

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Chron File - November 1994 #1 [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 377				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Jim Seaton. Subject: Significant Military Exercise NIRIIS 94. (2 pages)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise -NIRIIS 94. (1 page)	10/25/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief. [NIRIIS 94] (2 pages)	10/04/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. cable	re: Athens Mutes Reply to Agean Threats. (1 page)	10/26/1994	P1/b(1)
002. report	Foreign Travel Trip Report. (6 pages)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Lynn Davis et al from Robert Bell. Subject: Agency Views on CTB Verification. (1 page)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. cable	re: Conference on Disarmament: Supplemental CTBT Guidance, Part XII, on Verification Issues. (13 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/21/94 (11/27/94)

Dear Representative Livingston:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Livingston
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Hyde:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Skeen:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joe Skeen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Myers:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John T. Myers
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Young:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Lewis:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ron Lewis
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Cunningham:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Randy Cunningham
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Upton:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Fred Upton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jack:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John P. Murtha
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dave:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dave McCurdy
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Norm:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Norman Sisisky
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable G.V. Montgomery
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dick Swett
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Charlie:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Charles Wilson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Packard:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ron Packard
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Newt:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Zeff:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable William H. Zeff, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Walsh:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable James T. Walsh
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Callahan:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sonny Callahan
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Everett:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Terry Everett
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Armey:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard K. Armey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Quillen:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable James H. Quillen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Hefley:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joel Hefley
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Bunning:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jim Bunning
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Lewis:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative McCrery:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jim McCrery
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Clinger:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Walker:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert S. Walker
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Goss:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Porter J. Goss
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative McCollum:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bill McCollum
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Hastert:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Livingston:

Thank you for your letter of September 19 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs). I appreciate your interest in the Administration's efforts to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs and strategic ballistic missile defense systems while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.

During last month's Summit, President Yeltsin and I agreed that both the United States and Russia have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems and that we would work together in this crucial area on a cooperative basis. In this regard, we also took note of the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and instructed our respective delegations to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time. That said, I want to assure you that we are not going to rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs.

I look forward to working closely with you as we pursue the TMD programs required to carry out our national security strategy.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Livingston
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

*Pass 2 7653
8.5 x 11 paper
A zune*

Gray, Wendy E.

From: Gray, Wendy E.
To: Andreasen, Steven P.; Quinn, Mary E.; Kelly, Sandra L.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Additional Letters for package 7653 [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, October 20, 1994 5:40PM

Hi Steve, Sandy and Angie!

Both Mr. Lake and Ms. Brophy have approved the text of the letter in the subject package. I'll send you a copy of the letter and the diskette along with a copy of this note. Please prepare the letters as soon as convenient.

Thank you

The Honorable Bill Clinton--- September 19, 1994, ABM Treaty.

(Page 2)

The Honorable Bob Livingston

The Honorable John P. Murtha

The Honorable Henry Hyde

The Honorable Dave McCurdy

The Honorable Joe Skeen

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

The Honorable John Myers

The Honorable G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

The Honorable Dick Swett

The Honorable Ron Lewis

The Honorable Charles Wilson

The Honorable Randy "Duke" Cunningham/ The Honorable Ron Packard

The Honorable Fred Upton

The Honorable Newt Gingrich

(Page 3)

The Honorable William H. Zeliff

The Honorable Jim Bunning

The Honorable Chris Smith

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

The Honorable James T. Walsh

The Honorable Jim McCrery

The Honorable Sonny Callahan

The Honorable Bill Clinger

The Honorable Terry Everett

The Honorable Bob Walker

The Honorable Richard Armey

The Honorable Porter Goss

The Honorable James Quillen

The Honorable Bill McCollum

The Honorable Joel Hefley

The Honorable Dennis Hastert

1053

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515 34 SEP 20 P5:29

September 19, 1994

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you know, many Members of Congress strongly oppose any effort to expand the scope of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by introducing new constraints on the ability of the United States to provide effective theater defenses against missile attacks on our forces overseas and on our allies. Your Administration repeatedly has identified missile attacks as a serious and growing threat due to the accelerating proliferation of shorter-range ballistic missiles. For example, in May 1994 an interagency report on "Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities" placed wide-area/regional defenses -- particularly those with boost-phase intercept capability -- among the highest priority shortfalls in U.S. operational capabilities.

We are concerned that, despite this assessment -- with which we entirely agree -- your Administration is seeking additional limitations that would essentially foreclose options to test and deploy theater defenses against shorter-range missiles, both now and in the future. According to some reports, your summit meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on September 27 may be the occasion for completing the negotiations or even signing an amendment to the ABM Treaty along these lines.

We respectfully suggest that the agenda for such a meeting should instead be to build upon President Yeltsin's stated desire to collaborate in removing obstacles to the deployment of effective missile defenses. For example, in early 1992, Mr. Yeltsin announced that "We're prepared to design jointly, produce jointly and use jointly a *global security system* to replace the SDI system." This statement offers the prospect of moving swiftly beyond the ABM Treaty toward effective missile countermeasures, rather than increasing the already considerable impediments to realizing our defensive capabilities.

It is hard to imagine a more tangible -- or valuable -- demonstration that U.S.-Russian relations have genuinely emerged from the strictures of the Cold War than an agreement between you and President Yeltsin to replace the legacy of assured vulnerability to missile attack with a future of assured defense. We urge you to use the upcoming summit to create

new latitude to develop and field effective theater and global anti-missile systems and to reject any initiative that would further impinge upon the early acquisition of such systems.

Sincerely,

Bob Loring

Henry J. Hyde

John

John J. Myers

Buffy

Don Lewis

Blake Thompson

Fred

John P. Moore

Don McLeary

James

R. N. Montgomery

Phil Smith

Charles Wilson

Ron Packard

Nate Dineen

Wm H. Zang

Oliver Smith

John T. Walsh

Donny Ballou

Terry Everett

Dick Amey

James H. Quill
Ed H. H. H.

Jim Krumm

Jimmy Lewis

Jim McHenry

Bill Croyen

Bill With

Pat Jones

Ed McEllen

Jim H. H.

8759

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/26/94

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11/2

SUBJECT: MILITARY NOMINATION: BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN D. HOPPER, JR.

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	McGINTY	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	MYERS	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	QUINN	☐	☐
ICKES	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
BOWLES	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
RIVLIN	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BAGGETT	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	TYSON	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☐	WEBSTER	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
GRIFFIN	☐	☐	BELL	☒	☐
HALE	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
HERMAN	☐	☐		☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐		☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐		☐	☐
MIKVA	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Do you have any objections?

RESPONSE:

The National Security Council staff concurs in the attached military nomination. I am very pleased to note that General Hopper will be the first African-American to serve as Commandant of Cadets at the US Air Force Academy.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

Anthony Lake

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 25, 1994

94 OCT 26 P3:24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH:

THE EXECUTIVE CLERK *TK for*

FROM:

ALPHONSO MALDON, JR. *A. Maldon*
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

SUBJECT:

Air Force General Officer Action

Attached is a recommendation from the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommending you detail Brigadier General John D. Hopper, Jr., United States Air Force to the position of Commandant of Cadets, United States Air Force Academy under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 9333.

Your signature on the attached memorandum will constitute your approval to detail General Hopper to the position of Commandant of Cadets.

Recommendation

That you approve and sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



21 OCT 1994


MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend you detail Brigadier General John D. Hopper, Jr., United States Air Force, to the position of Commandant of Cadets, United States Air Force Academy, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 9333.

General Hopper, age 47, is currently serving as Commander, 375th Airlift Wing. He will succeed Major General Patrick K. Gamble, United States Air Force, who is being reassigned.

This action will not cause the Air Force to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of brigadier general. Your signature on this memorandum will constitute your approval to detail General Hopper to the position of Commandant of Cadets.



John M. Deutch

APPROVED: _____ DATE: _____
President of the United States

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 28, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN PODESTA

FROM: ROBERT BELL

SUBJECT: Assignment of Brigadier General Hopper

was
I am particularly pleased to be able to concur in ~~this~~
~~recommendation~~. Not only is General Hopper a member of the
particularly distinguished Air Force Academy Class of 1969 (!),
but also he will be the first Afro-American to serve at the
Academy as Commandant of Cadets.

*the recent action
approving the
appointment -
ment of
Brigadier
General
John
Hopper
as
Commandant
of
Cadets
at
the
U.S.
Air
Force
Academy.*

I am very pleased to note that General
Hopper will be the first Afro -
American to serve as Commandant
of Cadets at the U.S. Air Force
Academy.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8886

November 2, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Possible Military-Related Events for President in Hawaii

The following are provided as possible half day military-related events for the President in Hawaii on November 17th:

- Travel via helicopter to Bellows Air Force Station to view Marine amphibious assault demonstration and small unit training. Flight time approximately 30 minutes, to include quick tour of island. Event time approximately 50 minutes.
- Travel via helicopter to Schofield Barracks to observe platoon live fire demonstration. Should USSS object to live fire, as an option provide air assault training review. Flight time approximately 15 minutes. Event time approximately 50 minutes.
- Receive flight demonstration of C-17 aircraft, including trip to the "Big Island" for a touch-and-go landing, overflight of volcanoes on Hawaii and Maui. Flight time approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes.

After landing upon return from event, provide remarks to Press assembled at tarmac noting the readiness of troops or the contribution of new equipment to our national security.

Concurrence by: Joe Sestak *JS*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM:

JIM SEATON *JS*

SUBJECT:

Views on General McPeak's Proposals to Roles and
Missions Commission

At Tab A is a memorandum Bob Bell asked me to write reflecting my views on General Merrill McPeak's testimony to the Roles and Missions Commission. Bob asked that I forward a copy to your for your information. Though General McPeak recently retired as the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Air Force positions in the current roles and missions debate are not expected to change much under General Ronald Fogelman.

Attachment

Tab A Information Memorandum

November 1, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT BELL

FROM: JIM SEATON

SUBJECT: Views on General Merrill McPeak's Proposals to
Roles and Missions Commission

From a theoretical standpoint, General McPeak's briefing to the commissioners was intriguing. Of all the Services, the Air Force alone attempted to reconceptualize and to rethink tradition. This is something Congress sought when it asked the Commission to make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of roles, missions, and functions. This sharply contrasted with the other Services which sought primarily to retain the status quo and used the logic that what they are currently doing is working; therefore, it must be okay.

FOCUS ON BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

McPeak's primary argument centers on segmenting the battlefield into four distinct geographical battle areas: the rear, close, deep, and high battle areas, with no more than two services bearing responsibility for a battle area. [Rear: USA/USMC; Close: USA/USMC; Deep: USAF/USN; High: USAF/USN.] The argument posits that the modern battlefield is already segmented by a variety of conditions and we must doctrinally recognize these divisions in order to exploit the core competencies of the individual services. This argument is compelling, particularly when it is couched in the parameters McPeak used--as a way to limit redundancies and to respond to fiscal restraints. Yet, this is a managerial approach that de-emphasizes that which should be paramount--warfighting.

Creates Artificial Boundaries

Battlespace ownership introduces artificial boundaries into a dynamic environment where increasing complexity, fluidity and unpredictability reign. The spaces delineated by McPeak's boundaries require coordination, not Service ownership. To consign battlespace areas to individual Services flies in the face of joint warfighting. It permits Services to focus on that which they feel most comfortable with (or ideologically prefer) and neglects the synergistic and complimentary effects of "boundary overlap" (my term).

One potential consequence of such an approach is that a Service may overly emphasize countering similar type threats (threats which operate in the medium or battlespace where they predominate) and ignore or minimize efforts to support forces which operate primarily in other media or "battlespace" (to use McPeak's term). Similarly, assigning individual Services to select battlespace areas potentially limits military options. For example, the Air Force retains the deep battle for itself and the Navy, but the Army seeks to field the Army Tactical Advanced Missile System (ATACMS). General McPeak openly stated to the Commission that "ATACMS is a bid by the Army for the deep battle." Some Army officers suggest that this is in fact the case. But, by limiting the deep battle to one or two Services (using aircraft as the primary weapons systems of choice) potentially limits targeting choices (particularly if weather conditions preclude using aircraft).

The Air Force counter to my argument is that this segmentation or division of battlespace management does not limit options and is not an artificial creation. Rather, the division already exists. Its position is that the Joint Commander should delineate these divisions (not the Corps Commander as is currently the case), and that both the close (ground component) and deep (air component) commanders would have input into this decision. Thus, even if the ground commander sought to push screening or reconnaissance elements out into what is nominally deep battlespace, the Joint Commander could establish a close battle "bubble" around these ground elements.

ATACMS may be unnecessary on the future battlefield, as the Air Force argues. (The Army is buying relatively few systems and it does not have the precision terminal guidance features that PGMS have). Still, it seems to me that an attempt to exclude ground-to-ground missiles from deep battlespace is a form of technological determinism which has the potential to limit future development of alternative, currently unimagined weapons systems.

Ignores Positive Dimensions of Competition

This leads to another concern over battlespace segmentation. McPeak cloaked his arguments in two blankets which were surely designed to appeal to Congress and the Commission: eliminating redundancy, and operating with fiscal efficiency. He portrayed a military where individual Services focused on specific roles within certain areas of the battlefield. In shaping forces for these defined battlespaces, however, McPeak ignored the potentially healthy effects of inter-service competition for resources. For example, under McPeak's proposal, the Navy would never have been permitted to develop ICBMs. But, because the Navy was intent on capturing a share of the nuclear mission, it

developed what is probably the most cost-effective solution to the problem of survivable nuclear forces--the SLBM submarine force. Yes; unregulated competition can be expensive and lead to redundant capabilities. But, regulated competition can also provide unforeseen future developments. The Air Force proposal, as I see it, potentially limits these future warfighting advancements.

POLITICALLY UNWORKABLE

Each service has its own core competencies and emphasis. This was evident in each of the Service Chiefs' presentations; it was just more camouflaged in McPeak's. He led into his battlespace division proposal with the question: How should air and space be organized? He then laid out four key airpower roles: air superiority, strategic attacks, interdiction, and close air support. *Nowhere does this make mention of strategic or intra-theater airlift!* Thus, even though the Air Force presented its arguments in a novel fashion, it really was no different than the other Services, except that it offered to jettison a role it has never relished--close air support. McPeak proposed handing off CAS to the Army, as it is part of the close battle.

Major General Charles Link, the head of the Air Force roles and missions staff group, suggested in a recent telephone call that there may be marginal changes in some Air Force positions in the wake of McPeak's retirement, but his battlespace proposals really are the corporate Air Force position and will remain unchanged under General Fogelman. Link also suggested that General McPeak was perhaps not sensitive enough to other Services' views and failed to acknowledge the strengths they bring to bear in planning and fighting the joint battle. (Anecdotally, this is buttressed by comments from some ground officers that McPeak's view is: "What's mine is mine, and what's yours is joint.")

As I see it, these inter-service differences are largely a product of McPeak's personality and deep-seated Service biases. General McPeak took the offensive in the Roles and Missions debate and this angered the other Service Chiefs. Whether by some tacit gentleman's agreement, or a desire to minimize public disagreements, the other Chiefs sought to emphasize their strengths rather than focus on other Services. McPeak took a different tack and this is making for a more volatile atmosphere in the current debate. But there is also another element at play here. The Air Force proposal is grounded in airpower theory and doctrine--something the other Services neither understand nor really accept. While the Air Force does not argue that airpower can "win the war on its own," it does present airpower as a separate fighting arm that can independently shape the battlefield. This is conceptually difficult to understand to

those who fight on the ground. To ground commanders, airpower exists primarily to support the ground battle--to support the ground commander. The ground commander believes that whether the Air Force is fighting the close or the deep battle, its primary role is to shape the battlefield in order to create a situation that can be exploited by ground forces.

Because separate warfighting visions are in competition for future budgetary resources, public disagreements were bound to break out if any one Service took the Commission's mandate to heart and sought to redefine roles for the Services. General McPeak's style only served to exacerbate the situation.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Jim Seaton. Subject: Significant Military Exercise NIRIIS 94. (2 pages)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise NIRIIS 94

The National Security Council staff concurs in military exercise NIRIIS 94.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise -NIRIIS 94. (1 page)	10/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief. [NIRIIS 94] (2 pages)	10/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. cable	re: Athens Mutes Reply to Agean Threats. (1 page)	10/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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TO: LAKE

FROM: MCALEER, R

DOC DATE: 03 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JAPAN
AIR FORCE

KOREA SOUTH
DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRIP RPT OF SEC AIR FORCE WINDNALL

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 10 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ACKI
BELL
DANVERS
JONES
KRISTOFF
PONEMAN
ROTH
SEATON
SESTAK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 1/2/07
7016-0152-7

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9408980

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94110711 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	Foreign Travel Trip Report. (6 pages)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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8980

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

03 NOV 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel Trip Report

In accordance with established guidance, attached is a trip report by Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila E. Widnall on her recent overseas trip.

Robert P. McAleer
Colonel, USMC
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Sec Def Cont Nr. **X72350**~~SECRET~~UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT SHOULD BE DECLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For Lynn Davis et al from Robert Bell. Subject: Agency Views on CTB Verification. (1 page)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. cable	re: Conference on Disarmament: Supplemental CTBT Guidance, Part XII, on Verification Issues. (13 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November #1 1994 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4653

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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