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Chron File - September 1994 #2 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

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266

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Revised 9/23/94

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

September 16, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RGB*
FROM: JIM SEATON *JSS*
SUBJECT: Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel

At Tab V is a letter from Edward Kimmel requesting the Administration's position with regards to posthumously nominating his father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, for advancement in rank to that of full Admiral on the retired list. Admiral Kimmel was the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief on December 7, 1941. Included at Tab III are 1993 NSC staff actions on this subject.

At Tab I is a memorandum to the President responding to a letter from Manning Kimmel, Rear Admiral Kimmel's grandson, requesting that his grandfather be retired at four-star rank.

We have again reviewed the issues surrounding Admiral Kimmel's relief and retirement. There is no compelling justification to reverse prior decisions and posthumously promote Admiral Kimmel. Similarly, the Department of Defense reexamined the evidence and finds no justification for posthumous promotion (Tab B).

Admiral Kimmel's family has lobbied successive Administrations to restore Kimmel to the temporary four-star rank he held at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. They have renewed their efforts with this Administration and have enlisted the assistance of Admiral Crowe (who has taken a personal interest in this case).

The facts directly relevant to the case are clear (Tab IV). Admiral Kimmel received an official "war warning" message from the CNO on November 27, 1941 informing him that hostilities with Japan were imminent and directing him to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment." Even after this tasking, neither Kimmel, nor his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Walter Short, implemented the War Plans for defending the Hawaiian islands.

At President Roosevelt's direction, Kimmel and Short were relieved of their commands and retired in their permanent two-star ranks after numerous investigations and hearings ruled them derelict in their duties. (It should be noted that they were not court-martialed nor even demoted. They were simply not granted the courtesy of retiring in their highest temporary rank.)

While all intelligence available in Washington was not forwarded to Kimmel, there is no evidence that Washington had specific intelligence confirming an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. The "missing" intelligence merely amplified what Kimmel and Short had already been told, that war appeared imminent.

According to the Navy, virtually every Administration since FDR has reviewed the case and confirmed the original findings. The Navy position is that Kimmel should not be rehabilitated, since the principles of command accountability and responsibility fully justify the findings and actions taken in 1942, and no new information has surfaced which challenges earlier findings. In a letter to Edward Kimmel (Tab B), Secretary Perry stands by previous official judgments.

The Kimmel family forwards new argumentation to buttress the "FDR/Marshall" conspiracy thesis first levied by the Republican Party during the 1944 election campaign--that Roosevelt and George Marshall knew an attack was imminent and suppressed information in order to permit the U.S. to be drawn into the war. In a letter to the President (Tab C), Manning Kimmel includes an unpublished chapter of a book which cites a 1989 BBC documentary supporting this thesis. This chapter is particularly appealing to the Kimmels because the chapter's author argues that both Kimmel and Short should be posthumously advanced in rank and claims that "it is even possible--nay, likely (but pure speculation)--that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won." This is the supporting "evidence" for the most recent Kimmel requests.

Kimmel and Short were the most senior military officers held accountable for the failure of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. While the Kimmel family believes accountability should be placed higher up the chain of command, we believe the decisions of the investigating committees and subsequent reviews of those decisions have stood the test of time. Presently we find nothing to suggest that earlier findings are in error. In the absence of new findings we believe that the evidence supports the historical record.

[It should also be noted that restoring Kimmel to his previous rank would raise questions as to whether the President does or does not exonerate General Short. The historical record

suggests, however, that Short was even more culpable than Kimmel.]

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I and the letter to Edward Kimmel at Tab II.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Letter to Manning Kimmel
Tab B	SecDef Response to Edward Kimmel
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence from Manning Kimmel
Tab II	Letter to Edward Kimmel
Tab III	Previous NSC staff actions RE: Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel
Tab IV	Harvard Case Study
Tab V	Incoming Correspondence from Edward Kimmel

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel

Purpose

To respond to a request from Manning Kimmel to posthumously restore his grandfather, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, to the four-star rank he temporarily held at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Background

For decades, Admiral Kimmel's family has lobbied successive Administrations to restore his temporary rank. As you know, Admiral Crowe has taken a personal interest in their efforts.

The facts directly relevant to the case are clear. Admiral Kimmel received an official message from the CNO on November 27, 1941 warning that hostilities with Japan were imminent and directing him to take measures to defend the Hawaiian Islands. These actions were not taken by Kimmel or his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Walter Short.

At President Roosevelt's direction, Kimmel and Short were relieved of their commands and retired in their permanent two-star ranks after a series of service and congressional investigations. They were not court-martialed or even demoted. They were simply not granted the courtesy of retiring in their highest temporary rank.

According to the Navy, virtually every Administration since FDR has reviewed the case and confirmed the original findings. The Navy position is that Kimmel should not be rehabilitated, since the principles of command accountability and responsibility fully justify the findings and action taken in 1942 and no new information has surfaced which challenges earlier findings. In a letter to Edward Kimmel, RADM Kimmel's son (Tab B), Secretary Perry stands by previous official judgments.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Manning Kimmel forwards new argumentation to buttress the "FDR/Marshall" conspiracy thesis -- that Roosevelt and George Marshall knew an attack was imminent and suppressed information in order to permit the U.S. to be drawn into the war. (This argument was also the major thrust of the Republican Party's effort to unseat FDR in 1944.) At Tab C, Kimmel includes an unpublished chapter of a book which cites a 1989 BBC documentary supporting this thesis. This chapter is particularly appealing to the Kimmel family because the author argues that both Kimmel and Short should be posthumously advanced in rank. It claims that "it is even possible -- nay, likely (but pure speculation) -- that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won." This is the supporting "evidence" for this most recent Kimmel family request.

Kimmel and Short were the most senior military officials held accountable for the failure of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. While the Kimmel family believes accountability should be placed higher up the chain of command, the decisions of the investigating committees and subsequent reviews of those decisions have stood the test of time. Presently we find nothing to suggest that earlier findings are in error. In the absence of new findings, we believe that the evidence supports the historical record.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Manning Kimmel
Tab B	SecDef response to Edward Kimmel
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Kimmel:

I have reviewed the events surrounding the retirement after Pearl Harbor of your grandfather, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. While I understand your desire to see him posthumously promoted, I agree with the judgment of prior investigatory commissions, as recently revalidated by Secretary of Defense Perry.

Your grandfather was, without question, a patriotic American who served our country with bravery and dedication. With regard to the issue of his permanent retirement grade, though, the historical record provides no compelling justification for me to reverse prior decisions that he be retired at the two-star level.

I appreciate the importance of this issue to your family and respect your unwavering commitment to upholding its good name.

Sincerely,

Mr. Manning M. Kimmel IV
Post Office Box 307
142 North Confederate Avenue
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29731-6307



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

7 SEP 1994

Mr. Edward R. Kimmel
15 Wood Road
Wilmington, DE 19806

Dear Mr. Kimmel:

I am responding to your letter to then-Secretary Aspin in which you asked him to support the posthumous promotion of your father, Husband E. Kimmel, to the grade of Admiral.

Since Rear Admiral Kimmel's retirement in 1942, the appropriate grade with which to mark his service has been the subject of inquiry and debate. As you know, Rear Admiral Kimmel's conduct and accountability concerning the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor were examined by a commission presided over by a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, a Navy court of inquiry, an investigation commissioned by the Secretary of War, and extensive Congressional hearings conducted by the Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor attack. During the decades after the end of World War II, Rear Admiral Kimmel's retirement grade has also been considered by serving Presidents, my predecessors and Secretaries of the Navy, none of whom were persuaded that there is a sufficiently meritorious case for advancing Rear Admiral Kimmel to four-star rank on the retired list.

Despite recent historical reexaminations of the events which culminated in the Pearl Harbor attack, and the recommendations that have been expressed by distinguished retired flag officers, I believe that Rear Admiral Kimmel's status should not be changed. In my view, this conclusion is compelled by society's legitimate interest in the finality of official actions, and by the weight, basis and scope of the prior judgments on this issue. While the bar of history may ultimately be more sympathetic to Rear Admiral Kimmel in the context of his times, I cannot conclude that he has been treated unjustly or advocate a revision of the Navy's records.

I understand and appreciate the significance of this issue to your family and yourself and sincerely regret that I am unable to provide a more favorable response to your request.

Sincerely,

William J. Perry

17843



April 5, 1994

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear President Clinton,

I was hoping to meet you this afternoon at the reception in Fort Mill, but although my name was submitted by Congressman John Spratt, I was informed that the invitation that was originally extended to me was rescinded due to that fact that I am in broadcasting and the owner of two radio stations in York County. My reason for wanting to attend the reception was not of a "news nature" but a "personal nature". Since our meeting will not be possible, I have requested Congressman Spratt to give you this letter and the accompanying information.

I hope you can understand the extreme frustration and disappointment my family has experienced the past 50 years in trying to get Washington to honestly and fairly deal with the issue of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. I only hope that this packet of information is in your hands and not in those of a military aide who once again would relegate it to the Pentagon for an all too familiar "form letter response."

Although The White House has formally recognized my Grandfather as a "patriotic American who served his country well," they have refused to formally retire him at his proper rank, and rather would want the tarnish on his name to remain. A half century of research and numerous Naval and Congressional hearings, have proven Admiral Kimmel was not to blame for Pearl Harbor, and dozens of his Naval peers, including Admiral Crowe, agree that this simple gesture is long overdue.

You have impressed me, Mr. President, as being a fair and honorable man and I would ask you to help us put our Grandfather's contribution to our country in its proper place. Without your personal involvement, we will only face the continued judgement of Washington's military bureacracy.

Sincerely your,



Manning M. Kimmel IV

MMKIV/skk

Encl.

JOHN D. DEDMAN, NEBRASKA
 CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
 JIM BINGAMAN, NEW MEXICO
 JOHN GLENN, OHIO
 RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
 BOB GRAMM, FLORIDA
 CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
 JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA
 JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA
 WILLIAM V. ROSEN, MAINE
 JIMMIE H. HALE, ARIZONA
 TERRY L. HANSEN, MISSISSIPPI
 DON CLATS, INDIANA
 BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
 DAVID A. HARTHORNE, IDAHO
 LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, NORTH CAROLINA

ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ANTHONY J. PRINCIPAL, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

July 16, 1993

General Colin Powell, Chairman
 Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Room 2E873, The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20318

Dear General Powell:

Since April 1987, the Kimmel brothers, Edward and Thomas, have endeavored to have the Department of Defense initiate action to promote their father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, posthumously, to the rank of Admiral. He was Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

In 1988, after an extensive investigation, then Secretary of the Navy, William L. Ball, III, recommended to then Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, that the matter be placed before the President for decision. Secretary Carlucci declined to do so.

The Kimmel brothers have provided extensive documentation based on scholarly research to the Department of Defense and to us in support of their position. They have also gained support of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, two former Chiefs of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke and Thomas Moorer, Veterans of Foreign Wars and many other World War II veterans. Also, attached to this letter is a 1991 letter from thirty-six prominent retired Navy admirals urging President Bush "to nominate to the U.S. Senate Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN for posthumous promotion to Admiral...."

Reasons for not correcting this wrong have been conveyed in the past. But the reasoning has been unclear, such as (this matter) "has been reviewed a number of times in the decades since Admiral Kimmel's retirement in 1942" and that "the promotional process was not the way to address the issue of Admiral Kimmel's place in history."

The Kimmel brothers are merely seeking to remove the stigma and obloquy associated with the charge by the Roberts Commission which issued its report in 1942. After a hurried investigation to find a scapegoat, the Commission charged Admiral Kimmel with

being "derelict in his duty." This charge was widely publicized in 1942. It was not supported by later investigations, first in 1944 by a Naval Court of Inquiry, and again in 1946 by a Joint Congressional Investigation. Yet, the charge still sticks, and whenever the public thinks of the Pearl Harbor attack they think of the "dereliction of duty" by Admiral Kimmel.

The posthumous promotion of Admiral Kimmel will be a small step in restoring his honor. No retroactive pay should be involved. In addition, this would not be an extraordinary act. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 permitted previously retired officers to be advanced on the retired list to the highest grade held while on active duty.

General, this year is the 50th Anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, providing an appropriate time to promote Admiral Kimmel. We believe that this matter merits personal attention, review and careful consideration from you and the Joint Chiefs. ?

Sincerely,

John Warner

Strom Thurmond

Wick Bennett

Leuchstein

Richard Shelby

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

September 23, 1993

Dear Colleague:

Following the 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, unjust blame was placed on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commander of the United States Army's Hawaiian Department. As a result, both officers reverted their permanent ranks of Rear Admiral and Major General respectively, in which they retired and from which they never were advanced. This injustice can be rectified by posthumously advancing these two officers to the rank of Admiral and Lieutenant General respectively.

In 1944 a Naval Court of Inquiry found that no blame should be placed on Admiral Kimmel and specifically approved his decisions and disposition of forces. Further, a Joint Committee of the Congress in 1946 specifically found that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short had been derelict in his duty. Despite these findings, their names carry the unwarranted blame for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor. **The Congress can correct this mistake and set the historical record straight.**

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 authorizes the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to advance certain Naval and Army officers on the retired list to the highest ranks in which they served while on active duty. Admiral Kimmel and General Short are both eligible for such advancement.

In November 1991, an Army Board for the Correction of Military Records recommended that Major General Short be advanced posthumously to the rank of Lieutenant General. This recommendation was turned down by the Department of the Army.

15 Wood Road
Wilmington, DE 19806
March 16, 1993

Admiral Frank Kelso II USN
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Admiral Kelso:

I last corresponded with you in the fall of 1991. I congratulated you on the way in which you handled the Iowa matter which was in the news at that time. I then explained that my father was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN (Ret) (Deceased), who commanded the naval forces at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941.

You wrote that you had new information upon which to base your conclusions in the Iowa case whereas in the case of my father you had no new information, nor reason to judge those who had previously ruled in his case.

Captain Edward L. Beach USN (Ret) is currently writing a book dealing with his experiences as a naval officer in World War II and as a courtesy he sent me a copy of CHAPTER THREE, How Was It Possible ?. This Chapter is as succinct and clear analysis of the Pearl Harbor matter as I have seen. It focuses the reader on the forest and avoids blurring his vision with the many trees which appeared in the plethora of investigations into the Pearl Harbor disaster. I am enclosing a copy for you and commend it to your attention. Perhaps it will give you reason to judge those who have previously ruled in my father's case as well as give you a new insight into this matter.

I am also enclosing a copy of a Petition to the President urging him to posthumously promote Admiral Kimmel and General Short to the ranks they held at the time of the attack, promotions to which the Petitioners assert they are entitled. The signers are 36 retired navy flag officers including two former Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (Moorer and Crowe) and four former Chiefs of Naval Operations (Moorer, Crowe, Holloway and Zumwalt), 28 Admirals, 3 Vice Admirals and 1 Rear Admiral. In addition a former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke USN (Ret), sent a letter (copy enclosed) to the Secretary of Defense recommending the posthumous promotion. Hopefully the opinions of this impressive group of naval officers, including 5 of your predecessors in the important position you currently hold, will also give you reason to judge those who have previously ruled in my father's case.

In light of such support it is difficult to believe, as stated by Lieutenant General Richard Trefry, Military Assistant to President Bush, that the "uniformed" navy opposes such posthumous promotion. Copies of his letters were furnished you in 1991.

Should you have occasion to visit with any of the petitioners I urge you to discuss Admiral Kimmel and the Pearl Harbor disaster.

My brother, Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret) and I are still committed to seeing that corrective steps are taken to offset the baseless public impression that our father was solely responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster and "derelict in his duty". Hopefully you will become a convert to our cause along with the illustrious Petitioners noted above.

Sincerely,


Edward R. Kimmel

CHAPTER THREE

How Was It Possible?

In attempting to make some sense out of all the data emanating from the many investigations of the Pearl Harbor debacle, it is first necessary to discard all superfluous material and concentrate on what seems to be the direct line that was in place that fatal December night and early morning. There can be little question that Magic and the "14-part message" made up this direct line, for it was the official Japanese reply to our "ultimatum" (as they considered it to be) of 26 November. Although the 14-part message contained no declaration of war, it used strong language, specifically broke relations with the United States, and its delivery was carefully timed to take place, with the attacking planes en route, precisely one half hour before the first bomb was to fall. It was this message, paralleling the one sent to Moscow in 1904, that Japan counted on to square herself with history and the law of nations. In 1904, the surprise attack on Port Arthur took place two days after delivery of the official diplomatic note terminating negotiations. In 1941, owing to the greatly increased speed of communications, Japan planned to reduce the two days to thirty minutes; but difficulties in her Embassy in Washington caused the official break to be about an hour after the attack began, instead of half an hour before.

Counting the preliminary message alerting the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and the following "delivery message," there were 16 messages in all. The first and last, intended to be instructions to the two Japanese ambassadors then in our capital, were in Japanese. The 14 parts of the main message, the formal break in negotiations between Japan and the United States, were in English, as might be expected of a foreign nation with a strange circumlocutory sort of written language that desired above all to be explicitly understood.

Some doubt now seems to exist whether the 14th part, considerably later in arriving than the first 13, was in English. It bore marks indicating it had been "translated," but so did all the other messages, that were definitely in English. The 14th was the most direct-spoken of the 14 parts, and the most virulent in tone, although it stopped short of announcing hostilities. The authorities in Japan would not have trusted this most significant of the 14 parts to a Sunday morning translator in their Washington Embassy when they had already indicated their anxiety for exactitude by using English for the first 13. Unfortunately, the bureaucratic system used by the decoders required all messages processed to go through the recording, translation, and typing sections, and therefore, no matter how swiftly passed through, all Magic, without exception, bore indication of the time and date "translated." Under the circumstances, this meant little more than that someone in the translator section had okayed it for transmittal onward. This may have been a point of critical lapse, as will be shown.

All studies of the Pearl Harbor debacle have attempted to dissect, or somehow find a trail through, the tremendous amount of detail, much of it truly trivial, which, if totally and correctly evaluated, might have given our forces a better warning than they received. This would have required immaculate hindsight, and no one in any position of authority made any such evaluations at the time. The 14-part message, however, was in the direct line, the most important channel of communication between Japan and the United States. Even more importantly, we had secretly broken into this channel to such an extent that in many instances we were reading messages to the Japanese ambassadors in Washington before they themselves had even received them. Yet, despite all these conditions of special advantage, we did not understand the warnings we had been getting, which this message, and those we had read earlier, had made cumulatively and explicitly clear. This was where our true failure took place.

To begin at the true beginning of this extraordinary tale, it is first obligatory to divert attention to the understanding of "Magic," where it came from, and the reasons behind the adamant restrictions on its use.

In 1941 our code-breaking capability was in its infancy, and totally unsuspected by Japan. By mid-1941 it had been given the code-name "Magic," and it could break some, but not all, of Japan's codes. Sometime that year President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top advisers were informed that they could henceforth be provided in real time with the text of messages sent between Tokyo and its Embassy in Washington; that is, we could be reading messages sent in the diplomatic code about as soon as either of the intended recipients could. It was a coup of the first magnitude.

Official recipients of Magic were the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy (Cordell Hull, Henry Stimson, and Frank Knox), and the Service Chiefs (Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark). One or two other officers not in the direct intelligence chain, notably high-handed Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, then building his power structure in the Navy Department, were also aware of Magic, and as events marched on, others inevitably were included. One of our primary concerns, nevertheless, was to keep knowledge of it at a minimum, and prevent all chance that persons aware of it might fall into the hands of the enemy.

We were also worried that demonstrating foreknowledge too often of supposedly secret enemy plans might endanger Magic. We should not, for example, consistently concentrate forces at just the right place and time needed to defeat the enemy, for repeated coincidences of this nature might raise suspicions. Of the many ways Japan might deal with the possibility that their codes might have been invaded, the simplest would be to change codes immediately, thus risking alerting us to the fact. A more subtle reaction might be to make no overt change at all, but begin using the compromised system for disinformation, or to send messages designed to discover whether or not invasion had actually occurred.

Cryptographers are traditionally alert for any signs their systems have been compromised. From the code-breakers' point of view, once the enemy even suspects one of his codes has been violated, anything taken from the code or codes in question is no longer valuable, or at the minimum must be held suspect in its turn.

The code-breakers considered it a thousand times more difficult to invade a new system than it could have been for the originators to create it in the first place. Unwise use of Magic thus might lead to its sudden demise, possibly forever but certainly for a very long time. We consequently went to tremendous lengths, at this early stage of our code breaking capability, to keep everything about it as secret as possible. The extreme emphasis on security seems a bit exaggerated today, for we frequently did not pass vital information to those who had most need of it. At times we incurred deliberate losses it might have been possible to avoid--but this is always very difficult to explain to the survivors. It was always hard to judge which objective would be best served with any particular bit of intelligence, and it still is. Danger of compromising the source is an inherent factor in use of intelligence at any time.

It is necessary to appreciate the foregoing to gain an insight into the tremendous diplomatic power game Roosevelt embarked upon after election to his unprecedented third term, and the tremendous care with which he used his tools. Magic was fundamental to his entire foreign policy because, in poker parlance, it let him "look down Japan's throat."

Magic gave FDR information about Japanese plans and strategy at their very highest level, just as a similar capability, code-named "Enigma," served Winston Churchill against Hitler. Granting today's perception that our entry into World War II was imperative, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Magic, which continued to improve, was one of the important factors.

Without Magic, our President could not have had the sure touch with which he led us through the war, all the while suffering from a slowly debilitating illness that had no cure. With Magic, we had an extremely vulnerable tool, but it was of incalculable value. Men had sacrificed their lives to obtain only small portions of the extraordinary mosaic of logic and equipment that had gone into its creation, and more would do so to prevent even a small chance of its discovery by the enemy (it was, for example, the reason why Captain

John Philip Cromwell chose to remain below and not try to escape from his sinking submarine).

It had become clear that Hitler was close to winning the war in Europe. Churchill's pleas for help were becoming increasingly desperate, and even before his reelection Roosevelt became convinced the fall of England was imminent, that to prevent it the U.S. must soon become an outright ally. But he also understood the depth of America's isolationist sentiment, and the strength of American antipathy to the sacrifices this war would entail. In short, he understood our political unreadiness. Moreover, he knew a Congress that had extended the Draft Act by only a single vote late in 1940 would not declare war in 1941 out of policy alone, and he well remembered his campaign slogan that election year, that he was not going to send "any American boys into foreign wars."

At the same time, in speech after speech, because he had to, Roosevelt was assuring embattled England of all aid "short of war." In 1940 and 1941 he instituted "Lend Lease," gave 50 old destroyers to the British Navy to bolster its anti-U-boat campaign, and directed the U.S. Navy to convoy vitally needed supplies to England. He declared half the Atlantic Ocean a U.S. lake, prohibited to U-boats. Damaged British warships were repaired in American shipyards. U.S. industry received unlimited credit to fulfill emergency British orders for food, ammunition, war supplies of all kinds. Much of what he did would today be declared illegal. Most citizens of the U.S. supported him. Only the most unsophisticated believed we were still holding to the neutrality announced in 1939, but most wanted at all costs to stay out of the fight.

Most felt we were doing all we could, or should, do. They believed the simplistic statements officially given out that slow, even pressure from our side, without actually fighting, would finally bring a satisfactory termination to a war whose true dreadfulness they refused to look in the face. Our policy makers, however, the same ones who issued the encouraging announcements, knew the truth to be the contrary. England was nearing the end of her rope. Nazi Germany was winning. The situation was 1916 all over again. Without full and unstinting assistance from the U.S., including employment of all our armed forces--in other words, without a declaration of war on our part--England would soon have to give up. But how to change America's anti-war mindset? By and large, the war in Europe was interesting to our citizenry, but it directly affected only a small part of it. In fact, the war in Europe in many cases was beneficial to us because of the enormous amount of work it sent our way. How to change the collective mind of the average U.S. citizen?

The way Roosevelt used Magic showed that, despite a somewhat political or "P.R." approach to most matters, he fully understood its importance. With it in his bag of tricks, he began to look for ways to get the United States to enter the war with a national commitment to victory. At the same time, naturally enough, he continued to insist that his only objective was to keep Japan from initiating war in the far east.

In 1989 the British Broadcast Company produced a TV documentary titled "Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor," portraying Washington during the week before the Japanese attack, dramatizing the confusing information and rumors that were rife in high government circles at the time. The documentary states positively that Winston Churchill had information about a Japanese task force at sea headed toward Hawaii, and that he shared this with Roosevelt; that a number of intelligence officers intercepted a series of messages indicating something radical was going to happen on Sunday the 7th; that J. Edgar Hoover and our Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, had heard as early as the previous spring that Admiral Yamamoto was planning an attack on the Hawaiian naval base; and that a special navigation plotting team had been tracking the Japanese fleet from the Kurile Islands out into the Pacific, and knew, on the morning of 7 December, that it was due north of the island of Oahu, on which Pearl Harbor is located.

The BBC further states that crucial intelligence was deliberately withheld from the U.S. Fleet commander and his staff, and that even intercepts picked up at station Hypo, in

the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, under Commander Joseph Rochefort, and elsewhere in the navy complex, some of them, unbelievably, at an establishment in a small house near to Admiral Kimmel's own official quarters, were sent only to Washington, where they were buried in the jungle of official paper there. The barest suggestion of these strange things would have served to alert Kimmel and Short to the possibility something unusual was going on. But none of it--not even that obtained on their own official real estate--ever reached either one. Rochefort and the others were categorically forbidden to pass any information anywhere except through top-secret channels directly to their superiors in Washington, D.C.

Whether one takes this broadcast at face value or not, whatever the putative warnings and rumors of which it now would appear there were many, the attack, exactly half a century ago, was a strategic and tactical surprise of the first order. Eight investigations (by some counts nine), the latest completed in May, 1946, submitted reports totaling more than 15,000 pages in 30 printed volumes, plus another 15 volumes of appendices. All of them seem to have concentrated on what the army and navy commanders knew, when they knew it, and what they did about it. Few have paid much attention to what they should have known, and why they did not, beyond the tautological excuse that someone with "greater judgment" would have "more accurately" interpreted the warnings he actually did receive.

What could Admiral Kimmel have done better? With realistic appreciation of the warnings he did receive, and those he did not, what more should he have done during that crucial first week of December? Were there any indications that he should have had that he did not receive? Were there others, superior to him, who also should have done more? Is it possible that our high command, quite properly obsessed with the danger of an Axis victory in Europe, really wanted Japan to initiate the war that Hitler was obviously trying for the moment to avoid--and that only the extent of Japan's attack, that it reached across the Pacific to Pearl Harbor, was in fact a surprise? How else explain the superior intelligence made available to our commanders in the Far East? Or the extraordinary dilatoriness in getting a last minute alert message on the way to Pearl Harbor? It was almost as though the men in charge were torn in two directions: to let Japan attack, since it was vital that we get into the World War (we know that FDR's watchword, at that moment, was that Japan must attack first); or loyalty to the standards of military conduct ingrained in all of them. Many naval officers in high ranking posts asked themselves these questions at the time, and there were no answers, as there are none today.

But in 1942 American public opinion, fueled by a demanding media, had to have an immediate scapegoat for the Pearl Harbor disaster, and despite their strenuous efforts, Kimmel's in particular, the two hapless commanders in Hawaii found this was to be their only contribution to the national war effort. Hurriedly called, the Roberts Commission sat from 18 December 1941 to 23 January 1942, permitted no legal representation by either of the two accused commanders, found nonetheless that they had been seriously derelict in their duties, and brought about their retirement for cause two months later. It was not fair, but it may have been politic at the time. It is even possible--nay, likely (but pure speculation)--that Roosevelt intended somehow to make it up to them later, after the war was won. Undeniably, the ability to lay blame for initial failure on someone who could then be put aside would be helpful to its overall prosecution. Under such over-riding circumstances, there may be some excuse for relegating truth to a secondary role; but at the bar of history it must always remain primary.

Eight subsequent investigations of how the war began were held in all. In 1944 an official Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel. Most of the others found fault not only with Kimmel and Short but also, in various and different ways, with Marshall, Stark, MacArthur, and FDR. It is still, as this is written, an unsettled question as to where the most fault lies. All agree that there was much blame to spread around, but that in the largest sense it was necessary for America to become fully involved in World War II, and the sooner the better. Thus, Japan's duplicitous initiative was the greatest

possible benefit she could have done for the free world, and the most stupid thing she could have done for herself.

A brief review of the other star players in the military during this difficult time may be useful. In addition to Admiral Kimmel, these were six in number: Admiral J. O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS); Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet based at Cavite in Manila Bay; Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Army commander in Hawaii; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; and General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the newly established (July 1941) U.S. Armed Forces Far East (USAFEF). With exception of Admiral Richardson, the first named, all were in important military command posts on 7 December 1941, and the fates of all seven were closely intertwined.

Admiral Richardson was Admiral Kimmel's immediate predecessor in command of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. He became CINCUS (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet) on 6 January 1940, and normally would have been still in command on that terrible December morning 23 months later. Early in 1940, shortly after Richardson took over, the U.S. Fleet (actually only the Pacific Fleet) was based in Long Beach, California. In April and May it engaged in maneuvers simulating war with Japan. The fleet maneuvers ended in Pearl Harbor, where a planned rest and recreational stay of about two weeks was continuously extended by directive of Washington. It was gradually clear that the stay was to become permanent, at least for the foreseeable future. Richardson complained, twice directly to Roosevelt, that the fleet had inadequate logistic support to maintain itself at Pearl Harbor, that it was too much exposed to possible attack by the Japanese, and that he, the fleet commander, was not being kept adequately informed about what was going on in Washington. It is now evident that he was only too right in all this, but in reading his own account (*ON THE TREADMILL TO PEARL HARBOR*), completed in 1958 but not published until after the 1972 death of his old friend Admiral Stark, whom the book criticizes most strongly, one has to recognize the probability that FDR had come to look on Admiral Richardson as a bothersome nuisance in the big international game of power politics then going on.

Whether Richardson might have been more alert than Kimmel, therefore more successful in avoiding surprise, will never be answered, but a careful reading of his memoirs indicates that he, at least, did not think so. In Kimmel's place, with the information Kimmel was receiving, he wrote that he would have been taken just as much unawares. He went on to say, however, that if he had been CNO instead of Stark, Admiral Kimmel would have had much more of the critically important up-to-date information than he did receive. Clearly stated in several places is his opinion that Stark failed grossly in his responsibility to CINCUS, his immediate subordinate, and that it was this failure that led directly to the utter surprise of the attack itself.

It is also true that Richardson was so vocal with his concern over the untenable position of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and stated his feeling so strongly to the President himself, as well as in more routine official circles, that he was fired as fleet commander ten months before the attack. This was not lost on Kimmel: it was a mistake he would not make. Ironically, Richardson was right; the fleet was not adequately supported logistically in far off Hawaii--though neither he nor anyone really expected an all-out attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan's target was clearly the Far East: French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, perhaps the Philippines.

The glitch in this simplistic analysis appears now to have been Japan's Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Combined Fleet, opposite number to Kimmel, who felt the U.S. Fleet had to be neutralized too. Yamamoto was a very high quality naval officer and leader, and he won the point in Japan's high command. A well planned surprise attack is one of the most basic of military operations, by definition hardest to defeat. By definition the enemy is not ready, and a major portion of the

planning is always devoted to preserving the element of surprise. The defeat of the Maginot Line, the invasion of Normandy in 1944, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, all are examples of this. Another generally accepted truism: the prophet of disaster is usually unpopular too, along with the victimized leader.

For Admiral Richardson, not quite a prophet of disaster but the closest thing to it at the time, there was no warning that he was about to lose his job, except that he knew he had been unusually forthright in stating his disagreement with the President. He had even gone so far as to say that senior officers in the navy had lost confidence in their civilian leadership. This "hurt the President's feelings," the admiral was later told. The axe fell without even a telephoned preliminary notice from his close friend, the CNO; so it is probable, as Richardson believed, that instructions from FDR himself must have forbidden the courtesy. In January 1941, exactly one year after he took command, he received a dispatch cutting his normal tour in half, returning him to Washington, and directing his replacement by Admiral Kimmel.

In Washington, although told by Secretary of the Navy Knox to expect a call to the White House, Richardson never again saw the President (he had seen him frequently before). Demoted to Rear Admiral, he was employed in a succession of minor jobs in Washington. He reached the statutory retirement age of 64 in October 1942, was put on the retired list, and immediately recalled to active duty in similar assignments--as before, not connected with the war effort. He was finally retired in 1947. In his book he says, "after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel received the rawest of raw deals from Franklin D. Roosevelt and, insofar as they acquiesced in this treatment, from Frank Knox and "Betty" Stark (CNO)." Elsewhere in the same book he wrote, "I believe the President's responsibility for our initial defeats in the Pacific was direct, real, and personal."

Admiral Hart has already been mentioned. The "Purple" machine that provided "Magic," the ability to intercept and decode Japanese messages, was available to him and General MacArthur via a top secret special shipment sent in January 1941 (Hawaii received no such shipment.) How much use of it either of the commanders in the Philippines made is not specifically known, but Hart was not caught napping by the Japanese attack. He disposed of the forces under his command as well as anyone could have under the short time available to him, and it is possible that he might have done even better, possibly have saved the submarine *Sealion* (under overhaul and immobile), had he had another day's warning. His performance illustrates at least what could be done in the very minimum of time.

Hart was nothing if not a dedicated naval officer and knowledgeable fleet commander. Although he must have guessed that he was being protected because of his knowledge of our ability to decode Japanese messages, it no doubt caused him much heartburn to abandon his forces in the summary way he did, in mid-February 1942, knowing they were being used as a death offering in support of a cause already known to be lost. The Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously awarded to the commanding officer of the sacrificed *Houston* was truly deserved, as the facts now available clearly demonstrate, but it can never be more than an inadequate symbol of the debt owed to all the men of that forlorn, deserted, Asiatic Fleet. Yet, war is never without sacrifice, demanded and given. Before blame and accusation are handed out it is first necessary to decide what were the alternatives to all concerned. Japan, with a warrior class based on a samurai culture, would have had no difficulty with this problem. Neither, probably, would Nazi Germany. Had we abandoned the Dutch East Indies, more of our Asiatic Fleet might have survived; but the Dutch were our allies, and it would have been hard to predict the judgment of history.

Hart, the Asiatic Fleet's Commander-in-Chief, retired from active duty in June 1942. In February 1945 the Governor of Connecticut appointed him United States Senator on the death of Senator Francis Maloney of that state. He did not run for reelection in 1946, and his term expired the next year.

Admiral Stark received considerable unofficial blame for Pearl Harbor, though few then knew anything specific as to the reasons. He was shunted aside by the appointment of Admiral Ernest J. King as COMINCH, the new combined billet of CNO and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. All the many investigations of the Pearl Harbor debacle, it now appears, one way or another charged Stark with not keeping Admiral Kimmel adequately informed. Richardson states this accusation specifically: "I consider that "Betty" Stark, in failing to pick up a telephone and give Kimmel a last-minute warning on the morning of Pearl Harbor, committed a major professional lapse, indicating a basic absence of those personal military characteristics required in a successful war leader. I believe his failures in these respects were far more important derelictions than those of any of his subordinates....I cannot conceive of how he could have treated Kimmel as he did...unless...(it) was due to influence or possibly direct orders from above....His means of communication with Kimmel were equal to, if not superior to, those available to Marshall for communication with Short. He made no effort to warn Kimmel on the morning of December 7, but referred the matter to Marshall."

In his memoirs Richardson says he believes instructions had been given that no one but General Marshall was to send warnings to Pearl Harbor, and this explains why Stark did not send a warning directly. Regarding the lesser matter of simply keeping him informed, in which he reiterates his criticism of Stark, he makes a similar accusation relating to his own service as CINCUS, and goes on obliquely, "I believed also that few, if any, other senior officers in the Navy could have served the President so long and so satisfactorily as did Admiral Stark." He clearly did not consider this comment to be one of high praise.

In 1942 Admiral Stark was quietly exiled to England, where he served the United States well during the balance of the war. Nothing was ever done about his failure to notify Kimmel, and he never defended himself against the charge. Richardson sarcastically says, "In view of what happened to our fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, I believe he may have a few regrets as to his part in the matter."

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army Commander of the Hawaiian Department, is something of an enigma. Like George Marshall, he seems to have held an austere personal outlook on his duty, evidently accepted the disaster to himself as akin to but lesser than the deaths that overtook about 2,500 soldiers, sailors, and airmen on that terrible day, and holding his dismay, anger, whatever personal guilt he may have felt, and the terrible sorrow, within his own breast, quietly disappeared from the official scene. Except for his testimony when called before the sequence of investigations of the matter, in which he defended himself vigorously, he said nothing and wrote nothing. He had done his duty to the best of his ability, and like the samurai, he did not flinch at the penalty exacted of him by the overlords whom he served. He died in 1949.

General George C. Marshall was another American samurai, one of the authentic heroes of modern American history. He has rightly been revered by the American public, whom he served as Chief of Staff of the Army, then as Secretary of State and as Secretary of Defense. Seldom has one individual so combined the qualities of austere high-mindedness, self-abnegation, seriousness of purpose, and intellect. He was admired by Presidents, by the news media, in short by all who came into contact with him. The nation was singularly fortunate that this high quality person should have been near the seat of power during the extraordinary period that encompassed WWII and its aftermath. So far as is known, during Marshall's entire history there was only one single lapse in his otherwise superlative stewardship of our country's best interests, and this was on Pearl Harbor Day. That was the morning when he decided to cut himself off from all official communication and go horseback riding. Lesser officers bearing important information: the decode of the final section of the crucial "fourteen section" message, Admiral Stark's request that a war warning message be sent to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, a Colonel Bratton's desperate attempts to reach him with critical, and as we now know accurate,

though intuitive, information of the intentions of the Japanese fleet--all had to wait until the general could be found and attend to business.

Marshall was a man of commanding presence and a nearly mystical sense of duty. Absent some overriding criterion, there is literally no way he would, or could, have been so derelict in his duties on this all important Sunday. Other officials--Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Marshall's navy counterpart Admiral Stark, many lesser officers, in particular those involved with code work--were at their desks or trying frantically to reach someone in authority with what they considered to be important information. All were well aware of the critical state of Japanese-American relations. The Army Chief of Staff could not have been an exception. Admiral Richardson wrote that though he had no proof, he was certain FDR had directed that only General Marshall could send any warning message to Hawaii. Would the conscientious Marshall have absented himself from his post virtually the entire morning of that terribly important Sunday--on his own? Richardson did not think so. On the contrary, the rest of his life he believed that FDR wanted an attack of some kind to launch us into the war, and that Marshall held the key. But when FDR "realized the extent of the damage done by the attack on Pearl Harbor, he lost his nerve and (ran for cover)."

General MacArthur's USAFFE was created on 26 July 1941 when President Roosevelt called the Philippine armed forces into the service of the United States. Initially this force consisted only of the relatively small U.S. Army garrison on Corregidor, augmented by the Philippine Constabulary (the army of the autonomous but not yet fully independent Philippines), and other U.S. Army forces in the archipelago. MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935, already personally wealthy, was now politically powerful as well. As Field Marshall of the Philippine Army he had a fabulous apartment at the top of the storied Manila Hotel, supplied and staffed by the Philippine government, from which he carried out his administrative duties. Although the U.S. Army might have selected someone other than a flamboyant and ambitious retired general, even a former chief of staff, for the post of Commanding General of the USAFFE, Roosevelt picked MacArthur, a choice from which there was no audible dissent. He was guilty of far more dereliction than Admiral Kimmel when, 10 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, with complete knowledge that it had occurred, he permitted total destruction of his newly arrived air forces. He had, like Hart, been given Magic (it came in on a "purple" machine sequestered in his headquarters, and he and Hart were theoretically the only ones to see the messages). When orders came to save himself he protested loudly but did so nonetheless, along with, presumably, all those who had had contact with Magic. He had known FDR well for years, had been held over as Army Chief-of-Staff by Presidential order for an extra year after his term expired in 1934, and may well have contributed to FDR's political career, possibly by important campaign contributions, in ways known to no one else. The last point is speculative; the facts are that despite his failure at this critically important juncture he was continued as commander of the U.S. Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE), later appointed Supreme Commander Far East, and although the victory over Japan had clearly been won at sea, was given the honor of receiving the Japanese surrender. The sop to the navy was that the Japanese emissaries were obliged to surrender on board the U.S. battleship *Missouri*.

The records show that MacArthur was kept better informed than either of the Hawaii commanders. Moreover, he had the "purple" machine, that they did not have. Even so, and even after receipt of urgent messages from Hawaii and Washington describing the bombing that had taken place at Pearl Harbor, he remained indecisive. At dawn in the Philippines, many hours after the war had begun, his Army Air Corps commander, General Brereton, sent up some fighter planes from Clark Field on a patrol mission. This was in the early morning of 8 December, east longitude time. By some accounts the first attack on the Philippine mainland had already taken place, at Baguio, in the hills north of Manila, but the Army Air Corps fliers found no enemy planes, and returned to Clark Field to await further orders. No such further orders came, although Brereton begged for them several times.

The principal attack by Formosa-based Japanese bombers and fighters arrived over Clark Field several hours later. In their reports, the Japanese fliers expressed amazement at finding virtually the entire force of U.S. fighter and bomber planes in the Philippines, lined up neatly on the ground, not even in revetments for protection against ground strafing. Nearly all these so valuable aircraft, some of them just arrived and brand new, were destroyed. Some were shot down while desperately attempting to take off under the sudden emergency. Irreplaceable Army Air Corps fliers, some who had just arrived in the Philippines, lost their lives in this debacle.

With the sudden ascendancy of air power in 1941, the loss of most of the aircraft and trained fliers available to defend the Philippines and the Asiatic Fleet was a more severe blow to the United States than the loss of the Pacific Fleet battle line half a day earlier. Historians are united in laying the blame for this at MacArthur's door. How he could have been so derelict has never been satisfactorily explained.

The word "revisionist" has become an epithet these days. An individual who wants to change how history is viewed is called a "revisionist," with the connotation that anyone challenging the established perception is automatically wrong. There is something, all the same, to be said for those who look at things a little differently. One does not, for example, have to damn President Franklin Roosevelt for believing the United States must get into World War II to stop Nazi Germany. He felt this was vitally important, and the judgment of history supports him. Winston Churchill, with a much less complicated agenda, worked hard for the same, and was an international hero because of it. It is hard to be objective about the greater good of mankind in general when the immediate effects on oneself are bad, but it is also hard to conceive of what the world would be like had Hitler and his Nazis won that war. Roosevelt undoubtedly felt that he must at all costs weigh in on the side of a free Europe, and that failure to do so, in good time, would in the long run be disastrous to freedom and civilization. We cannot disagree with that assessment today.

None of Japan's recent aggression on the nearby mainland of Asia had caused the United States to do more than protest. Even the deliberate sinking of the USS PANAY in 1937 produced only a momentary flap. In 1941, however, with less apparent provocation, the U.S. began to freeze Japanese assets and threaten her oil supply. To any student of our diplomatic posture in that year, it must be clear that pressure of this sort, against a militant nation like Japan, could produce only one outcome: hostility immediately, war if persisted in. Since Roosevelt's major concern was Europe, choice of this particular time to push Japan toward war might seem illogical, until the thought strikes that it might have been because of the need in Europe, and not in spite of it. His knowledge that he could now be kept current on the secret interchanges between Tokyo and its Washington embassy can only have encouraged him in this course.

Roosevelt and Churchill were talking frequently by trans-Atlantic telephone. They knew Japan's Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy had secret provisions for mutual support in case of war with America. They also believed any warlike move by Japan into Southeast Asia would involve supporting action in Europe by the other Axis partners. No record of these conversations has come to light in America, and no historian has yet had access to Churchill's pre-Pearl Harbor files, but the ABC-1 (or ABCD) Staff Agreement of early 1941 is instructive. It declared the Axis threat in Europe to be the primary concern in the event of such a global war, and as we well know, that was how the war was conducted. When the conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill are finally opened, some of our questions may be answered.

Since we could break into Japan's codes, however, how could we have been caught so embarrassingly unalert at Pearl Harbor? As has already been said, for the answer it is first necessary to set aside everything in the deluge of detail except what bears directly on the subject. It was a confusing and complicated matter. Much of the data we see today

was under such heavy security when it was fresh that its accuracy, now, is doubtful. The motives of the participants are also suspect; self interest was not impossible, deliberate falsehood, for government secrecy or some other reason, not impossible either. And finally, it is important to go over everything from the points of view of the men on the spot at the time.

In the process, the sheer immensity of the material has been overwhelming. Investigators and historians have had to go over thousands--tens--hundreds of thousands of pages of testimony and personal narrative. To this must be added the known, and unknown, politics of the time. Now, however, half a century after the event, most of all this has been brought out, Magic has been exposed, and some of the political facts; so that others can be guessed. It is time we put aside the superfluous and concentrated on the significant. This is not an impossible task, but it cannot be done by a politically closed mind.

Here are the essential events as they took place; each is in the direct chain leading to our failure, and so far as possible, has been divested of immaterial detail. What follows is the kernel of what we knew:

1. Admiral Yamamoto spent a year planning the attack. He well knew how covertly it had to be conducted, and demanded the utmost secrecy from inception to execution. His precautions against accidental radio signals from the designated task force, the Kido Butai, extended to removal of transmitter keys from all ships' radios, because even an innocuous signal was subject to interception by direction finder stations that might wonder how it had happened to come from an area where no ships were supposed to be. He might also have expected the big movement of Japanese naval forces southward, into Southeast Asia, to dominate our attention. That move was no feint; but by accident or design, its secrecy did not compare to the absolute blackout imposed on the Kido Butai, both during its preparation and finally as it lunged eastward across the North Pacific. Yamamoto, who planned in utmost detail, expected the southern movement to attract all our attention, as it did. It would be the height of arrogance on our part to assume that the Japanese success could only have been due to our own failure. Admiral Yamamoto and his advisers had a great deal to do with it. Although they too suffered a little from Murphy's Law, on the whole they played their cards very well.

2. In 1941 The United States began to put strong pressure on Japan to stop her aggression in China. We froze Japan's assets wherever we could, and used our clout with England and the Dutch East Indies to threaten her source of oil to carry on the war. Churchill supported this all the way, and a diplomatic crisis resulted. Through Magic, our top officials knew Japan had no intention of complying with our demands and would instead move decisively, in force, into Southeast Asia.

3. On 5 November, Magic decoded a message from Tokyo to its ambassadors in Washington informing them that some kind of accommodation must be signed by 25 November. After that deadline, "things are automatically going to happen," Tokyo said. The Pacific commanders were not told of this. We now know that Yamamoto had selected 25 November as the day the Kido Butai would depart from its last staging port in the Kurile Islands.

4. On 19 November, Magic decoded what became known as the "Winds Code" message, announcing that in case of cutting of diplomatic relations, certain words relating to weather would be added to its daily plain language news broadcast. On hearing them, Japan's embassies were to destroy codes and secret documents. On our side, we welcomed the idea that the "winds code execute" might give us a few days of warning, and all saw it as an alternate source that could be developed entirely free of any connection with Magic, that fragile code-breaking secret. So all stations, Pearl Harbor included, were directed to keep a close watch for it. Although no official records can

today be found of such a message having been detected and reported as prescribed, a number of operatives have sworn before Congress that they in fact did exactly this. In his excellent book, PEARL HARBOR, The Story Of The Secret War, published in 1947, George Morgenstern wrote that such records did at one time exist, but he believed they had been deliberately destroyed.

5. On 26 November, the day after Japan's deadline (which, of course, Japan did not guess we had intercepted), our State Department sent Japan a formal demand to stop aggression on the mainland or face a total cutoff of oil imports from Southeast Asia. No word of this, nor of the coincidence in dates, was sent to the Pacific commanders.

6. A little later on the same day (26th), we read through Magic that in response to urgent requests by her two ambassadors to Washington, Nomura and Kurusu, the date after which "things were automatically going to happen" had been advanced to the 29th. No information about this was sent to outlying commanders. Hart and MacArthur were supposed to have picked it up on their "purple" machine. Turner, when asked, said there was also a purple machine in Hawaii, but this was not true.

7. Because of all this, on 27 November differently worded "War Warnings", specifying probability of an amphibious expedition by Japan to Southeast Asia, were sent to the Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific. Originally intended to be strongly stated, the warnings were so modified by cautionary language about secrecy and upsetting the public that all sense of urgency evaporated. Kimmel and Short responded routinely, and Washington was satisfied. On the same day, Washington proposed sending half of Short's fighter planes to Wake and Midway by aircraft carrier, and replacing the Marine detachments at both places with Army troops. This brought Kimmel and Short into extensive staff conferences that lasted a week and produced strong objections. The idea went no further, but it had effectively reduced the war warnings of 27 November to pro forma status.

8. From here on, events began to move very rapidly. On 1 December Magic produced a message to Japan's Ambassadors that read, "The date set in my message has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious... negotiations are continuing." The message concluded, "The above is only for your information." We evidently took them at their word, for our Pacific commanders were not informed of this ominous statement either. Official Washington, however, took it to mean that hostilities were imminent.

9. A few hours later on that same day, Magic decoded a message directing Japan's embassies and overseas consular offices to destroy their codes, secret communication systems, and classified libraries. This in effect made the "winds code" moot, but the Pacific Commanders were not informed. By previous order, their communication staffs were still wasting their time on maximum alert to detect a "winds code execute" signal that, according to the official account, never came.

10. Two days later, however, on 3 December, the Navy sent Kimmel two messages paraphrasing (for protection of Magic) Japan's 1 December order to destroy code materials. That the winds code was no longer of interest was still not mentioned. General Short received no such notification. Kimmel's staff did not note anything significant, nor did he think to check with the Army. This was a failure of magnitude on Kimmel's part, for which he and his staff were clearly guilty. In an unusual and elliptical attempt to give Short a "heads up" signal without crossing swords with Army Chief of Staff Marshall, who alone was empowered to issue instructions to outlying Army posts, General Miles, the Army Intelligence Chief, on 5 December radioed Colonel Fielder, Short's intelligence adviser, to "immediately contact Navy Cdr. Rochefort regarding Tokyo weather

broadcasts." Rochefort was Navy's top cryptanalyst in Hawaii, well known to Fielder. Colonel Rufus Bratton, second to Miles in Army Intelligence, claimed later to have suggested this most unusual message to Miles. Obviously very miscast in intelligence, Fielder did not carry out the order, even though it had come from his direct superior in Army Intelligence.

11. On 6 December came the climax. Magic decoded and translated a message informing the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington that a "very long" message in 14 parts, containing a reply to the ultimatum of 26 November, was being sent. It was to be put into "nicely drafted form" and held for a time of delivery to be directed later. This "pilot message," as it came to be called, reiterated again that although Japan considered all negotiations ruptured, the embassy was carefully not to give that impression. The U.S. had this pilot message in hand before it was delivered to the Japanese Ambassadors. Tension increased dramatically in Washington, but nobody told Kimmel or Short of this development.

12. A watch was immediately instituted for the 14-part message, and the first 13 parts were decoded as fast as they came in. It was instantly noted that the text was English, not Japanese, as heretofore. That no translation was needed was considered significant by the code-breakers most tuned into the Japanese scene, since this avoided possible error in an Embassy translation. The 13 parts did not come in sequence. When it was evident there was a delay in the 14th part, the Magic watch officers decided to send out the 13 parts en bloc and follow later with the 14th, which they expected to be of very high importance. Thus, by 9 p.m. of December 6th, the first 13 parts of Japan's reply to the U.S. ultimatum of 26 November were being shown to cognizant U.S. officials in Washington, along with the pilot message stating there would be 14 parts in all. There was no notice, however, that the Japanese Government had encoded this important dispatch in English, a fact of which none of our top officials was informed. Had they been, some of the intelligence-attuned officers in the circuit, Admiral Wilkinson or General Miles, to name the heads of navy and army intelligence, could hardly have failed to give them far more attention, not to mention careful scrutiny, than they in fact did.

13. Each service made its own Magic deliveries. Routine deliveries by Navy were to the White House, the Navy Secretary, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It being by this time rather late at night, the various courier drops had to be at local residences instead of government offices. The Navy intelligence chief, Wilkinson, that Saturday night happened to be giving a dinner party at his home. His guests included his opposite number in the Army, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, the Presidential Naval Aide, Captain J.R. Beardall, and two French naval officers. Excusing themselves from the others present, the highest intelligence officers of our two services thus simultaneously received the first 13 parts of this supremely important message before midnight of 6 December, and exchanged views as to its meaning.

Neither Wilkinson nor Miles saw anything special in the lengthy sequential bloc of messages in formal diplomatic language. By the pilot message they knew there was to be a final 14th part yet to come, but they had no way of knowing that, contrary to the usual practice, Japan had encoded this lengthy message in English, but in their code! The identification numbers our code-breakers always appended accurately indicated that the messages had been through the translation process, but not that translation was in fact unnecessary. None of the recipients remarked at the unusual smoothness of the language, which might have been a tip-off.

14. In the White House, meanwhile, President Roosevelt read the file and passed it over to Harry Hopkins, who was with him in his upstairs study. His duty aide heard FDR say to Hopkins at this point, "This means war!" Hopkins said, "It's too bad we can't strike the first blow, since we know their plans." Roosevelt said, "No, they must strike first!"

The corrected record of the Joint Committee shows that Roosevelt then asked the White House switchboard to connect him with Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations. When the operator reported that Stark was at the theater, he directed he not be paged, but that word be left for him in his quarters to call the White House. Surprisingly, according to all testimony, Roosevelt made no effort to call General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army.

15. It was illogical not to call Marshall, who was well known to be Roosevelt's principal military adviser. Nor is a convincing explanation made of the failure to deliver to the Army chief the first 13 parts of what must have seemed obviously a supremely important message (the Magic operatives thought so, at any rate, but they were not high on anyone's totem pole). Marshall testified that he could not recall where he was on the night of the 6th, thought he must have spent it at home in his quarters, and Sunday morning went for a long horseback ride where no one could find him. Much was made of all this in the hearing, but no satisfactory answer has ever surfaced. Marshall never explained his memory lapse.

16. The 7 December issue of the morning Washington Times Herald, however, reported that on the previous evening Marshall was guest of honor for dinner at a reunion of World War I veterans at the University Club on 16th Street, not far from the White House. It is possible that, like Stark, he found a call from the White House waiting for him when he returned home. Or, conscientious man that he was, it was not at all impossible for him to have checked in with the White House and discovered there might be need for his presence. Being but a few blocks away and fully aware of the critical Japanese situation, for him this would have been both logical and easy. For us it is speculative, but it would explain why Roosevelt did not place a call for him. There is good evidence (not ironclad, but the sources--one is Frank Knox--give identical accounts) that the Army and Navy chiefs of service, and Secretaries Stimson and Knox, joined Roosevelt and Hopkins in the President's study around midnight.

17. They had Roosevelt's copy of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese message, and a chart of the far Pacific Ocean areas (this chart still exists, bearing penciled notations of the locations of Japanese naval and troop forces on 6 December 1941). There were substantial reports of movements of such forces, and it appeared certain that Japan would soon make a dramatic strike in the Southeast Asia area, probably in the area of the most accessible oil. Yamamoto, if he had indeed planned it this way, had succeeded in focusing the attention of our leadership away from Pearl Harbor. Stimson and Marshall, as well as Roosevelt, reportedly said several times that hostilities in Southeast Asia would put us into the war, and we must "make sure the Japs strike first." The White House vigil lasted until nearly four in the morning, ending when it appeared the 14th part of the long Japanese reply was not to be forthcoming. Roosevelt, it can be surmised, doubtless enjoined those present to "forget about this meeting" and had gate, housekeeping, and secret service logs expunged.

18. Like Marshall, Admiral Stark also forgot that he had been called by the President on that momentous night, but for him forgetfulness was less easy because his memory was unexpectedly refreshed. The Starks had taken a house guest and his wife (Commander Harold Frick, a former aide with whom he had maintained an abiding friendship) to the theater. The CNO told of this in his testimony, but made no mention of a White House call. After the hearing, Frick privately reminded him that when they returned to the CNO's quarters (the same house now assigned to the Vice President), the duty steward reported the call, and Stark excused himself to return it. Faced with this new evidence, the CNO immediately wrote a longhand letter to the Joint Committee chairman, asking to correct his testimony, and a special meeting, with only a few committee members present and all objecting to the short notice, was held for him. He told of the call, but was not

asked whether he returned it, nor about the substance of his talk with the President, if there was one. No such embarrassment developed with Marshall, whose own memory lapse was neither explained nor corrected.

19. The 14th part was delivered from the code-breakers about midnight to Lieutenant Colonel Dusenbury, assistant to Bratton. Bratton had directed him to wait for it and upon receipt have it delivered to the Army Chief of Staff. The tone of the 14th part was sharper than any of the previous 13, but did not seem sensational to the tired Dusenbury, who made no effort to show it to anyone, simply put it on top of the file, designated a copy for Navy in accordance with procedure, and secured the office. At 0730 Sunday morning, 7 December, Colonel Bratton arrived, read the assembled 14-part message, "blew his stack" at Dusenbury for not following orders, but decided it was "the formal statement" of what they already knew, and not earth-shaking after all. Despite displeasure with his assistant for not having tried to get it to Marshall the previous midnight, now that the morning had arrived he decided routine distribution was adequate. At this moment, Bratton later testified, he was handed the message stipulating that the Japanese Ambassadors formally deliver their country's long response to the Secretary of State at one pm that same day. Like the pilot message, but unlike all 14 parts of the principal message, the delivery message was in Japanese and had needed translation. Bratton was not privy to the motives and objectives swirling in the minds of the men conducting our top-level international diplomacy, but he did see something in Japan's juxtaposition of English and Japanese in this way. It was clear matters of importance were in the wind. He saw no potential threat to Pearl Harbor, but the emphasis on time hinted at an attack somewhere in the Pacific. That, and the use of English in the main message, galvanized Bratton into action.

20. After his final deliveries on the night of the 6th, the Navy courier, LCdr. Kramer by name, who was also the Navy's top Japanese translator, had a few hours of sleep and returned to work at 0730 of the 7th. There he found his copy of the 14-part message left for him by Dusenbury, and immediately made folders for the White House, the State Department, and Admiral Wilkinson. (Wilkinson, he knew, would take care of deliveries to Stark and Knox.) His three office drops being only a few blocks apart, he walked the entire distance. When he got back to the Navy Department he found the delivery message waiting for him and, like Bratton, saw it must have special significance. On his own, he decided that it should be delivered at once. While more folders were prepared, he made a time chart of the Pacific, noted that one p.m. (1300) in Washington would be 0730 Sunday morning in Hawaii, and made the mental observation that this was just the time the big ships would be serving their crews a leisurely Sunday breakfast.

21. Gordon Prange's account (AT DAWN WE SLEPT) is superior to all others at this point, but only John Toland, in INFAMY, reports the White House vigil. Morgenstern refers to it inferentially in 1947 (he had heard of it but could not record it as fact), and mention of it is notably made in two personal letters by third parties. All other reviews of what happened at this extraordinary time simply accept the Army Chief of Staff's vague statement that he believed he was at home all night (despite the Washington Times Herald story), and that he went for a ride on horseback next morning when it would seem the whole Army was looking for him. All also agree that Stark arrived in his Main Navy office not long after 0800 on that Sunday morning (but ascribe no reason why he was there and not on a golf course somewhere, or even sleeping late on Sunday morning) and met with his intelligence chief, Admiral Wilkinson, and the latter's assistant, Commander Arthur McCollum, who were waiting with the complete 14-part message in Kramer's folder. A discussion over its meaning took place that lasted long enough for the courier/translator to finish his first set of walking courier rounds. Kramer's second trip to the CNO's office, occasioned by the delivery message, gave him the chance to point out to these high officers that 1300 in Washington D.C. was half an hour before morning colors in Hawaii. Wilkinson at once urged Stark to telephone a warning to Kimmel.

22. According to Admiral J.O. Richardson, whom Kimmel had relieved in command at Pearl Harbor ten months before, this was the moment when Stark should have picked up his special scrambler telephone to make the call that would have alerted Kimmel at about 0300, as was his duty. Versions differ on just what Stark did; Toland says he picked up the phone, hesitated, then decided instead to call the President. When the White House operator said the President was busy, he did nothing further. Prange and Clausen say he tried the President first, then Marshall, but the Army Chief of Staff was not in his office. All agree that Stark did nothing as the last few hours in which minimal defensive preparations at Pearl could have been accomplished slowly evaporated. Richardson states he was positive there had been "some directive from higher authority" that only Marshall was to make such a call, but he believed Stark should have done it anyway, and he never forgave him.

23. Marshall finally arrived in his office around 1100. He is reported to have studied "with glacial slowness" the 14-part message his two highest intelligence officers, General Miles and Colonel Bratton, laid before him, almost as though he were deliberately killing time (Prange says he read it aloud). In the meantime the two Army Intelligence officers, with the crucial delivery message in hand, several times (Morgenstern says "frantically") tried to interrupt to call it to his attention. But Marshall, known for fearsome concentration and forbidding style, refused to be diverted. Finally, with the office clock showing nearly noon, he reached for it. Containing himself as well as he could, Bratton explained that "something was going to happen" at one o'clock. Marshall then wrote out a warning message, initiated a call to Stark (who had been waiting about two hours), rebuffed the naval officer's offer to have it sent by more powerful navy radio, added Stark's request that "naval opposites" be informed, and sent Bratton off to get it transmitted by army radio.

24. Army S.O.P. required then, and it still does, that important operational messages be sent by all means available, simultaneously. Marshall did not do this; nor did he place any priority precedence on his emergency message. In spite of Bratton's urgency, because of atmospheric difficulties the message for General Short therefore went by Western Union, with routine priority. It was logged out of the Army Message Center at 1217, only ten minutes before sunrise in Hawaii, but Murphy's Law was not done with it yet. In Hawaii it was simply one of several unimportant-looking telegrams given to a motorcycle messenger of Japanese descent who took shelter when the attack began. General Short finally got his warning hours after everything was over. In irony (it could have been nothing else), he meticulously carried out the only specific instruction it contained that he could carry out: he sent a copy to his opposite number in the navy.

As the foregoing summation shows, the failures in Washington were extensive. None can be proved to have been by intent, despite the accusations of the isolationist wing, which for years has been claiming Roosevelt connived at "setting up" our fleet in Pearl Harbor, but in cumulative effect they were devastating. Secretary Knox, when he saw Admiral Kimmel two days after the attack, upon arriving at Pearl Harbor for his hurried inspection, exclaimed incredulously, "Didn't you get the message we sent you Saturday night?" There were reports such a message was sent during the course of the early morning White House vigil which Knox attended, but nothing has ever been found to confirm this. The best guess in the beclouded circumstances is that General Marshall's hand-written message, sent at noon on the 7th, was the only one to which Knox could possibly have referred, although no one has suggested how he might have known of it.

Admiral Stark, on 6 December, is supposed to have commented that further warnings to the Pacific commanders might confuse them, since "We have sent them so much already." Whatever he may have thought, the record proves that no tactical warning whatever, and very little of what might be called "strategic warning," had been sent for

over a week to the men on whom the blow was about to fall. Morgenstern, with the benefit of all the hearings before him, including that of the Army Pearl Harbor Board which he quotes devastatingly, is very clear on this. As he points out, Washington knew well that something was about to happen, but all hands there, from the Commander-in-Chief on down, chose to do nothing until after the blow fell.

We see reference after reference to "subtle hints" the Hawaiian commanders supposedly received, including headlines in the Honolulu newspapers, into which they were expected to have been able to read more than anyone else, more even than the people in Washington, who had Magic and a hundred other sources of special information. In fact, the only actual warnings sent from Washington to the Pacific Fleet were the emasculated "war warning" of 27 November, and the 3 December notice that Japanese embassies were burning secret papers.

Not a single hint of the frenetic activity in Washington on the night of 6-7 December was sent out to the commanders who had the most right to know. One can imagine what either Kimmel or Short would have done had they had the slightest idea of what was going on in Washington during that weekend. Not one official in the Nation's Capital, not the Chief of Naval Operations, not the Army Chief of Staff, both of whom should have felt command responsibility for their men on the firing line, did what their duties required. Warning signs of all sorts were missed. All the administrative bosses were derelict, and when the blow fell they all took cover in the adage that "the blame falls on the captain of the ship." So far as any concept of human justice was concerned, this was a travesty.

The inequality of treatment is even more obvious when General MacArthur in the Philippines is added to the equation. Eight hours after he was notified about Pearl Harbor, he was nonetheless caught utterly unready at noon on Monday, 8 December, Philippines time. William Manchester in his outstanding biography of MacArthur, *AMERICAN CAESAR*, explains his failure as a form of "input overload," plus a misapplication of FDR's order that Japan should "strike the first blow"--but does not claim that this lessens MacArthur's responsibility, which of course it does not. Compared to the disgraceful treatment of Kimmel and Short, MacArthur's preservation in command and later elevation to Supreme Commander stand in ironic contrast.

In their new book *FINAL JUDGEMENT* (I disagree with both the title and its spelling) Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee have made it clear that the most important mistakes were committed in Washington, not in Hawaii. There was a veritable cascade of admitted errors in our national capital--and yet the authors illogically lay primary blame for the success of the Japanese surprise just where the discredited Roberts Commission placed it in 1941: on the Hawaiian commanders because they were captains of the ship.

The real captain, as we all know, was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and we cannot today question his judgment that it was imperative we get into the war against Hitler. He knew America would have to be aroused to a warlike frame of mind before Congress would act, and he finally sought to achieve this through a secret, murky, but thoroughly understandable diplomatic campaign on Japan. In this he was entirely successful, but unfortunately too much so; for Japan had its own agenda for a war with the United States, and an excellent admiral, Yamamoto Isoroku by name, to put it into practice. There is no doubt that Roosevelt wanted the United States to go to war against Nazi Germany, and that he thereby preserved the freedom of the world against an unimaginable coalition of evil. But he failed to foresee Pearl Harbor, and, as J. O. Richardson says, "ran for cover" when the dimensions of the Pearl Harbor disaster came clear to him.

The fact is, as a nation we are glad Kimmel did not get enough warning to get his battle force to sea--at least, as envisioned in War Plan Orange, which would have had it looking for a great sea-battle. Admiral Nimitz himself has been quoted as saying if that had taken place the ships would have been sunk in deep water with horrendous loss of life, instead of in the shallow waters of their base with only one-tenth the casualties, grievous

though they were. We actually wish only that Kimmel and Short had had just enough time--and no more--to have readied their anti-aircraft batteries to shoot back the moment the attack began. This would have been the best of all worlds, because we would not have looked so ridiculous on that peaceful Sunday morning. Clausen and Lee point this out, and they are right. They might have gone on to say that it was really our ego that was most hurt.

Whatever fault may be ascribed to George Marshall, his unexplained absence at the critical moment, his Promethean deliberateness during the last crucial couple of hours, his failure to make sure that all possible preparations for a situation that Washington knew was critical had been properly done--all this has to be compared to the tremendous role he has played in our country's history. He is rightly revered as one of the highest quality public servants this fortunate republic has ever had. This is the only blot on his escutcheon. There is no need to deny his responsibility. His back is broad enough to carry it.

The same can be said for President Roosevelt. He, too, failed at this point, but his reputation as one of our most effective wartime Presidents remains secure. To those who still feel he did wrong "getting us into World War II," what Europe suffered is the answer. We could not have stayed out of that war. It was the Armageddon of modern times.

Admiral Stark failed too, for not doing his utmost to warn the Pacific Fleet commander that war was about to begin. Although not punished in any way, and indeed decorated for his performance in his next assignment, he was nonetheless held by Secretary Knox and the redoubtable Admiral King to have "failed to exhibit the high qualities of leadership" required by his post. In his own defense he once very revealingly stated that his conscience was clear because everything he did was in response to orders from higher authority. Sadly for his personal reputation, he was not able to compete with all the pressures on him at this critical time.

It is easy to suggest the warning message that should have been sent, shortly after people in authority, driven on that early Sunday by the dire knowledge something bad was in the wind, began to gather at their workplaces. The moment the Japanese ambassadors asked for the meeting with our Secretary of State, the following should have been sent to all Pacific commanders by all available means:

THIS IS A WAR WARNING BEYOND ALL WAR WARNINGS. PRESIDENT U.S. SENDS. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AT ALL TIME LOW. JAPANESE EMBASSY BURNING PAPERS AND CODES, AMBASSADOR DEMANDS MEETING WITH SECSTATE TODAY, SUNDAY, AT ONE PM SEVENTH EST REPEAT ONE PM SUNDAY SEVENTH EST. SIGNIFICANCE OF TIME UNKNOWN, BUT JAPAN HAS HABIT OF SURPRISE ATTACKS. BE READY FOR ANYTHING. ARMY, NAVY, URGENTLY COORDINATE. THIS IS NOT A DRILL. REPEAT, PRESIDENT U.S. SENDS.

This, or something similar, received in Hawaii as late as an hour before the attack, would have done the job. It makes no reference to Magic, and so far as security was concerned, once the audience with Hull had been requested it might have been sent in plain language. But no message remotely like it was ever sent.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short are of course not completely guiltless of some degree of fault. Obviously, they lacked superior extra-sensory-perception. Obviously, they should have reacted better to the news about destruction of Japanese codes and cipher machines. That they did receive some subtle indication of trouble afoot is not denied, but they received less than anyone else, and had the bad luck to be standing where the blow fell. The national leadership, which had the obligation of keeping them au courant with matters of their concern, failed them utterly. To have expected them to be more knowledgeable than Washington, D.C., therefore more ready, is patently ridiculous.

For our own sake as a generous people, and to respect the ideal of individual justice on which our nation was built, we should at last officially recognize that they were not the principal ones at fault for Pearl Harbor, and not derelict in their duties. This is the growing realization in our whole country, except for those few who have not thought deeply about how Pearl Harbor could have happened. The finely woven tapestry of time has done its work, for now it is our national honor, not that of these two men turned into scapegoats, that is at stake. Do we believe in equity for the individual, or do we not? Will our country persist in vindictively holding these two as the persons solely at fault for Pearl Harbor, or will it finally do the right thing?

To restore their good names to Admiral Kimmel and General Short will cost us nothing, but doing it will symbolize something we hold very dear. The two officers should, by official action of the President, be advanced posthumously on the retired lists of their respective services to the highest ranks in which they served, as have all other officers in the war. They were never fairly tried, never given a chance to defend themselves. More than anyone in our history, they have been solely before the bar of public opinion--and that deep, finely ground judgment is already resounding, nation-wide, with the verdict that they have suffered enough in the service of their country. Ask anyone; take a vote; there are few dissenters. The suggestion to posthumously restore the ranks they once held is not comparable to a Presidential Pardon, but to the righting of a wrong that has gone on too long. Others also at fault, in some cases more so, were retired full of honors at their highest active duty ranks. Restoring the two final casualties of Pearl Harbor will heal a running wound in the national body. It is little enough to do, will cost nothing except a few drops of ink and a bit of compassion, and the honor of our nation demands no less.

**Retired Naval Officers
5205 Leesburg Pike, Suite 200
Falls Church, VA 22041**

October 22, 1991

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. President:

As part of the observances of the 50th Anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, it is fitting that our country rectify a regrettable injustice which has prevailed since that time. We refer to the unjust assignment of sole blame for the tragic attack to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Hawaii, and the resulting cruel stigma and humiliation to these officers and their families for the past 50 years.

Shortly after December 7, 1941 a Presidential Commission, chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, was appointed to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack. Reputable historians readily concede that the Commission conducted a hurried investigation, neglecting to review all available evidence and to obtain the testimony of many persons who could have provided substantive information. The Commission's report issued in January 1942 was critical of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, charging them with "dereliction of duty". Although subsequent investigations discredited the Robert's Commission's findings, the Commission's report and attendant publicity have been the major factors in shaping public perception and preventing official action to correct the unfair treatment of Kimmel and Short.

Shortly after the Robert's Commission's report was issued, Kimmel and Short were forced into retirement. Under U.S. law at that time military officers could retire at a rank no higher than the senior authorized rank, which in the case of Admiral Kimmel was Rear Admiral and in the case of Lieutenant General Short was Major General, both two star ranks.

Following the Roberts Commission report and his retirement, Admiral Kimmel repeatedly requested that he be tried by a Military Court Martial so that a full legal hearing in his case could be conducted with an opportunity

for him to testify under oath and call witnesses in his behalf. A court martial was never convened even though the U.S. Congress repeatedly extended the statute of limitations time limits at Admiral Kimmel's urging to permit this to occur.

Finally, due to Admiral Kimmel's continued entreaties, the Congress directed the Navy Department to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack and a Naval Court of Inquiry was convened in 1944. The Court of Inquiry cleared Admiral Kimmel of any improper performance with regards to his military responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. It is also significant to note that historical material which has become available in recent years irrefutably shows that Kimmel and Short were not provided information by their superiors in Washington which would have alerted them that an attack on Hawaii was imminent. We refer specifically to Japanese messages that were intercepted and decoded by both the Americans and the British.

After World War II, U.S. law was changed to permit military officers to retire at the highest rank held while on active duty, upon nomination by the President of the United States and confirmation by the Senate. For reasons never explained, neither Admiral Kimmel nor Lieutenant General Short were nominated for promotion, the only World War II officers not so advanced.

At this point in time no action by the U.S. Government can fully rectify the injustices to Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short. A partial atonement can be achieved by posthumously promoting these two officers to the ranks they held at the time of the attack, promotions to which they are entitled by law.

The following distinguished bodies have also passed resolutions recommending the posthumous promotions: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Foundation, and the Pearl Harbor Survivors' Association. Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations, sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense in July 1991 recommending the posthumous promotion.

We the undersigned retired senior officers respectfully urge you to nominate to the U.S. Senate Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN for posthumous promotion to Admiral and Major General Walter C. Short, USA, for posthumous promotion to Lieutenant General.

Very respectfully,

Thomas H. Moorer
Thomas H. Moorer
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

E R Zumwalt Jr
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

David H Bagley
David H. Bagley
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William F. Bringle
William F. Bringle
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.
Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Charles D. Griffin
Charles D. Griffin
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

John J. Hyland
John J. Hyland
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Robert L. J. Long
Robert L. J. Long
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Frederick H. Michaelis
Frederick H. Michaelis
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Jr.
Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

James B. Stockdale
James B. Stockdale
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Waldemar F. A. Wendt
Waldemar F. A. Wendt
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William J. Crowe, Jr.
William J. Crowe, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Thomas B. Hayward
Thomas B. Hayward
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Worth H. Bagley
Worth H. Bagley
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Ralph W. Cousins
Ralph W. Cousins
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Sylvester R. Foley, Jr.
Sylvester R. Foley, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Huntington Hardisty
Huntington Hardisty
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William P. Lawrence
William P. Lawrence
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Wesley L. McDonald
Wesley L. McDonald
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

David C. Richardson
David C. Richardson
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Harold E. Shear
Harold E. Shear
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Stanfield Turner
Stanfield Turner
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Steven A. White
Steven A. White
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

James L. Holloway, III
James L. Holloway, III
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Lee Baggett, Jr.
Lee Baggett, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Walter F. Boone
Walter F. Boone
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Donald C. Davis
Donald C. Davis
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Noel A. M. Gayler
Noel A. M. Gayler
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Ronald J. Hays
Ronald J. Hays
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Roy L. Johnson
Roy L. Johnson
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Kinnaird R. McKee
Kinnaird R. McKee
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Horacio Rivero, Jr.
Horacio Rivero, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

William N. Small
William N. Small
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Maurice F. Weisner
Maurice F. Weisner
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Alfred J. Whittle, Jr.
Alfred J. Whittle, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

The Virginian Apt. 323
9229 Arlington Boulevard
Fairfax, VA 22031

The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Four Star Rank For
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN
(Retired) (Deceased)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I last wrote you on this subject January 23, 1990. At that time I told you that Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret) had informed me that you had asked for my recommendation regarding the efforts of the Kimmel family to restore four star rank to the late Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN (Ret) (Deceased). I wrote you that I had never had the occasion to make a study of the many complex issues involved in the Pearl Harbor attack and thus was lacking in information upon which to base a recommendation and requested that I be relieved from providing you with a recommendation on his posthumous promotion.

Since that time I have educated myself on the circumstances surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack and thus feel qualified to provide you with the recommendation you sought. It is my considered judgment that when all the circumstances are considered that you should approve this posthumous promotion and recommend it to the President. This conclusion was reached not because of the importance of this matter to the Kimmel family but because of its importance to the Navy as an institution. The record is clear that important information, available to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, was never made available to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. While the reason for this has never been clearly established the fact is that it placed Admiral Kimmel at a severe disadvantage in not having the full picture upon which to base his estimate of the situation. I have always been of the firm opinion that those who decide not to furnish important information should bear the responsibility for that decision.

Lastly, the Naval Court of Inquiry, which exonerated Admiral Kimmel, concluded that his military decisions were proper based on the information available to him. I place great weight on the conclusions of the Naval Court because its members were Admirals of great experience and eminently qualified to pass on the propriety of what Admiral Kimmel had done under the circumstances.


Sincerely, Arleigh Burke

Arleigh Burke
July 24, 1991

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Kimmel:

As requested, I examined the case for posthumously promoting your father, Husband E. Kimmel, to the grade of Admiral. After reviewing existing evidence (including the writings you sent to Secretary Dalton), I am recommending that the President defer to prior official judgments.

Though this is not the news you hoped for, there is no new evidence to suggest that earlier findings are in error, nor is there a compelling justification to reverse prior decisions.

I truly regret that I have not presented you with a more favorable response.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Edward R. Kimmel
15 Wood Road
Wilmington, DE 19806

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Neil Sen Anisgr
has seen

June 25, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
 FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RH*
 SUBJECT: Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel

We have reviewed the issues surrounding Admiral Husband Kimmel's relief and retirement following the attack on Pearl Harbor. We see no compelling reason for the President's acting to reverse President Roosevelt's decision.

For several decades, Admiral Kimmel's family has been lobbying successive administrations to restore Kimmel to the temporary four star rank he held at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. They have renewed their efforts with this Administration. As you know, Admiral Crowe has taken a personal interest in their case.

The facts relevant to the case are not in dispute (Tab I). Admiral Kimmel received an official "war warning" message from the Navy Department on November 27, 1941 informing him that hostilities with Japan were imminent and directing him to put Pearl Harbor in a state of defense. None of the naval or air deployments called for in the applicable war plans were implemented to defend the islands by Kimmel or his Army counterpart, LTG Walter Short.

?
(1941)

At President Roosevelt's direction, Kimmel and Short were relieved of their commands and retired in their permanent two star ranks after a series of lengthy and exhaustive service and congressional investigations. It should be noted that they were not courtmartialled or even demoted. They were simply not granted the courtesy of retiring in their highest temporary rank.

While some intelligence available in Washington was not forwarded to Kimmel, there is no evidence that Washington had any specific intelligence confirming an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. The "missing" intelligence merely amplified what Kimmel and Short had already been told, that war seemed imminent. Toward the end of these investigations, Admiral Kimmel increasingly adopted the "FDR conspiracy" defense and openly aligned himself with congressional Republicans hoping to use the Pearl Harbor disaster as a campaign issue in 1944.

According to the Navy, every Administration since FDR has reviewed the case and confirmed the findings of the original investigations. The current CNO, Admiral Kelso, takes the

position that Kimmel should not be rehabilitated, arguing a) that the principles of command accountability and responsibility fully justify the findings and actions taken at the time, and b) that no new information has surfaced which might challenge the original findings. We have found nothing to suggest that earlier investigations of the matter are in error.

I agree
- Jul

In the absence of new findings we believe that the evidence supports respecting the Navy's position and letting the matter stand.

It should also be noted that restoring Kimmel to his past rank would logically raise questions as to why the President had or had not exonerated General Short. However, the historical record suggests that Short was even more culpable than Kimmel.

Attachment

Tab I Harvard Case Study

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *for*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *for*

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Report RE: HR 13, Sense of the House of Representatives Regarding RADM Kimmel

At Tab II Defense is responding to a House bill that would posthumously advance RADM Husband E. Kimmel to the grade of Admiral on the retired list. RADM Kimmel, along with General Short, were the senior military officers held accountable for the failure of U.S. defenses in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Defense believes that the principle of command accountability dictates that RADM Kimmel not be reinstated to his previous rank of full Admiral.

We believe that the President should support the Department of Defense on this issue. At Tab III, Sandy Berger has indicated that he agrees with our recommendation that the President not reinstate RADM Kimmel. However, Tony Lake is aware that ADM Crowe has recommended to the President that he restore RADM Kimmel's rank, and we do not know whether Tony agrees with our recommendation.

Concurrence by: *in draft*
Jeremy Rosner

RECOMMENDATION

That you clear this concurrence with Tony Lake before signing the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence
Tab III Log #4574 -- Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Report RE: HR 13, Sense of the
House of Representatives Regarding RADM Kimmel

The National Security Council staff concurs in the proposed
Defense report.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

SPECIAL

June 24, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #I-724

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

JUSTICE - Faith Burton - (202) 514-2141 - 217
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202) 395-3723 - 249

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) 
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Report RE: HRES 13, Sense of
the House of Representatives regarding RADM
Kimmel

DEADLINE: MONDAY, July 19, 1993

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before
advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or
receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
T. Stanners

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
_____ response sheet

**DRAFT
FOR
ONB A-10
REVIEW**

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Forces
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request of March 4, 1993, for the views of the Department of Defense, on H. Res. 13, "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, should posthumously advance Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to the grade of Admiral on the retired list."

The Department of the Navy does not concur with the proposed resolution. The Naval tradition is that the Commanding Officer takes full personal responsibility for his command. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the death or wounding of 2,178 Navy personnel while Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. In addition, eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers, four auxiliary craft and 86 naval aircraft were either destroyed or heavily damaged.

Regardless of any action Congress takes in regard to RADM Kimmel, controversy will always surround his role at Pearl Harbor. There is no question that RADM Kimmel was an outstanding Naval officer. In fact, many historians have treated his involvement with the attack sympathetically. However, RADM Kimmel has already had his "day in court" and no action was subsequently taken to promote him on the retired list. Between December 1941 and January 1946 there were no less than eight different investigations into the facts surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor. At both a Naval Court of Inquiry and before a Joint Congressional Committee, RADM Kimmel was allowed to tell his side of the story. Results of these proceedings are part of the public and now, historical, record. There is no basis for disturbing these results.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

Copy to:
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Ranking Minority Member

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOOKER

DOC DATE: 22 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
JAPAN

NAVY

PERSONS: KIMMEL, H

SUBJECT: PEARL HARBOR COMMANDERS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 25 JUN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOOKER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HOOKER
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9304574

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 LAKE
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 93062811 FOR INFORMATION
X 93063012 NOTED BY LAKE

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

MEMO 6/28

5:20 PM
JWR
6/28

PROOFED BY: MM LOG # 4574

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOC JB A/O _____

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ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>MM</u>	
APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>HAS SEEN JWR</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JB 6/30</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty


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COMMENTS:

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23 JUL 93 10:21

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PEARL HARBOR

At 7:55 on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese attack force of 353 planes swept down on the United States Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, delivering the first and most devastating blow of a coordinated Japanese offensive throughout the Pacific. Launched from six carriers waiting two hundred miles off the northern shore of Oahu, Japanese aircraft reached Pearl Harbor virtually undetected. Within two hours they sank or seriously damaged eighteen American ships, disabling all but one of the American battleships assigned to the Pacific. Only the U.S. carriers and their aircraft were spared, by chance being at sea on weekend maneuvers. Almost 350 of the 394 American planes on the island were destroyed on the ground. 2,403 Americans were dead. Japanese losses totaled fifty five men and twenty nine aircraft. By sundown, Pearl Harbor was among a group of successful raids carried out simultaneously on Guam, Wake, and the Philippine Islands, on Hong Kong and Malaya.

Washington responded immediately to the blow. On December 8, President Roosevelt went before Congress to secure a declaration of war against Japan, characterizing the enemy action as "a surprise offensive, dastardly and unprovoked". The following day he told the American people that his administration had consistently pursued a peaceful solution to troubles in the Far East, negotiating in good faith with Japanese Ambassador Nomura until the moment of attack. With a sudden, unexpected, and deceptive strike, Roosevelt said, "the Japanese have treacherously violated the long-standing peace between us."¹

In private, however, Roosevelt and his advisers were at a greater loss to explain the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Top American officials in Washington and Hawaii were prepared for Japanese military action in the Pacific or Far East on the weekend of December 7. Detailed intelligence information indicated that a large offensive was imminent. Theater commanders in the Pacific had been alerted to the dangerous rift in relations with Japan. Warnings of war had been issued to military representatives in Hawaii, and precautions against hostile action had been taken. Still, a direct attack on the United States, especially one on Pearl Harbor, came as a complete surprise. Expecting conflict in the Pacific into which the United States might be drawn, and confident of their knowledge of Japanese capacity and intentions, high ranking members of the Roosevelt administration and their military counterparts concentrated on preventing World War II from entering through the back door. Japan blew up the front of the house.

Pearl Harbor and the Coming of War

The chief military officials at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were General Walter Short, Commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department, and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Each had a small intelligence staff operating under his command, responsible for collecting and reporting local information and receiving periodic dispatches from military sources in Washington. Generally, the duties assigned Hawaiian intelligence were limited and technical. Although the two Naval units, Combat Intelligence and Fleet Intelligence, were comprised of experienced and well-trained officers, they were restricted to the inexact science of monitoring Japanese ship movements and transmitting to Washington coded Japanese naval messages intercepted by radio receivers. Army Intelligence (or G-2) was staffed by less experienced men whose primary function was to guard the island against espionage. Neither Army nor Navy intelligence officers were expected, or given the opportunity, to prepare independent estimates of enemy action or intentions based on the information that passed through their hands.² For that, Short and Kimmel were dependent on their superiors in Washington, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff and Admiral Harold ("Betty") Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.

During the critical weeks prior to the raid on Pearl Harbor, the commanders in Hawaii were provided information by their sources in Washington and by their own intelligence officers that led them to expect Japanese military action in the near future. Reports ranged from fragments of "raw", or entirely factual, material concerning Japanese troop movements to explicit predictions and directives from Stark and Marshall. Throughout the month of November, Naval Intelligence in Hawaii was informed by contacts in the Far East of sightings of Japanese naval convoys heading toward Southeast Asia, observations that were consistent with claims of troop build-ups in Indochina since the summer. On November 1, the Chief of Combat Intelligence at Pearl reported a change in the call signals of Japanese ships, not an unusual occurrence by itself, but one that was a customary prelude to military action. When the call signals were altered again on December 1, an unprecedented event in such a short space of time, it suggested to naval intelligence in Hawaii that the Japanese were in the final stages of preparation for battle. The change in call signals was also disconcerting because it made the identification of Japanese vessels nearly impossible. In mid-November, Combat Intelligence lost track of a fleet of enemy carriers. Naval intelligence assumed that it was in home waters, a conclusion based on previous experience.³ The carriers were not located until December 7.

Reports of the southern movement of Japanese ships and the concurrent estimation of an imminent Japanese attack somewhere in

the vicinity of Southeast Asia were confirmed by dispatches sent from Washington in late November to both the Army and the Navy. On November 24, Naval Intelligence at Pearl received the following message from the Chief of Naval Operations:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees (addressees) to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.4

Three days later, on November 27, Admiral Stark sent a stronger statement to the Pacific Fleet, designed to bring Kimmel up to date on the perspective in Washington. It was a short, clear summary of the Navy's expectations:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department.5

The concurrent message sent to General Short was relayed to Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations on the following day. It was a more ambiguous warning than the Navy dispatch, less certain of the state of negotiations between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Nomura, and without an estimation of the probable target of Japanese hostilities. It read:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil

population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. A separate message is being sent to G-2, Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. Unquote...Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46, so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

On November 28, General Short also received a message via the local G-2 unit sent by General Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2 in Washington, warning of possible sabotage in the event of war:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop hostilities may ensue stop subversive activities may be expected stop inform commanding general and chief of staff only.7

Neither Kimmel nor Short regarded these messages with great concern. To Kimmel and his Fleet Intelligence officer, Commander Edwin Layton, the information from Stark and Marshall merely reinforced their own estimation that the Japanese were on the verge of launching an attack somewhere in Southeast Asia. Layton had also considered the possibility that Japan might move on the Philippines or Guam, as a precautionary measure to protect their flank. WPL 46, mentioned in both the Army and Navy warning, was a plan to deploy part of the Pacific Fleet to the Marshall Islands in the event of a Japanese offensive in the Far East. The term "a surprise aggressive move in any direction" was interpreted to apply only to the southern Pacific, perhaps including American forces in the Philippines, but certainly not Pearl Harbor. Kimmel did not increase the alert status of the Fleet as a result of the warning. General Short considered the message from the War Department as a warning against sabotage on the Islands, and heeding the caution "not to alarm civil population", he placed the troops under his command on the lowest alert possible. He replied to the War Department, General Marshall, and the directors of the Army and Navy War Plans: "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period".8

Subsequent information from Washington did little to alter these expectations. On December 3 and 4, Kimmel received the message that Japanese consular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London had been urgently instructed to destroy their codes and ciphers. This news was based on top secret MAGIC information available only in Washington.9 On December 6, Kimmel had been told by local G-2 that the Japanese consulate had been burning papers for the preceding two days. Following the attack, the reports of code destruction were considered by those in Washington as clear

indications to the theater commanders that they should have initiated a full alert.¹⁰ Kimmel, however, did not regard the information as a spectacular tip-off. He observed that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu had been seen burning papers four or five times earlier that year. He had also received a message from Naval Operations ordering him, on December 6, to instruct American posts in the outlying Pacific areas to destroy their own secret papers and documents in light of the tense international situation.¹¹

The danger signals of November were seen by the Hawaiian commanders in the context of an entire year of building tension between Japan and the United States. On three previous occasions during 1940 and 1941, war warnings were sent from Washington to the Pacific Theater: with the fall of France in May 1940, with the Roosevelt administration decision to impose an embargo on oil exports to Japan in July 1941, and with the collapse of the moderate Konoye cabinet in Tokyo just a month before, in mid-October 1941. These alerts, combined with numerous reports of sabotage threats or alleged Japanese plans to attack the Soviet Union, its long-time enemy, created a background of "noise" which could obscure or alter the perception of accurate and important intelligence information. The Hawaiian commanders were also mindful of fulfilling one of their primary missions in the Pacific, the training of American pilots and crews for duty in the Philippines. Time spent on reconnaissance and defense of Oahu was time wasted in the preparation of trained squadrons for the American base in the Far East, which was believed to be considerably more vulnerable to enemy attack than Pearl Harbor.¹²

Compounding the problem of sorting out significant signals from "noise", Kimmel and Short were kept in the dark concerning important international developments and current American foreign policy. Washington did not have a regular procedure for keeping the theaters abreast of decisions in the White House, details on the progress of negotiations between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Japanese Ambassador Nomura, planned American reaction to possible moves by the Axis powers, or reports of developments in Japan. This type of information was considered either irrelevant, since Hawaii was not expected to make its own predictions of enemy behavior, or too highly classified to risk having the Japanese intercept it. This was the case with Washington's most closely guarded, and most valuable, secret, the decoded and translated Japanese diplomatic messages, collectively known as "MAGIC". After July 1941, Pearl Harbor stopped receiving regular messages based on MAGIC. During November, only three dispatches, the information of Japanese code destruction among them, were derived from that source. Kimmel and Layton both repeated requests for more complete information. But for the most part, they and Short were given meager servings from their superiors, and what "raw" information they had was made difficult to interpret outside the context of events seen in

Washington or Tokyo. Except for information and opinions contained in personal letters to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark (infrequently relayed to General Short), the Hawaiian commanders were often only as well informed on policy matters as reading local newspapers would permit.¹³

Kimmel, Layton, and Short naturally filled these gaps with assumptions about the nature of the enemy and their own position in Hawaii. The Fleet at Pearl Harbor was stationed there primarily as a deterrent to Japanese aggression, as a prominent sign of American Naval power in the Pacific, thousands of miles from Japan. If swung into action, it could destroy a Japanese task force so far from home in a few minutes. Besides, as General Marshall explained to President Roosevelt in May of 1941, "The Island of Oahu, due to its fortifications, its garrison and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world."¹⁴ Admiral Kimmel concluded that the Japanese would be inviting "national suicide" by attacking it.¹⁵ Looking out his living room window on the morning of December 7, Kimmel could not identify the planes flying dangerously close to the ground until the bombs began to explode.

Washington Intelligence and Magic

In 1941, decision makers in Washington had access to a variety of intelligence sources dealing with the Japanese. Among them were the Tokyo Embassy and its contacts in the Far East, American reporters stationed abroad, and decoded intercepts of official Japanese correspondence. The last was by far the most spectacular. Although Army and Navy specialists had little luck reading Japanese military codes, they had broken a majority of the codes protecting diplomatic traffic. In August 1940, after almost two years of work, Colonel William F. Friedman succeeded in finding the key to the top secret PURPLE code, used by the Japanese in transmitting highest priority diplomatic messages. Intercepted, decoded, and translated PURPLE messages became known as MAGIC. Throughout the period surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor, top American officials were reading confidential diplomatic communications not only between Tokyo and the Washington Embassy, but between Japanese leaders and their chief representatives in London, Berlin, and Southeast Asia. On many of the days that Secretary of State Hull met with Ambassador Nomura in their crucial negotiations, he knew beforehand what the Japanese Ambassador was going to say and why. The apparent completeness and same-day receipt of MAGIC information gave many officials a sense of secure knowledge of Japanese intentions.

With 4000 MAGIC messages arriving daily, decoding was a 24-hour job shared by Army and Navy intelligence.

Distribution of information derived from MAGIC was subject

to extremely strict security in Washington. If the Japanese were to discover, or even suspect, that their codes had been broken, the United States would be deprived of one of its most valuable assets. The standard procedure for dissemination of MAGIC began in the Far Eastern sections of G-2 and ONI, where Colonel Rufus Bratton and Commander A.H. McCollum, with the help of his assistant, A.D. Kramer, selected the material to be passed on to the American high command. All three were highly trained and experienced intelligence officers. Their choices were confirmed by their superiors, Brig. General Sherman Miles, Director of MID, and Captain T.S. Wilkinson, head of ONI. Besides Miles and Wilkinson, only seven other officials in Washington received MAGIC intercepts: Secretary of War Henry Stimson; Chief of Staff Marshall; Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox; Chief of Naval Operations Stark; the Navy's Chief of War Plans, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner; Secretary of State Hull; and President Roosevelt by way of his military aide. Daily deliveries of MAGIC intercepts were made each day by a courier carrying copies in a locked pouch. While the messenger stood by, the copies were read once and then returned to ONI or MID, where they were destroyed.¹⁶

During November 1941, accumulating MAGIC intercepts told a dramatic, if sometimes cryptic, story of Japan's final maneuvers prior to war. Dispatches from Tokyo to the Washington Embassy came at a furious pace. They focused on the vital importance of Nomura's mission, pressing the Ambassador to obtain Hull's acceptance of a Japanese compromise deal before a late November "deadline". On November 5, Tokyo wired Washington: "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month."¹⁷ When Nomura pleaded for more time, Tokyo responded that the date was immovable, explaining, "the fate of our Empire hangs by a slender thread of a few days."¹⁸ On November 22, Tokyo relented and moved the deadline to November 29, but added, "this time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."¹⁹ There were eight "deadline" messages in all in November, an unprecedented series. In no previous messages, even in times of severe tension with the United States, had Tokyo specified a single date, after which things were "automatically going to happen."²⁰ In addition to these transmissions, Roberta Wohlstetter has uncovered at least nineteen others sent from Tokyo to Washington in November which stress that "a crisis is fast approaching" and that Japan was tendering its "final proposal", "our last effort". On November 14, Nomura was informed that "Both in name and in spirit this offer of ours is the last indeed...we gambled the fate of our land on this throw of the die."²¹

MAGIC also included instructions sent from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. Among these were the orders, on November 30, to pass the following information to Hitler and

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.²²

On the same day Tokyo ordered its embassies and consulates around the world (excepting Rome and Berlin) to destroy their codes and secret documents.

Intelligence and the Decision Makers: Perspectives on Intelligence
ece

With the exception of Colonel Bratton and Commander McCollum and his assistant Lieutenant Commander Kramer at the Far Eastern desks of G-2 and ONI, no official in Washington had an opportunity to study the MAGIC intercepts as a body. Those on the MAGIC distribution list saw only brief glimpses of the daily tally sheet. Faced with pressing problems around the world, they had neither the time nor the background to search for trends or develop alternative evaluations of Japanese moves based on MAGIC. Given the volume of intelligence material available, it would have been difficult for them to form reliable hypotheses about Japanese plans.

Although the official duties of ONI and MID included evaluation (as well as collection and distribution) of intercepted materials, this was in fact not the case. In practice, prediction of enemy intentions or evaluation of intelligence information was strictly off limits for ONI and MID officers. Neither Bratton nor McCollum, Miles nor Wilkinson, were consulted by the chief policy makers concerning the import of specific Japanese messages. Miles and Wilkinson were so excluded from the foreign policy structure that they resorted to reading intercepts of MAGIC information traveling from Washington to Tokyo in order to keep up to date on progress in the Hull-Nomura negotiations.²³ Wilkinson confessed after the attack, "...prior to getting into the war we did not know the U.S. side of the argument that was going on."²⁴ His boss, Admiral Turner of War Plans, was covetous of his own evaluations and information and kept ONI (which he considered "solely a collection agency and a distribution agency") in the dark.²⁵ Wilkinson, for instance, learned of the late November warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor after the fact and through "informal channels".²⁶

The isolation of intelligence officers not only kept them from using their close contact with MAGIC to work up their own estimates. It also exacerbated the already poor communication between the services and between Washington and the theaters. The

tight security protecting MAGIC caused confusion over who exactly was seeing it, or information based on it. General Miles believed that the command at Pearl Harbor was reading MAGIC on a regular basis. He was not alone in this assumption. A high ranking Army intelligence officer testified after the attack that he was under the impression that a staff of 400 on Oahu was intercepting, decoding and evaluating MAGIC.²⁷ Miles, and apparently Marshall, also thought that Hawaiian G-2, and consequently General Short, received automatically copies of all information sent to Commander Layton and Admiral Kimmel. In fact, Kimmel only relayed messages when specifically instructed to do so. As a result, G-2 dispatches to Hawaii contained only instructions relevant to the prevention of sabotage, which Miles considered the primary G-2 function.²⁸

The separation between collection and evaluation of intelligence information resulted in dilution of the message it might have provided. Personal assumptions about the Japanese were regularly substituted for background knowledge of the domestic political scene in Tokyo. Some officials thought the Japanese "tricky". For example, David Kahn quotes Fletcher Pratt, a pre-war writer on naval subjects, on theoretical reasons that the Japanese would make poor aviators. These included racially inherent myopia and inner ear defects resulting in poor balance; a code of values which assessed individual life as worthless, leading pilots to give up when their airplanes got into trouble; poor Japanese performance in individual activities such as flying; and a culture and educational system with little emphasis on development of mechanical skills. Kahn also notes the pre-Pearl Harbor views of a former ONI director, Captain W.D. Puleston, as typical of the day: "Japan has been energetic in her efforts to create naval aviation, but she is usually a phase behind. She cannot match in numbers the planes carried on American carriers, . . . and her personnel cannot send planes aloft or take them aboard as rapidly as American personnel." Kahn concludes "racism and the presumption of rationality prevented current details from being assembled into a pattern that might indicate what was happening in Japan."²⁹ Both Pratt and Puleston expressed the conventional wisdom of the day, that Japan would not dare take on the naval and industrial might of the United States.

Others felt that the Japanese had natural proclivities for collecting reams of unnecessary detail. This explanation was popular when, beginning in early September, ONI and MID intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting complete diagrams of berthing locations of the Pacific Fleet and the schedule of ships arriving and departing from Pearl Harbor. Washington pointed out that similar information had been requested for almost every port from Manila to Panama.³⁰

The subordinate role of ONI and MID was conditioned by a general lack of respect within the armed services for intelligence personnel. In 1941, intelligence was a job without much prestige, reserved for officers considered unqualified for a command position.³¹ Army and Navy "generalists" were suspicious of "egg head" units which they believed were unqualified to perform the delicate task of evaluation.³² This was certainly the case with the relationship between Admiral Turner and ONI. Those in Far Eastern sections were considered too immersed in the "oriental point of view." This was true even in MID, where Miles frequently discounted Bratton's ominous reports of possible developments in the Far East by placing them in the larger context of the European war.³³

Intelligence and the Decision Makers: Undeclared War and the Atlantic Strategy

Compared with Nazi Germany, Japan seemed remote and manageable. Since the spring of 1940, Germany had conquered Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium. On June 21, after less than six weeks of resistance, France surrendered. Britain was beleaguered by German bombers. Shipping lanes in the Atlantic were menaced by German submarines. Some felt an invasion of Great Britain was imminent. Then, almost a year to the day after the fall of France, Hitler turned on his ally, the Soviet Union, and launched a surprise offensive in the east.

"If we lose in the Atlantic, we lose everywhere." Few in the military or in the Roosevelt Administration disagreed with this conclusion by General Marshall. Through 1941, the President and Congress began to take measures to aid Britain without falling into open war with Germany. With American vessels running supplies for the British, the United States was risking a clash with German submarines. In October, alleged attacks took place on two American Naval vessels, both of which turned on the submarines. Although the circumstances of the confrontations remained a mystery to most Americans, Roosevelt accused Germany of unprovoked attacks on United States ships. In late October and early November, Roosevelt moved to arm merchant ships through an amendment in the Neutrality Act. On November 17, the revised Act was approved.

With events in the Atlantic slipping toward war with Germany, American analysts clarified United States strategy in the event of a World War. The signing of the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy and Japan in September 1940, in which they pledged cooperation against common enemies, led planners to consider a war with Germany to mean war with Japan as well.³⁴ With this in mind, a Joint Board of military chiefs developed the first in a series of Rainbow Plans. The Joint Board dismissed the possibility of an all-out American effort in the Pacific

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Compared with Nazi Germany, Japan seemed remote and manageable. Since the spring of 1940, Germany had conquered Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium. On June 21, after less than six weeks of resistance, France surrendered. Britain was beleaguered by German bombers. Shipping lanes in the Atlantic were menaced by German submarines. Some felt an invasion of Great Britain was imminent. Then, almost a year to the day after the fall of France, Hitler turned on his ally, the Soviet Union, and launched a surprise offensive in the east.

"If we lose in the Atlantic, we lose everywhere." Few in the military or in the Roosevelt Administration disagreed with this conclusion by General Marshall. Through 1941, the President and Congress began to take measures to aid Britain without falling into open war with Germany. With American vessels running supplies for the British, the United States was risking a clash with German submarines. In October, alleged attacks took place on two American Naval vessels, both of which turned on the submarines. Although the circumstances of the confrontations remained a mystery to most Americans, Roosevelt accused Germany of unprovoked attacks on United States ships. In late October and early November, Roosevelt moved to arm merchant ships through an amendment in the Neutrality Act. On November 17, the revised Act was approved.

With events in the Atlantic slipping toward war with Germany, American analysts clarified United States strategy in the event of a World War. The signing of the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy and Japan in September 1940, in which they pledged cooperation against common enemies, led planners to consider a war with Germany to mean war with Japan as well.³⁴ With this in mind, a Joint Board of military chiefs developed the first in a series of Rainbow Plans. The Joint Board dismissed the possibility of an all-out American effort in the Pacific

while Hitler continued to survive in Europe. Rainbow 5, the plan operational at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, was organized along the same theme. So was Admiral Stark's Plan D (or "Dog"), in which the Navy would hold the Japanese at bay while concentrating its fire power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Warned General Marshall in September 1940, "A serious commitment in the Pacific is just what Germany would like to see us undertake."³⁵ Steps taken by the military in 1940 and 1941 were consistent with this orientation. In April 1940, Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet, normally anchored in San Diego, to remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to the Japanese. In January 1941, the Army began a vigorous program reinforcing defenses in the Philippines for the same reason. That summer, the Islands received their most prominent reinforcement in the person of General Douglas MacArthur.

But there was a limit to the amount of preparatory action the Administration could authorize. Roosevelt and his advisers had to contend with an American public that was largely committed to avoiding war in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Roosevelt himself had made similar commitments while running for an unprecedented third term of office in 1940. "We will not participate in foreign wars...except in case of attack" was a central plank of the Democratic platform in 1940, and many hoped to hold Roosevelt to it. Although the Lend-Lease measure and the amendment of the Neutrality Act were billed by the Administration as acts of self-defense (the former was titled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States"), they encountered stiff opposition and heated debate in Congress.³⁶

Isolationist sentiment hampered military preparedness. All the armed service chiefs lamented the paucity of arms and men equipped to fight a two ocean war. During the 1930's heyday for isolationism and Pacifism, military appropriations were slashed by Congress. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the total strength of the U.S. Army was just under 190,000 officers and enlisted men. In the fall of 1941, the Army General Staff estimated that a "Victory Program" against the Axis powers would require over 8,000,000 men. Existing forces were just over 1,600,000.³⁷ Naval strength was similarly deficient; although strenuous efforts were made to put the Navy on a war footing following the beginning of war between Japan and China in 1937, the money for expansion was difficult to obtain. In August 1941, Congress came within one vote of sending home all draftees.

The strength of isolationism also influenced decision-makers' perceptions of probable Japanese strategies for war. Members of the Administration feared that if Japan attacked Russia or Britain first, the United States would be placed in an awkward and potentially dangerous position. Roosevelt had been reminded by Prime Minister Churchill in August 1941 that Japan could inflict a decisive blow against British forces in the Far

East if the United States did not pledge its willingness to oppose them with force.³⁸ But it seemed doubtful that American public opinion would permit a declaration of war against Japan in retaliation for an attack on Borneo, Singapore, the Netherland East Indies, or the Kra Isthmus. This would be the logical move for the Japanese if they hoped to avoid immediate conflict with the United States. Fear that this would be Japan's strategy gripped American decision-makers during the fall of 1941.

Intelligence and the Decision-Makers: Perspectives on Japan

Roosevelt's absorption in the European war left American dealings with Japan almost entirely in the hands of the State Department and Secretary Hull. By November 1941, Hull was exhausted by months of fruitless negotiations with Ambassador Nomura. At the time, he remarked that he and Nomura were "going around and around in the same circle."³⁹ He hoped still to reach an agreement which might defer war in the Pacific. But the odds seemed against it. Hull had concluded by mid-August that a conflict was inevitable sooner or later, saying, "Nothing will stop them but force."⁴⁰ He continued working to ensure that it was later.

Hull was a principled man, and his approach to the Japanese was based on principle. In 1937, he had set down his own "principles of international morality," a doctrine condemning nations involved in wanton aggression; in August 1941, he was still convinced that they were applicable. In 1938, he had advocated a "moral embargo" of war materials to the Japanese; in 1941, he had helped engineer the mandatory embargo on scrap iron and oil sales to Japan. When Nomura arrived in Washington to commence talks with the American government in the spring of 1941, Hull handed him a list of principles which he felt was the basis for any discussion of American Far Eastern policy:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including the equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.⁴¹

During his negotiations with Nomura, Hull had to contend with equally principled members of his own Department and of the Administration who considered his approach to the Japanese too

conciliatory. Although the State Department's Japan experts asked for understanding of the Japanese perspective, a more outspoken group advocated a hard line toward Tokyo. This faction was dominated by Stanley K. Hornbeck. The Department's chief Far Eastern expert between 1928 and 1941, Hornbeck saw China as the necessary center of American foreign policy in the Far East. His experience had taken him through the Manchurian Incident in 1931, when American failure to actively oppose Japan allowed them to annex that portion of northern China. After Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China in 1937, Hornbeck supported a "get tough" approach to aggression in the Far East.⁴² By 1941, he was hardly alone. This school drew support not only within State but also from Secretary of War Stimson, a former Governor General of the Philippines and the Secretary of State during the Manchurian Incident, and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Stimson, Ickes, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau had strenuously supported enforcing strict embargoes against Japan in the belief, expressed by Morgenthau, that it would bring Tokyo quickly to its knees. In the fall of 1941, Ickes felt that a war with Japan would be won swiftly, thereby allowing the United States to fight Hitler without distraction from the Pacific.⁴³ Hornbeck outdid even Ickes. He believed that Japan had neither the military capacity nor the political will to engage the United States in battle. In a memorable evaluation written on the 27th of November, 1941, Hornbeck, Hull's chief adviser on Far Eastern policy, asserted:

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States.... Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 15...would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January (i.e., seven weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1...⁴⁴

At the highest levels of the Army and Navy, this strain of optimism was tempered by concern over military unpreparedness. Throughout the late months of 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark petitioned President Roosevelt, and anyone else who would listen, not to provoke the Japanese into a war which the United States was not yet equipped to fight. As early as 1939 and 1940, Marshall advocated restraint in dealing with Japan because of the depleted condition of the U.S. Army.⁴⁵ In the summer of 1941, he and Stark argued against the imposition of embargoes for fear that the Japanese would retaliate.⁴⁶ During the fall, when Stark was convinced that the "shooting war" in the Atlantic made an

all-out war against Germany inevitable and imminent, he wrote Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, "The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned..."⁴⁷ A two-ocean war at this juncture could be disastrous. On November 5, Marshall and Stark presented a joint memo to Roosevelt in which they declared, "War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance."⁴⁸ On November 27, they wrote the President again with respect to Japan, concluding, "The most essential thing now, from the United States' viewpoint, is to gain time." In order to do this, they argued against transmitting an ultimatum to Tokyo stating America's last conditions for peaceful negotiations.⁴⁹

Within the armed services as a whole, the caution of Marshall and Stark alternated with a more aggressive and fatalistic attitude. In the Navy, rapid turnover of commanding officers and exclusion from the policy structure made it difficult to develop an independent image of Japan's political and military perspective. So too did tradition. Since the turn of the century, justification of American naval strength was based in part on the assumption of vital American interests in the Far East. The Navy had a natural tendency to view Japan as a monolithic aggressive force, an inevitable opponent of American naval expansion in the Pacific. Throughout the 1930's, Japan (under the code name "Orange") was the perennial enemy in Naval war exercises run out of Pearl Harbor. Historian Waldo Heinrichs writes, "The Navy's image was of an enemy poor in resources, overpopulated, historically expansionist, imbued with a warrior tradition, and, in the 1930's, ruled by a fanatical military clique."⁵⁰

Although the Army was troubled by its lack of power in the Far East, a strong streak of optimism was evident in War Plans during the second half of 1941. MacArthur's appointment to the Philippines lifted hopes that adequate reinforcements would soon be in position to deter and, if necessary, oppose Japan's southward advance. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, some Army officers, including General Miles, believed (as did Admiral Stark) that the Japanese were more likely to launch a Siberia campaign than to risk war with the United States. Finally, although the military considered the Japanese a dangerous enemy after reports of brutal fighting against the Chinese, the Army "affected a condescension toward the Japanese as it did toward all Orientals";⁵¹ and continued to harbor its negative presumptions regarding Japanese military capabilities. This translated into the belief that, faced with the threat of American force, Japan would relent. In a G-2 recommendation in August 1941, Miles joined the "get tough" team. He argued that "power diplomacy" would not only keep Japan out of the fight and out of Southeast Asia; but it also had a

good chance of breaking up the Tripartite pact. In late November, he asserted: "Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval Power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner."⁵²

On December 5, MID reported: "Japanese government leaders are aware of the perils of further military adventures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacific."⁵³ Ambassador Grew cabled Hull regarding reports of Japanese troop concentrations in Taiwan and Manchuria; Grew's ambiguous conclusion was that Japanese army operations were possible on short notice in Siberia, the southwest Pacific, or both.⁵⁴

Attempts at a Modus Vivendi

In November, the Japanese government made one last effort to avoid war through negotiation. On November 2, Prime Minister Tojo and his closest advisers agreed to defer the final decision for war until Washington responded to two proposals transmitted from Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull. Proposal A was a reiteration of the Japanese position on the major issues separating the United States and Japan: equality of economic opportunity throughout the world, Japan's right to maintain troops in China, Japan's right to protect its interests in China with troops in Indochina, and the viability of the Tripartite Pact.⁵⁵ Proposal B was to be offered only if Proposal A was rejected. It was a last ditch attempt to avoid war, a modus vivendi. Ambassador Nomura was instructed to obtain a reply to these two measures by the end of November. If the reaction from the American government was not favorable, Nomura was told, "things are automatically going to happen."

Proposal A had a short life. Nomura delivered it to Hull on the evening of November 7. The Secretary of State (who had already seen the document via MAGIC) was noncommittal, and agreed to Nomura's request to discuss the issues with Roosevelt. The Ambassador met with the President on November 10. He was told that Japan should remove its troops from Indochina immediately as a sign of good faith, a condition the Japanese were not disposed to meet.

Proposal B was presented to Hull on November 20. Again, the Secretary was apprised of its contents by virtue of MAGIC intercepts. He also knew of the preceding messages to Nomura indicating that it was the final Japanese offer. The proposal had five points. First, neither Japan nor the United States would engage in additional military expansion into Southeast Asia, save where Japanese troops were presently occupying Indochina. Second, Japan would withdraw its troops in Indochina when an "equitable peace" in China or the Pacific was restored.

Third, Japan and the United States would cooperate in the acquisition of needed raw materials from the Dutch East Indies. Fourth, Japan and the United States would restore commercial relations; the embargo on oil to Japan would be lifted. Finally, the United States would cease aid to China, or, "refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China."⁵⁶

To Hull, the proposal was "clearly unacceptable." He later wrote in his memoirs that "the commitments we should have to make were virtually a surrender." He objected especially to the provisions calling for the resumption of oil sales to Japan and the withdrawal of moral and material support to China. Hull insisted, "The President and I could only conclude that agreeing to these proposals would mean condonement by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent to future courses of conquest by Japan, abandonment of the most essential principles of our foreign policy, betrayal of China and Russia, and acceptance of the role of silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony over the western Pacific and eastern Asia."⁵⁷

Still, Hull worked to keep negotiations open and to comply with pleas from the Army and Navy to postpone war. In drafting a formal reply to Japan's Proposal B, he and Roosevelt designed a modus vivendi of their own. The United States would immediately ship some oil and rice to Japan. America would work to get Japan and China to the bargaining table. In return, Japan would suspend troop movements and promise not to respect the Tripartite Pact in the event of war between the United States and the Axis powers in Europe.⁵⁸ As a safety measure to guard against Japan misunderstanding the context of the modus vivendi, Hull compiled a statement of firm American principles, for a peaceful resolution in the Pacific, a ten-point note, to accompany the counterproposal. Drafts of both documents were completed on November 22.

On November 25, while the President's advisers waited for British and Chinese comments on the counterproposal Hull joined Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark at the White House to discuss the possibility of hostilities with Japan. If the American counterproposal failed to satisfy the Japanese leaders, the United States could be at war within the week. Roosevelt wanted to guarantee that, if war came, the roles of aggressor and victim were clearly delineated. Secretary Stimson noted in his diary that the President, "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked (as soon as) next Monday [December 1] for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into a position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves."⁵⁹

That afternoon, the group that had met at the White House learned from MID that a convoy of up to fifty Japanese ships had been sighted heading south past Formosa. The news convinced Hull and Roosevelt that their modus vivendi would be obsolete. Hull was also disheartened by the tepid response of Great Britain to the counterproposal, as well as by strong criticism from China that it was too conciliatory. On the morning of the 26th, Hull decided to abandon the modus vivendi. In its place, he chose to send the ten-point statement of principle alone as America's answer to Japan's Proposal B. The ten-point memorandum, which Hull called his "comprehensive basic proposal" for continued negotiations, was the strongest statement to date of the American position in the Pacific. It required Japan to withdraw completely from its occupation of the Asian mainland, and to recognize the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the sole legitimate authority in China. Japan was also to renounce the Tripartite Pact and support the formation of a "multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States."60

Hull did not expect Japan to consent to these conditions. The principles had been registered for the record. On November 27, the Secretary of State told Stimson, "I have washed my hands of it, and it [the situation] is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."61

The ten-point memorandum arrived in Tokyo on the same day. To the Japanese leaders, the document seemed an ultimatum, a flat challenge to the precepts guiding Japanese foreign policy since 1931. After the war, Foreign Minister Togo testified that "Japan was now asked not only to abandon all the gains of her years of sacrifice, but to surrender her international position as a power in the Far East. That surrender, as he saw it, would have amounted to national suicide. The only way to face this challenge and defend ourselves was war."62 The unfavorable American response to Proposal B activated a decision that had been made weeks earlier. On November 28, Nomura was informed (and with him, the recipients of MAGIC) that he would soon receive the official reply to the ten-point note. "With the report of the views of the Imperial Government that will be sent to you in two or three days, talks will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off.... From now on do the best you can."63 On December 1, the Japanese Emperor's formal approval for war was sealed. Japanese embassies and consulates were ordered subsequently to destroy their codes and secret papers. And the Pearl Harbor task force, en route from Japan since November 7, was permitted to proceed with its mission.

"This means war"

On the 27th, reports of Japanese ship movements to the south prompted Stark and Marshall to issue their war warnings to the Pacific theater commanders. Neither was aware that Hull had confronted Japan with a "basic comprehensive proposal." In a joint memorandum presented to Roosevelt on the same day, they reiterated their concern that the military have more time and cautioned against provoking Japan with an ultimatum. They did predict, however, that "If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; and the Russian Maritime Provinces." They qualified the estimate by pointing out that Japan was unlikely to risk a major assault on the Philippines.⁴

Between November 29 and December 6, the administration continued to examine the probable targets of Japanese aggression and courses of action available for the United States in the event of war. At the President's request, Knox, Stimson, and Hull worked on a warning message to the Japanese Emperor for delivery as a last resort. They also prepared a speech to inform Congress of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific. Retiring to his retreat at Warm Springs, Roosevelt was preoccupied with how to sell the administration's case to Congress and the American people should Japan attack Thailand, French Indochina, the Malay Straits or Russia. Great Britain would fight to defend some of these. Roosevelt and his top advisers agreed that if the British fought, so too should the United States. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's close personal adviser, remembered later the President's fear that Japan might follow the "one by one" strategy of Hitler's European campaign, gradually isolating the United States until an opportune time for an attack on American forces. Roosevelt concluded that he would have to wait for Japan to commit itself then rally Congress and the public to support the defense of Allied interests.⁵

The scene in the Far Eastern divisions of Army and Navy intelligence during early December was less complacent. In November, Miles in MID had projected that Thailand would be the next Japanese target.⁶ Colonel Bratton of G-2 and Commander McCollum of ONI interpreted recent signals as indications of more drastic Japanese plans in the Far East. Before war with Japan had become a real and immediate threat, an attack on Pearl Harbor had been considered a feasible and even likely alternative for Japanese planners. William Manchester writes:

Short and Kimmel later testified that neither had considered an attack on Pearl Harbor a possibility. Yet it is difficult to think of many moves in military history which had been predicted more often. Confronting one another across the Pacific, each nation had long pondered the

strategy of a surprise raid on the base. . . . [B]eginning in 1931, every member of each graduating class in Japan's naval academy had been required to answer one question: 'How would you execute a surprise assault on Pearl Harbor?' In January 1941 Ambassador Grew alerted Washington to the possibilities of a sneak raid on Pearl. [He referred in his diary to talk in Tokyo about such plans.] The Peruvian ambassador in Tokyo heard the same talk, and obligingly sent it to Washington via Grew. . . . In July 1941, Richmond Kelly Turner, then chief of the Navy War Plans Division, had named Hawaii as the 'probable' target of any Japanese offensive, and he also predicted that the attack would be made by aircraft. Navy Secretary Knox had written Stimson, 'Hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.' . . . An intercepted Tokyo message on December 3 had inquired whether there were 'any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor.' Rear Admiral Kimmel himself--his memory to the contrary--had warned his staff that 'declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.' But by early December Pearl seemed a less obvious choice. . . . Roosevelt had thought that the first blow would fall on the Phillipines. No American officer, including General Marshall, had expected a carrier strike on Hawaii now, because Hirohito's crack divisions were in Indochina, ready to jump off for Malaya, Singapore, and the oil fields of the Netherlands East Indies. Pearl Harbor wasn't anywhere near this corridor of advance . . . [I]n the context of the December 1941 strategic picture it seemed almost irrelevant."⁶⁷

On December 1, McCollum drafted an independent warning to the Pacific theaters based on his conclusion that "everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan."⁶⁸ He approached Admiral Turner of War Plans with revised estimates of Japanese troop movements that showed them to be greater than previously thought. Japanese citizens were being evacuated from key British and American locations. Espionage activity against the United States was on the increase. Turner accepted the data but not the interpretation. When he edited McCollum's warning message so that all but "informational" aspects were omitted, McCollum protested. Turner refused to compromise and the dispatch was never sent. On December 5, Bratton and McCollum again tried to convey their urgent forecasts to Army and Navy War Plans. They never got through.⁶⁹

On Saturday, December 6, Japan's awaited reply to the ten-point memorandum began arriving at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. It was in the form of a long, verbose message of fourteen parts. The first thirteen parts were intercepted and decoded by the United States during the early afternoon. They were a review of Japan's consistent and painstaking efforts to secure peace in the Far East despite opposition from the United

States and Great Britain. The theme did not surprise American officials who had expected Japan to reject the terms of the Hull statement. When the first thirteen sections were distributed to MAGIC recipients on the evening of December 6, they did not provoke a notable response from anyone except Roosevelt. Reading the document in his White House study, the President turned to Harry Hopkins and said, in effect, "This means war."⁷⁰ Probably war between Britain and Japan, which would soon involve the United States. There was nothing in the message suggesting a direct move against American positions.

Two final MAGIC intercepts early in the morning of December 7 provided the last clues of Japan's plans to those in Washington. At 3:00 am, the remaining section of the fourteen part message was intercepted by the Navy. It contained the news for which the first thirteen parts had served as an introduction: "The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through future negotiations."⁷¹ Almost an hour and a half later, the Army translated a second message to the Japanese Embassy, instructing Nomura to deliver the fourteen part statement in its entirety to Secretary Hull at 1:00 pm on December 7.⁷²

The completion of the fourteen part message caused little alarm at the intelligence desks of the Army and Navy. A rupture in negotiations had been expected since the MAGIC intercept of November 28. Never before had Nomura been given a precise time for the delivery of a message. When Colonel Bratton received this transmission near 9:00 am, he concluded immediately that the hour signified the time of an attack on American forces somewhere in the Pacific. His reaction was "frenzied."⁷³ He tried to reach General Marshall and the head of Army War Plans, General Gerow, the two men capable of authorizing warnings to the theaters. But Bratton and Miles were unable to locate Marshall, who was on a morning horseback ride in Virginia, until the General arrived at his office at 11:25. There they waited for Marshall to read the entire fourteen part message before coming to the one o'clock instructions. Immediately he drafted and sent an additional alert to the Pacific theaters. It arrived too late.⁷⁴

At 2:00 pm, an hour late, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu (sent to assist Nomura in mid-November) arrived at the State Department for their appointment with Hull. They offered the Secretary of State the document he had seen hours earlier. It said in part:

It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia or the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialist exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the

prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a condition since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.⁵

Hull glanced at the paper, pretending to read. Enraged, he replied:

In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.⁶

The time for negotiation and evasion had ended. In the Pacific, Japanese planes had been over Pearl Harbor for an hour.

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45. Weigley, op cit., p. 179.

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49. Quoted in Ibid., p. 448; Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 249.
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51. Weigley, op cit., p. 167.
52. Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 297.
53. Quoted in ibid., p. 297.
54. Kahn, op cit., p. 499.
55. Feis, op cit., p. 295.
56. Ibid., p. 309.
57. Quoted in Ibid., p. 310.
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60. Quoted in Wohlstetter, op cit., pp. 236-7.
61. Quoted in Feis, op cit., p. 321.
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63. Quoted in Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 200.
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66. Kahn, op cit., p. 500.
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15

15 Wood Road
Wilmington, DE 19806
February 19, 1994

The Honorable Anthony K. Lake
National Security Advisor to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:


Just about a year ago Admiral William J. Crowe USN (Ret) spoke with President Clinton about the possibility of posthumously nominating my father, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, for advancement in rank to that of full Admiral (four stars) on the retired list of naval officers. Admiral Kimmel was the Commander of Naval Forces at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941.

It is my understanding that President Clinton referred the matter to you for "investigation" and recommendation. Just a couple of months ago a friend of mine raised the subject with President Clinton and was told that Admiral Crowe had indeed spoken to him about the matter and that "we are looking into it". I was told that the President did not indicate whether he favored or opposed such action - in other words his attitude was reported as neutral.

As you can imagine, over the years I have had considerable correspondence with government officials on this subject and I understood that Admiral Crowe had supplied you with a selection from it. Only recently I wrote Secretary of the Navy, John Dalton, and requested his assistance in this matter. I sent him a selection of correspondence. For your information I am attaching a copy of my letter to Secretary Dalton which summarizes what has transpired on this matter since April 1987. I am not sending you copies of the documents attached to this letter on the theory that you have already seen most of it; however, should you wish copies I have a set readily available and would be glad to send them to you.

My brother, Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret), and I would very much appreciate this matter being given attention at the highest levels and being advised of the Administration's decision. Should you or your designee wish to discuss this matter orally we would be glad to come to your office for that purpose. Our greatest difficulty has been penetrating the Bureaucratic barrier so that we can tell our story. The only time we penetrated it (with former Secretary of the Navy William Ball) we experienced some success and made progress. Won't someone grant us an audience so we can present our case? I can be reached at the above address or by phone - 302-655-5330 (my primary residence) or 609-967-3680 (my secondary residence).

Sincerely,


Edward R. Kimmel

15 Wood Road
Wilmington, DE 19806
January 17, 1994

The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Since April 1987 my brother, Captain Thomas K. Kimmel USN (Ret), and I have sought to have our father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel USN (Ret) (Deceased), posthumously promoted to the rank of Admiral on the retired list of naval officers. Admiral Kimmel was the Commander of Naval Forces at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, December 7, 1941.

So far our efforts have been unsuccessful. This, despite the fact that: 1) a Naval Court of Inquiry in 1944 absolved him of all fault and found that his military decisions and disposition of forces were proper in light of information available to him; and, 2) a Joint Committee of the Congress to Investigate the Circumstances Surrounding the attack specifically found that there had been no dereliction of duty.

Shortly after the attack a Presidential Commission, Chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, was charged with investigating the attack. In January 1942 this Commission issued its report and found that Admiral Kimmel and the Army commander Lieutenant General Walter C. Short had been derelict in their duty. The subsequent investigations, previously referred to, proved the Roberts Commission charges were irresponsible.

Nevertheless the Roberts Commission charges stuck in the public mind and to this day the public believes that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were derelict in their duty and solely responsible for the success of the Japanese attack. It is this obloquy and stigma that my brother and I are seeking to erase from the public mind and from their names and the names of their families. We believe that a posthumous advancement to the highest rank held while on active duty (permissible under the applicable law), and highly appropriate under the circumstances, would go a long way toward achieving these objectives. No moneys are involved.

In May 1988 Secretary of the Navy William Ball met with my brother and me and discussed the situation. We left with him the attached statement which we had presented to him orally. (Attachment 1). He recommended to Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci that the matter be submitted to the President for decision. (Attachment 2). In January 1989, just before President Bush was inaugurated, Secretary Carlucci refused to do so - without explanation. Subsequently we approached Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney for help and he referred the matter to Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett and by the summer of 1991 the two of them had concluded to deny our request.

In the fall of 1991, just before the 50th anniversary of the attack, we appealed to the President directly. Our appeal was reinforced by a Petition to the President, signed by 37 navy flag officers among whom were five former Chiefs of Naval Operations, two of whom were former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 other full admirals, 3 vice admirals and 1 rear admiral. (Attachment 3) The Naval Academy Alumni Association also supported our effort and submitted a resolution to the President as well as the Departments of Defense and Navy. (Attachment 4) Five Senators also submitted a petition in support. (Attachment 5) The Veterans of Foreign Wars also adopted a resolution in support. (Attachment 6) The Pearl Harbor Survivors Association also supported our request and submitted a resolution to the President as well as to the Departments of Defense and Navy (Attachment 7). Despite this impressive support the President denied our request.

However, it is interesting to note that the Cheney-Garrett denial, written in August 1991, by Under Secretary of the Navy Dan Howard (Attachment 8), stated that the two had concluded "...that the promotion process is not the way to address the issue of your father's place in history...". But there was no suggestion by Howard or them as to an appropriate way to address this issue. Funny, but there was never any comment of this nature from the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy prior to this time - four and one half years after my brother and I first filed our request with the Board for Correction of Naval Records and after it had been considered by Secretaries James Webb, William Ball and Frank Carlucci. Moreover, Secretary Cheney, in a letter to one of his Wyoming constituents who had written him on our behalf, suggested that the Kimmel family could take certain actions which would help their cause. (Attachment 9) The Kimmel family followed Secretary Cheney's suggestions and submitted the information to him in May 1991. Obviously by August 1991 Secretary Cheney had shifted his position and he and Secretary Garrett dreamed up the response quoted above.

Equally interesting was President Bush's response to the efforts previously described. His response was signed by Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, Military Assistant to the President. (Attachment 10) My reply to General Trefry is attached for your perusal (Attachment 11).

Isn't it a bit incongruous to deny the request and at the same time write "...There is no question that the Admiral was a loyal, dedicated, patriotic American who was professionally competent and who served his country to the best of his ability..."?

Subsequently I had an exchange of correspondence with Admiral Frank Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations. (Attachments 12 and 13) In my letter I plead for the Navy and Defense Departments to deal candidly with my brother and me on this matter of great importance to our family. I point out that after all fifty years have elapsed since the Pearl Harbor attack and ask why we have been getting the runaround and stonewalled. The letters speak for themselves.

Admiral Kelso wrote me again in July 1993 (Attachment 14). By this time he had undertaken an in-depth review of numerous historical records contained in the National Archives and concluded there was certainly

information available to authorities in Washington, D.C. that was not forwarded to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii prior to the attack.

Interestingly he writes "...Your father was a superb naval flag officer...". This observation, as in the case of General Trefry's that Admiral Kimmel "was professionally competent", is inconsistent with denying our request for posthumous promotion.

Admiral Kelso then goes on to conclude "...I truly believe that it is in the best interests of both the U.S. Navy and the Kimmel family that this matter be left to the verdict of history...". My response, to which I have not yet received a reply, is attached (Attachment 15).

I direct your attention to the attachment to my reply to Admiral Kelso, the article by Vice Admiral David C. Richardson USN (Ret) which appeared in CRYPTOLOG for summer 1993.


Mr. Secretary I ask you to carefully consider what I have written and the material I have forwarded to you. Please be candid in any response you might make. My brother and I are fed up with bureaucratic gobbledegook. If there was ever a case of an injustice which will forever remain a black mark on the reputation of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Government it is what they did to my father and his family name.

My brother and I would be glad to visit with you and discuss this matter orally if that would best serve your busy schedule. I can be reached at the above address or by phone at 302-655-5330 (my principal residence) or 609-967-3680 (my secondary residence).

I might add that this matter has been discussed with President Clinton by Admiral William J. Crowe USN (Ret). The President referred the matter to his National Security Advisor, Mr. Lake, to investigate. As recently as a month ago I received word from a friend of the President, who also discussed the subject with him, that the President said he was "looking into it" and indicated neither approval or disapproval of the proposed action.

As you can see I am not convinced that "it is in the best interests of the Navy or the Kimmel family that this matter be left to the verdict of history", and until I am so convinced I intend to keep on fighting for justice. I might add that I have a son and my brother has a son, both of whom are well versed in this matter, and who will carry on after my brother and I have passed on. In other words this matter is not simply going to disappear by reason of bureaucratic stonewalling and passage of time.

Sincerely yours,


Edward R. Kimmel