

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Chron File - August 1994 #1 [3]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 265				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	[Walter J. Davis] [Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	06/10/1994	b(6)
001b. resume	Transcript of Naval Service for Rear Admiral Walter Jackson Davis, Jr. (3 pages)	06/03/1994	b(6)
002a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). [Polish PFP Exercise 94. (2 pages)	07/02/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	Duplicate of 002a. (2 pages)	07/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 265

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #1 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4607

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: ITOH

FROM: DAILEY, J

DOC DATE: 03 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

PDD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NASA COMMENTS ON DRAFT PDD ON NATL SECURITY POLICY COORDINATION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 05 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MISLOCK

LOGREF: 9420743

FILES: IFD

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
MISLOCK
NSC CHRON
TENET

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 10 OF 10

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9420915


DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	X	94080214	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
002	X	94080216	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
003	X	94080314	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
004	X	94080314	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
005	X	94080316	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
006	X	94080515	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
007	X	94080518	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
008	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
009	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
010	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

UNCLASSIFIED

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001



AUG 3 1994

Mr. William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Itoh:

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft Presidential Decision Directive on National Security Policy Coordination.

NASA has a key role in support of national security affairs, and our international cooperative programs are an important factor in furtherance of our Nation's foreign policy objectives. Our world-wide operating locations support activities such as the Deep Space Network and Space Shuttle abort landing sites. Work with our international partners, now including Russia, on the Space Station will necessitate an increased NASA presence in their countries. For these reasons, we believe that NASA should be included as a permanent member of both the Overseas Policy Board and the Security Policy Forum.

We also have a number of comments on the draft which go beyond NASA's specific involvement in national security policy coordination. These are listed in the enclosure for your consideration.

Sincerely,


J. R. Dailey
Acting Deputy Administrator

Enclosure

NASA Comments
Draft Presidential Decision Directive on
National Security Policy Coordination

Page 2, 6th paragraph: The abbreviation "DCI" is not spelled out previously.

Page 2, last paragraph:

The term "non-defense related agency" is not clear. We believe you mean an agency which is not part of the Department of Defense.

Rotating the "non-defense agency representative" annually may be too frequent to provide adequate representation of members of the Security Policy Forum to the Security Policy Board. Suggest the forum be allowed to decide how it will be represented.

Page 3, 2nd paragraph:

The term "National Policy Board" is used in the second sentence but not defined. We believe this is a typo which should have read "Security Policy Board." If we are incorrect and these are two separate boards, there is ambiguity in the following paragraphs when reference is made to the "Policy Board."

Page 3, 4th paragraph:

Add NASA as a member of the Overseas Policy Board.

A number of abbreviations are used which have not been spelled out previously.

Page 3, 7th paragraph:

The directive should provide more details on the Security Policy Advisory Board to make sure it is cost effective and provides real value added.

Are there members of the Security Policy Advisory Board in addition to the five appointed by the President? Does each of these five report to the President individually or do they report as a body?

Will the Security Policy Board be a Federal Advisory Committee Act board?

Page 4, 1st paragraph: Include NASA as a member of the Security Policy Forum.

Page 4, 2nd paragraph: The word "members" in the last line should be changed to "member."

Page 4, last paragraph:

The intent of the first sentence is not clear. What is expected within 30 days?

The term "Chairman" should be replaced with "Chairperson."

The word "principals" in the last line should be replaced with "principles."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

ROBERT BELL 

SUBJECT:

Read-Ahead for C-P-L Lunch Item: Readiness

Attached at Tab A is an attachment from our July 21 memorandum to the President on the release of the Meyer report on readiness. The attachment catalogues all the follow-up initiatives Defense is undertaking to ensure readiness remains our top priority.

All of these measures are important and must be fully implemented. At the end of the day, though, the readiness of our Armed Forces will be affected more than anything by decisions we will have to make soon on budget topline.

With the current, officially acknowledged shortfall associated with higher than expected inflation and higher than requested pay raises projected to be between \$20-\$40 billion across the FYDP, we must either get additional topline relief for Defense in FY 1996 or make a Hobson's Choice between reduced readiness or force structure reductions below the BUR levels.

Attachment

Tab

Points on "Additional DOD Readiness Initiatives"

Additional DoD Readiness Initiatives

In addition to creating the Meyer Task Force, increasing O&M budgets and including readiness reporting requirements in the DPG, the Department has undertaken other initiatives to ensure readiness remains the top priority in DoD, including:

- Created the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). This council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and co-chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior-level DoD forum for readiness policy and oversight.
- Created the Readiness Working Group. This group, co-chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-3), provides the primary support for the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.
- Established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel was reorganized and renamed, and then elevated to Under Secretary status.
- Established the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. This new position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the focal point on the OSD staff for readiness issues and, as previously noted, co-chairman of the Readiness Working Group.
- Increased Service focus on unit readiness monitoring capabilities.
- Conducted readiness off-site meetings (three days of meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense), which resulted in plans to develop analytical tools that relate resources to readiness.
- The Chairman, JCS, has taken the initiative and responsibility for assessing readiness of U.S. forces to execute assigned missions.
- The Vice Chairman, JCS, has expanded the focus of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) beyond its normal acquisition review function to include readiness issues. The JROC is comprised of the Vice Chairman and Service Vice Chiefs.
- The Vice Chairman, JCS, also initiated the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process, which will assess readiness operationally and programmatically, current and future, with a focus on mission accomplishment.

AUGUST 8, 1994

FILE: GLOSSON

WASHINGTON TIMES

Aug. 8, 1994

Pg. 4

Panel seeks new probe of general

3-star retirement for Glosson at risk

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Senate Armed Services Committee has decided to instruct the Pentagon to reopen the promotion-tampering probe of Air Force Lt. Gen. Buster Glosson, a prominent Desert Storm leader who was nominated by the White House to retire at full three-star rank.

Congressional sources said the committee decided at a closed session on July 27 to have the Pentagon establish a panel of three former defense officials or members of Congress to review the way the Air Force originally investigated Gen. Glosson. The panel would not take new testimony, but would review work already done and accept written submissions, the sources said.

The committee has been put in an awkward position in deciding how to vote on the nomination of Gen. Glosson, who designed the successful 1991 air war against Iraq.

The Air Force inspector general concluded earlier this year that Gen. Glosson tampered in the promotion of a major general by speaking with two generals who sat on the confidential promotion board. The IG also said Gen. Glosson lied to investigators when he told them he was unaware that the generals were on that board.

Gen. Glosson has denied any wrongdoing.

The committee's task became muddled when both Defense Secretary William Perry and Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall said they did not believe Gen. Glosson lied. They recommended he be retired at three-star rank.

In addition, The Washington Times disclosed several irregularities in the way Gen. Glosson was investigated.

The Air Force inspector general, who since has retired, was himself investigated on a sexual harassment complaint at the time of the Glosson probe and was asked to retire early, according to senior Pentagon officials.

Gen. Glosson — a confidant of Gen. Merrill McPeak, Air Force chief of staff — advised Gen.

McPeak to have the inspector general retire at an earlier date.

At least one senior Air Force general has told the Armed Services Committee that he personally informed Mrs. Widnall that the inspector general harbored a bias against Gen. Glosson.

Gen. Glosson, who was deputy Air Force chief of staff for operations, last month decided to retire at two-star rank, with the hope the committee would ultimately let him retire as a three-star general. Under law, the Senate must vote to confirm retirements of all three- and four-star officers.

"We have every confidence that the committee's choice in how they review the evidence will vindicate Gen. Glosson and that he will be confirmed," said Charles Gittins, his Washington attorney.

The panel set a Sept. 15 deadline for the Defense Department to report on the independent panel's findings.

Congressional sources said Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat and Armed Services chairman, is willing to defend Gen. Glosson's three-star retirement. But he is reluctant because he would have to

explain on the Senate floor how he reconciled his position with the findings of the Air Force IG.

Mr. Perry and top Pentagon officials have taken the seemingly contradictory position of supporting both Gen. Glosson and the IG.

GLOSSON...Pg. 15

GLOSSON...from Pg. 10

report.

Meanwhile, Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Ryan, one of the generals to whom Gen. Glosson spoke who accused him of tampering, has seen his own nomination get snarled in the process.

Some senators had put a "hold" on Gen. Ryan's nomination to a key NATO command post in Naples. The Pentagon has nominated Gen. Ryan as commander of all allied air forces in southern Europe, including warplanes flying missions over Bosnia.

Sources said they believe John Shalikashvili, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, persuaded senators to let Gen. Ryan's nomination go through in light of the fact the Pentagon agreed to the independent review.

FATAL...from Pg. 9

"He sounded very down in the dumps. He spent most of his time alone."

He was scheduled to graduate Friday.

"Something wasn't right," John Joseph Vazquez said. "I tried to get more information, and the most he said was, 'There are some jackasses out there.'"

According to the Lake County's coroner's office, Vazquez was taken to the naval base hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 2:16 a.m.

The physician performing the autopsy, Dr. Mark Wittek, wrote in his one-page report that Vazquez suffered an abrasion on the right side of his head and contusions on both sides of his brain—injuries that suggest a death from a fall.

Wipper said Vazquez also had a very thin skull for his age, a factor that likely contributed to his death.

The coroner's office is to issue a report in two to three weeks giving a detailed account of Vazquez's death.

But it may be impossible for the coroner's office to determine how Vazquez fell.

"It's always a possibility" that Vazquez was pushed from his bed, Wipper said. "We can only give the Navy so much information, because we have only so much to work with."

The Vazquez family said they have hired a private investigator to look into the case. "I'm not going to be blinded by grief and let this go unnoticed," Jo-Ann Vazquez said. "Everything is going to be checked out thoroughly."

The Vazquez family described the teenager as a generous, gregarious youth who spent his spare time doing volunteer work with the elderly and disadvantaged in New York City.

Born and raised in the Bronx, Vazquez graduated from the Manhattan Center for Science and Mathematics in 1992, family members said.

Vazquez attended college briefly, but left to join the military in hopes of finding his calling in life.

"I gave the Navy the best they could get," Jo-Ann Vazquez said.

CINCPAC...from Pg. 9

think we are doing great, but if there is no one out there to carry on what needs to be done, it becomes very futile."

Although Macke believes in Hawaii's "strategic location," he doesn't guarantee bases here will escape the next round of Navy closures unscathed. "I think everything we got here is important. I think this is the right location for it. I certainly don't forecast any closures, but I make no promises."

Macke, a Vietnam A-4 Skyhawk combat pilot with 150 missions, has served as a naval test pilot for the A7 fighter and aircraft carrier commanding officer. He was head of the Navy's Space Command from 1989 to 1993. He noted with obvious pride that the first two Americans in space were naval aviators.

Macke admits to two passions — golf and novels by John Grisham and Tom Clancy. His favorite golf course has been Tryall in Jamaica — the site of the Johnnie Walker World Championship.

His handicap, Macke said, is a military secret, although he acknowledged that it is in the low teens and "negotiable."

He leaves for his first Korea and Japan command visit tomorrow, shortly after attending the Pacific Fleet change of command ceremony at Pearl Harbor.

Macke said expectations are high that things will go well as North Korea and the United States resume crucial negotiations on North Korea's nuclear program in Geneva today following a month's break caused by the death of President Kim Il-sung.

But like many of the nation's military leaders, Macke believes there are still uncertainties surrounding North Korea's leadership, which is thought to be headed by Kim's son, Kim Jong-il.

"Kim Jong-il is an unknown," Macke said. "We do not really know what are his policies, his thoughts, and his ideas and where he may try to take North Korea. He faces some severe problems — severe economic problems, severe quality of life problems within North Korea which he needs to work on very hard."

As for his Annapolis story, Macke said that he had ruled out attending the Naval Academy because of height restrictions. But he ended up at Annapolis because the rule was changed and he got a basketball scholarship.

"I was in the first class when they raised the height limit from 6-4 to 6-6. Although I thought about the academy, I never thought I would go there because I knew they had the height restriction. Then I read an article in the paper that it had been changed. Since then I have had fun. It's been a great ride. It's been an E-ticket ride at Disney World."

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

MONDAY, August 8, 1994

BALTIMORE SUN

Aug. 6, 1994

Pg. 7

Male sailor investigated in rape of female shipmate

By Tom Bowman
Sun Staff Writer

A sailor serving aboard the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first combat ship with female crew, will face the military's equivalent of a grand jury on charges that he raped a female sailor in a Virginia Beach, Va., park.

The male sailor was reassigned earlier this week from the nuclear-powered carrier to a shore command in Norfolk, Va., to await an Article

32, a pretrial hearing that could lead to a general court-martial, said Cmdr. Kevin Wensing, a spokesman for the Atlantic fleet in Norfolk.

The female sailor is still serving aboard the ship, he said.

The hearing at the Navy Legal Service Office in Norfolk is expected to be held within the next month, said Commander Wensing. The hearing generally lasts about a week, he said.

The female sailor, who like the accused holds the rank of E-2 or seaman's apprentice, said she was

raped by the sailor in a Virginia Beach park shortly after midnight July 15.

She did not contact local police and returned to the carrier with a female shipmate, said Commander Wensing.

Shortly after noon that day the woman told medical personnel aboard the ship she was raped. She was treated and then transferred to Portsmouth Naval Hospital.

The ship left three days later for a training exercise off Virginia, returning July 27 to Norfolk. Both sailors,

who work in different areas of the ship, took part in the training exercises. They were counseled by their superiors to remain apart, said Commander Wensing.

The carrier is scheduled to set sail in October for a six-month tour in the Mideast. It is expected to have about 500 women among its 6,000 crew members. Currently, about 250 women are on board.

Crew members receive special training about sexual harassment and are strongly discouraged from dating, said Commander Wensing.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

Aug. 5, 1994 Pg. II-1

Fatal fall probed at Great Lakes

Recruit's parents raising questions on cause of death

By Lou Carlozo
Tribune Staff Writer

Officials at Great Lakes Naval Training Center are investigating the bizarre death of a seaman recruit who apparently fell from his bunk bed and struck his head on a tiled concrete floor.

The death of John Christopher Vazquez, 19, of the Bronx, N.Y., earlier this week has been tentatively called an accident by Navy officials, according to Navy Cmdr. Ken Cronk, a spokesman for the Great Lakes in North Chicago.

But Vazquez's parents are questioning whether the death really was an accident.

A preliminary report from the Lake County coroner's office said that Vazquez's head injuries were "consistent with a fall from a height," said Deputy Chief Coroner Jim Wipper.

"We don't suspect anything other than a fall," Wipper said of the ongoing investigation by the coroner's office. "It doesn't appear to be a suicide or a homicide at this point."

There is no record of a similar accidental death at the base, Cronk said.

In a one-page statement, the Navy said the cause of death was "blunt head trauma."

Vazquez died about 2 a.m. Monday after he apparently fell about 6 feet from the top bunk. He was in a common sleeping area he shared with about 80 recruits, Cronk said.

Medical experts said that death from a bunk bed fall is extremely rare in young adults.

"In 28 years, I can't ever remember having a case where an adult fell out of a bunk bed and was killed," said Roy Dames, executive director of the Cook County medical examiner's office. "It's rare, but I suppose it's not impossible."

There was no sign of foul play, according to Navy investigators, but Navy officials would not comment on the continuing investigation.

On Thursday, Vazquez's parents, Jo-Ann and John Joseph Vazquez, disputed the Navy's classification of the death as an accident.

"My son has slept in bunk beds much higher than the Navy's racks, and never fell out before," Jo-Ann Vazquez said. "He was not a restless sleeper, that he would just roll out of bed. It sounds highly unlikely to me."

Vazquez's mother said her son had complained during several phone calls about a month ago that he was being harassed and mistreated by recruits and by his commanding officer.

According to his parents, John Christopher Vazquez was caught in the middle of a conflict between some recruits, though the parents said he never told them the nature of the dispute.

"He said that no one talked to him all day long, not even his commanding officer," Jo-Ann Vazquez said in a phone interview Thursday.

FATAL...Pg. 10

HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN

Aug. 5, 1994

Pg. 3

Hard to miss new head of Pacific Command

By GREGG K. KAKESAKO
Star-Bulletin Staff Writer

His height almost made him miss a slot at the Academy

The year was 1966 and a young Marine youth nearly missed an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy because of his tall frame.

Now more than three decades later, Adm. Richard C. Macke, the 16th naval officer to command the U.S. Pacific Command, still remembers over his peers.

At 6 feet 5 inches, Macke is a hard man to miss.

His presence will be felt over the next three years as he leads the country's largest unified command that encompasses 45 Pacific basin countries, 10 territories of other countries and eight U.S. territories.

Macke is getting acquainted with the islands and the 34 installations in

the state. This is the first time during his 34 years on active duty that he has been stationed here.

Macke, 56, wants to get into the field as soon as possible with the Army's 25th Infantry Division — one of his premiere combat units. He also wants to inspect some of the 30,000 military housing units used by soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen in his command.

"I'm a firm believer that the most important thing we have in the military are our people," Macke said. "And people readiness, which includes quality of life, absolutely requires us to take care of them."

"It's going to take a lot of money to fix them (current military housing)," Macke said, "but we owe it to our people to take care of them. They are our most important asset. If we don't take care of them, we might find ourselves short of them."

"The rest of us can sit here and

CINCPAC...Pg. 10

STRIKE...from Pg. 8

ties from the strike. This was because the Serbs have previously positioned their armor near churches and hospitals to make air strikes more difficult.

Once these conditions were met, the pilots locked onto the gun, an anti-tank system built by the United States in the 1940s. It was left in Europe after World War II and has been used recently by the Serbs.

"The A-10 is ideally suited for this type of work," said a senior Pentagon officer. "The 800 rounds are going to make that (anti-tank gun) system inoperative."

A damage assessment will not be available until today, but the Mary-

land pilots reported hitting their target.

The Maryland Air National Guard, Colonel Tuxill noted, was recently awarded the first "outstanding" rating for operational readiness given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to any unit in the 9th Air Force since 1976. The unit was deployed to Panama during the 1989 Noriega crisis. It was on standby for the 1991 allied invasion of Iraq.

"We are not strangers to operational things," said Colonel Tuxill. He said the A-10 pilots were trained to fire bursts of about 15 bullets — with the same explosive energy as a 500-pound bomb — from their cannon, which can actually fire 4,000 rounds a minute. The A-10 is equipped with armor-piercing and explosive shells.

TO: ITOH

FROM: FREEH, L

DOC DATE: 03 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

PDD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FBI COMMENTS ON DRAFT PDD ON NATL SECURITY POLICY COORDINATION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 05 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MISLOCK

LOGREF: 9420743

FILES: IFD

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL

MISLOCK

NSC CHRON

TENET

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 11 OF 11

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9420915

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	X	94080214	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
002	X	94080216	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
003	X	94080314	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
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006	X	94080515	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
007	X	94080518	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
008	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
009	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
010	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
011	X	94080911	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

UNCLASSIFIED



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

20915

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 3, 1994

Mr. William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Itoh:

I have reviewed the draft Presidential Decision Directive on National Security Policy Coordination and I am concerned to find there is no provision for direct FBI representation on the Security Policy Board. While in terms of size and resources the FBI is a relatively small component, it is the principal U.S. counterintelligence agency and has a clear performance record of disproportionate contribution to national security. Exclusion of the FBI from the Board would seem to run counter to the stated intent of the intelligence community to seriously address demonstrated coordination deficiencies.

Sincerely, yours,

Louis J. Freeh
Director

6297

Document No. 072606SS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 8/3 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 8/5

MILITARY NOMINATION: REAR ADMIRAL WALTER J. DAVIS, JR., USN

SUBJECT: _____

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	McGINTY	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	MYERS	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	QUINN	☐	☐
LADER	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
ICKES	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
RIVLIN	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BAGGETT	☐	☐	SEIDMAN	☐	☐
CUTLER	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	TYSON	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	BELL	☒	☐
GRIFFIN	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
HALE	☐	☐		☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐		☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐		☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Do you have any objection?

RESPONSE:

The National Security Council staff concurs in the attached military nomination.

Anthony Lake

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 28, 1994

94 AUG 1 P4:45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK *J*
FROM: ALPHONSO MALDON, JR. *Amg*
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE
SUBJECT: Flag Officer Nomination

Forwarded for your approval and signature is the nomination of Rear Admiral Walter J. Davis, Jr., United States Navy, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral and a recommendation for his assignment as Director, Space Electronic Warfare, N6, Office of the Chief of naval Operations.

As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601 (d) (1), the Deputy Secretary of Defense has attached an evaluation of Admiral Davis' performance in two joint equivalent assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This nomination has been staffed by the Secretary of the Navy and approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation

That you approve and sign the attached.

Attachment



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



19 JUL 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Flag Officer Nomination

I recommend you assign Rear Admiral Walter J. Davis, Jr., United States Navy, as Director, Space Electronic Warfare, N6, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This position was previously authorized to carry the grade of vice admiral under the title Director, Space and Electronic Warfare, OP-094. I further recommend you nominate Admiral Davis, age 57, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral. He currently serves as Director, Warfare Systems Architecture and Engineering, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. He will succeed Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski who has been nominated as the Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, J-6, Joint Staff.

In order to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, a flag officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in senior leadership positions. He must be able to plan, program, direct, and coordinate support functions necessary for effective Naval command and control, including telecommunications, reconnaissance, surveillance, electronic warfare, intelligence-related activities, and Navy space programs. Admiral Davis meets these qualifications.

As required by Title 10, United States Code, Section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation of Admiral Davis from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while assigned to two joint equivalent assignments.

This action will not cause the Navy to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of vice admiral.

Attachment



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

**CN-321-94
10 June 1994**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense**

Subject: Flag Officer Nomination

1. In accordance with the provisions of title 10, United States Code, and DOD Instruction 1320.4, the Secretary of the Navy has recommended Rear Admiral Walter J. Davis, Jr., for assignment as Director, Space and Electronic Warfare, N6, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and appointment to the grade of vice admiral.
2. I have reviewed Rear Admiral Davis' performance in two joint equivalent assignments. As the Project Officer, Weapons Systems Test Division, Navy Air Training Center, Patuxent River, he was instrumental in efforts to modify aircraft in the current Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation inventory to fleet defensive electronic countermeasures system configuration. While planning and conducting comprehensive test series, he maintained extensive liaison with Air Force and contractor personnel. As the Assistant Project Manager for F-14s, Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters, his technical expertise and operational experience enabled him to meld the technical communities and fleet operators into an effective working team. He was particularly effective in leading a study effort to define long-range F-14 improvements necessary to ensure that the aircraft remained a premier fighter in the 1990s. I am confident he is well qualified for this assignment and advancement.
3. I concur in the Secretary's nomination of Rear Admiral Davis for this assignment and appointment to the grade of vice admiral and recommend you forward the enclosed nomination to the President for approval.


JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001a. letter	[Walter J. Davis] [Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	06/10/1994	b(6)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 265

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #1 [3]

2016-0152-F
vz4607

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

The White House

Washington

To the Senate of the United States:

I nominate:

The following named officer for appointment to the grade of Vice Admiral while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under Title 10, United States Code, Section 601:

To be Vice Admiral

Rear Admiral Walter J. Davis, Jr., U. S. Navy, (b)(6) [001a]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. resume	Transcript of Naval Service for Rear Admiral Walter Jackson Davis, Jr. (3 pages)	06/03/1994	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 265

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #1 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4607

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No.

(703) 697-5131 (media)

(703) 697-3189 (copies)

(703) 697-5737 (public/industry)

FLAG OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry announced today that the President has nominated Rear Admiral Walter J. Davis, Jr., U.S. Navy, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral and assignment as Director, Space Electronic Warfare, N6, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in The Pentagon. Rear Admiral Davis is currently serving as Director, Warfare Systems Architecture and Engineering, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in Arlington, Virginia.

Rear Admiral Davis was born August 1, 1936 in Winston Salem, North Carolina.

-END-


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

ROBERT BELL 

SUBJECT:

Read-Ahead for ~~C-F-L~~ Lunch Item: Readiness

Attached at Tab A is an attachment from our July 21 memorandum to the President on the release of the Meyer report on readiness. The attachment catalogues all the follow-up initiatives Defense is undertaking to ensure readiness remains our top priority.

All of these measures are important and must be fully implemented. At the end of the day, though, the readiness of our Armed Forces will be affected more than anything by decisions we will have to make soon on budget topline.

With the current, officially acknowledged shortfall associated with higher than expected inflation and higher than requested pay raises projected to be between \$20-\$40 billion across the FYDP, we must either get additional topline relief for Defense in FY 1996 or make a Hobson's Choice between reduced readiness or force structure reductions below the BUR levels.

Attachment

Tab

Points on "Additional DOD Readiness Initiatives"

Additional DoD Readiness Initiatives

In addition to creating the Meyer Task Force, increasing O&M budgets and including readiness reporting requirements in the DPG, the Department has undertaken other initiatives to ensure readiness remains the top priority in DoD, including:

- Created the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). This council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and co-chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior-level DoD forum for readiness policy and oversight.
- Created the Readiness Working Group. This group, co-chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-3), provides the primary support for the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.
- Established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel was reorganized and renamed, and then elevated to Under Secretary status.
- Established the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. This new position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the focal point on the OSD staff for readiness issues and, as previously noted, co-chairman of the Readiness Working Group.
- Increased Service focus on unit readiness monitoring capabilities.
- Conducted readiness off-site meetings (three days of meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense), which resulted in plans to develop analytical tools that relate resources to readiness.
- The Chairman, JCS, has taken the initiative and responsibility for assessing readiness of U.S. forces to execute assigned missions.
- The Vice Chairman, JCS, has expanded the focus of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) beyond its normal acquisition review function to include readiness issues. The JROC is comprised of the Vice Chairman and Service Vice Chiefs.
- The Vice Chairman, JCS, also initiated the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process, which will assess readiness operationally and programmatically, current and future, with a focus on mission accomplishment.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

6290

August 3, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RBB*

FROM:

JIM SEATON *JBS*

SUBJECT:

Vice Presidential Support for Proposed FF-21 Sale
to UAE

The United Arab Emirates are expected to award a contract for four Multipurpose Frigates during the next year. Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) is the only American shipyard selected by the UAE to submit a second proposal. Competing shipyards are located in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and The Netherlands. NNS is vital to the Virginia economy and to the welfare of other businesses throughout the United States. As a shipyard, over 2,000 production jobs would be dedicated solely for designing and producing the FF-21 frigates. In addition, thousands of other jobs are generated or preserved through subcontracts.

Visible government support for NNS's proposal is both important to winning this contract and consistent with the President's emphasis on promoting U.S. trade and economic revitalization. American contractors are commonly at a disadvantage to government subsidized European defense industries. Backing has already occurred at the DoD- and Commerce-levels, but a meeting by Vice President Gore with the UAE Foreign Minister on the margins of his participation in the GCC Foreign Minister's Conference in Jeddah during his upcoming Middle East trip could underscore the Administration's strong support for the NNS proposal.

Concurrence by:

Martin Indy *MI*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum and talking points at Tab I to the Vice President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Vice President

Tab A Talking Points for the Vice President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT: Support for Proposed FF-21 Sale to UAE

Purpose

To provide talking points and background information concerning Newport News Shipbuilding's (NNS) proposed FF-21 sale to the UAE.

Background

The UAE is expected to award a contract for four Multipurpose Frigates next year. NNS is the only U.S. shipyard selected to submit a second proposal. Competing shipyards are located in France, Germany, the UK, and The Netherlands.

NNS is vital to the Virginia economy and to the welfare of other businesses throughout the United States. As a shipyard, over 2,000 production jobs rest on this contract; thousands of other jobs are generated or preserved through subcontracts. The UAE contract will help preserve our naval shipbuilding base and likely reduce overhead costs for future U.S. Navy ship orders.

DoD and Commerce Secretary Brown have already lent strong support to the NNS proposal. Further visible support for NNS's proposal (similar to the Administration's promotion of commercial aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia) is both important to winning this contract and consistent with the President's emphasis on promoting U.S. trade and economic revitalization.

RECOMMENDATION

That you meet with the UAE Foreign Minister on the margins of the GCC Foreign Ministers Conference during your upcoming trip to the region and affirm the Administration's support for the Newport News Shipbuilding proposal.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

**TALKING POINTS FOR NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING'S PROPOSED FF-21 SALE
TO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

- The FF-21 presents an opportunity to build on the long-term security cooperation relationship between the UAE and the U.S. government.
- The UAE can marry up with a premier U.S. naval shipbuilder and the most technologically advanced naval shipyard in the world (Newport News Shipbuilding). NNS has produced every American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and 47 nuclear submarines.
- NNS has instant credibility as a U.S. Navy repair facility. NNS can best optimize the UAE's ship repair/construction capability and capacity, by providing the experience and expertise of NNS and its long standing relationship with the U.S. Navy. (This refers to the offset program where NNS substantially expands the Abu Dhabi Dry Docks.)
- The FF-21 provides enhanced operational interoperability with the U.S. Navy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

6267

August 3, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

~~ROBERT G. BELL~~ *RGB*

FROM:

STEVEN R. JONES *SJR*

SUBJECT:

NSTC PDD on National Space Transportation Policy

OSTP has requested your concurrence on a National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on National Space Transportation Policy.

I attended the NSTC IWG meetings that developed this PDD. Bob Bell represented the NSC at the June 27, 1994 NSTC Deputies meeting that approved the policy, and Dan Poneman has closely coordinated the non-proliferation aspects of this policy.

The main points of the PDD are summarized in Gibbons's proposed memorandum to the President. Under the new policy, DoD will take the lead in modernizing our current expendable launch vehicle fleet, while NASA will assume the lead responsibility for next generation reusable launch systems. The policy supports our commercial space launch industry and allows use of foreign components, technologies and (under certain conditions) foreign launch services when consistent with our national security, foreign policy and commercial interests.

This PDD also concurs with the main thrust of DoD recommendations regarding the use of excess U.S. ballistic missile assets for space launch. The excess ballistics missile policy is summarized in section VII of the PDD. An expanded version of the policy will soon be coming to you and Dr. Gibbons in a separate memorandum to transmittal to the federal agencies.

The June 27, 1994 NSTC Deputies Meeting was convened to resolve four outstanding issues. These issues were successfully resolved at this meeting and in follow-up correspondence on one of the issues regarding the linkage of MTCR to space launch agreements and export of U.S. satellites. It was agreed at the Deputies level that the PDD could go forward providing this issue is addressed separately by Dan Poneman's Non-Proliferation IWG.

The proposed PDD accurately reflects the IWG and NSTC Deputies' positions on space transportation policy. I recommend that you concur, but suggest that a sentence be added to the background section reflecting the NSTC Deputies review and approval of this policy.

Concurrences by:

In draft *In draft*
Dan Poneman, Alan Kreczko

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *10* NARA Date *1/3/07*

246-0152-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Will Itoh sending the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Concurrency Memorandum

Tab A Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN PODESTA

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: NSTC PDD on National Space Transportation Strategy

The National Security Council concurs on the proposed Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-4. We recommend that the cover letter to the President reference the NSTC Deputies review and approval of this policy.

Attachment

Tab A White House Staff Memorandum and PDD/NSTC-4

2 AUG 14 9:03
TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 20911

ACTION OFFICER: JONES

DUE: 8/3, COB

- ☒ Prepare Memo For Lake/Berger
☐ Prepare Memo For Podesta
☐ Prepare Memo _____

- ☐ Appropriate Action
☐ Prepare Memo For Itoh
to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

Concur	FYI	Concur	FYI	Concur	FYI
☐	☐ Andreasen	☐	☐ Hahn	☐	☐ Reed
☐	☐ Andricos	☐	☐ Hammonds	☐	☐ Rice
☐	☐ Aoki	☐	☐ Harris	☐	☐ Rossin
☐	☐ Beers	☐	☐ Holl	☐	☐ Roemer
☐	☒ Bell	☐	☐ Indyk	☐	☐ Satterfield
☐	☐ Beyrie	☐	☐ Jones	☐	☐ Schifter
☐	☐ Burns	☐	☐ Kreczko	☐	☐ Schwartz
☐	☐ Canas	☐	☐ Kristoff	☐	☐ Steinberg
☐	☐ Clarke	☐	☐ Kyle	☐	☐ Tenet
☐	☐ Claussen	☐	☐ Laipson	☐	☐ Van Eron
☐	☐ Danvers	☐	☒ Leary	☐	☐ Waddell
☐	☐ Darragh	☐	☐ LeBourgeois	☐	☐ Wales
☐	☐ DeShazer	☐	☐ Liu	☐	☐ Walker
☐	☐ Fauver	☐	☐ Manzanares	☐	☐ Walsh
☐	☐ Feaver	☐	☐ Menan	☐	☐ Whyman
☐	☐ Feinberg	☐	☐ Mislock	☐	☐ Wiedemann
☐	☐ Forsythe	☐	☐ Mitchell	☐	☐ Wilson
☐	☐ Fried	☐	☐ Murase	☐	☐ Witkowski
☐	☐ Froman	☐	☐ Owens-Kirkpatrick	☐	☒ <u>MERCHANT</u>
☐	☐ Genton	☐	☐ Poneman	☐	☐
☐	☐ Gottemoeller	☐	☐ Punkte	☐	☐

INFORMATION

☒ Itoh
☐ Lake

☒ Kenney
☐ Berger

☒ Soderberg
☐ Wolin

☐ Exec Sec Desk
☒ Records Mgmt.

COMMENTS

Logged By [Signature]

Return to Records Mgmt.
379 OEOB

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 8-1 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 8-3 COB

SUBJECT: PDD - Nat'l Space Transportation Policy

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☒	☐	MCGINTY	☐	☐
PANETTA	☒	☐	MYERS	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	QUINN	☒	☐
LADER	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
ICKES	☐	☐	RUBIN	☒	☐
RIVLIN	☒	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BAGGETT	☐	☐	SEIDMAN	☐	☐
CUTLER	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	TYSON	☒	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐		☐	☐
GRIFFIN	☐	☐		☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐		☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐		☐	☐
LAKE	☒	☐		☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please provide comments on the attached directly to this office NO LATER THAN WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, COB.

Thank you.

RESPONSE:

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 28, 1994

94 JUL 28 P 6:46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:  JOHN H. GIBBONS, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: Presidential Decision Directive on National Space Transportation Policy

Summary

This Decision Directive replaces National Space Policy Directive 4, as approved by President Bush on July 24, 1991, and establishes new policies, guidelines, and implementing actions for the conduct of national space transportation programs. This directive provides guidance to federal agencies on R&D spending, the disposition of excess ballistic missiles, the use of foreign launch systems, launch trade agreements, and support for the commercial space transportation industry.

Background

NSPD 4 committed the nation to the development of a new expendable space launch vehicle, to be developed jointly by NASA and the Department of Defense. Last August, OSTP initiated an interagency review of the Bush policy relative to current budget constraints for NASA and DoD, and in light of recent advances in reusable launch technologies.

This review concluded that development of a new expendable launch vehicle as directed in NSPD 4 was neither affordable nor cost-effective. The review determined that the United States should instead pursue a two-track strategy of: (1) maintaining and improving the current fleet of expendable launch vehicles as necessary to meet civil, commercial, and national security requirements; and (2) investing R&D resources in developing and demonstrating next generation reusable space transportation systems with the potential to greatly reduce the cost of access to space.

The review, which was completed under the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), also identified additional areas of space transportation policy which needed to be addressed in light of post-Cold War opportunities and challenges.

The enclosed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD/NSTC-4) establishes a new National Space Transportation Policy consistent with the results of the NSTC interagency review. This policy will accomplish four main objectives:

- 1) Establish new national policy for federal space transportation spending, consistent with current budget constraints and the opportunities presented by emerging technologies. Under the new policy, DoD will assume the lead responsibility for modernization of the current expendable launch vehicle fleet. NASA will assume the lead responsibility for research and development of next generation reusable systems. NASA will focus their investments on technologies to support a decision no later than December 1996 on whether to proceed with a flight demonstration program. This program would, in turn, provide the basis for deciding by the end of the decade whether to proceed with a new launch system to replace the aging Shuttle fleet.
- 2) Establish policy on federal agencies' use of foreign launch systems and components. With the end of the Cold War, it is important for the U.S. to be in a position to capitalize on foreign technologies -- including Russian technologies -- without, at the same time, becoming dependent on them. This PDD would allow the use of foreign components, technologies and (under certain conditions) foreign launch services, consistent with U.S. national security, foreign policy and commercial space guidelines in the PDD.
- 3) Establish policy on federal agencies' use of excess U.S. ballistic missile assets for space launch, to prevent adverse impacts on the U.S. commercial space launch industry. Under START, these assets may be used in certain circumstances for civilian space launch. A serious concern in developing the policy was the possible impact that widespread government use of these assets could have on U.S. commercial launch companies. The policy obliges the government to fully consider commercial services as part of the decision making process and imposes specific criteria on the use of excess assets to avoid "flooding" the commercial market.
- 4) Provide for an expanded private sector role in the federal space transportation R&D decision making processes. In contrast with previous national policy on space transportation, this policy specifically directs the Departments of Transportation and Commerce to identify opportunities for government-industry cooperation and to factor these into NASA's and DoD's implementation plans.

Under the PDD, agencies are directed to develop specific implementation plans and provide these to OSTP and NSC within 90 days of signature of the PDD. These plans will be the basis for budget planning and for long term, rationalized investments in our national space transportation capabilities.

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed PDD (Tab A).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____

Enclosure--Presidential Decision Directive (TAB A)

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSTC-4

**TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION**

SUBJECT: National Space Transportation Policy

This directive establishes national policy, guidelines, and implementing actions for the conduct of National space transportation programs that will sustain and revitalize U.S. space transportation capabilities. This directive supersedes portions of previous National Space Policy Directives that pertain, in whole or in part, to U.S. space transportation policy and programs. Relevant portions of National Space Policy, National Security, and Presidential Decision Directives dealing with technology transfer guidelines and definition of terms are unaffected by this policy and remain in force.

The United States space program is critical to achieving U.S. national security, scientific, technical, commercial, and foreign policy goals. Assuring reliable and affordable access to space through U.S. space transportation capabilities is a fundamental goal of the U.S. space program. In support of this goal, the U.S. Government will:

- (1) Balance efforts to sustain and modernize existing space transportation capabilities with the need to invest in the development of improved future capabilities;
- (2) Maintain a strong space transportation capability and technology base, including launch systems, infrastructure, and support facilities, to meet the national needs for space transport of personnel and payloads;
- (3) Promote the reduction in the cost of current space transportation systems while improving their reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety;
- (4) Foster technology development and demonstration to support future decisions on the development of next generation reusable space transportation systems that greatly reduce the cost of access to space;
- (5) Encourage the cost-effective use of commercially provided U.S. products and services, to the fullest extent feasible, that meet mission requirements; and
- (6) Foster the international competitiveness of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry, actively considering commercial needs and factoring them into decisions on improvements in launch facilities and launch vehicles.

This policy will be implemented within the overall resource and policy guidance provided by the President.

I. Implementation Guidelines

To ensure successful implementation of this policy, U.S. Government agencies will cooperate to take advantage of the unique capabilities and resources of each agency.

This policy shall be implemented as follows:

- (1) The Department of Defense (DoD) will be the lead agency for improvement and evolution of the current U.S. expendable launch vehicle (ELV) fleet, including appropriate technology development.
- (2) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will provide for the improvement of the Space Shuttle system, focusing on reliability, safety, and cost-effectiveness.
- (3) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be the lead agency for technology development and demonstration for next generation reusable space transportation systems, such as the single-stage-to-orbit concept.

- (4) The Departments of Transportation and Commerce will be responsible for identifying and promoting innovative types of arrangements between the U.S. Government and the private sector, as well as State and local governments, that may be used to implement applicable portions of this policy. U.S. Government agencies will consider, where appropriate, commitments to the private sector, such as anchor tenancy or termination liability, commensurate with the benefits of such arrangements.
- (5) The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will plan for the transition between space programs and future launch systems in a manner that ensures continuity of mission capability and accommodates transition costs.
- (6) The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will combine their expendable launch service requirements into single procurements when such procurements would result in cost savings or are otherwise advantageous to the Government. A Memorandum of Agreement will be developed by the Agencies to carry out this policy.

II. National Security Space Transportation Guidelines

- (1) The Department of Defense will be the launch agent for the national security sector and will maintain the capability to evolve and operate those space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities necessary to meet national security requirements.
- (2) The Department of Defense will be the lead agency for improvement and evolution of the current expendable launch vehicle fleet, including appropriate technology development. All significant ELV technology-related development associated with medium and heavy-lift ELVs will be accomplished through the DoD. In coordination with the DoD, NASA will continue to be responsible for implementing changes necessary to meet its mission-unique requirements.
- (3) The objective of DoD's effort to improve and evolve current ELVs is to reduce costs while improving reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety. Consistent with mission requirements, the DoD, in cooperation with the civil and commercial sectors, should evolve satellite, payload, and launch vehicle designs to achieve the most cost-effective and affordable integrated satellite, payload, and launch vehicle combination.
 - (a) ELV improvements and evolution plans will be implemented in cooperation with the Intelligence Community, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Departments of Transportation and

Commerce, taking into account, as appropriate, the needs of the commercial space launch sector.

- (b) The Department of Defense will maintain the Titan IV launch system until a replacement is available.
- (4) The Department of Defense, in cooperation with NASA, may use the Space Shuttle to meet national security needs. Launch priority will be provided for national security missions as governed by appropriate NASA/DoD agreements. Launches necessary to preserve and protect human life in space shall have the highest priority except in times of national emergency.
- (5) Protection of space transportation capabilities employed for national security purposes will be pursued commensurate with their planned use in crisis and conflict and the threat. Civil and commercial space transportation capabilities identified as critical to national security may be modified at the expense of the requesting agency or department. To the maximum extent possible, these systems, when modified, should retain their normal operational utility.

III. Civil Space Transportation Guidelines

- (1) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will conduct human space flight to exploit the unique capabilities and attributes of human access to space. NASA will continue to maintain the capability to operate the Space Shuttle fleet and associated facilities.
 - (a) The Space Shuttle will be used only for missions that require human presence or other unique Shuttle capabilities, or where use of the Shuttle is determined to be important for national security, foreign policy or other compelling purposes.
 - (b) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will maintain the Space Shuttle system until a replacement is available.
 - (c) As future development of a new reusable launch system is anticipated, procurement of additional Space Shuttle orbiters is not planned at this time.
- (2) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be the lead agency for technology development and demonstration of next generation reusable space transportation systems.

- (a) The objective of NASA's technology development and demonstration effort is to support government and private sector decisions by the end of this decade on development of an operational next-generation reusable launch system.
- (b) Research shall be focused on technologies to support a decision no later than December 1996 to proceed with a sub-scale flight demonstration which would prove the concept of single-stage-to-orbit.
- (c) Technology development and demonstration, including operational concepts, will be implemented in cooperation with related activities in the Department of Defense.
- (d) It is envisioned that the private sector could have a significant role in managing the development and operation of a new reusable space transportation system. In anticipation of this role, NASA shall actively involve the private sector in planning and evaluating its launch technology activities.

IV. Commercial Space Transportation Guidelines

- (1) The United States Government is committed to encouraging a viable commercial U.S. space transportation industry.
 - (a) The Departments of Transportation and Commerce will be responsible for identifying and promoting innovative types of arrangements between the U.S. Government and the private sector, as well as State and local governments, that may be used to implement applicable portions of this policy.
 - (b) The Department of Transportation will license, facilitate, and promote commercial launch operations as set forth in the Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended, and Executive Order 12465. The Department of Transportation will coordinate with the Department of Commerce where appropriate.
 - (c) U.S. Government agencies shall purchase commercially available U.S. space transportation products and services to the fullest extent feasible that meet mission requirements and shall not conduct activities with commercial applications that preclude or deter commercial space activities, except for national security or public safety reasons.

- (d) The U.S. Government will provide for the timely transfer to the private sector of unclassified Government-developed space transportation technologies in such a manner as to protect their commercial value.
 - (e) The U.S. Government will make all reasonable efforts to provide stable and predictable access to appropriate space transportation-related hardware, facilities, and services; these will be on a reimbursable basis. The U.S. Government reserves the right to use such facilities and services on a priority basis to meet national security and critical civil sector mission requirements.
 - (f) U.S. Government agencies shall work with the U.S. commercial space sector to promote the establishment of technical standards for commercial space products and services.
- (2) U.S. Government agencies, in acquiring space launch-related capabilities, will, to the extent feasible and consistent with mission requirements:
- (a) Involve the private sector in the design and development of space transportation capabilities and encourage private sector financing, as appropriate.
 - (b) Emphasize procurement strategies that are based on the use of commercial U.S. space transportation products and services.
 - (c) Provide for private sector retention of technical data rights, limited only to the extent necessary to meet government needs.
 - (d) Encourage private sector and State and local government investment and participation in the development and improvement of U.S. launch systems and infrastructure.

V. Trade in Commercial Space Launch Services

- (1) A long term goal of the United States is to achieve free and fair trade. In pursuit of this goal, the U.S. Government will seek to negotiate and implement agreements with other nations that define principles of free and fair trade for commercial space launch services, limit certain government supports and unfair practices in the international market, and establish criteria regarding participation by space launch industries in countries in transition from a non-market to a market economy.

- (a) International space launch trade agreements in which the U.S. is a party must allow for effective means of enforcement. The range of options available to the U.S. must be sufficient to deter and, if necessary, respond to non-compliance and provide effective relief to the U.S. commercial space launch industry. Agreements must not constrain the ability of the United States to take any action consistent with U.S. laws and regulations.
- (b) International space launch trade agreements in which the U.S. is a party must be in conformity with U.S. obligations under arms control agreements, U.S. nonproliferation policies, U.S. technology transfer policies, and U.S. policies regarding observance of the Guidelines and Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

VI. Use of Foreign Launch Vehicles, Components, and Technologies

- (1) For the foreseeable future, United States Government payloads will be launched on space launch vehicles manufactured in the United States, unless exempted by the President or his designated representative.
 - (a) This policy does not apply to use of foreign launch vehicles on a no-exchange-of-funds basis to support the following: flight of scientific instruments on foreign spacecraft, international scientific programs, or other cooperative government-to-government programs. Such use will be subject to interagency coordination procedures.
- (2) The U.S. Government will seek to take advantage of foreign components or technologies in upgrading U.S. space transportation systems or developing next generation space transportation systems. Such activities will be consistent with U.S. nonproliferation, national security, and foreign policy goals and commitments as well as the commercial sector guidelines contained in this policy. They will also be conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. obligations under the MTCR and with due consideration given to dependence on foreign sources and national security.

VII. Use of U.S. Excess Ballistic Missile Assets

- (1) U.S. excess ballistic missile assets that will be eliminated under the START agreements shall either be retained for government use or be destroyed. These assets may be used within the U.S. Government in accordance with established DoD procedures, for any purpose except to launch payloads into orbit. Requests from within the Department of Defense or from other U.S.

Government agencies to use these assets for launching payloads into orbit will be considered by the DoD on a case-by-case basis and require approval by the Secretary of Defense.

Mindful of the policy's guidance that U.S. Government agencies shall purchase commercially available U.S. space transportation products and services to the fullest extent feasible, use of excess ballistic missile assets may be permitted for launching payloads into orbit when the following conditions are met:

- (a) The payload supports the sponsoring agency's mission.
- (b) The use of excess ballistic missile assets is consistent with international obligations, including the MTCR guidelines and the START agreements.
- (c) The sponsoring agency must certify the use of excess ballistic missile assets results in a cost savings to the U.S. Government relative to the use of available commercial launch services that would also meet mission requirements, including performance, schedule, and risk.

VIII. Implementing Actions

- (1) Within 90 days of approval of this directive, United States Government agencies are directed to prepare the following for submission to the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:
 - (a) The Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with appropriate input from the Director of Central Intelligence, will provide a report that will include a common set of requirements and a coordinated technology plan that addresses the needs of the national security, civilian, and commercial space launch sectors.
 - (b) The Secretary of Defense, with the support of other agencies as required, will provide an implementation plan that includes schedule and funding for improvement and evolution of the current U.S. ELV fleet.
 - (c) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with the support of other agencies as required, will provide an implementation plan that includes schedule and funding for improvements of the Space Shuttle system and technology development

and demonstration for next generation reusable space transportation systems.

- (d) The Secretaries of Transportation and Commerce, with the support of other agencies as required and U.S. industry, will provide an implementation plan that will focus on measures to foster an internationally competitive U.S. launch capability. In addition, the Secretaries will provide recommendations to the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that promote the full involvement of the commercial sector in the NASA and DoD plans.

UNCLASSIFIED
FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: Bob Bell

PHONE: (202) 395-3330

FAX: 395-1185

TO

Sam Randall

FAX 703-

734-1565

PHONE 703-

874-5443

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET

2

SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS:

UNCLASSIFIED

8/3/94 - Tom: Re our discussion Tuesday - please
INTERVIEW Share with your two analysts.

and we ought to use that language and try to persuade China and France to join. Then we would have harmonized that security assurance among the five.

ACT: If the CTB is not completed before next April's review and extension conference, does the United States plan to offer any assurances or statements about testing that might be used to buttress its compliance with Article VI of the NPT?

Graham: The U.S. testing moratorium already extends through September 30, 1995, well past the conference and a decision as to whether or not to extend it one year beyond that will have to be made before the conference starts. It will have to be made, as per U.S. law, by March 30, 1995.

So it seems to me the United States has already made its commitment and extended its moratorium beyond the conference. And it has urged all other nuclear-weapon states to observe it. Thus far, all others except China are doing so. President Clinton has stated that the United States wants to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty "as soon as possible"—and we really mean that. So I hope we will achieve a CTB soon so this issue will not arise. If it does, I would point to our continued adherence to the moratorium.

ACT: There has been some suggestion that the 1995 conference might be recessed for awhile or prolonged if the CTB is not completed by next April in an effort to link the two topics. What is your reaction to these proposals?

Graham: I think that would be unwise in the extreme and of questionable legality.

ACT: How will the United States present the case at the conference on Article VI related to negotiating an end to the arms race?

Graham: At the risk of sounding biased or parochial, I think our case is decisive on Article VI. I would not have said that a few years ago, but I would now. We have the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, we have signed and are waiting to implement START I and START II, and we have CTB negotiations, the testing moratorium, a fissile material cutoff convention proposal, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and other agreements in the non-nuclear area.

I have looked at the negotiating record and it seems clear that in formulating Article VI, what was uppermost in the minds of the negotiators was a CTB, a cutoff of fissile material and security assurances. Those are the three things that were, by far, most frequently mentioned and we are doing those three things.

Let me add this: Under the voluntary exchange of offers between President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, a large number of tactical nuclear weapons were eliminated pursuant to this informal arrangement. The United States, pursuant to this agreement and other commitments, is destroying 2,000 nuclear weapons a year, which is as fast as we can do it with the facilities that we have. That is working 16 hours a day, seven days a week.

Russia is doing something comparable, so a tremendous number of nuclear weapons are already being destroyed and in the context of Article VI and the preamble to the NPT, the nuclear arms race is over.

ACT: Article VI also calls for the nuclear-weapon states to pursue a treaty on both general and complete disarmament. Some states might

point to a lack of any concrete proposals. How will the United States respond to that type of concern?

Bob

Graham: The first thing to note about general and complete disarmament is that it would apply to all states; not just the nuclear-weapon states. We are doing things, like the CFE Treaty and various confidence-building measures, to try to spread the cause of disarmament as much as possible. And as I said earlier, all these arms control and disarmament efforts depend on the NPT. Even the non-nuclear agreements depend on the NPT umbrella and to weaken the NPT in any way or suggest that it will not be here forever greatly undermines all disarmament efforts.

ACT: What about Article V on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)?

Graham: What is that magic phrase—"O.B.E."—overtaken by events?

No one has found a way to distinguish between peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear weapon tests in terms of the benefit to be achieved by nuclear weapon programs. Nor has any reasonable use been found for a PNE. At one point some people suggested that perhaps a new Panama Canal could be dug with PNEs. Maybe that would have been good because it would not have needed night lighting. But that was abandoned. So, I would hope that with the end of nuclear testing, the end of PNEs is also at hand.

ACT: India has expressed displeasure with the NPT and is a leader of the non-aligned movement. If India attends the conference as an observer, will this have any effect on the conference?

Graham: In our judgment it will not have an effect on the outcome of the conference if India attends as an observer or in some other status. True, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao made some unhelpful comments about the NPT in parliament a few weeks ago, but India has told us on a number of occasions that it will not in any way play a negative role in relation to the 1995 conference and we expect that assurance will govern its behavior.

ACT: At all the previous review conferences one of the goals was to produce a final consensus document. Is the United States seeking a final document from this conference?

Graham: We see no need for a final document. If others want to urge one upon us we would not oppose it. We would oppose, however, any effort to make the vote on extension contingent upon, or hostage to, agreement upon or resolution of a final document.

ACT: What type of roles do you expect Sri Lankan Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala and Nigerian Ambassador Isaac Ayewuah to play?

Graham: We expect Ambassador Ayewuah will play a constructive role in managing the third PrepCom. We have already met with him several times and it is clear to me that he plans to conduct it in a professional manner. We have had two good discussions with him about the issues that might come up at the third PrepCom and how they might be handled.

Ambassador Dhanapala, who has been selected as the president of the 1995 conference, is a very experienced diplomat who knows a great deal about the NPT and has wide experience in the area. He was chairman of Main Committee One at the 1985 review conference and he was the Sri Lankan ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a number of years. I am sure he will do an excellent job of leading the conference in 1995. ACT


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

ROBERT BELL 

SUBJECT:

Read-Ahead for C-F-L Lunch Item: Readiness

Attached at Tab A is an attachment from our July 21 memorandum to the President on the release of the Meyer report on readiness. The attachment catalogues all the follow-up initiatives Defense is undertaking to ensure readiness remains our top priority.

All of these measures are important and must be fully implemented. At the end of the day, though, the readiness of our Armed Forces will be affected more than anything by decisions we will have to make soon on budget topline.

With the current, officially acknowledged shortfall associated with higher than expected inflation and higher than requested pay raises projected to be between \$20-\$40 billion across the FYDP, we must either get additional topline relief for Defense in FY 1996 or make a Hobson's Choice between reduced readiness or force structure reductions below the BUR levels.

Attachment

Tab

Points on "Additional DOD Readiness Initiatives"

Additional DoD Readiness Initiatives

In addition to creating the Meyer Task Force, increasing O&M budgets and including readiness reporting requirements in the DPG, the Department has undertaken other initiatives to ensure readiness remains the top priority in DoD, including:

- Created the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). This council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and co-chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior-level DoD forum for readiness policy and oversight.
- Created the Readiness Working Group. This group, co-chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-3), provides the primary support for the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.
- Established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel was reorganized and renamed, and then elevated to Under Secretary status.
- Established the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. This new position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the focal point on the OSD staff for readiness issues and, as previously noted, co-chairman of the Readiness Working Group.
- Increased Service focus on unit readiness monitoring capabilities.
- Conducted readiness off-site meetings (three days of meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense), which resulted in plans to develop analytical tools that relate resources to readiness.
- The Chairman, JCS, has taken the initiative and responsibility for assessing readiness of U.S. forces to execute assigned missions.
- The Vice Chairman, JCS, has expanded the focus of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) beyond its normal acquisition review function to include readiness issues. The JROC is comprised of the Vice Chairman and Service Vice Chiefs.
- The Vice Chairman, JCS, also initiated the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process, which will assess readiness operationally and programmatically, current and future, with a focus on mission accomplishment.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420915
RECEIVED: 02 AUG 94 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: SMITH, M

DOC DATE: 03 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

PDD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NSA COMMENTS ON NATL SECURITY POLICY COORDINATION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 05 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MISLOCK

LOGREF: 9420743

FILES: IFD

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DOC 15 OF 15

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9420915

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014	X	94081120	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
015	X	94081313	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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20915



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N51/058/94
03 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY)

SUBJECT: Draft PDD on National Security Policy
Coordination - **INFORMATION MEMORANDUM**

Reference your memorandum of July 27, 1994 requesting comments on your proposed response to the Draft PDD. We concur with the points made in your proposal, and offer the following additional points for inclusion in the response.

a. We are concerned that INFOSEC is not included as part of the charter of the Security Policy Board. We believe that it should be and as the draft PDD is implemented, we caution that focus on information systems security (INFOSEC) as currently provided by the National Security Telecommunications and Informations Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC) not be lost. The focus that the NSTISSC has provided for the last ten years to the Executive Branch is becoming increasingly important as the government enters a partnership with industry in the evolution of the National Information Infrastructure. Before the existing NSTISSC structure and process is absorbed into the structure proposed by the draft PDD, we believe a thorough review of the ramifications would be wise.

b. The term "security," while used throughout the PDD, is nowhere defined. In particular, the scope of what the term covers ought to be clarified. Is it the traditional classified national security subject matter or is the intent to address unclassified, but sensitive, information as well? If, in fact, the intent is to include unclassified, but sensitive, information, we recommend that the Security Policy Board be augmented with the Secretary of Commerce when it is considering information systems security matters for sensitive, but unclassified information.

c. The second full paragraph on the second page sets forth a number of organization's authorities that are not changed by this PDD. This list is


extensive, but not exhaustive. To avoid the implication that the statutory or other authorities of unlisted agencies are affected by the PDD, this paragraph should be rewritten to replace the list of agencies with the phrase "Executive Branch agencies." Further, since a PDD cannot amend or change either a statute or an Executive Order, the lead into this paragraph should be rewritten to state, "Nothing on this directive is intended to alter..."

d. Please clarify the reference in the second paragraph on page three of the draft. Should it read "Security Policy Board" vice "National Policy Board"? Also, this "National Policy Board" is to be the principal mechanism for proposing to the NSC legislation and executive orders relevant to U.S. security policy matters outside the statutory jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. The scope of this carve-out is unclear, as is the reason the Secretary of State should have such a unique position. We are concerned that the effect will be to assure the SPD cannot comprehensively address security policy issues.

e. We recommend clarifying the Overseas Policy Board's interrelationship with the SPB. Perhaps one way to accomplish this is to amend the fifth paragraph on page three to insert, after the word "promote" in the first line, the phrase, ", as approved by the SPB,".

f. On the last page, under "Implementation," reference is made to the "Policy Board." Please clarify.

g. Also in the "Implementation" paragraph, "principals" should read "principles."


MICHAEL A. SMITH
Director of Policy

TO: LAKE

FROM: WOOLSEY, R

DOC DATE: 05 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

PDD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CIA COMMENTS ON DRAFT NATL SECURITY POLICY COORDINATION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 05 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MISLOCK

LOGREF: 9420743

FILES: IFD

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOC 14 OF 14

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9420915

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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013	X	94081119	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
014	X	94081120	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Draft PPD on National Security Policy Coordination

FROM: R. James Woolsey
DCI
7D60 OHB

EXTENSION

NO.

CMS 4291-94

DATE

8 August 1994

47695

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. Anthony Lake
Asst. to the President
for NSA

2. First Floor, West Wing
Washington, D.C. 20506

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

5 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Draft PDD on National Security Policy
Coordination

1. This responds to your request for comments on the draft PDD on National Security Policy Coordination. The creation of a national level security policy committee under the NSC was one of the recommendations of the Joint Security Commission, and was supported by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, and me in our joint memorandum of 19 April 1994. In recommending the creation of a national level committee, the Commission said:

The Commission unanimously believes that the fragmentation of the security policy structure is the prime cause of the problems now associated with security policies, practices, and procedures and that no substantive and long-term improvements can be achieved without a unifying structure to provide leadership, focus, and direction to the government security communities.

2. The Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense and I immediately establish a committee to fulfill these functions "as a first step" in the implementation of its recommendation. In the view of the Commission, this joint committee would provide the central element of a broader, national level security committee. The DepSecDef and I signed a Charter establishing the Joint Security Executive Committee (JSEC) on 3 June 1994, and we are well on our way to having it operational by 15 August 1994.

3. Building on the Joint Security Commission's recommendation, the draft PDD represents a significant step in the right direction, and I support it. The groundwork laid by the DepSecDef and me with regard to JSEC can migrate to the Security Policy Board established in the PDD. The conceptual framework laid out in the PDD strikes an appropriate balance between the need to establish an

SUBJECT: Draft PDD on National Security Policy Coordination

empowered workable board of senior agency officials, with the rights of members to take unresolved disputes to the Principals Committee of the NSC.

We would offer the following comments:

- a. The draft PDD states that the "Security Policy Forum established under the Joint Security Executive Committee (JSEC) is retained under the Security Policy Board." We want to confirm our understanding that this section includes retention, among other things, of the current structure of Co-Chairmen, in which one is appointed by me and the other by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- b. The draft provides for representation on the Security Policy Board from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Such representation on the senior level board was not provided for in the JSEC Charter. We believe representation from OMB may be more appropriate on the Security Policy Forum, where security costs and savings in the early policy formulation stages may be more effectively considered.
- c. We suggest consolidation of the staffs. Having a separate staff for the Security Advisory Board might be viewed as an extravagance in today's budget environment providing few benefits. We understand the reasoning is to provide independence for the Advisory Board. Selection of the right Board members, however, will be the major factor in Board independence. Having dedicated members of a single staff support the Advisory Board, but free to work on other matters time allowing, might be a reasonable and cost-effective compromise.
- d. The draft provides for representation on the Staff from "other Policy Board members agencies as appropriate and as their resources allow." It would be our understanding that such representation would be at the expense of the member agencies and consequently, not reimbursable.


SUBJECT: Draft PDD on National Security Policy Coordination

- e. As significant groundwork has already been laid with regard to modifications to NSD 63, we recommend the following language be added to the "Implementation" section of the PDD, so that it can be modified without having to return to the President:

The Security Policy Board is hereby authorized to make appropriate changes to the policies set forth in National Security Directive 63, "Single Scope Background Investigations" to further the objectives of this Directive. Any such changes shall be reported to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

- f. And last, the title of the PDD, "National Security Policy Coordination", and the title for the oversight board, "National Security Policy Board", seem too broad and may be subject to misinterpretation. The focus of the PDD and the associated administrative structure is "security policy", and therefore we suggest the titles be "Security Policy Coordination" and "Security Policy Board".

4. In conclusion, I believe the NSC is on the right track. The draft is right in line with the recommendations of the Joint Security Commission, and I hope the Security Policy Board can play the "pivotal role" envisioned for it by the Commission.



R. James Woolsey

SUBJECT: Draft PDD on National Security Policy Coordination

External Distribution: (CMS 4291-94)

- 1 - Addressee
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TO: LAKE

FROM: DUTH

DOC DATE: 11 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

PDD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DOD COMMENTS ON DRAFT PDD ON NATL SECURITY POLICY COORDINATION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 05 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MISLOCK

LOGREF: 9420743

FILES: IFD

NSCP:

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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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BELL
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DOC 13 OF 13

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9420915

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001	X	94080214	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
002	X	94080216	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
003	X	94080314	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
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005	X	94080316	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
006	X	94080515	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
007	X	94080518	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
008	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
009	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
010	X	94080909	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
011	X	94080911	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
012	X	94081010	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
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UNCLASSIFIED



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 AUG 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS


SUBJECT: Draft PDD on National Security Policy Coordination

The Department of Defense concurs with the substantive content of the proposed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) forwarded with your memorandum of July 18, 1994. Notwithstanding, the following comments are provided for the purpose of improving the draft PDD and setting forth the Department's intent with respect to implementation of certain provisions of the draft.

- The draft PDD states that the Joint Security Executive Committee (JSEC) established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence is designated the Security Policy Board. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are the co-chairs of the JSEC. Accordingly, the provision at the top of page 3 of the draft PDD for a Chairman of the Security Policy Board, to be designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, should be changed to provide for the option of designating "The Chair(s)," in order to maintain the current co-chairs.
- At the center of page 2 of the draft is a paragraph mentioning the authorities of entities that will not be changed because of issuance of the PDD. This paragraph should be modified to include responsibilities of the Secretary of Commerce that flow from the Computer Security Act of 1987 and NSD 42. Notwithstanding, the Department is of the view that the Board should look at all forms of security, including the security of sensitive information that is not classified pursuant to Executive Order. If the Security Policy Board is not to delve into computer security issues, then we question the role of the Defense Information Systems Agency unless it is to help the Board interface with the computer security community.
- It is appropriate to have a senior-level member on the Security Policy Board to represent the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The last paragraph on page 2 of the draft PDD should be modified to include the Vice Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, following the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

- The Security Policy Forum is retained and its composition is specified at the top of page 4 of the draft PDD. The JSEC Security Policy Forum co-chairs, the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Security), should be retained in the new organization.
- It is the intent of this Department to retain its Security Policy Forum co-chair within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Another official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense will be the member of the Forum.
- The functions of the National Advisory Group/Security Countermeasures (NAG/SCM) are to be transferred to the Security Policy Board. Those functions, and the NAG/SCM membership, more closely parallel the Security Policy Forum of the Board. It is recommended that the penultimate paragraph on page 2 of the draft PDD be adjusted to reflect this recommended transfer arrangement.
- The draft specifies that there will be a separate staff for the Security Policy Advisory Board. To conserve resources, consideration should be given to providing a single staff to support the Advisory Board, the Forum, and the Security Policy Board.
- Finally, all references to the Security Policy Board should be standardized to read "Security Policy Board."

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John H. Stutch". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the beginning and a stylized end.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6263

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 3, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise POLISH PFP EXERCISE
1994

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, concurring in military exercise POLISH PFP EXERCISE 1994. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

POLISH PFP EXERCISE 1994 is a Partnership for Peace (PFP) exercise designed to exercise cooperation and interoperability procedures between NATO and partner nations for multi-national peacekeeping operations. Approximately 122 U.S. troops will participate in the September 12-16 exercise.

The critical cancellation date is August 31, 1994.

Concurrence by: Daniel Fried *DF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *7* NARA, Date *1/3/07*
2016-0152-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise POLISH PFP EXERCISE
1994

The National Security Council staff concurs in military exercise
POLISH PFP EXERCISE 1994.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6263



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

02 AUG 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise -
POLISH PFP EXERCISE 1994

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise POLISH PFP EXERCISE 1994. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is 31 August 1994.

Robert P. McAleer
Robert P. McAleer
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

Sec Def Cont Nr. **X71629**

This memo is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from its attachment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). [Polish PFP Exercise 94. (2 pages)	07/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 265

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #1 [3]

2016-0152-F
vz4607

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002b. cable	Duplicate of 002a. (2 pages)	07/02/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 265

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - August 1994 #1 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4607

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The Press Club

of San Francisco

August 1, 1994

AUG 2 1994

The President of the
United States
William J. Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Sehr geehrter Herr Praesident,


als Programm Direktor des Presse Clubs in San Francisco moechte ich Sie waehrend Ihres naechsten Besuches hier in der Stadt zum Presse Club einladen. Der Presse Club ist der aelteste Clubs in den Vereinigten Staaten. Er wurde 1888 gegrundet. Unser Maskottchen ist eine schwarze Katze deren Namen "Tombstone" ist. Sie koennen also wenn Sie wollen Socks mitbringen. "Tombstone" ist eine Skulptur des amerikanischen Kuestlers Beniamino Bufano, der hier im Presse Club gelebt hat.

Wie die meisten privaten Clubs haben wir keine sehr grosse Mitgliederzahl von aktiven Presseleuten. Wir sind auch nicht diejenigen die beissen. Ich habe das Vergnuegen an dem Reiseplan Ihres Freundes Rudy Loewe, der die Vereingiten Staaten am 17. Oktober besuchen wird, mitzuarbeiten. Er plant zum Ende Oktober hier in der Stadt zu sein.

Was mich ausserordentlich beeindruckt hat ist Ihr Brief vom Oktober 1967, worin Sie als Seminar Vorstand ihm Themen fuer ein Arbeitspapier gaben. Es ist unglaublich, dass ein 22 jaehriger der 3 Jahre nach Errichtung der Mauer Visionen einer Wiedervereinigung hat, ueber ost-europaeische Sicherheit spricht, das Verhaeltnis der Vereinigten Staaten mit der ehemaligen UdSSR einschaezt. Und da gibt es Personen, die Ihnen vorwerfen, dass Sie keine aussenpolitischen Ausbildung haben. Mit Ihrer Erlaubnis wuerde ich gerne ueber diesen Brief und Ihre Weitsicht schreiben. Die amerikanische Bevoelkerung soll darueber Kenntnis haben.

Sehr geehrter Herr Praesident, ich danke Ihnen recht herzlich fuer Ihre Zeit und hoffe Sie bald hier im Presse Club begruessen zu koennen, wenn Sie eine "Cross-Section" der San Francisco Bevoelkerung aussprechen koennen. Sollten Sie oder Ihr Buero weitere Informationen benoetigen so lassen Sie es mich bitte wissen. Einstweilen verbleibe ich, als Gast und dankbarer Deutscher in Ihrem Land und ich versichere Ihnen meine vollste Unterstuetzung.

Mit freundlichen Gruessen,
Ihr,



Werner H. Kraus
-Programm Direktor-