

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chron File - September 1994 #3 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

266

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	3	5	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum LRM #M-1838. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	09/26/1994	P3/b(3)
002. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum LRM #I-3900. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	09/27/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - September 1994 #3 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4636

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *J*SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Testimony on Unexplained
Illnesses Among Persian Gulf War Veterans
(LRM #M-1834/1845)

OMB has requested NSC views on proposed Defense testimony before the Force Requirements and Personnel Subcommittee of the SASC on September 29, 1994. The testimonies by the Service Surgeon Generals describe the numerous actions and studies being undertaken to investigate the nature of the illnesses reported by Persian Gulf War veterans.

I discussed the testimony and VA and HHS comments with the OMB staff contact. I have no comment regarding factual changes in the number of veterans being surveyed in various studies. I concur that two specific references in the draft testimony to a singular "Persian Gulf illness" or "mysterious illness" is premature and should be changed to a more general description of the symptoms and illnesses reported by Persian Gulf War veterans. Due to the immediate suspense, I offered no objections to the proposed testimony, providing the above change was made.

Concurrences by: Bill Danvers and Elisa Harris *SDH*RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JANET R. FORSGREN

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Testimony on Unexplained
Illnesses Among Persian Gulf War Veterans
(LRM #M-1834/1845)

The National Security Council staff has no objections to the subject draft testimony providing the references to a singular "Persian Gulf illness" or "mystery illness" are changed to a more general reference to the symptoms and illnesses reported by Persian Gulf War veterans. Because of the immediate suspense, this change has already been discussed with the OMB contact, Anna Briatico.

10-202 355 0140

7793

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503**

SPECIAL

September 26, 1994

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #M-1834

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

VA - Robert Coy - (202)273-6666 - 229
HHS - Frances White - (202)690-7760 - 328
OSTP - Elisa Wynn - (202)456-6020 - 288
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249

FROM: JANET R. FORSGREN (for) *Janet R. Forsgren*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Anna BRIATICO (395-7887)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-7362

**SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Testimony on unexplained
illnesses among Persian Gulf War veterans**

DEADLINE: 2:00 p.m. September 27, 1994

THIS TRANSMISSION CONTAINS _____ PAGE(S) (total).

**COMMENTS: Hearing is before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services on Thursday, September 29th. NOTE: TWO pieces of
testimony attached -- Army and Navy.**

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before
advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or
receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

Nancy-Ann Min
Jennifer O'Connor
Frank Reeder
Toni Hustead
David Zavada
Alex Keenan
Cookie Walden

Barry Clendenin (2)
Phoebe Vickers
Mary Jo Siclari
Jim Fish
Joe Lackey
Janet Forsgren

RESPONSE TO LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

If your response to this request for views is simple (c.g., concur/no comment) we prefer that you respond by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is simple and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a secretary.

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

TO: Anna BRIATICO (395-7887)
Office of Management and Budget
Fax Number: (202) 395-6148
Branch-Wide Line (to reach secretary): (202) 395-7362

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Testimony on unexplained illnesses among Persian Gulf War veterans

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
_____ response sheet

15-102-000-0170 027 10 94 10 07 101000-1000

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE**

**STATEMENT OF
VICE ADMIRAL DONALD F. HAGEN, MEDICAL CORPS
SURGEON GENERAL
UNITED STATES NAVY
SEPTEMBER 29, 1994
BEFORE THE
FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE**

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee to present information and answer your concerns regarding unexplained illnesses among Persian Gulf War veterans. Navy Medicine is very concerned about the health and well-being of every member of the Navy-Marine Corps team; that any one of the members of the team is affected by an illness that we do not fully understand is troubling to us. The Navy, in close coordination with the other services, Department of Veterans Affairs and other federal agencies, is concentrating substantial energy and resources on discovering the reasons for illnesses among our troops.

The Navy has been proactive in its efforts to understand the problems and provide the required support for those with unexplained illnesses. In September 1992, then again in December 1992 and November 1993, I sent messages to all Navy medical treatment facilities describing the commonly reported symptoms of Persian Gulf veterans and requiring a report to the Navy Registry at Navy Environmental Health Center on each affected individual. In May of this year the Secretary of the Navy sent a message to all Navy and Marine Corps personnel to share current medical information and to describe the research efforts underway to find answers to the health questions of the Persian Gulf veterans. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), in coordination with the service surgeons general, has established a DoD wide Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Surveillance System to

better understand and care for the health needs of active duty members and their families. Active duty Persian Gulf Veterans or their family members need only present themselves to the nearest military medical treatment facility for evaluation and treatment of active symptoms and may request to be entered into the DoD registry.

Beginning in November of 1992 and continuing through February of this year, epidemiologists from the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number Two (NEPMU-2) led a multi-disciplinary team that conducted surveys on detachments of Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (RNMCB-24) to gather information to ensure proper diagnosis and treatment of their symptoms and to be used as a basis for research investigations. The NEPMU-2 team is working in close coordination with the Tuskegee Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Tuskegee, Alabama, to collect data on medical histories and diagnoses. During these surveys there has been continuing dialogue with a number of your congressional colleagues and we have invited their participation in the visits. Although these surveys dealt with Navy reservists, there is no current information available that leads us to believe that the manifestations of unexplained illnesses are any different in active duty personnel.

The Navy Health Research Center in San Diego, California, has begun a five year, investigation to examine the illness and

hospitalization rates of over 2000 active duty construction battalion personnel (Seabees) and over one million Marine Corps and Army personnel, including individuals who did and did not serve in the Persian Gulf. The goal is to identify illnesses which may be more common in Persian Gulf veterans, and to identify possible risk factors of disease which may be linked to an increased number of illnesses.

examining these issues Several other research efforts are underway to look into *all biologically plausible every possible* causes for chronic illnesses among Desert Storm veterans. Among those agencies and organizations *that have examined or conducting* research are: The Defense Science Board Task Force on Chemical and Biological Warfare Exposure, National Institutes of Health Workshop, the Interagency (VA, DoD, HHS) Persian Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board, the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine/Medical Follow-up Agency, and the VA Persian Gulf Expert Scientific Committee. Navy medicine is providing manpower, expertise, and resources to assist in the solution to this baffling problem for those veterans who deployed to southwest Asia in defense of the United States. One of our senior preventive medicine physician is heading up the tri-service team administering the DoD Persian Gulf Veteran Health Surveillance System. The team is being supported with equipment and manpower from the Naval Medical Information Management Center in Bethesda, Maryland. We also have representation on the Persian Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board.

We will continue to keep Navy and Marine Corps personnel abreast of information and survey results as they become available. Preliminary findings of the survey of the RNCB-24 detachments were reported in the March 7, 1994, issue of Navy Times. Findings from the National Institutes of Health workshop on illnesses among Persian Gulf veterans, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Possible Chemical and Biological Warfare Exposure (Lederberg committee) ~~and the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine's committee~~ have concluded that the wide range and variety of symptoms and ailments do not support a single case definition or clinical diagnosis. The consensus among the scientific community is that more research must be done to identify the cause or causes of ^{these unexplained} ~~this mystery~~ ^{Symptoms} ~~illness~~.

Navy Medicine's primary mission is to maintain the health of the active duty forces of the Navy and Marine Corps. We have medical treatment facilities, research laboratories, preventive and occupational medicine units all around the world in support of this mission. Our health care system is designed to handle the vast array of medical maladies experienced by a highly complex operational organization and its associated logistical support structures. Appropriate health care for active duty members with unexplained symptoms and a discovery of the cause or causes is of extreme importance to me. When an active duty member presents to a medical treatment facility with a complaint

of injury or illness, "individualized" care is provided based upon an that patient's medical condition. This individualized medical care includes all active duty personnel who served in the Persian Gulf. We do not feel there is any scientific evidence at this time for a single therapy, conventional or investigational, which can be applied to all veterans with unexplained symptoms who served in the Persian Gulf.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee and I will be pleased to answer any of your questions.

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALCIDE LANOUÉ
THE SURGEON GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND PERSONNEL
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

SECOND SESSION, 103RD CONGRESS

HEALTH CARE CONCERNS AND PROBLEMS OF OPEN DEPLOYMENT
PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS


29 SEPTEMBER 1994

CLEARED

SEP 20 1994 21

APPROPRIATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND SECURITY INFORMATION (FOIA/PA)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE



SAPA-OSR
DATE: 23 SEP 1994
INITIALS: JLP

ASA(MIA) COL Suttle verbal
DACS-OPM WAF YOW verbal
SAFM-BUL LTC Meadows verbal

SAFM-BUL Sue Lange verbal
SALL-P LTC Hanley verbal

94-C-1071

15-201 050 014

The health of our Persian Gulf War veterans is of vital importance and concern to the Army Medical Department and we are continuing to mobilize our energies and resources in a coordinated medical response to their needs. Our most pressing effort has been focused on identifying reasons for the unexplained illnesses that still affect some Gulf War veterans, many of whom are still on active duty.

The military health care system has sought extensive consultation from within DoD and from outside agencies and individual experts in addressing the issue of post-ODS/DS medical illnesses. The Army Medical Department, the DoD, and the Department of Veterans Affairs continue their investigation and treatment of symptomatic veterans who served in Southwest Asia in support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

In response to the medical needs of Persian Gulf veterans, the DoD established the OASD (HA) Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program (CCEP), a tri-service medical clinical evaluation program which commenced in June 1994 at all military hospitals. Standardized clinical evaluations, developed in close coordination with the VA, are provided for military personnel and eligible family members requesting them. The CCEP ensures that all men and women who served their country in the Persian Gulf have full access to the complete range of health care services for the problems they

are now experiencing and provides an in-depth medical evaluation of DoD beneficiaries who are experiencing illnesses which may be related to their service in the Persian Gulf War. The CCEP focuses on diagnosing illnesses and obtaining an accurate and comprehensive understanding of what factors have contributed to health problems reported by Persian Gulf veterans and their families. As of this date, over 6,000 persons have been entered into the CCEP. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs will be reporting initial CCEP results in October. *still target date?*

In order to coordinate interdepartmental responsibilities and actions, the Persian Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board was created to deal with matters involving long-term health effects from Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The research, clinical evaluation, and review *and benefits and compensation* efforts of the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Department of Health and Human Services related to the health of Persian Gulf veterans are being closely coordinated to avoid duplication, foster cooperation, and to ensure that the most efficient and effective approach to the various health problems is taken. Over 30 research, clinical care, and assessment projects are currently being conducted.

Several large population-based studies will add to our understanding of post-ODS/DS medical problems. The DoD, in collaboration with the VA and the University of California,

will be conducting a series of epidemiological studies on active duty members who deployed to the Gulf. Studies will include personal interviews and physiologic testing of 2,250 Seabees (1500 Gulf War veterans and 750 non-deployed Persian Gulf War-era veterans); analysis of the hospitalization records of 1.2 million servicemembers; and review of pregnancy outcomes among Gulf War veterans and their spouses (as compared with non-deployed Gulf War era veterans). Initial evaluation of the Seabees began this month.

The Department of Veterans Affairs in Washington, DC, will be conducting a random survey of 15,000 veterans and active duty members who served in the Persian Gulf. This mail/telephone survey will be designed to: (1) determine the prevalence of potential environmental exposures experienced by members during their Gulf service, (2) describe symptomatology experienced after Gulf service and (3) assess the current health status of veterans and their family members, including reproductive outcomes. The Persian Gulf veteran group will be compared to a randomly selected group of veterans and military members (15,000) who served in the same era but who were not deployed to the Gulf region. The mail/telephone survey of this study has been funded and will be implemented.

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, will be investigating the prevalence among veterans

from Iowa of illnesses possibly related to military service in the Persian Gulf. The study will compile self-reported health outcomes from about 20,000 Iowa Persian Gulf veterans (approximately 16,800 active duty, 3,500 reserve/National Guard). This study will attempt to assess pre- and post-service factors that may have contributed to the incidence of self-reported illnesses. Reproductive outcomes will be an important part of this investigation.

The actions of the Army Medical Department and DoD before, during, and after the Persian Gulf War illustrate our concern for the safety, health, and well-being of our military personnel and the military community. We will continue our concerted efforts, in collaboration with other governmental and civilian agencies and institutions, to investigate and resolve the wide range of health problems reported by veterans who deployed to Southwest Asia in defense of the United States.

*a random sample of 4,000 service personnel
(2,000 Persian Gulf veterans and 2,000 servicemembers who served them but were deployed elsewhere).*

This will include both A.D. and reserve national Guard members.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

7842 SPECIAL

September 27, 1994

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #M-1845

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

HHS - Frances White - (202)690-7760 - 328
VA - Robert Coy - (202)273-6666 - 229
OSTP - Elisa Wynn - (202)456-6020 - 288
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249

FROM: JANET R. FORSGREN (for) *Janet R. Forsgren*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Anna BRIATICO (395-7887)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-7362

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Testimony on Unexplained
Illnesses Among Persian Gulf Veterans

DEADLINE: Noon September 28, 1994

COMMENTS: Additional testimony for 9/29 hearing on Persian
Gulf illness among veterans.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before
advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or
receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

Nancy-Ann Min
Jennifer O'Connor
Frank Roeder
Toni Heustead
David Zavada
Alex Keenan *Sarah Schulte*
Cookie Walden
Barry Clendenin (2)

Phebe Vickers
Mary Jo Siclari
Jim Fish
Joe Lackey
Bob Pellicci
Janet Forsgren

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this response sheet

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL

UNITED STATES SENATE

SUBJECT: *Unexplained Illnesses Encountered by Persian Gulf War Veterans*
~~Persian Gulf Illnesses~~

STATEMENT OF: Major General Robert A. Bueche, Jr.
Acting Surgeon General of the Air Force

September 1994

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
UNITED STATES SENATE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJ*

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Testimony on Human Radiation
Experimentation (LRM #M-1838)

OMB has requested NSC views on the proposed testimony by Dr. Soper (Principal Deputy ASD/AE) before the Committee on Government Operations on September 28, 1994, regarding human radiation experimentation. The testimony presents the status of ongoing data collection and record searches regarding prior experiments and states that since this review is still in progress it is premature to discuss any potential Government remedy. The testimony states that Congress, in concert with the Executive Branch, will need to examine and determine the need to establish specific compensation and medical care programs for individual participants in radiation experiments and that the Department of Defense is committed to a full accounting of this matter.

The DoD testimony presents the current status and makes no specific commitments regarding findings or compensation. Due to the immediate suspense (we did not receive this package until after the suspense), I provided a telephonic "no objections" to the OMB staff contact.

Concurrence by: Bill *W. Danvers*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Testimony on Human Radiation
Experimentation (LRM #M-1838)

The National Security Staff has no objections to the proposed testimony. Due to the immediate suspense, this information has been passed telephonically to the OMB contact, Mike Goad.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum LRM #M-1838. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	09/26/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - September 1994 #3 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4636

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

7786
URGENT

September 26, 1994

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #M-1838

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

CIA - [redacted] (b)(3)
ENERGY - Bob Rabben - (202)586-6718 - 209
HHS - Frances White - (202)690-7760 - 328
JUSTICE - Sheila F. Anthony - (202)514-2141 - 217
NASA - Jeff Lawrence - (202)358-1948 - 219
NEC - Sonyia Matthews - (202)456-6630 - 429
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249
OSTP - Elisa Wynn - (202)456-6020 - 288
VA - Robert Coy - (202)273-6666 - 229

[001]

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Testimony on Human Radiation
Experimentation

DEADLINE: 3:00 P.M., Today, Monday, September 26, 1994

THIS TRANSMISSION CONTAINS 12 PAGE(S) (total).

COMMENTS: If you do not respond by the deadline, we will
assume that your agency has no comment.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before
advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or
receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

✓E. Pelton
✓K. Peroff
T.J. Glauthier
✓A. Keenan
✓D. Zavada
✓B. Dorotinsky
✓G. Henry
✓A. Silas
J. Palmieri

B. Damus
J. Klein
S. Neuwirth
C. Varney/P. Caplan
B. Burton
T. Thornton
J. Podesta
J. Morall, OIRA

SEP. -25' 94 (FRI) 17:03 SAIC

TEL: 1 703 847 0890

P.002

**DRAFT TESTIMONY FOR DR. SOPER
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
28 SEPTEMBER 1994**

Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Gordon K. Soper, the Principal Deputy in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. I am here to support your request of August 12th to conduct oversight hearings on Cold War era human subject experimentation. My testimony will focus on radiation experiments.

Before I address the specific questions you asked in your letter of August 12th, I would like to provide you with some background information that will help put our answers into proper context. The use of human volunteers in biomedical research programs in the Armed Forces dates back to the early 1800s. With the advent of the nuclear age and the following Cold War, this research began to include human radiation experiments. There has been Congressional oversight on this topic. For example, in 1972, Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Mike Gravel held hearings into the Department of Defense involvement in radiation experiments at the University of Cincinnati, and in 1986, Representative Edward Markey published a detailed report on 31 Government-sponsored human radiation studies involving 695 individuals. In December of 1993, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary provided to the public some additional information about the Government's participation in human radiation experimentation during the Cold War era. Secretary O'Leary's statements are a reflection of the Clinton Administration's desire to govern in

SEP. -15' 94(FRI) 17:03 SAIC

TEL:1 703 847 0890

P.005

a more open manner. In a further demonstration of a full accounting of the Government's past history in this area, President Clinton instructed the Federal Agencies to conduct a comprehensive search for all available records related to Government-sponsored human radiation experimentation, followed by the full public release of the pertinent information in those records.

In order to facilitate this systematic record search and comprehensive review, the President established two major activities: an Interagency Working Group on Human Radiation Experiments and the Independent Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments.

First, the Government-wide Interagency Working Group includes key representatives from the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Health and Human Services, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Justice, and the Office of Management and Budget. This group is responsible for coordinating and overseeing the Government's search for records of human radiation experimentation. The search strategy for this group is straightforward and all-inclusive. Radiation experiments are defined as those:

- (1) Experiments on individuals involving intentional exposure to ionizing radiation. This category does not include common and routine clinical practices, such as established diagnosis and treatment methods, involving incidental exposures to ionizing radiation.

SEP. 23 94 (PRI) 17:03 SAIG

TEL: 1 703 847 0890

P. 004

(2) Experiments involving intentional environmental releases of radiation that (A) were designed to test human health effects of ionizing radiation; or (B) were designed to test the extent of human exposure to ionizing radiation.

The second activity is the Independent Advisory Committee. It is an outside, independent group composed of eminent scientists, physicians, legal experts and medical ethicists. Its purpose is to advise and guide the government on the larger questions of ethical and scientific standards of government sponsored or conducted research which involved the intentional exposure to ionizing radiation. Specifically, as stated in the Executive Order issued by President Clinton in January: "The Advisory Committee shall consider whether (A) there was a clear medical or scientific purpose for the experiments; (B) appropriate medical follow-up was conducted; and (C) the experiments' design and administration adequately met the ethical and scientific standards, including standards of informed consent, that prevailed at the time of the experiments and that exist today."

These two organizations are working very closely together and obviously will provide guidance that has relevance for the human use experiments that the Department conducts today and in the future.

Within the Department of Defense, we took further steps to ensure that the Department was able to respond positively to the President's challenge. First, then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin appointed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), Dr. Harold P. Smith,

SEP. 23 '94 (FRI) 17:04 SAIC

Jr. as the Department's focal point for this important initiative. Second, to focus the Department's efforts, we set up a command center structure, initially led by a Flag Officer and now led by a Senior Executive Service civilian, that serves as the central repository for all documents retrieved as a result of our record search. The command center is also responsible for reviewing and analyzing documents found during the search and for responding to public inquiries related to human subject participation in radiation experiments.

Third, DoD established strict records review procedures for all DoD components to ensure a comprehensive record search. Within these procedures, the need to "err on the side of inclusion" when searching for records was emphasized to assure the public that the Government was being open and forthcoming on this issue. We also established guidelines to allow for the expeditious declassification of documents located during the record search.

Five simple and straightforward principles guide the Department's efforts. First, we want the search to be thorough. Second, the search will be done as quickly as possible. Third, all due care is to be exercised to preserve records related to human radiation experiments. Fourth, the integrity of the process must be preserved to insure that it retains its credibility in the long term. Fifth, the process must result in open accounting of the Department's past action in human radiation experiments.

In concert with these principles, the Department's approach to fully respond to this issue has two phases. Phase I has been completed and focused on the identification of DoD

organizations that conducted or sponsored human radiation experiments, together with identifying the archives or records center where records concerning such experiments are stored and a description of the process by which the search was conducted. Phase II is still in progress and deals with identifying each human radiation experiment, providing details of the experiment and locating the relevant records. The Department has also focused its efforts to respond to requests for records and information from the Independent Advisory Committee. The Department has provided information related to Departmental informed consent procedures since the mid-1940's; records on the development of ethics policies since 1944; and policy directives related to the establishment and operation of pertinent research and development bodies; and other data.

The record search has been a massive undertaking and is still in progress. It is truly a box-by-box, page-by-page endeavor. Hundreds of people throughout DoD have been involved in this research task expending considerable effort. Some of the locations where records have been located include: National Archives, Washington, D.C. and Suitland, Maryland; Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; Federal Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri; Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland; Naval Hospital, San Diego, California; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; the Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; and Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Since January, we have spent approximately 65,000 man hours on this process; we are making progress, but we still have a long way to go.

Now I would like to address your specific questions. First, concerning DoD sponsored

SEP. -25' 94(FRI) 17:05 SAIC

TEL: 1 703 847 0890

P. 007

programs involving human subject ionizing radiation experiments during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the Department has categorized these experiments into four categories: therapeutic/diagnostic, intentional atmospheric releases, total body irradiation, and tracer studies. To give you the flavor of what I am talking about, the following are examples of experiments from each category: Therapeutic/diagnostic studies include "The Use of Radioisotopes in Diagnostic Hematologic Procedures (Simultaneous Cr-51 and Fe-59 Studies)" and "The Significance of Positive Ipsilateral Nodes in Resections of Lung"; intentional atmospheric releases include "The Green Run Test" conducted in Washington and radiological warfare tests conducted at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah from 1949-1952; total body irradiation research includes the "Metabolic Changes in Humans Following Total Body Irradiation" experiments conducted at the University of Cincinnati and "Systemic and Clinical Effects Induced in 263 Cancer Patients by Whole-Body X-Irradiation with Nominal Air Doses of 15 to 200 Rads"; and tracer studies include "The Total Exchangeable Potassium and Chloride and Total Body Water in Healthy Men of Varying Water and Fat Content" and "Assessment of Platelet Function in Patients with Coronary Artery Disease."

In total, approximately 2,000 human radiation experiments with over 52,000 participants were conducted or sponsored by DoD. Most of the experiments identified to date fall into the therapeutic/diagnostic or tracer study categories where radioactive materials were used to assist the experimentation, but effects of the irradiation were not a part of the research. Phase II of the record search is continuing and is expected to be complete by April of 1995. As a result of this continued intensive search, more experiments may be identified in the future.

SEP. 25 '94 (FRI) 17:05 SAIC

I will now address your question concerning the potential effects of these ionizing radiation experiments upon human subjects. This is a key focus of the investigation of both the Independent Advisory Committee and the Department of Defense. Since its creation in February 1994, the DoD command center has been compiling information about human radiation experimentation. A detailed questionnaire has been developed and distributed to all individuals who contact or are referred to the command center and come under DoD's purview. This questionnaire includes a section concerning medical problems experienced by these individuals. Responses to these questions are helping to determine individuals who may have been affected by radiation experiments. This information will ultimately be helpful in any notification and compensation initiatives. Determining the potential effect of exposure to ionizing radiation will have to be done on a case-by-case basis. Many factors will influence the answer, such as the subject's age and the type, duration and frequency of exposure.

Let me now respond to your question about what efforts DoD has made to notify the subjects of these experiments. As I mentioned earlier, one of the responsibilities of the DoD command center is to respond to public inquiries related to human subjects participation in radiation experiments. Inquiries come to the command center by several means: the Radiation Experiments National Helpline, referrals from other agencies, Congressional referrals, White House referrals, or direct contact. To date the command center has been in contact with more than 4,000 individuals.

You have also enquired about the efforts DoD has made to provide medical care or

SEP. -25' 94 (FRI) 17:05 SAIC

compensation for the subjects of these experiments. On this issue, one of the prime responsibilities of the Independent Advisory Committee is to provide recommendations on the need for the Government to compensate and/or provide medical care to participants in human radiation experiments. At this time I believe it is premature to discuss any remedy the Government should apply in this matter until our research is completed and their report and recommendations are evaluated. However, as an example of the Department's response to previous problems related to ionizing radiation exposure, the Department does oversee the Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) program, which was established in the late 1970s to identify individuals who participated in U. S. atmospheric nuclear testing or participated in the post-war occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. This program provides the Department with the means to investigate and evaluate each case. Over 205,000 individuals have been identified as participating in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing program. Another 195,000 DoD personnel have been identified as participating in the occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over the last five years an average of 2,000 new program participants have been added to the program annually. To date NTPR has been in contact with more than 70,000 individuals.

Furthermore, the provision of medical care as a result of exposure to ionizing radiation is governed by Public Law 97-72, the "Veterans' Health Care and Small Business Loan Act of 1981," which authorized the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide hospital and nursing home care and limited outpatient services to "veterans who were exposed while serving on active duty to ionizing radiation from the detonation of a nuclear device in connection with each veteran's participation in the test of such a device, or with the American occupation of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki during the period beginning September 11, 1945 and ending July 1, 1946." This law provides for medical care related to radiogenic diseases, but does not authorize care for conditions that are found by the Department of Veterans Affairs to have resulted from other than the exposure to ionizing radiation.

As you are aware, Congress has not passed legislation to direct the Government to provide compensation or medical services to the subjects of human radiation experiments. Several bills are currently before Congress related to compensation and medical care for radiation experiment subjects, including HR 4292, "Radiation Experimentation Victims Act of 1994" introduced by Representative Edward Markcy; HR 3743 "Radiation Experimentation Compensation Act of 1994" introduced by Representative Martin Frost. Congress, in concert with the Executive branch, will need to examine and determine the need to establish specific compensation and medical care programs for individual participants in radiation experiments.

As concerns your question regarding informed consent, formal DoD policy for the protection of human subjects in research dates back to at least 1953. At that time a TOP SECRET Memorandum was sent to the Secretaries of the Services from Secretary of Defense C.E. Wilson, titled "Use of Human Volunteers in Experimental Research". This memorandum authorized the voluntary participation of military personnel and civilian employees in DoD conducted research for atomic, biological and chemical warfare defense and established specific standards, based on guidelines from the Nuremberg Code, for informed consent, minimization of risk of harm to subjects, and other matters.

SEP 25 94(FRI) 17:06 SAIC

TEL:1 703 847 0890

P.011

Over the years, more detailed procedures have been established, including incorporation in 1991 of the 1974 Department of Health and Human Services regulations for the Protection of human subjects, 45 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 46.

Today, DoD-sponsored research is governed by the so-called "Common Rule"—the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects—which is part of DoD regulations at Title 32, CFR, Part 219. A copy of this regulation is attached to my statement. DoD is a full partner in the government's commitment to this standard and has further defined its human use regulation in DoD Directive 3216.2, "Protection of Human Subjects in DoD Supported Research," January 7, 1983 and Department of Defense Guidance for Assurance of Compliance with the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, June 10, 1993.

In closing, I would like to reemphasize that the Department of Defense is committed to a full accounting in this matter and is equally committed to ensuring that any experiments involving human subjects are conducted in accordance with established protocols and the highest ethical standards. I will be happy to answer any questions you might have on this issue.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*
SUBJECT: SR For Return to Normandy Visit to White House

At Tab II is a letter to the President from the head of the Return to Normandy Association (RTN), an organization made up of WWII veterans who parachuted into Normandy during the June 1994 commemoration of the WWII landings. The RTN President writes that during the D-Day commemoration events in France, the President invited members of their organization to visit the White House.

If you recall, some Pentagon officials were against the idea of these veterans jumping into Normandy, until President Clinton lent his support to the veterans' efforts. We recommend that the President invite them to sit in a VIP box during Veterans Day activities at Arlington National Cemetery on November 11, 1994. Prior to the ceremony at Arlington, we would arrange for the group to receive a tour of the White House.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

date____/____/____

☐ ACCEPT☐ REGRET☐ PENDING

TO: Ricki Seidman
Assistant to the President and
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST Meeting with President

PURPOSE: Provides an opportunity for
President to honor WWII veterans who
jumped into Normandy in June

BACKGROUND: The head of the Return to Normandy
Association (RTN), an organization
of WWII veterans who parachuted into
Normandy during the June 1994
Normandy commemoration, requested
that members of their organization
meet with the President. If you
recall, some Pentagon officials were
against the idea of these veterans
jumping into Normandy, until
President Clinton lent his support
to the veterans' efforts.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President met with several
members of this group during the D-
Day commemoration ceremonies on June
6. The RTN Association's head
writes that on this occasion the
President and Mrs. Clinton invited
them to the White House.

DATE AND TIME: November 11, 1994 11:00 a.m.

DURATION: N/A

LOCATION: Arlington National Cemetery

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
Participating veterans' names to be
provided later

cc: Stephanie Streett

OUTLINE OF EVENTS:

During his Veterans Day remarks at Arlington, the President would acknowledge the presence in a VIP box of these veterans. Prior to the ceremony, the veterans would be given a tour of the White House.

REMARKS REQUIRED:

None (other than speech for occasion)

MEDIA COVERAGE:

WH Photographer

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE:

As desired

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE:

As desired

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE:

None

RECOMMENDED BY:

NSC

CONTACT:

Jim Seaton (6-9191)

Scheduling Advice Memorandum

FROM: RICKI SEIDMAN

TO:

JOAN BAGGETT _____
LLOYD CUTLER _____
RAHM EMANUEL _____
JOHN EMERSON _____
MARK GEARAN _____
JACK GIBBONS _____
PAT GRIFFIN _____
MARCIA HALE _____
KAREN HANCOX _____
ALEXIS HERMAN _____
NANCY HERNREICH _____
HAROLD ICKES _____
WILL ITOH X _____
PHIL LADER _____
ANTHONY LAKE _____
BRUCE LINDSEY _____
AL MALDON _____

KATIE MCGINTY _____
MACK MCLARTY _____
LEON PANETTA _____
JOHN PODESTA _____
JACK QUINN _____
CAROL RASCO _____
BOB RUBIN _____
ELI SEGAL _____
PATTI SOLIS _____
GEORGE STEPHANOPOLOUS _____
ANN STOCK _____
CHRISTINE VARNEY _____
MELANNE VERVEER _____
DANNY WEXLER _____
MAGGIE WILLIAMS _____
TONY WILSON _____

RE: *Return to Normandy Association visit*

The Scheduling Office is considering the attached invitation.
Please advise us:

- X POTUS should attend.
____ POTUS should/need not attend.
____ POTUS should/need not attend but should send a representative

X If you think POTUS should attend please submit a proposal ASAP

Your Additional Comments:

PLEASE RETURN THIS MEMO TO ANNE MCGUIRE IN ROOM 185.5 BY

9/28

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

- ☐ O - OUTGOING
☐ H - INTERNAL
☐ I - INCOMING
 Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: Sam M. Gibbons

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Endorses request for the President to meet with the Veterans from the Return to Normandy Association

ROUTE TO:

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>SC</u>	<u>WIND</u>		<u>99/9/21</u>		<u>1/1</u>
<u>NS</u>	<u>1704</u>		<u>99/9/21</u>		<u>1/1</u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
 C - Comment/Recommendation
 D - Draft Response
 F - Furnish Fact Sheet
 to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 S - For Signature
 X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
 B - Non-Special Referral
 C - Completed
 S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 Code = "A"
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOP).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

SCANNED

WAYS AND MEANS
COMMITTEE
(ACTING CHAIRMAN)

SUBCOMMITTEES:
TRADE

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION
(VICE CHAIRMAN)

SAM M. GIBBONS

11th DISTRICT, FLORIDA

Congress of the United States

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 14, 1994


The Honorable Bill Clinton
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed are copies of correspondence from the Return to Normandy Association that is self-explanatory.

I don't know, Mr. President, if you want to reiterate your invitation to these veterans to visit The White House, but it might be a good opportunity to get some political support from some of these folks, some of whom appear to be from California. In any case, I know you will make the right decision.

Sincerely,



Sam M. Gibbons
United States Congressman

SMG:f
Enclosure

PLEASE RESPOND TO:

- ☐ HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-3376
- ☐ 2002 N. LOIS AVE.
SUITE 260
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33607
TELEPHONE: (813) 870-2101
- ☐ 201 S. KINGS AVE., #6
BRANDON, FLORIDA 33511
TELEPHONE: (813) 689-2847

BARBARA TOFFLING
CHIEF OF STAFF

GREG WONDERS
FLORIDA OFFICE MANAGER

PRESIDENT: Richard F. Mandich • 3420 Xenophon St., San Diego, CA 92106 • PH: (619) 222-1602

VICE PRESIDENT: Col. Emile Gueguen (Ret.) • Liaison-U.S./French • PH: (619) 488-5452

VICE PRESIDENT: Max Gurney • Public Relations & Travel • PH: (619) 459-8912

VICE PRESIDENT: Kenneth Shaker • Special Events & Funding • PH: (619) 223-9432

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Richard Case • PH: (702) 735-6932

Rene Dussaq • PH: (818) 789-1389

Thomas Rice • PH: (619) 281-8477

William Sykes • PH: (310) 598-4148



August 22, 1994

The Honorable Sam Gibbons
2204 Rayburn Bldg.
Washington, DC 20515

Enclosure: Letter to President Clinton of June 9, 1994.

Dear Mr. Gibbons,

Bill Coleman, myself and several other of our Return to Normandy (RTN) association WW2 veteran combat paratroopers had the honor of meeting you at our jump field at Amfreville, France on June 5 of this year.

I understand that Bill Coleman had recently talked with you and/or Rich Davis regarding an invitation to visit the White House that was extended to several of our RTN men at both the Utah Beach and Omaha Beach D-Day ceremonies by both Bill and Hillary Clinton. Following up on these verbally expressed invitations I had the letter of enclosure (1) sent to President Clinton from Paris on behalf of our RTN association.

There were 41 of us veterans who parachuted into Normandy on June 5, 1994 and as stated in the letter we would be delighted to visit the White House at the convenience of the president. We have a commitment by Continental Airlines to fly all of us veterans and spouses to Washington at no cost for the visit.

It would be sincerely appreciated if you would follow up on this invitation such that a specific date for our visit may be set. A suggestion is that November 11, 1994 Veterans Day might be ideal occasion for such a visit.

Very Truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R. Mandich'.

Richard F. Mandich

PRESIDENT: Richard F. Mandich • 3420 Xenophon St., San Diego, CA 92106 • PH: (619) 222-1602

VICE PRESIDENT: Col. Emile Gueguen (Ret.) • Liaison-U.S./French • PH: (619) 488-5452

VICE PRESIDENT: Max Gurney • Public Relations & Travel • PH: (619) 459-8912

VICE PRESIDENT: Kenneth Shaker • Special Events & Funding • PH: (619) 223-9432

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Richard Case • PH: (702) 735-6932

Rene Dussaq • PH: (818) 789-1389

Thomas Rice • PH: (619) 281-8477

William Sykes • PH: (310) 598-4148



President William CLINTON
The White House
Washington DC 20500
USA

Paris, 9th June, 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I am President of the Return to Normandy Association, consisting of the 41 Veterans World War II combat paratroopers who parachuted at Ste Mère Eglise, France on June 5, 1994 as part of the Normandy landing 50th anniversary ceremonies. A copy of our association booklet which gives the profiles and photos of those men is forwarded to you with this letter.

On behalf of all of our members I thank you for speaking with a number of our men at the Utah and Omaha beaches ceremonies and for the invitation extended to our paratroopers by both you and Mrs. Clinton to visit the White House.

We would be delighted to visit the White House at your convenience. It would be a memorable event for all of us and we think it would be of personal relations benefit to you with respect to both active and retired U.S. Military.

I and others of our association have talked with many of the young and old French and American people here in France as well as other U.S. veterans. The feeling has been universal that your presence enhanced the Normandy landing ceremonies and that the words you spoke were in very good taste and very well received.

A number of our men, including myself, had the additional honor of meeting at the Ste Mère Eglise parachute landing field with Senator Sam Gibbons, who himself was a World War II paratrooper, and with Senator Sam Nunn.

We are looking forward to meeting with you and Mrs Clinton.

Sincerely,

Richard F. MANDICH
Life Member-101st Airborne Division Association
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Report RE: HR 4489, NASA
Authorizations, FY 95-96

*Bh -
Note last entry -*

Tab II provides the Defense response to a Senate amendment to HR 4489. Defense opposes the Senate amendment on the grounds that the wording is sufficiently vague that a licensee could interpret it as meaning there is no requirement for notifying the government before selling imagery gained from certain satellites. Defense notes that, although none of the firms currently granted operating licenses is yet operational in space, some of the arrangements these firms are making with foreign entities could raise national security issues. Therefore, we need to be aware of any plans for these firms to make such sales.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers *BD*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the proposed Defense report.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Report RE: HR 4489, NASA
Authorizations, FY 95-96

The National Security Council staff concurs in the proposed
Defense report.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum LRM #1-3900. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	09/27/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - September 1994 #3 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4636

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

7874pgp

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503**

September 27, 1994

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #I-3900

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

AGRICULTURE - Marvin Shapiro - (202)720-1516 - 312
COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202)482-3151 - 324
INTERIOR - Jane Lyder - (202)208-4371 - 329
JUSTICE - Sheila F. Anthony - (202)514-2141 - 217
STATE - Julia C. Norton - (202)647-4463 - 225
TRANSPORTATION - Tom Harlihy - (202)366-4687 - 226
NASA - Jeff Lawrence - (202)358-1948 - 219
NEC - Sonyia Matthews - (202)456-6630 - 429
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249
OSTP - Elisa Wynn - (202)456-6020 - 288
USTR - Fred Montgomery - (202)395-3475 - 223
CIA - (b)(3)

[002]

FROM: JAMES J. JUKES (for)
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Jeffrey WEINBERG (395-3457)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-3454

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Report RE: HR 4489, NASA
Authorizations, FYs 95-96

DEADLINE: 10 AM September 28, 1994

COMMENTS: The House and Senate staffs are working on the final version of HR 4489.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
Regina Genton, NSC
Jeff Hofgard, OSTP
Ken Schwartz
Louisa Koch
Jonas Neihardt
Kevin Scheid

Tony Wu
Jack Fellows
Sarah Horrigan
Peter Weiss

RESPONSE TO LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

If your response to this request for views is simple (e.g., concur/no comment) we prefer that you respond by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is simple and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a secretary.

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

TO: Jeffrey WEINBERG
Office of Management and Budget
Fax Number: (202) 395-3109
Analyst/Attorney's Direct Number: (202) 395-3457
Branch-Wide Line (to reach secretary): (202) 395-3454

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

**SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Report RE: HR 4489, NASA
Authorizations, FYs 95-96**

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
_____ response sheet

The Honorable Ernest Hollings
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please consider the views of the Department of Defense on the proposed amendment in section 301(13) of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 4489, 103d Congress, a bill entitled the "National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization and Space Policy Act, Fiscal Year 1995". After careful review of H.R. 4489 and S. 1881, the Department of Defense respectfully recommends that the proposed amendment in section 301(13) be deleted.

Title III of the H.R. 4489 and S. 1881 deals with "Revisions to Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992," and the amendment proposed at section 301(13) would amend section 202(b)(6) of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 by inserting the underlined words in the following sentence: Licensees would be required to:

"(6) Notify the Secretary of any agreement, other than for the sale of data generated by the system in accordance with the license, that the licensee intends to enter with a foreign nation, entity, or consortium involving foreign nations or entities"

The Department of Defense is concerned that since the basic purpose for which an operating license is issued is the sale of imagery, the proposed additional wording is sufficiently vague that a licensee could interpret it as meaning there was no real requirement for notification of the government.

Five operating licenses already have been issued to United States commercial firms and the terms of these licenses assumed a continuation of section 202(b)(6) as it was enacted in 1992 in the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act. Had this not been the case, it might well be that different conditions would have been included in the licenses granted.

The Department of Defense has a particular interest in the changes proposed for title III of H.R. 4489 and S. 1881 because the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assuring that licensed systems are operated in support of the national security. It is difficult to foresee how this might be accomplished if licensees can make arrangements with "a foreign nation, entity, or consortium involving foreign nations or entities" without ever having to inform the United States Government.

It is Department of Defense's understanding that section 202(b)(6) was never intended to apply to the sale of one or a few imagery products to a foreign customer. However, the Department of Defense considers the reporting responsibilities of all licensees must include notification to the Secretary of Commerce for the sale to foreign entities of data which provide for near real-time direct access to or foreign distribution rights for unenhanced data, or which involve high volume data purchases.

None of the firms granted operating licenses is yet operational in space, but it already is apparent that some of the arrangements with foreign entities already in progress have the potential to raise foreign policy issues and to raise issues requiring national security review. This makes it important that the United States Government be kept fully aware as to what is going on by requiring notification.

If you consider that, despite our arguments to the contrary, some amendment to section 202(b)(6) still is called for, Department of Defense representatives are prepared to meet with your staffers to develop specific wording.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 28, 1994

JOINT STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY
BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscored that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening global strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. Multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban have begun. The Presidents noted the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in ensuring global stability.

President Yeltsin outlined the initiative Russia presented to the UN General Assembly for a treaty among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council for a halt to the production of fissile materials for weapons; a ban on the reuse of fissile materials in weapons; further elimination of nuclear warheads; and reduction of strategic delivery systems.

President Clinton outlined the ideas he described at the UN General Assembly for cooperation in advancing nuclear non-proliferation, particularly to enhance the security of nuclear materials and to prevent nuclear smuggling.

The Presidents discussed these initiatives, of which they had informed each other in advance and which therefore reflected shared goals and certain common proposals designed to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. In this regard, the Presidents agreed that the permanent members of the UN Security Council, given their responsibilities as nuclear powers, have a special role to play.

The United States and Russia will work with the other permanent members, as well as other countries, to ensure a successful outcome at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty conference that produces an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test

ban treaty at the earliest possible date, and to achieve a global prohibition on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The Presidents also agreed on the desirability of continuing their respective moratoria on nuclear weapon tests.

The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation and dismantlement of strategic nuclear systems by the parties to the START I Treaty and the implementation of the January 14, 1994 Trilateral Statement. They welcomed the real possibility to bring the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol into force in the very near future and pledged full cooperation to this end. The Presidents agreed that their defense ministers would exchange information every three months on strategic systems that have been deactivated and eliminated.

The Presidents confirmed their intention to seek early ratification of the START II Treaty, once the START I Treaty enters into force, and expressed their desire to exchange START II instruments of ratification at the next U.S.-Russia summit meeting.

In an important new development, the Presidents agreed that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia will proceed to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status.

The Presidents instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces. They also discussed the prospect for confidence-building and transparency measures in this area. The Presidents consider that, as the political partnership develops, there will be new opportunities to strengthen stability through openness and transparency.

President Clinton described to President Yeltsin the unilateral adjustments the United States will make in its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces and safety, security and use control practices as a result of the recently completed nuclear posture review. President Yeltsin noted these U.S. changes as a manifestation of the new relationship between the United States and Russia and described the comparable review of measures

underway in Russia to reduce Russian nuclear forces and improve their safety. The Presidents agreed that each side would independently consider further unilateral steps, as appropriate, with regard to their respective nuclear forces.

The Presidents agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. Noting the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, the Presidents instructed their respective delegations, working with the other participating states, to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time.

Both sides have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The Presidents agreed that the two sides will conduct a joint exercise of theater missile defenses and early warning. This exercise would contribute to providing a basis for U.S. and Russian forces to operate together, for example, in peacekeeping operations.

Proceeding from the principles of partnership and reciprocity, the Presidents agreed to work together to develop broad bilateral and multilateral cooperation on assuring nuclear security. They agreed to:

Cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including through the exchange of appropriate information, to prevent illegal trade in nuclear materials and undertake measures to strengthen the regime control and physical protection of such materials.

Exchange detailed information at the next meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security. The sides will develop a process for exchanging this information on a regular basis.

Direct their joint working group on nuclear safeguards, transparency and irreversibility to pursue by March 1995 further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Facilitate broad cooperation among appropriate agencies in both countries to ensure effective control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials.

Facilitate cooperative programs between U.S. and Russian national laboratories in the areas of safety, physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials.

Deepen cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense in the area of ensuring nuclear security.

Implement a joint plan to expedite construction of a new, long-term storage facility for fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons at Mayak.

Taking a broad view of strategic stability and bearing in mind the need to control all types of weapons of mass destruction, the Presidents agreed on:

The importance of continued, full, mutual and reciprocal implementation of the September 1992 U.S.-Russian-UK statement on Biological Weapons as a means of gaining confidence that offensive biological weapons programs have been terminated.

The need for adherence by all states to the Chemical Weapons Convention and for universal application of its provisions, as well as the need for adoption without delay of measures that make it possible to bring the CWC into force; and the need to resolve without delay the outstanding issues related to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding.

###

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7198

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(u)*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Senator DeConcini and
Representative Hoyer Regarding General Wesley
Clark

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding suggested replies to Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer in response to their letter about General Clark's meeting with Bosnian Serb General Mladic.

Concurrence by: *for* Bill Danvers *(u)* and Bob Bell *(u)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Replies to DeConcini and Hoyer

Tab B Incoming correspondence

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *W* NARA, Date *1/3/2007*

2,16-0152-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUSAN BROPHY

SUBJECT: Letters to Senator DeConcini and Representative
Hoyer Regarding General Wesley Clark

Purpose

To respond to a letter co-signed by Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer.

Background

Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer wrote expressing their "outrage" over Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic during the former's recent visit to Bosnia. John Deutch and I have reviewed the circumstances surrounding the meeting and concluded that disciplinary action would not be appropriate. There was, however, a breakdown in coordination between the Embassy and Clark, which is acknowledged in the attached replies. Apparently, the Embassy's disapproval of the meeting was not conveyed to Clark and he was under the impression it was an approved meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 1/3/2017
7516-0151-6

Attachments

Tab A Replies to DeConcini and Hoyer
Tab B Incoming correspondence from DeConcini and Hoyer
Tab C Letter from John Deutch on the incident

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's August 27 meeting with General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Bosnian Serb Armed Forces. I understand and share your concern over this meeting, which was not consistent with United States policy toward the Bosnian Serbs. I do not believe, however, that disciplinary action against General Clark is appropriate.

General Clark has served his country throughout his distinguished career with brilliance and dedication. In this instance, he was in Bosnia on a fact-finding mission related to ongoing U.S. and NATO operations and planning for a possible lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Federation. After meeting with several Bosnian Government and Federation leaders, General Clark was encouraged by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Commander of UN forces in Bosnia, to meet with General Mladic. Because of a breakdown in communications between General Clark and the U.S. Charge d'affaires, General Rose's offer was accepted instead of being turned down.

Although the meeting should not have taken place, it did serve the purpose of allowing General Clark to state U.S. policy quite clearly and forcefully to General Mladic. The Bosnian Serbs can have no doubt that we expect them to accept the Contact Group proposal and that they will face increased pressure and isolation as long as they continue to reject peace.

General Clark is an officer of absolute integrity and unquestioned loyalty. As he continues to carry out his important duties, he retains my full confidence.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis DeConcini
Chairman
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Steny:

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's August 27 meeting with General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Bosnian Serb Armed Forces. I understand and share your concern over this meeting, which was not consistent with United States policy toward the Bosnian Serbs. I do not believe, however, that disciplinary action against General Clark is appropriate.

General Clark has served his country throughout his distinguished career with brilliance and dedication. In this instance, he was in Bosnia on a fact-finding mission related to ongoing U.S. and NATO operations and planning for a possible lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Federation. After meeting with several Bosnian Government and Federation leaders, General Clark was encouraged by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Commander of UN forces in Bosnia, to meet with General Mladic. Because of a breakdown in communications between General Clark and the U.S. Charge d'affaires, General Rose's offer was accepted instead of being turned down.

Although the meeting should not have taken place, it did serve the purpose of allowing General Clark to state U.S. policy quite clearly and forcefully to General Mladic. The Bosnian Serbs can have no doubt that we expect them to accept the Contact Group proposal and that they will face increased pressure and isolation as long as they continue to reject peace.

General Clark is an officer of absolute integrity and unquestioned loyalty. As he continues to carry out his important duties, he retains my full confidence.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN
STENY H. HOYER, MARYLAND, CO-CHAIRMAN

FRANK LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
KARRY REID, NEVADA
BOB GRAHAM, FLORIDA
BARBARA MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
ALFONSO M. D'AMATO, NEW YORK
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA
COWIE BACCH, FLORIDA

EDWARD J. MARKEY, MASSACHUSETTS
BILL RICHARDSON, NEW MEXICO
FRANK MCCLOSKEY, INDIANA
BLAISEN CAUDIN, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER M. SMITH, NEW JERSEY
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, ILLINOIS
FRANK R. WOLF, VIRGINIA
HAMILTON FISH, NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
JOHN SHATTUCK, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASHTON CARTER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CHARLES MEISNER, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

SAMUEL G. WISE, COMMISSION STAFF DIRECTOR
JANE B. FISHER, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
MARY SUE HAFNER, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL

COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

234 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(202) 225-1901

#0778'2

SEP 6 11

September 2, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our outrage over Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's meeting with Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic. General Clark's handling of this meeting has seriously undermined previously stated U.S. positions regarding the conflict and damaged his own credibility in the eyes of the many surviving victims of Mladic's criminal forces. We therefore seriously question his ability to carry out his duties relating to the Yugoslav conflict any further.

Ratko Mladic is known as one of the most villainous war criminals of our times. During the Croatian phase of the war, his ruthlessness as commander of a Yugoslav Army corp earned him the name "butcher of Knin." Taking over the Bosnian Serb military force the next year, he earned the additional title "ethnic cleanser in chief." His forces are directly responsible for the months of shelling of Sarajevo, Gorazde and other cities, brazenly terrorizing an innocent civilian population in front of the entire world. The forced expulsions, executions, torture and rapes which were carried out on a massive scale as part of Bosnian Serb aggression were not only tolerated, but in all likelihood encouraged and perhaps even ordered, by this man.

Fact-finding, the ostensible purpose of this meeting, is of course a necessary task when dealing with as critical a problem as the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, press reports indicated that the meeting was requested by Mladic, not General Clark. The Pentagon indicated that it was not aware of State Department objections at the time of the meeting, but common sense should have led the General to seek this advice before agreeing to such a controversial meeting. In any event, we seriously question the utility of a high-level meeting with a man known for spewing forth lies, propaganda and threats.


We find it unquestionably inappropriate, however, that a senior U.S. military officer like General Clark would conduct what the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs labelled a "military-to-military" meeting with the leader of forces representing a self-proclaimed but completely illegitimate Bosnian Serb state. It is unimaginable that this U.S. military officer would then switch caps with this war criminal, accept a bottle of alcohol and a pistol from him as a gift, and, moreover, allow himself to be photographed doing so.

The message this must have sent to aggressor and victim alike is appalling, and we are sure Mladic has used it to his advantage. Rather than isolating Serb extremists, which we believe is our stated policy, we appear to be currying their favor.

Mr. President, two months ago, the international community drew up a peace settlement plan. While it was widely viewed as rewarding Serb aggression, it was at least offered to those engaged in the conflict on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with a two-week deadline for a clear response, and consequences suggested to those rejecting it. The Bosnians accepted the plan on time and unconditionally. The Bosnian Serbs effectively said no, and Ratko Mladic's subsequent attacks on UN personnel and civilians served as an explanation point to that response. The militants have since rejected the plan again and again. Still the plan is left open to them to accept at their leisure. Still the arms embargo is illegally imposed on legitimate Bosnian forces. Tighter sanctions on Serbia, the only real consequence of the Serb rejection, is replaced by the possible lifting of some sanctions. Intra-Serb squabbling has done more to derail the international approach than to stop the war, and only became manifest when the international community appeared to have resolve. Now, as we reportedly deny a general of Bosnian forces a trip to Washington, we allow ourselves to be viewed as warming up to the man most responsible for the conduct of the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This, Mr. President, cannot continue. We have written to you previously about the steps we believe should be taken to decisively thwart Serb aggression. We urge you, at this junction, to correct the image of complicity with the aggressor which has just been created by taking appropriate and necessary action against Lieutenant General Wesley Clark.

Sincerely,



STENY H. HOYER
Co-Chairman



DENNIS DeCONCINI
Chairman

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 12, 1994

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DENNIS DECONCINI

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER LIEUTENANT GENERAL
WESLEY CLARK'S MEETING WITH BOSNIAN SERB
MILITARY LEADER RATKO MLADIC

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
PATRICK GRIFFIN		ORG	94/09/12		C 94/09/12
WILLIAM ITOH	REFERRAL NOTE:	RSA	94/09/12		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: ADDITIONAL SIGNEE

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 1 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D AZ (B) (C)

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:      *DISPOSITION      *OUTGOING      *
*                  *                  *              *
*A-A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM        *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE       *C-COMPLETED      *          OF SIGNER  *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET   *S-SUSPENDED      *      CODE = A      *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                  *COMPLETED = DATE OF  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                  *          OUTGOING   *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                  *                  *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                  *                  *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,EOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

SCANNED

Nancy



Nancy:

My suggested
re-write is
enclosed.

Bob

To Bob -

9/26

I think your rewrite is
right on target - as always!
Thanks.

Can you do a memo from R to POTUS
+ endorse it appropriate the note from Keith. More
version clear. ~~OK~~ Thanks m

no. RGA

LOG # 7198

URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

Amke

DISPOSITION

1

TWR

A

1

.....

1

— — — — —

2

1

Age Group	Percentage of Respondents
18-24	65
25-34	75
35-44	85
45-54	90
55-64	95
65-74	98
75+	99

3

$$\frac{1}{2}$$

5



FFA

N = No Further Action

To Bob Belf -

Can you please take a crack at this. As drafted it doesn't work.

Thanks,

Man

Exec Sec Office has diskette

YES

9-20-94

Nancy:

For what it's worth, my own view is that we ought to distance the President from this visit more than the attached letter does.

Two alternatives: 1) either have the POTUS response more forthrightly express disapproval, or 2) have Tony sign out a letter on behalf of the President.

1) Edits at Tabs I+A please.

2) May also want to re-run letter on larger (8 1/2 x 11) paper.

TWR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7198

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20
September 19, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Senator DeConcini and
Representative Hoyer Regarding General Wesley
Clark

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding suggested replies to Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer in response to their letter about General Clark's meeting with Bosnian Serb General Mladic. ~~The letter was drafted by OSD, modified by NSC, and cleared by John Deutch and VADM Owens.~~

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers *Bob Bell*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letters to DeConcini and Hoyer
Tab B Incoming correspondence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *1/3/2017*
2016-0152 -F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUSAN BROPHY

SUBJECT: Letters to Senator DeConcini and Representative
Hoyer Regarding General Wesley Clark

Purpose

To respond to a letter co-signed by Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer.

Background

Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer wrote expressing their "outrage" over Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic during the former's recent visit to Bosnia. John Deutch and I have reviewed the circumstances surrounding the meeting and concluded that disciplinary action ~~is not required~~. There was, however, a breakdown in coordination between Washington and the field, which is acknowledged in the attached replies. ~~The attached letters have been cleared by the Chairman of the JCS. General Shalikashvili.~~ ~~Also reviewed with the attached responses to DeConcini and Hoyer.~~

would be appropriate the embassy Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to DeConcini and Hoyer
Tab B Incoming correspondence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 72 NARA, Date 1/4/2017

2016-0152-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

*The embassy's
Apparently, the embassy's
disapproval of the
meeting was not conveyed
to Clark and he
was under the impression
it was an approved
meeting*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7198

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 19, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Senator DeConcini and
Representative Hoyer Regarding General Wesley
Clark

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding suggested replies to Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer in response to their letter about General Clark's meeting with Bosnian Serb General Mladic. The letter was drafted by OSD, modified by NSC, and cleared by John Deutch and VADM Owens.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letters to DeConcini and Hoyer
Tab B Incoming correspondence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *W* NARA, Date *1/3/07*
2016-0157-f

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUSAN BROPHYSUBJECT: Letters to Senator DeConcini and Representative
Hoyer Regarding General Wesley ClarkPurpose

To respond to a letter co-signed by Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer.

Background

Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer wrote expressing their "outrage" over Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic during the former's recent visit to Bosnia. John Deutch and I have reviewed the circumstances surrounding the meeting and concluded that disciplinary action is not required. There was, however, a breakdown in coordination between Washington and the field, which is acknowledged in the attached replies. ~~The attached letters have been cleared by the Chairman of the JCS.~~ *the embassy* *Clarke* *General Shalikashvili also concurs with the attached responses to DeConcini and Hoyer.*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to DeConcini and Hoyer
Tab B Incoming correspondence

The embassy's
Apparently, the embassy's
disapproval of the
meeting was not conveyed
to Clarke and he
was under the impression
it was an approved
meeting

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *12* NARA, Date *1/2/07**1016-0152-6*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1994

To: Sandy V.

The Pentagon sent over a draft response defending Clark's actions. Their line is that Clark and his staff never received the US Charge D'affairs' disapproval of Clark's meeting with Mladic. They say he made all the right points in all meeting ("he clearly and forcefully expressed US concerns about the Bosnian Serbs' lack of cooperation in the peace process and pressed Mladic to make a significant overture of peace such as to demilitarize Sarajevo or one of the other safe zones.") [I've killed draft because it is too detailed and defensive.]

Please check with State on their view and draft response. TL suggest the following:

- 
- appreciate concern, apparently there was a miscommunication with State
 - Clark stated our policy clearly in meeting.
 - The Serbs have no doubt about policy.
 - Don't make judgement on whether Clark's action was appropriate or not.

Thanks, Nancy S.

Nancy,

As you know, John Deutch and General Shalikashvili have very strong feelings about how they want General Wes Clark to be defended by the Administration.

As John mentioned, the JCS prepared the attached packet. Deutch and Perry would like the White House to go with the brief response to Hoyer and DeConcini signed by the President (not Deutch) which is Tab #3. In spite of John's strong preference, he wanted me to show you the entire packet -- not to confuse you -- but to give you additional background information.

Tab #1 is a proposed letter from Deutch to the President defending Clark. John has no intention of signing this -- he just wants you to see it.

Tab #2 is a long response to Hoyer and DeConcini detailing the events surrounding Clark's meeting with Mladic.

Because John and Shali care so much about the handling of this matter, if you or Tony have problems or are going to make changes to the proposed response, could you please let me know.

Thanks.



THE SPECIAL
ASSISTANT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



September 15, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR, NSC

FROM: Margie Sullivan

SUBJECT: Lieutenant General Wesley Clark

As you know, John Deutch and General Shalikashvili have very strong feelings about how they want General Wes Clark to be defended by the Administration.

As John mentioned, the JCS prepared the attached packet. Deutch and Perry would like the White House to go with the brief response to Hoyer and DeConcini signed by the President (not Deutch) which is Tab #3. In spite of John's strong preference, he wanted me to show you the entire packet -- not to confuse you -- but to give you additional background information.

Tab #1 is a proposed letter from Deutch to the President defending Clark. John has no intention of signing this -- he just wants you to see it.

Tab #2 is a long response to Hoyer and DeConcini detailing the events surrounding Clark's meeting with Mladic.

Because John and Shali care so much about the handling of this matter, if you or Tony have problems or are going to make changes to the proposed response, could you please let me know.

Thanks.

Attachment



DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA, C
STENY H. HOYER, MARYLAND, CO-CHAIRMAN

FRANK LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
BARTY PERD, NEVADA
BOB GRAHAM, FLORIDA
BARBARA MURKIN, MARYLAND
ALFONSO M. D'AMATO, NEW YORK
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
CHARLES S. BRADLEY, IOWA
CONRAD MACE, FLORIDA

EDWARD J. MARKEY, MASSACHUSETTS
BILL MCCHESNEY, NEW MEXICO
FRANK MCELROY, INDIANA
MELANIE SARGENT, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER A. SMITH, NEW JERSEY
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, ILLINOIS
FRANK B. WELSH, VIRGINIA
BRANTON ROSS, NEW YORK

DISCUSSIVE SESSION COORDINATORS
JOHN SHATTUCK, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ANTHONY GASTEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CHARLES MCGUIRE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE -

SAMUEL E. WISE, CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES E. REIMER, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
MARY ELIZABETH HARRIS, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

234 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(202) 225-1901

September 2, 1994

To:
Comm
Franklin

703-697-9758

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our outrage over Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's meeting with Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic. General Clark's handling of this meeting has seriously undermined previously stated U.S. positions regarding the conflict and damaged his own credibility in the eyes of the many surviving victims of Mladic's criminal forces. We therefore seriously question his ability to carry out his duties relating to the Yugoslav conflict any further.

Ratko Mladic is known as one of the most villainous war criminals of our times. During the Croatian phase of the war, his ruthlessness as commander of a Yugoslav Army corp earned him the name "butcher of Knin." Taking over the Bosnian Serb military force the next year, he earned the additional title "ethnic cleanser in chief." His forces are directly responsible for the months of shelling of Sarajevo, Gorazde and other cities, brazenly terrorizing an innocent civilian population in front of the entire world. The forced expulsions, executions, torture and rapes which were carried out on a massive scale as part of Bosnian Serb aggression were not only tolerated, but in all likelihood encouraged and perhaps even ordered, by this man.

Fact-finding, the ostensible purpose of this meeting, is of course a necessary task when dealing with as critical a problem as the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, press reports indicated that the meeting was requested by Mladic, not General Clark. The Pentagon indicated that it was not aware of State Department objections at the time of the meeting, but common sense should have led the General to seek this advice before agreeing to such a controversial meeting. In any event, we seriously question the utility of a high-level meeting with a man known for spewing forth lies, propaganda and threats.

The President
September 2, 1994

Page 2


We find it unquestionably inappropriate, however, that a senior U.S. military officer like General Clark would conduct what the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs labelled a "military-to-military" meeting with the leader of forces representing a self-proclaimed but completely illegitimate Bosnian Serb state. It is unimaginable that this U.S. military officer would then switch caps with this war criminal, accept a bottle of alcohol and a pistol from him as a gift, and, moreover, allow himself to be photographed doing so.

The message this must have sent to aggressor and victim alike is appalling, and we are sure Mladic has used it to his advantage. Rather than isolating Serb extremists, which we believe is our stated policy, we appear to be currying their favor.

Mr. President, two months ago, the international community drew up a peace settlement plan. While it was widely viewed as rewarding Serb aggression, it was at least offered to those engaged in the conflict on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with a two-week deadline for a clear response, and consequences suggested to those rejecting it. The Bosnians accepted the plan on time and unconditionally. The Bosnian Serbs effectively said no, and Ratko Mladic's subsequent attacks on UN personnel and civilians served as an explanation point to that response. The militants have since rejected the plan again and again. Still the plan is left open to them to accept at their leisure. Still the arms embargo is illegally imposed on legitimate Bosnian forces. Tighter sanctions on Serbia, the only real consequence of the Serb rejection, is replaced by the possible lifting of some sanctions. Intra-Serb squabbling has done more to derail the international approach than to stop the war, and only became manifest when the international community appeared to have resolve. Now, as we reportedly deny a general of Bosnian forces a trip to Washington, we allow ourselves to be viewed as warming up to the man most responsible for the conduct of the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This, Mr. President, cannot continue. We have written to you previously about the steps we believe should be taken to decisively thwart Serb aggression. We urge you, at this junction, to correct the image of complicity with the aggressor which has just been created by taking appropriate and necessary action against Lieutenant General Wesley Clark.

Sincerely,


STENY H. HOYER
Co-Chairman


DENNIS DeCONCINI
Chairman

be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality and military thinking, General Clark and our nation have been well served.

During the meeting with Mladic, General Clark stated U.S. policy quite clearly. The Bosnian Serbs can have no doubt that we expect them to accept the Contact Group proposal and that they will face increased pressure and isolation as long as they continue to reject peace.

My confidence in General ~~Wesley~~⁹ Clark's intelligence, competence, integrity and loyalty remains unshaken. I hope you will agree that his character and service to the United States remain beyond reproach.)

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis DeConcini
Chairman
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Parallel changes
on 2nd letter

Dear Mr. Chairman:

over meet
Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. While I understand your concern ~~that the visit and its negative media coverage may have damaged both General Clark's credibility and that of United States policy toward the Bosnian Serbs, I have concluded after consulting with the Department of Defense that disciplinary action against General Clark is neither necessary nor warranted.~~ do not believe

related to

Unintentionally,
the Embassy's
concerns about
a meeting with Mladic
were not conveyed to

General Clark was in Bosnia on a fact-finding mission ~~connected with ongoing U.S. and NATO operations and with planning for a possible lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Federation. The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. Because of a breakdown in coordination with Washington, neither General Clark nor his staff were made aware of political concerns about a meeting with Mladic.~~ Had this breakdown in communication

Such

Although this Administration has deliberately avoided high-level contacts as part of our arms-length diplomatic policy toward the Bosnian Serbs, I do not agree that General Clark's meeting was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for U.S. participation in Bosnia operations, General Clark may someday

While in relation
the meeting was
not appropriate
in all
like Lincoln
has
occurred.



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



Senator Dennis DeConcini
Chairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. While I understand your concern that the visit and its negative media coverage may have damaged both General Clark's credibility and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I have concluded that disciplinary action against General Clark is neither necessary nor warranted.

The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After reviewing those facts, I have concluded that he was not informed of the Department of State's concern about the visit due to a failure of communication not attributable to General Clark or his staff and that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Although this Administration has deliberately avoided high-level contacts as part of our arms-length diplomatic policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I do not agree that General Clark's meeting was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for US participation in Bosnia operations, he may someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality, and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.

My confidence in General Wesley Clark's intelligence, competence, integrity, and loyalty remains unshaken. I hope you will agree that his character and service to the United States remain beyond reproach.



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Co-Chairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. While I understand your concern that the visit and its negative media coverage may have damaged both General Clark's credibility and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I have concluded that disciplinary action against General Clark is neither necessary nor warranted.

The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After reviewing those facts, I have concluded that he was not informed of the Department of State's concern about the visit due to a failure of communication not attributable to General Clark or his staff and that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Although this Administration has deliberately avoided high-level contacts as part of our arms-length diplomatic policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I do not agree that General Clark's meeting was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for US participation in Bosnia operations, he may someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality, and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.

My confidence in General Wesley Clark's intelligence, competence, integrity, and loyalty remains unshaken. I hope you will agree that his character and service to the United States remain beyond reproach.

Senator Dennis DeConcini
Chairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. While I understand your concern that the visit and its negative media coverage may have damaged both General Clark's credibility and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I have concluded after consulting with Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch that disciplinary action against General Clark is neither necessary nor warranted.

The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After reviewing those facts, I have concluded that he was not informed of the Department of State's concern about the visit due to a failure of communication not attributable to General Clark or his staff and that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Although this Administration has deliberately avoided high-level contacts as part of our arms-length diplomatic policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I do not agree that General Clark's meeting was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for US participation in Bosnia operations, he may someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality, and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.

My confidence in General Wesley Clark's intelligence, competence, integrity, and loyalty remains unshaken. I hope you will agree that his character and service to the United States remain beyond reproach.

Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Co-Chairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. While I understand your concern that the visit and its negative media coverage may have damaged both General Clark's credibility and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I have concluded after consulting with Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch that disciplinary action against General Clark is neither necessary nor warranted.

The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After reviewing those facts, I have concluded that he was not informed of the Department of State's concern about the visit due to a failure of communication not attributable to General Clark or his staff and that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Although this Administration has deliberately avoided high-level contacts as part of our arms-length diplomatic policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I do not agree that General Clark's meeting was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for US participation in Bosnia operations, he may someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality, and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.

My confidence in General Wesley Clark's intelligence, competence, integrity, and loyalty remains unshaken. I hope you will agree that his character and service to the United States remain beyond reproach.

Senator Dennis DeConcini
Chairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. While I understand your concern that the visit and its negative media coverage may have damaged both General Clark's credibility and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I have concluded after reviewing all the facts that disciplinary action against General Clark is neither necessary nor warranted.

A Department of Defense inquiry prompted by one-sided press accounts revealed that General Clark acted reasonably and honorably in a difficult situation created by an unfortunate sequence of events beyond his knowledge or control. General Clark's stop in Sarajevo on his way back to Washington from US-Russian joint staff talks in Moscow provided him an opportunity to observe first-hand UN operations in which our forces are involved and to collect information for a paper on Bosnia options the National Security Council had tasked him to write.

After meeting with several Bosnian Muslim and Federation leaders, General Clark was encouraged by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, commander of UN forces in Bosnia, also to meet with General Mladic in Banja Luka. General Rose suggested the trip would give him a broader perspective and more complete appreciation of the obstacles to peace. Although the US Charge d'Affaires had disapproved such a visit prior to General Clark's arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that fact was never communicated to General Clark or his staff. On the contrary, General Clark's staff reasonably believed the State Department concurred in the plan.

General Clark met with General Mladic on 27 August. During their meeting, General Clark clearly and forcefully expressed United States concerns about the Bosnian Serbs' lack of cooperation in the peace process, and pressed Mladic for a tangible gesture of peace such as to demilitarize Sarajevo or one of the other safe zones. When the meeting ended, General Clark was met by an unexpected group of reporters and photographers. General Mladic presented General Clark his field cap as a gesture of goodwill. General Clark reciprocated and the two were then photographed. General Clark then told reporters he was in Banja Luka on a fact-finding mission and nothing more.

At lunch just before his departure, General Clark again pressed General Mladic for a tangible gesture of peace. Mladic responded by presenting his personal weapon as an expression of his desire to end the fighting. The only personal gifts offered to General Clark were Mladic's hat and a bottle of brandy. In keeping with common and accepted practice, he accepted the pistol and gifts. All three items have been turned in to the Department of Defense for appropriate disposition.

Understandably upset by what they perceived to be General Clark's blatant disregard for their advice, State Department officials immediately denounced his visit. Had they investigated this matter further, they would have concluded that he was in fact a victim of communication failure and a skillful Bosnian Serb media ambush.

The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After reviewing those facts, I have concluded that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Although this Administration has deliberately avoided high-level contacts as part of our arms-length diplomatic policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I do not agree that General Clark's meeting was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for US participation in Bosnia operations, he may someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality, and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.

My confidence in General Wesley Clark's intelligence, competence, integrity, and loyalty remains unshaken. I hope these new facts will also convince you that his character and service to the United States remain beyond reproach.

Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Co-Chairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. While I understand your concern that the visit and its negative media coverage may have damaged both General Clark's credibility and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I have concluded after reviewing all the facts that disciplinary action against General Clark is neither necessary nor warranted.

A Department of Defense inquiry prompted by one-sided press accounts revealed that General Clark acted reasonably and honorably in a difficult situation created by an unfortunate sequence of events beyond his knowledge or control. General Clark's stop in Sarajevo on his way back to Washington from US-Russian joint staff talks in Moscow provided him an opportunity to observe first-hand UN operations in which our forces are involved and to collect information for a paper on Bosnia options the National Security Council had tasked him to write.

After meeting with several Bosnian Muslim and Federation leaders, General Clark was encouraged by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, commander of UN forces in Bosnia, also to meet with General Mladic in Banja Luka. General Rose suggested the trip would give him a broader perspective and more complete appreciation of the obstacles to peace. Although the US Charge d'Affaires had disapproved such a visit prior to General Clark's arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that fact was never communicated to General Clark or his staff. On the contrary, General Clark's staff reasonably believed the State Department concurred in the plan.

General Clark met with General Mladic on 27 August. During their meeting, General Clark clearly and forcefully expressed United States concerns about the Bosnian Serbs' lack of cooperation in the peace process, and pressed Mladic for a tangible gesture of peace such as to demilitarize Sarajevo or one of the other safe zones. When the meeting ended, General Clark was met by an unexpected group of reporters and photographers. General Mladic presented General Clark his field cap as a gesture of goodwill. General Clark reciprocated and the two were then photographed. General Clark then told reporters he was in Banja Luka on a fact-finding mission and nothing more.

At lunch just before his departure, General Clark again pressed General Mladic for a tangible gesture of peace. Mladic responded by presenting his personal weapon as an expression of his desire to end the fighting. The only personal gifts offered to General Clark were Mladic's hat and a bottle of brandy. In keeping with common and accepted practice, he accepted the pistol and gifts. All three items have been turned in to the Department of Defense for appropriate disposition.

Understandably upset by what they perceived to be General Clark's blatant disregard for their advice, State Department officials immediately denounced his visit. Had they investigated this matter further, they would have concluded that he was in fact a victim of communication failure and a skillful Bosnian Serb media ambush.

The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After reviewing those facts, I have concluded that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Although this Administration has deliberately avoided high-level contacts as part of our arms-length diplomatic policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, I do not agree that General Clark's meeting was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for US participation in Bosnia operations, he may someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality, and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.

My confidence in General Wesley Clark's intelligence, competence, integrity, and loyalty remains unshaken. I hope these new facts will also convince you that his character and service to the United States remain beyond reproach.