

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chron File - November 1994 #1 [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

377

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31	3	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For William Itoh from Joseph Sestak. Subject: PDD on Significant Military Operations and Exercises. Record ID: 9421343. (1 page)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Presidential Decision Directive/ NSC. Record ID: 9421343. (3 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For William Itoh from Joseph Sestak. Subject: PDD on Freedom of Navigation. Record ID: 9421342. (1 page)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. draft	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC. Record ID: 9421342. (2 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Jim Seaton. Subject: Military Readiness Report. Record ID: 9409156. (2 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Military Readiness Report. Record ID: 9409156. (2 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)
003c. memo	For the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Subject: Army Readiness. (3 pages)	10/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [6]

2016-0152-F

vz4657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8860

November 14, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY *AAW*
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Leahy and Congressman Evans
Concerning U.S. Landmine Policy

When the President announced his call for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines at the UN General Assembly opening this September, Senator Leahy publicly praised it as "a symbolic, but crucial step to keep the United States a leader in the global campaign against landmines." With respect to our landmine control regime proposal, which the President announced at the same time, Leahy expressed skepticism in Senate floor remarks, but said that he would "...support any interim measure that will lead to the ultimate goal of the elimination of these killers."

Now, Leahy, with Evans, has sent a letter criticizing the regime proposal as not far reaching enough. They also express concern that in part it steps away from the export moratorium we observe and that we advocate other states observe. As you know, the regime has been designed to address in particular the problem of long-lived anti-personnel landmines that are the chief humanitarian problem. The regime would allow export of self-destructing (short-lived) landmines to responsible users. We have not decided if we will seek a change to the Leahy legislation that imposes a U.S. export ban on all anti-personnel landmines through 1996.

Concurrences by: *hcb* Bill Danvers and Mort Halperin *2/1*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo for the President

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letters to Leahy and Evans
Tab B Incoming Letter from Leahy and Evans

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Leahy and Congressman Evans on
U.S. Landmine Policy

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Senator Leahy and Congressman Evans concerning our proposal to control anti-personnel landmines.

Background

When you announced your call for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines at the UN General Assembly opening this September, Senator Leahy publicly praised it as "a symbolic, but crucial step to keep the United States a leader in the global campaign against landmines." With respect to our landmine control regime proposal, which you announced at the same time, Leahy expressed skepticism in Senate floor remarks, but said that he would "...support any interim measure that will lead to the ultimate goal of the elimination of these killers."

Now, Leahy, with Evans, has sent a letter criticizing the regime proposal as not far reaching enough. He and Evans also express concern that in part it steps away from the export moratorium we observe and that we advocate other states observe. As you know, the regime has been designed to address in particular the problem of long-lived anti-personnel landmines that are the chief humanitarian problem. The regime would allow limited export of self-destructing (short-lived) landmines to responsible users. We have not decided if we will seek a change to the Leahy legislation that imposes a U.S. export ban on all anti-personnel landmines through 1996.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters at Tab A.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Leahy and Evans

Tab B Incoming Letter from Leahy and Evans

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter on the issue of anti-personnel landmines. I continue to appreciate the leadership you have shown in the effort to deal with the global humanitarian tragedy caused by the illegal and indiscriminate use of these weapons.

With your help we have focused global attention on this problem. As you point out in your letter, we have made strides in the last year in persuading countries to adopt anti-personnel landmine export moratoria, as called for in our UN resolution. I am pleased that you were able to introduce that resolution to the UN General Assembly for a second time, now strengthened with its call for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines as our ultimate objective.

You and I agree that interim steps are needed. I believe that we have taken the right first step. While seeking to achieve a long-term objective, we also must address the near-term need to alleviate the most immediate humanitarian problem caused by long-lived landmines. These mines are the source of most civilian casualties because they remain in place and deadly long after conflicts have ceased. We must pursue practical ways of cutting the number and availability of these weapons if we are to reduce this human toll.

Our proposal would put in place a comprehensive set of agreed provisions to govern anti-personnel landmine export, production and stockpiling. With respect to exports, the regime would prohibit entirely the export of all long-lived anti-personnel landmines. In permitting limited export of self-destructing landmines to responsible parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, we have recognized that at present a significant number of nations rely on anti-personnel landmines for legitimate defense needs.

Although we share the goal of eventually eliminating anti-personnel landmines, I do not believe it is feasible to achieve this in the near term. Many nations around the world, including our own, have legitimate security requirements for these weapons. We can move most effectively toward this ultimate goal as viable and humane alternatives are developed. The only practical approach is one in which we move step by step toward our common aim. Our regime proposal offers us the chance to attract international adherence to a meaningful agreement in the shortest possible time.

I look forward to continuing our dialogue on this issue as we seek to reduce the terrible human suffering caused by these weapons.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Lane:

Thank you for your recent letter on the issue of anti-personnel landmines. I appreciate your concern about the global humanitarian tragedy caused by the illegal and indiscriminate use of these weapons.

With your help, we have focused global attention on this problem. As you point out in your letter, we have made strides in the last year in persuading countries to adopt anti-personnel landmine export moratoria, as called for in our UN resolution. That resolution has been introduced to the UN General Assembly for a second time, now strengthened with its call for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines as our ultimate objective.

You and I agree that interim steps are needed. I believe that we have taken the right first step. While seeking to achieve a long-term objective, we also must address the near-term need to alleviate the most immediate humanitarian problem caused by long-lived landmines. These mines are the source of most civilian casualties because they remain in place and deadly long after conflicts have ceased. We must pursue practical ways of cutting the number and availability of these weapons if we are to reduce this human toll.

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I look forward to continuing our dialogue on this issue as we seek to reduce the terrible human suffering caused by these weapons.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Lane Evans
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4502

October 26, 1994

The Honorable William Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We want you to know how pleased we were to hear your remarks on landmines in your speech to the UN General Assembly on September 26. The speech dealt with many important challenges facing the United States, but given our deep personal interest in the landmine problem it was very gratifying to hear you endorse the goal of the elimination of antipersonnel landmines.

This is a crucial milestone and we applaud you for taking this stand. It should end the debate about the need for a comprehensive ban on landmines. The question now is how best to achieve that goal.

In your speech, you urged other states to support, as a first step towards the elimination of antipersonnel landmines, an agreement to reduce the number and availability of these weapons. Since it will take time to reach the goal, we support interim measures that will lead us to it. However, we are deeply disappointed with the step being proposed. Rather than move us forward, we believe it will impede, for years to come, fulfillment of the goal we all share.

Since the enactment in October, 1992 of the US moratorium on exports of antipersonnel landmines, the United States has been the leader in a global effort to stop the senseless carnage these cruel weapons cause. Much has been achieved since then. At least seventeen countries have declared their own export moratoria and there has been a remarkable growth in public support around the world for banning antipersonnel mines. It is crucial that the United States continue to provide such leadership.

Unfortunately, we believe the Administration's proposed control regime would undermine its leadership role. If we are to eliminate landmines we must create a new international norm rejecting these inhumane weapons as acceptable means of warfare. Potential users need to know that they risk political censure if they use landmines, as they do with chemical weapons. We will not be able to achieve that by promoting a regime now that insists that certain mines, those produced in the US, are acceptable. While we doubt seriously that the regime would significantly reduce the use of cheap, conventional mines by poor


countries and insurgent groups, it most certainly would end the US export moratorium and the moratoria of at least a dozen other nations by exempting self-destruct/self-deactivating mines. It could well result in the US again becoming a leading exporter of landmines, rather than a leading voice for ending the proliferation of landmines.

This would be a tragic mistake. Recently, the United Nations issued a report which concluded that "the best and most effective way to [solve the global landmine problem] is to ban completely the production, use and transfer of all landmines. Member states are invited to consider establishing such a ban as a matter of urgency." This is a time for the United States to boldly press ahead towards that goal, rather than promote a weapon which, no matter how technologically sophisticated, cannot distinguish between a soldier and a child. Landmines are routinely used offensively as weapons of terror, sowed like seed by the thousands around populated areas. Whether they are active for three months or three years, they will continue to kill and maim indiscriminately.


We are aware of the arguments that some in the Pentagon, who do not support the goal of eliminating antipersonnel landmines, have made in support of this regime. However, while landmines undoubtedly have some military use, that must be weighed against their advantage as a force-multiplier for potential enemies in countries like Somalia or Iraq where our troops are increasingly being sent. Whether as a UN peacekeeper or combatant, the most highly trained, best equipped US soldier can be easily killed or permanently disabled by a \$3 landmine. It must also be weighed against the immense economic and social costs to the countries where mines are used, and the tens of billions of dollars to locate and destroy the world's existing 100 million mines. Another 2 million mines were laid in the past year alone.

We greatly appreciate the time and attention you, Secretary Christopher, Ambassador Albright and others in the Administration have given to this issue. We share the goal of ending the senseless suffering landmines cause. We believe that goal can be achieved, but not without the unequivocal leadership of the United States. Instead of spending years trying to coax other countries to agree to a complex regime of unenforceable rules that seeks to legitimize certain mines versus others, we urge you to seek further limits on the production, export and use of all antipersonnel landmines, and eventually a comprehensive ban.

Sincerely,



PATRICK LEAHY
United States Senator



LANE EVANS
Member of Congress

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 14, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*

SUBJECT: Commander-in-Chief Visits to California/Nevada

In June Secretary Perry recommended to the President that he visit military troops to see them in their day-to-day jobs. You and Mack McLarty agreed that late summer/early fall was a good time for the President to travel west on a tour of military bases that included: Nellis AFB, Nevada, to watch aerial combat training; Ft. Irwin, California, to observe Army maneuver warfare training on the computerized training range; and Twenty-Nine Palms, California, to observe Marine Corps combined arms training. Earlier schedule proposals (log #s 5194 and 6364) attempted to schedule a trip during October.

The proposal at Tab I recommends the February 20 - 22 timeframe as the optimum period when major exercises simultaneously occur at these bases. Tab I also recommends a visit with former military/DoD personnel who are currently involved in the "Troops to Teachers" Program. This is a teacher certification program that pays for retraining and certifying former military personnel and provides funds to low-income school districts.

Tab A provides background on military training exercises conducted at Nellis AFB, Ft. Irwin and Twenty-Nine Palms, as well as information on the "Troops to Teachers" Program.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal

Tab A Background Information on Training Sites/Programs

Schedule Proposal	THE WHITE HOUSE		date____/____/____
	WASHINGTON		
____ACCEPT		____REGRET	____PENDING

TO: Billy Webster
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Commander-in-Chief Visits

PURPOSE: To visit U.S. Service members as they conduct their day-to-day operations.

BACKGROUND: In June Secretary Perry proposed that the President visit military installations and activities in other than a ceremonial capacity. The President indicated that he would like to visit U.S. forces in a dynamic training environment where they are engaged in their craft.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None at these military bases

DATE AND TIME: February 20 - 22, 1995

DURATION: 2-3 days

LOCATION: Nellis AFB, Nevada
Ft. Irwin, California
Twenty-Nine Palms, California
Oakland or Los Angeles, California

PARTICIPANTS: To be determined

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: President would watch aerial combat training at Nellis AFB, Nevada; observe Army maneuver warfare training on the computerized training range at Ft. Irwin, California; view Marine Corps combined arms training at Twenty-Nine Palms, California; and visit with military veteran participants in a program that certifies them as teachers.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

cc: Stephanie Streett

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open Press
FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: As desired
VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: No
SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: No
RECOMMENDED BY: Anthony Lake
CONTACT: Jim Seaton, 6-9191

Attachment

Tab A Background information on training sites/programs

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TRAINING SITES/PROGRAMS FOR PROPOSED
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO MILITARY BASES IN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA

February 20 - 21 are the optimum dates to view training exercises at Ft. Irwin and Twenty-Nine Palms, California, for these are the only dates this winter when major exercises occur simultaneously at both bases. February 21 or 22 are better dates for operations at Nellis AFB, Nevada. These bases host their respective Services' "state of the art" combat training centers where the various warfighting components are integrated in realistic combat scenarios. The President can observe these exercises and talk to small groups operating in the training areas and to larger groups during the exercise debriefs.

Ft. Irwin, located about 150 miles northeast of Los Angeles, is the Army's National Training Center (NTC). Army units visit the NTC's computerized training range and engage in mechanized simulated combat against soldiers stationed at the NTC who operate using the uniforms, tactics and equipment of potential adversaries. The visiting units are often defeated in their first force-on-force engagements with these NTC adversaries. By the end of the training cycle, however, the visiting units master the adversary tactics and hone their own maneuver warfare skills and tactics. The optimum date for viewing the NTC exercise is February 21.

Twenty-Nine Palms, located about 100 miles east of Los Angeles, is the Marine Corps Air/Ground Combat Center where the Marine Corps conducts Combined Arms Exercises. The primary emphasis of these exercises differs from those at NTC. At Twenty-Nine Palms the Marine Corps emphasizes integration of actual air and ground fires with troops maneuvering on the ground. Battalion-sized units maneuver across the desert floor where just minutes before aircraft, artillery, tanks and troops were firing on targets. The Combined Arms Exercise dates are February 19 - 21. [Note: Units based at Twenty-Nine Palms were some of the first units to deploy to Saudi Arabia in 1990 and to Somalia two years later.]

At **Nellis AFB**, eight miles northeast of Las Vegas, the Air Force conducts air combat exercises. These exercises integrate individual aircraft and crews (air-to-air, surface bombing, electronic warfare, AWACs, etc.) into an effective air campaign. Nellis has a high-tech computerized range complex which permits evaluators to play back the entire air war on video screens and critique the aircrews' actions. Although a major exercise will not be in progress during the proposed visit period, students in the Fighter Weapons School are undergoing advanced training. This is the USAF equivalent to the Navy's "Top Gun" school.

This trip also presents an opportunity to meet former military/DoD personnel who are now teaching in Oakland or Los Angeles schools as part of the **"Troops to Teachers"** program. The program provides a stipend to offset certification training costs, then subsidizes participants' salaries over five years, provided that a school district has a concentration of low-income families. Approximately 500 members are expected to enter the program this year. This is a good news story! Service members are getting help starting a new career, low-income school districts are receiving needed teachers and funding, and the students are getting highly motivated teachers who are excellent role models.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21339

November 14, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG

THROUGH: JOCELYN G. BREELAND

FROM: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Travel

Request orders be provided to me (per Tony Lake) to travel to New York Thursday, November 17, to join and provide guidance to the U.S. Delegation to the First Committee voting on nuclear arms control resolutions in the UN General Assembly on Thursday and Friday.

NSC is requested to cover all expenses. Per diem is estimated at \$180 per day; round trip air fare is \$146.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve orders for the above travel request and authorize Will Itoh to sign the Travel Authorization Form at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Travel Authorization form

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: ROBERT G. BELL
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): To join and provide guidance to the US Delegation to the 1st Committee voting on nuclear arms control resolutions in the UN General Assembly on Nov 17-18, 1994.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Washington, DC, to New York, NY, and return to Washington, DC.
4. DEPARTURE DATE 11-17-94 RETURN DATE 11-18-94
DEPARTURE TIME 12:00noon RETURN TIME TBD
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR X POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION \$146 PER DIEM \$180/day OTHER _____
TOTAL _____
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC X OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO X
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ _____
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Robert G. Bell
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director Robert G. Bell
Director of Administration _____
Executive Secretary _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For William Itoh from Joseph Sestak. Subject: PDD on Significant Military Operations and Exercises. Record ID: 9421343. (1 page)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on
Significant Military Operations and Exercises

Attached for comment is draft PDD on Significant Military
Operations and Exercises. This directive will supersede NSD-62
dated July 8, 1991. NSC point of contact is Joseph Sestak (202-
456-9191).

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. MARGARITA ROQUE
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on Freedom
of Navigation

Attached for comment is draft PDD on Freedom of Navigation. This directive will supersede NSD-49 dated October 12, 1990. NSC point of contact is Joseph Sestak (202-456-9191).

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. draft	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC. Record ID: 9421342. (2 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [6]

2016-0152-F
vz4657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Jim Seaton. Subject: Military Readiness Report. Record ID: 9409156. (2 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [6]

2016-0152-F

vz4657

RESTRICTION CODES

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
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON




November 4, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I forward to you, attached, a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, Army, providing an update on the impact of Fiscal Year 1994 contingency operations. In a nutshell, the Chief of Staff concludes that unit readiness has been degraded due to the loss of training opportunities that could not be funded.

Operations and Maintenance accounts, as a broad category, have been the visible billpayer for unforeseen events - we have responded immediately by using the funds in our pocket. The invisible billpayer has been readiness. The pace, breadth and number of contingencies in Fiscal Year 1994 overwhelmed the ability to pay for the immediacy of the operations at hand. As a result, three existing major combat units have reported significant levels of decreased readiness. The Chief's memorandum provides details of the causes and effects.

Obviously, we must have a better process for funding contingency operations. We have tried this with Congress on previous occasions. Options suggested to me by the Chief of Staff include Air Force and Navy funding of airlift/sealift (instead of Army fee for service); immediate reimbursement by Congress; or receivership of bills in Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) until a supplemental appropriation is passed.


Togo D. West, Jr.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RL Date: 1/20/2007

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from
Classified enclosures

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Military Readiness Report. Record ID: 9409156. (2 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. memo	For the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Subject: Army Readiness. (3 pages)	10/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 377

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [6]

2016-0152-F

vz4657

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Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515-6018

Dear Chairman Murtha:

On 4 August of this year, when I testified on behalf of an emergency supplemental and the Department's reprogramming request, I expressed concern about the impact of our operations on readiness. I noted that, if we were not reimbursed for the expenses of these operations, the Defense operation and maintenance accounts of the defense budget would pay for it, and this would have a direct and predictable negative impact on readiness. At that time, I promised to keep you advised of the effect of these and other actions resulting from readiness cash flow problems.

I have recently reviewed the readiness performance of our forces this year. Based on this review, I conclude that our force is, overall, ready to carry out the nation's tasks. It has performed magnificently in recent deployments to Rwanda, Haiti and Kuwait. It is, as General Shalikashvili put it recently, "... a more capable force, pound for pound, man for man, woman for woman" than during Operation Desert Storm.

As anticipated, however, we have seen some readiness concerns that I would like to bring to your attention. As you know from my testimony before your committee, FY 1994 funding levels for operations and maintenance had little safety margin built into them. On top of this, our forces engaged in a variety of unforeseen operations that forced us to expend ~~\$1.7 billion~~ more than we planned in our enacted budget. Thankfully the Congress, following your leadership, provided some relief through supplemental appropriations.

Nevertheless, the Department did suffer some difficult readiness cash flow shortages, particularly in the fourth quarter of FY 1994. In part, these were triggered by high year-end demands on our forces -- Rwanda, Cuba, Haiti, and Kuwait in rapid succession. In part, these shortages were exacerbated by the second increment of supplemental funds being made available only after FY 1994 ended. It is critical that we receive FY 1995 supplemental funds by the March/April time frame to preclude repetition of our FY 1994 experience.

The Department took aggressive measures to minimize the effects of these temporary cash flow shortages. Examples include withdrawing rapidly forces once their missions were accomplished, using of financial management measures to ensure our engaged troops could carry

out their missions, and freeing operating funds by reductions in the training, maintenance, and supply of selected units.

Notwithstanding these measures, each of the Services had to selectively cut back on readiness related activities. In most cases, the readiness of units affected is recovering quickly with the influx of funds in FY 1995. A notable exception, however, involves three later deploying heavy reinforcing divisions in the Army. The readiness of these units fell late in FY 1994 to a point where they were capable of undertaking most, but not all, portions of the missions for which they were designed. Thus, they were rated as "C-3" under our readiness reporting system.

The Army is carrying out a readiness recovery plan to put these divisions on a sounder readiness footing in the second quarter of FY 1995. Nevertheless, I am not satisfied with the current readiness of these divisions and am determined to work with you and others to avoid a repetition of these circumstances in the future. The success of their recovery is directly dependent on additional funding in FY 1995.

In this regard, please permit me to suggest two areas for our cooperation in the coming year. First, we must ensure adequate funding of operations and maintenance for core readiness. As you know, my judgment is that FY 1994 funding was cut too fine for readiness, so I proposed, with the concurrence of the President and the Congress, that we increase operations and maintenance funding for FY 1995 by \$5.7 billion. My intention is similarly to request operations and maintenance funds for FY 1996 that will be sufficient to keep our forces ready.

Second, we must work together to provide timely supplemental appropriations. When we do not have rapid approval of these appropriations, we put our readiness at risk. We must avoid last fiscal year's experience where there was a lag of several months between submission and approval of our second supplemental request. For the coming legislative year, my intention is to submit early, for your consideration, a request for supplemental appropriations to cover added FY 1995 costs of ongoing operations, as well as costs we have not recouped for engagements in FY 1994.

Given your steadfast commitment to keeping our forces ready and to supporting the men and women who operate them, I know I can count on your leadership to gain congressional support for these readiness funding initiatives.

Sincerely,

Suggested Press "Talking Points"

The Defense Department announced today that three active divisions are in a less than satisfactory readiness status which could limit their ability to accomplish potential missions. This readiness shortfall is a temporary situation resulting from the Army's need to shift operations and maintenance funds away from regular training in order to pay for ongoing contingency operations during the fourth quarter of FY94. Secretary Perry has estimated that with the availability of FY95 funding, these divisions' readiness will be restored during the second quarter of FY95.

- The President has repeatedly pledged to ensure that our fighting forces are the best prepared, best trained and best equipped in the world, and he remains fully committed to ensuring our military's readiness is fully maintained.
- The Meyer Commission recently validated that our forces are on balance still maintaining an acceptable state of readiness. However, it also mentioned that there are certain areas that we need to pay particularly close attention to, including training. The training shortfall in these three divisions is an area that we knew required close attention, but our options were limited due to the end-of-fiscal-year financial squeeze.
- With the FY95 defense authorization and appropriations bills now enacted, we are moving quickly to correct this readiness deficiency and we expect all three units to reach an acceptable level by the second quarter of FY95.
- In addition, as we continue working on the FY96 budget, the Administration intends to work closely with Congress to work out a mechanism whereby the Services are reimbursed for contingency operations in a more timely fashion, so as to avoid a repeat of this experience next September.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 16, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *J*
SUBJECT: Remarks for National War College

Bell 9126
Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

You are scheduled to address the National War College (NWC) Class of 1995 and faculty on Tuesday, November 22, from 2:30-3:15 pm in Room 450 OEOB (Agenda at Tab I). NWC, located locally at Fort McNair, is our preeminent joint senior Service military school. The class consists of O-5/O-6 level officers from all Services and senior civilians from the departments and agencies (Tab II).

Since 11 international officers attending NWC will also be present, all presentations must be UNCLASSIFIED. I will act as escort for these officers and introduce our speakers to the class.

Bo Cutter will first address the class and emphasize the economic dimension of national security and the activities of the NEC. I have included some general remarks for you (Tab III), but the class will probably be interested in your personal perspective on how our national security strategy is developing, some day-to-day examples of how NSC decisions are reached to implement that strategy, and the impact of the recent elections on our foreign policy and national security implementation process. They would also like to have the opportunity to ask you questions. Bob Bell will then address the group on current defense policy and arms control issues.

Please let me know if you need any further background information before addressing the NWC class.

Attachments

Tab I Draft Remarks
Tab II Proposed NWC Visit Agenda
Tab III Information on NWC Class of 1995

Remarks for National War College

- Focus: three areas of national security which may be of interest to you as senior leaders in our armed forces
 - How the national decisionmaking process works and how the uniformed military fits into that process
 - This Administration's national security strategy
 - Changing roles for the U.S. military

National Security Decisionmaking

- National security policy is a collaborative process, seeking to gain consensus and blend the expertise of different actors and institutions to produce sound decisions and sound policy
- In this Administration the NSC (along with the NEC and NSTC) provide forums to examine cross-cutting issues
 - Serve as "honest brokers" to filter out organizational biases and encourage different analytical perspectives
 - Provide broad oversight and insure policies and programs conform to the President's views
 - Strive to balance political perspectives with department and agency desires
- I chair the Deputies Committee which meets frequently to raise and consider national security issues
 - Helps set national security agenda by defining problems which require attention, setting up working groups to address them and vetting the recommended policy options
 - Issues requiring further review or action forwarded to the Principals Committee and to the President
- Inter-agency working groups (IWGs) -- something like military joint task forces -- integrate and coordinate the views and analysis of many different organizations
 - Depending on the specific issue, different departments or agencies will play lead roles in the process

- In most national security decisions, the military plays a key role
 - As the recognized experts in the application of force and most often as the implementers of the policy
 - In recommending courses of action to civilian decisionmakers, you must be conscious of the political, economic and diplomatic consequences which flow from them

National Security Policy in the Clinton Administration

- The major foreign policy themes that President Clinton addressed during his campaign have carried over into our current national security strategy
 - Restore a healthy, vibrant domestic economy
 - Restructure and develop more mobile, more flexible and ready military forces
 - Develop more stable network of democracies
 - Address emerging global challenges, such as proliferation, terrorism and global environmental decay
- As we approach the new century, our national security strategy (as published this summer) has evolved into one of engagement and enlargement
 - Engaging with active leadership abroad
 - Enlarging the community of market democracies
 - We must be as creative and constructive in building American engagement as the generation of the late 1940s
- The central goals of our national security strategy are to:
 - Maintain a strong defense capability and promote cooperative security measures
 - Project and sustain forces in two nearly simultaneous MRCs
 - Forces forward deployed
 - Stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

- Participate in Multilateral efforts
- Meet other global missions
- Open foreign markets and spur global economic growth
- Promote democracy abroad
- Recent lessons:
 - "Ideas matter" -- they are at stake in most of the daily struggles we see around the world
 - Power still matters.
 - Our power (including military and economic power) will still make the critical difference in world affairs, as it did in the two World Wars and the Cold War

--- Diplomacy disconnected from power usually fails

--- The heart of American power lies in the threat of military force

--- Recent examples, including Iraq, and Haiti

Non-Traditional Roles and Missions

- Our fundamental military missions remain unchanged
 - Continue to be organized, resourced and tasked to deter, and if necessary, defeat armed threats to US interests, values, citizens and property
- The emerging security environment places a higher priority on alternative uses of military force
 - Humanitarian relief and peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations now take on heightened significance.
 - Domestic emergency assistance here at home
- You have the organization, leadership, discipline and drive to tackle immense challenges. But I want to assure you that your primary warfighting roles remain top priority.

- Let me close my remarks by sharing with you my respect and admiration for your achievements thus far, and what you will go on to achieve in the service of our nation
- I would be glad to respond to any questions you may have

11/15/94

DRAFT AGENDA

VISIT OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CLASS OF 1995

Room 450, OE0B

November 22, 1994

2:00 - 2:05 pm	Introduction - Col Jones
2:05 - 2:35 pm	NEC - Bowman Cutter
2:35 - 3:15 pm	NSC - Samuel Berger
3:15 - 4:00 pm	NSC - Robert Bell


NSC POC/Escort: Col Steve Jones

NWC POC: Dr. Charlie Stevenson

TAB III

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

CLASS OF 1995



NOTE: INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS ARE FROM AUSTRALIA, BANGLADESH, GERMANY, ITALY, KOREA, LEBANON, SWITZERLAND THAILAND, UKRAINE, URUGUAY, ZIMBABWE.

FEDERAL AGENCIES
NWC CLASS OF 1995

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OSD	1	D/ARMY	2	DIA	3
D/AIR FORCE	1	DoD At Large	1	NSA	2
D/NAVY	1				

OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

AID	1	JUSTICE	1
CIA	2	STATE	18
USIA	2	TREASURY	1
ACDA	1	GAO	1
CRS	1	DOE	1

HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT

NWC CLASS OF 1995

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>SEA SERVICES</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>	<u>IF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DOCTORATE	2	0	0	2	0	4
PROFESSIONAL (JD, MD, ETC.)	1	1	1	1	0	4
MASTERS	34	37	22	19	4	116
BACHELORS	3	2	11	14	1	31
TOTAL	40	40	34	36	5	155

HISTORY

The National War College was officially established on 1 July 1946 as an upgraded replacement for the Army-Navy Staff College (June 1943 - July 1946). According to Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, President of the board which recommended its formation, **"The College is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources necessary to implement that strategy.... Its graduates will exercise a great influence on the formulation of national and foreign policy in both peace and war...."** This theme was underscored with the inclusion of State Department and, eventually, other government agency representatives into the faculty and student body.

American experience in 20th Century wars has repeatedly shown that the complexity of planning and conducting global war and joint and combined military operations required officers and civilians in government to be thoroughly familiar with each other's roles and missions. They also needed the skills to operate comfortably at levels in which key national security and strategy decisions would be made in peace and war.

Since its inception, the National War College has proven invaluable in preparing its students for those responsibilities.

The National War College is located in Theodore Roosevelt Hall on Fort Lesley J. McNair, the oldest active Army Post in existence today. Established near the confluence of the Anacostia and Potomac rivers, it was originally designed to protect Washington from river invasion. Later, it was the site of the trial and hanging of four conspirators in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln. At Fort McNair on 21 February 1903, President Roosevelt laid the cornerstone of the building which now bears his name. Since that date, it has been home to the Army War College (1903-1917, 1919-1940), War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Selective Service System Headquarters, Headquarters U.S. Army Ground Forces (all successively during World War II), and the National War College (1946-Present). In June 1974, this unique structure was designated a National Historic Landmark.


MISSION

NWC's mission is to prepare future leaders of the Armed Forces, State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy and national security policy process.

The College program is designed to expand and enhance students' knowledge of national security issues and to sharpen their analytical abilities. The curriculum focuses on grand strategy--the integration of all elements of national power--and addresses national security policy, the theory and practice of war, the domestic and international context of national security strategy, contemporary military strategy, and joint and combined warfare.

A fundamental strength of the College is its joint environment and approach. Students and faculty are drawn from all Armed Services and from civilian departments and agencies concerned with national security policy. The College program stresses "jointness" in military planning and operations and the interrelationship of domestic, foreign, and defense policies.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



A national security strategy must identify the interests of the nation and the challenges to those interests, and specify the objectives to be met through the use of specific policy instruments, particularly in any use of military force.

Instruments of policy must be orchestrated within a cohesive strategy that deliberately integrates the selected instruments to achieve specified objectives.

As a component of national security, military strategy and operations require the development within the Armed Forces of a joint culture that fosters the teamwork essential for deterrence, joint warfighting, and multinational endeavors. Planning and prosecution of joint campaigns and major operations require competency in joint skills, including the ability to orchestrate air, land, sea, space and special operations forces into effective joint teams.

CORE PROGRAM

All students, including research fellows, normally must complete the core curriculum. The core program is presented weekday mornings plus Monday and Friday afternoons. The program averages from 9 to 12 class contact hours per week. It consists of the following major courses:

Foundations of National Security Strategy. The opening course sets the broad framework and introduces the major concepts for the year's study. It addresses the nature of national security and presents a framework for analyzing national security policy and strategy. In the first part of the course, students explore the contemporary debate on U.S. national security strategy in the post-containment era, examine the strengths and weaknesses of the various non-violent instruments of statecraft from diplomacy and negotiation to economic sanctions, and discuss the link between strategic objectives and available resources. The second half of the course illustrates the principles and concepts studied above by a selective review of the national security strategies practiced by American presidents since the turn of the century.

Economic Review for Strategists. This series of lessons is a review of economic principles that relate to national security matters. This course is short, normally limited to six seminars interwoven with Course 1 topics, and focuses principally on domestic fiscal and monetary policies, international trade and finance, and economic reforms in the former Soviet bloc and developing countries. It reflects the growing importance of economics in the context of national security and the need for NWC students to understand better the economic dimensions of geopolitical and strategic issues.

Joint Force Capabilities. This course reviews national military capabilities and command structures. It provides students with a basic grounding in the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (air, land, sea, space, and special operations) and the organizational framework and team context within which joint forces are employed. It aims to promote an understanding of U.S. military forces as policy instruments, to examine the joint command

structure and the body of joint doctrine, to provide competency in joint skills (including the ability to orchestrate air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces), and to develop a joint culture.

Foundations of Military Thought and Strategy. This course enables NWC students to understand the effectiveness of military power as an instrument of policy and the theoretical options for the strategic employment of military power in support of national policy objectives. In addition, students will be better prepared to develop new strategic military plans or critique existing military plans. Students examine the ideas of the masters of the military art from the perspective of a continually evolving corpus of military thought. The catalysts to changing ideas are studied as are the changing conditions in which wars are fought. Additionally, fundamental principles are assessed that remain constant regardless of the conditions. Selective examination of wars and military operations over the past two centuries allows students to critique the employment of military power based on their knowledge of military theory.

Nov 14 -
Jan 5

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ADVANCED STUDIES PROGRAM

Overview. National War College students may select from a variety of advanced courses on military strategy and history, defense policy, joint and combined operations, international politics, regional studies, and domestic political institutions and processes. NWC students may also take courses presented by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Information Resources Management College and by the National Defense University. Course schedules and course descriptions, along with registration instructions, will be provided to students during the first week of the school year.

Purpose. The Advanced Studies Program establishes graduate-level seminar settings for courses that a) provide deeper, more comprehensive analyses of themes and issues raised in the core

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 16, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJ*
SUBJECT: Remarks for National War College

You are scheduled to address the National War College (NWC) Class of 1995 and faculty on Tuesday, November 22, from 2:30-3:15 pm in Room 450 OEGB (Agenda at Tab I). NWC, located locally at Fort McNair, is our preeminent joint senior Service military school. The class consists of O-5/O-6 level officers from all Services and senior civilians from the departments and agencies (Tab II).

Since 11 international officers attending NWC will also be present, all presentations must be UNCLASSIFIED. I will act as escort for these officers and introduce our speakers to the class.

Bo Cutter will first address the class and emphasize the economic dimension of national security and the activities of the NEC. I have included some general remarks for you (Tab III), but the class will probably be interested in your personal perspective on how our national security strategy is developing, some day-to-day examples of how NSC decisions are reached to implement that strategy, and the impact of the recent elections on our foreign policy and national security implementation process. They would also like to have the opportunity to ask you questions. Bob Bell will then address the group on current defense policy and arms control issues.

Please let me know if you need any further background information before addressing the NWC class.

Attachments

Tab I Draft Remarks

Tab II Proposed NWC Visit Agenda

Tab III Information on NWC Class of 1995

Remarks for National War College

- Focus: three areas of national security which may be of interest to you as senior leaders in our armed forces
 - How the national decisionmaking process works and how the uniformed military fits into that process
 - This Administration's national security strategy
 - Changing roles for the U.S. military

National Security Decisionmaking

- National security policy is a collaborative process, seeking to gain consensus and blend the expertise of different actors and institutions to produce sound decisions and sound policy
- In this Administration the NSC (along with the NEC and NSTC) provide forums to examine cross-cutting issues
 - Serve as "honest brokers" to filter out organizational biases and encourage different analytical perspectives
 - Provide broad oversight and insure policies and programs conform to the President's views
 - Strive to balance political perspectives with department and agency desires
- I chair the Deputies Committee which meets frequently to raise and consider national security issues
 - Helps set national security agenda by defining problems which require attention, setting up working groups to address them and vetting the recommended policy options
 - Issues requiring further review or action forwarded to the Principals Committee and to the President
- Inter-agency working groups (IWGs) -- something like military joint task forces -- integrate and coordinate the views and analysis of many different organizations
 - Depending on the specific issue, different departments or agencies will play lead roles in the process

- In most national security decisions, the military plays a key role
 - As the recognized experts in the application of force and most often as the implementers of the policy
 - In recommending courses of action to civilian decisionmakers, you must be conscious of the political, economic and diplomatic consequences which flow from them

National Security Policy in the Clinton Administration

- The major foreign policy themes that President Clinton addressed during his campaign have carried over into our current national security strategy
 - Restore a healthy, vibrant domestic economy
 - Restructure and develop more mobile, more flexible and ready military forces
 - Develop more stable network of democracies
 - Address emerging global challenges, such as proliferation, terrorism and global environmental decay
- As we approach the new century, our national security strategy (as published this summer) has evolved into one of engagement and enlargement
 - Engaging with active leadership abroad
 - Enlarging the community of market democracies
 - We must be as creative and constructive in building American engagement as the generation of the late 1940s
- The central goals of our national security strategy are to:
 - Maintain a strong defense capability and promote cooperative security measures
 - Project and sustain forces in two nearly simultaneous MRCs
 - Forces forward deployed
 - Stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

- Participate in Multilateral efforts
 - Meet other global missions
 - Open foreign markets and spur global economic growth
 - Promote democracy abroad
- Recent lessons:
 - "Ideas matter" -- they are at stake in most of the daily struggles we see around the world
 - Power still matters.
 - Our power (including military and economic power) will still make the critical difference in world affairs, as it did in the two World Wars and the Cold War
 - Diplomacy disconnected from power usually fails
 - The heart of American power lies in the threat of military force
 - Recent examples, including Iraq, and Haiti

Non-Traditional Roles and Missions

- Our fundamental military missions remain unchanged
 - Continue to be organized, resourced and tasked to deter, and if necessary, defeat armed threats to US interests, values, citizens and property
- The emerging security environment places a higher priority on alternative uses of military force
 - Humanitarian relief and peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations now take on heightened significance.
 - Domestic emergency assistance here at home
- You have the organization, leadership, discipline and drive to tackle immense challenges. But I want to assure you that your primary warfighting roles remain top priority.

- Let me close my remarks by sharing with you my respect and admiration for your achievements thus far, and what you will go on to achieve in the service of our nation
- I would be glad to respond to any questions you may have

11/15/94

DRAFT AGENDA

**VISIT OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CLASS OF 1995**

Room 450, OEOb

November 22, 1994


2:00 - 2:05 pm	Introduction - Col Jones
2:05 - 2:35 pm	NEC - Bowman Cutter
2:35 - 3:15 pm	NSC - Samuel Berger
3:15 - 4:00 pm	NSC - Robert Bell

NSC POC/Escort: Col Steve Jones

NWC POC: Dr. Charlie Stevenson

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

CLASS OF 1995



NOTE: INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS ARE FROM AUSTRALIA, BANGLADESH, GERMANY, ITALY, KOREA, LEBANON, SWITZERLAND THAILAND, UKRAINE, URUGUAY, ZIMBABWE.

FEDERAL AGENCIES

NWC CLASS OF 1995

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OSD	1	D/ARMY	2	DIA	3
D/AIR FORCE	1	DoD At Large	1	NSA	2
D/NAVY	1				

OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

AID	1	JUSTICE	1
CIA	2	STATE	18
USIA	2	TREASURY	1
ACDA	1	GAO	1
CRS	1	DOE	1

HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT

NWC CLASS OF 1995

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>SEA SERVICES</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>	<u>IF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DOCTORATE	2	0	0	2	0	4
PROFESSIONAL (JD, MD, ETC.)	1	1	1	1	0	4
MASTERS	34	37	22	19	4	116
BACHELORS	3	2	11	14	1	31
TOTAL	40	40	34	36	5	155

HISTORY

The National War College was officially established on 1 July 1946 as an upgraded replacement for the Army-Navy Staff College (June 1943 - July 1946). According to Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, President of the board which recommended its formation, **"The College is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources necessary to implement that strategy.... Its graduates will exercise a great influence on the formulation of national and foreign policy in both peace and war...."** This theme was underscored with the inclusion of State Department and, eventually, other government agency representatives into the faculty and student body.

American experience in 20th Century wars has repeatedly shown that the complexity of planning and conducting global war and joint and combined military operations required officers and civilians in government to be thoroughly familiar with each other's roles and missions. They also needed the skills to operate comfortably at levels in which key national security and strategy decisions would be made in peace and war.

Since its inception, the National War College has proven invaluable in preparing its students for those responsibilities.

The National War College is located in Theodore Roosevelt Hall on Fort Lesley J. McNair, the oldest active Army Post in existence today. Established near the confluence of the Anacostia and Potomac rivers, it was originally designed to protect Washington from river invasion. Later, it was the site of the trial and hanging of four conspirators in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln. At Fort McNair on 21 February 1903, President Roosevelt laid the cornerstone of the building which now bears his name. Since that date, it has been home to the Army War College (1903-1917, 1919-1940), War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Selective Service System Headquarters, Headquarters U.S. Army Ground Forces (all successively during World War II), and the National War College (1946-Present). In June 1974, this unique structure was designated a National Historic Landmark.


MISSION

NWC's mission is to prepare future leaders of the Armed Forces, State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy and national security policy process.

The College program is designed to expand and enhance students' knowledge of national security issues and to sharpen their analytical abilities. The curriculum focuses on grand strategy--the integration of all elements of national power--and addresses national security policy, the theory and practice of war, the domestic and international context of national security strategy, contemporary military strategy, and joint and combined warfare.

A fundamental strength of the College is its joint environment and approach. Students and faculty are drawn from all Armed Services and from civilian departments and agencies concerned with national security policy. The College program stresses "jointness" in military planning and operations and the interrelationship of domestic, foreign, and defense policies.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



A national security strategy must identify the interests of the nation and the challenges to those interests, and specify the objectives to be met through the use of specific policy instruments, particularly in any use of military force.

Instruments of policy must be orchestrated within a cohesive strategy that deliberately integrates the selected instruments to achieve specified objectives.

As a component of national security, military strategy and operations require the development within the Armed Forces of a joint culture that fosters the teamwork essential for deterrence, joint warfighting, and multinational endeavors. Planning and prosecution of joint campaigns and major operations require competency in joint skills, including the ability to orchestrate air, land, sea, space and special operations forces into effective joint teams.

CORE PROGRAM

All students, including research fellows, normally must complete the core curriculum. The core program is presented weekday mornings plus Monday and Friday afternoons. The program averages from 9 to 12 class contact hours per week. It consists of the following major courses:

Foundations of National Security Strategy. The opening course sets the broad framework and introduces the major concepts for the year's study. It addresses the nature of national security and presents a framework for analyzing national security policy and strategy. In the first part of the course, students explore the contemporary debate on U.S. national security strategy in the post-containment era, examine the strengths and weaknesses of the various non-violent instruments of statecraft from diplomacy and negotiation to economic sanctions, and discuss the link between strategic objectives and available resources. The second half of the course illustrates the principles and concepts studied above by a selective review of the national security strategies practiced by American presidents since the turn of the century.

Economic Review for Strategists. This series of lessons is a review of economic principles that relate to national security matters. This course is short, normally limited to six seminars interwoven with Course 1 topics, and focuses principally on domestic fiscal and monetary policies, international trade and finance, and economic reforms in the former Soviet bloc and developing countries. It reflects the growing importance of economics in the context of national security and the need for NWC students to understand better the economic dimensions of geopolitical and strategic issues.

Joint Force Capabilities. This course reviews national military capabilities and command structures. It provides students with a basic grounding in the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces (air, land, sea, space, and special operations) and the organizational framework and team context within which joint forces are employed. It aims to promote an understanding of U.S. military forces as policy instruments, to examine the joint command

structure and the body of joint doctrine, to provide competency in joint skills (including the ability to orchestrate air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces), and to develop a joint culture.

Foundations of Military Thought and Strategy. This course enables NWC students to understand the effectiveness of military power as an instrument of policy and the theoretical options for the strategic employment of military power in support of national policy objectives. In addition, students will be better prepared to develop new strategic military plans or critique existing military plans. Students examine the ideas of the masters of the military art from the perspective of a continually evolving corpus of military thought. The catalysts to changing ideas are studied as are the changing conditions in which wars are fought. Additionally, fundamental principles are assessed that remain constant regardless of the conditions. Selective examination of wars and military operations over the past two centuries allows students to critique the employment of military power based on their knowledge of military theory.

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