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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	1993 National Security Strategy Report. [Integrated Regional Approaches Section] (10 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

November 7, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RGB*
FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*
SUBJECT: Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel

At Tab I is a memorandum to the President responding to a letter from Manning Kimmel requesting that his grandfather, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, be posthumously retired at four-star rank.

Admiral Kimmel's family has lobbied successive Administrations to restore Kimmel to the temporary four-star rank he held at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. They have renewed their efforts with this Administration and have been assisted by Admiral Crowe, who has taken a personal interest in this case.

We have again reviewed the issues surrounding Admiral Kimmel's relief and retirement. We do not believe there is compelling justification to reverse prior decisions and posthumously promote Admiral Kimmel. Similarly, the Department of Defense reexamined the evidence and on September 7 Secretary Perry sent the Kimmel family a letter in which he stated that he found no justification for posthumous promotion (Tab B).

The facts directly relevant to the case are clear. Admiral Kimmel received an official "war warning" message from the CNO on November 27, 1941 informing him that hostilities with Japan were imminent and directing him to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment." Even after this tasking, neither Kimmel, nor his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Walter Short, implemented the War Plans for defending the Hawaiian islands.

At President Roosevelt's direction, Kimmel and Short were relieved of their commands and retired in their permanent two-star ranks after numerous investigations and hearings ruled them derelict in their duties. (It should be noted that they were not court-martialed nor even demoted. They were simply not granted the courtesy of retiring in their highest temporary rank.)

While all intelligence available in Washington was not forwarded to Kimmel, there is no evidence that Washington had specific intelligence confirming an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. The

"missing" intelligence merely amplified what Kimmel and Short had already been told, that war appeared imminent.

According to the Navy, virtually every Administration since FDR has reviewed the case and confirmed the original findings. The Navy position is that Kimmel should not be rehabilitated, since the principles of command accountability and responsibility fully justify the findings and actions taken in 1942, and no new information has surfaced which challenges earlier findings.

The Kimmel family forwards new argumentation to buttress the "FDR/Marshall" conspiracy thesis first levied by the Republican Party during the 1944 election campaign--that Roosevelt and George Marshall knew an attack was imminent and suppressed information in order to permit the U.S. to be drawn into the war. In a letter to the President (Tab C), Manning Kimmel includes an unpublished chapter of a book which cites a 1989 BBC documentary supporting this thesis. This chapter is particularly appealing to the Kimmels because the chapter's author argues that both Kimmel and Short should be posthumously advanced in rank and claims that "it is even possible--nay, likely (but pure speculation)--that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won." This is the supporting "evidence" for the most recent Kimmel requests.

Kimmel and Short were the most senior military officers held accountable for the failure of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. While the Kimmel family believes accountability should be placed higher up the chain of command, we believe the decisions of the investigating committees and subsequent reviews of those decisions have stood the test of time. Presently we find nothing to suggest that earlier findings are in error. In the absence of new findings we believe that the evidence supports the historical record.

It should also be noted that restoring Kimmel to his previous rank would raise questions as to whether the President does or does not exonerate General Short. The historical record suggests, however, that Short was even more culpable than Kimmel.

At your request, Bob Bell took the opportunity while in London on a CFE mission last month to meet with Admiral Crowe and discuss his views on this issue. Admiral Crowe told Bob that he thought it very difficult for the President to come out in favor of this retroactive promotion now that Secretary Perry has written the Kimmel family a negative response. Admiral Crowe said that he originally saw granting the request as a means for the President to reach out to the military community, since so many retired admirals favor this action. He also revealed a side of this controversy that was new to Bob: the institutional Navy's resentment that General George Marshall (who was privy to all the "Magic" intercepts) was not "hurt" by Pearl Harbor (and indeed went on to near-sainthood status), while Admiral Kimmel (who was not given access to "Magic") was cashiered. Admiral Crowe said,

in summary, that while he still believes the President should restore Kimmel's rank, he does not feel as strongly about it as before.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Letter to Manning Kimmel
Tab B	SecDef Response to Edward Kimmel
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence from Manning Kimmel

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel

Purpose

To respond to a request from Manning Kimmel to posthumously restore his grandfather, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, to the four-star rank he temporarily held at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Background

For decades, Admiral Kimmel's family has lobbied successive Administrations to restore his temporary rank. As you know, Admiral Crowe has taken a personal interest in their efforts.

The facts directly relevant to the case are clear. Admiral Kimmel received an official message from the CNO on November 27, 1941 warning that hostilities with Japan were imminent and directing him to take measures to defend the Hawaiian Islands. These actions were not taken by Kimmel or his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Walter Short.

At President Roosevelt's direction, Kimmel and Short were relieved of their commands and retired in their permanent two-star ranks after a series of service and congressional investigations. They were not court-martialed or even demoted. They were simply not granted the courtesy of retiring in their highest temporary rank.

According to the Navy, virtually every Administration since FDR has reviewed the case and confirmed the original findings. The Navy position is that Kimmel should not be rehabilitated, since the principles of command accountability and responsibility fully justify the findings and action taken in 1942 and no new information has surfaced which challenges earlier findings. In a September 7 letter to Edward Kimmel, RADM Kimmel's son (Tab B), Secretary Perry stands by previous official judgments.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Manning Kimmel's recent argumentation relies heavily on the "FDR/Marshall" conspiracy thesis -- that President Roosevelt and General George Marshall knew an attack was imminent and suppressed information in order to permit the U.S. to be drawn into the war. This accusation was also the major thrust of the Republican Party's effort to unseat FDR in 1944. Mr. Kimmel cites an unpublished chapter of a book which takes note of a 1989 BBC documentary supporting this thesis. This chapter is particularly appealing to the Kimmel family because the author argues that both Kimmel and Short should be posthumously advanced in rank. It claims that "it is even possible -- nay, likely (but pure speculation) -- that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won."

Kimmel and Short were the most senior military officials held accountable for the failure of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. While the Kimmel family believes accountability should be placed higher up the chain of command, the decisions of the investigating committees and subsequent reviews of those decisions have stood the test of time. Presently we find nothing to suggest that earlier findings are in error. In the absence of new findings, we believe that the evidence supports the historical record.

At my request, Bob Bell recently took the opportunity to discuss the Kimmel case with Admiral Crowe while in London on other business. Admiral Crowe said he thought it would be very difficult for you to restore Admiral Kimmel's rank on the heels of Secretary Perry's recent letter to the family upholding prior official judgments. He also told Bob that while he originally saw this as a means for you to reach out to the military community (many retired admirals have lobbied on behalf of Admiral Kimmel) and still believes Kimmel was treated unjustly, he no longer feels as strongly about it as before.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Manning Kimmel
Tab B	SecDef response to Edward Kimmel
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Kimmel:

I have reviewed the events surrounding the retirement after Pearl Harbor of your grandfather, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. While I understand your desire to see him posthumously promoted, I agree with the judgment of prior investigatory commissions, as recently revalidated by Secretary of Defense Perry.

Your grandfather was, without question, a patriotic American who served our country with bravery and dedication. With regard to the issue of his permanent retirement grade, though, the historical record provides no compelling justification for me to reverse prior decisions that he be retired at the two-star level.

I appreciate the importance of this issue to your family and respect your unwavering commitment to upholding its good name.

Sincerely,

Mr. Manning M. Kimmel IV
Post Office Box 307
142 North Confederate Avenue
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29731-6307



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

7 SEP 1994

Mr. Edward R. Kimmel
15 Wood Road
Wilmington, DE 19806

Dear Mr. Kimmel:

I am responding to your letter to then-Secretary Aspin in which you asked him to support the posthumous promotion of your father, Husband E. Kimmel, to the grade of Admiral.

Since Rear Admiral Kimmel's retirement in 1942, the appropriate grade with which to mark his service has been the subject of inquiry and debate. As you know, Rear Admiral Kimmel's conduct and accountability concerning the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor were examined by a commission presided over by a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, a Navy court of inquiry, an investigation commissioned by the Secretary of War, and extensive Congressional hearings conducted by the Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor attack. During the decades after the end of World War II, Rear Admiral Kimmel's retirement grade has also been considered by serving Presidents, my predecessors and Secretaries of the Navy, none of whom were persuaded that there is a sufficiently meritorious case for advancing Rear Admiral Kimmel to four-star rank on the retired list.

Despite recent historical reexaminations of the events which culminated in the Pearl Harbor attack, and the recommendations that have been expressed by distinguished retired flag officers, I believe that Rear Admiral Kimmel's status should not be changed. In my view, this conclusion is compelled by society's legitimate interest in the finality of official actions, and by the weight, basis and scope of the prior judgments on this issue. While the bar of history may ultimately be more sympathetic to Rear Admiral Kimmel in the context of his times, I cannot conclude that he has been treated unjustly or advocate a revision of the Navy's records.

I understand and appreciate the significance of this issue to your family and yourself and sincerely regret that I am unable to provide a more favorable response to your request.

Sincerely,

William J. Perry

17843

THE WHITE HOUSE

4.11.94

Mr Bell-

Enclosed are
the materials forwarded
by Cong. Spratt's office.
Please copy me your
response to the
Kinnels.

Thanks for your
assistance in this
matter.

Yung Khapra

x62663

Rm 176.

AM 1140

April 5, 1994

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear President Clinton,


I was hoping to meet you this afternoon at the reception in Fort Mill, but although my name was submitted by Congressman John Spratt, I was informed that the invitation that was originally extended to me was rescinded due to that fact that I am in broadcasting and the owner of two radio stations in York County. My reason for wanting to attend the reception was not of a "news nature" but a "personal nature". Since our meeting will not be possible, I have requested Congressman Spratt to give you this letter and the accompanying information.

I hope you can understand the extreme frustration and disappointment my family has experienced the past 50 years in trying to get Washington to honestly and fairly deal with the issue of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. I only hope that this packet of information is in your hands and not in those of a military aide who once again would relegate it to the Pentagon for an all too familiar "form letter response."

Although The White House has formally recognized my Grandfather as a "patriotic American who served his country well," they have refused to formally retire him at his proper rank, and rather would want the tarnish on his name to remain. A half century of research and numerous Naval and Congressional hearings, have proven Admiral Kimmel was not to blame for Pearl Harbor, and dozens of his Naval peers, including Admiral Crowe, agree that this simple gesture is long overdue.

You have impressed me, Mr. President, as being a fair and honorable man and I would ask you to help us put our Grandfather's contribution to our country in its proper place. Without your personal involvement, we will only face the continued judgement of Washington's military bureacracy.

Sincerely your,



Manning M. Kimmel IV

MMKIV/skk

Encl.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

July 16, 1993

General Colin Powell, Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E873, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20318

Dear General Powell:

Since April 1987, the Kimmel brothers, Edward and Thomas, have endeavored to have the Department of Defense initiate action to promote their father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, posthumously, to the rank of Admiral. He was Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

In 1988, after an extensive investigation, then Secretary of the Navy, William L. Ball, III, recommended to then Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, that the matter be placed before the President for decision. Secretary Carlucci declined to do so.

The Kimmel brothers have provided extensive documentation based on scholarly research to the Department of Defense and to us in support of their position. They have also gained support of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, two former Chiefs of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke and Thomas Moorer, Veterans of Foreign Wars and many other World War II veterans. Also, attached to this letter is a 1991 letter from thirty-six prominent retired Navy admirals urging President Bush "to nominate to the U.S. Senate Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN for posthumous promotion to Admiral...."

Reasons for not correcting this wrong have been conveyed in the past. But the reasoning has been unclear, such as (this matter) "has been reviewed a number of times in the decades since" Admiral Kimmel's retirement in 1942" and that "the promotional process was not the way to address the issue of Admiral Kimmel's place in history."

The Kimmel brothers are merely seeking to remove the stigma and obloquy associated with the charge by the Roberts Commission which issued its report in 1942. After a hurried investigation to find a scapegoat, the Commission charged Admiral Kimmel with

being derelict in his duty. This charge was widely publicized in 1942. It was not supported by later investigations, first in 1944 by a Naval Court of Inquiry, and again in 1946 by a Joint Congressional Investigation. Yet, the charge still sticks, and whenever the public thinks of the Pearl Harbor attack they think of the "dereliction of duty" by Admiral Kimmel.

The posthumous promotion of Admiral Kimmel will be a small step in restoring his honor. No retroactive pay should be involved. In addition, this would not be an extraordinary act. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 permitted previously retired officers to be advanced on the retired list to the highest grade held while on active duty.

General, this year is the 50th Anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, providing an appropriate time to promote Admiral Kimmel. We believe that this matter merits personal attention, review and careful consideration from you and the Joint Chiefs.

Sincerely,

John Warner
Dick Bennett

Strom Thurmond
Lynch Fairclott

Richard Shelby

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

September 23, 1993

Dear Colleague:

Following the 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, unjust blame was placed on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commander of the United States Army's Hawaiian Department. As a result, both officers reverted their permanent ranks of Rear Admiral and Major General respectively, in which they retired and from which they never were advanced. This injustice can be rectified by posthumously advancing these two officers to the rank of Admiral and Lieutenant General respectively.

In 1944 a Naval Court of Inquiry found that no blame should be placed on Admiral Kimmel and specifically approved his decisions and disposition of forces. Further, a Joint Committee of the Congress in 1946 specifically found that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short had been derelict in his duty. Despite these findings, their names carry the unwarranted blame for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor. The Congress can correct this mistake and set the historical record straight.

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 authorizes the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to advance certain Naval and Army officers on the retired list to the highest ranks in which they served while on active duty. Admiral Kimmel and General Short are both eligible for such advancement.


In November 1991, an Army Board for the Correction of Military Records recommended that Major General Short be advanced posthumously to the rank of Lieutenant General. This recommendation was turned down by the Department of the Army despite the fact that it was supported by the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association and Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee of Lexington, Kentucky.

Numerous organizations and naval personnel have supported advancing posthumously Rear Admiral Kimmel to the rank of Admiral on the retired list, including the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, thirty-seven navy flag officers among whom were five former Chiefs of Naval Operations, twenty-nine other full admirals, three vice admirals and one rear admiral, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).


The Executive Branch has not seen fit to nominate either Rear Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short for advancement in rank on the retired list as contemplated by the reference statute, despite the fact that almost all of their contemporary officers have been so nominated and advanced. The only appropriate way to redress this injustice is for Congress to call on the President to posthumously promote both Rear Admiral Kimmel and General Short to Admiral and Lieutenant General respectively on the retired list.


You can help set the historical record straight and restore the good name of these two honorable officers. Cosponsor H.CON.RES. 150 by contacting Patrick Holten with Congresswoman Bentley's staff at X5-3061.

Sincerely,


Strom Thurmond


John M. Spratt, Jr.


Bob Stump


Helen Delich Bentley


Joe Skeen


Henry Bonilla

15 Wood Road
Wilmington, DE 19806
March 16, 1993

Admiral Frank Kelso II USN
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Admiral Kelso:

I last corresponded with you in the fall of 1991. I congratulated you on the way in which you handled the Iowa matter which was in the news at that time. I then explained that my father was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN (Ret) (Deceased), who commanded the naval forces at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941.

You wrote that you had new information upon which to base your conclusions in the Iowa case whereas in the case of my father you had no new information, nor reason to judge those who had previously ruled in his case.

Captain Edward L. Beach USN (Ret) is currently writing a book dealing with his experiences as a naval officer in World War II and as a courtesy he sent me a copy of CHAPTER THREE, How Was It Possible ?. This Chapter is as succinct and clear analysis of the Pearl Harbor matter as I have seen. It focuses the reader on the forest and avoids blurring his vision with the many trees which appeared in the plethora of investigations into the Pearl Harbor disaster. I am enclosing a copy for you and commend it to your attention. Perhaps it will give you reason to judge those who have previously ruled in my father's case as well as give you a new insight into this matter.

I am also enclosing a copy of a Petition to the President urging him to posthumously promote Admiral Kimmel and General Short to the ranks they held at the time of the attack, promotions to which the Petitioners assert they are entitled. The signers are 36 retired navy flag officers including two former Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (Moorer and Crowe) and four former Chiefs of Naval Operations (Moorer, Crowe, Holloway and Zumwalt), 28 Admirals, 3 Vice Admirals and 1 Rear Admiral. In addition a former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke USN (Ret), sent a letter (copy enclosed) to the Secretary of Defense recommending the posthumous promotion. Hopefully the opinions of this impressive group of naval officers, including 5 of your predecessors in the important position you currently hold, will also give you reason to judge those who have previously ruled in my father's case.

In light of such support it is difficult to believe, as stated by Lieutenant General Richard Trefry, Military Assistant to President Bush, that the "uniformed" navy opposes such posthumous promotion. Copies of his letters were furnished you in 1991.

Should you have occasion to visit with any of the petitioners I urge you to discuss Admiral Kimmel and the Pearl Harbor disaster.

My brother, Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret) and I are still committed to seeing that corrective steps are taken to offset the baseless public impression that our father was solely responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster and "derelict in his duty". Hopefully you will become a convert to our cause along with the illustrious Petitioners noted above.

Sincerely,

Edward R. Kimmel
Edward R. Kimmel

CHAPTER THREE

How Was It Possible?

In attempting to make some sense out of all the data emanating from the many investigations of the Pearl Harbor debacle, it is first necessary to discard all superfluous material and concentrate on what seems to be the direct line that was in place that fatal December night and early morning. There can be little question that Magic and the "14-part message" made up this direct line, for it was the official Japanese reply to our "ultimatum" (as they considered it to be) of 26 November. Although the 14-part message contained no declaration of war, it used strong language, specifically broke relations with the United States, and its delivery was carefully timed to take place, with the attacking planes en route, precisely one half hour before the first bomb was to fall. It was this message, paralleling the one sent to Moscow in 1904, that Japan counted on to square herself with history and the law of nations. In 1904, the surprise attack on Port Arthur took place two days after delivery of the official diplomatic note terminating negotiations. In 1941, owing to the greatly increased speed of communications, Japan planned to reduce the two days to thirty minutes; but difficulties in her Embassy in Washington caused the official break to be about an hour after the attack began, instead of half an hour before.

Counting the preliminary message alerting the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and the following "delivery message," there were 16 messages in all. The first and last, intended to be instructions to the two Japanese ambassadors then in our capital, were in Japanese. The 14 parts of the main message, the formal break in negotiations between Japan and the United States, were in English, as might be expected of a foreign nation with a strange circumlocutory sort of written language that desired above all to be explicitly understood.

Some doubt now seems to exist whether the 14th part, considerably later in arriving than the first 13, was in English. It bore marks indicating it had been "translated," but so did all the other messages, that were definitely in English. The 14th was the most direct-spoken of the 14 parts, and the most virulent in tone, although it stopped short of announcing hostilities. The authorities in Japan would not have trusted this most significant of the 14 parts to a Sunday morning translator in their Washington Embassy when they had already indicated their anxiety for exactitude by using English for the first 13. Unfortunately, the bureaucratic system used by the decoders required all messages processed to go through the recording, translation, and typing sections, and therefore, no matter how swiftly passed through, all Magic, without exception, bore indication of the time and date "translated." Under the circumstances, this meant little more than that someone in the translator section had okayed it for transmittal onward. This may have been a point of critical lapse, as will be shown.

All studies of the Pearl Harbor debacle have attempted to dissect, or somehow find a trail through, the tremendous amount of detail, much of it truly trivial, which, if totally and correctly evaluated, might have given our forces a better warning than they received. This would have required immaculate hindsight, and no one in any position of authority made any such evaluations at the time. The 14-part message, however, was in the direct line, the most important channel of communication between Japan and the United States. Even more importantly, we had secretly broken into this channel to such an extent that in many instances we were reading messages to the Japanese ambassadors in Washington before they themselves had even received them. Yet, despite all these conditions of special advantage, we did not understand the warnings we had been getting, which this message, and those we had read earlier, had made cumulatively and explicitly clear. This was where our true failure took place.

To begin at the true beginning of this extraordinary tale, it is first obligatory to divert attention to the understanding of "Magic," where it came from, and the reasons behind the adamant restrictions on its use.

In 1941 our code-breaking capability was in its infancy, and totally unsuspected by Japan. By mid-1941 it had been given the code-name "Magic," and it could break some, but not all, of Japan's codes. Sometime that year President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top advisers were informed that they could henceforth be provided in real time with the text of messages sent between Tokyo and its Embassy in Washington; that is, we could be reading messages sent in the diplomatic code about as soon as either of the intended recipients could. It was a coup of the first magnitude.

Official recipients of Magic were the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy (Cordell Hull, Henry Stimson, and Frank Knox), and the Service Chiefs (Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark). One or two other officers not in the direct intelligence chain, notably high-handed Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, then building his power structure in the Navy Department, were also aware of Magic, and as events marched on, others inevitably were included. One of our primary concerns, nevertheless, was to keep knowledge of it at a minimum, and prevent all chance that persons aware of it might fall into the hands of the enemy.

We were also worried that demonstrating foreknowledge too often of supposedly secret enemy plans might endanger Magic. We should not, for example, consistently concentrate forces at just the right place and time needed to defeat the enemy, for repeated coincidences of this nature might raise suspicions. Of the many ways Japan might deal with the possibility that their codes might have been invaded, the simplest would be to change codes immediately, thus risking alerting us to the fact. A more subtle reaction might be to make no overt change at all, but begin using the compromised system for disinformation, or to send messages designed to discover whether or not invasion had actually occurred.

Cryptographers are traditionally alert for any signs their systems have been compromised. From the code-breakers' point of view, once the enemy even suspects one of his codes has been violated, anything taken from the code or codes in question is no longer valuable, or at the minimum must be held suspect in its turn.

The code-breakers considered it a thousand times more difficult to invade a new system than it could have been for the originators to create it in the first place. Unwise use of Magic thus might lead to its sudden demise, possibly forever but certainly for a very long time. We consequently went to tremendous lengths, at this early stage of our code breaking capability, to keep everything about it as secret as possible. The extreme emphasis on security seems a bit exaggerated today, for we frequently did not pass vital information to those who had most need of it. At times we incurred deliberate losses it might have been possible to avoid—but this is always very difficult to explain to the survivors. It was always hard to judge which objective would be best served with any particular bit of intelligence, and it still is. Danger of compromising the source is an inherent factor in use of intelligence at any time.

It is necessary to appreciate the foregoing to gain an insight into the tremendous diplomatic power game Roosevelt embarked upon after election to his unprecedented third term, and the tremendous care with which he used his tools. Magic was fundamental to his entire foreign policy because, in poker parlance, it let him "look down Japan's throat."

Magic gave FDR information about Japanese plans and strategy at their very highest level, just as a similar capability, code-named "Enigma," served Winston Churchill against Hitler. Granting today's perception that our entry into World War II was imperative, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Magic, which continued to improve, was one of the important factors.

Without Magic, our President could not have had the sure touch with which he led us through the war, all the while suffering from a slowly debilitating illness that had no cure. With Magic, we had an extremely vulnerable tool, but it was of incalculable value. Men had sacrificed their lives to obtain only small portions of the extraordinary mosaic of logic and equipment that had gone into its creation, and more would do so to prevent even a small chance of its discovery by the enemy (it was, for example, the reason why Captain

John Philip Cromwell chose to remain below and not try to escape from his sinking submarine).

It had become clear that Hitler was close to winning the war in Europe. Churchill's pleas for help were becoming increasingly desperate, and even before his reelection Roosevelt became convinced the fall of England was imminent, that to prevent it the U.S. must soon become an outright ally. But he also understood the depth of America's isolationist sentiment, and the strength of American antipathy to the sacrifices this war would entail. In short, he understood our political unreadiness. Moreover, he knew a Congress that had extended the Draft Act by only a single vote late in 1940 would not declare war in 1941 out of policy alone, and he well remembered his campaign slogan that election year, that he was not going to send "any American boys into foreign wars."

At the same time, in speech after speech, because he had to, Roosevelt was assuring embattled England of all aid "short of war." In 1940 and 1941 he instituted "Lend Lease," gave 50 old destroyers to the British Navy to bolster its anti-U-boat campaign, and directed the U.S. Navy to convoy vitally needed supplies to England. He declared half the Atlantic Ocean a U.S. lake, prohibited to U-boats. Damaged British warships were repaired in American shipyards. U.S. industry received unlimited credit to fulfill emergency British orders for food, ammunition, war supplies of all kinds. Much of what he did would today be declared illegal. Most citizens of the U.S. supported him. Only the most unsophisticated believed we were still holding to the neutrality announced in 1939, but most wanted at all costs to stay out of the fight.

Most felt we were doing all we could, or should, do. They believed the simplistic statements officially given out that slow, even pressure from our side, without actually fighting, would finally bring a satisfactory termination to a war whose true dreadfulness they refused to look in the face. Our policy makers, however, the same ones who issued the encouraging announcements, knew the truth to be the contrary. England was nearing the end of her rope. Nazi Germany was winning. The situation was 1916 all over again. Without full and unstinting assistance from the U.S., including employment of all our armed forces--in other words, without a declaration of war on our part--England would soon have to give up. But how to change America's anti-war mindset? By and large, the war in Europe was interesting to our citizenry, but it directly affected only a small part of it. In fact, the war in Europe in many cases was beneficial to us because of the enormous amount of work it sent our way. How to change the collective mind of the average U.S. citizen?

The way Roosevelt used Magic showed that, despite a somewhat political or "P.R." approach to most matters, he fully understood its importance. With it in his bag of tricks, he began to look for ways to get the United States to enter the war with a national commitment to victory. At the same time, naturally enough, he continued to insist that his only objective was to keep Japan from initiating war in the far east.

In 1989 the British Broadcast Company produced a TV documentary titled "Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor," portraying Washington during the week before the Japanese attack, dramatizing the confusing information and rumors that were rife in high government circles at the time. The documentary states positively that Winston Churchill had information about a Japanese task force at sea headed toward Hawaii, and that he shared this with Roosevelt; that a number of intelligence officers intercepted a series of messages indicating something radical was going to happen on Sunday the 7th; that J. Edgar Hoover and our Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, had heard as early as the previous spring that Admiral Yamamoto was planning an attack on the Hawaiian naval base; and that a special navigation plotting team had been tracking the Japanese fleet from the Kurile Islands out into the Pacific, and knew, on the morning of 7 December, that it was due north of the island of Oahu, on which Pearl Harbor is located.

The BBC further states that crucial intelligence was deliberately withheld from the U.S. Fleet commander and his staff, and that even intercepts picked up at station Hypo, in

the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, under Commander Joseph Rochefort, and elsewhere in the navy complex, some of them, unbelievably, at an establishment in a small house near to Admiral Kimmel's own official quarters, were sent only to Washington, where they were buried in the jungle of official paper there. The barest suggestion of these strange things would have served to alert Kimmel and Short to the possibility something unusual was going on. But none of it--not even that obtained on their own official real estate--ever reached either one. Rochefort and the others were categorically forbidden to pass any information anywhere except through top-secret channels directly to their superiors in Washington, D.C.

Whether one takes this broadcast at face value or not, whatever the putative warnings and rumors of which it now would appear there were many, the attack, exactly half a century ago, was a strategic and tactical surprise of the first order. Eight investigations (by some counts nine), the latest completed in May, 1946, submitted reports totaling more than 15,000 pages in 30 printed volumes, plus another 15 volumes of appendices. All of them seem to have concentrated on what the army and navy commanders knew, when they knew it, and what they did about it. Few have paid much attention to what they should have known, and why they did not, beyond the tautological excuse that someone with "greater judgment" would have "more accurately" interpreted the warnings he actually did receive.

What could Admiral Kimmel have done better? With realistic appreciation of the warnings he did receive, and those he did not, what more should he have done during that crucial first week of December? Were there any indications that he should have had that he did not receive? Were there others, superior to him, who also should have done more? Is it possible that our high command, quite properly obsessed with the danger of an Axis victory in Europe, really wanted Japan to initiate the war that Hitler was obviously trying for the moment to avoid--and that only the extent of Japan's attack, that it reached across the Pacific to Pearl Harbor, was in fact a surprise? How else explain the superior intelligence made available to our commanders in the Far East? Or the extraordinary dilatoriness in getting a last minute alert message on the way to Pearl Harbor? It was almost as though the men in charge were torn in two directions: to let Japan attack, since it was vital that we get into the World War (we know that FDR's watchword, at that moment, was that Japan must attack first); or loyalty to the standards of military conduct ingrained in all of them. Many naval officers in high ranking posts asked themselves these questions at the time, and there were no answers, as there are none today.

But in 1942 American public opinion, fueled by a demanding media, had to have an immediate scapegoat for the Pearl Harbor disaster, and despite their strenuous efforts, Kimmel's in particular, the two hapless commanders in Hawaii found this was to be their only contribution to the national war effort. Hurriedly called, the Roberts Commission sat from 18 December 1941 to 23 January 1942, permitted no legal representation by either of the two accused commanders, found nonetheless that they had been seriously derelict in their duties, and brought about their retirement for cause two months later. It was not fair, but it may have been politic at the time. It is even possible--nay, likely (but pure speculation)--that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won. Undeniably, the ability to lay blame for initial failure on someone who could then be put aside would be helpful to its overall prosecution. Under such over-riding circumstances, there may be some excuse for relegating truth to a secondary role; but at the bar of history it must always remain primary.

Eight subsequent investigations of how the war began were held in all. In 1944 an official Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel. Most of the others found fault not only with Kimmel and Short but also, in various and different ways, with Marshall, Stark, MacArthur, and FDR. It is still, as this is written, an unsettled question as to where the most fault lies. All agree that there was much blame to spread around, but that in the largest sense it was necessary for America to become fully involved in World War II, and the sooner the better. Thus, Japan's duplicitous initiative was the greatest

possible benefit she could have done for the free world, and the most stupid thing she could have done for herself.

A brief review of the other star players in the military during this difficult time may be useful. In addition to Admiral Kimmel, these were six in number: Admiral J. O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS); Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet based at Cavite in Manila Bay; Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Army commander in Hawaii; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; and General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the newly established (July 1941) U.S. Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE). With exception of Admiral Richardson, the first named, all were in important military command posts on 7 December 1941, and the fates of all seven were closely intertwined.

Admiral Richardson was Admiral Kimmel's immediate predecessor in command of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. He became CINCUS (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet) on 6 January 1940, and normally would have been still in command on that terrible December morning 23 months later. Early in 1940, shortly after Richardson took over, the U.S. Fleet (actually only the Pacific Fleet) was based in Long Beach, California. In April and May it engaged in maneuvers simulating war with Japan. The fleet maneuvers ended in Pearl Harbor, where a planned rest and recreational stay of about two weeks was continuously extended by directive of Washington. It was gradually clear that the stay was to become permanent, at least for the foreseeable future. Richardson complained, twice directly to Roosevelt, that the fleet had inadequate logistic support to maintain itself at Pearl Harbor, that it was too much exposed to possible attack by the Japanese, and that he, the fleet commander, was not being kept adequately informed about what was going on in Washington. It is now evident that he was only too right in all this, but in reading his own account (*ON THE TREADMILL TO PEARL HARBOR*), completed in 1958 but not published until after the 1972 death of his old friend Admiral Stark, whom the book criticizes most strongly, one has to recognize the probability that FDR had come to look on Admiral Richardson as a bothersome nuisance in the big international game of power politics then going on.

Whether Richardson might have been more alert than Kimmel, therefore more successful in avoiding surprise, will never be answered, but a careful reading of his memoirs indicates that he, at least, did not think so. In Kimmel's place, with the information Kimmel was receiving, he wrote that he would have been taken just as much unawares. He went on to say, however, that if he had been CNO instead of Stark, Admiral Kimmel would have had much more of the critically important up-to-date information than he did receive. Clearly stated in several places is his opinion that Stark failed grossly in his responsibility to CINCUS, his immediate subordinate, and that it was this failure that led directly to the utter surprise of the attack itself.

It is also true that Richardson was so vocal with his concern over the untenable position of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and stated his feeling so strongly to the President himself, as well as in more routine official circles, that he was fired as fleet commander ten months before the attack. This was not lost on Kimmel: it was a mistake he would not make. Ironically, Richardson was right; the fleet was not adequately supported logistically in far off Hawaii--though neither he nor anyone really expected an all-out attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan's target was clearly the Far East: French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, perhaps the Philippines.

The glitch in this simplistic analysis appears now to have been Japan's Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Combined Fleet, opposite number to Kimmel, who felt the U.S. Fleet had to be neutralized too. Yamamoto was a very high quality naval officer and leader, and he won the point in Japan's high command. A well planned surprise attack is one of the most basic of military operations, by definition hardest to defeat. By definition the enemy is not ready, and a major portion of the

planning is always devoted to preserving the element of surprise. The defeat of the Maginot Line, the invasion of Normandy in 1944, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, all are examples of this. Another generally accepted truism: the prophet of disaster is usually unpopular too, along with the victimized leader.

For Admiral Richardson, not quite a prophet of disaster but the closest thing to it at the time, there was no warning that he was about to lose his job, except that he knew he had been unusually forthright in stating his disagreement with the President. He had even gone so far as to say that senior officers in the navy had lost confidence in their civilian leadership. This "hurt the President's feelings," the admiral was later told. The axe fell without even a telephoned preliminary notice from his close friend, the CNO; so it is probable, as Richardson believed, that instructions from FDR himself must have forbidden the courtesy. In January 1941, exactly one year after he took command, he received a dispatch cutting his normal tour in half, returning him to Washington, and directing his replacement by Admiral Kimmel.

In Washington, although told by Secretary of the Navy Knox to expect a call to the White House, Richardson never again saw the President (he had seen him frequently before). Demoted to Rear Admiral, he was employed in a succession of minor jobs in Washington. He reached the statutory retirement age of 64 in October 1942, was put on the retired list, and immediately recalled to active duty in similar assignments--as before, not connected with the war effort. He was finally retired in 1947. In his book he says, "after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel received the rawest of raw deals from Franklin D. Roosevelt and, insofar as they acquiesced in this treatment, from Frank Knox and "Betty" Stark (CNO)." Elsewhere in the same book he wrote, "I believe the President's responsibility for our initial defeats in the Pacific was direct, real, and personal."

Admiral Hart has already been mentioned. The "Purple" machine that provided "Magic," the ability to intercept and decode Japanese messages, was available to him and General MacArthur via a top secret special shipment sent in January 1941 (Hawaii received no such shipment.) How much use of it either of the commanders in the Philippines made is not specifically known, but Hart was not caught napping by the Japanese attack. He disposed of the forces under his command as well as anyone could have under the short time available to him, and it is possible that he might have done even better, possibly have saved the submarine *Sealion* (under overhaul and immobile), had he had another day's warning. His performance illustrates at least what could be done in the very minimum of time.

Hart was nothing if not a dedicated naval officer and knowledgeable fleet commander. Although he must have guessed that he was being protected because of his knowledge of our ability to decode Japanese messages, it no doubt caused him much heartburn to abandon his forces in the summary way he did, in mid-February 1942, knowing they were being used as a death offering in support of a cause already known to be lost. The Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously awarded to the commanding officer of the sacrificed *Houston* was truly deserved, as the facts now available clearly demonstrate, but it can never be more than an inadequate symbol of the debt owed to all the men of that forlorn, deserted, Asiatic Fleet. Yet, war is never without sacrifice, demanded and given. Before blame and accusation are handed out it is first necessary to decide what were the alternatives to all concerned. Japan, with a warrior class based on a samurai culture, would have had no difficulty with this problem. Neither, probably, would Nazi Germany. Had we abandoned the Dutch East Indies, more of our Asiatic Fleet might have survived; but the Dutch were our allies, and it would have been hard to predict the judgment of history.

Hart, the Asiatic Fleet's Commander-in-Chief, retired from active duty in June 1942. In February 1945 the Governor of Connecticut appointed him United States Senator on the death of Senator Francis Maloney of that state. He did not run for reelection in 1946, and his term expired the next year.

Admiral Stark received considerable unofficial blame for Pearl Harbor, though few then knew anything specific as to the reasons. He was shunted aside by the appointment of Admiral Ernest J. King as COMINCH, the new combined billet of CNO and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. All the many investigations of the Pearl Harbor debacle, it now appears, one way or another charged Stark with not keeping Admiral Kimmel adequately informed. Richardson states this accusation specifically: "I consider that "Betty" Stark, in failing to pick up a telephone and give Kimmel a last-minute warning on the morning of Pearl Harbor, committed a major professional lapse, indicating a basic absence of those personal military characteristics required in a successful war leader. I believe his failures in these respects were far more important derelictions than those of any of his subordinates....I cannot conceive of how he could have treated Kimmel as he did...unless...(it) was due to influence or possibly direct orders from above....His means of communication with Kimmel were equal to, if not superior to, those available to Marshall for communication with Short. He made no effort to warn Kimmel on the morning of December 7, but referred the matter to Marshall."

In his memoirs Richardson says he believes instructions had been given that no one but General Marshall was to send warnings to Pearl Harbor, and this explains why Stark did not send a warning directly. Regarding the lesser matter of simply keeping him informed, in which he reiterates his criticism of Stark, he makes a similar accusation relating to his own service as CINCUS, and goes on obliquely, "I believed also that few, if any, other senior officers in the Navy could have served the President so long and so satisfactorily as did Admiral Stark." He clearly did not consider this comment to be one of high praise.

In 1942 Admiral Stark was quietly exiled to England, where he served the United States well during the balance of the war. Nothing was ever done about his failure to notify Kimmel, and he never defended himself against the charge. Richardson sarcastically says, "In view of what happened to our fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, I believe he may have a few regrets as to his part in the matter."

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army Commander of the Hawaiian Department, is something of an enigma. Like George Marshall, he seems to have held an austere personal outlook on his duty, evidently accepted the disaster to himself as akin to but lesser than the deaths that overtook about 2,500 soldiers, sailors, and airmen on that terrible day, and holding his dismay, anger, whatever personal guilt he may have felt, and the terrible sorrow, within his own breast, quietly disappeared from the official scene. Except for his testimony when called before the sequence of investigations of the matter, in which he defended himself vigorously, he said nothing and wrote nothing. He had done his duty to the best of his ability, and like the samurai, he did not flinch at the penalty exacted of him by the overlords whom he served. He died in 1949.

General George C. Marshall was another American samurai, one of the authentic heroes of modern American history. He has rightly been revered by the American public, whom he served as Chief of Staff of the Army, then as Secretary of State and as Secretary of Defense. Seldom has one individual so combined the qualities of austere high-mindedness, self-abnegation, seriousness of purpose, and intellect. He was admired by Presidents, by the news media, in short by all who came into contact with him. The nation was singularly fortunate that this high quality person should have been near the seat of power during the extraordinary period that encompassed WWII and its aftermath. So far as is known, during Marshall's entire history there was only one single lapse in his otherwise superlative stewardship of our country's best interests, and this was on Pearl Harbor Day. That was the morning when he decided to cut himself off from all official communication and go horseback riding. Lesser officers bearing important information: the decode of the final section of the crucial "fourteen section" message, Admiral Stark's request that a war warning message be sent to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, a Colonel Bratton's desperate attempts to reach him with critical, and as we now know accurate,

though intuitive, information of the intentions of the Japanese fleet--all had to wait until the general could be found and attend to business.

Marshall was a man of commanding presence and a nearly mystical sense of duty. Absent some overriding criterion, there is literally no way he would, or could, have been so derelict in his duties on this all important Sunday. Other officials--Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Marshall's navy counterpart Admiral Stark, many lesser officers, in particular those involved with code work--were at their desks or trying frantically to reach someone in authority with what they considered to be important information. All were well aware of the critical state of Japanese-American relations. The Army Chief of Staff could not have been an exception. Admiral Richardson wrote that though he had no proof, he was certain FDR had directed that only General Marshall could send any warning message to Hawaii. Would the conscientious Marshall have absented himself from his post virtually the entire morning of that terribly important Sunday--on his own? Richardson did not think so. On the contrary, the rest of his life he believed that FDR wanted an attack of some kind to launch us into the war, and that Marshall held the key. But when FDR "realized the extent of the damage done by the attack on Pearl Harbor, he lost his nerve and (ran for cover)."

General MacArthur's USAFFE was created on 26 July 1941 when President Roosevelt called the Philippine armed forces into the service of the United States. Initially this force consisted only of the relatively small U.S. Army garrison on Corregidor, augmented by the Philippine Constabulary (the army of the autonomous but not yet fully independent Philippines), and other U.S. Army forces in the archipelago. MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935, already personally wealthy, was now politically powerful as well. As Field Marshall of the Philippine Army he had a fabulous apartment at the top of the storied Manila Hotel, supplied and staffed by the Philippine government, from which he carried out his administrative duties. Although the U.S. Army might have selected someone other than a flamboyant and ambitious retired general, even a former chief of staff, for the post of Commanding General of the USAFFE, Roosevelt picked MacArthur, a choice from which there was no audible dissent. He was guilty of far more dereliction than Admiral Kimmel when, 10 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, with complete knowledge that it had occurred, he permitted total destruction of his newly arrived air forces. He had, like Hart, been given Magic (it came in on a "purple" machine sequestered in his headquarters, and he and Hart were theoretically the only ones to see the messages). When orders came to save himself he protested loudly but did so nonetheless, along with, presumably, all those who had had contact with Magic. He had known FDR well for years, had been held over as Army Chief-of-Staff by Presidential order for an extra year after his term expired in 1934, and may well have contributed to FDR's political career, possibly by important campaign contributions, in ways known to no one else. The last point is speculative; the facts are that despite his failure at this critically important juncture he was continued as commander of the U.S. Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE), later appointed Supreme Commander Far East, and although the victory over Japan had clearly been won at sea, was given the honor of receiving the Japanese surrender. The sop to the navy was that the Japanese emissaries were obliged to surrender on board the U.S. battleship *Missouri*.

The records show that MacArthur was kept better informed than either of the Hawaii commanders. Moreover, he had the "purple" machine, that they did not have. Even so, and even after receipt of urgent messages from Hawaii and Washington describing the bombing that had taken place at Pearl Harbor, he remained indecisive. At dawn in the Philippines, many hours after the war had begun, his Army Air Corps commander, General Brereton, sent up some fighter planes from Clark Field on a patrol mission. This was in the early morning of 8 December, east longitude time. By some accounts the first attack on the Philippine mainland had already taken place, at Baguio, in the hills north of Manila, but the Army Air Corps fliers found no enemy planes, and returned to Clark Field to await further orders. No such further orders came, although Brereton begged for them several times.

The principal attack by Formosa-based Japanese bombers and fighters arrived over Clark Field several hours later. In their reports, the Japanese fliers expressed amazement at finding virtually the entire force of U.S. fighter and bomber planes in the Philippines, lined up neatly on the ground, not even in revetments for protection against ground strafing. Nearly all these so valuable aircraft, some of them just arrived and brand new, were destroyed. Some were shot down while desperately attempting to take off under the sudden emergency. Irreplaceable Army Air Corps fliers, some who had just arrived in the Philippines, lost their lives in this debacle.

With the sudden ascendancy of air power in 1941, the loss of most of the aircraft and trained fliers available to defend the Philippines and the Asiatic Fleet was a more severe blow to the United States than the loss of the Pacific Fleet battle line half a day earlier. Historians are united in laying the blame for this at MacArthur's door. How he could have been so derelict has never been satisfactorily explained.

The word "revisionist" has become an epithet these days. An individual who wants to change how history is viewed is called a "revisionist," with the connotation that anyone challenging the established perception is automatically wrong. There is something, all the same, to be said for those who look at things a little differently. One does not, for example, have to damn President Franklin Roosevelt for believing the United States must get into World War II to stop Nazi Germany. He felt this was vitally important, and the judgment of history supports him. Winston Churchill, with a much less complicated agenda, worked hard for the same, and was an international hero because of it. It is hard to be objective about the greater good of mankind in general when the immediate effects on oneself are bad, but it is also hard to conceive of what the world would be like had Hitler and his Nazis won that war. Roosevelt undoubtedly felt that he must at all costs weigh in on the side of a free Europe, and that failure to do so, in good time, would in the long run be disastrous to freedom and civilization. We cannot disagree with that assessment today.

None of Japan's recent aggression on the nearby mainland of Asia had caused the United States to do more than protest. Even the deliberate sinking of the USS PANAY in 1937 produced only a momentary flap. In 1941, however, with less apparent provocation, the U.S. began to freeze Japanese assets and threaten her oil supply. To any student of our diplomatic posture in that year, it must be clear that pressure of this sort, against a militant nation like Japan, could produce only one outcome: hostility immediately, war if persisted in. Since Roosevelt's major concern was Europe, choice of this particular time to push Japan toward war might seem illogical, until the thought strikes that it might have been because of the need in Europe, and not in spite of it. His knowledge that he could now be kept current on the secret interchanges between Tokyo and its Washington embassy can only have encouraged him in this course.

Roosevelt and Churchill were talking frequently by trans-Atlantic telephone. They knew Japan's Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy had secret provisions for mutual support in case of war with America. They also believed any warlike move by Japan into Southeast Asia would involve supporting action in Europe by the other Axis partners. No record of these conversations has come to light in America, and no historian has yet had access to Churchill's pre-Pearl Harbor files, but the ABC-1 (or ABCD) Staff Agreement of early 1941 is instructive. It declared the Axis threat in Europe to be the primary concern in the event of such a global war, and as we well know, that was how the war was conducted. When the conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill are finally opened, some of our questions may be answered.

Since we could break into Japan's codes, however, how could we have been caught so embarrassingly unalert at Pearl Harbor? As has already been said, for the answer it is first necessary to set aside everything in the deluge of detail except what bears directly on the subject. It was a confusing and complicated matter. Much of the data we see today

was under such heavy security when it was fresh that its accuracy, now, is doubtful. The motives of the participants are also suspect; self interest was not impossible, deliberate falsehood, for government secrecy or some other reason, not impossible either. And finally, it is important to go over everything from the points of view of the men on the spot at the time.

In the process, the sheer immensity of the material has been overwhelming. Investigators and historians have had to go over thousands--tens--hundreds of thousands of pages of testimony and personal narrative. To this must be added the known, and unknown, politics of the time. Now, however, half a century after the event, most of all this has been brought out, Magic has been exposed, and some of the political facts; so that others can be guessed. It is time we put aside the superfluous and concentrated on the significant. This is not an impossible task, but it cannot be done by a politically closed mind.

Here are the essential events as they took place; each is in the direct chain leading to our failure, and so far as possible, has been divested of immaterial detail. What follows is the kernel of what we knew:

1. Admiral Yamamoto spent a year planning the attack. He well knew how covertly it had to be conducted, and demanded the utmost secrecy from inception to execution. His precautions against accidental radio signals from the designated task force, the Kido Butai, extended to removal of transmitter keys from all ships' radios, because even an innocuous signal was subject to interception by direction finder stations that might wonder how it had happened to come from an area where no ships were supposed to be. He might also have expected the big movement of Japanese naval forces southward, into Southeast Asia, to dominate our attention. That move was no feint; but by accident or design, its secrecy did not compare to the absolute blackout imposed on the Kido Butai, both during its preparation and finally as it lunged eastward across the North Pacific. Yamamoto, who planned in utmost detail, expected the southern movement to attract all our attention, as it did. It would be the height of arrogance on our part to assume that the Japanese success could only have been due to our own failure. Admiral Yamamoto and his advisers had a great deal to do with it. Although they too suffered a little from Murphy's Law, on the whole they played their cards very well.
2. In 1941 The United States began to put strong pressure on Japan to stop her aggression in China. We froze Japan's assets wherever we could, and used our clout with England and the Dutch East Indies to threaten her source of oil to carry on the war. Churchill supported this all the way, and a diplomatic crisis resulted. Through Magic, our top officials knew Japan had no intention of complying with our demands and would instead move decisively, in force, into Southeast Asia.
3. On 5 November, Magic decoded a message from Tokyo to its ambassadors in Washington informing them that some kind of accommodation must be signed by 25 November. After that deadline, "things are automatically going to happen," Tokyo said. The Pacific commanders were not told of this. We now know that Yamamoto had selected 25 November as the day the Kido Butai would depart from its last staging port in the Kurile Islands.
4. On 19 November, Magic decoded what became known as the "Winds Code" message, announcing that in case of cutting of diplomatic relations, certain words relating to weather would be added to its daily plain language news broadcast. On hearing them, Japan's embassies were to destroy codes and secret documents. On our side, we welcomed the idea that the "winds code execute" might give us a few days of warning, and all saw it as an alternate source that could be developed entirely free of any connection with Magic, that fragile code-breaking secret. So all stations, Pearl Harbor included, were directed to keep a close watch for it. Although no official records can

today be found of such a message having been detected and reported as prescribed, a number of operatives have sworn before Congress that they in fact did exactly this. In his excellent book, PEARL HARBOR, The Story Of The Secret War, published in 1947, George Morgenstern wrote that such records did at one time exist, but he believed they had been deliberately destroyed.

5. On 26 November, the day after Japan's deadline (which, of course, Japan did not guess we had intercepted), our State Department sent Japan a formal demand to stop aggression on the mainland or face a total cutoff of oil imports from Southeast Asia. No word of this, nor of the coincidence in dates, was sent to the Pacific commanders.

6. A little later on the same day (26th), we read through Magic that in response to urgent requests by her two ambassadors to Washington, Nomura and Kurusu, the date after which "things were automatically going to happen" had been advanced to the 29th. No information about this was sent to outlying commanders. Hart and MacArthur were supposed to have picked it up on their "purple" machine. Turner, when asked, said there was also a purple machine in Hawaii, but this was not true.

7. Because of all this, on 27 November differently worded "War Warnings", specifying probability of an amphibious expedition by Japan to Southeast Asia, were sent to the Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific. Originally intended to be strongly stated, the warnings were so modified by cautionary language about secrecy and upsetting the public that all sense of urgency evaporated. Kimmel and Short responded routinely, and Washington was satisfied. On the same day, Washington proposed sending half of Short's fighter planes to Wake and Midway by aircraft carrier, and replacing the Marine detachments at both places with Army troops. This brought Kimmel and Short into extensive staff conferences that lasted a week and produced strong objections. The idea went no further, but it had effectively reduced the war warnings of 27 November to pro forma status.

8. From here on, events began to move very rapidly. On 1 December Magic produced a message to Japan's Ambassadors that read, "The date set in my message has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious... negotiations are continuing." The message concluded, "The above is only for your information." We evidently took them at their word, for our Pacific commanders were not informed of this ominous statement either. Official Washington, however, took it to mean that hostilities were imminent.

9. A few hours later on that same day, Magic decoded a message directing Japan's embassies and overseas consular offices to destroy their codes, secret communication systems, and classified libraries. This in effect made the "winds code" moot, but the Pacific Commanders were not informed. By previous order, their communication staffs were still wasting their time on maximum alert to detect a "winds code execute" signal that, according to the official account, never came.

10. Two days later, however, on 3 December, the Navy sent Kimmel two messages paraphrasing (for protection of Magic) Japan's 1 December order to destroy code materials. That the winds code was no longer of interest was still not mentioned. General Short received no such notification. Kimmel's staff did not note anything significant, nor did he think to check with the Army. This was a failure of magnitude on Kimmel's part, for which he and his staff were clearly guilty. In an unusual and elliptical attempt to give Short a "heads up" signal without crossing swords with Army Chief of Staff Marshall, who alone was empowered to issue instructions to outlying Army posts, General Miles, the Army Intelligence Chief, on 5 December radioed Colonel Fielder, Short's intelligence adviser, to "immediately contact Navy Cdr. Rochefort regarding Tokyo weather

broadcasts." Rochefort was Navy's top cryptanalyst in Hawaii, well known to Fielder. Colonel Rufus Bratton, second to Miles in Army Intelligence, claimed later to have suggested this most unusual message to Miles. Obviously very miscast in intelligence, Fielder did not carry out the order, even though it had come from his direct superior in Army Intelligence.

11. On 6 December came the climax. Magic decoded and translated a message informing the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington that a "very long" message in 14 parts, containing a reply to the ultimatum of 26 November, was being sent. It was to be put into "nicely drafted form" and held for a time of delivery to be directed later. This "pilot message," as it came to be called, reiterated again that although Japan considered all negotiations ruptured, the embassy was carefully not to give that impression. The U.S. had this pilot message in hand before it was delivered to the Japanese Ambassadors. Tension increased dramatically in Washington, but nobody told Kimmel or Short of this development.

12. A watch was immediately instituted for the 14-part message, and the first 13 parts were decoded as fast as they came in. It was instantly noted that the text was English, not Japanese, as heretofore. That no translation was needed was considered significant by the code-breakers most tuned into the Japanese scene, since this avoided possible error in an Embassy translation. The 13 parts did not come in sequence. When it was evident there was a delay in the 14th part, the Magic watch officers decided to send out the 13 parts en bloc and follow later with the 14th, which they expected to be of very high importance. Thus, by 9 p.m. of December 6th, the first 13 parts of Japan's reply to the U.S. ultimatum of 26 November were being shown to cognizant U.S. officials in Washington, along with the pilot message stating there would be 14 parts in all. There was no notice, however, that the Japanese Government had encoded this important dispatch in English, a fact of which none of our top officials was informed. Had they been, some of the intelligence-attuned officers in the circuit, Admiral Wilkinson or General Miles, to name the heads of navy and army intelligence, could hardly have failed to give them far more attention, not to mention careful scrutiny, than they in fact did.

13. Each service made its own Magic deliveries. Routine deliveries by Navy were to the White House, the Navy Secretary, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It being by this time rather late at night, the various courier drops had to be at local residences instead of government offices. The Navy intelligence chief, Wilkinson, that Saturday night happened to be giving a dinner party at his home. His guests included his opposite number in the Army, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, the Presidential Naval Aide, Captain J.R. Beardall, and two French naval officers. Excusing themselves from the others present, the highest intelligence officers of our two services thus simultaneously received the first 13 parts of this supremely important message before midnight of 6 December, and exchanged views as to its meaning.

Neither Wilkinson nor Miles saw anything special in the lengthy sequential bloc of messages in formal diplomatic language. By the pilot message they knew there was to be a final 14th part yet to come, but they had no way of knowing that, contrary to the usual practice, Japan had encoded this lengthy message in English, but in their code! The identification numbers our code-breakers always appended accurately indicated that the messages had been through the translation process, but not that translation was in fact unnecessary. None of the recipients remarked at the unusual smoothness of the language, which might have been a tip-off.

14. In the White House, meanwhile, President Roosevelt read the file and passed it over to Harry Hopkins, who was with him in his upstairs study. His duty aide heard FDR say to Hopkins at this point, "This means war!" Hopkins said, "It's too bad we can't strike the first blow, since we know their plans." Roosevelt said, "No, they must strike first!"

The corrected record of the Joint Committee shows that Roosevelt then asked the White House switchboard to connect him with Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations. When the operator reported that Stark was at the theater, he directed he not be paged, but that word be left for him in his quarters to call the White House. Surprisingly, according to all testimony, Roosevelt made no effort to call General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army.

15. It was illogical not to call Marshall, who was well known to be Roosevelt's principal military adviser. Nor is a convincing explanation made of the failure to deliver to the Army chief the first 13 parts of what must have seemed obviously a supremely important message (the Magic operatives thought so, at any rate, but they were not high on anyone's totem pole). Marshall testified that he could not recall where he was on the night of the 6th, thought he must have spent it at home in his quarters, and Sunday morning went for a long horseback ride where no one could find him. Much was made of all this in the hearing, but no satisfactory answer has ever surfaced. Marshall never explained his memory lapse.

16. The 7 December issue of the morning Washington Times Herald, however, reported that on the previous evening Marshall was guest of honor for dinner at a reunion of World War I veterans at the University Club on 16th Street, not far from the White House. It is possible that, like Stark, he found a call from the White House waiting for him when he returned home. Or, conscientious man that he was, it was not at all impossible for him to have checked in with the White House and discovered there might be need for his presence. Being but a few blocks away and fully aware of the critical Japanese situation, for him this would have been both logical and easy. For us it is speculative, but it would explain why Roosevelt did not place a call for him. There is good evidence (not ironclad, but the sources--one is Frank Knox--give identical accounts) that the Army and Navy chiefs of service, and Secretaries Stimson and Knox, joined Roosevelt and Hopkins in the President's study around midnight.

17. They had Roosevelt's copy of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese message, and a chart of the far Pacific Ocean areas (this chart still exists, bearing penciled notations of the locations of Japanese naval and troop forces on 6 December 1941). There were substantial reports of movements of such forces, and it appeared certain that Japan would soon make a dramatic strike in the Southeast Asia area, probably in the area of the most accessible oil. Yamamoto, if he had indeed planned it this way, had succeeded in focusing the attention of our leadership away from Pearl Harbor. Stimson and Marshall, as well as Roosevelt, reportedly said several times that hostilities in Southeast Asia would put us into the war, and we must "make sure the Japs strike first." The White House vigil lasted until nearly four in the morning, ending when it appeared the 14th part of the long Japanese reply was not to be forthcoming. Roosevelt, it can be surmised, doubtless enjoined those present to "forget about this meeting" and had gate, housekeeping, and secret service logs expunged.

18. Like Marshall, Admiral Stark also forgot that he had been called by the President on that momentous night, but for him forgetfulness was less easy because his memory was unexpectedly refreshed. The Starks had taken a house guest and his wife (Commander Harold Frick, a former aide with whom he had maintained an abiding friendship) to the theater. The CNO told of this in his testimony, but made no mention of a White House call. After the hearing, Frick privately reminded him that when they returned to the CNO's quarters (the same house now assigned to the Vice President), the duty steward reported the call, and Stark excused himself to return it. Faced with this new evidence, the CNO immediately wrote a longhand letter to the Joint Committee chairman, asking to correct his testimony, and a special meeting, with only a few committee members present and all objecting to the short notice, was held for him. He told of the call, but was not

asked whether he returned it, nor about the substance of his talk with the President, if there was one. No such embarrassment developed with Marshall, whose own memory lapse was neither explained nor corrected.

19. The 14th part was delivered from the code-breakers about midnight to Lieutenant Colonel Dusenbury, assistant to Bratton. Bratton had directed him to wait for it and upon receipt have it delivered to the Army Chief of Staff. The tone of the 14th part was sharper than any of the previous 13, but did not seem sensational to the tired Dusenbury, who made no effort to show it to anyone, simply put it on top of the file, designated a copy for Navy in accordance with procedure, and secured the office. At 0730 Sunday morning, 7 December, Colonel Bratton arrived, read the assembled 14-part message, "blew his stack" at Dusenbury for not following orders, but decided it was "the formal statement" of what they already knew, and not earth-shaking after all. Despite displeasure with his assistant for not having tried to get it to Marshall the previous midnight, now that the morning had arrived he decided routine distribution was adequate. At this moment, Bratton later testified, he was handed the message stipulating that the Japanese Ambassadors formally deliver their country's long response to the Secretary of State at one pm that same day. Like the pilot message, but unlike all 14 parts of the principal message, the delivery message was in Japanese and had needed translation. Bratton was not privy to the motives and objectives swirling in the minds of the men conducting our top-level international diplomacy, but he did see something in Japan's juxtaposition of English and Japanese in this way. It was clear matters of importance were in the wind. He saw no potential threat to Pearl Harbor, but the emphasis on time hinted at an attack somewhere in the Pacific. That, and the use of English in the main message, galvanized Bratton into action.

20. After his final deliveries on the night of the 6th, the Navy courier, LCdr. Kramer by name, who was also the Navy's top Japanese translator, had a few hours of sleep and returned to work at 0730 of the 7th. There he found his copy of the 14-part message left for him by Dusenbury, and immediately made folders for the White House, the State Department, and Admiral Wilkinson. (Wilkinson, he knew, would take care of deliveries to Stark and Knox.) His three office drops being only a few blocks apart, he walked the entire distance. When he got back to the Navy Department he found the delivery message waiting for him and, like Bratton, saw it must have special significance. On his own, he decided that it should be delivered at once. While more folders were prepared, he made a time chart of the Pacific, noted that one p.m. (1300) in Washington would be 0730 Sunday morning in Hawaii, and made the mental observation that this was just the time the big ships would be serving their crews a leisurely Sunday breakfast.

21. Gordon Prange's account (AT DAWN WE SLEPT) is superior to all others at this point, but only John Toland, in INFAMY, reports the White House vigil. Morgenstern refers to it inferentially in 1947 (he had heard of it but could not record it as fact), and mention of it is notably made in two personal letters by third parties. All other reviews of what happened at this extraordinary time simply accept the Army Chief of Staff's vague statement that he believed he was at home all night (despite the Washington Times Herald story), and that he went for a ride on horseback next morning when it would seem the whole Army was looking for him. All also agree that Stark arrived in his Main Navy office not long after 0800 on that Sunday morning (but ascribe no reason why he was there and not on a golf course somewhere, or even sleeping late on Sunday morning) and met with his intelligence chief, Admiral Wilkinson, and the latter's assistant, Commander Arthur McCollum, who were waiting with the complete 14-part message in Kramer's folder. A discussion over its meaning took place that lasted long enough for the courier/translator to finish his first set of walking courier rounds. Kramer's second trip to the CNO's office, occasioned by the delivery message, gave him the chance to point out to these high officers that 1300 in Washington D.C. was half an hour before morning colors in Hawaii. Wilkinson at once urged Stark to telephone a warning to Kimmel.

22. According to Admiral J.O. Richardson, whom Kimmel had relieved in command at Pearl Harbor ten months before, this was the moment when Stark should have picked up his special scrambler telephone to make the call that would have alerted Kimmel at about 0300, as was his duty. Versions differ on just what Stark did; Toland says he picked up the phone, hesitated, then decided instead to call the President. When the White House operator said the President was busy, he did nothing further. Prange and Clausen say he tried the President first, then Marshall, but the Army Chief of Staff was not in his office. All agree that Stark did nothing as the last few hours in which minimal defensive preparations at Pearl could have been accomplished slowly evaporated. Richardson states he was positive there had been "some directive from higher authority" that only Marshall was to make such a call, but he believed Stark should have done it anyway, and he never forgave him.

23. Marshall finally arrived in his office around 1100. He is reported to have studied "with glacial slowness" the 14-part message his two highest intelligence officers, General Miles and Colonel Bratton, laid before him, almost as though he were deliberately killing time (Prange says he read it aloud). In the meantime the two Army Intelligence officers, with the crucial delivery message in hand, several times (Morgenstern says "frantically") tried to interrupt to call it to his attention. But Marshall, known for fearsome concentration and forbidding style, refused to be diverted. Finally, with the office clock showing nearly noon, he reached for it. Containing himself as well as he could, Bratton explained that "something was going to happen" at one o'clock. Marshall then wrote out a warning message, initiated a call to Stark (who had been waiting about two hours), rebuffed the naval officer's offer to have it sent by more powerful navy radio, added Stark's request that "naval opposites" be informed, and sent Bratton off to get it transmitted by army radio.

24. Army S.O.P. required then, and it still does, that important operational messages be sent by all means available, simultaneously. Marshall did not do this; nor did he place any priority precedence on his emergency message. In spite of Bratton's urgency, because of atmospheric difficulties the message for General Short therefore went by Western Union, with routine priority. It was logged out of the Army Message Center at 1217, only ten minutes before sunrise in Hawaii, but Murphy's Law was not done with it yet. In Hawaii it was simply one of several unimportant-looking telegrams given to a motorcycle messenger of Japanese descent who took shelter when the attack began. General Short finally got his warning hours after everything was over. In irony (it could have been nothing else), he meticulously carried out the only specific instruction it contained that he could carry out: he sent a copy to his opposite number in the navy.

As the foregoing summation shows, the failures in Washington were extensive. None can be proved to have been by intent, despite the accusations of the isolationist wing, which for years has been claiming Roosevelt connived at "setting up" our fleet in Pearl Harbor, but in cumulative effect they were devastating. Secretary Knox, when he saw Admiral Kimmel two days after the attack, upon arriving at Pearl Harbor for his hurried inspection, exclaimed incredulously, "Didn't you get the message we sent you Saturday night?" There were reports such a message was sent during the course of the early morning White House vigil which Knox attended, but nothing has ever been found to confirm this. The best guess in the beclouded circumstances is that General Marshall's hand-written message, sent at noon on the 7th, was the only one to which Knox could possibly have referred, although no one has suggested how he might have known of it.

Admiral Stark, on 6 December, is supposed to have commented that further warnings to the Pacific commanders might confuse them, since "We have sent them so much already." Whatever he may have thought, the record proves that no tactical warning whatever, and very little of what might be called "strategic warning," had been sent for

over a week to the men on whom the blow was about to fall. Morgenthau, with the benefit of all the hearings before him, including that of the Army Pearl Harbor Board which he quotes devastatingly, is very clear on this. As he points out, Washington knew well that something was about to happen, but all hands there, from the Commander-in-Chief on down, chose to do nothing until after the blow fell.

We see reference after reference to "subtle hints" the Hawaiian commanders supposedly received, including headlines in the Honolulu newspapers, into which they were expected to have been able to read more than anyone else, more even than the people in Washington, who had Magic and a hundred other sources of special information. In fact, the only actual warnings sent from Washington to the Pacific Fleet were the emasculated "war warning" of 27 November, and the 3 December notice that Japanese embassies were burning secret papers.

Not a single hint of the frenetic activity in Washington on the night of 6-7 December was sent out to the commanders who had the most right to know. One can imagine what either Kimmel or Short would have done had they had the slightest idea of what was going on in Washington during that weekend. Not one official in the Nation's Capital, not the Chief of Naval Operations, not the Army Chief of Staff, both of whom should have felt command responsibility for their men on the firing line, did what their duties required. Warning signs of all sorts were missed. All the administrative bosses were derelict, and when the blow fell they all took cover in the adage that "the blame falls on the captain of the ship." So far as any concept of human justice was concerned, this was a travesty.

The inequality of treatment is even more obvious when General MacArthur in the Philippines is added to the equation. Eight hours after he was notified about Pearl Harbor, he was nonetheless caught utterly unready at noon on Monday, 8 December, Philippines time. William Manchester in his outstanding biography of MacArthur, *AMERICAN CAESAR*, explains his failure as a form of "input overload," plus a misapplication of FDR's order that Japan should "strike the first blow"—but does not claim that this lessens MacArthur's responsibility, which of course it does not. Compared to the disgraceful treatment of Kimmel and Short, MacArthur's preservation in command and later elevation to Supreme Commander stand in ironic contrast.

In their new book *FINAL JUDGEMENT* (I disagree with both the title and its spelling) Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee have made it clear that the most important mistakes were committed in Washington, not in Hawaii. There was a veritable cascade of admitted errors in our national capital—and yet the authors illogically lay primary blame for the success of the Japanese surprise just where the discredited Roberts Commission placed it in 1941: on the Hawaiian commanders because they were captains of the ship.

The real captain, as we all know, was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and we cannot today question his judgment that it was imperative we get into the war against Hitler. He knew America would have to be aroused to a warlike frame of mind before Congress would act, and he finally sought to achieve this through a secret, murky, but thoroughly understandable diplomatic campaign on Japan. In this he was entirely successful, but unfortunately too much so; for Japan had its own agenda for a war with the United States, and an excellent admiral, Yamamoto Isoroku by name, to put it into practice. There is no doubt that Roosevelt wanted the United States to go to war against Nazi Germany, and that he thereby preserved the freedom of the world against an unimaginable coalition of evil. But he failed to foresee Pearl Harbor, and, as J. O. Richardson says, "ran for cover" when the dimensions of the Pearl Harbor disaster came clear to him.

The fact is, as a nation we are glad Kimmel did not get enough warning to get his battle force to sea—at least, as envisioned in War Plan Orange, which would have had it looking for a great sea-battle. Admiral Nimitz himself has been quoted as saying if that had taken place the ships would have been sunk in deep water with horrendous loss of life, instead of in the shallow waters of their base with only one-tenth the casualties, grievous

though they were. We actually wish only that Kimmel and Short had had just enough time--and no more--to have readied their anti-aircraft batteries to shoot back the moment the attack began. This would have been the best of all worlds, because we would not have looked so ridiculous on that peaceful Sunday morning. Clausen and Lee point this out, and they are right. They might have gone on to say that it was really our ego that was most hurt.

Whatever fault may be ascribed to George Marshall, his unexplained absence at the critical moment, his Promethean deliberateness during the last crucial couple of hours, his failure to make sure that all possible preparations for a situation that Washington knew was critical had been properly done--all this has to be compared to the tremendous role he has played in our country's history. He is rightly revered as one of the highest quality public servants this fortunate republic has ever had. This is the only blot on his escutcheon. There is no need to deny his responsibility. His back is broad enough to carry it.

The same can be said for President Roosevelt. He, too, failed at this point, but his reputation as one of our most effective wartime Presidents remains secure. To those who still feel he did wrong "getting us into World War II," what Europe suffered is the answer. We could not have stayed out of that war. It was the Armageddon of modern times.

Admiral Stark failed too, for not doing his utmost to warn the Pacific Fleet commander that war was about to begin. Although not punished in any way, and indeed decorated for his performance in his next assignment, he was nonetheless held by Secretary Knox and the redoubtable Admiral King to have "failed to exhibit the high qualities of leadership" required by his post. In his own defense he once very revealingly stated that his conscience was clear because everything he did was in response to orders from higher authority. Sadly for his personal reputation, he was not able to compete with all the pressures on him at this critical time.

It is easy to suggest the warning message that should have been sent, shortly after people in authority, driven on that early Sunday by the dire knowledge something bad was in the wind, began to gather at their workplaces. The moment the Japanese ambassadors asked for the meeting with our Secretary of State, the following should have been sent to all Pacific commanders by all available means:

THIS IS A WAR WARNING BEYOND ALL WAR WARNINGS. PRESIDENT U.S. SENDS. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AT ALL TIME LOW. JAPANESE EMBASSY BURNING PAPERS AND CODES, AMBASSADOR DEMANDS MEETING WITH SECSTATE TODAY, SUNDAY, AT ONE PM SEVENTH EST REPEAT ONE PM SUNDAY SEVENTH EST. SIGNIFICANCE OF TIME UNKNOWN, BUT JAPAN HAS HABIT OF SURPRISE ATTACKS. BE READY FOR ANYTHING. ARMY, NAVY, URGENTLY COORDINATE. THIS IS NOT A DRILL. REPEAT, PRESIDENT U.S. SENDS.

This, or something similar, received in Hawaii as late as an hour before the attack, would have done the job. It makes no reference to Magic, and so far as security was concerned, once the audience with Hull had been requested it might have been sent in plain language. But no message remotely like it was ever sent.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short are of course not completely guiltless of some degree of fault. Obviously, they lacked superior extra-sensory-perception. Obviously, they should have reacted better to the news about destruction of Japanese codes and cipher machines. That they did receive some subtle indication of trouble afoot is not denied, but they received less than anyone else, and had the bad luck to be standing where the blow fell. The national leadership, which had the obligation of keeping them au courant with matters of their concern, failed them utterly. To have expected them to be more knowledgeable than Washington, D.C., therefore more ready, is patently ridiculous.

For our own sake as a generous people, and to respect the ideal of individual justice on which our nation was built, we should at last officially recognize that they were not the principal ones at fault for Pearl Harbor, and not derelict in their duties. This is the growing realization in our whole country, except for those few who have not thought deeply about how Pearl Harbor could have happened. The finely woven tapestry of time has done its work, for now it is our national honor, not that of these two men turned into scapegoats, that is at stake. Do we believe in equity for the individual, or do we not? Will our country persist in vindictively holding these two as the persons solely at fault for Pearl Harbor, or will it finally do the right thing?

To restore their good names to Admiral Kimmel and General Short will cost us nothing, but doing it will symbolize something we hold very dear. The two officers should, by official action of the President, be advanced posthumously on the retired lists of their respective services to the highest ranks in which they served, as have all other officers in the war. They were never fairly tried, never given a chance to defend themselves. More than anyone in our history, they have been solely before the bar of public opinion--and that deep, finely ground judgment is already resounding, nation-wide, with the verdict that they have suffered enough in the service of their country. Ask anyone; take a vote; there are few dissenters. The suggestion to posthumously restore the ranks they once held is not comparable to a Presidential Pardon, but to the righting of a wrong that has gone on too long. Others also at fault, in some cases more so, were retired full of honors at their highest active duty ranks. Restoring the two final casualties of Pearl Harbor will heal a running wound in the national body. It is little enough to do, will cost nothing except a few drops of ink and a bit of compassion, and the honor of our nation demands no less.

Retired Naval Officers
5205 Leesburg Pike, Suite 200
Falls Church, VA 22041

October 22, 1991

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. President:

As part of the observances of the 50th Anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, it is fitting that our country rectify a regrettable injustice which has prevailed since that time. We refer to the unjust assignment of sole blame for the tragic attack to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Hawaii, and the resulting cruel stigma and humiliation to these officers and their families for the past 50 years.

Shortly after December 7, 1941 a Presidential Commission, chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, was appointed to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack. Reputable historians readily concede that the Commission conducted a hurried investigation, neglecting to review all available evidence and to obtain the testimony of many persons who could have provided substantive information. The Commission's report issued in January 1942 was critical of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, charging them with "dereliction of duty". Although subsequent investigations discredited the Robert's Commission's findings, the Commission's report and attendant publicity have been the major factors in shaping public perception and preventing official action to correct the unfair treatment of Kimmel and Short.

Shortly after the Robert's Commission's report was issued, Kimmel and Short were forced into retirement. Under U.S. law at that time military officers could retire at a rank no higher than the senior authorized rank, which in the case of Admiral Kimmel was Rear Admiral and in the case of Lieutenant General Short was Major General, both two star ranks.

Following the Roberts Commission report and his retirement, Admiral Kimmel repeatedly requested that he be tried by a Military Court Martial so that a full legal hearing in his case could be conducted with an opportunity

for him to testify under oath and call witnesses in his behalf. A court martial was never convened even though the U.S. Congress repeatedly extended the statute of limitations time limits at Admiral Kimmel's urging to permit this to occur.

Finally, due to Admiral Kimmel's continued entreaties, the Congress directed the Navy Department to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack and a Naval Court of Inquiry was convened in 1944. The Court of Inquiry cleared Admiral Kimmel of any improper performance with regards to his military responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. It is also significant to note that historical material which has become available in recent years irrefutably shows that Kimmel and Short were not provided information by their superiors in Washington which would have alerted them that an attack on Hawaii was imminent. We refer specifically to Japanese messages that were intercepted and decoded by both the Americans and the British.

After World War II, U.S. law was changed to permit military officers to retire at the highest rank held while on active duty, upon nomination by the President of the United States and confirmation by the Senate. For reasons never explained, neither Admiral Kimmel nor Lieutenant General Short were nominated for promotion, the only World War II officers not so advanced.

At this point in time no action by the U.S. Government can fully rectify the injustices to Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short. A partial atonement can be achieved by posthumously promoting these two officers to the ranks they held at the time of the attack, promotions to which they are entitled by law.

The following distinguished bodies have also passed resolutions recommending the posthumous promotions: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Foundation, and the Pearl Harbor Survivors' Association. Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations, sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense in July 1991 recommending the posthumous promotion.

We the undersigned retired senior officers respectfully urge you to nominate to the U.S. Senate Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN for posthumous promotion to Admiral and Major General Walter C. Short, USA, for posthumous promotion to Lieutenant General.

Very respectfully,

Thomas H. Moorer
Thomas H. Moorer
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

E R Zumwalt Jr
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

David H Bagley
David H. Bagley
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William F. Bringle
William F. Bringle
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Jeremiah A. Denton Jr
Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Charles D. Griffin
Charles D. Griffin
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

John J. Hyland
John J. Hyland
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Robert L. J. Long
Robert L. J. Long
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Frederick H. Michaelis
Frederick H. Michaelis
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Ulysses S. G. Sharp Jr
Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

James B. Stockdale
James B. Stockdale
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Waldemar F. A. Wendt
Waldemar F. A. Wendt
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William J. Crowe Jr
William J. Crowe, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Thomas B. Hayward
Thomas B. Hayward
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Worth H. Bagley
Worth H. Bagley
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Ralph W. Cousins
Ralph W. Cousins
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Sylvester R. Foley Jr
Sylvester R. Foley, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Huntington Hardisty
Huntington Hardisty
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William P. Lawrence
William P. Lawrence
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Wesley L. McDonald
Wesley L. McDonald
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

David C. Richardson
David C. Richardson
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Harold E. Shear
Harold E. Shear
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Stanford Turper
Stanford Turper
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Steven A. White
Steven A. White
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

James L. Holloway III
James L. Holloway, III
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Lee Baggett Jr
Lee Baggett, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Walter F. Boone
Walter F. Boone
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Donald C. Davis
Donald C. Davis
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Noel A. M. Gayler
Noel A. M. Gayler
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Ronald J. Hays
Ronald J. Hays
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Roy L. Johnson
Roy L. Johnson
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Kinnaird R. McKee
Kinnaird R. McKee
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Horacio Rivero Jr
Horacio Rivero, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William N. Small
William N. Small
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Maurice F. Weisner
Maurice F. Weisner
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Alfred J. Whittle Jr
Alfred J. Whittle, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

The Virginian Apt. 323
9229 Arlington Boulevard
Fairfax, VA 22031

The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Four Star Rank For
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN
(Retired) (Deceased)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I last wrote you on this subject January 23, 1990. At that time I told you that Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret) had informed me that you had asked for my recommendation regarding the efforts of the Kimmel family to restore four star rank to the late Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN (Ret) (Deceased). I wrote you that I had never had the occasion to make a study of the many complex issues involved in the Pearl Harbor attack and thus was lacking in information upon which to base a recommendation and requested that I be relieved from providing you with a recommendation on his posthumous promotion.

Since that time I have educated myself on the circumstances surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack and thus feel qualified to provide you with the recommendation you sought. It is my considered judgment that when all the circumstances are considered that you should approve this posthumous promotion and recommend it to the President. This conclusion reached not because of the importance of this matter to the Kimmel family but because of its importance to the Navy as an institution. The record is clear that important information, available to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, was never made available to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. While the reason for this has never been clearly established the fact is that it placed Admiral Kimmel at a severe disadvantage in not having the full picture upon which to base his estimate of the situation. I have always been of the firm opinion that those who decide not to furnish important information should bear the responsibility for that decision.

Lastly, the Naval Court of Inquiry, which exonerated Admiral Kimmel, concluded that his military decisions were proper based on the information available to him. I place great weight on the conclusions of the Naval Court because its members were Admirals of great experience and eminently qualified to pass on the propriety of what Admiral Kimmel had done under the circumstances.


Sincerely, Burke

Arleigh Burke
July 24, 1991

November 7, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD SCHIFTER
DONALD STEINBERG
SANDY VERSHBOW
NICHOLAS BURNS
MARTIN INDYK
STANLEY ROTH
SANDRA KRISTOFF
RICHARD FEINBERG

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RGB*

FROM:

JOSEPH SESTAK *Jes*

SUBJECT:

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT (NSSR)

The annual National Security Strategy Report is due on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year (approximately 6-7 February 1995). Our intention is to update the 1994 Report in view of the foreign policy accomplishments since its publication in July, while elaborating on the strategy which has guided this effort.

Attached is the "Integrated Regional Approaches" section of the 1994 Report. We ask that you update your respective region to reflect recent policy achievements and accomplishments.

Please pen in the recommended changes or use Windows' line-in/line-out format (available under the "Tools" menu by opening "revisions" and clicking on "mark revisions while editing"). A file containing last year's regional section is provided by E-mail. Your response is requested by 18 November.

Attachment

Tab I Integrated Regional Approaches section of 1994 NSSR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	1993 National Security Strategy Report. [Integrated Regional Approaches Section] (10 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [4]

2016-0152-F

vz4655

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

November 7, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES
SUBJECT: Deutch/Shali Memo Re: POTUS Speech at National
Defense University

At Tab II, John Deutch and General Shalikashvili invite the President to speak at the National Defense University (NDU) this fall. Information on NDU is included with the Deutch letter.

If you are looking for a venue for the President to address defense policy or national security strategy, NDU would be an attractive option. At the same time, though, it is important to note that the President has already given one speech at NDU (his July 19, 1993 speech on gays-in-the-military). In addition, our highest priority among already pending SPs for military-related POTUS events remains for the President to observe military exercises in Nevada and California. On balance, we do not recommend that the NSC submit an SP for an NDU speech.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward proposed reply to Deutch at Tab I, thanking him for his suggestion and advising him that we will keep it in mind.

Attachments

Tab I Reply to DepSecDef Deutch
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN M. DEUTCH
The Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the President to Speak at
the National Defense University

Thanks for your suggestion that the President speak at the National Defense University this fall. We will keep this in mind as the President finalizes his schedule. Our first priority among military-related events remains for the President to observe military exercises in Nevada and California.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



17 OCT 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak at the National Defense University

Shali and I would be delighted if you could find the time to speak at the National Defense University (NDU) this fall. NDU is the Nation's preeminent joint professional military education center and, as such, would provide an excellent forum for you to address the country's future leadership. Additional information on the University is provided at the Enclosures.

We are prepared to accommodate your schedule and to work with your staff to make the necessary arrangements.

Enclosures a/s

ENCLOSURE


THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The National Defense University is an educational and research institution under the auspices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its senior college components include the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and The School of Information Warfare and Strategy. The University's primary mission is to educate senior military officers and civilians in national strategy, national security policy and resource management. The student body is approximately 450 strong and consists of Army, Air Force, and Marine colonels and lieutenant colonels; Navy and Coast Guard captains and commanders; and equivalent level civilian officials from the executive departments and agencies. Approximately 25 percent of these select officers will ultimately be promoted to general or flag rank. In addition to the American students, there are 24 foreign officers called International Fellows.

The second part of the University's mission is executed by the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Nearly 50 experts in this institute conduct research and policy analysis for the Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant Commanders in Chief.

The University President is a senior military officer, currently Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF; the Vice President is a Foreign Service Officer in the rank of Ambassador. The incoming Vice President is Ambassador Arthur H. Hughes. This leadership arrangement continues the long tradition (since 1946) of close cooperation between the Departments of Defense and State. George Kennan, for example, lectured at the National War College during the academic year 1946-47.

Enclosure



National Defense University

*"We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world.
And the peace can only be maintained by the strong."*

--- General of the Army George Catlett Marshall

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 7, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *268*

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *G.*

SUBJECT: Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Report on
Civil-Military Integration

OTA Director Roger Herdman has sent you a copy of OTA's most recent study examining commercial-military integration. Project Director Jack Nunn recently briefed the NSC, NEC and OMB staff on the results of the OTA study.

The OTA study shows that greater commercial-military integration is possible and can be an important means of preserving important defense technologies and industrial capabilities during the defense downsizing. Although OTA says savings from increased commercial-military integration may be more slowly realized than some have previously predicted, even so, OTA estimates that cost savings of five to ten percent of baseline defense technology and industrial base spending appear achievable. Promoting greater commercial-military integration over the long term remains a central component of our defense reinvestment strategy.

The proposed reply to Mr. Herdman thanks him for the contribution OTA has made in analyzing commercial-military integration and potential strategies to speed its implementation.

Concurrence by: *G. Dault* Dorothy Robyn (NEC)

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the letter at Tab I to Mr. Herdman.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to OTA Director Herdman

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Herdman:

Thank you for your recent letter forwarding your Office of Technology Assessment report on "Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration: Technologies, Processes and Practices."

I appreciate that Mr. Jack Nunn recently previewed your report findings with NSC, NEC and OMB staff. I have noted your findings that continued emphasis on implementing commercial-military integration can achieve significant cost savings as compared to our baseline defense technology and industrial base investments.

Commercial-military integration remains an important part of our defense reinvestment program. I appreciate the contribution OTA has made in analyzing commercial-military integration along with potential strategies to speed its implementation.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Roger C. Herdman
Director
Office of Technology Assessment
Washington D.C. 20510-8025

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DIRECTOR

8909

Congress of the United States
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8025

October 26, 1994

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

I am pleased to enclose OTA's Report on *Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration: Technologies, Processes, and Practices*.

OTA prepared this Report in response to requests from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, as well as the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology. The assessment was also requested by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Armed Services.

Closer integration of defense and civilian technology and industry (termed civil-military integration or CMI), has been advocated as a strategy for meeting future defense needs. In analyzing the potential for such integration, this assessment considered the current level of integration, alternative policies for increasing CMI, the potential for increasing CMI, and the costs and benefits of the policies directed at CMI. The assessment found that greater CMI is possible, but identified no "silver bullet" policies that might easily achieve CMI goals. Some policies can have broad effects, but in most instances the barriers to CMI are sufficiently intertwined to demand a comprehensive (and complex) set of policies if the projected benefits are to be achieved. While the assessment confirms the potential for cost savings and increased technology transfer, analysis indicates such savings are likely to be less, and slower to be realized, than many previous studies have suggested. Even so, cost savings of even a few percent of total defense technology and industrial spending would amount to billions of dollars in overall savings that might be used to meet other vital defense needs. The most important benefit of increased CMI may be the preservation of a viable defense technology and industrial capability in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment.

I hope you will find the Report useful and informative.

Sincerely,


Roger C. Herdman

Enclosures:
Report Brief
Report

SEPTEMBER
1994



OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ■ U.S. CONGRESS

REPORT *brief*

Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration

America's national security and economic well-being have long rested on its technological and industrial prowess. Over the four-decade-long Cold War, as a result of changes in the acquisition system, differences in defense and commercial technology and the need for security, the nation's defense technology and industrial base (DTIB) became isolated from the commercial base. This isolation raised the cost of defense goods and services, reduced the Department of Defense's access to commercial technologies with potential defense application, and made it difficult for commercial firms to exploit the results of the nation's extensive defense science and technology investments.

The integration of defense and commercial technology and industry (often termed civil-military integration or CMI) has been advocated as a means to preserve the capability to meet future defense needs in the face of budget reductions. Under CMI, common technologies, processes, labor, equipment, material, and/or facilities are used to meet both defense and commercial needs. But concerns over possible costs and risks of modifying government acquisition to implement CMI have hindered change. Despite several initiatives to promote integration, much of the DTIB remains isolated.

This report assesses the potential for greater CMI, its benefits, and implementing steps. It considers three broad policy areas — policies to increase commercial purchases and practices, policies to increase integrated processes, and policies to improve operations in that portion of the DTIB likely to remain segregated. It uses case studies and microeconomic data to evaluate the claims for CMI and the implications of suggested policy changes.

Increased CMI is possible

Some CMI currently exists. (See figure 1.)¹ Increased CMI is possible, but requires changes in current government acquisition policy, taking advantage of technological developments, adapting technologies for both defense and commercial use, and restructuring the DTIB.

The growth of CMI depends on the extent of policy change. OTA's estimates of the potential

¹Estimates for figures 1 and 2 are for the private sector DTIB only. They are based on a macroeconomic examination of the DTIB and an industry survey of 16 randomly selected industrial sectors providing goods and services to national defense. Since the estimates are based on a limited industrial sector survey, they should be considered suggestive rather than definitive. OTA also used interviews, case studies, and analyses of selected industrial sectors to validate its estimates.

(Full Report with Steve Jones)

OTA REPORT *brief*

FIGURE 1. Current Facility-Level CMI in the Private DTIB at All Tiers

Source:
Industrial survey
conducted by the
Office of Technology
Assessment, 1994.





FIGURE 2. Potential Facility-Level CMI in the Private DTIB at All Tiers

Source:
Industrial survey
conducted by the
Office of Technology
Assessment, 1994.



Key:

Commercial buy: Procured from private facilities on the basis of a commercial market price.

Integrated processes: Procured from private facilities that predominantly use common processes for both defense and commercial goods and services. This sharing of processes might occur in R&D, production, maintenance, or administration. It might involve the use of common equipment, labor, management, or inventory.

Segregated processes: Procured from private facilities that have largely or completely segregated their defense work from any commercial work.

for increased CMI, based on significant acquisition reform and restructuring, are shown in figure 2.

Some technologies, industrial sectors and product tiers are more amenable to integration than others. Prime contractors performing systems integration on complex defense systems may have a limited ability to integrate production. Lower tier activities, such as production of components and subcomponents, appear far more amenable to integration. Services appear particularly amenable to commercial purchases.

Benefits

Cost savings and increased technology transfer are difficult to quantify. OTA's analysis, however, indicates that savings may be lower than some advocates have claimed. Implementation may be more difficult, and take longer to achieve, than many anticipate because: 1) integration is already occurring in many of the tiers and technologies most amenable to CMI, 2) change is more difficult to implement than many have anticipated, and 3) an important portion of the base may not be amenable to integration.

Still, even if the percentage of total savings from greater CMI is relatively small, overall savings could amount to several billion dollars per year. Possibly more important than direct savings, however, is that increased CMI can provide access to those rapidly developing commercial technologies in critical areas (e.g., electronics) that will be essential to defense in a more fiscally constrained environment.

OTA REPORT *brief*

structuring. Together they form a phased implementation of CMI. (See figure 3.) A Readjustment Strategy modestly increases CMI, but retains many of the current procedures for oversight of defense expenditures; thus both the risks and the benefits are likely to be relatively small.

A Reform Strategy builds on the foundation of a Readjustment Strategy and takes a more expansive approach to fostering CMI. It promises more benefits, but with a corresponding increase in potential risks.

Finally, a Restructuring Strategy might gain the maximum potential CMI benefits, but would demand major changes in future military acquisition policy, system design and force structure, and would present greater risks.

Issues for Congress

Congressional initiatives have been central to developing and pursuing CMI. Although DOD can unilaterally take important steps to implement CMI (e.g., move from military to commercial specifications and standards) Congress has an important role if the full benefits of CMI are to be achieved.

Should Congress wish to promote CMI while retaining strong oversight over defense expenditures, it could implement the Readjustment policies and stop at that point. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) provides the legislative basis for implementing the commercial purchase portion of a Readjustment Strategy. DOD's new policies toward military specifications and standards provide for the introduction into the DTIB of a modest amount of commercial innovation.

FASA provisions also appear to meet many of the needs for expanding commercial purchases

ORDERING INFORMATION

Congressional requests: Call OTA's Congressional and Public Affairs Office at 202-224-8241.

Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office for \$13.00 (200 pages, S/N 052-003-01384-1). Call GPO at 202-512-1800.

Orders placed at GPO generally take four weeks for delivery. For fast delivery, Federal Express service is available for domestic telephone orders only. The cost is an additional \$8.50 per order. Inquire for bulk quantities. There is no Federal Express delivery to Post Office boxes or APO/FPO addresses.

For information about other OTA publications, a free *Catalog of Publications* is available from OTA's Publication Distribution Office. Call 202-224-8998 or e-mail pubsrequest@ota.gov or write to: Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. 20510-8025. Attn: Publication Distribution.



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envisioned in a Reform Strategy. Increasing process integration, however, will necessitate a further reduction in the demands for cost and pricing data, and fewer government demands for rights in technical data. Congress has important interests in each of these issues.

The possible restructuring of forces included in a Readjustment Strategy pose significant questions. Congress may wish to examine possible force restructuring now, in anticipation of changes in the decades ahead.

Successful implementation of CMI will require a long-term commitment. Many CMI benefits will take years to appear. Patience and a steady effort will need to be maintained. Congress will want to monitor and evaluate results over time, and make necessary course corrections.

OTA REPORT *brief*




FIGURE 3. Building Blocks of CMI

Source:
Office of Technology
Assessment, 1994.

Implementing CMI will not be easy

This assessment identified no "silver bullet" policies that might easily achieve CMI goals. The complexity of the DTIB demands a diverse set of CMI policies. Some policies can have broad effects, but in most instances the barriers to CMI are sufficiently intertwined to demand a comprehensive (and complex) set of policies if projected benefits are to be achieved. Operations and Maintenance spending, for example, may be influenced by policies directed at increased use of commercial items and greater use of commercial practices. R&D, on the other hand, would be influenced by research goals that encompass both civilian and defense uses, and by modifying government requirements for rights in technical data.

Policies designed to promote integration are not free of either cost, or risk. One of the most discussed risks is that commercial goods and

services will fail in military operations. While this is possible, it need not occur — commercial products should not be used if they fail to meet performance needs.

A second risk is increased dependence on foreign goods and services. But there is no reason that increased foreign sourcing necessarily leads to military vulnerabilities. Further, potential vulnerabilities can be identified and managed.

A third risk involves a potential increase in fraud and abuse resulting from a reduction in government oversight. But most of the CMI alternatives proposed provide for continued (although different) oversight of government spending.

Strategies to implement CMI

The assessment outlines three strategies for consideration: Readjustment, Reform, and Re-

The Office of Technology Assessment is an analytical arm of the U.S. Congress. OTA's basic function is to help legislators anticipate and plan for the positive and negative impacts of technological changes.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 8, 1994

Dear Arnold:

I am writing to extend my heartfelt congratulations on your promotion to the rank of Brigadier General in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. As one who has served his country with particular distinction in both a military and a legislative role, you are an inspiration to all who know and work with you. I know General Mundy and Senator Nunn are enormously proud on this happy occasion.

Please let me take this opportunity to thank you and all your staff for your hard work and superb performance in assisting Senator Nunn in crafting the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act. As I told sailors on the USS Eisenhower at Norfolk Naval Base the day after I signed this important legislation into law, the bill helps ensure we maintain the best trained, best equipped and best prepared military in our nation's history and in the world.

Again, congratulations on your promotion.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill Clinton".

Mr. Arnold L. Punaro
Staff Director
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 10510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 8, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *260*

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *J*

SUBJECT: Letter from Lockheed and Martin Marietta
RE: Proposed Merger

Dan Tellep, CEO of Lockheed, and Norm Augustine, CEO of Martin Marietta, have written to you promoting the advantages of their proposed merger.

Last month Mr. Richard Cook, on behalf of the CEOs, requested a meeting with you and the CEOs to discuss the merger. The White House Counsel recommended against you, or anyone else in the White House, meeting with the companies on this issue, since it is currently under review at the Federal Trade Commission.

The Department of Defense should complete its review of the proposed merger and forward its findings to the FTC by the end of this month. Satellite and space operations are a principal focus of their study. The overall FTC review will continue into early next year.

Based upon the White House Counsel's guidance, we recommend that you acknowledge the Tellep/Augustine letter and inform the CEOs that you are aware of the current reviews and will await the findings with interest.

Concurrence by: Alan Kreczko *AK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the letters at Tab I to Dan Tellep and Norm Augustine.

Attachments

Tab I Letters to Mr. Tellep and Mr. Augustine
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Tellep:

Thank you for the recent letter that you and Norm Augustine sent to me regarding the proposed Lockheed-Martin merger. You argue the advantages of the merger for our nation's defense and competitiveness very eloquently.

I am aware of the Department of Defense assessment of the proposed merger now underway, as well as the antitrust clearance process undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission. I am confident that they will make a thorough and considered review of your proposal, and I will await the findings of the review with great interest.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Daniel M. Tellep
Chairman and CEO
Lockheed Corporation
4500 Park Granada Boulevard
Calabasas, CA 91399

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Augustine:

Thank you for the recent letter that you and Dan Tellep sent to me regarding the proposed Lockheed-Martin merger. You argue the advantages of the merger for our nation's defense and competitiveness very eloquently.

I am aware of the Department of Defense assessment of the proposed merger now underway, as well as the antitrust clearance process undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission. I am confident that they will make a thorough and considered review of your proposal, and I will await the findings of the review with great interest.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Norman R. Augustine
Chairman and CEO
Martin Marietta Corporation
6801 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda, MD 20817

October 24, 1994

The Honorable Anthony Lake
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th St. & Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Secretary Lake:

You are by now aware of the proposed Lockheed Martin Marietta merger of equals. The new company will be called Lockheed Martin Corporation; it will have annual sales of about \$22 billion dollars and will employ approximately 170,000 people. It will be a highly diversified, advanced technology company with core businesses in defense, space, energy, environmental remediation, electronics, and technology services, in both government and commercial, domestic and international markets.

The long-term result of this merger of equals will be a 21st-century company better positioned to benefit employees, customers, shareholders and U.S. taxpayers. Building on a solid foundation of technology and aerospace businesses, Lockheed Martin will have the critical mass and strength to more successfully compete in the global marketplace against well-supported foreign companies and transnational consortia. Our international sales alone will mean thousands of jobs in the United States.

Consistent with the Department of Defense's urging for industry consolidation, Lockheed Martin will be a streamlined, robust corporation with consolidated facilities, lower overhead and higher productivity. This merger will help maintain vital national research and development capabilities, strengthen the nation's high technology industrial base and deliver significant financial savings to customers and taxpayers.

In recent years, both companies also have expanded into related non-defense businesses. The merger will accelerate that movement, and the

The Honorable Anthony Lake
October 24, 1994
Page Two

combined company will derive almost half of its revenues from civilian and international business. So, while it will continue to meet our nation's critical defense needs, it will also help meet the challenges facing our cities, our environment, and our information age.

The Lockheed Martin merger is pro-competitive. Each business unit of the new company will compete against numerous, financially healthy, high technology companies. Our expanding presence in commercial and civilian sectors, such as information systems and environmental remediation, will enhance competition in these areas. Lockheed Martin will strengthen U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace of the 21st century.

We are confident that when you are briefed on the materials and issues we have presented to the Federal Trade Commission, Department of Defense, NASA and the Department of Energy, you will share our enthusiasm for this merger. We believe the arguments for this merger are compelling and urge your support so that its benefits to our customers, U.S. taxpayers, employees and shareholders can be realized.

Sincerely,



Daniel M. Tellep
Chairman and CEO
Lockheed Corporation



Norman R. Augustine
Chairman and CEO
Martin Marietta Corporation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 8, 1994

Dear Arnold:

I am writing to extend my heartfelt congratulations on your promotion to the rank of Brigadier General in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. As one who has served his country with particular distinction in both a military and a legislative role, you are an inspiration to all who know and work with you. I know General Mundy and Senator Nunn are enormously proud on this happy occasion.

Please let me take this opportunity to thank you and all your staff for your hard work and superb performance in assisting Senator Nunn in crafting the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act. As I told sailors on the USS Eisenhower at Norfolk Naval Base the day after I signed this important legislation into law, the bill helps ensure we maintain the best trained, best equipped and best prepared military in our nation's history and in the world.

Again, congratulations on your promotion.

Sincerely,



Mr. Arnold L. Punaro
Staff Director
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 10510

Monday
7:00 pm

Sandie :

We'll need to check on
this first thing Tuesday! Bob

USMC
Publicity
is
10th

former Name
members +
staff

FAX to
55112/69151 Col
Flynn

703-614-2500

FAX 703
697-7246

Sandie -

Note: we'll
need to FAX
a copy of the
Signed letter
to Gen Mundy
NLT than
next Weds
morning. Bob

9:10a.m.
11/8/94
w/ Podesta's (Pres) since yesterday;
Name will check w/ Podesta's office
& push urgently! WCB

3:40 p.m.
Tarned To Fran in Podesta's, who
Guaranteed Ltr would be signed before
Ceremony -- w/ Call Sandie after
Arrive when Ltr is signed."

49TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

DAILY SCHEDULE
Wednesday, November 9, 1994

Short Title [Agenda Number]

Plenary

10:00 a.m. Situation in Central America [42]
 Commemoration of UN's 50th anniversary [44]

(Informal consultations on Law of the Sea [35] are at 10:30 a.m.)

First Committee

10:00 a.m. Consideration of draft resolutions [53-66, 68-72, 153]
 & 3 p.m.

Second Committee

10:00 a.m. Sustainable development and
 international economic cooperation [88a-f, h-i]

Third Committee

10:00 a.m. Report of UN High Commissioner for Refugees [99]
 Social development (voting on resolutions) [95]

Sixth Committee

10:00 a.m. Attacks on UN personnel [141]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1994.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

ROBERT BELL *RB*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Letter to Brigadier General Punaro

On Wednesday, November 9, General Mundy will host a ceremony in the Senate Caucus Room in which he promotes Arnold Punaro, Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to the rank of Brigadier General in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Some of us have always thought Arnold acted like a "general," but now he will actually be one!

The proposed letter for the President's signature at Tab A expresses the President's congratulations for this achievement and for Arnold's continuing contributions to national security in his legislative role. General Mundy could read this letter at the ceremony, which I also plan to attend.

Concurrence

hcy
Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Letter to Brigadier General Punaro

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Letter of Congratulations to Brigadier General
Arnold Punaro

Purpose

To congratulate Arnold L. Punaro, Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on his promotion to Brigadier General in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Background

General Mundy will host a promotion ceremony for Brigadier General Punaro next Wednesday in the Senate Caucus Room and would be happy to read the letter at Tab A on your behalf. Arnold has been Senator Nunn's most trusted aide on defense issues going back two decades and has served as Staff Director since the Senator became Chairman in 1986. Arnold is a Vietnam veteran who received the Purple Heart for wounds suffered in combat during Marine Corps operations near DaNang.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Letter to Brigadier General Punaro

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Arnold:

I am writing to extend my heartfelt congratulations on your promotion to the rank of Brigadier General in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. As one who has served his country with particular distinction in both a military and a legislative role, you are an inspiration to all who know and work with you. I know General Mundy and Senator Nunn are enormously proud on this happy occasion.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you and all your staff for your hard work and superb performance in assisting Senator Nunn in crafting the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act. As I told sailors on the USS Eisenhower at Norfolk Naval Base the day after I signed this important legislation into law, the bill helps ensure we maintain the best trained, best equipped and best prepared military in our nation's history and in the world.

Again, congratulations on your promotion.

Sincerely,

Mr. Arnold L. Punaro
Staff Director
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 10510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1994

ACTION

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Concurrence: *hcs* Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

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Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Letter to Brigadier General Punaro

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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