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Folder Title:

Chron File - August 1994 #3 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

266

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). [Lailaps 2-94] (1 page)	08/10/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	Duplicate of 001a. (1 page)	08/10/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	Duplicate of 001a. (1 page)	08/10/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For Lynn Davis et al From Robert Bell. Subject: IWG on PRD-34. (1 page)	08/25/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. draft	Presidential Review Thirty Four. (24 pages)	08/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #3 [4]

2016-0152-F

vz4621

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~with SECRET Attachment~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6171

August 24, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RG for*
FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY *AAW*
SUBJECT: ACDA Report to Congress on Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies
Completed in 1993

ACDA has submitted the subject report to NSC staff for review. The report has been interagency cleared as drafted. We have made minor changes which are marked on the report and which have been transmitted to ACDA telephonically. With these changes we recommend approval.

In draft *In draft* *spb*
Concurrences by: Bill Danvers, Elisa Harris, Steve Andreasen

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum approving the ACDA Report.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to ACDA Executive Secretary
Tab A ACDA Report to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED

~~with SECRET Attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~with SECRET Attachment~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

6171

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: ACDA Report to Congress on Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies
Completed in 1993

The NSC staff approves the subject report, with changes, as marked.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
ACDA Report to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED

~~with SECRET Attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

JUL 29 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. WILLIAM H. ITOH
Executive Secretary
National Security CouncilMR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of StateCOL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of DefenseMS. ANN W. LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of EnergyMR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence AgencyCOL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of StaffSUBJECT: Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993 (U)

Attached are the "Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993," including a classified addendum as called for by Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and the associated transmittal letters to the Congress. This year's report, which was due to Congress on 30 June, has been revised to include an assessment. (U)

Please provide clearance to Al Lieberman (202-647-4695) by Noon, Thursday, August 11, 1994. (U)

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As statedHandle as UNCLASSIFIED When
Separated From Classified AttachmentClassified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

THE DIRECTOR

DRAFT

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to transmit our "Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993" and the classified addendum. I hope that this document will enhance Congressional and public understanding of the important arms control issues that the U.S. Government is addressing in a research capacity.

The enclosed report, consistent with Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as recently amended, provides:

- (1) a comprehensive list of studies relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues concluded during the previous calendar year by government agencies or for government agencies by private institutions or persons;
- (2) a brief description of each such study; and
- (3) a classified addendum.

This report is intended as a significant improvement over previous submissions as part of the process of revitalizing ACDA. Previous reports provided a compilation of abstracts describing the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies completed in the target year. This year's report continues to contain these abstracts, but also adds an assessment of the relationship of this body of work to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities of the U.S. Government.

Sincerely,

John D. Holum

Enclosures

The Honorable
Albert Gore
President
United States Senate

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the Report

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT



DRAFT

**REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
STUDIES
COMPLETED IN 1993**

XX JULY 1994

In response to Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET/NOFORN/WHINTEL~~
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

THE DIRECTOR

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am pleased to transmit our "Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993" and the classified addendum. I hope that this document will enhance Congressional and public understanding of the important arms control issues that the U.S. Government is addressing in a research capacity.

The enclosed report, consistent with Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as recently amended, provides:

- (1) a comprehensive list of studies relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues concluded during the previous calendar year by government agencies or for government agencies by private institutions or persons;
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Sincerely,

John D. Holum

Enclosures

The Honorable
Thomas S. Foley
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives

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CLASSIFIED Addendum to
the Report

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WHINTEL~~

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the latest in a series of reports fulfilling the requirement on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to provide a report to Congress setting forth a comprehensive list and brief description of studies relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues concluded during the previous calendar year. This year's report, dealing with studies completed in 1993, is a significant departure from the previous submissions. Previous reports provided a compilation of abstracts describing the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies completed in the target year. This report continues to contain these abstracts, but also adds an assessment of the relationship of this body of work to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities of the US Government.

Data to produce this report was collected from U.S. Government agencies through the interagency Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee (ACRCC) chaired by ACDA. For this year's report we have added individual reviews of each study to categorize its relationship to arms control and nonproliferation issues along the dimensions of the "issues" addressed or supported (*Strategic Arms Control, Conventional Arms Control, Nuclear Testing, Nuclear Proliferation, Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Regional Issues*), the "focus" of research (*Problem Identification, Strategies, Negotiations, Verification - Signatures, Verification - Remote sensing, and Verification - On-site sensing*), and the "product" of research (*Basic Research, Analytical Tools, Micro Analysis, Macro Analysis, and Equipment Development*).

A series of tables is provided listing the studies of interest in each of the "issue" areas of arms control and nonproliferation, along with the "focus" and "product" of each study. They provide a general view of the arms control research reported in the studies, and serve as a basis for observations. Specific observations are discussed along with a number of topics defined according to specific treaties, organizations or focuses within each area.

This report is the first step in a continuing process of improvement. Plans for further improvement are discussed, including increased interagency participation in the planning and assessment, and means of obtaining greater uniformity and completeness of data on individual studies. *in the report,*
steps in preparing the report,

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ACDA REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT STUDIES COMPLETED IN 1993

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act (ACDA Act; 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2571) established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA. Section 39 of the Act, as amended, requires ACDA to provide a report to Congress setting forth-

- "(1) a comprehensive list of studies relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues concluded during the previous calendar year by government agencies or for government agencies by private or public institutions or persons; and
- (2) a brief description of each study."

This report is the latest in a series of reports fulfilling this requirement.

The arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies described in this report support both the pursuit of new initiatives and the implementation of existing agreements in arms control. They involve a variety of roles encompassing the definition of issues, plans for implementation and inspections, and technological developments from basic research to the acquisition of needed equipment.

The scope of this report is significantly expanded compared to previous submissions. Previous reports provided a compilation of abstracts describing the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies completed in the target year. This report continues to contain these abstracts, but also provides assessments of the relationship of this body of work to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities of the US Government. ACDA signaled its intention to improve this report in the Agency's 1993 annual report to Congress:

"ACDA will make a significant revision in the format of the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research. Past reports listed research project summaries without commentary regarding the relationship of these research efforts to arms control priorities. Future Annual Reports will include assessments of the relationship of these research projects to national arms control priorities."

The goals ACDA set out to achieve in producing this report focused on developing an improved process going well beyond simply providing details of study efforts. The current report is the first step in the process of change from the previous format. The goal is to provide an improved format directly relating US Government studies to national arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities.

The main body of this report describes the approach taken this year, the observations

made, and process improvements to further improve next year's report. Two appendices are included to provide tables that relate individual studies to areas of arms control and nonproliferation, and abstracts for each study. The last appendix, listing study abstracts, is essentially the report as submitted in previous years.

The majority of this report is unclassified. Classified material, consisting of classified abstracts, is contained in a separate addendum that is an extension of Appendix B.

2.0 APPROACH

Data to produce this report was collected from US Government agencies through the interagency Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee (ACRCC) chaired by ACDA.

Appendix B contains the abstracts of studies as have been included in previous annual reports since beginning in 1988. ACDA works with the Agencies' submissions to produce these abstracts. They are modified to provide a consistent emphasis and format, consolidated in some cases to avoid repeated or multiple volume submissions and rejected in some cases for submissions that do not seem applicable either because of content or date of completion. This year we have categorized each study as to its relationship to arms control and nonproliferation issues and some of this additional information has been included with the abstracts presented in Appendix B.

The improvements made this year revolve around determining the relationship of studies to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament needs of the US Government. The first step taken in determining these relationships was to define the needs. Table 1 gives the framework ACDA defined to make these assessments. Six broad areas of current arms control interest are defined along with specific treaties, organizations or focuses within each area. A "General" focus was added to each area to accommodate useful studies that did not fit any one of the specific foci. Observations on studies supporting the focus are given in Section 3 of this report. Work in support of agreements not yet tabled are included in the "General" focus.

Each study was examined to determine its relationship to the Table 1 framework of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities. From this assessment a number of observations were made that are discussed in Section 3.

It was noted that not only was it important to define the area each study supported, but that it was also important to define the manner or form of this support. Accordingly, each study was evaluated on the basis of the focus of the research (i.e., the aspect of arms control addressed by the study) and the form of product (i.e., type of product produced). The focus of research was divided into four basic categories:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6889

August 25, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM:

JIM SEATON *JS*

SUBJECT:

Significant Military Exercise LAILAPS 2-94

At Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, concurring in military exercise LAILAPS 2-94. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

LAILAPS 2-94 is a very small-scale bilateral U.S./Greek exercise scheduled for September 5-12, 1994. It involves one U.S. Navy antisubmarine aircraft flying two sorties in support of Greek Navy training in the north/central Aegean/Cyclades Islands area.

The critical cancellation date is September 3, 1994.

Concurrence by: Kathleen D. Stephen *KDS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *Vh* NARA, Date *1/3/07*
7016-0152-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise LAILAPS 2-94

The National Security Council staff concurs in military exercise
LAILAPS 2-94.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). [Lailaps 2-94] (1 page)	08/10/1994	P1/b(1)

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To: Sordy Kelly - Name for Congressional
Angie
Andersen
2/11/94
P12:08

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

July 22, 1994

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are deeply concerned that discussions now underway with Russian officials could lead to an acceptance of limits on the performance of theater ballistic missile defense systems even though these are not covered by the ABM Treaty. These limits, which would not affect the current modest theater defense program, would foreclose important defense options for the future.


We know of no compelling argument for limiting our freedom to pursue theater defense options with the very best technology we are capable of developing. One of our country's greatest strengths is our unparalleled ability to develop advanced technologies. The anniversary of the lunar landing is a reminder of how we can conquer technical obstacles once thought to be beyond man's reach.


We depend heavily on advanced technology for our defense. Technology enables us to minimize the risk to American lives in combat by allowing us to stand off and still reach targets with precision, disabling enemy forces without exposing our own men and women to hostile fire.

No one can now anticipate the technical accomplishments we may be able to achieve in the future. Nor can we know what missile threats to our theater forces will emerge over the next 10, 20, or 30 years. That is why it would be short-sighted in the extreme to accept limits now, after the end of the Cold War, in the context of an ABM Treaty of declining relevance and whose provisions were never intended to limit theater defenses.

We urge you to instruct our officials to reject any limits on theater defenses. If Russia seeks to constrain our theater defense systems they should be told that theater defenses are not covered by the ABM Treaty and any definitional problems can be handled by a full explanation as to the nature of our work on theater systems.

Sincerely,


Floyd Spence


Henry J. Hyde

8/25/84
To: Secretariat
d. date - 1:40pm

✓ Doug Bunker
Douglas Bunker

* ✓ Bill Young
C.W. Bill Young

✓ Jennifer Dunn
Jennifer Dunn

* ✓ John R. Kasich KASICH

✓ Duncan Hunter
Duncan Hunter

✓ Mike Crapo
Mike Crapo, MICHAEL D. CRAPO

✓ Bob Walker Robert S. Walker

✓ Gerald B.H. Solomon
Jerry Solomon

✓ William F. Goodling
Bill Goodling

✓ Stephen Horn
Stephen Horn

* ✓ Bob Stamp STAMP

✓ Newt Gingrich
Newt Gingrich

✓ John A. Boehner
John A. Boehner

* ✓ Richard H. Arme RICHARD H. ARMEY

✓ David Dreier
David Dreier

✓ Bill Paxton
Bill Paxton

✓ Billy Archer
Billy Archer

✓ Joseph M. McDade
JOSEPH M. McDade

✓ Chris Smith CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

✓ Ben Gilman
Ben Gilman

✓ Benjamin A.
Benjamin A.

✓ John J Myers
John T. Myers

* Mac L. Smith
Nick Smith

✓ Wally Heger
Wally Heger

✓ George W. Beckas
George W. Beckas

✓ Dan Burt
Dan Burt

✓ Bob Livingston
Bob Livingston

✓ Charles T. Canady
Charles T. Canady

* Peter Hoover Don't know, leave off

✓ Bob Goodlatte
Bob Goodlatte

✓ Ed Royce
Ed Royce Edward R. Royce

✓ Robert K. Dornan
Robert K. Dornan

✓ Stephen E. Buyer
Stephen E. Buyer Buyer

✓ John Linder
John Linder

✓ Lamar Smith
Lamar Smith

✓ Carlos J. Moorhead
Carlos J. Moorhead

✓ Jay Kim
Jay Kim

✓ Terry Everett
Terry Everett

✓ Rob Portman
Rob Portman
Rob

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Armey:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard K. Armey
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-4326

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Bereuter:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Douglas Bereuter
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-2701

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Boehner:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John A. Boehner
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3508

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Burton:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dan Burton
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1406

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Buyer:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Stephen E. Buyer
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1405

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Canady:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Charles T. Canady
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0912

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Crapo:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Michael D. Crapo
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1202

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Dornan:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0546

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Dreier:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable David Dreier
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0528

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Dunn:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jennifer Dunn
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-4708

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Everett:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Terry Everett
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0102

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Gekas:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George W. Gekas
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3817

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Gilman:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3220

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Newt:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1006

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Goodlatte:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-4606

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Goodling:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable William F. Goodling
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3819

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Herger:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Wally Herger
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0502

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Horn:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Stephen Horn
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0538

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Hunter:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0552

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Hyde:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1306

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Kasich:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John R. Kasich
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3512

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Kim:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jay Kim
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0541

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Linder:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John Linder
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1004

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Livingston:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Livingston
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1801

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative McDade:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph M. McDade
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3810

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Moorhead:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

Although there are still a number of substantive issues to be resolved, I am encouraged by the progress we have made on this issue over the course of the last nine months in the SCC. All of the states participating in the SCC agree on the need to ensure that the Treaty's provisions allow the development, testing and deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, that will give us the ability to address the longer range theater missile threat.

We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Carlos J. Moorhead
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0527

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Myers:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John T. Myers
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-1407

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Paxon:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bill Paxon
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3227

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Royce:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Edward R. Royce
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0539

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3004

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-4321

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Nick Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-2207

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Solomon:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Gerald B. H. Solomon
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3222

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Spence:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Floyd Spence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-4002

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Stump:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Stump
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0303

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Walker:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert S. Walker
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-3816

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Young:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 regarding theater missile defenses (TMDs) and the Administration's efforts in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missile defense systems.

Our objective in these negotiations is to ensure that the ABM Treaty is updated to allow the United States to test and deploy TMDs to counter the current and projected threat to U.S. forces, friends and allies from the proliferation of theater missile systems with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. To accomplish this, the United States is seeking an agreement among our ABM Treaty partners regarding the distinction between TMD systems not limited by the Treaty and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the Treaty.

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We appreciate knowing your views on this question and I look forward to working closely with Congress to strengthen both the ABM Treaty and our theater missile defenses.

Sincerely,

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-0910

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For Lynn Davis et al From Robert Bell. Subject: IWG on PRD-34. (1 page)	08/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #3 [4]

2016-0152-F

vz4621

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. draft	Presidential Review Thirty Four. (24 pages)	08/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #3 [4]

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vz4621

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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