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Folder Title:

Chron File - September 1994 #3 [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

266

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Lynn Davis et al From Robert Bell. Subject: Summit Follow-Up on START Issues. (2 pages)	09/30/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - September 1994 #3 [5]

2016-0152-F

vz4640

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1994

Cleaned
Telecom w/ Wendy
10/4 1430 7774

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *llg*

SUBJECT: Letter from GOP Senators Alleging Insufficient
Ammunition Issued to Troops in Haiti

Thirteen Republican Senators wrote, on the basis of a rumor first surfaced on the "Rush Limbaugh Show," to express outrage that our troops in Haiti were grossly under-supplied with ammunition. The reply at Tab A sets forth the true situation.

Once the letter at Tab A is approved we will prepare identical replies to the other signatories of the incoming.

Concurrences by: Richard Clarke, Bill Danvers and Tara
Sonenshine

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Reply Letters
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
Tab C USACOM Memo Detailing Ammunition Supply

Bob -
Please clear / ~~comment~~
ASAP comment
ASAP
Thanks
See

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUSAN BROPHY

SUBJECT: Letter from GOP Senators Alleging Insufficient
Ammunition Issued to Troops in Haiti

Purpose

To respond to a letter from several GOP Senators alleging that our forces in Haiti have been issued insufficient ammunition.

Background

Two anonymous callers to the "Rush Limbaugh Show" claiming to be members of the 82nd Airborne Division alleged that our soldiers were issued only 15 rounds apiece, less than 10 percent of the normal issue. This canard was picked up by several GOP Senators who exploited it by writing a letter which repeated the allegations and then releasing it to the news media.

The Executive Director of the American Legion informed the Office of Public Liaison that he was besieged by members worried by this rumor. The Division Commander of the 82nd refuted the allegation on "Rush Limbaugh" and the Pentagon effectively quashed it elsewhere.

The letter at Tab A puts the facts on the record and states your confidence in the work of our military unit commanders.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to GOP Senators
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
Tab C USACOM Memo Summarizing Ammunition Issued for Haiti

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Brown:

I have received your recent letter in which you and several colleagues allege that our forces were deployed to Haiti with insufficient ammunition. This charge is completely unfounded.

As the Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne and other responsible Defense Department officials have stated, 1.2 million rounds of ammunition were initially issued to the some 6,000 soldiers involved in the first phase of our operations in Haiti. Contrary to your allegations, individual ammunition allocations were fully in accordance with normal standards for soldiers operating in a potentially hostile environment. Grenades and other devices were issued and replenishment supplies have been delivered and distributed as necessary.

My guidance to the Department of Defense was to ensure that our men and women were fully equipped to perform their missions safely and effectively. Having reviewed their plans and preparations with our senior military commanders prior to the operation, I have full confidence that, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated, our military forces were absolutely ready to undertake this important mission in Haiti.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Hank Brown
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 22, 1994

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

We were outraged to learn today from Pentagon officials that some U.S. combat soldiers normally assigned to Ft. Bragg, North Carolina who are in Haiti are carrying only one clip of ammunition containing 15 rounds, the amount assigned to troops operating in "benign environments."

We are told that standard issue for the troops assigned to the 82nd Airborne at Ft. Bragg is 210 rounds of ammunition. In other words, U.S. troops are operating in Haiti in the midst of what has been characterized as an "extremely violent society" with less than 1/10 of the standard issue of ammunition.

We are told by Defense Department officials that these reports are true. We ask that you check into them immediately and rectify them if they are accurate. Please let us know what actions your Administration plans to take.

Sincerely,

Don North
Alfonse D'Amato
Lance Paulsen
Dick Kempthorne
Larry E. Craig
Hank Brown
Zell Miller
Jesse Helms
Terry Pruster
Mick McConnell

Bené T. Vel

Bird Trail

Front Left

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY *SB*
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached are copies of letters sent to the White House from several members of Congress.

Since these letters address national security issues, I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response. The letters are as follows:

- 1) Hank Brown (R-CO) and others, concerning Haiti; and
- 2) Newt Gingrich (R-GA), concerning the President's meeting with Yeltsin.

Thank you for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call LeeAnn Inadomi at x7500.

Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER IN
U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND
MITCHELL AVENUE
NOFFEL, VA 23061

22 September 1994
J3323/4-5636

From: Director for Operations, United States Atlantic Command
To: Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION ISSUED TO
U.S. TROOPS FOR OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Ref: Phone conversation between CJCS and CINCUSACOM, 22
September 1994

1. Reference directed XVIII Airborne Corps/JTF 180 to query all units that participated in Operation Uphold Democracy on the number of magazines and rounds of ammunition issued to service members.

2. Table 1 reflects the number of magazines and rounds per magazine issued to each service member, who was issued an M16A2 rifle, by major subordinate unit.

UNIT	Number of Magazines	Rounds/Magazine
XVIII ABN	7	30
82nd ABN	7	30
10th MT	7	28
JSOTF	7	30
7th TRANSCOM	7	30
COSCOM	7	30
NAVFOR/SPMAGTF	6	30

Table 1. Ammunition Issued to Service Members In Uphold Democracy

3. XVIII ABN/JTF 180 states that all units reported a minimum of six magazines/28 rounds per magazine were issued every service member assigned a M16A2 rifle as an individual weapon for Operation Uphold Democracy.

Buckley
Edward T. Buckley JR
COL, IN
J3A, USACOM

- 80-5216192

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

1 of pages 1

ADM. WILLIAMSON

From

COL BUCKLEY

RES-J3/CSR CHIEF

Phone #

USACOM J-3A

DAN: 223-5476

Fax #

14-00000-0000

1000-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

TOTAL P.01

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RAB*

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *J*

SUBJECT: Reply to The Wilderness Society on Idaho
Training Range

Mr. G. Jon Roush, President of The Wilderness Society, has written the President reiterating his organization's strong opposition to the establishment in Southwestern Idaho of a new bombing range for the 366th Composite Wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho (Tab B). The range, known as the Idaho Training Range (ITR), has been a subject of intense debate between defense and environmental interests, as highlighted in your August 23 memorandum to the President (Tab II).

Following a briefing by Secretary of the Air Force Widnall and Katie McGinty to Mr. Panetta on this issue, and John Podesta's September 16 memorandum (Tab III), the President agreed to an approach in which the Air Force will issue a supplemental draft EIS that will detail the recent, significant additions the Air Force has made to its mitigation plan (such as a no-drop, no-scar range in the North ITR). The supplemental draft EIS will undergo another 60-90 day public comment and result in a final ITR EIS in early 1995 (Tab III). The Administration will not take a final position regarding land transfer to establish this range until the EIS review process is complete and all views have been heard.

It was decided that Mr. Panetta would respond to the various inquiries to the White House regarding this issue. The proposed reply to Mr. Roush thanks him for his letter, and informs him of the Air Force plans to issue a supplemental draft EIS that will hopefully promote consensus in meeting our military and environmental needs.

Concurrences by: *EC* Eileen Claussen, Katie McGinty (OEP),
MS Mark Schaefer (OSTP)

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Mr. Panetta
 Tab A Reply to the Wilderness Society
 Tab B Incoming Correspondence
Tab II August 23 ITR Decision Memorandum
Tab III September 16 Podesta Memorandum

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: LEON PANETTA

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PHIL LADER

SUBJECT: Reply to The Wilderness Society on Idaho
Training Range

Purpose

To reply to an August 12 letter from Mr. G. Jon Roush, President of The Wilderness Society, reiterating his organization's strong opposition to the establishment of the Idaho Training Range (ITR).

Background

Having recently reviewed the issues related to the Idaho Training Range and the Air Force's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), you are aware of the intense debate between defense and environmental interests regarding this range. To allow time for all sides to consider recent changes to the Air Force's mitigation plan, it was agreed that the Air Force will issue a supplemental draft EIS that will detail the recent changes to the Air Force mitigation plan (such as a no-drop, no-scar range in the North ITR). The supplemental draft EIS will undergo another 60-90 day public comment period and result in a final ITR EIS in early 1995. The Administration will not take a final position regarding the land transfer to establish this range until the EIS review process is complete and all views have been heard.

The proposed reply to Mr. Roush thanks him for his letter, expresses appreciation for The Wilderness Society's efforts to preserve our environment, and expresses the hope that the Air Force's release of a draft supplemental EIS will help forge a consensus that will meet both our military and environmental needs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Roush at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to The Wilderness Society
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Roush:

Thank you for your letter explaining The Wilderness Society's opposition to the establishment of a military bombing range in southwestern Idaho. The President has asked me to respond to you regarding this issue.

This Administration shares completely your goal of protecting our nation's wildland heritage and we appreciate the environmental concerns you have raised. At the same time, we must ensure that our military has the opportunity to train as they may be called upon to fight.

In attempting to balance military readiness with Native American and environmental concerns regarding the proposed Idaho Training Range (ITR), the Air Force has developed a comprehensive mitigation plan to address potential damage to wildlife and sacred sites. In addition, the Air Force will continue to study alternatives that may further minimize environmental impacts while preserving military training utility. Because this entails significant modifications to the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and because the Air Force would like to fully consider other alternatives, the Air Force plans to release a supplemental draft EIS detailing these mitigations, for which there will be additional time for public comment. The Administration will not take a final position regarding the ITR until the public response has been thoroughly considered.

I hope that the release of the supplemental draft EIS and the ensuing public discussion will allow a broad consensus to emerge that will satisfy both our military and environmental needs.

Sincerely,

Leon E. Panetta
Chief of Staff to the President

Mr. G. Jon Roush
President
The Wilderness Society
900 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006



Staff

THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY

August 12, 1994

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Wilderness Society would like to take this opportunity to reiterate its strong opposition to the proposal from the U.S. Air Force to create a military combat and bombing range in the Owyhee Canyonlands of southwest Idaho. We urge you to reject efforts by the Air Force to publish its final environmental impact statement for the Owyhee bombing range and instead direct the Air Force to withdraw this proposal pending completion by the Defense Department of a national training needs assessment.

The potential fallout for the Administration from a decision to proceed with the Owyhee bombing range cannot be overstated. The effort to protect the Owyhees has escalated over the last several months to an issue of critical national importance to The Wilderness Society and other conservation organizations. Conservationists will view the actions on the bombing range proposal as an indication of this Administration's commitment to the nation's natural resource heritage.

The Owyhee Canyonlands comprise one of the largest undeveloped high desert ecosystems in the United States. Through sonic booms, overflights, on-the-ground activity and the bomb impact areas, more than 3 million acres of public land would be affected if the bombing range was established. The Owyhee Canyonlands include both candidate wilderness areas and wild and scenic rivers, and critical habitat for listed and candidate threatened and endangered species including the bald eagle, the peregrine falcon, and California desert bighorn sheep. Over 400 archaeological sites, some 5,000 years old, are scattered throughout the proposed bombing range. The Canyonlands still play an important role in the religious ceremonies of resident Native Americans.

Opponents to the range are numerous. Four lawsuits have already been filed against the Air Force and Bureau of Land Management, challenging the establishment of the bombing range. Idaho's Democratic candidate for governor Larry Echohawk has "grave concerns" about the range. Democratic Congressman Larry LaRocco has stated that the Air Force has not adequately justified the need for a new bombing range. Democratic candidate for Lt. Governor John Peavey opposes the range. The Idaho


President William J. Clinton
August 12, 1994
Page 2

Democratic party platform opposes a bombing range in the Owyhees. The Oregon congressional delegation, except Rep. Bob Smith, opposes the range. Senators Reid, Inouye, and Campbell recently sent a letter to you questioning the need for this range.

The Air Force has publicly stated that a new bombing range is not essential for the Mountain Home Air Force Base. During a recent federal court hearing on the proposed range the Air Force admitted the existing Saylor Creek Range coupled with other training ranges in Utah and Nevada provide adequate training opportunities.

The Air Force has never justified the need to establish a bombing range in the heart of one of the nation's wildest desert regions. In rejecting the Air Force's request to proceed with the bombing range proposal, a clear message will be sent that protecting the nation's wildland heritage is a priority for this Administration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Jon Roush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

G. Jon Roush
President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PHILIP LADER
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: EIS on Idaho Training Range

Purpose

To decide whether to allow the Air Force to release the final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed Idaho Training Range (ITR).

Background

The Air Force and the State of Idaho have been working since 1987 to expand the training range capability of Mountain Home AFB. Mountain Home is home to the 366th Composite Wing, comprised of B-1 bombers, F-15 fighters, KC-135 tankers and other "strike force" aircraft. When the Air Force determined, after extensive public hearings, that the existing Saylor Creek training range in east-central Idaho could not be expanded, Governor Andrus proposed in 1991 to exchange dispersed state endowment land in eastern Idaho for Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administered land in southwestern Idaho. This land exchange would create a state-owned range that would then be leased to the Air Force for its use. The land exchange requires the approval of both BLM and the State of Idaho.

Under the Governor's proposal, the Air Force accepted primary responsibility, in cooperation with other federal agencies, for the environmental analysis. The Air Force published a draft EIS in November, 1993, and received public comments through February 9, 1994. The Air Force now requests your approval to file the final EIS with EPA on September 2, with congressional notifications beginning on August 31.

Following the publication of the final EIS, the Air Force must by regulation wait at least 30 days before issuing its Record of Decision (ROD). In the case of the ITR, this 30-day period would be extended until Interior completes its land-use plan. If Interior approves the exchange agreement,

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

including any land-use amendments that may be required, the Air Force and Interior would then meet to develop the final ROD, which would incorporate final measures to mitigate environmental impacts.

In this context, then, issuance of the final EIS by the Air Force can be characterized as a critical, but not necessarily determinative, step toward a final decision on ITR. Since Interior could still stop the ITR proposal by disapproving the land exchange, there would be another "checkpoint" at which we could gauge reaction to the final EIS before deciding whether to take that next step.

National Security Considerations

Defense and JCS strongly support the establishment of the ITR. The CINCs consider the 366th Composite Wing to be our "premier intervention wing." In other words, if the United States has to engage in hostilities on the Korean peninsula or in the Persian Gulf, the fighter aircraft, bombers and tankers of the 366th will be one of the first, if not the first, Air Force units deployed. That obviously puts an enormous emphasis on readiness.

If the 366th Composite Wing is to be ready to fulfill its combat missions on short notice, it must constantly train. A special premium is placed on practicing large formation (up to 50-80 aircraft) attacks over a wide area against a notional adversary. This requires generating high numbers of training sorties, which in turn translates into high Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs. In the current fiscal environment, defense budgets at all levels, including at the unit level, are under enormous pressure. That means the Services, as well as each unit, must strive for maximum cost efficiency in meeting their O&M requirements.

The Air Force has concluded that if the Wing can conduct its training at the ITR (as opposed to having to have its aircraft fly great distances before they can begin their aerial training maneuvers), it can "save" 3,000 flight training hours annually. This translates into an annual savings of \$20 million.

If the Air Force cannot meet its readiness training requirements at Mountain Home within reasonable costs, there is a possibility it will be forced to relocate the Wing. Governor Andrus is convinced that the ITR is crucial to keeping Mountain Home AFB off future base-closing lists. If the Air Force decided the 366th must be moved, it would forfeit the \$50 million military construction (MILCON) investment already made in stationing the Wing at Mountain Home and incur substantial MILCON costs to build new facilities for the unit at a new base.

Environmental Concerns

The ITR proposal has prompted extremely sharp and determined opposition from national environmental organizations and such prominent supporters as Paul Newman, Joanne Woodward and Robert Redford. Teresa Heinz has been actively engaged against this proposal and warns that going forward with the final EIS will cost us dearly in terms of your base of support among

environmental groups and sportsmen's associations -- hunters, primarily (a not insignificant consideration given the crime bill). Tim Wirth believes issuing the EIS would be "political suicide" in terms of alienating pro-environment constituencies in the West. Katie McGinty reports a growing volume of calls from groups and private citizens opposed to the range and points out that the Idaho Fish and Game Commission has come out in opposition to the proposal.

Jack Gibbons believes publication of the November 1993 EIS would touch off a political firestorm that could discredit the Administration. He has only recently received supplemental EIS information from the Air Force that he has not yet had an opportunity to review. Jack notes that he cannot make a recommendation until he completes his review.

Environmental concerns have focused on a host of specific issues, including the impact on bighorn sheep in the area, noise levels, overflights of pristine canyonlands, road and infrastructure construction, and fire hazards associated with bomb drops. The ITR controversy has also drawn attention to the fact that the Air Force has been overflying these remote lands for the last 20 years, which in turn has led to sentiment among some environmental groups not only to deny the ITR but also to prohibit all low-level overflights in this area.

The Air Force believes that much of the environmental opposition to the ITR is based on the original plan for the range and that it has adjusted the plan in significant respects to address each concern that has been raised. For example, the area of land encompassed by the range has been reduced from 166,000 to 25,000 acres, low-level training routes over the Owyhee canyons have been deleted and the proposed target areas have been split to avoid bighorn sheep habitats.

As a final accommodation, the Air Force is prepared to accept a "no drop" rule during bombing runs over the range, though that restriction is not currently in its final EIS. Jack Gibbons, who finds fault with the EIS in its current form on several grounds, regards the "no drop" option as a particularly significant improvement. Jack urged Secretary Widnall to incorporate this prohibition in the EIS or at least insert a few sentences alluding to it. The Air Force agreed to follow this latter course in the final EIS and to reference as well the use of soft silhouette targets on the ground in lieu of hard, permanent structures. Interior believes the Air Force has satisfactorily addressed the specific environment issues on the merits but is very troubled by the depth and breadth of opposition to the ITR across the environmental community. If these groups maintain a solid front in opposition to the range, Secretary Babbitt will recommend that the land exchange not be approved by Interior, thereby stopping the proposal.

Katie McGinty opposes the release of the EIS. She anticipates very strong opposition to this proposal even if some of these additions are made to the EIS because the proposal would continue to recommend that the training range be located in the canyon area. She proposes that dialogue with the public be held first, and other site locations be more fully explored before releasing a final EIS on the grounds that it will be very difficult, or impossible, to overcome the strong negative reaction to the EIS, regardless of the intensity or sincerity of subsequent public dialogue in which we might engage.

To give the Air force a new, and significantly improved, baseline for engaging the national groups and explaining to them how far it has gone in addressing specific environmental concerns, Interior agrees with the Air Force that it is important to get the final EIS out on the street. If this dialogue fails to split off at least some of the national groups opposed to the ITR, though, Interior will vote "no" on the ITR.

Native American Concerns

A major issue in the ITR controversy has been concern by Native Americans over adverse cultural impacts on the historic homeland of the Shoahone-Paiute Tribes and aerial training over or near the Duck Valley Reservation in south-central Idaho. The tribes have raised the specter of "genocide" in public hearings. For its part, the Air Force has agreed to avoid flight below 15,000 feet over inhabited areas of the reservation and banned supersonic flight over Duck Valley at any altitude. Native Americans remain concerned that bomb drops at ITR could desecrate burial sites across southwestern Idaho, most of whose locations are unmarked and unknown. Adoption of the "no drop" restriction should ameliorate this concern. The Air Force has also agreed not to use ITR on days when the tribes conduct religious ceremonies at sites on the range.

Congressional Attitudes

The Idaho Congressional Delegation is strongly supportive of the ITR, though Congressman LaRocco (the only Democratic member of the Delegation) expressed serious reservations about the draft EIS in February. Senator Kempthorne has charged that the ITR is vital to our national security and accused the Administration of "playing politics" with the EIS out of deference to "politically correct" thinking among the "Hollywood pro-environment community." This line of attack has spilled over into the Idaho gubernatorial race, where Democratic nominee Echo Hawk has tried to walk a fine line on the ITR. Echo Hawk himself is strongly opposed to the ITR proposal. He reports that the citizens of Idaho want a training range in order to secure Mountain Home AFB, but do not want it located in the canyon area. Kempthorne has recently placed a hold on all senior DOD civilian nominations (six are currently pending) in response to the delay in publishing the final EIS.

Congressional delegations from states adjoining southwestern Idaho are in the main strongly opposed to the range. In some instances (Oregon), this reflects concern over overflights of the neighboring areas. In the case of Nevada, it is in part parochial in that existing Air Force training ranges in that state (e.g., Nellis AFB) will be more insulated against possible BRAC action if the ITR is denied. Senators Inouye and Campbell have also been strongly opposed to the ITR, reflecting in particular their concern over adverse impacts on Native American culture.

Congress as a whole has sent conflicting signals on the ITR. In the FY 1994 Military Construction Appropriations Act, the House and Senate conferees expressed support for the ITR and provided \$6.7 million to facilitate the range (though it "fenced" obligation of the funds pending certification by the Secretary of Defense that the ITR was required for training and readiness and consistent with the EIS). Last month, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a Reid amendment to the FY 1995 defense appropriations bill that would prohibit

expenditure of funds for the ITR until the Secretary of Defense submits a long-term land use plan and reports on the applicability of the "Engle Act" to the proposed land exchange. ITR critics, including Congressman Vento, see Governor Andrus' land-exchange plan as a deliberate circumvention of the Engle Act. The Air Force contends the Engle Act does not apply in this case and sees no difficulty in meeting the conditions of the amendment. Jack Gibbons recommends Justice review this legal issue.

Alternatives

During the past several months of White House review of the ITR issue, a central point of inquiry has been whether alternatives exist elsewhere in Idaho or nearby states. The Air Force has consistently maintained that insufficient airspace for large-scale composite wing aerial maneuvers is available from the FAA at other locations in Idaho. While the Air force acknowledges that more distant ranges in Nevada and Utah do provide adequate airspace, it emphasizes that the ITR will double the time provided for realistic "strike force" training compared to these existing ranges, assuming equal sortie length. Put differently, relying on existing ranges produces costs for this crucial training double those available through the ITR.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you decide whether to approve the release by the Air Force of the final EIS.

Approve Release _____ Disapprove Release _____

If you mark "approve" above, that you direct Interior to withhold final action on the land exchange proposal pending your review of the reaction to the publication of the final EIS and a Justice review of the applicability of the Engle Act..

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FAX TO:
GOB BELL
STEVE JONES
FROM: W. HALL
FYI

September 16, 1994

MEMORANDUM TO: LEON PANETTA
FROM: JOHN PODESTA *JP*
SUBJECT: IDAHO TRAINING RANGE

Since our last meeting on the Idaho Training Range, I've been discussing with DOD, the Air Force and OEP various options for moving ITR decision making out of the White House and back to DOD and Interior. We've explored several options. I'd like to bring one to your attention which I think has merit.

DOD is now prepared to forego issuing a final Environmental Impact Statement at this time and instead issue a supplemental draft EIS which would trigger another round of public notice and comment.

A rough time line for this approach would be as follows:

- 1) Next week, DOD would inform key State and Congressional leaders that they intend to issue a supplemental draft EIS (draft letter is attached);
- 2) DOD would finalize the supplemental draft EIS, containing the revised ITR plan during the month of October;
- 3) The supplemental draft EIS would be published for comment in mid-November;
- 4) The public would be given 60-90 days to comment;
- 5) DOD would review public comment and if it chooses to go forward, DOD could issue a final EIS in early 1995.

This approach has several advantages. It permits DOD the time and opportunity to convince opponents that criticisms of the original plan have been addressed. It helps quiet the Governor's criticism that we are stalling out on the project while keeping Attorney General EchoHawk's options open until sometime in early 1995. It mutes ITR proponents arguments that Democrats can't be trusted to keep the Mountain Home base open and jobs in place. Finally, it provides a final opportunity to study modifications, or alternative that can address the concerns of environmentalists and Native Americans.

Interior does not object to proceeding in this manner. OEP continues to have strong reservations about proceeding at all with the project, but does not object to taking this additional interim step.

I would recommend that we give the go-ahead to proceed with this plan.

cc: Phil Lader
Tony Lake
Jack Gibbons
Marcia Hale
Katie McGinty
T.J. Glauthier

DRAFT

USAF DRAFT

The post-Cold War era presents new challenges for our armed forces, making it necessary to refocus our defense posture. As our overseas presence declines, rapid mobility of our combat forces becomes an essential element of our national strategy. To rapidly project air power to a potential trouble spot we must have a highly trained expeditionary force that can quickly deploy anywhere in the world and be prepared to fight on a moment's notice. The Air Force responded by forming an air intervention wing, the 366th wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. In a future crisis, this composite wing will be the first to go, and if necessary, the first to fight.

If we are to ask the men and women of the 366th Wing to go in harm's way, we must give them the training they need. To fully realize the capabilities of the composite wing, they must train as they plan to fight. Facilities in Idaho today cannot support this type of training.

The Idaho Training Range (ITR) proposal is the product of an extensive public process to balance military readiness and environmental protection. By working closely with our neighbors in Idaho, the Air Force is identifying Native American and environmental concerns surrounding the location of the proposed range. In response to these concerns, we have developed a comprehensive mitigation plan.

Further, the Air Force will also continue to study alternatives that may further minimize environmental impacts while preserving military training utility.

Because these mitigations represent a significant modification to the proposal, and because we would like fully to consider other alternatives, it is important that we reopen the issue for public debate. To provide the opportunity for complete review by the people of Idaho, the Air Force will release a supplemental draft environmental impact statement (EIS) detailing the new comprehensive mitigation plan. The release of the supplemental draft EIS will initiate another round of public discussion designed to bring us closer to a solution that balances military training and Native American and environmental concerns.

The Air Force has enjoyed a strong relationship with the people of Idaho over the last 50 years. We intend to build an even stronger relationship for the next 50 years.


DRAFT

USAF DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7199



September 30, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*
 FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJ*
 SUBJECT: Reply to Representative LaRocco RE: Idaho Training Range

Representative Larry LaRocco (D-Idaho) has written the President (Tab B) stating "let's get on with" the decision regarding the Idaho Training Range (ITR) in order to resolve the concerns about environmental impacts and the operational need for the range. In his view many critical issues remain largely unaddressed. The ITR has been a subject of intense debate between defense and environmental interests, as highlighted in your August 23 memorandum to the President (Tab II).

Following a briefing by Secretary of the Air Force Widnall and Katie McGinty to Mr. Panetta on this issue, and John Podesta's September 16 memorandum (Tab III), the President agreed to an approach in which the Air Force will issue a supplemental draft EIS that will detail the recent, significant additions the Air Force has made to its mitigation plan (such as a no-drop, no-scar range in the North ITR). The supplemental draft EIS will undergo another 60-90 day public comment and result in a final ITR EIS in early 1995 (Tab III). The Administration will not take a final position regarding land transfer to establish this range until the EIS review process is complete and all views have been heard.

It was decided that Mr. Panetta would respond to the various inquiries to the White House regarding this issue. The proposed reply to Representative LaRocco thanks him for his letter, informs him of the Air Force plans to issue a supplemental draft EIS, and expresses our hope that the ensuing public debate will develop a consensus that will meet both our military and environmental needs.

Concurrences by: Eileen Claussen, Katie McGinty (OEP)
 Mark Schaefer (OSTP), Bill Danvers

MS

Can Draft

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Mr. Panetta.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
 Tab A Reply to Representative LaRocco
 Tab B Incoming Correspondence
Tab II August 23 ITR Decision Memorandum
Tab III September 16 Podesta Memorandum

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: LEON PANETTA

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PHIL LADERSUBJECT: Reply to The Wilderness Society on Idaho
Training RangePurpose

To reply to an August 19 letter from Representative LaRocco in which he says "let's get on with" the decision regarding the Idaho Training Range (ITR). LaRocco believes many critical issues remain largely unaddressed and urges the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process to continue.

Background

Having recently reviewed the issues related to the Idaho Training Range and the Air Force's EIS, you are aware of the intense debate between defense and environmental interests regarding this range. To allow time for all sides to consider recent changes to the Air Force's mitigation plan, it was agreed that the Air Force will issue a supplemental draft EIS that will detail the recent changes to the Air Force mitigation plan (such as a no-drop, no-scar range in the North ITR). The supplemental draft EIS will undergo another 60-90 day public comment period and result in a final ITR EIS in early 1995. The Administration will not take a final position regarding the land transfer to establish this range until the EIS review process is complete and all views have been heard.

The proposed reply to Representative LaRocco thanks him for his letter and expresses the hope that the Air Force's release of a draft supplemental EIS will address remaining issues and help forge a consensus that will meet both our military and environmental needs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Representative LaRocco at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative LaRocco
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative LaRocco:

Thank you for your letter to the President about the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) review process regarding the proposed Idaho Training Range (ITR). The President has asked me to respond to you regarding this issue.

This Administration shares completely your desire to move ahead with the ITR decision-making process. In attempting to balance the needs of military readiness with Native American and environmental concerns regarding the proposed ITR, the Air Force has developed a comprehensive mitigation plan to address potential damage to wildlife and sacred sites. In addition, the Air Force will continue to study alternatives that may further minimize environmental impacts while preserving military training utility. Because this entails significant modifications to the EIS and because the Air Force would like to fully consider other alternatives, the Air Force plans to release a supplemental draft EIS detailing these mitigations, for which there will be additional time for public comment. The Administration will not take a final position regarding the ITR until the public response has been thoroughly considered.

I hope that the release of the supplemental draft EIS and the ensuing public discussion will result in a comprehensive review of any remaining concerns and allow a broad consensus to emerge that will satisfy both our military and environmental needs.

Sincerely,

Leon E. Panetta
Chief of Staff to the President

The Honorable Larry LaRocco
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

LARRY LAROCCO

1ST DISTRICT, IDAHO

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS

AT-LARGE WHIP



7199
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(208) 667-2110

August 19, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing today to express views relating to the Idaho Training Range or ITR. The proposed training range is associated with the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Mountain Home, Idaho, and would provide additional training options for the Air Force's 366th Composite Wing.

The new training range would be physically located in the canyonlands of Owyhee County. Thus, the 25,000 acres that comprise the immediate range, and most of the three million acres that would be affected by training activities are within Idaho's First Congressional District, which I represent.

According to some press speculation in Idaho, the environmental impact statement on the proposed ITR may have been delayed to provide me with some unspecified political advantage. I want to emphasize, from my perspective, any decision on ITR should not be delayed. In plain language, let's get on with it.

It is my understanding there may be as many as 24 points of legal challenge between now and final approval. To delay undermines the integrity of the process.

The integrity of the decision-making process continues to be of great concern and importance to me. Whether actual or perceived, a failure of the process to engage the public, and to reflect the breadth and depth of public concern about the ITR proposal has figured importantly in the questions I have raised.

I have said repeatedly that if the process is sound, Idahoans have good reason to believe that the decisions it produces will be sound.

Having made these points about the process of the decision, I want to draw your attention to the concerns about the substance of the issue as expressed in the enclosed copy of a letter which I submitted as comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement last February.

Mr. President, these concerns remain largely unaddressed.

For example, one of my concerns continues to be the apparent lack of a standard cost-benefit analysis. No one would question the need for fighter pilot training, but the question remains whether the proposed ITR is cost-effective?

It seems fundamental that costs and benefits should be analyzed from local, regional and national perspectives prior to a decision on the ITR. To date, however, my questions about this issue have produced nothing more exhaustive than the enclosed seven-sentence response. It appears to conclude that the range will provide \$20 million per year of incremental benefit with no cost.

Similarly, ambivalence by the Air Force about the need for the new range continues. As recently as last week, spokesmen for the Air Force were quoted in the press as saying, "Nowhere does [a prior environmental impact statement] say the range was absolutely critical, was required for the composite wing." According to this account, the Air Force is formally arguing in federal court that "the wing can operate at a mix of ranges, such as the existing Saylor Creek bombing range, the Utah training ground or others."

When the Air Force states the ITR is both essential and unnecessary, the failure of the EIS to fully analyze the question of need is simply unacceptable.

My February comments also referred to a perception among my constituents that the Air Force had already reached a decision to build the range, and was now simply going through the motions of involving the public. You should know that of 2,033 Idahoans who have contacted me about the proposed ITR, 1,986 have expressed opposition to it, and only 47 have expressed support.

Mr. President, it is my belief that these points must be resolved. It is my hope they will be adequately addressed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, or ancillary documents.


Furthermore, I am deeply concerned that Mountain Home and the residents of Idaho are being held hostage to the threat of the closure of the Base. Mountain Home Air Force Base was reportedly rated by the Air Force as one of its top three fighter-plane bases during the 1993 round of base closures. It is in the center of a vast tract of uncluttered airspace. The weather is stable and suitable for air operations year-round.

Perhaps most significantly, Mountain Home Air Force Base has strong public support. Idahoans understand if trouble erupts on the Korean Peninsula or some other hotspot, the 366th Composite Wing would likely be deployed immediately. They are proud of this role, as am I. To threaten abandonment of such an asset if the proposed ITR is not built is illogical and counterproductive.

Finally, I want to suggest the time may be right for a comprehensive ecosystem analysis of Southwest Idaho as part of the search for a consensus among the stakeholders. If so, I want to offer all possible assistance for such an approach.

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Larry LaRocco", written over the word "Sincerely,".

Larry LaRocco
Member of Congress

Enclosures

LARRY LAROCCO

1ST DISTRICT, IDAHO

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS

AT-LARGE WHIP



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February 9, 1994

Brenda Cook
HQ ACC/CEVA
129 Andrews Street, Suite 102
Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2769

Dear Ms. Cook:

I am writing to express serious reservations about the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) prepared by the Air Force concerning the proposed Idaho Training Range. It is my understanding that the period for public comment on the DEIS remains open until today. With that in mind, I intend that this letter be made a part of the record.

The Air Force training range's target areas would lie entirely within Idaho's First Congressional District, which I represent. I am aware that debate over the proposal has become increasingly polarized. But I have never doubted that Idaho citizens would be broadly supportive if evidence showed that a training range in the Owyhee County canyonlands was needed to secure our national defense.

This question of whether the national defense requires the new training range has been central to my own inquiry from the beginning. In my view, the Air Force's failure to address this issue directly in the DEIS is so fundamental that it calls the document itself into question. In addition, it reinforces public perceptions that the results of an ostensibly public process have been predetermined by the Pentagon.

The inadequacy I seek to draw to your attention is rooted in a contradictory and extraordinarily confusing string of comments Air Force officials have issued about the need for the range. The comment of Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Michael A. Nelson in June of 1991 that "[e]xisting ranges are adequate to support training needs of the Composite Wing and other forces that will use them," may be one extreme. The other is perhaps represented by the recent statement of Air Force Secretary Sheila E. Widnall, as reported in press accounts, that "[i]t's crucial."

But the problem is most readily apparent in the failure of the DEIS to include a standard, cost-benefit analysis of how the

economics of training at a new Idaho range would compare, over time, to the economics of training at existing ranges in Utah or Nevada based on quantified needs, benefits and expenses. Without such a comparison, statements in the DEIS about the need for the range are little more than subjective conclusions.

On page 1-35, the DEIS identifies the need for an additional range as one of the issues raised during preliminary public input:

Commentors indicated that the need for an additional range should be established in the EIS. In many instances, the issue centered on a perceived contradiction with the policy of defense reductions. The comments also indicated that the Air Force should consider use of existing ranges in the region, such as the Utah Test and Training Range, as an alternative to developing a range in Idaho.

Nevertheless, on the same page, the draft includes the following statement as the first paragraph of the section entitled "Issues Beyond the Scope of This Environmental Impact Statement":

National Needs Assessment. A national needs assessment for training ranges and associated airspace is beyond the scope of this draft EIS, which defines the need for the proposed action in terms of mission and training requirements of the Composite Wing and IDANG.

The kind of training that would be carried out at the range is needed, and it is difficult to imagine pilots getting too much training. But are there viable, alternate ways of getting this training now? The Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR), for example, appears from the descriptions in the DEIS to be a place with the topography, size, and facilities to support realistic training for a composite wing based at Mountain Home. The proposed Idaho Training Range might be more convenient from a narrow point of view, but is it cost-effective from an empirical point of view? In my study of the DEIS I found no suggestion that current Composite Wing training is less than acceptable. The ITR would make it possible to train more often, but it does not follow that the absence of the ITR degrades our national security picture.

The DEIS makes a good case that the existing Saylor Creek range is increasingly limited as the training becomes more complex. But it leaps from that fact to a very general conclusion that becomes the premise of the entire draft study. This premise is that "additional assets" are needed to provide flexibility and realism "in support of mission readiness," and that these assets can only be provided for locally. The central flaw of the draft is that this premise is never seriously questioned. The DEIS does a good job of articulating the

advantages that would accrue to the Air Force and the Idaho Air National Guard if the proposed action is taken. But given that budgets are contracting, and the defense establishment itself is under pressure to adjust its expenditures to reflect a changed world, the absence of a section quantifying costs and benefits is glaring.

In short, the DEIS begins with an unsupported conclusion that the range is needed and then discusses the impact of various configurations in Owyhee County. It considers no alternatives to a range in Owyhee County. Its references to remote ranges are limited to perfunctory observations about the physical effects that additional ordnance and aircraft activity would have on areas already almost entirely degraded.

The failure of the DEIS to specifically discuss the effects of the range on sites of historical or religious significance to Native Americans is also problematic, but more understandable given the fact that until recently the information was being guarded by Native Americans as a precautionary measure.

By focusing on omissions I do not mean to minimize my concern about the biological impacts which the DEIS does identify. In particular, I am concerned about the impact of a range on the important bighorn sheep population in the Owyhee River Canyon. Since 1980, these sheep have been transplanted on a yearly basis from Owyhee County to other parts of the Great Basin region. In fact, the Owyhee County herd now provides the only potential source of transplant stock for this species nationwide, since export of California bighorn sheep from British Columbia was discontinued in 1991.

Catastrophic, all-age die-offs in bighorn sheep populations are well-known. They usually result from physical conditions known to exist in the Owyhee herd, coupled with external stress. The proposed training range obviously has the potential to increase stress. Under the circumstances, the Air Force's bare conclusion that bighorn sheep need to be monitored if the range proposal is implemented seems self-evident.

Still, the DEIS identifies this and similar specific impacts. If we move forward, it simply means that there has been a collective decision that the impacts are both justified and absorbable. At least that is what it *should* mean.

By contrast, the Air Force's approach has left citizens of Idaho believing that these questions are academic. There is a pervasive feeling that the Air Force has long ago decided the ITR is going to be built, and is simply going through the motions of involving the public. To put it more bluntly, many Idahoans feel they are being "slam-dunked" by the Air Force. The failure of the DEIS to address the most fundamental question about the range exacerbates this problem, be it perception or reality.

I have repeatedly expressed my support for the Composite Wing and its presence at Mountain Home. As the only military veteran in the Idaho Congressional delegation, I know the importance of a vital defense organization. I know the role that training plays in creating that vitality. I also recognize that the Mountain Home Air Force base is important to Idaho, and vice versa. With a significantly wider variety of facilities and capabilities than exist at a base housing a traditional wing, Mountain Home offers an extremely valuable home for the Composite Wing. It is located in the only remaining part of the country where comprehensive air training can take place, whether the planes' destination is the proposed ITR, the Utah ranges, or elsewhere.


It is not Idaho's sole responsibility to provide training for the federal military, but the state would certainly do so if convinced of the need. If the need does not exist, I believe that most Idahoans would agree that any surplus defense dollars could be better spent -- for such things as keeping cost of living increases to veterans on schedule, for example.

For reasons such as these, I have tried to keep an open mind. I have focused on doing what I can to ensure that the process of reaching a decision is open, fair, and genuinely public. To date, it has been troubling. I think, for example, of the blatantly promotional nature of the displays and information presented by the Air Force at the recent public hearings. Alternately, it is difficult for me to ignore the constituents' complaints that the Secretary of the Air Force, who will make crucial choices about the base, appears to have already made her decision.

In my view, public involvement that is genuine leads to good decisions. Decisions which do not reflect public wishes are inimical to democracy and ultimately poison their products. I urge you to consider, in that context, the numerous comments you have received about the DEIS. If the process is sound it is reasonable to have confidence that the decision will be sound.

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Larry LaBocco", written in a cursive style.

Larry LaBocco
Member of Congress

The number of sorties using the MOA that may practice low level (sometime during the flight) will increase; however, these flights will be spread over a larger area. Getting an exact and accurate count is not possible since low level may or may not be a necessary part of the events practiced on a particular sortie. Attached are comparison tables of sorties to MOAs and ranges. MOA figures include range sortie counts (Attachment 2).

QUESTION: Why were there separate EISs for the Composite Wing and the Idaho Range Proposal? Shouldn't there have been a supplement to the Composite Wing EIS? Why not? Provide time frame of the Idaho Governor's land transfer proposal in relation to the timing of the Air Force recommendation for the Composite Wing.

RESPONSE: A Chronology of Actions pertaining to the Idaho Training Range is provided at Attachment 3.

QUESTION: What is the impact to the Wing if the Idaho Training Range proposal failed to be implemented? How would it specifically diminish training and mission capability? How many more hours of actual training do we expect to gain?

RESPONSE: The Air Force estimates that by having a range that supports large scale, composite training nearer to Mountain Home Air Force Base, the Air Force could redirect 3,000 flight hours, currently used to transit to more distant ranges in Utah and Nevada, to local composite force training. The Composite Wing could use these hours to increase the number of graduated combat capability (GCC) events each aircrew receives during a training period. Practicing these events more frequently leads to higher proficiency and readiness. If the range is not established, the wing will continue to train to the highest possible standards that fiscal and physical resources allow.


QUESTION: What is the cost benefit of having the proposed range in place as opposed to use of more distant ranges for training?

RESPONSE: The Wing gains 3,000 hours of demanding (three dimensional maneuvers involving combat tactics) training time with no increase in operations and maintenance funding. Funding the additional sorties and flight hours needed to obtain the 3,000 hours of demanding training time on distant ranges would exceed \$20 million annually. The \$20 million figure considers the closest range (Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR)) and increases with more distant ranges in Nevada. Flying these additional sorties and hours would necessitate an increase in the operation tempo of both the aircraft and personnel. This increased tempo would wear out aircraft and maintenance equipment sooner and increases workload and stress on personnel.

Using the UTTR, every 0.8 hour of demanding training time requires 1.5 hours of non-demanding (transit, air refueling, takeoff/landing) training time. By using the proposed range, the Wing can add an additional 0.3-0.4 hours to a local sortie. Thus, the Air Force gains 3,000 hours of demanding training time increasing the frequency of individual training events, with the additional benefit of more flexibility in how the training is done.

We trust the information provided is useful.

Sincerely,



ERIK L. WINBORN
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief, Programs and
Legislation Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PHILIP LADER
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: EIS on Idaho Training Range

Purpose

To decide whether to allow the Air Force to release the final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed Idaho Training Range (ITR).

Background

The Air Force and the State of Idaho have been working since 1987 to expand the training range capability of Mountain Home AFB. Mountain Home is home to the 366th Composite Wing, comprised of B-1 bombers, F-15 fighters, KC-135 tankers and other "strike force" aircraft. When the Air Force determined, after extensive public hearings, that the existing Saylor Creek training range in east-central Idaho could not be expanded, Governor Andrus proposed in 1991 to exchange dispersed state endowment land in eastern Idaho for Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administered land in southwestern Idaho. This land exchange would create a state-owned range that would then be leased to the Air Force for its use. The land exchange requires the approval of both BLM and the State of Idaho.

Under the Governor's proposal, the Air Force accepted primary responsibility, in cooperation with other federal agencies, for the environmental analysis. The Air Force published a draft EIS in November, 1993, and received public comments through February 9, 1994. The Air Force now requests your approval to file the final EIS with EPA on September 2, with congressional notifications beginning on August 31.

Following the publication of the final EIS, the Air Force must by regulation wait at least 30 days before issuing its Record of Decision (ROD). In the case of the ITR, this 30-day period would be extended until Interior completes its land-use plan. If Interior approves the exchange agreement,

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

including any land-use amendments that may be required, the Air Force and Interior would then meet to develop the final ROD, which would incorporate final measures to mitigate environmental impacts.

In this context, then, issuance of the final EIS by the Air Force can be characterized as a critical, but not necessarily determinative, step toward a final decision on ITR. Since Interior could still stop the ITR proposal by disapproving the land exchange, there would be another "checkpoint" at which we could gauge reaction to the final EIS before deciding whether to take that next step.

National Security Considerations

Defense and JCS strongly support the establishment of the ITR. The CINCs consider the 366th Composite Wing to be our "premier intervention wing." In other words, if the United States has to engage in hostilities on the Korean peninsula or in the Persian Gulf, the fighter aircraft, bombers and tankers of the 366th will be one of the first, if not the first, Air Force units deployed. That obviously puts an enormous emphasis on readiness.

If the 366th Composite Wing is to be ready to fulfill its combat missions on short notice, it must constantly train. A special premium is placed on practicing large formation (up to 50-80 aircraft) attacks over a wide area against a notional adversary. This requires generating high numbers of training sorties, which in turn translates into high Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs. In the current fiscal environment, defense budgets at all levels, including at the unit level, are under enormous pressure. That means the Services, as well as each unit, must strive for maximum cost efficiency in meeting their O&M requirements.

The Air Force has concluded that if the Wing can conduct its training at the ITR (as opposed to having to have its aircraft fly great distances before they can begin their aerial training maneuvers), it can "save" 3,000 flight training hours annually. This translates into an annual savings of \$20 million.

If the Air Force cannot meet its readiness training requirements at Mountain Home within reasonable costs, there is a possibility it will be forced to relocate the Wing. Governor Andrus is convinced that the ITR is crucial to keeping Mountain Home AFB off future base-closing lists. If the Air Force decided the 366th must be moved, it would forfeit the \$50 million military construction (MILCON) investment already made in stationing the Wing at Mountain Home and incur substantial MILCON costs to build new facilities for the unit at a new base.

Environmental Concerns

The ITR proposal has prompted extremely sharp and determined opposition from national environmental organizations and such prominent supporters as Paul Newman, Joanne Woodward and Robert Redford. Teresa Heinz has been actively engaged against this proposal and warns that going forward with the final EIS will cost us dearly in terms of your base of support among

environmental groups and sportmens' associations -- hunters, primarily (a not insignificant consideration given the crime bill). Tim Wirth believes issuing the EIS would be "political suicide" in terms of alienating pro-environment constituencies in the West. Katie McGinty reports a growing volume of calls from groups and private citizens opposed to the range and points out that the Idaho Fish and Game Commission has come out in opposition to the proposal.

Jack Gibbons believes publication of the November 1993 EIS would touch off a political firestorm that could discredit the Administration. He has only recently received supplemental EIS information from the Air Force that he has not yet had an opportunity to review. Jack notes that he cannot make a recommendation until he completes his review.

Environmental concerns have focused on a host of specific issues, including the impact on bighorn sheep in the area, noise levels, overflights of pristine canyonlands, road and infrastructure construction, and fire hazards associated with bomb drops. The ITR controversy has also drawn attention to the fact that the Air Force has been overflying these remote lands for the last 20 years, which in turn has led to sentiment among some environmental groups not only to deny the ITR but also to prohibit all low-level overflights in this area.

The Air Force believes that much of the environmental opposition to the ITR is based on the original plan for the range and that it has adjusted the plan in significant respects to address each concern that has been raised. For example, the area of land encompassed by the range has been reduced from 166,000 to 25,000 acres, low-level training routes over the Owyhee canyons have been deleted and the proposed target areas have been split to avoid bighorn sheep habitats.

As a final accommodation, the Air Force is prepared to accept a "no drop" rule during bombing runs over the range, though that restriction is not currently in its final EIS. Jack Gibbons, who finds fault with the EIS in its current form on several grounds, regards the "no drop" option as a particularly significant improvement. Jack urged Secretary Widnall to incorporate this prohibition in the EIS or at least insert a few sentences alluding to it. The Air Force agreed to follow this latter course in the final EIS and to reference as well the use of soft silhouette targets on the ground in lieu of hard, permanent structures. Interior believes the Air Force has satisfactorily addressed the specific environment issues on the merits but is very troubled by the depth and breadth of opposition to the ITR across the environmental community. If these groups maintain a solid front in opposition to the range, Secretary Babbitt will recommend that the land exchange not be approved by Interior, thereby stopping the proposal.

Katie McGinty opposes the release of the EIS. She anticipates very strong opposition to this proposal even if some of these additions are made to the EIS because the proposal would continue to recommend that the training range be located in the canyon area. She proposes that dialogue with the public be held first, and other site locations be more fully explored before releasing a final EIS on the grounds that it will be very difficult, or impossible, to overcome the strong negative reaction to the EIS, regardless of the intensity or sincerity of subsequent public dialogue in which we might engage.

To give the Air force a new, and significantly improved, baseline for engaging the national groups and explaining to them how far it has gone in addressing specific environmental concerns, Interior agrees with the Air Force that it is important to get the final EIS out on the street. If this dialogue fails to split off at least some of the national groups opposed to the ITR, though, Interior will vote "no" on the ITR.

Native American Concerns

A major issue in the ITR controversy has been concern by Native Americans over adverse cultural impacts on the historic homeland of the Shoahone-Paiute Tribes and aerial training over or near the Duck Valley Reservation in south-central Idaho. The tribes have raised the specter of "genocide" in public hearings. For its part, the Air Force has agreed to avoid flight below 15,000 feet over inhabited areas of the reservation and banned supersonic flight over Duck Valley at any altitude. Native Americans remain concerned that bomb drops at ITR could desecrate burial sites across southwestern Idaho, most of whose locations are unmarked and unknown. Adoption of the "no drop" restriction should ameliorate this concern. The Air Force has also agreed not to use ITR on days when the tribes conduct religious ceremonies at sites on the range.

Congressional Attitudes

The Idaho Congressional Delegation is strongly supportive of the ITR, though Congressman LaRocco (the only Democratic member of the Delegation) expressed serious reservations about the draft EIS in February. Senator Kempthorne has charged that the ITR is vital to our national security and accused the Administration of "playing politics" with the EIS out of deference to "politically correct" thinking among the "Hollywood pro-environment community." This line of attack has spilled over into the Idaho gubernatorial race, where Democratic nominee Echo Hawk has tried to walk a fine line on the ITR. Echo Hawk himself is strongly opposed to the ITR proposal. He reports that the citizens of Idaho want a training range in order to secure Mountain Home AFB, but do not want it located in the canyon area. Kempthorne has recently placed a hold on all senior DOD civilian nominations (six are currently pending) in response to the delay in publishing the final EIS.

Congressional delegations from states adjoining southwestern Idaho are in the main strongly opposed to the range. In some instances (Oregon), this reflects concern over overflights of the neighboring areas. In the case of Nevada, it is in part parochial in that existing Air Force training ranges in that state (e.g., Nellis AFB) will be more insulated against possible BRAC action if the ITR is denied. Senators Inouye and Campbell have also been strongly opposed to the ITR, reflecting in particular their concern over adverse impacts on Native American culture.

Congress as a whole has sent conflicting signals on the ITR. In the FY 1994 Military Construction Appropriations Act, the House and Senate conferees expressed support for the ITR and provided \$6.7 million to facilitate the range (though it "fenced" obligation of the funds pending certification by the Secretary of Defense that the ITR was required for training and readiness and consistent with the EIS). Last month, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a Reid amendment to the FY 1995 defense appropriations bill that would prohibit

expenditure of funds for the ITR until the Secretary of Defense submits a long-term land use plan and reports on the applicability of the "Engle Act" to the proposed land exchange. ITR critics, including Congressman Vento, see Governor Andrus' land-exchange plan as a deliberate circumvention of the Engle Act. The Air Force contends the Engle Act does not apply in this case and sees no difficulty in meeting the conditions of the amendment. Jack Gibbons recommends Justice review this legal issue.

Alternatives

During the past several months of White House review of the ITR issue, a central point of inquiry has been whether alternatives exist elsewhere in Idaho or nearby states. The Air Force has consistently maintained that insufficient airspace for large-scale composite wing aerial maneuvers is available from the FAA at other locations in Idaho. While the Air force acknowledges that more distant ranges in Nevada and Utah do provide adequate airspace, it emphasizes that the ITR will double the time provided for realistic "strike force" training compared to these existing ranges, assuming equal sortie length. Put differently, relying on existing ranges produces costs for this crucial training double those available through the ITR.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you decide whether to approve the release by the Air Force of the final EIS.

Approve Release _____ Disapprove Release _____

If you mark "approve" above, that you direct Interior to withhold final action on the land exchange proposal pending your review of the reaction to the publication of the final EIS and a Justice review of the applicability of the Engle Act..

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

GOC BELL
STEVE JONES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FROM: W. HALL
FYI

September 16, 1994

MEMORANDUM TO: LEON PANETTA
FROM: JOHN PODESTA *JP*
SUBJECT: IDAHO TRAINING RANGE

Since our last meeting on the Idaho Training Range, I've been discussing with DOD, the Air Force and OEP various options for moving ITR decision making out of the White House and back to DOD and Interior. We've explored several options. I'd like to bring one to your attention which I think has merit.

DOD is now prepared to forego issuing a final Environmental Impact Statement at this time and instead issue a supplemental draft EIS which would trigger another round of public notice and comment.

A rough time line for this approach would be as follows:

- 1) Next week, DOD would inform key State and Congressional leaders that they intend to issue a supplemental draft EIS (draft letter is attached);
- 2) DOD would finalize the supplemental draft EIS, containing the revised ITR plan during the month of October;
- 3) The supplemental draft EIS would be published for comment in mid-November;
- 4) The public would be given 60-90 days to comment;
- 5) DOD would review public comment and if it chooses to go forward, DOD could issue a final EIS in early 1995.

This approach has several advantages. It permits DOD the time and opportunity to convince opponents that criticisms of the original plan have been addressed. It helps quiet the Governor's criticism that we are stalling out on the project while keeping Attorney General EchoHawk's options open until sometime in early 1995. It mutes ITR proponents arguments that Democrats can't be trusted to keep the Mountain Home base open and jobs in place. Finally, it provides a final opportunity to study modifications, or alternative that can address the concerns of environmentalists and Native Americans.

Interior does not object to proceeding in this manner. OEP continues to have strong reservations about proceeding at all with the project, but does not object to taking this additional interim step.

I would recommend that we give the go-ahead to proceed with this plan.

cc: Phil Lader
Tony Lake
Jack Gibbons
Marcia Hale
Katie McGinty
T.J. Glauthier

DRAFT

USAF DRAFT

The post-Cold War era presents new challenges for our armed forces, making it necessary to refocus our defense posture. As our overseas presence declines, rapid mobility of our combat forces becomes an essential element of our national strategy. To rapidly project air power to a potential trouble spot we must have a highly trained expeditionary force that can quickly deploy anywhere in the world and be prepared to fight on a moment's notice. The Air Force responded by forming an air intervention wing, the 366th wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. In a future crisis, this composite wing will be the first to go, and if necessary, the first to fight.

If we are to ask the men and women of the 366th Wing to go in harm's way, we must give them the training they need. To fully realize the capabilities of the composite wing, they must train as they plan to fight. Facilities in Idaho today cannot support this type of training.

The Idaho Training Range (ITR) proposal is the product of an extensive public process to balance military readiness and environmental protection. By working closely with our neighbors in Idaho, the Air Force is identifying Native American and environmental concerns surrounding the location of the proposed range. In response to these concerns, we have developed a comprehensive mitigation plan.

Further, the Air Force will also continue to study alternatives that may further minimize environmental impacts while preserving military training utility.

Because these mitigations represent a significant modification to the proposal, and because we would like fully to consider other alternatives, it is important that we reopen the issue for public debate. To provide the opportunity for complete review by the people of Idaho, the Air Force will release a supplemental draft environmental impact statement (EIS) detailing the new comprehensive mitigation plan. The release of the supplemental draft EIS will initiate another round of public discussion designed to bring us closer to a solution that balances military training and Native American and environmental concerns.

The Air Force has enjoyed a strong relationship with the people of Idaho over the last 50 years. We intend to build an even stronger relationship for the next 50 years.

DRAFT

USAF DRAFT

NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE



FOR RELEASE AT

9:00 p.m. EDT September 22, 1994

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Press Conference with
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
General Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch
Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ATSD-PA
Thursday, September 22, 1994

Mr. Bacon: Good afternoon. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will open with comments, then Secretary Deutch will answer your questions. Unfortunately, Secretary Perry and General Shali will not be able to because they have an appointment at 4 o'clock.

Q: Any chance for a quick dump on Haiti before you begin, Mr. Secretary, since the time is short?

A: No.

Secretary Perry: Nuclear weapons were the most vivid and significant symbol of the Cold War. They were characterized by four principle factors. First of all, an application of enormous resources. During the peak of our spending we were spending about \$50 billion a year on our strategic nuclear programs. And of course they occupied some of our most talented scientists and engineers.

Secondly, it was characterized by an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, an arms race which was dangerous to both countries, and indeed, dangerous to the world.

Third, it was characterized by a unique web of treaties which were intended to try to control that arms race and reduce the danger.

Fourth, it was characterized by a unique military strategy called mutual assured destruction, or MAD. I would liken MAD to two men holding revolvers and standing about ten yards away and pointing their revolvers at each other's heads. The revolvers are loaded, cocked, their fingers are on the

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anger. To make matters worse, they're shouting insults at each other. That characterized MAD, which was what we had to control this arms race, this nuclear terror, during all the periods of the Cold War.

Now with an end to the Cold War there have been fundamental changes. We have had a dramatic reduction in resources, from \$50 billion a year heading down to \$15 billion a year, and a corresponding reduction in personnel working on this program. Now instead of competition and build-up of weapons, we have cooperation and build-down. We have about a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons and about a 90 percent reduction in tactical nuclear weapons. Now we have much less dependence on treaties and much greater dependence on unilateral and bilateral reductions in nuclear weapons. But even with those dramatic changes, the strategy remains the same. That is, to quote a famous nuclear scientist, "We have changed everything except the way we think."

Now it's time to change the way we think about nuclear weapons, and the Nuclear Posture Review was conceived to do just that. The Nuclear Posture Review dealt with two great issues. The first issue was how to achieve the proper balance between what I would call leading and hedging. By leading I mean providing the leadership for further and continuing reductions in nuclear weapons, so that we can get the benefit of the savings that would be achieved by that. At the same time, we also want to hedge, hedge against the reversal of reform in Russia. A return to an authoritative military regime hostile to the United States and still armed with 25,000 nuclear weapons. We do not believe that reversal is likely, and we are working with Russia to minimize the risk of it occurring. Nevertheless, we still feel it is prudent to provide some hedge against that happening.

Therefore, we have tried to achieve a balance between those two objectives, and I believe this Nuclear Posture Review may be judged and should be judged by how successful we were in achieving the balance between leading on the one hand and hedging on the other.

The second big issue in the Nuclear Posture Review was how to achieve the benefit of improved safety and security for the residual force of nuclear weapons. Inherent in the reduction of nuclear forces and inherent in the improved technology is the potential for achieving very great improvement in safety and security. Therefore, the Nuclear Posture Review focused on what actions, what programs we could undertake to fully achieve those benefits -- both in the United States and in Russia.

Therefore, the new posture which we are seeking responds to those two great issues and therefore, almost by definition, it is no longer based on

mutual assured destruction, no longer based on MAD. We have coined a new term for our new posture which we call mutual assured safety, or MAS.

This press briefing will describe the results of the ten month study we've conducted on these issues, and will describe to you the blueprints we have put together for our nuclear posture on into the next century. This blueprint will determine the programs we have for force structure, for infrastructure, for safety and security, for command, control, communications and intelligence programs, all associated with our nuclear program.

This Nuclear Posture Review, like the Bottom-Up Review, was conducted by a joint civilian/military team in this building. The team was headed by Dr. Carter on the civilian side, Vice Admiral Owens on the military side. The study was an in-depth study, and it was a no-holds-barred study.

Last week we presented the results of the study to President Clinton, who gave us his full approval to proceed on this program. Today I wanted to introduce the study to you, ask General Shali to join me in the introduction, and then our Deputy Secretary, John Deutch, will give you a detailed report on our findings in the Nuclear Posture Review.

Let me now introduce General Shalikashvili.

General Shalikashvili: Before I relinquish this podium to Dr. Deutch, let me reemphasize the point that Secretary Perry made, and that is that this nuclear review is the product of a very close and collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the services, and the commanders of our unified commands. The conclusions of this review are, in my judgment, a very prudent balance between our arms control accord, our current and anticipated deterrent requirements, and our conviction that we need to protect the inherent advantages of our triad structure. And I think equally importantly, the results also provide us with the necessary hedges in the event that some of our more optimistic anticipations don't materialize.

I think there is one other point that is important to emphasize, and that is that our commitments to our allies are neither changed nor in any way diminished by this review. The United States will retain all of the capabilities we need to sustain our commitments overseas. To this end, even though we are removing the capability to place non-strategic nuclear weapons in our surface ships and our carrier-based aircraft, we will retain our ability to place nuclear Tomahawk missiles on board our attack submarines and to deploy these forward. And of course, our dual purpose aircraft, those capable of performing conventional and nuclear missions, will

retain the ability to deploy when and if the situation may require to support our allies and important interests abroad.

Finally, the Chiefs and I are in full agreement that this review strikes a prudent balance between leading the way to a safer world and hedging against the unexpected. When it is fully implemented, the results will certainly protect America and its interests.

With that, let me turn it over to Dr. Deutch.

Q: General Shali, can we just ask you a quick question about Bosnia?

Dr. Deutch: I am going to try and tell you a little bit about this Nuclear Posture Review. I think you have available a set of these viewgraphs. What I'll do is I'll try... I'm going to go through it very quickly, and I know you want to ask questions about other subjects of others. So let me begin by telling you about the Nuclear Posture Review.

Bill Clinton is clear on the fact that nuclear weapons remain part of the post Cold War world that we have to deal with. It's important that we retain the nuclear forces necessary to deter any possible outcome. Our problem here in the Nuclear Posture Review, a 10 month study, jointly undertaken by the civilian and military of this Department, was to chart the course of our nuclear posture.

This is the first comprehensive look in a number of years. It does lean very heavily on the new security environment, both with respect to strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. We tried to be sensitive to the fact that we were under resource constraints, and we are very sensitive to the changes which have taken place in the past. The one area where one wants to have continuity in policies and programs is the nuclear programs of this country. We're not looking for abrupt changes, we are looking for adaptations for change. What I think this study will show you is we are on a consistent path in this country on reducing our nuclear arsenal, improving the safety of the world, and yet maintaining our security.

This is the prospectus, all the different subjects that were undertaken in the Nuclear Posture Review. Strategic forces is one which usually gets the headlines. Let me say that there are incredibly important aspects we're undergoing in the command and control of our nuclear forces, in ways of improving the safety and the security and the use of these weapons. In this ten month study all elements, including infrastructure, were looked upon in the Bottom-Up Review. I'm going to try and briefly spend time on each one of them.

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The structure of this review is described here. What you see is all the different pieces that have to be taken into account in arriving at a nuclear posture, in arriving at a policy for the role of nuclear weapons in our national security. There are a whole set of complicated considerations that have to be taken into account.

The effort that was undertaken by the Department, as Bill Perry and General Shalikashvili mentioned, included working groups from both the Joint Staff, Strike Com and our civilian parts of the Department of Defense. It was under the heading of Ash Carter and General Wes Clark. Bill Owens and myself served as head of the steering committee. But the important point here is the collaborative effort which involves all elements of the Department.

The most important part which I can talk to you about to begin this discussion has to do with perspective. If I can ask you to recall, since the height of the Cold War there have been significant reductions in our nuclear arsenal, there have been significant reductions in operations, and there have been many program terminations, and many of you here are well aware of the history that's led to such things as cancellation, first introduction and then cancellation of the small ICBM, the reduction in the size of the B-2 program. All these steps are things that have taken place as this country has responded to the changed strategic circumstances that have existed at the end of the Cold War.

Perhaps it's important to get a quantitative sense here. This may be one of the most important charts that I present to you. First of all, I would like you to note that the number of accountable strategic nuclear warheads as a result of our arms control efforts have dropped considerably from the beginning, from the height of the Cold War in 1965, but there has been a significant reduction. So today, the situation we have now, START I has been ratified but has not yet entered into force; START II has yet to be ratified or entered into force. Currently there is a major disparity in the countable nuclear warheads. But at 2003, the end of the time period under consideration by the Nuclear Posture Review, we expect that there will have been a sharp reduction for both Russia and the United States in terms of their accountable strategic nuclear weapons.

It's very important, one of the most important parts of the Nuclear Posture Review, is the decline which we anticipate will take place in non-strategic nuclear forces is not happening. Currently today Russia has between 6,000 and 13,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. We have a much reduced number from that. We are anticipating going significantly lower in non-strategic nuclear forces, and we have to encourage the Russians--there

are no treaties requiring that we reduce the non-strategic nuclear forces in the outcoming years. Non-strategic nuclear forces remain one of the central problems we will be facing in managing our nuclear relationships during the coming year.

I want to also emphasize there has been a 70 percent reduction in the amount of money we're spending on nuclear weapons from the height of the Cold War to the program period we're talking about here--as well as a 70 percent reduction in the personnel who are concerned with nuclear weapons.

The point is, you have a context here for the Nuclear Posture Review: this country has been adjusting over time in both its programs and its policies and its arms control agreements due to changed political circumstances at the end of the Cold War, and we have further steps that we are describing here today along that path. It is no longer the mutually assured destruction situation that Bill Perry mentioned of the Cold War.

In arriving at our nuclear posture, we had many different considerations. Some of them quite qualitative, like counterproliferation--the declaratory policy we might have with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. Some very quantitative, such as the stability of our forces--the ability of our forces to withstand a postulated first attack so that we know we would be able to retaliate. And thereby, that ability to retaliate deters the probability of a first strike initially hedges--quantitative ways we can rebuild our forces if Russia does not develop in the peaceful way that we hope in the future.

All of these different considerations go into arriving at the policy and the force structure that we have recommended to the President--we decided upon last week. This is a changed role for nuclear forces. You'll see smaller nuclear forces, and very importantly, it means safer and more controllable nuclear forces.

Because of the uncertainty, I would next talk to you about strategic forces. Because of the uncertainty in the way the force structure will change in Russia, whether the path they will take to comply with START I and START II, we face the following situation. The actual number of warheads that are possessed by the states of the former Soviet Union is coming down much more slowly than the warheads that are in our active military stockpiles. We are on a path to reducing and have reduced these very significantly. And out through the end of the START II period--2003 when START II comes into force--we intend to have our force structure down to 3500. But you see that there is a question. Already the Russians are reducing their warheads more slowly than us, and there's a question about what might happen in the future. There's a possibility that as we go through this period of time there will be additional reductions and our force structure that we are proposing today is sufficiently flexible to lead in a direction of

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Let me remind you that Russia has little prospect of returning to the kind of conventional force structure that they had at the height of the Cold War due to the collapse of their economy and the change in their political situation. It is a less expensive and less demanding matter for them to return to a much more aggressive nuclear posture. If something does go wrong in Russia, it is likely that it is in the nuclear forces area that we will face the first challenge. It is for this reason that we must keep the possibility both of hedging the need to increase these forces that we are planning to reduce down to the level of 3500, and at the same time, if matters go as we hope, towards a more democratic, more peaceful Russia, that we will be able to reduce the warheads even further. So this is a posture which allows us both to lead, lead in terms of the reductions we're taking, and to hedge in case we have to make adjustments in the future.

The way we arrived at requirements for U.S. nuclear force structure for this period of time through START II was to assess the capabilities of the former Soviet Union--the targets that are there--and we looked at the kind of targeting and kinds of attack plans we might have, and also are prepared to deal with hostile governments not only in Russia, but in other countries.

The central elements of our strategic posture are submarines, bombers and ICBMs. Each of these different platforms have important attributes, especially submarines, which have the virtue of contributing stability, too, because they are so difficult to target and impossible to track when they are deployed at sea. So each one of these elements was considered in the Nuclear Posture Review.

We looked at a variety of different targets--target sets that had to be required, that might be required. We looked at a variety of different force structures. What I would like to do is report to you now on the force structure decisions that have been made.

First, we will reduce the number of ballistic missile submarines from 18 to 14. We will retire four submarines.

Second, we proposed to retrofit all 14 of these submarines with D-5 Trident missiles. That means we will take four of the boats that currently have D-4 missiles and retrofit them with D-5 missiles.

Third, we plan to maintain two bases for this Trident force on both the East and West Coast[s].

Secondly, with respect to bombers, we propose to maintain a force of 66 B-52 bombers which are dual-capable for both conventional and nuclear role[s]. The B-1 bomber will no longer have a nuclear role. And we believe that the 20 B-2s, no more than the 20 B-2s that are currently programmed, are required to be dual capable for the nuclear mission.

With respect to ICBMs, we will retain the 500 Minuteman ICBMs in three wings located in the Western part of the United States.

I want to emphasize that this force structure permits options for deeper reductions to accelerate both the implementation of START II and to go to even larger and more far-reaching reductions, should the political circumstances warrant. One part of this strategy is to lead into deeper reductions if the political circumstances should allow. Alternatively, the structure, as I've indicated as a hedge possibility, we preserve the option for uploading additional warheads on the Trident missiles, additional weapons on the bombers, additional loadings on the ICBMs--in case it should be necessary in an adverse and unexpected situation to require more robust nuclear forces.

May I next turn to the non-strategic nuclear force. There are some central decisions here that General Shalikashvili mentioned. First, we will maintain United States Air Force dual-capable aircraft. That is aircraft that is capable to carry either conventional or nuclear ordnance. We will maintain those in the United States, and we will maintain them in Europe as part of our commitment to the Alliance. We will cease to maintain the capability for nuclear weapons on our surface ships--that is, both our carriers and our other surface combatants. For some years we have not had nuclear weapons on these ships, and today we are beginning the process of removing the capability both in terms of the training of the individuals and the facilities on the ships themselves to deal with nuclear weapons on the surface vessels. However, our attack submarines will maintain the capability to launch nuclear-tipped Tomahawk missiles or so-called T-LAM missiles.

The headlines are usually given to the force structure changes. An important part of this has been to improve also the command, control and communications of these weapons systems. It is both C3--command, control and communications-- which makes the forces capable, and therefore contributes to their deterrent value, and which maintains the controllability of these forces which assures that we have a more secure and a safer nuclear arsenal.

Here are some of the modifications that have been made, and are proposed to be made in order to improve the command, control and communications of our nuclear forces.

We will continue to work on, although at a lower level from what was the case in the Cold War--to work on improving the command, control, and communications of these nuclear forces and especially to correct and improve the communications systems and attack warning systems for the nuclear systems.

Let me next turn to infrastructure. Consistent with the Bottom-Up Review we looked at the infrastructure. And I will just briefly report to you on some of the conclusions of our look at the industrial infrastructure--technological infrastructure for nuclear weapons. On this chart perhaps the most important point is our view that the D-5 production will not only serve a low cost way of providing for the missile systems with a reduced ballistic missile fleet, but it also preserve an industrial base for strategic missiles in this country.

Another aspect of our infrastructure concerns our relationship with the Department of Energy to assure that the Department of Energy has the capability in nuclear weapons that we need to arm our systems, and we have a mechanism in place through the Nuclear Weapons Council to provide our requirements to the Department of Energy. We think this is working very well. These are at the top levels, the requirements that we are placing into the Department of Energy. There is an issue about providing for tritium over the longer term which we are working with them. I want to stress that at the present time we do not see the need for new nuclear warheads to be added to our arsenal. No new designed nuclear warhead is required as a result of this review.

Connected with the command, control, and communications--which is such an important element of controlling forces--are the safety and security of the weapons themselves. This is an area where enormous effort has been taken by this Administration. Over a period of time, as a result of the reductions that we've had in our nuclear forces, we have a more controlled and a safer posture for our nuclear weapons. In addition to these changes in posture, we have a number of technical changes. Again, they're not very glamorous, but they are important to improving the controllability and the safety and reliability of these nuclear weapons. All of these permissive action links and safety improvements will be introduced over the next five-year period. We have the funds programmed to do it, and we will include these funds in the FY96 budget.

I want to touch on a related and important matter with our nuclear posture. We are very conscious of the fact that the way we conduct ourselves with our nuclear weapons will influence the way the Russians comport themselves with respect to their nuclear weapons. We have a whole series of operational practices, changes in the way we manage our forces, that we hope that--working together with the Russians--will bring them to have a smaller, more secure and stabler nuclear posture themselves. It is in our interest to encourage the Russians to move in this direction. Counterproliferation is an important part of that feature, and our efforts on cooperative threat reduction with the Russians are an essential feature of the way we view our nuclear force structure. It's not only how our forces are maintained, but our ability to influence the Russians in the way they take steps for a smaller, more secure, safer stockpile.

Let me summarize the results of this posture review, and I'm sorry I'm going on so long. We believe that we have continued a trend that has been going on in response to a very changed security environment. We've rebalanced, as you've seen, our triad by reducing our forces. We believe that we are continuing to plan for START II totals, requirements for 3500 weapons in 2003--the time period when START II should enter into force. But very importantly, we are leading towards the possibility for further reduction, but we are hedging in case there are needs for additional forces.

We believe that this posture commits us to a safer future, and that it is an important one in the continuing process this nation has had for the safe, secure, and responsible customs of these nuclear weapons.

In order to summarize, let me give you two panels that summarize the changes that have been included in this Bottom-Up Review of the nuclear posture. First, strategic forces; secondly, non-strategic forces. These are the changes that are included in the Nuclear Posture Review. And finally, the changes that are proposed in the safety, security, and use of nuclear weapons, in the command and control improvements required for better stewardship of those weapons; the infrastructure changes that have been proposed, and finally the related areas of threat reduction and counterproliferation which are so important in our activities with the Russians.

Let me just end with a personal note. I have the greatest regard for Ash Carter, for General Foss, for Admiral Owens and what they've done to give leadership to this effort. We believe that it provides an excellent, sensible, balanced lead and hedge posture for our nuclear forces over the coming next decade, and we are very proud of this accomplishment from the Department.

I'll be happy to take any questions you have. I'm sorry this went on so long.

Q: Two questions, one on numbers, one on policy. First on numbers.

You had a chart up there that said post START II force structure, 2003. The one where you talk about reducing 18 to 14 submarines and all of that. I was unclear from your chart. Are you meaning that that's what you want to initiate in 2003, or post START II? I just didn't understand...

A: That is where we will be at START II on its entry into force.

Q: Are you making any recommendations at this point to go below START II levels?

A: No, we are not. This is a study that I said stays within the framework of START II until it enters into force, and we are prepared at any time to consider reductions below that. Let me just point out to you that not only within strategic forces, we're also very interested in these non-strategic forces. That imbalance to us is of greater concern than small changes in the strategic totals.

Q: In May, you issued a report with your name on it that said we needed to spend \$400 million a year on counterproliferation.

A: Yes.

Q: You outlined it here today. Why is your office then coming up with a plan which they publicly say will only spend \$80 million at the most?

A: The \$80 million which I hope the appropriations conference will put in, is an incremental amount of money. In our base we have put in additional changes, as well. I believe we've gone a significant way to funding the initiatives and counterproliferation that were in the report that we submitted to Congress in May.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the hedge part of the strategy. It seems as though the review came to the conclusion that the former Soviet Union was not that stable enough for you to reduce below the START II levels. Was that a central element of your review?

A: Given the pace at which the Russians are bringing down their actual warheads, we think at this time, before START I has entered into force, before START II has been ratified, we who have to run programs believe that it would not be prudent to commit now for a reduction below those levels. We think it is enormously responsible to be in a posture to respond to a further reduction, but we don't think it would be responsible or prudent to commit now before START II has been ratified, much less entered into force.

Q: What are the prospects for a reversal of reform in the former Soviet Union? What are the prospects of that?

A: We all read the newspapers and know all the moments of uncertainty in Russia. I think there is certainly some possibility of reversal in Russia. We're not predicting that, but we have to be prepared for that eventuality.

Q: I don't know whether I was reading too much into the way the chart was drawn, but it seems that that line of reduction was continuing as is until about 1997, and then you faced a decision point whether to reconstitute or go down further. Is that the way it works?

A: We could make changes anywhere. That's a schematic. The flexibility maintained in this program, at any time, we can make an adjustment up or down. Now how difficult it is depends on the particular circumstances. But planned into this, for example, the pace at which we take these four submarines--18 submarines down to 14. We're going to do it quickly and rapidly. How we handle those submarines in the interim period until 2003. All of that has an impact about whether you want to go faster or slower, and that we're going to do on a year-by-year basis as we appraise the progress that's been made.

Q: How do you think this set of decisions is going to play at the Non-Proliferation Review Conference the beginning of the next year when renewal of the treaty is A, difficult; and B, the Administration's high priority?

Second question, what's the logic? You say you're worried about a reversal in the Soviet Union. Isn't the logic that you should push them to go faster in removing nuclear weapons rather than a standstill policy?

A: First of all, I think that our posture in the NPT Review Conference is unbelievably strong. We have taken step after step over the past five years to show our interest in reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. This continues that trend. We no longer have any tests. We have taken a whole series of steps which are reduction in the size of the arsenal, a much more stable arsenal. All of these are steps which would make the credibility of the United States at the NPT Review Conference much, much stronger than it has been in past years, and I'm confident that we will be successful there.

Q: And the logic of...

A: I hope that I've left you with the message that we are extremely eager to work with the Russians on reducing the number of weapons that they have as rapidly as possible, down to the levels that we've already reduced to, especially in the area of non-strategic nuclear forces. We will do anything we can to encourage them in that regard, and we believe we have been doing so.

Q: Do we know the rate of the Russian destruction of their weapons? And if so, how do we know?

A: We, of course, don't know with all precision. They do report to us, and we do have intelligence to estimate further. But we believe we have a pretty good fix on the rate at which they are bringing down their weapons and the state they are in different levels of dismantlement and the like. While it's obviously not 100 percent precise, we think we have certainly much better knowledge than we had five years ago about what is going on in the Russian nuclear program.

Q: It's not clear to me when the Administration would start negotiating a START III. Would it be only after START II is fully implemented, or would it be after the Russian Duma ratifies START II?

A: I don't think that decision has been made. Mr. Yeltsin is coming here next week, and initiatives could forward from that. Not every initiative with the Russians has to be in the context of a post START strategic nuclear agreement. There could be another kind of agreement which had to do with security of forces, including their controllability which we think is so important; improving the pace at which they dismantle their nuclear weapons; it could have to do with non-strategic nuclear weapons. So the possibilities here of improving stability in the world are vast. They don't only have to be with respect to START III, although that could be introduced at any time.

Q: You've announced a unilateral reduction in launching platforms. Will we be asking the Russians to make similar unilateral cuts?

A: That's the kind of issue that can be discussed in the Summit, and certainly the way we want to go is to point out steps that we are taking to lower the dependence on nuclear weapons, to improve their controllability, their safety, and their security, and we would hope that besides taking unilateral steps, we'll also improve the stability of the world.

Q: When you talk about the reconstitution capability, I assume you mean that warheads that are taken out of active service will be kept in some kind of a reserve so that you could re-arm if you wanted to. Is that the case? And also, do you expect that the Russian government would do a similar thing?

A: Yes, I think that both countries have warheads in reserve, warheads out of the military stockpiles. Then they have absolutely demilitarized warheads which with some time and effort and cost could be made into warheads again. But all of this has to look back against the management of the entire stockpile. But both of us keep some warheads in reserve.

Q: Did the review at all look at the question of the SIOP targetry developed in the Cold War and how much that's going to be reduced by?

A: Yes. We certainly did that, with great diligence. I should report to you that that target base has gone down vastly since the height of the Cold War. Extraordinarily. A great deal of that reduction was taken in the past Administration. Secretary Cheney did an extensive review of the targeting of these missiles, and additional reductions that occur in the target base, as the force structure comes down, you comply with the START II and START I treaty. As that happens, the target base comes down to significantly lower numbers than have been assessed.

Q: ...50 percent less than five years ago?

A: Much more than 50 percent reduction, yes.

Q: Can you talk about the internal workings of coming up with a final review, and where all the uniformed services and agreements with the civilian side, was there any disagreement on reaching this point?

A: There was no serious disagreement. We had a very significant review group which I chaired with Admiral Owens. Admiral Owens and I went out to STRATCOM together. But there was really no matter of major disagreement.

Philosophically, the structure of this review went forward, hand in hand and step by step so there were no surprises here, no moments of great controversy. There was one adjustment made at the end which neither Bill Perry nor I thought was especially consequential.

Q: What's your assessment of the reason for the relatively slow Russian forces? Is it political, financial or...

A: You can get that as well as I can. I would say all of the above.

Q: Was there consideration given to discussing numerical targets below 3500? Was there consideration given to discussing, eliminating a leg of the triad? Some of the more radical things that Les Aspin was originally at least kicking around hypothetically.

A: We certainly debated at length eliminating a leg of the triad. That, it seems, was a very important question to consider. We looked at that with great detail, and discussed at some length eliminating the ICBM leg of the triad. It's a sensible thing to think about. On balance, we judged it not to be something to be done today. So, we did look at that.

3 The second point I want answered is, "Did we consider reductions below 2,500?" When a matter of that kind of political importance comes up, it has to be carried out in an inter-agency environment, and indeed, that is taking place now. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council are, indeed, involved in an inter-agency effort to gauge and pace the level at

which we want to go for further arms control, arms reduction efforts. Again, I want to tell you that this should not only be restrictive to strategic nuclear forces, but also to these non-strategic nuclear forces which are troublesome.

Q: ...review of all of these things, and what you're doing is you're saying you've sort of eliminated them and pushed them off...

A: No, I think that as we went through our no-holds-barred analysis we saw that for the Department of Defense, the key issue was to arrive at a posture that was both leaning forward and a hedge for this START II period. This is from now to the year 2003. Here, we have to deal with the programs that have to be in place throughout this period. We have to have a structure that can flexibly respond to new political circumstances. All principle responsibility is to run those programs, design and run them properly. It is not to undertake large scale changes in the possible treaty end point that would come to a broader discussion between the United States and Russia. But our posture permits us to respond to them.

The way I would answer, the dramatic difference here is that we don't have an inflexible posture. We have one that can move this way or that way as circumstances require.

Q: Concerning the ICBM leg of the triad, you're saying that it will remain at 500 land-based missiles?

A: That's correct.

Q: Some Administration officials have said over the past 24 hours that the Administration plans to go down to 300.

A: They're wrong. [Laughter]

Q: Why the confusion?

A: I don't understand it, but I can tell you, this is it. I'm sorry, I've seen that speculation myself. The answer is 500, 450.

Q: There are some programs that have been ongoing where some of the platforms are increasing their conventional capability. Will this have any impact on that, or will those programs remain pretty much the same-- such as the conventional capabilities on the B-1s, B-2s, that sort of thing?

A: Those are absolutely important. The conventional capabilities on the B-52, on the B-2, and the upgrades on the B-1 are very important, because that is central to the conventional capability of those bombers relating to our two major regional conflict strategies. So the principal purpose of these bombers is their conventional role, but they will maintain a nuclear role for the deterrent value they contribute.

Q: Could you elaborate a little bit more on the permissive action links and relate it to submarines? Did you tighten up somehow the U.S. control over those...

A: Yes, we have. What I would prefer to do is to do that off line. There are a series of actions we've taken there which will be put into force over a period of time for bombers and submarines.

Q: What was the minor adjustment at the end that you and the SecDef deemed insignificant?

A: I said not significant. I didn't say insignificant.

Q: What was it? [Laughter]

Q: What's the purpose of nuclear Tomahawks? Nuclear weapons on Tomahawk missiles?

A: Because in a hypothetical situation where you have an exchange or reach of nuclear weapons that do not involve the homeland of either the United States or of Russia, or which involve--you can argue how realistic this is today, historically--the security of NATO. The way you deter that from happening is to have an ability to respond on a regional basis.

Q: Such as deterring chemical weapons use?

A: No one is suggesting that if chemical or biological weapons were used that you would deter with nuclear weapons. Certainly a country who is considering using them would have to take that into account. That's how we contribute to deterrence.

Q: Would the final size of the ICBM force get that not "significant change" that you and the Secretary made at the end?

Q: Why did you do so?

A: Because we thought there was ample time to adjust the ICBMs in the future if political circumstances warranted.

Q: Why not now?

A: That was our judgment.

Q: What was calculation?

A: The calculation was of the ability of these weapons uniquely to be collectively used. The additional stability that they provided for the triad. And a sense that there was no reason to give them up now. They aren't very costly to maintain and they contribute to our security.

Q: Will we continue to deploy our air-launched nuclear weapons forward in Europe and outside the United States?

A: Yes.

Q: I'd like your assessment of military progress. Is it fast enough in Haiti to allow the return of exiled Parliamentarians so that they can participate in the vote by the recognized Parliament on the question of amnesty?

A: The first answer is that I am extremely pleased with the progress of the military buildup in Haiti, and principally its safety. No U.S. soldier has been harmed. No bullets have been fired. So I would say rather than swiftness, it is that aspect of the operation which is most gratifying to Bill Perry, to myself, and to General Shalikashvili.

With respect to the timing of the return of Parliamentarians, that's something that Aristide is going to have to consider. We are prepared to accommodate to that. It will be an issue which President Aristide will have to decide.

Q: Is it your understanding that that vote which Cedras is moving to call requires a so-called legitimate Parliament in Haiti, a recognized Parliament to be in place in order for a meaningful amnesty vote to occur?

A: I'm not really sufficiently on top of that issue to give you an absolutely accurate answer. I would guess that it would certainly require the legitimate Parliament to do the voting, yes. They've done so in the past, of course.

Q: The current military leader, Cedras, has told CBS he does not plan to leave Haiti. If he's not posturing and does not, in effect, leave, aren't you concerned that we are up against another Somalia revisited, right in the center of a coming civil war between Cedras and Aristide?

A: I would assume that there are many, many things which are on General Cedras' mind, and he may change his position three or four times between now and the date of the 15th. So I don't think we've heard the last word about where General Cedras or the other de factos may be when President Aristide returns.

Q: That's not answering the question, sir. If he does stay are we not caught, in effect, in a similar situation to what we were caught in in Somalia?

A: Not necessarily. I don't believe so. We have a legitimate government returning there, for one.

Q: How soon would you like to see Aristide get in? Is the expectation that he'll go sooner rather than closer to the 15th? Is that a priority, to get him in as quickly as possible?

A: I think the priority there is to first of all, introduce our troops in there safely, without casualties. The second thing is to establish public

order. And the third thing is to have the de factos step down, and then to bring back General Aristide. All of that will happen before the 15th.

Q: The Aristide camp has asked the United States to stay in touch--or to get in touch--with Aristide's Defense Minister, General Beliyat. Were there contacts today between the American military and Beliyat?

A: I don't know whether they happened, but I know that they were planned. I don't know that they happened, but I know that they were planned.

Q: Have there been documented instances of retribution against the pro-Aristide people by the de facto government? And what is the role of the U.S. military now in protecting people who seek it?

A: Let me say that there has not been, to my knowledge, certainly not in the 48 hours--any documented cases actually against Aristide followers.

Q: Can you talk about the strike in Bosnia today? Are any more strikes like that planned?

A: I don't believe that any other strikes are planned. We are just now getting the results of those strikes in Bosnia. It seems to me that we've said for a long time that if these heavy weapons stayed in these areas--these sanctuary areas--eventually we would go after them. I believe that there was at least one, and, perhaps more tanks destroyed today. One I noticed was--at least one I believe--was also destroyed by a British fighter. That's very welcome.

Q: No BDA yet?

A: We'll get you BDA on it.

Q: We can expect more of these in the future if there are more incidents like that?

A: I think we're committed the way we stated it, [about] what happens to these army units that go into sanctuary areas.

Thank you all.

-END-

Bell-

7829

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 27, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MORTON H. HALPERIN *MS*
ROBERT BELL *RB*

SUBJECT: National Security Strategy Report

The next National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) is due out in late January. We need your guidance as to how you want to proceed.

One possibility, which Bob recommends, is that we up-date the first Report as necessary to take account of new developments, but leave the basic building blocks of the July NSSR as is. The rationale for this approach is that the two reports will come out in such rapid succession that we should simply be reiterating the strategy laid out in the previous Report. We can decide later if we want to do something new for the following year. (Option 1)

The alternative, which Mort recommends, is that we build from the current draft to produce a revised statement of the Clinton Administration National Security Strategy which we would be more comfortable calling to people's attention. The rationale for this approach is that the Report is widely read however we put it out. Moreover, those who were disappointed with the July NSSR will argue that there is still a pressing need to present a more coherent statement of our strategy. (Option 2)

There is also a need to decide which Directorate should take the lead in producing the Report. We suggest that this assignment be determined by which option you select.

RECOMMENDATION

That you decide which option to pursue.

Option 1 _____ Option 2 _____ Set up a meeting _____

with Bell, Halperin + Borsini

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 28, 1994

JOINT STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY
BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscored that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening global strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. Multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban have begun. The Presidents noted the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in ensuring global stability.

President Yeltsin outlined the initiative Russia presented to the UN General Assembly for a treaty among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council for a halt to the production of fissile materials for weapons; a ban on the reuse of fissile materials in weapons; further elimination of nuclear warheads; and reduction of strategic delivery systems.

President Clinton outlined the ideas he described at the UN General Assembly for cooperation in advancing nuclear non-proliferation, particularly to enhance the security of nuclear materials and to prevent nuclear smuggling.

The Presidents discussed these initiatives, of which they had informed each other in advance and which therefore reflected shared goals and certain common proposals designed to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. In this regard, the Presidents agreed that the permanent members of the UN Security Council, given their responsibilities as nuclear powers, have a special role to play.

The United States and Russia will work with the other permanent members, as well as other countries, to ensure a successful outcome at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty conference that produces an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test

ban treaty at the earliest possible date, and to achieve a global prohibition on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The Presidents also agreed on the desirability of continuing their respective moratoria on nuclear weapon tests.

The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation and dismantlement of strategic nuclear systems by the parties to the START I Treaty and the implementation of the January 14, 1994 Trilateral Statement. They welcomed the real possibility to bring the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol into force in the very near future and pledged full cooperation to this end. The Presidents agreed that their defense ministers would exchange information every three months on strategic systems that have been deactivated and eliminated.

The Presidents confirmed their intention to seek early ratification of the START II Treaty, once the START I Treaty enters into force, and expressed their desire to exchange START II instruments of ratification at the next U.S.-Russia summit meeting.

In an important new development, the Presidents agreed that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia will proceed to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status.

The Presidents instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces. They also discussed the prospect for confidence-building and transparency measures in this area. The Presidents consider that, as the political partnership develops, there will be new opportunities to strengthen stability through openness and transparency.

President Clinton described to President Yeltsin the unilateral adjustments the United States will make in its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces and safety, security and use control practices as a result of the recently completed nuclear posture review. President Yeltsin noted these U.S. changes as a manifestation of the new relationship between the United States and Russia and described the comparable review of measures

underway in Russia to reduce Russian nuclear forces and improve their safety. The Presidents agreed that each side would independently consider further unilateral steps, as appropriate, with regard to their respective nuclear forces.

The Presidents agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. Noting the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, the Presidents instructed their respective delegations, working with the other participating states, to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time.

Both sides have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The Presidents agreed that the two sides will conduct a joint exercise of theater missile defenses and early warning. This exercise would contribute to providing a basis for U.S. and Russian forces to operate together, for example, in peacekeeping operations.

Proceeding from the principles of partnership and reciprocity, the Presidents agreed to work together to develop broad bilateral and multilateral cooperation on assuring nuclear security. They agreed to:

Cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including through the exchange of appropriate information, to prevent illegal trade in nuclear materials and undertake measures to strengthen the regime control and physical protection of such materials.

Exchange detailed information at the next meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security. The sides will develop a process for exchanging this information on a regular basis.

Direct their joint working group on nuclear safeguards, transparency and irreversibility to pursue by March 1995 further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Facilitate broad cooperation among appropriate agencies in both countries to ensure effective control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials.

Facilitate cooperative programs between U.S. and Russian national laboratories in the areas of safety, physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials.

Deepen cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense in the area of ensuring nuclear security.

Implement a joint plan to expedite construction of a new, long-term storage facility for fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons at Mayak.

Taking a broad view of strategic stability and bearing in mind the need to control all types of weapons of mass destruction, the Presidents agreed on:

The importance of continued, full, mutual and reciprocal implementation of the September 1992 U.S.-Russian-UK statement on Biological Weapons as a means of gaining confidence that offensive biological weapons programs have been terminated.

The need for adherence by all states to the Chemical Weapons Convention and for universal application of its provisions, as well as the need for adoption without delay of measures that make it possible to bring the CWC into force; and the need to resolve without delay the outstanding issues related to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding.

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