hawaii commanders. Moreover, he had the "purple" machine, that they did not have. Even so, and even after receipt of urgent messages from Hawaii and Washington describing the bombing that had taken place at Pearl Harbor, he remained indecisive. At dawn in the Philippines, many hours after the war had begun, his Army Air Corps commander, General Brereton, sent up some fighter planes from Clark Field on a patrol mission. This was in the early morning of 8 December, east longitude time. By some accounts the first attack on the Philippine mainland had already taken place, at Baguio, in the hills north of Manila, but the Army Air Corps fliers found no enemy planes, and returned to Clark Field to await further orders. No such further orders came, although Brereton begged for them several times.

was under such heavy security when it was fresh that its accuracy, now, is doubtful. The motives of the participants are also suspect; self interest was not impossible, deliberate falsehood, for government secrecy or some other reason, not impossible either. And finally, it is important to go over everything from the points of view of the men on the spot at the time.

In the process, the sheer immensity of the material has been overwhelming. Investigators and historians have had to go over thousands--tens--hundreds of thousands of pages of testimony and personal narrative. To this must be added the known, and unknown, politics of the time. Now, however, half a century after the event, most of all this has been brought out, Magic has been exposed, and some of the political facts; so that others can be guessed. It is time we put aside the superfluous and concentrated on the significant. This is not an impossible task, but it cannot be done by a politically closed mind.

Here are the essential events as they took place; each is in the direct chain leading to our failure, and so far as possible, has been divested of immaterial detail. What follows is the kernel of what we knew:

1. Admiral Yamamoto spent a year planning the attack. He well knew how covertly it had to be conducted, and demanded the utmost secrecy from inception to execution. His precautions against accidental radio signals from the designated task force, the Kido Butai, extended to removal of transmitter keys from all ships' radios, because even an innocuous signal was subject to interception by direction finder stations that might wonder how it had happened to come from an area where no ships were supposed to be. He might also have expected the big movement of Japanese naval forces southward, into Southeast Asia, to dominate our attention. That move was no feint; but by accident or design, its secrecy did not compare to the absolute blackout imposed on the Kido Butai, both during its preparation and finally as it lunged eastward across the North Pacific. Yamamoto, who planned in utmost detail, expected the southern movement to attract all our attention, as it did. It would be the height of arrogance on our part to assume that the Japanese success could only have been due to our own failure. Admiral Yamamoto and his advisers had a great deal to do with it. Although they too suffered a little from Murphy's Law, on the whole they played their cards very well.

2. In 1941 The United States began to put strong pressure on Japan to stop her aggression in China. We froze Japan's assets wherever we could, and used our clout with England and the Dutch East Indies to threaten her source of oil to carry on the war. Churchill supported this all the way, and a diplomatic crisis resulted. Through Magic, our top officials knew Japan had no intention of complying with our demands and would instead move decisively, in force, into Southeast Asia.

3. On 5 November, Magic decoded a message from Tokyo to its ambassadors in Washington informing them that some kind of accommodation must be signed by 25 November. After that deadline, "things are automatically going to happen," Tokyo said. The Pacific commanders were not told of this. We now know that Yamamoto had selected 25 November as the day the Kido Butai would depart from its last staging port in the Kurile Islands.

4. On 19 November, Magic decoded what became known as the "Winds Code" message, announcing that in case of cutting of diplomatic relations, certain words relating to weather would be added to its daily plain language news broadcast. On hearing them, Japan's embassies were to destroy codes and secret documents. On our side, we welcomed the idea that the "winds code execute" might give us a few days of warning, and all saw it as an alternate source that could be developed entirely free of any connection with Magic, that fragile code-breaking secret. So all stations, Pearl Harbor included, were directed to keep a close watch for it. Although no official records can

broadcasts." Rochefort was Navy's top cryptanalyst in Hawaii, well known to Fielder. Colonel Rufus Bratton, second to Miles in Army Intelligence, claimed later to have suggested this most unusual message to Miles. Obviously very miscast in intelligence, Fielder did not carry out the order, even though it had come from his direct superior in Army Intelligence.

11. On 6 December came the climax. Magic decoded and translated a message informing the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington that a "very long" message in 14 parts, containing a reply to the ultimatum of 26 November, was being sent. It was to be put into "nicely drafted form" and held for a time of delivery to be directed later. This "pilot message," as it came to be called, reiterated again that although Japan considered all negotiations ruptured, the embassy was carefully not to give that impression. The U.S. had this pilot message in hand before it was delivered to the Japanese Ambassadors. Tension increased dramatically in Washington, but nobody told Kimmel or Short of this development.

12. A watch was immediately instituted for the 14-part message, and the first 13 parts were decoded as fast as they came in. It was instantly noted that the text was English, not Japanese, as heretofore. That no translation was needed was considered significant by the code-breakers most tuned into the Japanese scene, since this avoided possible error in an Embassy translation. The 13 parts did not come in sequence. When it was evident there was a delay in the 14th part, the Magic watch officers decided to send out the 13 parts en bloc and follow later with the 14th, which they expected to be of very high importance. Thus, by 9 p.m. of December 6th, the first 13 parts of Japan's reply to the U.S. ultimatum of 26 November were being shown to cognizant U.S. officials in Washington, along with the pilot message stating there would be 14 parts in all. There was no notice, however, that the Japanese Government had encoded this important dispatch in English, a fact of which none of our top officials was informed. Had they been, some of the intelligence-attuned officers in the circuit, Admiral Wilkinson or General Miles, to name the heads of navy and army intelligence, could hardly have failed to give them far more attention, not to mention careful scrutiny, than they in fact did.

13. Each service made its own Magic deliveries. Routine deliveries by Navy were to the White House, the Navy Secretary, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It being by this time rather late at night, the various courier drops had to be at local residences instead of government offices. The Navy intelligence chief, Wilkinson, that Saturday night happened to be giving a dinner party at his home. His guests included his opposite number in the Army, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, the Presidential Naval Aide, Captain J.R. Beardall, and two French naval officers. Excusing themselves from the others present, the highest intelligence officers of our two services thus simultaneously received the first 13 parts of this supremely important message before midnight of 6 December, and exchanged views as to its meaning.

Neither Wilkinson nor Miles saw anything special in the lengthy sequential bloc of messages in formal diplomatic language. By the pilot message they knew there was to be a final 14th part yet to come, but they had no way of knowing that, contrary to the usual practice, Japan had encoded this lengthy message in English, but in their code! The identification numbers our code-breakers always appended accurately indicated that the messages had been through the translation process, but not that translation was in fact unnecessary. None of the recipients remarked at the unusual smoothness of the language, which might have been a tip-off.

14. In the White House, meanwhile, President Roosevelt read the file and passed it over to Harry Hopkins, who was with him in his upstairs study. His duty aide heard FDR say to Hopkins at this point, "This means war!" Hopkins said, "It's too bad we can't strike the first blow, since we know their plans." Roosevelt said, "No, they must strike first!"

asked whether he returned it, nor about the substance of his talk with the President, if there was one. No such embarrassment developed with Marshall, whose own memory lapse was neither explained nor corrected.

19. The 14th part was delivered from the code-breakers about midnight to Lieutenant Colonel Dusenbury, assistant to Bratton. Bratton had directed him to wait for it and upon receipt have it delivered to the Army Chief of Staff. The tone of the 14th part was sharper than any of the previous 13, but did not seem sensational to the tired Dusenbury, who made no effort to show it to anyone, simply put it on top of the file, designated a copy for Navy in accordance with procedure, and secured the office. At 0730 Sunday morning, 7 December, Colonel Bratton arrived, read the assembled 14-part message, "blew his stack" at Dusenbury for not following orders, but decided it was "the formal statement" of what they already knew, and not earth-shaking after all. Despite displeasure with his assistant for not having tried to get it to Marshall the previous midnight, now that the morning had arrived he decided routine distribution was adequate. At this moment, Bratton later testified, he was handed the message stipulating that the Japanese Ambassadors formally deliver their country's long response to the Secretary of State at one pm that same day. Like the pilot message, but unlike all 14 parts of the principal message, the delivery message was in Japanese and had needed translation. Bratton was not privy to the motives and objectives swirling in the minds of the men conducting our top-level international diplomacy, but he did see something in Japan's juxtaposition of English and Japanese in this way. It was clear matters of importance were in the wind. He saw no potential threat to Pearl Harbor, but the emphasis on time hinted at an attack somewhere in the Pacific. That, and the use of English in the main message, galvanized Bratton into action.

20. After his final deliveries on the night of the 6th, the Navy courier, LCdr. Kramer by name, who was also the Navy's top Japanese translator, had a few hours of sleep and returned to work at 0730 of the 7th. There he found his copy of the 14-part message left for him by Dusenbury, and immediately made folders for the White House, the State Department, and Admiral Wilkinson. (Wilkinson, he knew, would take care of deliveries to Stark and Knox.) His three office drops being only a few blocks apart, he walked the entire distance. When he got back to the Navy Department he found the delivery message waiting for him and, like Bratton, saw it must have special significance. On his own, he decided that it should be delivered at once. While more folders were prepared, he made a time chart of the Pacific, noted that one p.m. (1300) in Washington would be 0730 Sunday morning in Hawaii, and made the mental observation that this was just the time the big ships would be serving their crews a leisurely Sunday breakfast.

21. Gordon Prange's account (AT DAWN WE SLEPT) is superior to all others at this point, but only John Toland, in INFAMY, reports the White House vigil. Morgenstern refers to it inferentially in 1947 (he had heard of it but could not record it as fact), and mention of it is notably made in two personal letters by third parties. All other reviews of what happened at this extraordinary time simply accept the Army Chief of Staff's vague statement that he believed he was at home all night (despite the Washington Times Herald story), and that he went for a ride on horseback next morning when it would seem the whole Army was looking for him. All also agree that Stark arrived in his Main Navy office not long after 0800 on that Sunday morning (but ascribe no reason why he was there and not on a golf course somewhere, or even sleeping late on Sunday morning) and met with his intelligence chief, Admiral Wilkinson, and the latter's assistant, Commander Arthur McCollum, who were waiting with the complete 14-part message in Kramer's folder. A discussion over its meaning took place that lasted long enough for the courier/translator to finish his first set of walking courier rounds. Kramer's second trip to the CNO's office, occasioned by the delivery message, gave him the chance to point out to these high officers that 1300 in Washington D.C. was half an hour before morning colors in Hawaii. Wilkinson at once urged Stark to telephone a warning to Kimmel.

over a week to the men on whom the blow was about to fall. Morgenstern, with the benefit of all the hearings before him, including that of the Army Pearl Harbor Board which he quotes devastatingly, is very clear on this. As he points out, Washington knew well that something was about to happen, but all hands there, from the Commander-in-Chief on down, chose to do nothing until after the blow fell.

We see reference after reference to "subtle hints" the Hawaiian commanders supposedly received, including headlines in the Honolulu newspapers, into which they were expected to have been able to read more than anyone else, more even than the people in Washington, who had Magic and a hundred other sources of special information. In fact, the only actual warnings sent from Washington to the Pacific Fleet were the emasculated "war warning" of 27 November; and the 3 December notice that Japanese embassies were burning secret papers.

Not a single hint of the frenetic activity in Washington on the night of 6-7 December was sent out to the commanders who had the most right to know. One can imagine what either Kimmel or Short would have done had they had the slightest idea of what was going on in Washington during that weekend. Not one official in the Nation's Capital, not the Chief of Naval Operations, not the Army Chief of Staff, both of whom should have felt command responsibility for their men on the firing line, did what their duties required. Warning signs of all sorts were missed. All the administrative bosses were derelict, and when the blow fell they all took cover in the adage that "the blame falls on the captain of the ship." So far as any concept of human justice was concerned, this was a travesty.

The inequality of treatment is even more obvious when General MacArthur in the Philippines is added to the equation. Eight hours after he was notified about Pearl Harbor, he was nonetheless caught utterly unready at noon on Monday, 8 December, Philippines time. William Manchester in his outstanding biography of MacArthur, *AMERICAN CAESAR*, explains his failure as a form of "input overload," plus a misapplication of FDR's order that Japan should "strike the first blow"--but does not claim that this lessens MacArthur's responsibility, which of course it does not. Compared to the disgraceful treatment of Kimmel and Short, MacArthur's preservation in command and later elevation to Supreme Commander stand in ironic contrast.

In their new book *FINAL JUDGEMENT* (I disagree with both the title and its spelling) Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee have made it clear that the most important mistakes were committed in Washington, not in Hawaii. There was a veritable cascade of admitted errors in our national capital--and yet the authors illogically lay primary blame for the success of the Japanese surprise just where the discredited Roberts Commission placed it in 1941: on the Hawaiian commanders because they were captains of the ship.

The real captain, as we all know, was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and we cannot today question his judgment that it was imperative we get into the war against Hitler. He knew America would have to be aroused to a warlike frame of mind before Congress would act, and he finally sought to achieve this through a secret, murky, but thoroughly understandable diplomatic campaign on Japan. In this he was entirely successful, but unfortunately too much so; for Japan had its own agenda for a war with the United States, and an excellent admiral, Yamamoto Isoroku by name, to put it into practice. There is no doubt that Roosevelt wanted the United States to go to war against Nazi Germany, and that he thereby preserved the freedom of the world against an unimaginable coalition of evil. But he failed to foresee Pearl Harbor, and, as J. O. Richardson says, "ran for cover" when the dimensions of the Pearl Harbor disaster came clear to him.

The fact is, as a nation we are glad Kimmel did not get enough warning to get his battle force to sea--at least, as envisioned in War Plan Orange, which would have had it looking for a great sea-battle. Admiral Nimitz himself has been quoted as saying if that had taken place the ships would have been sunk in deep water with horrendous loss of life, instead of in the shallow waters of their base with only one-tenth the casualties, grievous

For our own sake as a generous people, and to respect the ideal of individual justice on which our nation was built, we should at last officially recognize that they were not the principal ones at fault for Pearl Harbor, and not derelict in their duties. This is the growing realization in our whole country, except for those few who have not thought deeply about how Pearl Harbor could have happened. The finely woven tapestry of time has done its work, for now it is our national honor, not that of these two men turned into scapegoats, that is at stake. Do we believe in equity for the individual, or do we not? Will our country persist in vindictively holding these two as the persons solely at fault for Pearl Harbor, or will it finally do the right thing?

To restore their good names to Admiral Kimmel and General Short will cost us nothing, but doing it will symbolize something we hold very dear. The two officers should, by official action of the President, be advanced posthumously on the retired lists of their respective services to the highest ranks in which they served, as have all other officers in the war. They were never fairly tried, never given a chance to defend themselves. More than anyone in our history, they have been solely before the bar of public opinion--and that deep, finely ground judgment is already resounding, nation-wide, with the verdict that they have suffered enough in the service of their country. Ask anyone; take a vote; there are few dissenters. The suggestion to posthumously restore the ranks they once held is not comparable to a Presidential Pardon, but to the righting of a wrong that has gone on too long. Others also at fault, in some cases more so, were retired full of honors at their highest active duty ranks. Restoring the two final casualties of Pearl Harbor will heal a running wound in the national body. It is little enough to do, will cost nothing except a few drops of ink and a bit of compassion, and the honor of our nation demands no less.

for him to testify under oath and call witnesses in his behalf. A court martial was never convened even though the U.S. Congress repeatedly extended the statute of limitations time limits at Admiral Kimmel's urging to permit this to occur.

Finally, due to Admiral Kimmel's continued entreaties, the Congress directed the Navy Department to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack and a Naval Court of Inquiry was convened in 1944. The Court of Inquiry cleared Admiral Kimmel of any improper performance with regards to his military responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. It is also significant to note that historical material which has become available in recent years irrefutably shows that Kimmel and Short were not provided information by their superiors in Washington which would have alerted them that an attack on Hawaii was imminent. We refer specifically to Japanese messages that were intercepted and decoded by both the Americans and the British.

After World War II, U.S. law was changed to permit military officers to retire at the highest rank held while on active duty, upon nomination by the President of the United States and confirmation by the Senate. For reasons never explained, neither Admiral Kimmel nor Lieutenant General Short were nominated for promotion, the only World War II officers not so advanced.

At this point in time no action by the U.S. Government can fully rectify the injustices to Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short. A partial atonement can be achieved by posthumously promoting these two officers to the ranks they held at the time of the attack, promotions to which they are entitled by law.

The following distinguished bodies have also passed resolutions recommending the posthumous promotions: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Foundation, and the Pearl Harbor Survivors' Association. Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations, sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense in July 1991 recommending the posthumous promotion.

We the undersigned retired senior officers respectfully urge you to nominate to the U.S. Senate Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN for posthumous promotion to Admiral and Major General Walter C. Short, USA, for posthumous promotion to Lieutenant General.

Very respectfully,

The Virginian Apt. 323
9229 Arlington Boulevard
Fairfax, VA 22031

The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Four Star Rank For
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN
(Retired) (Deceased)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I last wrote you on this subject January 23, 1990. At that time I told you that Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret) had informed me that you had asked for my recommendation regarding the efforts of the Kimmel family to restore four star rank to the late Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN (Ret) (Deceased). I wrote you that I had never had the occasion to make a study of the many complex issues involved in the Pearl Harbor attack and thus was lacking in information upon which to base a recommendation and requested that I be relieved from providing you with a recommendation on his posthumous promotion.

Since that time I have educated myself on the circumstances surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack and thus feel qualified to provide you with the recommendation you sought. It is my considered judgment that when all the circumstances are considered that you should approve this posthumous promotion and recommend it to the President. This conclusion was reached not because of the importance of this matter to the Kimmel family but because of its importance to the Navy as an institution. The record is clear that important information, available to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, was never made available to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. While the reason for this has never been clearly established the fact is that it placed Admiral Kimmel at a severe disadvantage in not having the full picture upon which to base his estimate of the situation. I have always been of the firm opinion that those who decide not to furnish important information should bear the responsibility for that decision.

Lastly, the Naval Court of Inquiry, which exonerated Admiral Kimmel, concluded that his military decisions were proper based on the information available to him. I place great weight on the conclusions of the Naval Court because its members were Admirals of great experience and eminently qualified to pass on the propriety of what Admiral Kimmel had done under the circumstances.


Sincerely, Arleigh Burke

Arleigh Burke
July 24, 1991

"missing" intelligence merely amplified what Kimmel and Short had already been told, that war appeared imminent.

According to the Navy, virtually every Administration since FDR has reviewed the case and confirmed the original findings. The Navy position is that Kimmel should not be rehabilitated, since the principles of command accountability and responsibility fully justify the findings and actions taken in 1942, and no new information has surfaced which challenges earlier findings.

The Kimmel family forwards new argumentation to buttress the "FDR/Marshall" conspiracy thesis first levied by the Republican Party during the 1944 election campaign--that Roosevelt and George Marshall knew an attack was imminent and suppressed information in order to permit the U.S. to be drawn into the war. In a letter to the President (Tab C), Manning Kimmel includes an unpublished chapter of a book which cites a 1989 BBC documentary supporting this thesis. This chapter is particularly appealing to the Kimmels because the chapter's author argues that both Kimmel and Short should be posthumously advanced in rank and claims that "it is even possible--nay, likely (but pure speculation)--that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won." This is the supporting "evidence" for the most recent Kimmel requests.

Kimmel and Short were the most senior military officers held accountable for the failure of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. While the Kimmel family believes accountability should be placed higher up the chain of command, we believe the decisions of the investigating committees and subsequent reviews of those decisions have stood the test of time. ~~Presently~~ ~~we~~ find nothing to suggest that earlier findings are in error. In the absence of new findings we believe that the evidence supports the historical record.

It should also be noted that restoring Kimmel to his previous rank would raise questions as to whether the President does or does not exonerate General Short. The historical record suggests, however, that Short was even more culpable than Kimmel.

At your request, Bob Bell took the opportunity while in London on a CFE mission last month to meet with Admiral Crowe and discuss his views on this issue. Admiral Crowe told Bob that he thought it very difficult for the President to come out in favor of this retroactive promotion now that Secretary Perry has written the Kimmel family a negative response. Admiral Crowe said that he originally saw granting the request as a means for the President to reach out to the military community, since so many retired admirals favor this action. He also revealed a side of this controversy that was new to Bob: the institutional Navy's resentment that General George Marshall (who was privy to all the "Magic" intercepts) was not "hurt" by Pearl Harbor (and indeed went on to near-sainthood status), while Admiral Kimmel (who was not given access to "Magic") was cashiered. Admiral Crowe said,

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
ARMS CONTROL

TREATIES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: START I INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION

ACTION: PRESIDENT SCD PER WH EXEC CLERK

DUE DATE: 03 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN
BELL
KRECKO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9409477

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ANDREASEN
002 LAKE
003

Z 94113009 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
Z 94120115 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
X 94120216 PRESIDENT SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 941201
003 941201

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: LAKE

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 28 NOV 94
SOURCE REF: 9426903

KEYWORDS: START
ARMS CONTROL

TREATIES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RATIFICATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY - START

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE DUE DATE: 03 DEC 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ANDREASEN

FOR CONCURRENCE
GOTTEMÖELLER
KRECZKO
PONEMAN
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO
BELL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

President sgd per WH
Executive Clerk 12/2/94

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: START I Instruments of Ratification

Purpose

To submit for your signature the START I instrument of ratification.

Background

Attached for your signature is the instrument of ratification, in quintuplicate, of the START I Treaty.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the instrument of ratification at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Instrument of Ratification (in quintuplicate)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

President of the United States of America

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:

CONSIDERING THAT:

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991, including the Annexes on Agreed Statements and Definitions; the Protocols on Conversion or Elimination, Inspection, Notification, Throw-weight, Telemetry, and the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; the Memorandum of Understanding; the Corrigenda of December 19, 1991; and the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed at Lisbon, Portugal, on May 23, 1992, between the United States of America and the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; and

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of October 1, 1992, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to

ratification of the Treaty, including the Annexes on Agreed Statements and Definitions; the Protocols on Conversion or Elimination, Inspection, Notification, Throw-weight, Telemetry, and the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; the Memorandum of Understanding; the Corrigenda of December 19, 1991; and the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States of America and the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, ratify and confirm the said Treaty, including the Annexes on Agreed Statements and Definitions; the Protocols on Conversion or Elimination, Inspection, Notification, Throw-weight, Telemetry, and the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; the Memorandum of Understanding; the Corrigenda of December 19, 1991; and the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States of America and the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this instrument of ratification and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington

our Lord one thousand
nine hundred ninety-four
and of the Independence
of the United States of
America the two hundred
nineteenth.

By the President:



9477 staff
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9426903

November 28, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: Ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START)

Attached for signature by the President is the instrument of ratification, in quintuplicate, of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991, including the Annexes on Agreed Statements and Definitions; the Protocols on Conversion or Elimination, Inspection, Notification, Throw-weight, Telemetry, and the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; the Memorandum of Understanding; the Corrigenda of December 19, 1991; and the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Lisbon, Portugal, on May 23, 1992, between the United States of America and the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

START will be the first Treaty that actually reduces strategic offensive arms. START will lead to stabilizing changes to the composition of, and reductions in, the deployed strategic offensive nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union and the United States. The overall strategic nuclear forces will be reduced by 30-40 percent, with a reduction of as much as 50 percent in the most threatening systems. The Treaty will

have a 15-year duration, and can be extended for successive 5-year periods through the agreement of the Parties. The Protocol would ensure that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, the four former Soviet republics within whose territory all former Soviet Union strategic offensive arms are based and all declared U.S.S.R. START-related facilities are located, were legally bound by the START Treaty.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to the Treaty on October 1, 1992.



Kenneth C. Brill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Instrument of ratification (in quintuplicate).

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 30, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SPA*
SUBJECT: START I Instruments of Ratification

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President requesting his signature on the START I instrument of ratification (in quintuplicate).

State (which provided the originals to the NSC yesterday) is requesting signature by the President on Thursday, December 1.

Concurrence by: Kreczko *AK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____


Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Instrument of Ratification (in quintuplicate)

National Security Council
The White House

1000-11
12/10/91

PROOFED BY: 45H LOG # 9477
URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 45H A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
 Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>Jur</u>	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>MTBN 12/1</u>	<u>D To Pres</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>48K 12/2</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS: Needs to get on a plane to Budapest today.
Jur

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

9487

December 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: BILL DANVERS

SUBJECT: POTUS Meeting with Sen. Dole and Rep. Gingrich and
the Democratic leadership

The President is scheduled to meet with Sen. Dole and Rep. Gingrich on Friday at 1:45 PM and with the Democratic leadership after that meeting

In preparation for the meetings, we have prepared a memo forwarding suggested talking points on national security issues for the President from you and Pat Griffin (Tab I). The talking points address readiness (Tab A), Bosnia (Tab B), N. Korea (Tab C), Haiti (Tab D), peacekeeping (Tab E), the importance of aid to the NIS (Tab F) and the upcoming Summit of the Americas (Tab G).

Concurrence by: Bell, Vershbow, Clarke, Aoki, Rossin, Burns
and Feinberg

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo

Attachment

Tab I Memo for the President

Tabs A-G Talking points

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PAT GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: National security points for meeting with Senator
Dole and Representative Gingrich and the
Democratic Leadership

Attached are suggested talking points on national security issues for your meeting on Friday, December 2 at 1:45 PM with Senator Dole and Representative Gingrich and with the Democratic leadership after that meeting. The talking points address military readiness (Tab A), Bosnia (Tab B), N. Korea (Tab C), Haiti (Tab D), peacekeeping (Tab E), the importance of aid to the NIS (Tab F) and the upcoming Summit of the Americas (Tab G).

Attachments

Tab A	Talking points on military readiness
Tab B	Talking points on Bosnia
Tab C	Talking points on N. Korea
Tab D	Talking points on Haiti
Tab E	Talking points on peacekeeping
Tab F	Talking points on the importance of aid to the NIS
Tab G	Talking points on the Summit of the Americas

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

READINESS AND MILITARY SPENDING

BACKGROUND

On November 15, Secretary Perry informed Congress that the readiness status of three active Army divisions (1st and 4th Infantry and 2d Armored) had slipped in September to "C-3" -- a substandard condition that means the units could not execute all their assigned missions. Although SecDef made it clear that this was a temporary situation occasioned by the failure of Congress to pass a supplemental appropriations measure quickly enough this fall to reimburse Defense for unexpected contingencies overseas, many in Congress attacked the Administration for allowing what they saw as a return to the "hollow force." The funding shortfall that led to this readiness problem is being corrected using FY 1995 defense appropriations. Future reoccurrences will be prevented thru the Defense topline increases for FY 1996-2001 you announced with the Joint Chiefs at your meeting on December 1st (Thursday).

TALKING POINTS

- Last summer several unanticipated contingencies (Cuba, Haiti, Rwanda, etc.) arose which required immediate funding by the Defense Department.
- In August, Secretary Perry appeared before Chairman Murtha's defense appropriations subcommittee and urged Congress to enact supplemental appropriations at once to pay for these military operations. Perry warned that unless Congress acted immediately, training would have to be cancelled to free up O&M funds to pay for the contingencies.
- In his testimony, Perry itemized exactly which units would have their readiness impaired if the training were cancelled. He specifically named the three active Army divisions that have now been classified "C-3" for readiness (1st Division, 4th Division and 2nd Armored).
- Unfortunately, Congress did NOT enact a supplemental in time. Instead, it went on its Labor Day recess and did not pass the supplemental until early October. By then, the training had been cancelled and the damage to readiness done.
- Now, with the supplemental bill and the FY 1995 defense authorization and appropriations acts signed into law, we

have the funds to reschedule the training and restore the readiness. (Perry estimates a "get well" date for the 3 divisions of January-March of next year).

- One of the reasons we will have the necessary money is because we fought for an INCREASE in defense spending in FY 1995 compared to the enacted FY 1994 level of one percent (not adjusted for inflation). Specifically, last year we increased the Defense topline (in Budget Authority) for FY 1995 by \$2.4 billion and added \$11.4 billion back to the defense spending plan across the FYDP. In our FY 95 defense budget we also increased funding for O&M by 5.7% even though the size of the force was decreasing by 7%. In other words, the dollars available for readiness purposes in FY 1995 on a per-soldier basis have been substantially increased.

- ~~I have decided to increase defense budget over the next six years by \$25 billion. And, as I announced after my meeting with the Joint Chiefs yesterday, I have decided to increase the defense budget over the levels specified in this year's Budget Resolution for FY 96-01 by \$10.5 billion.~~ This increase will ensure that our defense spending plans will meet our requirement to: (1) protect readiness, (2) maintain the conventional and strategic nuclear force postures specified in the Bottom Up Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, (3) improve the Quality of Life for our military personnel (including the full pay raise authorized under current law), and (4) fund necessary modernization programs.

Jm

*need to correct
ASAP !!*

BOSNIA

- Have been working to solve the Bosnian Conflict for two administrations, without success we had hoped.
- Have made progress over the past year, including Bosnia's Federation of Muslims and Croats and the development of the Contact Group peace plan.
- Events at Bihac have set back, but not ended, our efforts to bring peace to Bosnia.
- Bosnian Government forces are not defeated, despite Bihac setback. Prospects on the ground are for a protracted, bloody stalemate.
- In looking at options, there are three basic ways the United States can proceed.
- One option is to become directly involved by deploying tens of thousands of U.S. combat forces in an effort to alter the outcome of the war on the battlefield.
 - Doubtful American people would consider it wise or in U.S. interests. Could result in major war, high U.S. casualties, yet fail to solve underlying ethnic hatreds.
- A second option would be to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, provide massive air strikes, or if no air strikes, disengage and allow the outcome to be decided on the battlefield. Strongly oppose this option.
 - No guarantee this would work. Would be difficult to provide assistance, conduct airstrikes without Allied cooperation. Bosnians could lose substantial territory. Then what?
 - Grave consequences on the ground. UNPROFOR departure would leave terrible humanitarian situation.
- Third option is to move forward with vigorous efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. Considering risks associated with other options, this is best course for our country. Only way out is a political solution.
- Continue to stand by the Contact Group plan as the best basis for a political settlement that can provide a viable future for all of Bosnia's peoples.

- Remain committed to the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its existing borders.
- Do not favor Bosnian Serb confederation with Serbia, but it is up to parties to work out constitutional arrangements.
- Have not authorized any new concessions to the Bosnian Serbs, despite press reports you might have seen.
- This being said, our leverage is limited, but believe there is a real chance for success in renewed diplomatic effort.
- Thus, we are trying to end the fighting and get the parties to complete negotiations on a political settlement.
- Secretary Christopher is meeting with his Contact Group counterparts today to reinvigorate the negotiating process.
- Stand by our NATO commitments to provide air power throughout Bosnia when requested by the UN, although circumstances now make it unlikely that the UN will agree to robust air strikes.
- Dual key, while frustrating, was established at insistence of allies, who have genuine concerns about troops' safety.
- Must emphasize that while there is a serious crisis in Bosnia, there is not a crisis in NATO. NATO has done all it has been asked to do in Bosnia.
- NATO is vital to U.S. strategic interests. Our actions must not harm NATO. If the war spreads, it will have to be dealt with by NATO, not the U.S. alone. And Europeans can't cope without us.
- Will do everything we can to achieve a political settlement, but remain prepared to move forward with our proposal to multilaterally lift the arms embargo if necessary.
- Remain strongly opposed to unilateral lift as a step that would have grave consequences for the United States. Will consult closely with the new Congress on implications of both unilateral and multilateral lift and on U.S. involvement.

ADDITIONAL QS AND AS ON BOSNIA

Q: Has the President decided to commit U.S. ground forces to a possible NATO operation to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia?

A: The U.S. has longstanding commitments, dating back to the previous Administration, to assist in the rescue or evacuation of allied troops in the former Yugoslavia in emergency situations. These commitments still stand.

NATO has been conducting contingency planning for several months for the possibility that the UN could request the assistance of NATO forces in protecting UNPROFOR troops in the event a decision is made to withdraw them.

NATO's planning takes into account the possibility that the withdrawal could take place in hostile conditions, which could necessitate the temporary deployment of significant numbers of NATO ground forces.

We would note that both sides have recently indicated that they would not impede UNPROFOR in the event a decision were made to withdraw. Therefore, it is premature to make any assumptions about the actual requirements for NATO ground forces.

The President has not yet made a decision on this question.

(If pressed) As a member of the Alliance, we would certainly contribute in some way to a NATO operation to assist UNPROFOR's withdrawal. But the President has not made a decision in principle that our contribution would include U.S. ground forces.

Q: Does the U.S. favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal?

A: The United Nations Security Council has made no decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia. We do not favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal.

UNPROFOR has made a major contribution in delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia's population.

Despite UNPROFOR's limited effectiveness in protecting Bihac and the other safe areas and the constraints it has placed on the use of NATO air power, we believe it continues to play a stabilizing role overall.

Q: Did Boutros-Ghali call for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR?

A: UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali said that deteriorating conditions in Bosnia could make it difficult to persuade the members of the UN Security Council to continue UNPROFOR's mission.

He did not call for UNPROFOR's withdrawal.

This is a decision for the UN Security Council. We do not believe UNPROFOR should withdraw at this time.

Q: Do you agree with Senator Dole's call for tougher NATO air strikes?

A: We stand ready to implement all of NATO's commitments on the use of air power to protect the safe areas and to respond to threats against UNPROFOR troops.

We continue to favor robust action by NATO to enforce its decisions on exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde. When the Bihac situation began to worsen two and a half weeks ago, we called for establishment of an exclusion zone around Bihac enforced by NATO air power.

But we must take into account the concerns of the UN and our Allies about the safety of their troops.

NORTH KOREA

- The Agreed Framework with North Korea meets our key national security objectives by:
 - Freezing and eventually eliminating North Korea's dangerous plutonium production program;
 - Requiring full compliance by North Korea with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.
- IAEA inspectors now in North Korea report that the DPRK is complying with the freeze. They are discussing additional measures to continue to monitor the freeze on the reprocessing plant, reactor construction and other nuclear activities.
- We have begun discussing with North Korea how to store safely the 8,000 spent fuel rods, for eventual removal from North Korea. As part of these technical discussions, a U.S. team visited the Yongbyon reactor for the first time.
- The North Koreans agreed to accept special inspections, and to comply fully with IAEA safeguards, before they get significant nuclear components of a light water reactor. Deferring these inspections has no adverse effect on U.S. national security.
- In return for these significant nonproliferation steps, the U.S. agreed to lead an international consortium to provide alternative energy to North Korea (heavy fuel oil) and to construct a light water reactor project, to open liaison offices, and to begin removing barriers to U.S. trade and investment in North Korea.
- At the APEC summit, South Korea and Japan reiterated their support for the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. They will bear the lion's share of the costs for the light water reactor project and alternative energy supply.
- This agreement is not based on trust, but on independent monitoring of North Korean compliance by the IAEA and on interlocking steps by both sides, ensuring that we retain leverage at each stage.
- The North Korean Agreed Framework is strongly in our national interest. Hope we can keep this issue from becoming a partisan battleground.

HAITI

- Want to work together with you to consolidate our achievements, fulfill all our objectives in Haiti.
- Major accomplishments already -- peaceful deployment of multinational force to restore democracy and elected President. Initial security and stability established. Aristide stress on reconciliation critical to process.
- Establishment of Haitian police on schedule. Overall Haitian progress in restoring functioning government adequate though slow given damage of coup period.
- To finish job, protect interests, must keep our commitments to general security, economic aid, private sector support. Only basis for credible foreign policy.
- Means no premature or forced departure, but rather smooth hand-off to UNMIH capable of fulfilling UNSCR 940 mandate. Need your support for steps to achieve seamless transition to UN Mission, including U.S. participation in UNMIH.
- Well on track to smooth transition to UNMIH in early months 1995. Our troops coming home fast. 9000 remain now, will be 6000 of original 20,000 by end December.
- Good quality foreign participants for UNMIH identified, most already in Haiti, others ready now or soon.
- Pleased to note UNMIH military commander will be U.S. general. (IF ASKED: Not yet made decision who it will be.)
- Working well with UN to shape UNMIH. Major joint planning session next week.
- Delay in scheduling elections need not hamper transition. Will make point forcefully if needed to UN, Haitians.
- With bipartisan support, ingredients there for exit strategy to ensure UNMIH withdrawal in early 1996 as planned.
- (IF RAISED) Share your concern over role of reintegrated officers associated with excesses during last Aristide Presidency. Reviewing best way to handle problem.

PEACEKEEPING

- Peacekeeping has been portrayed as a point of contention between the Administration and the Republican-led Congress.
- It does not have to be. I hope we can work together constructively on this as well as other national security issues.
- There will certainly be points of difference between us, but I think there is a good deal of common ground.
- UN peacekeeping serves our common interest in burden-sharing
 - getting others to take responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It is in our national interests to preserve this as one of many tools of U.S. foreign policy.
- UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, Cyprus, Cambodia, Namibia, El Salvador, and elsewhere demonstrate the value to the U.S. of many recent UN efforts.
- As our policy on *reforming* UN peacekeeping makes clear, we share a commitment to using UN peacekeeping only when it serves U.S. interests, to reducing costs and the U.S. assessment, and to improving UN management and accountability. We have made progress thus far and will continue pressing for meaningful reforms.
- We are serious about keeping U.S. troops under U.S. command and control when they serve in large numbers or potentially complex missions, as demonstrated by our insistence on a U.S. commander for UNMIH.
- We do not intend to use the UN for operations likely to involve combat. Instead, we will act unilaterally or through NATO.
- I hope we can build on our points of agreement and avoid partisanship on this issue.

RUSSIA/NIS POLICY

- You both have been strong supporters of our policies toward Russia, Ukraine, and other ex-Soviet states.
- You also haven't held back with criticism when you felt it was warranted -- e.g. on effectiveness of our aid program (Gingrich) or Russia's foreign policy (Dole).
- That's constructive -- appreciate it because it shows you share concern about importance of this effort.
- Still my top priority: make sure we do everything we can to help Russia keep on the right road, lock in the changes already made and keep moving ahead. Get them so integrated into the global world they can never be isolated and threatening again.
- Want to maintain bipartisan support -- I will need your personal help to do this.
- Hard to see any other foreign policy issue with such impact on our own national security. Detargeting agreement; getting nuclear weapons out of Ukraine, Belarus, etc.; recent operation corralling loose nuke material in Kazakhstan. This is Nunn-Lugar money at work. Lots more to do.
- START I enters into force next week when I meet Yeltsin and Kuchma in Budapest. President Yeltsin and I agreed at our summit in September that we wanted to be able to exchange the instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty at our next summit, late next spring. I will work with the Senate to achieve this goal.
- Economically, Russia and other states getting up on their feet a bit more. Our assistance shifting from direct aid to trade. OPIC and Ex-Im can leverage relatively small amounts into large U.S. investments. Exchanges with next generation also very important.
- Think we have our assistance level about right -- just under one billion this year and next. Russia no longer gets the lion's share, because others -- Ukraine, Armenia, Baltics -- need it even more and will get majority in 1995.
- I will work to ensure our assistance is relevant and efficient -- a top priority. Appreciate your continued interest in this. Bipartisan support has brought us a long way already.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

- Summit will promote U.S. interests in hemisphere for new relationship between United states and countries of the hemisphere.
- We will announce hemispheric wide commitment to goal of free trade.
- Important step in trade policy that benefits U.S. companies and American consumers. Follows other important steps: NAFTA, APEC and GATT.
- Commitments also to seek more favorable climate for private investment in infrastructure and telecommunications that will benefit U.S. companies.
- Measures to strengthen democratic institutions, primarily through OAS.
- Combating corruption, U.S. companies disadvantaged competing with foreign firms not barred from bribery, similar practices. First step toward redressing that in the hemisphere.
- Strong counter-narcotics and money-laundering initiative. Cooperative effort to get at traffickers and their assets.
- Joint efforts to improve education and health and protect the environment.
- Latin America will become increasingly important to United States-- in business obviously but in other ways as well.
- Want to keep the hemisphere democratic. Fundamental goal.
- Want to keep economies on road to reform and to more open trading practices.
- Want U.S. businesses to participate fully, fairly in growing hemispheric market. By next year, U.S. exports to hemisphere will exceed those in Europe, including Eastern Europe and Russia. Cannot ignore this market.

- Want to end once and for all north-south divide and approach common issues on cooperative basis. Previous summits consisted largely of Latin requests for more U.S. foreign aid. This summit is different. Emphasis on trade and investment opportunities and we expect reciprocity.
- Will put in place what we are calling Miami process, which will include regular high-level hemispheric meetings on such issues as trade and counter-narcotics. Strengthened role for OAS and Inter-American Development Bank. A new architecture for hemispheric relations.
- 27 years since last hemispheric summit. Cannot let that happen again.
- Miami process will lead to continual hemispheric dialogue and real progress on issues important to the United States and rest of the hemisphere.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 2, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: JOSEPH SESTAK *JS*
SUBJECT: Scheduling Recommendation

At Tab B the Director of Scheduling for the First Lady requests a recommendation in responding to a letter of invitation from the Eleventh Battalion of Army Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps to attend its Military Ball in Germany on March 11, 1995. At Tab A is a proposed letter of regret. While the First Lady's attendance at a Military Ball would be immensely appreciated by any military community, the travel for this particular one is too great without being in conjunction with an already planned trip.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the proposed letter of regret.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Letter of Regret
Tab B Scheduling Recommendation Request

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR PATTI SOLIS

FROM: WILLIAM ITOH

SUBJECT: Scheduling Recommendation

At Tab A is a proposed letter of regret to the invitation from the Eleventh Battalion of Army Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps for the First Lady to attend its Military Ball in Germany on March 11, 1995 (Tab B). While the First Lady's attendance at a Military Ball would be immensely appreciated by any military community, the travel for this particular one is too great without being in conjunction with an already planned trip.

Attachment

Tab A Letter of regret

Tab B Scheduling Recommendation request

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Rudd:

Thank you for the invitation to attend the Military Ball at the Leighton Barracks in Wuerzburg, Germany. I appreciate your kind offer.

Unfortunately, my schedule does not give me the opportunity to accept as many invitations as I would like. I regret that I will be unable to attend the Ball.

Thank you again for your thoughtful invitation. Please have a wonderful evening.

Sincerely,

CWO-4 Douglas M. Rudd (Ret.)
Senior Army Instructor
Wuerzburg American High School
Unit 26625
APO AE 09244

9484

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: PATTI SOLIS *Patti*
DIRECTOR OF SCHEDULING FOR THE FIRST LADY

RE: SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATIONS

Enclosed please find the letter from the Eleventh Battalion of Army Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps, who have invited The First Lady to their Ninth Annual Military Ball. The Ball will commence on Saturday, March 11, 1995 at 6:00 pm - 12:00 am. The Ball is being held at the Leighton Barracks in Wuerzburg, Germany.

Please advise on further course of action.

11th US Army

to NSC ²



JROTC Cadet Battalion

ELEVENTH BATTALION
Army Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps
Request the honor of your presence
at their

NINTH ANNUAL MILITARY BALL
Saturday, the eleventh day of March
Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Five

1800-2400
Top of the Marne Club
Leighton Barracks
Wuerzburg, Germany

R.S.V.P by 25 February 1995
Dress: Formal
Wuerzburg Mil: 350-7176 or 7177
Civ: 0931-889-7176/7177

Wuerzburg American High School
Unit 26625
APO AE 09244

29 September 1994

First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mrs. Clinton:

We are requesting your assistance in helping us get the Public Law changed which regulates the pay and benefits for the Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps (JROTC) Teachers giving us the same basic benefits as regular Department of Defense (DoDDS) School teachers.

Currently there are about forty one retired military personnel employed as DoDDS teachers for high school JROTC Programs overseas. The mission of JROTC is to "Motivate young people to become better Americans." The JROTC program is a vital part of the educational process. It helps students realize their potential through first hand experience which improves overall discipline in schools. JROTC promotes team building, leadership, cooperative learning, citizenship, interpersonal skills, and the importance of a sound education for higher learning and the work place.

Mrs. Clinton, since 1983, we have written numerous letters to Presidents, Vice Presidents, Congressmen and to various agencies of the US Government asking for a change to this public law giving JROTC teachers the same basic benefits as other DoDDS teachers. As of this date, the only replies that we have received has been thanking us for taking the time to write regarding this problem. Mrs. Clinton, JROTC teachers are also actively involved in all school activities the same as their fellow classroom teachers. Some of the benefits that other teachers receive that JROTC teachers don't include:

- A tax free housing allowance over a 12 month period. JROTC teachers receive this during the summer months that school is not in session.
- DoDDS requires all teachers to complete six semester hours in higher education for recertification ever six years which we pay for. The regular classroom teacher can move to a higher pay lane based on this requirement where the JROTC teachers are denied this. We asked DoDDS over one year ago to treat JROTC teachers the same as other teachers regarding this but to date we have not received a response.
- The current system used to compute JROTC pay is so complex that we never know whether we are being overpaid or underpaid. A classic example of this was in January 1994, we were granted a pay raise. As of this date, we have not received it. If there is a change in our pay there is never an explanation. Numerous letters to DoDDS and the 266th Finance in Germany have yielded negative results.

- All transportation for sports programs within DoDDS are funded through DoDDS with the exception of JROTC Sports. Students participating in sports that DoDDS considers to be under the JROTC umbrella like Rifle and Drill Teams must use military transportation, if available, to and from meets. JROTC teachers are expected to drive military buses to sports meets which I feel places a great deal of stress on the JROTC teacher. This pressure comes about because it requires them to drive vehicles that they are unfamiliar with on high speed German roadways that could place the students as well as themselves in grave danger. This added stress is not placed on regular DoDDS teacher as they are given civilian buses and drivers to transport their students. This was brought to the attention of Dr. Stremple in 1992 but nothing was ever changed.


We personally feel as do other JROTC teachers that we are not being treated equally because we are retired military. I am proud to say that we have served our nation as defenders during peace and war. We now serve as role models for tomorrows leaders which are our nations most valuable resource, todays youth. Yet we are considered and treated as something less because of our retired status, something which we are entitled too for having served our country for 20 plus years.

Mrs. Clinton, the only thing that we are asking for is to receive the same benefits and treatment as our co-workers for doing the same job. We feel that you are our last resort in getting positive action. If you should ever decide to run for President, you surely will have our votes.

In closing, the students and staff would like to extend an invitation to you to be their guest at the students 9th JROTC Military Ball and to be their guest speaker. Enclosed please find an invitation.

On behalf of all the DoDDS JROTC teachers, we look forward to your response.


Sincerely,



Douglas M. Rudd
CWO-4, (Retired)
Senior Army Instructor



Dixon S. Barfield
CSM, (Retired)
Army Instructor



John R. Freeman
SGM, (Retired)
Army Instructor

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 04 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
CSCE
AZERBAIJAN

NATO
ARMENIA
HS

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES YELTSIN ON NATO & NAGORNO - KARABAKH

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 07 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ANDREASEN
BELL
BEYRLE
BURNS
FORSYTHE
FRIED
GARDNER
GOTTEMOELLER
GRAY
HALPERIN
KERRICK
LEBOURGEOIS
NSC CHRON
SCHIFTER
SENS
SESTAK
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW
WALES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSARH

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 8/2/09
2016-0152 -F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9409622

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRESIDENT
001

Z 94120414 FOR INFORMATION
X 94120414 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 941204
001 941204

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Letter from President Yeltsin on NATO and Nagorno-Karabakh. Record ID: 9409622. [See 2015-0815-M-2] (2 pages)	12/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - December 1994 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4663

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. letter	To President Clinton from President Yeltsin. [English translation] [See 2015-0815-M-2] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - December 1994 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4663

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. letter	To President Clinton from President Yeltsin. [Original Russian] [See 2015-0815-M-2] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - December 1994 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4663

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. letter	To President Yeltsin from President Clinton. [See 2015-0815-M-2] (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - December 1994 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4663

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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