

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Chron File - August 1994 #3 [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 266				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Duplicate of vz4617_002a. Record ID: 9406676. (1 page)	08/18/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Duplicate of vz4617_002b. (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	Duplicate of vz4617_002b. (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. report	Duplicate of vz4617_002c. (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #3 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4619

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY
Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: U.S. Reply to the 1994 NATO Defense Planning
Questionnaire (DPQ-94)

I approve the proposed U.S. reply to the 1994 NATO DPQ for
release to NATO.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Duplicate of vz4617_002b. (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)

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001c. memo	Duplicate of vz4617_002b. (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 266

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001d. report	Duplicate of vz4617_002c. (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6778

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, concurring in the military exercise FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2 is a routine small-scale bilateral U.S./Indian Special Operations Forces training exercise scheduled for September 6-27. It involves two U.S. C-130 aircraft, 72 U.S. Air Force and Navy personnel and an undetermined number of Indian Marine Commandos training in the vicinity of Bombay, India. The exercise reinforces military-to-military contacts in the South Asia region and is the first time for U.S. Navy SEALs to train with Indian Special Forces in combat swimmer operations, maritime infiltration and weapons/demolition training.

The critical cancellation date is August 23, 1994.

Concurrence by: Ellen Laipson *EL*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *W* NARA, Date *1/3/2017*

7016-052-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER

Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2

The National Security Council staff concurs in military exercise
FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6778

18 AUG 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2

The Department of Defense recommends NSC concurrence of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date for Exercise FLASH IROQUOIS 94-2 is 23 August 1994. Should you have any questions or comments, our action officer for significant military activities is Col Linda Olsen, (703)697-5454.

Robert P. McAleer
Robert P. McAleer
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

This memo is UNCLASSIFIED without its attachment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V71762

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~with SECRET Attachment~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6171

August 24, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RG for*
FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY *AAW*
SUBJECT: ACDA Report to Congress on Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies
Completed in 1993

ACDA has submitted the subject report to NSC staff for review. The report has been interagency cleared as drafted. We have made minor changes which are marked on the report and which have been transmitted to ACDA telephonically. With these changes we recommend approval.

In draft *In draft* *spt*
Concurrences by: Bill Danvers, Elisa Harris, Steve Andreasen

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum approving the ACDA Report.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to ACDA Executive Secretary
Tab A ACDA Report to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED
~~with SECRET Attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~with SECRET Attachment~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6171

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: ACDA Report to Congress on Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies
Completed in 1993

The NSC staff approves the subject report, with changes, as marked.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
ACDA Report to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED

~~with SECRET Attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

JUL 29 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. WILLIAM H. ITOH
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. ANN W. LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993 (U)

Attached are the "Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993," including a classified addendum as called for by Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and the associated transmittal letters to the Congress. This year's report, which was due to Congress on 30 June, has been revised to include an assessment. (U)

Please provide clearance to Al Lieberman (202-647-4695) by Noon, Thursday, August 11, 1994. (U)

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

THE DIRECTOR

DRAFT

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to transmit our "Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993" and the classified addendum. I hope that this document will enhance Congressional and public understanding of the important arms control issues that the U.S. Government is addressing in a research capacity.

The enclosed report, consistent with Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as recently amended, provides:

- (1) a comprehensive list of studies relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues concluded during the previous calendar year by government agencies or for government agencies by private institutions or persons;
- (2) a brief description of each such study; and
- (3) a classified addendum.

This report is intended as a significant improvement over previous submissions as part of the process of revitalizing ACDA. Previous reports provided a compilation of abstracts describing the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies completed in the target year. This year's report continues to contain these abstracts, but also adds an assessment of the relationship of this body of work to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities of the U.S. Government.

Sincerely,

John D. Holum

Enclosures

The Honorable
Albert Gore
President
United States Senate

Handle as UNCLASSIFIED
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CLASSIFIED Addendum to
the Report

Classified by: Multiple Sources
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DRAFT



DRAFT

**REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
STUDIES
COMPLETED IN 1993**

XX JULY 1994

In response to Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/NOFORN/UNINTTEL~~
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

THE DIRECTOR

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am pleased to transmit our "Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993" and the classified addendum. I hope that this document will enhance Congressional and public understanding of the important arms control issues that the U.S. Government is addressing in a research capacity.

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Sincerely,

John D. Holum

Enclosures

The Honorable
Thomas S. Foley
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives

Handle as UNCLASSIFIED
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CLASSIFIED Addendum to
the Report

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET/NOFORN/UNINTTEL~~

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the latest in a series of reports fulfilling the requirement on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to provide a report to Congress setting forth a comprehensive list and brief description of studies relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues concluded during the previous calendar year. This year's report, dealing with studies completed in 1993, is a significant departure from the previous submissions. Previous reports provided a compilation of abstracts describing the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies completed in the target year. This report continues to contain these abstracts, but also adds an assessment of the relationship of this body of work to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities of the US Government.

Data to produce this report was collected from U.S. Government agencies through the interagency Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee (ACRCC) chaired by ACDA. For this year's report we have added individual reviews of each study to categorize its relationship to arms control and nonproliferation issues along the dimensions of the "issues" addressed or supported (*Strategic Arms Control, Conventional Arms Control, Nuclear Testing, Nuclear Proliferation, Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Regional Issues*), the "focus" of research (*Problem Identification, Strategies, Negotiations, Verification - Signatures, Verification - Remote sensing, and Verification - On-site sensing*), and the "product" of research (*Basic Research, Analytical Tools, Micro Analysis, Macro Analysis, and Equipment Development*).

A series of tables is provided listing the studies of interest in each of the "issue" areas of arms control and nonproliferation, along with the "focus" and "product" of each study. They provide a general view of the arms control research reported in the studies, and serve as a basis for observations. Specific observations are discussed along with a number of topics defined according to specific treaties, organizations or focuses within each area.

In the report,
This report is the first step in a continuing process of improvement. Plans for further improvement are discussed including increased interagency participation in the planning and assessment, *and* means of obtaining greater uniformity and completeness of data on individual studies. *Steps in preparing the report,*

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ACDA REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT STUDIES COMPLETED IN 1993

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act (ACDA Act; 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2571) established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA. Section 39 of the Act, as amended, requires ACDA to provide a report to Congress setting forth-

- "(1) a comprehensive list of studies relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues concluded during the previous calendar year by government agencies or for government agencies by private or public institutions or persons; and
- (2) a brief description of each study."

This report is the latest in a series of reports fulfilling this requirement.

The arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies described in this report support both the pursuit of new initiatives and the implementation of existing agreements in arms control. They involve a variety of roles encompassing the definition of issues, plans for implementations and inspections, and technological developments from basic research to the acquisition of needed equipment.

The scope of this report is significantly expanded compared to previous submissions. Previous reports provided a compilation of abstracts describing the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies completed in the target year. This report continues to contain these abstracts, but also provides assessments of the relationship of this body of work to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities of the US Government. ACDA signaled its intention to improve this report in the Agency's 1993 annual report to Congress:

"ACDA will make a significant revision in the format of the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research. Past reports listed research project summaries without commentary regarding the relationship of these research efforts to arms control priorities. Future Annual Reports will include assessments of the relationship of these research projects to national arms control priorities."

The goals ACDA set out to achieve in producing this report focused on developing an improved process going well beyond simply providing details of study efforts. The current report is the first step in the process of change from the previous format. The goal is to provide an improved format directly relating US Government studies to national arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities.

The main body of this report describes the approach taken this year, the observations

made, and process improvements to further improve next year's report. Two appendices are included to provide tables that relate individual studies to areas of arms control and nonproliferation, and abstracts for each study. The last appendix, listing study abstracts, is essentially the report as submitted in previous years.

The majority of this report is unclassified. Classified material, consisting of classified abstracts, is contained in a separate addendum that is an extension of Appendix B.

2.0 APPROACH

Data to produce this report was collected from US Government agencies through the interagency Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee (ACRCC) chaired by ACDA.

Appendix B contains the abstracts of studies as have been included in previous annual reports since beginning in 1988. ACDA works with the Agencies' submissions to produce these abstracts. They are modified to provide a consistent emphasis and format, consolidated in some cases to avoid repeated or multiple volume submissions and rejected in some cases for submissions that do not seem applicable either because of content or date of completion. This year we have categorized each study as to its relationship to arms control and nonproliferation issues and some of this additional information has been included with the abstracts presented in Appendix B.

The improvements made this year revolve around determining the relationship of studies to the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament needs of the US Government. The first step taken in determining these relationships was to define the needs. Table 1 gives the framework ACDA defined to make these assessments. Six broad areas of current arms control interest are defined along with specific treaties, organizations or focuses within each area. A "General" focus was added to each area to accommodate useful studies that did not fit any one of the specific foci. Observations on studies supporting the focus are given in Section 3 of this report. Work in support of agreements not yet tabled are included in the "General" focus.

Each study was examined to determine its relationship to the Table 1 framework of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities. From this assessment a number of observations were made that are discussed in Section 3.

It was noted that not only was it important to define the area each study supported, but that it was also important to define the manner or form of this support. Accordingly, each study was evaluated on the basis of the focus of the research (i.e., the aspect of arms control addressed by the study) and the form of product (i.e., type of product produced). The focus of research was divided into four basic categories:

TO: MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 25 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE PEACEKEEPER 94

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 25 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SEATON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EXECSEC
HAHN

COMMENTS:

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DATE 8/25

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

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DOC 3 OF 3

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001 SEATON
002 ITOH
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Z 94082510 ACTION TRANSFERRED
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X 94082514 REED SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

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UNCLASSIFIED

TO: ITOH

FROM: MCALEER, R

DOC DATE: 22 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SIGNIFIGANT MILITARY EXERCISE PEACEKEEPER 94 TOTSKOYE RUSSIA
8 - 18 SEP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ITOH

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STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

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FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOC 1 OF 1


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise PEACEKEEPER 94

The National Security Council staff concurs in military exercise
PEACEKEEPER 94.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise PEACEKEEPER 94

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, concurring in the military exercise PEACEKEEPER 94. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

PEACEKEEPER 94 is U.S./Russian peacekeeping field training exercise scheduled for September 8-18 in Totskoye, Russia. Approximately 300 American and 500 Russian troops are involved. This exercise was originally scheduled for early July, but pressure from the Russian DUMA forced its postponement.

Totskoye was the site of above-ground nuclear testing in the 1950s; however, a July 1994 radiological survey by the European Radiological Assessment Monitoring Team certified that the area meets federal safety standards for the general public.

The critical cancellation date is August 26, 1994.

in draft *in draft*
Concurrences by: Nicholas Burns, Rose Gottemoeller

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

6791



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


22 AUG 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - PEACEKEEPER 94

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise PEACEKEEPER 94. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date has been changed from 1 September to 26 August 1994. Should you have any questions or comments, our action officer for significant military activities is Col Linda Olsen, (703)697-5454.


Robert P. McAleer
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

PRIORITY
P 261313Z JUL 94
FM USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ37//
TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JETD//
INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J4/J5/LA//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:SP/EP//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD:ISP/ASD:PA/FMRA//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//DUSD:SR//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PM-ISO//
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USDAO MOSCOW RU
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC//
HQ USAF RAMSTEIN AB GE//DOOE//
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N313/N3//
USCINACOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J7//
USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//AMC/MSC/MTMC//
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N3/N5//
HQA WASHINGTON DC//DCSOPS/DCSLOG//
HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XOEE//
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ37/ECJ3-EX/ECJ5//

ZYUW RUSNMHS0127 2071207

UNCLAS
SECTION 001 OF 002
EXER/PEACEKEEPER 94//
MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCEUR/ECJ37//
SUBJ/PART I SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE BRIEF (SMEB) (U//

REF/A/JCS MSG/181140Z JUN 93/IMPLEMENTATION OF CJCS DECISION ON
PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE AND TRAINING/B/MOU BETWEEN U.S. DOD AND
RUSSIAN FEDERATION MOD ON COOPERATION IN DEFENSE AND MILITARY
RELATIONS/8 SEP 93/C/PROTOCOL BETWEEN CDR 31D AND CDR 27GMRD ON
COMBINED PEACEKEEPING TRAINING AND EXERCISES/9 SEP93/D/JCS
MSG/121231Z JUL 94/US-RUSSIAN COMBINED PEACEKEEPING TRAINING
EXERCISE --NEW DATES//
POC/MCKENZIE/LTC(P)/PRIPH: (DSN) 430-4153/-VAHINGEN GE//
RMKS/1. EXERCISE NAME: U.S.-RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING EXERCISE
1994/PEACEKEEPER 94//
2. GEOGRAPHIC AREA : TOTSKOYE, RUSSIA
3. DATES: 08-18 SEP 94
4. CRITICAL CANCELLATION DATE: 26 Aug 94
5. TYPE: BILATERAL FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE (FTX)
6. PURPOSE: DEPLOY AND EXERCISE A REINFORCED COMPANY FROM THE
U.S. THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION (31D) IN COORDINATION WITH A
REINFORCED MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY AND OTHER FORCES FROM THE 27TH
GUARDS MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION (27GMRD) IN A U.S.-RUSSIAN
COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO IMPROVE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES INCLUDE:
A. EXERCISE COMMANDERS AND STAFF IN CONTROLLING, ORGANIZING
AND SUPPORTING A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.

JOINT STAFF V1
ACTION J7:JETD(3)
INFO CMAS(1) NMCC:CWO(1) J3(3) J3:JODEUR-J(1)
J3:JODWHEM-J(1) NIDS(1) J4(5) J4:LPEILD3-J(1)
J4:SMEDENG-J(1) J7(6) J5(1) J5:STRAT-J(1)
QUAL CONTROL(1) J5:ORGN-J(1) J7:JECG-J(1)
SHAPE LNO(1) J5:NUC-J(1) J5:NAC-J(1) J5:CACCON-J(1)
J5:CACMIS-J(1) J6E-J(1) J5:RRB-J(1) J6U-J(1)
J1:PPPD-J(1) J5:ASIA-J(1) J6:NSA-J(1) J5:POLICY-J(1)
J5:WARFARE-J(1) J5:WTCNP-J(1) J5:WTCCBW-J(1)
J36:READY-J(1)
+NATS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC
+NEACP

SECDEF V2
ACTION
INFO SECDEF-N(1) DOTE(2) SECDEF-C(1)
USDP:FILE(1) ASD:LA(1) USDP:TWP(1) USDP:IP(2)
ATSD:PA(1) GC(1) USDP:ISP(1) USDP:AP(2)
USDP:DASDEUR(1) USDP:USAA(1) USDP:CH(1) USDP:SR(1)
USDP:PK/PE(1) USDP:FMRA(1) USDP:FSUNA(1) USDP:NAC(1)
USDP:NIA(1) USDP:SCC(1) USDP:EP(1) USDP:EUR POL(1)
USDP:RUE(1) USDP:NATOPOL(1) USDP:ISA(1) USDP:NA(1)
+USDP:DTSA
+USDP:CCC
+SAFE

B. EXAMINE AND EVALUATE THE COMPATIBILITY OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN
UNITS TO CONDUCT COMBINED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
C. EXERCISE UNITS ACCORDING TO AN AGREED UPON TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTP) GUIDE WITHIN A PEACEKEEPING
SCENARIO.

7. OPLAN EXERCISED: LIVEX
8. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:
A. US COMMITMENTS TO ALLIES: NONE
B. DATE COMMITMENTS MADE TO ALLIES: NOT APPLICABLE
C. OTHER POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:

(1) PEACEKEEPER 94 WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO OCCUR 4-17
JULY 94 IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS FORMALIZED IN REFS A
THROUGH C. DUE TO RUSSIAN POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES AND PRESSURE
FROM THE DUMA, THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD), IN MAY 94,
FORMALLY POSTPONED PEACEKEEPER 94. AT THAT TIME THE RUSSIANS
OFFERED NO NEW DATES FOR THE EXERCISE. IN JUNE 94, THE RUSSIAN
MOD AND THE U.S. SECDEF AGREED TO RESCHEDULE THE EXERCISE FOR 8-
18 SEPTEMBER 94 IN TOTSKOYE, RUSSIA. POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES IN
THE DUMA STILL EXIST AND COULD POSSIBLY AFFECT THE RESCHEDULED
EXERCISE. TO PRECLUDE THIS, THE RUSSIAN MOD AND MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) WILL PROVIDE DETAILED BRIEFINGS TO THE DUMA
ON THE SCOPE, OBJECTIVES, AND PURPOSE OF PEACEKEEPER 94.

(2) THE TOTSKOYE AREA WAS THE SITE OF ABOVE-GROUND NUCLEAR
TESTING IN THE 1950'S, HOWEVER, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY MAINTAINS
THAT THE DESIGNATED EXERCISE AREA IS COMPLETELY SAFE. IN
RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS, A RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY WILL BE
CONDUCTED BY THE EUROPEAN RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT MONITORING TEAM
(E-RAMT) DURING THE FINAL COORDINATION VISIT TO TOTSKOYE, 27-30
JULY 94 TO ENSURE THAT RADIATION LEVELS IN THE EXERCISE AREA
COMPLY WITH FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

(3) AT PRESENT, NO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) WITH
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED NOR ARE THE RUSSIANS
WILLING TO EXCHANGE DIPLOMATIC NOTES. THESE ARE THE PREFERRED
VEHICLES TO PROTECT U.S. FORCES DURING THEIR TIME IN RUSSIA.
WITHOUT EITHER A SOFA OR EXCHANGE OF DIP NOTES, OUR ONLY
ALTERNATIVE IS TO TREAT THE EXERCISE AS A "PORT VISIT". ANY
PROBLEMS OR ISSUES WOULD BE HANDLED BY AMEMBASSY PERSONNEL AT THE
TIME THEY OCCUR.

(4) ALTHOUGH THE EXERCISE IS BI-LATERAL BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, TWO FACTORS ARE SIGNIFICANT WITH
REGARDS TO GERMANY. FIRST, 31D IS DEPLOYING FROM BASES IN
GERMANY AND SIGNIFICANT U.S./RUSSIAN CONTACT HAS BEEN AND WILL BE
DONE IN GERMANY. SECONDLY, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WILL PROVIDE
NAVIGATORS/TRANSLATORS FOR EACH U.S. AIRCRAFT DURING EXERCISE
DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT. THESE RUSSIAN PERSONNEL WILL SPEND
SIGNIFICANT TIME BOTH ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR OVER GERMANY
AND GERMAN APPROVAL IS REQUIRED.

9. POLITICO-MILITARY SCENARIO SUMMARY: NONE.

10. SUMMARY OF KEY EXERCISE EVENTS:

07 SEP: AIRLIFT COORDINATION ELEMENT DEPLOYS
08 SEP: ADVANCE PARTY DEPLOYS
10-11 SEP: MAIN BODY (31D) DEPLOYS
12 SEP: ESTABLISH LOGEMENT
13-15 SEP: CONDUCT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS TRAINING
16-17 SEP: POST-EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
17-18 SEP: REDEPLOY

11. DIRECTING HEADQUARTERS: HQ USEUCOM

12. PARTICIPATING COMMANDS, HEADQUARTERS, AND FORCES:

A. U.S.: USEUCOM (2 PERSONNEL)
USAREUR (12 PERSONNEL)
V CORPS (7 PERSONNEL)
3RD INFANTRY DIVISION (249 PERSONNEL)
TRADOC (1 PERSON)
USTRANSCOM

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (43 PERSONNEL).

B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: 27TH GMRD (249 PERSONNEL)
EXERCISE SUPPORT STAFF (ESTIMATED
250 PERSONNEL).

C. TOTAL: 806 PERSONNEL

13. SCOPE OF ANTICIPATED PARTICIPATION:

A. OTHER UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS: USTRANSCOM
B. UNASSIGNED FORCES OF THE U.S. MILITARY SERVICES: NONE
C. ALLIED NATIONS: NONE
D. NEUTRAL AND NACC NATIONS: RUSSIAN FEDERATION
E. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES OR DEPARTMENTS: DEPARTMENT OF
STATE (AMERICAN EMBASSIES MOSCOW AND BONN; USDAOs MOSCOW AND

MCN=94207/04826 TOR=94207/1221Z TAD=94207/1221Z CDSN=MAK434

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PAGE 1 OF 2
261313Z JUL 94
02 SECT MSG

National Security Council
The White House

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West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

Critical Cancellation Date
is 8-26-94

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

TO: KOPETSKI, MIKE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 25 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CTB
ANSA

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES REPLY TO REP KOPETSKI RE CTB

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 03 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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DOC 5 OF 5

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RECORD ID: 9406184

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001 ANDREASEN	Z 94073010 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 ANDREASEN	Z 94080519 APPROPRIATE ACTION
003 LAKE	Z 94081918 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
004 PRESIDENT	Z 94082608 FOR SIGNATURE
005	X 94082608 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
005 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 94082608 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

004 940824	VICE PRESIDENT
004 940824	WH CHIEF OF STAFF
005 940825 KOPETSKI, MIKE	
005 940825 WH STRIPPING DESK	

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National Security Council
The White House

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West Wing Desk	3	SP 8/18	D To Brophy
NSC Secretariat			

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	9/25	D
NSC Secretariat	6	[Signature]	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

Date 8-25-94

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9406184

REFERRAL

DATE: 26 AUG 94

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: KOPETSKI, MIKE

SOURCE: PRESIDENT


DATE: 25 AUG 94

SUBJ: PRES REPLY TO REP KOPETSKI RE CTB

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 26 AUG 94

COMMENT:


FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 25, 1994


Dear Mike:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations. My Administration is committed to completing a CTB Treaty at the earliest possible time while maintaining a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent into the next century. Since the opening of formal negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) in January 1994, we have made important progress toward achieving a CTB Treaty and I expect the pace of the negotiations to accelerate during the third round of talks currently underway.

During this round, we are working with the Chairman of the Nuclear Test Ban's Ad Hoc Committee and CD member states to develop a draft treaty text. Our goal is to have such a text in hand when the third round concludes on September 7. The United States is also prepared to continue work on the treaty text in the "intersessional" period between September 7, 1994 and the opening of the CD in January, 1995, and we are discussing with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and CD member states an appropriate schedule for this work.

I look forward to continuing to work closely with Congress on this issue.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Michael J. Kopetski
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1994
94 AUG 21 10

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓
SUSAN BROPHY SB

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Kopetski on CTB

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Representative Kopetski on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations.

Background

Representative Kopetski has written you regarding the CTB negotiations. Specifically, he urges you to restate your commitment to a CTB at the earliest possible date and discuss personally the CTB with French President Mitterrand.

The response from you thanks the Representative for his support and reports on our objectives for the third round of negotiations currently underway in Geneva.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Kopetski
Tab B Letter from Representative Kopetski

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

MICHAEL J. KOPETSKI
5TH DISTRICT, OREGON

218 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3705
202-225-5711
FAX: 202-225-9477

COMMITTEE:
WAYS & MEANS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3705

July 27, 1994

6184
HOME OFFICE:
THE EQUITABLE CENTER BUILDING
530 CENTER STREET, NE
SUITE 340
SALEM, OR 97301
503-588-9100
FAX: 503-588-0963

CLACKAMAS COUNTY OFFICE:
815 HIGH STREET
OREGON CITY, OR 97045
503-850-1273

OREGON TOLL FREE: 1-800-548-7179

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:


I am writing to bring two important dates to your immediate attention. Additionally, I offer several suggestions for you to demonstrate your commitment to the important non-proliferation objectives you have outlined previously and which are currently being considered by the international community.

The first date is August 6, 1994, the 49th commemoration of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by the United States. Across our nation, including in Salem and Corvallis, Oregon, groups of citizens will commemorate the world's first use of an atomic weapon on mankind. Included in these commemoration activities will be vows to continue grassroots activism to ensure the world never experiences another Hiroshima. I urge you to include in your weekly Saturday radio address comments commemorating Hiroshima. I feel strongly that this would be an appropriate date to restate your commitment to a comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible date.

The second date is August 9, 1994, the 49th commemoration of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki by the United States. On this date, I urge you to discuss personally the comprehensive test ban treaty with French President Mitterand. Together, you and President Mitterand can provide the spark needed at the Conference on Disarmament to bring this issue to a successful conclusion. President Mitterand's 1995 departure from the French Presidency may close the window to a comprehensive test ban treaty. This is why your personal intervention at this critical time is important and necessary.

Mr. President, you have earned the respect of millions of Americans with your non-proliferation agenda. The above suggestions, in my opinion, are timely and necessary steps to ensure momentum is not lost as your Administration pursues your non-proliferation objectives. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Mike Kopetski
Member of Congress

P.S. Enclosed are two recent editorials stressing the importance of the CTBT negotiations

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JULY 25, 1994

The New York Times

Founded in 1851

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Galvanizing the Test Ban Talks

Talks on a treaty to ban nuclear tests around the world resume today in Geneva with little indication that they will be given the urgency they deserve.

A test ban is surely in America's interest. The U.S. no longer needs tests to design new warheads, assess the reliability of old warheads or rattle potential foes. Indeed, a ban on such tests would help improve the political atmosphere for tougher curbs on the spread of nuclear arms, perhaps the most critical security issue today. But these benefits could be imperiled if the sluggish pace of the talks does not pick up.

Most countries, including the U.S. and Russia, want a prompt ban. But Britain, France and China cannot seem to find the accelerator. They may harbor hopes of delaying a draft treaty through April 1995, when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty comes up for renewal. Once that renewal conference ends, much of the steam behind a test ban will dissipate. Then, the recalcitrants hope, new leaders less committed to a ban might take over in Moscow and Washington.

Britain has yet to get over its belief that nuclear arms put it among the leading powers and that periodic tests, at U.S. sites, are a potent reminder of that status. While London is in no position to block a treaty, it is no apparent hurry to draft one either.

France is divided over the test ban issue. President François Mitterrand, who leaves office next May, has declared a moratorium on tests and seems committed to a ban. Even the conservative Government of Edouard Balladur does not want France to be the lone holdout among nuclear powers. Some French officials are also increasingly uneasy about the possibility of a nuclear-armed North Africa and would not want to undermine nonproliferation efforts. But the conservatives would like to conduct a quick burst of up to five test blasts next year to help simulate future tests of warhead designs by computer.

China is the lone nuclear power not to declare a moratorium on testing. It wants time to complete tests of warheads to be mounted on multiple-armed missiles. In an obvious delaying tactic, the Chinese want the treaty to contain security assurances for non-nuclear states, including a commitment to no first use of nuclear arms.

It will take a strong push from President Clinton to move the talks along. That means setting a target date of Dec. 31 for completing a treaty and urging the chairman of the negotiating body, Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico, to exert leadership by offering his own draft this round. An injection of energy into the talks might bring a ban into effect by August 1995 — 50 years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 1994

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Key to the Nuclear Lock

THE NUCLEAR Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the basic law by which the nations of the world broker and enforce nuclear restraint. It's up for renewal in 1995, and few things could be do more to undercut the American interest in a safer world than to have this treaty vitiated or delayed. But something like that could yet happen, and it could be partly on the American account. Not that the United States lacks enthusiasm for extending the treaty. But the United States has the chief responsibility for the particular development—a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB)—that enables the nuclear have countries to look the have-nots in the eye and insist they sign on the non-nuclear line, and that effort is not going so well.

The problem is that, among the five acknowledged nuclear powers, America and Russia have forsworn testing, but China, France and Britain have not. The non-nuclear countries have some justification in saying that they cannot really be expected to abandon their nuclear option altogether when nuclear countries do not accept concrete limits on their own existing capabilities. Testing, which facilitates and symbolizes nuclear development and nuclear pride, is the most conspicuous of these limits. It's the key to the nuclear lock.

This is what compels Washington to heed the practices of China, France and Britain. If they do not stop testing, and very soon, the United States risks weakening or even losing the powerful counter-proliferation lever of a renewed, strengthened and indefinitely extended NPT.

That makes the lesser tactical question of how best to corral the nuclear testers a larger strategic question as well. Britain, it is felt, will finally go with the crowd. France may come to such a view but may want to leave it to its next president, after elections in 1995, to fire off a few parting shots. That could delay a treaty until 1996. China says it will stop testing but also appears to be thinking of a treaty in 1996. But in 1996, both Russia and the United States are to elect new presidents. The political clutter is troubling.

There may be a way to beat it. President Clinton could commit the United States to completing CTB negotiations by a date certain and early enough to complete a new NPT in 1995. The White House is hanging back. Its eye is on drawing in China, and it fears that setting a CTB deadline may "snap the leader"—lose China. It takes a fine feel. For President Clinton to capture the high prize of a world newly reinforced with nuclear controls, he better get it right.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6184

August 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: KEITH HAHN *KL*
FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SPA*
SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Kopetski Regarding CTB

Representative Kopetski has written the President regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations. Specifically, he urges the President to restate his commitment to a CTB at the earliest possible date and discuss personally the CTB with French President Mitterrand.

The response from the President thanks the Representative for his support and reports on our objectives for the third round of negotiations currently underway in Geneva.

Concurrences by: *WD*
Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Representative Kopetski
Tab B Letter from Representative Kopetski

Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY *SB*
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached is a copy of the letter sent to the President from Representative Mike Kopetski (D-OR), concerning the our non-proliferation objectives. I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call LeeAnn Inadomi at x7500.

Enclosure